Each vice in the authors' own words, with its kinds and gravity. The arrangement is ours; every reference opens the passage.
A vice with no remedies here has none named for it in the works read. Remedies against sin in general are on the map, and the means of gaining each virtue are on its page.
Imprudence in General
What It Is
As a privation: “Taken as a privation, imprudence denotes lack of that prudence which a man can and ought to have, and in this sense imprudence is a sin by reason of a man's negligence in striving to have prudence”
In every sin, by participation: “so have all vices and sins a share of imprudence, because no sin can occur, without some defect in an act of the directing reason”
Yet a special sin, about the acts of reason: “imprudence is not a general sin, as neither is prudence a general virtue: since it is concerned with special acts, namely the very acts of reason”
Not the mere absence of prudence: “Properly speaking it is not taken as a negation, so as merely to signify the absence of prudence, for this can be without any sin.”
Not that every sin comes from imprudence: “from this it is not yet licit to conclude that every sin proceeds from imprudence, since several sins proceed from disordered passion, or even from malice”
Four, by defect: “Vices by defect are called by the common name of imprudence, and they are four: precipitation, inconsideration, inconstancy, and negligence.”
One for each act of reason, counsel, judgment and command: “Thus, by defect of "counsel" to which euboulia (deliberating well) corresponds, "precipitation" or "temerity" is a species of imprudence”
By the kinds of prudence: “By opposition to the diverse species of prudence, it is divided into personal, regnative, political, economic, and military imprudence.”
Otherwise venial: “whereas if he act beside the Law and without contempt, and without detriment to things necessary for salvation, it will be a venial sin”
Prümmer, venial from their kind: “These four sins are venial from their kind; nevertheless they can become mortal on account of circumstances, e.g. of scandal, or of exposing oneself to the danger of grave sin.”
Against the privation, instruction: “one has taken no pains to educate oneself through study, sermons, instructions, etc., so as to be able to act prudently when the occasion arises”
From the other passions too, but less: “Envy and anger cause inconstancy by drawing away the reason to something else; whereas lust causes inconstancy by destroying the judgment of reason entirely.”
The steps of counsel passed over: “the steps that intervene by which one ought to descend in orderly fashion are "memory" of the past, "intelligence" of the present, "shrewdness" in considering the future outcome, "reasoning" which compares one thing with another, "docility" in accepting the opinions of others”
And against the gift of counsel: “Rectitude of counsel belongs to the gift of counsel and to the virtue of prudence; albeit in different ways, as stated above (II-II:52:2), and consequently precipitation is opposed to both.”
Not slowness, which is nearer to right counsel: “precipitation is more directly opposed to rectitude of counsel than over slowness is, for the latter bears a certain likeness to right counsel”
Mortal from contempt of God's teaching: “it will be a mortal sin, as when a man acts precipitately through contempt and rejection of the Divine teaching”
With the others, venial from their kind: “These four sins are venial from their kind; nevertheless they can become mortal on account of circumstances, e.g. of scandal, or of exposing oneself to the danger of grave sin.”
In the law's penalties, rashness means contempt: “that we may know when the penalty of some Law, or Canon, enacted against those doing something rashly, is incurred, namely when it is done from contempt”
“the lack of right judgment belongs to the vice of thoughtlessness, in so far, to wit, as one fails to judge rightly through contempt or neglect of those things on which a right judgment depends”
Also in passing over the better good: “Nor does culpable Inconsideration intervene only in choosing evil simply; but also in rejecting the greater, or better good”
Not trusting God when there is no time to think: “Our Lord did not forbid us to take thought, when we have the opportunity, about what we ought to do or say”
But leaving to God what one could think out is tempting Him: “else if man, instead of doing what he can, were to be content with awaiting God's assistance, he would seem to tempt God”
Not a sudden forgetting: “But often he does not have culpability, if from the sudden presence of some unexpected thing the mind is suddenly snatched into oblivion”
With the others, venial from their kind: “These four sins are venial from their kind; nevertheless they can become mortal on account of circumstances, e.g. of scandal, or of exposing oneself to the danger of grave sin.”
And it grows with the sin it serves: “the more the will succumbs to the appetite of sensible things, the less the Intellect can attend to the due pondering of things”
For no cause, or a slight one: “because of slight motives, and without any cause or without a just cause, repudiates what it had before rightly dictated”
Not the want of perseverance under fortitude: “perseverance in good belongs to all moral virtues, chiefly, however, to fortitude, which suffers a greater impulse to the contrary”
Not negligence: “the inconstant man fails in commanding, being hindered as it were, by something, whereas the negligent man fails through lack of a prompt will”
St. Bonaventure's three degrees, in Bontempi: “The first is, when someone is stricken from what he has begun by the praise, or indeed the blame of good men: The second, when someone is easily seduced by the praise or adulation of Players, or of evil men: The third is when someone is moved from a good purpose by mockery, or by any other light cause”
Incontinence and effeminacy, its kin: “From inconstancy result incontinence (i.e., instability in the face of pleasure) and effeminacy (i.e., instability in the face of sadness).”
With the others, venial from their kind: “These four sins are venial from their kind; nevertheless they can become mortal on account of circumstances, e.g. of scandal, or of exposing oneself to the danger of grave sin.”
Double-mindedness: “Duplicity also is something resulting from lust, just as inconstancy is, if by duplicity we understand fluctuation of the mind from one thing to another.”
The Catechism, contempt of God's inspirations: “What then is the cause of this misery and inconstancy? Manifestly a contempt of the divine inspirations.”
Not the omission, which opposes the virtue concerned: “generally for the omission of any due act, and thus it is not opposed to prudence, but to the virtue in whose matter it is concerned”
Not laziness, which is in the execution: “Negligence is a defect in the internal act, to which choice also belongs: whereas idleness and laziness denote slowness of execution”
Not inconstancy: “the inconstant man fails in commanding, being hindered as it were, by something, whereas the negligent man fails through lack of a prompt will”
Mortal, from what is omitted: “First on the part of that which is omitted through negligence. If this be either an act or a circumstance necessary for salvation, it will be a mortal sin.”
Mortal, from its cause: “Secondly on the part of the cause: for if the will be so remiss about Divine things, as to fall away altogether from the charity of God, such negligence is a mortal sin”
Prümmer, venial from its kind: “These four sins are venial from their kind; nevertheless they can become mortal on account of circumstances, e.g. of scandal, or of exposing oneself to the danger of grave sin.”
Confessing one's negligences: “they who wish to preserve fervor should often purify their souls by accusing themselves in confession of all their defects, and all their negligence in his service”
From want of fervor: “Man may be said to love God less in two ways. First through lack of the fervor of charity, and this causes the negligence that is a venial sin”
Why prudence can be named in a bad sense: “although prudence is taken simply in a good sense, yet, if something be added, it may be taken in a bad sense”
Not care of the body for a good end: “But if a man actually refers the care of the flesh to a good end, as when one is careful about one's food in order to sustain one's body, this is no longer prudence of the flesh”
Not a sin apart from the evil work, unless willed for itself: “hence it is not a sin distinct from the evil work itself, unless it is directly and in itself voluntary”
Mortal, with an evil last end: “if prudence of the flesh be taken as corresponding to prudence in its absolute signification, so that a man place the last end of his whole life in the care of the flesh, it is a mortal sin”
Nor from pride, which acts openly: “do not arise directly from pride, but rather from covetousness, which seeks its own profit and sets little by excellence”
“when, in order to obtain a certain end, whether good or evil, a man uses means that are not true but fictitious and counterfeit, and this belongs to the sin of craftiness”
As injustice, fraud belongs to other vices also: “The execution of craftiness may be carried out by another vice, just as the execution of prudence by the virtues: and accordingly nothing hinders fraud from pertaining to covetousness or illiberality.”
By the means: “on account of the object the sin is grave when the means chosen are very bad (e.g., serious calumnies), venial when the means are slightly evil (e.g., lies about unimportant matters)”
By the end: “on account of the end the sin is mortal when one intends to perpetrate a serious offense (e.g., clever ruses to get into a house in order to rob it), venial when the purpose is not so bad”
Of the future: “an excessive occupation of the mind concerning future things, especially things necessary for life, with anxiety and little confidence in divine providence”
Nor care for the poor and for souls: “In the works of mercy solicitude about temporal things is directed to charity as its end, wherefore it is not unlawful, unless it be superfluous.”
Nor provision for need: “Our Lord does not condemn those who according to human custom, provide themselves with such things, but those who oppose themselves to God for the sake of these things”
Too much effort: “Secondly, solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful, through too much earnestness in endeavoring to obtain temporal things, the result being that a man is drawn away from spiritual things”
Forebodings: “Those who willingly occupy and disquiet themselves with forebodings of dire calamities that are uncertain (e.g., the imminent destruction of the world) or of evils that cannot be prevented (e.g., their death), are also guilty of sinful solicitude.”
St. Bonaventure's three, in Bontempi: “The first is great anxiety for acquiring temporal things, whether the effect follows or not; and this is found both in those who possess much and those who possess little: The second is great tenacity in retaining, which allows nothing to be spent on pious causes or the relief of the poor: The third, finally, is a burning thirst for amassing worldly riches from every quarter, whether by fair means or foul.”
Mortal, with temporal things as the last end: “if we seek temporal things as the ultimate end, by preferring them to spiritual things, which is mortal”
Too much effort, by what it keeps one from: “this is mortal if it withdraws from spiritual things prescribed under grave obligation; otherwise it is venial”
By state of life, in Bontempi: “In Religious, though small, this withdraws from perfection; in a Father of a family, when moderate, it is laudable; in anyone, however, when immoderate, it is culpable”
Our Lord's first motive, the body and soul He gave: “on account of the yet greater favors bestowed by God on man, independently of his solicitude, viz. his body and soul”
Seek first the spiritual: “Consequently He concludes that we should be solicitous most of all about spiritual goods, hoping that temporal goods also may be granted us according to our needs, if we do what we ought to do.”
For those who keep the goods of a house: “Be careful also not to omit your devotions, nor to live like a secular, through an excessive solicitude to save for the monastery.”
Distrust of Providence: “because of Divine providence, through ignorance of which the gentiles are solicitous in seeking temporal goods before all others”