A Cardinal Virtue

Prudence

St. Thomas treats it at II-II, qq. 47-56. See also every passage on the topic page.

How the Authors Compare

How grave the sins of imprudence are is disputed. Prümmer calls the four “venial from their kind” (n. 634). Merkelbach ascribes that view to “Lessius and generally the Jesuits who copy him” and answers that the defect is “not mortal per accidens, but per se and from its genus” (II, n. 36, note). St. Thomas says only of negligence that it “may happen to be a mortal sin in two ways” (II-II, q. 54, a. 3). Noldin and Wouters do not rate these sins here.
St. Thomas places negligence in reason's failure to command, “a lack of solicitude on the part of the reason in commanding what it should command” (II-II, q. 54, a. 3), and Prümmer keeps it apart from slothfulness and torpor, which “pertain to execution” (n. 634). Noldin's short definition speaks only of execution: “a matter deliberated and determined is not committed to execution at the opportune time” (n. 264).
On shrewdness, St. Thomas speaks of a “quick conjecture of the middle term” (II-II, q. 48), and Wouters of “finding a suitable means” (n. 375). Noldin alone turns it to the future: “shrewdness in considering future events” (n. 265).
Foresight divides them too. Wouters has it foresee “future contingents” (n. 375). Prümmer allows both senses, “either for the ordering of means to an end” or “for the consideration of future events” (n. 631). Merkelbach warns that “Several understand foresight to be mere cognition of future events, but this is not according to the mind of St. Thomas” (II, n. 25).
St. Thomas, Prümmer, Merkelbach and Wouters distinguish the prudence of the ruler, called regnative or regal, from the political prudence of subjects. Noldin has no regnative prudence and gives the name political to the prudence “by which a society of men living under the same laws is ruled” (n. 265). Lessius, as Merkelbach reports him, understood civil prudence “not as the virtue of subjects who obey laws, but of judges and magistrates who see to it that laws are observed”, and held “there is no need of a peculiar prudence in a citizen”; Merkelbach answers: “Nevertheless these things are not conformed to the interpretation of St. Thomas” (II, n. 27).
Merkelbach insists that integral parts are not virtues: “according to St. Thomas, integral parts are not virtues, but conditions of virtue” (II, n. 22). Prümmer likewise calls them “certain prerequisites for the perfect act of virtue” (n. 631).
Its formal object is named six ways. Prümmer: “the human act under the aspect of practical truth and good” (n. 627); Merkelbach: “their practical truth, that is, rectitude or conformity to right appetite and to the due end and moral law” (II, n. 11). Noldin: “natural honesty” (n. 263); Wouters: “the conformity of practical judgment with the moral order, or with the supernatural end” (n. 372); Marc: “the mean of reason, between defect and excess; or practical rectitude” (n. 391); McHugh-Callan: “the right deliberation, decision, and direction” given to human acts “with a view to the observance of the golden mean” (n. 1629). Prümmer and Merkelbach name the truth of its judgment, Noldin the honesty of the act, Wouters its fit with the moral order, Marc and McHugh-Callan the mean.
Whether its chief act belongs to reason. St. Thomas makes command “the chief act of the practical reason, and consequently of prudence” (II-II, q. 47, a. 8), and Prümmer, Merkelbach and Wouters follow him: “The act of commanding is the principal and proper act of prudence” (n. 630). Vermeersch makes the most proper act “The preceptive election of an action indicated as honorable”, composed of the intellect's conclusion “and of the consent of the will” (n. 157). Bontempi denies command to the intellect altogether: “imperium is nowhere conceded to the intellect, against the Thomists” (Whether prudence is a virtue, n. 26), for “command belongs to the will, which is as it were the queen” (What the offices of prudence are, n. 13). Prudence, for him, directs as the assessor directs a judge, “yet not by commanding” (Whether prudence is a virtue, n. 26).
One prudence or many. St. Thomas makes prudence one special virtue, set apart by its object (II-II, q. 47, a. 5), with species only by the multitude it governs (II-II, q. 50, a. 1). Bontempi: “all Thomists admit one Prudence”; Scotus, with the Nominalists and the Scotists, “held that there are as many formal Prudences, specifically distinct, as there are acquired moral virtues about them” (Whether there is one prudence for, n. 1). He argues that prudence gained about the mean of fortitude does not bring that of temperance, “as experiment shows” (Whether there is one prudence for, n. 7), and concludes: “There is therefore ONE generic Prudence, and many species” (Whether there is one prudence for, n. 12). Merkelbach, of those who add species “for diverse particular affairs”: “this seems to be contrary to St. Thomas and Cajetan” (II, n. 27).
How many potential parts, and whether they are other virtues. St. Thomas, Prümmer, Noldin, Wouters, Marc, Merkelbach and Bontempi give three: “eubulia, synesis, gnome” (n. 633). McHugh-Callan gives two, one for each lesser act: “The principal act of prudence is direction, its secondary acts are deliberation and decision”, and so “wise deliberation” and “wise decision” (n. 1646). St. Thomas holds eubulia “a distinct virtue from prudence” (II-II, q. 51, a. 2), and Merkelbach: “Potential parts are true virtues, but annexed” (II, n. 30). Lessius, as Merkelbach reports him, held them “not really distinguished from prudence”, to which Merkelbach answers: “Thus prudence would not be a cardinal virtue” (II, n. 30).
Solicitude, of command only or of every act. St. Thomas ties it to command, prudence's “chief act is a command about what has been already counselled and judged”, and so “one should be quick in carrying out the counsel taken, but slow in taking counsel” (II-II, q. 47, a. 9); Merkelbach: “quickness in commanding and pursuing those things which are to be done” (II, n. 13). Prümmer and Marc require it in all three acts: “These three acts, that they may be done well, must be exercised with solicitude and diligence” (n. 630); “must be exercised with solicitude and fitting diligence” (n. 392). Merkelbach names Lessius and Billuart for that view and answers that it is true, “but then solicitude and diligence are taken in another and diverse, broader sense” (II, n. 14).
Whether prudence sets the ends of the moral virtues. St. Thomas: “it does not belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means” (II-II, q. 47, a. 6); so Merkelbach, McHugh-Callan and Bontempi, who give the ends to synderesis (II, n. 12; n. 1631; What the offices of prudence are, n. 1). Bontempi names Scotus against them, “where he contends that the ends themselves are set before the moral virtues by Prudence” (What the offices of prudence are, n. 1). Merkelbach meets a text of St. Thomas that seems to say the same (I-II, q. 66, a. 3, ad 3): there prudence sets the end “not first but in application to special matter, by determining what sort it is in the concrete and in particular” (II, n. 12).
Docility and caution, two senses. For St. Thomas docility is readiness to be taught, “especially by old folk who have acquired a sane understanding of the ends in practical matters” (II-II, q. 49, a. 3), and so in all the manuals; Prümmer: “an affection and promptitude for learning” (n. 631). St. Bonaventure, as Bontempi gives him, takes it the other way: “Docility is the power of teaching, in this order, that you first instruct yourself, and afterward others” (What prudence is, n. 8). Caution, for St. Thomas, guards “against the hindrance of acts of virtue” (II-II, q. 49, a. 8, ad 1); St. Bonaventure's is “the prudence of discerning vices that bear the appearance of virtues” (What prudence is, n. 8).
Whether sinners have any true prudence. St. Thomas distinguishes a “false prudence”, for an evil end; a true but imperfect prudence, for some particular good end, or which counsels and judges well but fails to command; and the perfect, which alone “cannot be in sinners” (II-II, q. 47, a. 13). Merkelbach: “in sinners there can be imperfect prudence” (II, n. 19); Marc: “only imperfect prudence can exist” in them (n. 392); McHugh-Callan: evil and imperfect prudence “are of course found in sinners” (n. 1651). Bontempi says without that distinction: “in sinners prudence is false; I speak of those sinning mortally” (Who share in prudence, n. 3). Of acquired prudence, McHugh-Callan holds that it “is lost by repeated acts of mortal sin”, “but not by one sole act” (n. 1652); Bontempi, that it “is not in those who sin very frequently” (Who share in prudence, n. 6).
Which prudence is prudence simply. St. Thomas gives prudence “in its special and most perfect sense” to the king (II-II, q. 50, a. 1). Merkelbach keeps both: personal prudence is “prudence absolutely and simply so called”, since it makes a man good, the others only a good citizen, king or father (II, n. 28); “Nevertheless regnative prudence is the most perfect” (II, n. 28). Marc says of the prudence that rules others: “It is not simply prudence, because it does not always render him who has it better” (n. 394). Vermeersch notes the lower sense of the word: a prudence “which is called prudence in a certain respect, even saints can lack” (n. 162).

What It Is

Prudence is, with Aristotle, “right reason applied to action”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 8In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 626; Noldin n. 263; Merkelbach II, n. 3; Wouters n. 373; Marc n. 391; Vermeersch n. 156; Bontempi What prudence is, n. 6
As infused, it is “a virtue supernaturally infused by which the practical intellect, enlightened by formed faith and stirred by the Holy Spirit, judges and commands what in individual cases is to be done as fitting for the supernatural end, or to be avoided as unfitting for that end”	Prümmer n. 626In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 4; Wouters n. 371
Or it is “the moral virtue dictating in any business whatever what, with the circumstances considered, must be done, so that the action may be fitting to right reason”	Noldin n. 263In nearly the same words: Marc n. 391; Bontempi What prudence is, n. 5
McHugh-Callan, naming both its works: “Prudence is the virtue that consults well about the means to be used for leading a good life and applies the knowledge acquired through consultation to particular contingencies as they arise.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1627
Vermeersch, more fully: “a virtue which perfects the practical intellect so that, with the will moving it, it promptly and easily commands things to be done which are apprehended as honorable and more honorable”	Vermeersch n. 159
With St. Augustine: “Prudence is knowledge of things to be sought and to be fled.”	Prümmer n. 626In nearly the same words: St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 1, ad 1; Bontempi What prudence is, n. 11
With St. Bonaventure: “Prudence is to direct all things according to the norm of reason.”	Bontempi What prudence is, n. 7
Its name, with St. Isidore: “A prudent man is one who sees as it were from afar, for his sight is keen, and he foresees the event of uncertainties.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 1In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 371
The word is also taken broadly: “Prudence (phronesis) in the broader sense is any cognition of the true pertaining to morals, speculative or practical, for example, faith, moral science”	Merkelbach II, n. 3In nearly the same words: Bontempi What prudence is, n. 2

Its Place Among the Virtues

Without it, no moral virtue: “no moral virtue can be without prudence”	St. Thomas I-II, q. 65, a. 1In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 626; Prümmer n. 626
The charioteer of the virtues: “Prudence, however, is deservedly called the moderator and charioteer of the virtues, the orderer of affections, the teacher of morals.”	Prümmer n. 629In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 263; Wouters n. 374; Merkelbach II, n. 12; Bontempi Whether prudence is a virtue, n. 18
So that “Thus mercy inclines a man to assist the poor, but prudence dictates how much, where, when, and how it must be given to the poor man, so that the act of mercy may be fitting to right reason in every respect.”	Noldin n. 263
“Without prudence bravery becomes foolhardiness, temperance degenerates into fanaticism, and mercy changes to weakness.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1631In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether prudence is a virtue, n. 19
First among the moral virtues: “which is first in dignity among all moral virtues”	Wouters n. 371In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether prudence is a virtue, n. 20
Worthier than they: “Hence prudence is called the measure and rule of the moral virtues, because it determines their mean or object (from which they have that they are virtues), and therefore it is worthier than they”	Merkelbach II, n. 12
Yet below synderesis, which gives them their ends: “Whence it must be concluded that synderesis, not the moral virtues, is nobler than prudence, and this conclusion is right.”	Merkelbach II, n. 12
And below wisdom: “Nevertheless, prudence falls short of the Gift of Wisdom, for prudence is concerned with human good, wisdom with divine good.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1627
It directs the moral virtues, but “it serves the theological virtues”	Merkelbach II, n. 12In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1632
For the confessor: “But especially for the confessor prudence is exceedingly necessary”	Prümmer n. 629In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1650
Neglected: “See, therefore, how much is lacking in modern moralists, who speak so little of prudence.”	Merkelbach II, n. 5In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 154

Its Subject

In the reason: “It follows therefore that prudence, properly speaking, is in the reason.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 1In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 626; Marc n. 391
The practical reason only: “Hence it is evident that prudence resides only in the practical reason.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 9
Though it directs study too: “It should be noted, however, that the acts of the speculative reason, although they do not belong to prudence itself, are like other acts subject to the direction of prudence”	McHugh-Callan n. 1628
Secondarily, in the cogitative power: “Therefore prudence is in reason using the cogitative power, says Cajetan; and therefore secondarily and ministerially it is in the cogitative power insofar as this cooperates dispositively with the intellect.”	Merkelbach II, n. 10
Called love by St. Augustine, because “Accordingly prudence is said to be love, not indeed essentially, but in so far as love moves to the act of prudence.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 1, ad 1

Its Object

Its Matter
Its matter: “Material object of prudence is all the moral actions of man”	Prümmer n. 627In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 263; Wouters n. 372; Marc n. 391; McHugh-Callan n. 1629
Things done, not things made: “but not physical actions, since art is concerned with these”	Prümmer n. 627In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 3; Vermeersch n. 162
Singulars: “Now actions are in singular matters: and so it is necessary for the prudent man to know both the universal principles of reason, and the singulars about which actions are concerned.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 3In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 10
“Nevertheless experience reduces the infinity of singulars to a certain finite number which occur as a general rule, and the knowledge of these suffices for human prudence.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 3, ad 2
And the common good: “it is evident that prudence regards not only the private good of the individual, but also the common good of the multitude”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 10In nearly the same words: Bontempi What the offices of prudence are, n. 19
Its Formal Object
Prümmer and Merkelbach: “The formal object by which of prudence is the human act under the aspect of practical truth and good.”	Prümmer n. 627In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 11
Practical truth, with Billuart: “practical truth by conformity to right appetite, namely that the intellect conceive and enunciate that which is conformed to right appetite”	Prümmer n. 627In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1630
Noldin: “The formal object is natural honesty, which shines forth in this, that all deliberate actions be done according to right reason.”	Noldin n. 263
Wouters: “The formal object of prudence is the conformity of practical judgment with the moral order, or with the supernatural end”	Wouters n. 372
Marc: “But the formal object is the mean of reason, between defect and excess; or practical rectitude, as a form to be impressed upon each action”	Marc n. 391
McHugh-Callan: “The formal object of prudence is the right deliberation, decision, and direction”	McHugh-Callan n. 1629
The Means, Not the End
Not the end: “Consequently it does not belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 6In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 12; McHugh-Callan n. 1631; Bontempi What the offices of prudence are, n. 1; Vermeersch n. 159
Synderesis sets the ends: “Reason through synderesis establishes the ends to be pursued by the moral virtues, by enunciating the universal principles of practical reason.”	Merkelbach II, n. 12In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1631; Bontempi What the offices of prudence are, n. 2
Prudence finds the mean: “But it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and by what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in his deeds.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 7In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 12; Prümmer n. 629; Wouters n. 372
In the concrete, though, it sets the end too, Merkelbach explains, squaring St. Thomas with I-II, q. 66, a. 3, ad 3: “there he says that prudence pre-establishes the end not first but in application to special matter, by determining what sort it is in the concrete and in particular”	Merkelbach II, n. 12
Scotus held otherwise, “where he contends that the ends themselves are set before the moral virtues by Prudence”	Bontempi What the offices of prudence are, n. 1

Its Acts

Counsel, Judgment, Command
Three acts: “The first is "to take counsel," which belongs to discovery, for counsel is an act of inquiry”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 8In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 626; Noldin n. 263; McHugh-Callan n. 1633; Wouters n. 373
“The second act is "to judge of what one has discovered," and this is an act of the speculative reason.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 8
“But the practical reason, which is directed to action, goes further, and its third act is "to command," which act consists in applying to action the things counselled and judged.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 8
How they follow on the will of an end: “From a true will of any end whatever the intellect is moved to considering, by inquiring, the means; then, at the end of the inquiry, to giving a sentence concerning suitable means; finally to proposing the execution of the means”	Vermeersch n. 155
The Chief Act
Command, the chief: “And since this act approaches nearer to the end of the practical reason, it follows that it is the chief act of the practical reason, and consequently of prudence.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 8In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 630; Merkelbach II, n. 13; Wouters n. 373
“For no one would call him prudent who indeed knows what must rightly be done, but by no means acts rightly; indeed such a man is most of all foolish.”	Prümmer n. 626In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 13
Unlike art, where “he who sins voluntarily against his craft is reputed a better craftsman than he who does so involuntarily”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 8In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 10
in prudence “it is more imprudent to sin voluntarily, since this is to be lacking in the chief act of prudence”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 8In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 10
Vermeersch puts the will into it: “The preceptive election of an action indicated as honorable, which election is composed of the practical conclusion of the intellect, that the action is to be done, and of the consent of the will, is the most proper act of prudence.”	Vermeersch n. 157
“Prudence is not accurately described by acts of recognition or judgment.”	Vermeersch n. 159
Bontempi gives command to the will alone: “It is proved, because command belongs to the will, which is as it were the queen”	Bontempi What the offices of prudence are, n. 13In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether prudence is a virtue, n. 26
Solicitude and Diligence
Solicitude: “Hence it is that solicitude belongs properly to prudence”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 9In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 13
With Aristotle: “one should be quick in carrying out the counsel taken, but slow in taking counsel”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 9In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1634; Bontempi What the offices of prudence are, n. 15
St. Gregory: “In the highest matters, counsel ought not to be hasty.”	Bontempi What the offices of prudence are, n. 15
In all three acts: “These three acts, that they may be done well, must be exercised with solicitude and diligence, according as the condition of the person and of the business requires”	Prümmer n. 630In nearly the same words: Marc n. 392
Merkelbach, of Lessius and Billuart: “This is true, but then solicitude and diligence are taken in another and diverse, broader sense”	Merkelbach II, n. 14
Due diligence: “But if he has employed that due diligence, although he erred speculatively, nevertheless he is called prudent and does not sin.”	Prümmer n. 630In nearly the same words: Marc n. 392
Too much care, though, “overcarefulness blinds the judgment and paralyzes decision”	McHugh-Callan n. 1634
“In the character of Hamlet Shakespeare pictures the man who is imprudent through excess of caution.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1634
Its Certainty
Its certainty: “the certainty of prudence cannot be so great as to be devoid of all solicitude”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 9, ad 2
Not mere opinion: “From these things it follows that an opinion of the honorable is not a judgment of prudence”	Merkelbach II, n. 17
Not deceived though the outcome fail: “it remains that prudence was not deceived in its decision, for that decision when made was according to right reason and a good will”	McHugh-Callan n. 1630

The Virtue Itself

Intellectual and Moral
A virtue, intellectual and moral: “Hence prudence has the nature of virtue not only as the other intellectual virtues have it, but also as the moral virtues have it, among which virtues it is enumerated.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 4In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether prudence is a virtue, n. 1; Merkelbach II, n. 15
“Prudence, by reason of its subject, is an intellectual virtue”	Marc n. 391In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether prudence is a virtue, n. 25
“But by reason of its object it is moral”	Marc n. 391In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 373
A special virtue: “any habit that has a corresponding special object, distinct from other objects, must needs be a special habit, and if it be a good habit, it must be a special virtue”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 5In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 16
Bound to the Moral Virtues
Bound to the moral virtues: “Prudence, in its functions, depends much upon the moral virtues”	Marc n. 392In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 374
“Perfect prudence cannot exist except in upright men, who have the affection rightly disposed in every matter of virtue.”	Marc n. 392
So that “Thus a learned and acute man will more easily be able to find speculatively the reasons of the honorable; yet in true prudence he will yield to the duller mind of a more virtuous man”	Vermeersch n. 158
Acquired and Infused
Acquired and infused: “natural prudence is acquired by repeated acts of ours, but supernatural prudence is infused into us by God with sanctifying grace”	Prümmer n. 626In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 20
St. Thomas, in Prümmer: “For the right reason of prudence it is much more required that a man be well disposed concerning the ultimate end, which is done by charity, than concerning other ends”	Prümmer n. 626
Human prudence: “and accurately to discern how it differs from human prudence, which, per se, is without merit”	Vermeersch n. 154
One Prudence or Many
One: “WITH immense applause all Thomists admit one Prudence”	Bontempi Whether there is one prudence for, n. 1
Scotus “held that there are as many formal Prudences, specifically distinct, as there are acquired moral virtues about them”	Bontempi Whether there is one prudence for, n. 1
Bontempi, with St. Bonaventure as he reads him: “There is therefore ONE generic Prudence, and many species; just as there is one virtue of Temperance, and under it several species are enclosed.”	Bontempi Whether there is one prudence for, n. 12
“For what does the rule of fasting subserve to the rule of buying?”	Bontempi Whether there is one prudence for, n. 23

The Integral Parts

“the things which need to concur for the perfect act of a virtue” (II-II, q. 48.)

Memory
Not pieces: “Integral parts are so called, not because from them as from parts the habit is composed”	Prümmer n. 631
Merkelbach against the moderns: “Moderns are accustomed to affirm that certain other virtues are reduced to the cardinal virtues also as integral parts.”	Merkelbach II, n. 22
Eight: “the five former of these pertain to prudence according as it is cognitive, but the three remaining according as it is preceptive by applying knowledge to work”	Prümmer n. 631In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 23; Noldin n. 265; Marc n. 393
Lessius, in Merkelbach: “Caution, circumspection, foresight, and understanding are acts of prudence, because they are intrinsically included in prudent judgment and execution; memory, reason, docility, and shrewdness are only required for acquiring prudence”	Merkelbach II, n. 23
All are needed in great matters: “If the act is of great moment, it will not be perfectly prudent unless all the aforesaid conditions are present.”	Merkelbach II, n. 26
Memory: “Now experience is the result of many memories”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 49, a. 1In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 631; Wouters n. 375; Marc n. 393
“memory not only arises from nature, but is also aided by art and diligence”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 49, a. 1, ad 2
Understanding
Understanding: “Understanding denotes here, not the intellectual power, but the right estimate about some final principle, which is taken as self-evident”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 49, a. 2In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 631; Marc n. 393; Wouters n. 375
Docility
Docility: “Hence in matters of prudence man stands in very great need of being taught by others, especially by old folk who have acquired a sane understanding of the ends in practical matters.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 49, a. 3In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 631; Merkelbach II, n. 24; Noldin n. 265; Marc n. 393; McHugh-Callan n. 1637
“nor is there anyone who suffices for himself in all things”	Merkelbach II, n. 24
St. Bonaventure, in Bontempi, takes the word otherwise: “Docility is the power of teaching, in this order, that you first instruct yourself, and afterward others.”	Bontempi What prudence is, n. 8
Shrewdness
Shrewdness: “Shrewdness is a habit whereby congruities are discovered rapidly.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 49, a. 4In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 631; Wouters n. 375; Marc n. 393; Merkelbach II, n. 24; McHugh-Callan n. 1637
“just as docility consists in a man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from another man, so shrewdness is an apt disposition to acquire a right estimate by oneself”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 49, a. 4
“Shrewdness is indeed often a natural gift and not granted to all in the same degree; nevertheless it can also be acquired in some way by diligent exercise.”	Prümmer n. 631
Noldin turns it to the future: “shrewdness in considering future events”	Noldin n. 265
Reasoning
Reasoning: “Now counsel is a research proceeding from certain things to others.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 49, a. 5In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 631; Marc n. 393; Noldin n. 265
“Even those who are not skilled dialecticians have a certain amount of natural logic”	McHugh-Callan n. 1638
Foresight
Foresight: “Accordingly foresight is the principal of all the parts of prudence”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 49, a. 6, ad 1In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 631; Merkelbach II, n. 25
“future contingents, in so far as they can be directed by man to the end of human life, are the matter of prudence”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 49, a. 6In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 375; Marc n. 393
“Foresight is taken here in a twofold sense, namely either for the ordering of means to an end, or for the consideration of future events which can follow from a work.”	Prümmer n. 631
Circumspection
Circumspection: “Hence the need of circumspection in prudence, viz. of comparing the means with the circumstances.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 49, a. 7In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 631; Marc n. 393
“Thus to show signs of love to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way to arouse love in his heart, yet if pride or suspicion of flattery arise in his heart, it will no longer be a means suitable to the end.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 49, a. 7
Caution
Caution: “Wherefore prudence needs caution, so that we may have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 49, a. 8In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 631; Marc n. 393; Wouters n. 375
“Caution is required in moral acts, that we may be on our guard, not against acts of virtue, but against the hindrance of acts of virtue.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 49, a. 8, ad 1
St. Bonaventure's caution: “Caution is the prudence of discerning vices that bear the appearance of virtues.”	Bontempi What prudence is, n. 8

The Subjective Parts

“The subjective parts of a virtue are its various species.” (II-II, q. 48.)

Ruling Oneself
By what it governs: “wherever in human acts we find a special kind of governance and command, there must be a special kind of prudence”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 50, a. 1In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1639
Ruling oneself: “Personal or monastic prudence, through which man rules himself; this alone can absolutely and simply be called prudence.”	Marc n. 394In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 28; Noldin n. 265; Wouters n. 375
Ruling Others
Ruling a kingdom: “Hence prudence in its special and most perfect sense, belongs to a king who is charged with the government of a city or kingdom”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 50, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 28
Marc, of every prudence that rules others: “It is not simply prudence, because it does not always render him who has it better”	Marc n. 394
In subjects: “wherefore some kind of rectitude of government is required in them, so that they may direct themselves in obeying their superiors; and to this belongs that species of prudence which is called political”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 50, a. 2In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 632; Wouters n. 375; McHugh-Callan n. 1642
So prudence “is architectonically in the prince, but in subjects after the manner of an art working by hand”	Merkelbach II, n. 18In nearly the same words: St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 12
Noldin gives the name to the ruler's: “into political prudence, by which a society of men living under the same laws is ruled and its common good is sought”	Noldin n. 265
Lessius, in Merkelbach, puts civil prudence in judges and magistrates; “He adds that there is no need of a peculiar prudence in a citizen, so that he may obey the laws of the community”	Merkelbach II, n. 27
Foul means in government “cannot be honored with the name of prudence, but should rather be called Machiavellism and dishonest politics”	McHugh-Callan n. 1641
The household: “a household is a mean between the individual and the city or kingdom”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 50, a. 3In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 265
The army: “Ruling prudence over an army is called military prudence.”	Prümmer n. 632In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 375
Marc adds the pastor's: “This is manifold, namely domestic, civil, pastoral, military, etc.”	Marc n. 394
More species than these? “Some, besides military prudence, here posit several species of prudence for diverse particular affairs”	Merkelbach II, n. 27

The Potential Parts

They are “the virtues connected with it, which are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having, as it were, the whole power of the principal virtue” (II-II, q. 48.)

Eubulia
Three: “Potential parts of prudence are called the joined virtues which are ordered to some secondary acts or secondary matters, and are three, namely eubulia, synesis, gnome.”	Prümmer n. 633In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 375; Noldin n. 265; Bontempi On the parts of the virtue of prud, n. 13
McHugh-Callan gives two, one for each lesser act: “The principal act of prudence is direction, its secondary acts are deliberation and decision”	McHugh-Callan n. 1646
Wise decision, “which is an habitual state of the mind which makes it ready to draw right conclusions about the means to be chosen for virtuous conduct”	McHugh-Callan n. 1646
True virtues: “Potential parts are true virtues, but annexed.”	Merkelbach II, n. 30
Lessius, in Merkelbach: “According to Lessius they are commanded by love of the end(!), and are not really distinguished from prudence.”	Merkelbach II, n. 30
“Thus prudence would not be a cardinal virtue.”	Merkelbach II, n. 30
Eubulia, for counsel: “Consequently euboulia (deliberating well) which makes man take good counsel must needs be a distinct virtue from prudence, which makes man command well.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 51, a. 2In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 633; Noldin n. 265; Wouters n. 375; Marc n. 395
“It belongs to prudence to take good counsel by commanding it, to euboulia (deliberating well) by eliciting”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 51, a. 2, ad 1
“There is no good counsel either in deliberating for an evil end, or in discovering evil means for attaining a good end”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 51, a. 1, ad 1In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 156
Synesis
Synesis, for judgment by the common rules: “synesis (judging well according to common law) signifies a right judgment, not indeed about speculative matters, but about particular practical matters, about which also is prudence”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 51, a. 3In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 633; Noldin n. 265; Wouters n. 375; Marc n. 395
“for many can take good counsel, without having good sense so as to judge well”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 51, a. 3In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 30
Gnome
Gnome, for judgment beyond them: “it is necessary to judge of such matters according to higher principles than the common laws”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 51, a. 4In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 633; Noldin n. 265; Wouters n. 375; Marc n. 395
“Therefore gnome produces the act of epikeia in the observance of law.”	Prümmer n. 633In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 265
Under Prudence
Under prudence: “Wise deliberation and wise decision differ from prudence, which is wise direction, and they are subject to it just as counsellors are subject to a commander.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1647

Who Has It

True, Imperfect and False
False prudence: “There is a false prudence, which takes its name from its likeness to true prudence.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 13
Imperfect prudence: “The second prudence is indeed true prudence, because it devises fitting ways of obtaining a good end; and yet it is imperfect, from a twofold source.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 13In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 19; Marc n. 392; McHugh-Callan n. 1651
Perfect prudence, St. Thomas in Prümmer: “Prudence is true and perfect which rightly takes counsel, judges, and commands for the good end of the whole life; and this alone is called prudence simply, which cannot be in sinners.”	Prümmer n. 626In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 19
Bontempi: “I SAY, first, that in sinners prudence is false”	Bontempi Who share in prudence, n. 3
And the saints may lack the lesser kind: “of this prudence, which is called prudence in a certain respect, even saints can lack or be deprived”	Vermeersch n. 162
Lost by Sin
Lost by mortal sin: “Infused prudence is lost by any and every act of mortal sin”	McHugh-Callan n. 1652In nearly the same words: Bontempi Who share in prudence, n. 4
“Acquired prudence is lost by repeated acts of mortal sin opposed to the knowledge had through reason, but not by one sole act.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1652In nearly the same words: Bontempi Who share in prudence, n. 6
The Just
All the just: “Now whoever has grace has charity, so that he must needs have all the other virtues, and hence, since prudence is a virtue”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 14In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 19
“Infants in the state of grace through Baptism possess this virtue in an habitual, but not in an actual manner”	McHugh-Callan n. 1654
“Those who require to be guided by the counsel of others, are able, if they have grace, to take counsel for themselves in this point at least, that they require the counsel of others and can discern good from evil counsel.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 14, ad 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 19; McHugh-Callan n. 1654
The Young
Acquired prudence, not in the young: “hence it cannot be in the young, neither in habit nor in act”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 14, ad 3In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 20; Bontempi Who share in prudence, n. 9; McHugh-Callan n. 1655
“The young are in duty bound to listen frequently, willingly and reverently to the admonitions of their elders, and hence the modern tendency of youth to act as critics of morals is as foolish as it is presumptuous.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1655
Fitness to Govern
Holiness is not fitness to govern: “Hence the holier person is quite often less fit for the office of superior, because he lacks this art of ruling.”	Wouters n. 375In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1648
St. “Celestine abdicated the Supreme Pontificate, because he felt himself unequal to directing the Church in those most difficult times.”	Prümmer n. 632In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1648
Yet “Therefore the Blessed Virgin, who was most holy, is called the most prudent virgin.”	Prümmer n. 632
Of St. Bonaventure's six wings of a prelate (zeal, piety, patience, example, prudence, devotion): “THE FIFTH Wing of the Praelati is Prudence, and circumspect discretion.”	Bontempi On the Government of Princes, Like, n. 35In nearly the same words: Bontempi On the Government of Princes, Like, n. 35

Its Precepts

None in the Decalogue: “Hence it was not fitting that the precepts of the decalogue should include a precept relating directly to prudence.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 56, a. 1
“And yet all the precepts of the decalogue are related to prudence, in so far as it directs all virtuous acts.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 56, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 6
Yet commanded: “It is not doubtful that the Virtue of Prudence, which is the rule of all the virtues, is a matter of precept”	Bontempi On the precepts of prudence, n. 1
In Scripture: “Lean not upon thy own prudence; that is, be not, assuredly, tenacious of thine own judgment.”	Bontempi On the precepts of prudence, n. 3
Wise as serpents, with St. Jerome: “That by prudence they may avoid snares; by simplicity not do evil.”	Bontempi On the precepts of prudence, n. 4
St. Peter: “Be prudent therefore, and watch in prayers.”	Bontempi On the precepts of prudence, n. 5

The Gift of Counsel

The Gift
The gift: “Hence the Holy Ghost is said to move the rational creature by way of counsel, wherefore counsel is reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 52, a. 1
“The gift of counsel is a supernaturally infused habit by which the just man, moved by the Holy Spirit, rightly judges and commands the individual actions to be done.”	Prümmer n. 450
The gift of counsel is “a certain light by which, as if by counsel received from God, man sees what is to be done in order to salvation”	Merkelbach II, n. 32
“The gift of counsel disposes man, from the motion of the Holy Spirit, to choose the means which are apt for progressing in the way of perfection.”	Noldin n. 33
Or “an infused habit which makes the soul prompt to receive and act upon the enlightenment offered by the Holy Ghost about the means to be chosen with a view to its own eternal salvation”	McHugh-Callan n. 1659In nearly the same words: Bontempi What the gift of counsel is, and w, n. 1
Why needed: “Hence in the research of counsel, man requires to be directed by God who comprehends all things”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 52, a. 1, ad 1
Answering Prudence
Answering prudence: “Therefore the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence, as helping and perfecting it.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 52, a. 2In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 478
Named for counsel, not command, because “To judge and command belongs not to the thing moved, but to the mover.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 52, a. 2, ad 1In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 161
Bontempi, with St. Bonaventure: “Counsel makes known whether something is to be done, and warns against precipices, lest one repent after the fact”	Bontempi What the gift of counsel is, and w, n. 5
“Whence Prudence and Counsel seem as it were the lesser Light and the greater Light”	Bontempi What the gift of counsel is, and w, n. 6
Not eubulia: “Counsel is different from the virtue of wise deliberation spoken of in 1646”	McHugh-Callan n. 1659
Its Matter and Its Bearers
Its matter: “Counsel considered as a gift of the Holy Ghost guides us in all matters that are directed to the end of eternal life whether they be necessary for salvation or not”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 52, a. 4, ad 2In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1660
In all the just: “The gift of counsel is in all the just, at least as to those things which are necessary for salvation”	Merkelbach II, n. 34
In heaven: “And it remains in the fatherland, where man is perfectly directed by the Holy Spirit; but there it will have another act.”	Merkelbach II, n. 34In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether the gift of counsel remain, n. 1
For “but Christ had the Gift of Counsel, as Isaias has it”	Bontempi Whether the gift of counsel remain, n. 4
Unusual callings: “persons who feel called to unusual kinds of life should submit their ideas to the judgment of the Church”	McHugh-Callan n. 1661
Its Beatitude
Its beatitude: “Therefore the beatitude of mercy specially corresponds to the gift of counsel, not as eliciting but as directing mercy.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 52, a. 4In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 34; McHugh-Callan n. 1662

The Vices Opposed to Prudence

The columns give each author’s own word in this library’s English. Each entry opens the passage.

St. ThomasII-II, qq. 53-55	Prümmernn. 634-635	MerkelbachII, nn. 35-45	Noldinn. 264	Woutersn. 376
By defect: imprudence
precipitation	Precipitation	precipitation	Precipitation	Precipitation
thoughtlessness	Inconsideration	inconsideration	Inconsideration	Inconsideration
inconstancy	Inconstancy	inconstancy	Inconstancy	Inconstancy
negligence	Negligence	negligence	Negligence	Negligence
By excess: a false likeness of prudence
prudence of the flesh	Prudence of the flesh	Prudence of the flesh	Prudence of the flesh	Prudence of the flesh or of the world
craftiness	Craftiness	cunning	Astuteness	Craftiness
guile	deceit	deceit	if it is committed by words, it is called deceit	Guile
fraud	fraud	fraud	if by deeds, it is called fraud	Fraud
solicitude about temporal things	Excessive solicitude concerning temporal and future things	of temporal things	Solicitude for temporal things	Excessive solicitude for temporal things
solicitous about the future	Excessive solicitude concerning temporal and future things	of future things	Solicitude for future things	Excessive solicitude for future things

Each of these is set out by author, with its kinds and gravity, on The Vices Against Prudence.

Where These Vices Come From, and Their Gravity

Here the virtues meet the capital vices. The authors trace imprudence to lust and the false likenesses of prudence to covetousness. Where Merkelbach has luxury, the Latin word is the same, luxuria. Noldin does not take up the question here. Each vice is set out in full on the vices against prudence.

Where They Come From
Imprudence: “it follows that they arise chiefly from lust”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 53, a. 6In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 634; Merkelbach II, n. 38; Wouters n. 376; McHugh-Callan n. 1670; Bontempi On negligence, n. 3
Its false likenesses: “the aforesaid vices arise chiefly from covetousness”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 55, a. 8In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 45; Prümmer n. 635; Wouters n. 376; McHugh-Callan n. 1686
Imprudence
Mortal from contempt of God's law: “if this should happen through aversion from the Divine Law, it will be a mortal sin”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 53, a. 1In nearly the same words: Marc n. 396; McHugh-Callan n. 1664; Bontempi On negligence, n. 4
Otherwise venial: “whereas if he act beside the Law and without contempt, and without detriment to things necessary for salvation, it will be a venial sin”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 53, a. 1
With the others, venial from their kind: “These four sins are venial from their kind; nevertheless they can become mortal on account of circumstances, e.g. of scandal, or of exposing oneself to the danger of grave sin.”	Prümmer n. 634
Negligence
Mortal, from what is omitted: “First on the part of that which is omitted through negligence. If this be either an act or a circumstance necessary for salvation, it will be a mortal sin.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 54, a. 3In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 39; McHugh-Callan n. 1673; Bontempi On negligence, n. 4
Prudence of the Flesh
Mortal, with an evil last end: “if prudence of the flesh be taken as corresponding to prudence in its absolute signification, so that a man place the last end of his whole life in the care of the flesh, it is a mortal sin”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 55, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 42; Bontempi On the prudence of the flesh, n. 2; McHugh-Callan n. 1676
Venial, with a particular end: “If, on the other hand, prudence of the flesh be taken as corresponding to particular prudence, it is a venial sin.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 55, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 42; McHugh-Callan n. 1676
Craftiness, Guile and Fraud
“mortal if it proceeds from a mortally evil affection, or inflicts grave harm”	Merkelbach II, n. 43In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1680; Bontempi On fraud, n. 3
Excessive Solicitude
Mortal, with temporal things as the last end: “if we seek temporal things as the ultimate end, by preferring them to spiritual things, which is mortal”	Merkelbach II, n. 44

How It Is Gained, Kept and Lost

How It Is Gained
Infused with grace: “whoever has grace has charity, so that he must needs have all the other virtues, and hence, since prudence is a virtue”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 14
“natural prudence is acquired by repeated acts of ours, but supernatural prudence is infused into us by God with sanctifying grace”	Prümmer n. 626
By practice: “The experience required by prudence results not from memory alone, but also from the practice of commanding aright.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 16, ad 2In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1657; Bontempi How prudence is acquired, and lost, n. 1
By the old: “SECONDLY, by the instruction of wise elders”	Bontempi How prudence is acquired, and lost, n. 2
“Stand in the multitude of prudent Elders, and join your heart to their Wisdom.”	Bontempi How prudence is acquired, and lost, n. 2
The Means
Prümmer's means: “it is worth the labor to desire it from the whole heart and acquire it by intense labor”	Prümmer n. 636
1. “fervent prayer to God, the Father of every light”	Prümmer n. 636
2. “restraint of disordered passions, and especially of lust”	Prümmer n. 636
“Solomon, most wise, on account of lust fell into most foolish idolatry.”	Prümmer n. 636
3. “Consideration of all events under the aspect of eternity”	Prümmer n. 636
Asking: “What is this to eternity?”	Prümmer n. 636
How It Is Lost
What corrupts it: “Hence prudence is not taken away directly by forgetfulness, but rather is corrupted by the passions.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 16In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 21; McHugh-Callan n. 1657; Bontempi How prudence is acquired, and lost, n. 3
“when judgment is to be given about particular lines of action, “as a man is, so he judges,” the licentious man judging for pleasure, the cowardly man for neglect of duty”	McHugh-Callan n. 1657
Hence: “Do not accept gifts, which even blind the prudent.”	Bontempi How prudence is acquired, and lost, n. 3
“Nevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so far as the latter's command depends on knowledge which may be forgotten.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 47, a. 16In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1657
Prudence in Courtship (Deshon)
Deshon, to young women, of the harbor: “So it is when about to anchor one’s self for life in the state of matrimony.”	Deshon Guide, ch. LXXVI
“The whole approach to this state is filled with the greatest danger, and requires untiring vigilance to get through it safely without a wreck of happiness in this world and the next.”	Deshon Guide, ch. LXXVI
Of the modesty and shyness of that age: “No doubt God has given this to be a safeguard at the most dangerous period of life.”	Deshon Guide, ch. LXXVI
“Let us see what intimacies it would be prudent for her to form, and how she should behave herself during the period of the courtship.”	Deshon Guide, ch. LXXVI

Where Each Author Treats It

St. Thomas	After charity, at the head of the cardinal virtues	II-II, qq. 47-56
St. Thomas	Its integral parts	II-II, q. 49
St. Thomas	Its subjective parts	II-II, q. 50
St. Thomas	Its potential parts	II-II, q. 51
St. Thomas	Its precepts	II-II, q. 56
Prümmer	Its own treatise, closing the first volume’s virtues	nn. 625-636
Merkelbach	The first treatise of the moral virtues, with conscience as its annexed matter	II, nn. 3-130
Noldin	Among the cardinal virtues, in three paragraphs	nn. 263-265
Wouters	Among the supernatural moral virtues	nn. 371-376