Title IV: Good from an Integral Cause, Evil from Any Defect

What moral goodness or malice requires. In order that an act be good, it is necessary that its goodness be not only known, but in some way intended, that is, that, at least confusedly, as good, it be voluntary. For goodness toward which we are not formally affected is not ours, remains extrinsic to us, and cannot render the will formally good.

Yet a reflected intention is not required, but a direct or exercised intention suffices, which per se he has who, conscious of the good nature of the action, effects it.

But in order that an act be evil, it suffices that the malice be known, although in itself it displeases. The reason is the negative precept of avoiding evil, which is violated by every voluntary transgression. Moreover malice in itself is not lovable. Whence evil cannot terminate the will except per accidens, or as joined with good.

What the circumstance of the end can do. An act evil from the object cannot become good because of a good end. For by choosing this means of an evil action, the will is not wholly turned away from evil. Although from a good end, as from every good note, sin can be diminished.

On the contrary, an act good from the object can become evil on account of an evil end or evil circumstances. It becomes evil if it is wholly referred to an evil end, or if on account of an evil circumstance the act itself is prohibited: as if a suspended priest gives a sacred sermon.

On the other hand, there are accidental and extrinsic circumstances which, although less good, allow the act to be substantially good: motions of impatience in the service of the sick.

The maxim. Whence there appears that which St. Thomas copies from pseudo-Dionysius: Good is caused from an integral cause, but evil from individual defects. And it is manifest per se, since good and being are convertible, and absolute evil, or that which would be nothing except evil, cannot exist, that evil is spoken of by the partial privation of good. Wherefore evil has origin from individual privations; but once privations are removed, good is obtained, and at the same time integral good. Cf. 1, 2, q. 18, art. 1; and q. 19, art. 6, ad 1.

Intention and the exterior act. Nevertheless intention cannot change the nature of an exterior work as such; and therefore it will not render unjust an action which was done according to right. Wherefore he is not to be charged with injustice who from hatred pronounces a just sentence of condemnation; nor the commander of an army who wills to kill innocents through the explosion of a fortress, otherwise necessary or licit. Cf. Bucceroni, Institutiones, I, n. 80.

I. All morality is taken from the object completely taken, with the end and circumstances. The object taken precisely can be indifferent, good, or evil by intrinsic goodness or malice, that is, from the nature of the thing, and by extrinsic goodness or malice.

More strictly, that malice is called intrinsic which cannot be removed by the will of God. But the object, if it has any morality, contributes the first morality.

II. The end is distinguished as end of the work and end of the worker; proximate, remote; intermediate, ultimate, whether simply or according to something, whether negatively or positively; total, partial, primary, and secondary.

The end can be good or evil, but not indifferent, if the act is human from the end.

III. Hence to act on account of delight which itself is perceived not to be evil is neither evil nor indifferent, but morally good, though less so than if the delight is positively referred to an honorable end.

IV. An action cannot be better than its total end. To formal goodness an intermediate end, merely loved as a means, adds nothing. But the primary end confers the principal morality. From two principal ends the action as it were becomes morally twofold, since it participates in the morality of each.

V. Good or evil circumstances sometimes merely increase or diminish morality; sometimes they transfer the same to another species, whether moral or theological; sometimes they confer the first morality: but then they are rather the object.

VI. Because goodness must be intended in order that the action be good from it, while an action becomes evil by the sole choice of evil, and because an evil end and evil circumstances can corrupt an act but cannot, if it is already evil from the object, render the same good, good is said to be from an integral cause, but evil from any defect. Yet there are accidental circumstances not gravely evil which allow an act to be substantially good.

An evil intention does not change the objective nature of an external act as such.