Section — Marc, Institutiones Morales
§ 1. On Prudence and the Virtues Contained Under It
- NOTION. Prudence is defined by the Angelic Doctor (2.2, q. 47, a. 2): right reason of things to be done. By others: "A habit of the practical intellect, for rightly determining, through an act of command, what is to be done in any particular case."
Hence: 1. The material object of prudence is particular human actions. But the formal object is the mean of reason, between defect and excess; or practical rectitude, as a form to be impressed upon each action (cf. n. 383, 2).
- Prudence, by reason of its subject, is an intellectual virtue; for it resides in the intellect, so that it may decide what we ought to pursue and from what we ought to decline. But by reason of its object it is moral; for it is occupied about morals, all of which it directs, and over which it commands, although it does not elicit them: whence it is an essentially practical virtue (St. Thom., l. c., a. 5).
- Acts of prudence. There are three acts or functions of prudence: 1. Prudence consults well, that is, it diligently and without precipitation investigates and deliberates what means, what circumstances, are necessary, so that the work may be done honestly and virtuously. 2. Prudence judges rightly, that is, after diligent deliberation, it firmly concludes and pronounces what means, among those sought and found, are good and fitting. 3. Prudence commands efficaciously, namely by moving the moral virtues to the execution of those things which have been diligently deliberated and firmly judged (Bened. XIV, de Beatif., l. 3, c. 24, n. 5).
But these acts, so that they may be done duly, must be exercised with solicitude and fitting diligence; and if someone has applied this, and has done what he could, although he speculatively errs, nevertheless the judgment will be prudent, and he will not sin (cf. n. 21). See Billuart, de Prud., Diss. 1, a. 2.
From these things you will gather: 1. Prudence, in its functions, depends much upon the moral virtues: partly because the virtues restrain the passions, which disturb reason in the consideration of the honest, and display a delectable good; partly because they so dispose the subject that the honest work exhibits itself as most congruous to him, as drink to the thirsty, food to the hungry. "For each one judges according as he is affected." And: "As each one is, so does the end appear to him."
- Perfect prudence cannot exist except in upright men, who have the affection rightly disposed in every matter of virtue. For these alone, in any business that occurs, are able to judge rightly. But in men who are not upright, or who are given to some vice, only imperfect prudence can exist: namely that maimed prudence by which they only consult and judge well toward some particular good, but not toward the end of the whole of human life; or by which, although they consult and judge well as regards this whole end, they by no means bring to effect the things which they consult and judge (cf. Lessius, de Prud., c. 1, n. 30-35).
- Parts of prudence. I. The integrating parts, or endowments of perfect prudence, are eight, namely:
- Memory, or recollection of past things; for past things teach us; whence that worn saying: "Believe Robert, the experienced one." 2. Understanding, that is, full knowledge of the state of the matter here and now to be done, and of the moral principles which ought to concur for judging prudently. 3. Providence, which, as if seeing from afar, considers the end of the work and future events. 4. Shrewdness, that is, sudden and ready discovery of a fitting means. 5. Docility, or promptness of soul for taking hold of others' counsels. 6. Reason, that is, a certain promptness in reasoning and gathering one thing from another. 7. Circumspection, or attention to all the circumstances of the work, lest some requisite be lacking. 8. Caution, or care of avoiding evils and impediments by which, from without, the work of virtue could be vitiated or impeded (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 48 and 49).
- II. The subjective parts, that is, the species of prudence, are numbered as two, namely:
- Personal or monastic prudence, through which man rules himself; this alone can absolutely and simply be called prudence. 2. Governing prudence, by which man rules others. This is manifold, namely domestic, civil, pastoral, military, etc. (2.2, q. 50). It is not simply prudence, because it does not always render him who has it better (2.2, q. 47, a. 11, 12).
- III. The potential parts of prudence, that is, the companion virtues which prudence uses, are numbered as three:
- Eubulia, which is the habit of consulting rightly, that is, of finding good counsel in doubtful matters. 2. Synesis, or the habit of judging rightly concerning things consulted. Through this, men are called well-sensed. 3. Gnome, that is, the habit of judging rightly, when there is need, from higher principles, beyond the common rules of things to be done, yet according to the mind of the legislator. The act which corresponds to this in the will is called epikeia (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 51). Cf. n. 173 and n. 403, 3.
- Vices opposed to prudence. I. Imprudence is opposed to prudence THROUGH DEFECT; under this name commonly come: 1. Precipitation, by which someone undertakes some work without sufficient deliberation. 2. Inconsideration, by which judgment concerning means is made without due attention. 3. Inconstancy of mind, that is, change of opinion on account of no cause or a slight cause. 4. Negligence, or omission of the diligence required for urging the execution of the matter deliberated (2.2, q. 53 and 54).
What kind of sin, you will ask, is imprudence? - Resp. Imprudence can be taken in three ways: 1. negatively, for the mere lack of prudence; and thus it can be without sin, as is clear in children; 2. privatively, for the lack of due prudence; and in this way it is a general sin, which is found in every theological fault; 3. contrariwise, when the counsels of prudence are positively spurned and repudiated; and in this way imprudence is a special sin, and indeed mortal, if there is grave contempt of divine rules; otherwise it will be venial.
- II. Those things which have a likeness with prudence itself are opposed to prudence THROUGH EXCESS, namely:
- Prudence of the flesh, which is the diligent devising of means for fulfilling the instincts of corrupt nature; and these can regard external goods, or the delectations of the senses, or one's own excellence. This prudence is of itself mortal, according to that saying (Rom. 8:6): The prudence of the flesh is death.
Indeed, moderate solicitude concerning temporal goods is not condemned, but that solicitude which is superfluous and disturbs the soul: because it imports distrust in the providence of God, and is a grave or venial sin according to the gravity of the matter (2.2, q. 55, a. 1).
- Astuteness (or craftiness, or cunning), which is knowledge and use of depraved means for deceiving, with the intention of attaining what is intended, whether good or evil. Yet properly astuteness is taken in an evil sense (St. Thom., l. c., a. 3).