Question — Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Question V: On the Goodness and Malice of Circumstances

¶1.

Concerning the more principal circumstance "why" enough has been said where the end was treated; likewise concerning the circumstance "what," where the goodness and malice of the effect was treated. Moreover, the things we noted about the passions already regard the circumstance "how" (as to part of it). Therefore it remains to speak of the remaining circumstances not explained, and indeed in order to the interior act and exterior act together, because all can modify the latter and several the former.

181.

181. The circumstance who does not denote the very person of the one acting according to himself (for thus he pertains to the substance of the human act), but his accidental condition or quality, by reason of which in the moral estimation the act or omission is of greater or lesser moral value, for example, that the agent is religious, a priest or a layman, married or free, superior or subject, rich or poor, a child or an old man, etc.

181.

Often it indicates an office or special obligation (of justice, piety, fidelity), and then it brings to the good or evil act a new species of goodness or malice, as if one bound by vow preserves chastity or a married person fornicates; otherwise it is only aggravating: thus, other things being equal and the same deliberation or negligence being supposed, a religious acts better or sins more gravely than a secular, the learned man than the unlearned, because he operates more perfectly or sin disgraces him more.

182.

182. The circumstance about what does not signify the object itself or the matter (for that pertains to the substance of the act), but an accident joined to it, for example, quantity or quality, such as that the thing is sacred or profane, of one's father or of a stranger, much or little, grave or light, etc.

182.

Often quality changes the species, namely, if it brings a distinct goodness or malice, as alms given to a poor church, or the theft of a sacred thing, the praise or striking of a father or cleric. Thus in acts concerning another, in the matter of chastity by reason of the accomplice, in the matter of religion toward sacred things. When, namely, a quality on the part of the agent changes the species, the same quality on the part of the object or matter also does this; hence it is understood that there is a double malice in adultery or carnal sacrilege if each person is married or sacred, because a double circumstance changes the species. Sometimes quality only aggravates, as to love an enemy or do good to orphans and widows, to harm one who is plainly innocent.

182.

But quantity of matter only aggravates, for example, to give or steal two hundred francs instead of one hundred, to pray for many hours or to work on the Lord's Day.

183.

183. The circumstance by what helps indicates the accidental instruments or means (also companions) which we use for acting, for example, to employ the help of a saint or a demon, to get drunk with money taken by theft, to use a sacred thing for fornication, to kill with prohibited weapons, with a sword or with poison.

183.

It changes the species if the means imply a special morality, as the use of magicians for seducing a girl, of sacred rites for deceiving another (Gen. XXXIV, 15), of confession for soliciting; otherwise it aggravates, as if you induce a priest to lie, or choose weapons devised for torture in order to kill, or if the feet of the Lord are anointed with precious ointment (Lk. VII, 46; Mt. XXVI, 7; Mk. XIV, 3; Jn. XII, 3).

184.

184. The circumstance how signifies the accidental mode by which the internal or external act is done, for example, with a voluntary that is perfectly or imperfectly deliberate, direct or indirect; intensely or remissly; from malice, passion, or ignorance; from contempt, levity, force, deceit; cautiously or imprudently; in good or bad faith, etc.

184.

Sometimes it changes the species: thus violence makes robbery from simple theft, rape from fornication; likewise the modes against nature in lust. Ordinarily it aggravates, for example, to act from perfect knowledge or from a will confirmed in good or evil, to kill limb by limb; or it diminishes, for example, to act from grave fear, vehement temptation, sudden passion. Thus intensely or remissly does not change the species but increases or diminishes.

185.

185. The circumstance where does not denote bare place (for every act must take place somewhere), but the accidental quality of place conferring upon the act something of goodness or malice, such as that the place is sacred, with respect to prayer and worship, or theft, fornication, homicide, etc.; or public, in scandal or good example (II Kings XVI, 21).

185.

It rather often changes the species in external acts by adding the special morality of religion or charity; it also gives the first species of morality if the work is of itself indifferent and is prescribed or prohibited by reason of place, such as to uncover oneself or to carry on commerce in a church. More rarely it aggravates, namely, in internal acts which do not have so direct a relation with place, for example, meditation performed in church, complacency there in a shameful thought.

186.

186. The circumstance when denotes an accidental condition of time, as quantity or duration if the act lasts long or briefly (for example, love or hatred or desire), or quality if the act is done on a feast day, in sacred time, in a more difficult time.

186.

Quantity of time is an aggravating or diminishing circumstance; but quality of itself, and direct intention of honoring or dishonoring being set aside, does not do much to increase morality, unless the act of itself good or evil has been specially prescribed or prohibited by reason of sacred time (Mass, breakfast), or through it special reverence or irreverence is brought upon divine worship, or scandal is present, for example, if someone on Good Friday exhibited public games or immediately after communion went to a concubine or got drunk.

186.

Time differs from place: the latter, because of stability, is capable of consecration and permanent holiness; time, continually passing, is called sacred only per accidens, by reason of the mystery or action which is then recalled or done; hence of itself it does not change the species.

186.

If an act of itself neither good nor evil is prescribed or prohibited in sacred time, the circumstance of time passes over into the notion of object, and gives the first morality, for example, to work on a sacred day or to abstain from work.

187.

That the concurrence of circumstances in one act may be better understood, we note the following case, classic in theology: "John, the church custodian, violently snatches from the hands of the pastor, in church, on Holy Thursday itself, with companions employed and with the intention of profaning the Sacrament, a consecrated golden ciborium containing Hosts necessary for paschal communion. How many and which circumstances intervene in this case?"

187.

Resp. All of them; namely, 1) the circumstance who: the church custodian; 2) about what, by reason of quantity: a golden ciborium; by reason of quality: a consecrated ciborium; 3) what, by reason of effect: deprivation of paschal communions; 4) where: in church; 5) by what helps: companions employed; 6) why: from the intention of profaning the Sacrament; 7) how: violently; 8) when: on Holy Thursday itself.