12. On Probable Conscience

1. Clemens, a learned theologian, thinks that the Probabilists favor liberty too much. Therefore he says that, when there is a concurrence of an opinion certainly more probable for the law, it is not licit to follow a less probable opinion for liberty. For this is clear, first, from the authority of Clement III, c. Capellanus, De Feriis, where he declares that the opinion is to be followed "which rests upon the better and more subtle reason." But where the probability is certainly greater, there without doubt the reason is better and more subtle. Therefore. Rule 45 of Law in the Sixth agrees: "In obscure matters we look to what is more likely." The same is clear, secondly, from the authority of the Probabiliorists, and of all the Probabilists of better note, who defend equiprobabilism in substantial matters. Before the rest let Suarez be heard, De Legibus, l. 8, c. 3, n. 19: "Greater probability is a certain moral certitude, if the excess of probability is certain." Muzzarelli says the same, Opusc. de Regul. moral. opin., in Migne, Cursus Theologicus XI, 1309: "Some excess of reasons for one side against the other, unless it is notable, does not remove doubt. But when it has been notable, the weight already preponderates for one side, we are already determined to one, and in it we stand." The same is clear, thirdly, from the authority of St. Alphonsus, l. 1, n. 56: "Whenever," he says, "it certainly appears to the intellect that truth stands much more for the law than for liberty, then the will cannot prudently and without fault adhere to the less safe part; since in that case the man would not act relying on his own judgment, or on his own belief, but rather by a certain effort which by his will he would bring upon the intellect, so that he might be removed from the part which appears to him far more likely, and be bent toward the part which does not appear true to him, indeed which seems not even to have a certain foundation by which it could be true. And to this pertains that saying of the Apostle to Rom. 14:23: Everything that is not from faith is sin." Ioannes-Petrus and Antonius, themselves also learned theologians but probabilists, hear these things incredulously. Cf. Marc. Instit. Moral. Alphons., n. 100, 101, second ed. 1886.

Q. 1. What is Probabilism? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first: the whole doctrine of Probabilism can be reduced in few words to two assertions.

The first is the certain principle, admitted by all, especially by St. Alphonsus: an uncertain law cannot beget a certain obligation; a doubtful law does not oblige. It is a certain principle, because law does not bind the will except through knowledge of itself. The other is that when against the law there is a truly probable opinion, the law becomes uncertain and doubtful. Likewise a certain principle, because certitude is incompatible with opposite probability. Therefore it matters little for the true doctrine of Probabilism whether the opinion for the law is equally probable, or a little more probable, or much more probable, or simply more probable. For the question is this and no other: namely, whether the opinion against the law is truly probable; for then, whatever may be the case concerning the opinion for the law, it is impossible that the law be certain and evident, binding the will through knowledge. I. M. 111 seqq.

To the second: the reasons brought forward for holding Probabiliorism prove nothing indeed. For first, in c. Capellanus 4, De Fer., Clement III defines by his authority a particular question in which there were two opinions, choosing one among them. The matter is of the three weeks during which the canon forbids marriages to be made before the feast of St. John the Baptist; and "some," says the Pontiff, "understand those weeks without interruption. But others, wishing to make an interval between the feast and the weeks themselves, understand that it was established out of reverence for the festivity of Pentecost, which is sometimes accustomed to intervene in those weeks; and thus, beginning from the three days of Rogations before the Ascension of the Lord up to the eighth day after Pentecost, those weeks being counted, they do not permit marriages to be celebrated in that space of time alone, in no way forbidding their celebration from that point." The question having been so proposed, the Holy Pontiff, thus interpreting the canon authentically, resolved it by his own authority: "Therefore, since we were consulted as to which of these opinions might seem stronger, it appeared to us and to our brothers that, although it is the custom of the Roman Church that, at whatever time marriage may be contracted, legitimate consent intervening in the present; yet because marriages are not permitted to be celebrated from Septuagesima until the seventh day after Pentecost, and afterwards they are also celebrated for three weeks or more before the festivity of St. John without distinction, the latter opinion rests upon the better and more subtle reason; and whether according to the canons marriages are suspended from Septuagesima until after the octaves of Easter, or according to the custom of the Roman Church until after seven days of the feast of Pentecost, which lacks octaves, on the Sunday which follows, and thereafter, they can be licitly celebrated." Therefore Clement III by no means defines that where there are two probable opinions, of which one is probable and the other more probable, or certainly much more probable, the latter is altogether and always to be held; but he says only that of the two proposed opinions the second is better and more subtle. Whence certainly nothing is drawn out for Probabiliorism. Indeed, what is the chief point, Clement III defines the matter not relying on a certainly much more probable opinion, but relying on a certain canon and a certain custom.

2. Rule 45 of Law in the Sixth does not properly regard probability, but doubt, which is quite different. Cf. I. M. 137, 138. Whence probability is almost excluded by that Rule, since it is said that we look to what is more likely, which properly bears before itself not probability but presumption. Indeed, the whole Rule is of the following tenor: We look in obscure matters to what is more likely; or to what for the most part is accustomed to happen. Namely, in obscure matters, that is, in those in which the truth does not even probably appear, which certainly is not the same as in probable matters. What is more likely, that is to say, what, with all the circumstances of the matter itself having been attended to, has a presumption founded in likelihood. Or what for the most part is accustomed to happen, that is, when the aforesaid presumption is lacking, that must be held which commonly and ordinarily is accustomed to happen, for then presumption stands for that. It is moreover useless to advert that this Rule, like other similar Rules, pertains rather to forensic judgments and to judicial sentences. Cf. Reiffenst. in Reg. cit. But now, from the fact that in those matters in which probability is even lacking, that is to be held, and indeed in judgments and in matters of justice, for it is a question of a Rule of Law, which, all the circumstances of the matter weighed, appears more likely; or which, this presumption lacking, is rather presumed from things commonly and ordinarily occurring; or finally, if not even this can be had, the least is to be followed and held, as Rule 30 in the Sixth has it; from this it certainly does not follow that, probable and more probable opinions standing against the law and for the law, the law certainly obliges. And indeed Canon Law does not contradict itself. Moreover, the remaining things now being passed over, in c. Cum iure 31, De Off. et Pot. Iud. Deleg., it is said: "Unless you have become certain of the mandate, you are not compelled to execute what is commanded." The same is had in c. Sicut quaedam, d. 14, where St. Leo writes these things: "In those matters which have been doubtful or obscure, let us know that this is to be followed, which is found neither contrary to the evangelical precepts, nor opposed to the decrees of the holy Fathers." And St. Alphonsus, l. 3, after n. 130, Epist. Resp., part Adversarius in Dissertat., adds this commentary: "This has place insofar as it can be asserted that some action is not gravely illicit. But, in order that it be affirmed absolutely that some action is a mortal sin, a probable opinion does not suffice; nor even a more probable one."

3. Suarez certainly was not a probabiliorist, nor is it necessary to demonstrate this, since it is conceded by the adversaries themselves. Cf. Marc. l. c. 92. Therefore his saying only has to be explained, and it is easily explained. It certainly happens sometimes that for some truth a greater absolute probability is had, and the excess of probability is so certain that the opposite opinion is scarcely probable, or enjoys only a certain slender probability, so that the probability of that opposite opinion is uncertain and doubtful. In such a case that greater probability, with such a certain excess of probability, is equivalent to a certain moral certitude. But in such a case, as is clear, it is no longer a matter of two truly probable opinions, although one is more probable than the other. Therefore nothing is drawn from the saying of Suarez for Probabiliorism.

4. The same must be said of Muzzarelli's affirmation. For he is treating of such a notable excess of probability that the doubt of the opposite side is removed, we are determined to one, and in it we stand. But in such a case we are already outside the limits of true probability, and we are found at least in moral certitude. Muzzarelli has these words in the cited Opusc., Roman edition, 1807, page 19: "If the excess is of great or notable moment, then I say that in practice ordinarily there does not subsist before the intellect a persuasion of reasons for the contrary opinion; and therefore that case has always seemed to me very rare in practice. For a great or notable preponderance of reasons for one opinion removes before the intellect the weight for the other, and makes it before the intellect not only less weighty, but even LIGHT and IMPROBABLE." But that Muzzarelli is not a probabiliorist but in reality simply a probabilist is clear from the Rule of acting which, after Benedict XIV, he established in the aforesaid little work. For this generally is it, namely that in obscure and more difficult matters we embrace that opinion which reason advises and authority confirms. "Which reason advises," that is, which reason proposes as true or likely in such a way that it induces a prudent man to give assent to it. For in this stands the force of reasonable persuasion; whence an opinion in which the reason of a prudent man cannot rest, although sometimes it bears before itself some apparent truth or likelihood, is nevertheless altogether to be refuted. It follows: "and authority confirms." For the authority of learned men is the greatest hinge by which the weakness of the human intellect is ruled, so that for the ignorant and unlearned authority of this sort almost always stands in place of reason.... God does not require from us that we always act with metaphysical or physical evidence concerning the material honesty of our action: for this is above the powers of human nature for this state of life; but he requires from us only that we never act without a firm and prudent persuasion that our action here and now to be posited is not sinful, but licit.... But he who in obscure and disputable matters finally executes that which, all things having been seriously weighed, reason advises him and authority confirms, follows that which prudently appears to him true and honest.... As soon as in controversial matters, after diligent examination and all things seriously weighed, I find an opinion which right reason advises to me, and several classical authors confirm, now I have no need to inquire further, and to search out all the doctors, to compare each of their reasons and authorities, and to judge concerning their inequality and preponderance, which would be a morally intolerable burden, as entangled in innumerable scruples and liable to dangers of erring." And hence it is more than sufficiently clear, not only that Muzzarelli in reality simply defends probabilism, but also that he excludes equiprobabilism and probabiliorism; whence below he asserts still more clearly: "But if it should sometimes happen that there is at the same time a greater notable persuasion for the respectively contradictory opinion, I would not indeed dare to add anything to the rule of Benedict XIV, who simply counsels following that which reason advises, not that which advises more....

Most prudently Pontiff Benedict XIV abstained from these comparative preeminences, and prescribed only that we descend to the opinion which reason advises and authority confirms." And this opinion indeed, in obscure and disputed matters, is indeed an opinion which is truly probable, whatever may be the degree of its probability, concerning which it is so difficult a matter to judge that, as the same Muzzarelli says, "it is not to be presumed that God willed, when it is a question of the observance of law necessary for salvation, to cast us into so many difficulties and ambages, from which we cannot extricate ourselves, and by which we are almost driven into despair."

5. The mind of St. Alphonsus is also the same; since the holy Doctor openly says that, when an opinion certainly much more probable for the law stands, the will cannot prudently adhere to the less safe part. Therefore this part, if it is such that the will cannot prudently adhere to it, is already not truly probable, and the opposite is already morally certain. And indeed the holy Doctor established this in order to retain Probabilism within the limits of true probability, and consequently to remove from it slender and doubtful probability. Hence in the text brought forward in the case, the holy Doctor does not speak of any probability whatever, but of that which plainly appears to the intellect of the one judging; who consequently, if he departed from this probability, would depart from his own judgment by a certain effort of the will, and would act against his conscience, to which therefore he applies that saying of the Apostle, Rom. 14:23: What is not from faith is sin. Hence the holy Doctor taught most constantly: "That there be no grave sin, it suffices that true probability be had; I understand that which rests on a foundation NOT SLENDER, so that safely, according to the common opinion, the question of the more probable and the less probable being set aside, it can be held and taught." Op. Mor. l. 3, after n. 130, Epist. Resp., part Adversarius in Dissertat. And the holy Doctor indeed opposes and calls lax that opinion which defends even the less probable for liberty WITHOUT ANY DISTINCTION between grave and slender, between certain and doubtful probability. Apol. cont. il P. Patuzzi, year 1765. Cf. I. M. 131 seqq. And l. 3, n. 547, St. Alphonsus establishes and develops this assertion: "Precepts are not to be imposed under grave fault unless evident reason advises it." And this, as far as pertains to us, is truly the Probabilism which we defend, with every question set aside concerning the more probable and less probable, concerning the much more and the little more probable, and the equally probable. Probabiliorists simply assert that one must stand for the more probable, the less probable being left. Equiprobabilists affirm that one must stand for the much more probable, the much less probable being left; but they concede that someone can hold the probable, the other equally probable or a little more probable being left. Probabilists say that it is licit to follow an opinion simply probable, provided it is truly probable, the other being left although it is more probable and much more probable. Therefore we defend this system with St. Alphonsus and with St. Thomas, and no other: "Precepts are not to be imposed under grave fault unless evident reason advises it," l. 3, n. 547; "No one is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept," Quodl. 14, De Verit., a. 3. - G. 46, 47, 56-64.

2. Probus the theologian does not approve Probabilism, but Probabiliorism; because, he says, the intellect strives to attain truth as nearly as possible. What concerning Probus?

R. That which Probus affirms, that our intellect strives to attain truth as nearly as possible, can be taken in two ways. First indeed for the objective truth of the thing, or for the effect of some action of ours, to be obtained absolutely. But in this sense the reason of Probus proves nothing against Probabilism. For when it is a question of that objective truth and objective effect to be obtained absolutely, the probabilists themselves say that it is neither probable nor licit to follow the less probable and less safe opinion. Therefore in such a case it is not licit to follow that probable opinion about the thing itself, not because it is not licit to follow a probable opinion, but because it is not licit to follow a false opinion. For it is not probable, but false, that it is licit to follow a probable opinion about the thing itself when the thing itself must be obtained absolutely. In the other sense, however, the assertion of Probus can be taken for the merely subjective truth of the liceity of some action, in the speculative order, which ought to be, in the practical order, that from which the practical dictate of conscience would be taken for acting, so that our action would become licit and honest. And in this other sense the assertion of Probus is altogether false.

For then the question is not whether the intellect ought to adhere to the more probable opinion, because it is, or rather appears, nearer to the truth. But the question is whether the will ought to adhere to the more probable opinion, because it is then bound by law. But it is not only not nearer to the truth, but altogether alien from the truth, that the will is then bound by the law; for then the law, if it has against itself a truly probable opinion, although it has for itself a more probable one, is doubtful, and it is an axiom that a doubtful law does not oblige.

Only then could the obligation of the will from the probability of the greater opinion have place, when, where there stood, for example, a more probable opinion for the law, the law would thereby become certain, and knowledge of the law would then be had. For the will is not bound except by a certain law, and by a certain law through knowledge of the law itself. But an opinion, although more probable, exhibits neither certitude nor knowledge. Therefore from the reason of Probus the contrary follows, namely, that if the intellect strives to attain truth as nearly as possible, the intellect cannot impose on the will the obligation of a law while its doubt stands; which Probabilism declares. Therefore from the fact that the intellect embraces what appears more probable, it does not follow that the will ought to follow what the intellect has judged more probable. For it is altogether one thing that this or that is speculatively more probable; another thing that consequently it is more probable that, that greater probability standing, notwithstanding the opposite probability, the law is certain and certainly obliges. This is not only not more probable, but not even probable, since the principles are admitted by all: Probability excludes certitude; a doubtful law does not oblige.

3. Titius, a confessor and probabilist, says: either Probabilism is true, and it is true in every case; or, if it is false even in one case, it is always false. Hence he does not hesitate to assert that Probabilism ought consequently to be extended even to the sacramental seal. But Titius adds: what is true speculatively is also true practically. Therefore without any scruple he is accustomed to speak in a rather free manner about things heard in confession. And if at any time others wonder at this manner of speaking, he says: they are ignorant; so much the worse for them.

Q. What as to the case?

R. It is true what Titius affirms: either Probabilism is true, and it is true in every case; or, if it is false even in one case, it is always false. The reason is, first, because the truth of a universal proposition must be verified in every other particular proposition contained under it; secondly, because in every true case of probabilism the axiom holds on which probabilism rests: a doubtful law does not oblige. Therefore if this axiom is once false, the foundation of all Probabilism is destroyed. - But the conclusion of Titius concerning the extension of probabilism to the sacramental seal of confession is not legitimate. The reason is that probability here does not regard the subjective liceity or illicitness of the action, which probabilism alone touches, but regards the very objective truth of the matter: whether the sacramental seal is manifested. For if it is probable that by speaking or acting in this or that way the sacramental seal is manifested, now it is not probable that it is licit to speak or act in this or that way, but it is certain that it is not licit. The reason is that the sacrament of penance is certainly rendered odious, and the faithful are removed from it; and moreover that probability does not make it so that, if in reality by that speech or by that action the sacramental seal is violated, the penitent is not thereby defamed, to which he has a certain right in whatever case, as much as is by force of the sacramental seal. And he has a certain right not to be exposed, by force of sacramental confession, even to a probable danger of infamy. Each has place, as is clear, both in probability of fact and in probability of law, which many wrongly distinguish in this matter. G. Comp. v. 2, 650; Cas. v. 2, 749; I. M. 116, 117, 120, 121. But what Titius adds, that what is true speculatively is also true practically, contains truth in the abstract, not in the concrete. For in the concrete, extrinsic circumstances can be superadded which render a matter licit in itself, although accidentally, illicit in practice. But in the case of Titius speaking in a freer manner about things heard in confession, according to his doctrine about probabilism, the matter is illicit not only extrinsically because of the wonder and scandal of others, but also intrinsically. Therefore not the others, but Titius himself, is ignorant, and for him the matter stands altogether badly.

4. Antoninus remembers that long ago, to avoid very frequent relapses against chastity, he most firmly brought into his mind that henceforth he wished to abstain from every sin against the angelic virtue, and that he had indeed often promised this to the confessor before receiving sacramental absolution, and that he had often renewed the same will immediately after receiving Communion. Hence Antoninus is anxious whether, by reason of a vow made, he ought to abstain from entering marriage. But he remembers that, in order to fulfill in deed what he had resolved in mind, on the feast day of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus he vowed several fasts to be performed, and several rosaries to be recited. But he does not now know whether he ought to do this on each Friday and Saturday, or only on the first Friday and Saturday of each month. He doubts besides whether he ought to do both on Friday and Saturday, or to fast on Friday and say the rosary on Saturday, and whether the whole rosary, or only a chaplet or third part of the rosary, since he himself did not distinguish sufficiently between the one and the other.

Q. Whether and how is Antoninus bound by the aforesaid vows?

R. Antoninus is not held by a vow of chastity; for a purpose of chastity, although most firm, which he most firmly brought into his mind to be observed, is not a vow. Nor is a promise often made to the confessor in confession and before sacramental absolution a vow. For a vow is a promise made to God alone. Nor likewise does that renewal of purpose and promise immediately after Communion have the value of a vow; for renewal is of the same will, which contained no vow. And, if Antoninus had truly emitted a vow of chastity, as he now well remembers that he vowed fasts and rosaries, so certainly he would also well remember that he vowed chastity. But as far as fasts and rosaries are concerned, after the matter has been weighed and the doubt remains, he is obliged only to the minimum. Therefore he must fast only and recite the rosary on the first day of Friday and Saturday each month; namely, fast on the first day of Friday, and recite the rosary on the first Saturday day, which seems more likely. And if there is also serious doubt about reciting the whole rosary, it suffices that he recite the chaplet, namely if, not sufficiently distinguishing between rosary and chaplet, he had in mind and vowed the rosary as he was accustomed to recite it in his family, and as it is also commonly accustomed to be recited. - I. M. 570, 572, 577, 586, 592, 593; Elbel 156 seqq.; G. 44.

5. Leofridus the confessor, following a probable opinion, imposed on his penitent an obligation of restitution from which he had already been freed by another confessor, who had also embraced a probable opinion in favor of his penitent. Hence, when the penitent refused to restore, Leofridus says: it is a matter of justice, in which probability has no place. For it belongs to justice to preserve equality; therefore, when doubt and probability stand, restitution must be made at least according to the proportion of the doubt and probability. - But although he himself was certainly persuaded about the reality of fire in hell, and he himself certainly held the contrary opinion as false and erroneous, nevertheless he did not hesitate to absolve a certain noble man who, on the contrary, thought the fire of hell to be metaphorical. For there are not lacking, he said, theologians, both old and also more recent, who think the matter doubtful, and the Church has as yet defined nothing about this matter. But a confessor does not have the right of imposing his own opinions on a penitent, since there are others who think the contrary.

Q. 1. Can the confessor impose on the penitent, at least a rude and ignorant one, his own opinion? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 119. To the second: first, Leofridus, in itself, is held to restitution toward his penitent. For since the penitent had for himself a truly probable opinion, Leofridus unjustly obliged the penitent to restitution, and so was an efficacious and unjust cause of the penitent's damage. But his general doctrine is false, that probability has no place in justice, as is seen everywhere among the doctors, and especially in St. Alphonsus. Likewise his reason is false, for it indeed belongs to justice to preserve equality and to restore it when injured; but restitution is to be made, from the same justice, by rendering to each one his own right, where it is certain concerning such a right. But where the right of another is doubtful, the very equality of justice to be preserved requires that the right of the possessor prevail, and that the possessor in good faith not then be despoiled of his own thing. G. 62, 70; L. 1, 6, n. 547.

Secondly, since Leofridus was certainly persuaded concerning the reality of fire in hell, and he himself certainly held the contrary opinion as false and erroneous, he could not give absolution to the noble man thinking otherwise. Nor indeed does his reason avail, namely that no definition of the Church has yet come forth on that matter, nor are there lacking some theologians who do not admit real fire of hell, but metaphorical fire. For first, if these things did not destroy the certitude of his intellect concerning the truth of the fire of hell, he could not form a conscience for himself by some reflex principle for absolving; for it is impossible that someone be directly certain concerning some truth, but reflexively doubt concerning the same. Then, in fact, it is not a matter here of something disputed among Catholic doctors, but of the common opinion of Catholic doctors, which Suarez affirms to be certain and Catholic. Cf. Suarez, De Angelis, l. 8, c. 12, n. 9; Petavius, De Angelis, l. 3, c. 5, n. 7; Toletus on I p., q. 64, a. 3, etc.; G. 71. But what Leofridus asserts in excuse of himself by no means excuses him. For from the fact that the Church has defined nothing, it does not follow that therefore the opposite opinion can be held as probable, or at least not improbable. Likewise from the fact that theologians are not lacking who hold the contrary opinion, this opinion cannot therefore be held as extrinsically probable, or at least not improbable. Extrinsic probability cannot be invoked if no probable reason is brought forward by the theologians; for extrinsic probability is resolved into intrinsic. And only then can extrinsic probability be invoked, abstracting from intrinsic, when it is a question of some matter entangled, obscure, involved in difficulties, not in reality sufficiently clear among doctors. Lastly, it is true that a confessor cannot impose his own opinions on his penitents when the opinion of the penitent is probable, or at least does not appear certainly improbable; but he cannot approve that the penitent follow false and erroneous opinions in a practical matter which pertains to faith and morals. L. 1, 6, n. 604; G. 69, 71-74. The present resolution is confirmed from the response of the Sacred Penitentiary, 30 April 1890.

6. Sigismundus admits a testament made in his favor, but destitute of legal formalities, because, he says, it probably avails. But he refuses to pay certain pious and profane legacies inscribed in it, because, he says, they are probably null. The same Sigismundus juridically asks that another testament made in favor of Caius his blood-relative be annulled, since it is destitute of due formalities. He obtains the annulment of this testament. Likewise he refuses to pay certain profane legacies inscribed in it, because, he says again, they are null, as having been inscribed in a null testament.

Q. 1. Can one change a probable opinion once accepted, by acting according to the opposite probable opinion? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 128. To the second: Sigismundus, first admitting the testament, follows a truly probable opinion, and cannot be disturbed. Cf. I. M. 1029. But he cannot not pay the pious and profane legacies inscribed in it; since, accepting the testament as valid from a probable opinion, by that very fact he both acquires the right as to the advantage of the testament and at the same time contracts the obligation of the burden of the legacies, according to Rule 55 of Law in the Sixth: "He who feels the advantage ought also to feel the burden."

But if a testament lacking formalities is for a pious cause, it is certainly valid indeed, if from elsewhere the will of the testator is certainly established. I. M. 1030, 1031. But whether profane legacies contained in it are also valid is disputed. The reason for denying is that a testament of this sort does not avail except from the will of the Supreme Pontiff and from Canon Law, which does not involve itself in profane causes; and so profane legacies do not avail, but consequently by right of accretion they will pertain to the pious cause itself. The reason for affirming is that, since the pious cause suffers no damage from the defect of solemnities, equity at least requires that from the same defect, against the will of the deceased, it not take an advantage. But, on the contrary, since the heir is the pious cause itself, because the will of the deceased is certainly established by natural law alone, when by the same natural law the will of the deceased is certainly established as to the legacies, it is necessary that the pious cause execute this certain will of the testator. - Lugo d. 22, n. 274; L. 1, 3, n. 922.

Sigismundus, having recourse to the judge concerning the other testament, relying on a probable opinion concerning its invalidity, acts licitly, and uses his right, which a just law concedes to any citizen. But once the nullity of the testament has been declared by the sentence of the judge, consequently the profane legacies inscribed in it are null. For the law renders such testaments destitute of due formalities simply liable to nullity, no distinction being made between the testamentary disposition itself and the legacy. C. I. 804; C. G. 1001. - G. 75-78; I. M. 936.