IV. Objections Against Probabilism

82. Probabilism seeks utility, not truth. - It certainly seeks utility, but at the same time truth. It seeks utility, and a very great one: not sinning, and not multiplying sins without necessity. But it obtains this utility by this most certain truth, which St. Alphonsus hands down, l. 1, n. 60, p. 30, ed. 6, Gaude, which doctors most commonly hand down, and which is had in L. 31, De Off. et Pot. Iudic. Deleg.: "Unless you have become certain about the mandate, you will not be compelled to execute what is commanded." Certain, as the same St. Alphonsus says, l. 1, n. 75, p. 51, either through an evident reason or through manifest authority. - Wherefore again probabilism seeks utility: to impede formal sins. This indeed is the greatest utility; for no one is damned because of material sins, but because of formal sins.

83. But to seek utility is certainly not something illicit; otherwise it would be a sin to seek eternal beatitude itself, and virtue. What indeed can be more useful than to exercise virtue and avoid sin? If to seek utility is illicit, this is only because someone seeks either a vicious utility or seeks utility viciously. But the utility which probabilism seeks is neither vicious, nor does probabilism seek it viciously. For probabilism seeks this, and nothing else: not to multiply sins without necessity. And this utility is certainly not vicious. If entities are not to be multiplied without necessity, much less are sins to be multiplied without necessity. Nor is this sought viciously; for this is not sought except by means of this principle: a doubtful law does not oblige; with this other principle added: with true probability standing against the law, it is impossible that the law be certain. Each principle is most true, and consequently no vice can come from it.

84. Therefore while probabilism seeks a praiseworthy utility, it also seeks truth: for it seeks this practical truth, when a law obliges the will to observance of itself, and when it does not. And to find this truth in individual cases as they occur, it establishes the unshaken principle of St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus: "No one is bound by any precept except through the mediation of knowledge of that precept." St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 17, a. 3; St. Alphonsus, l. 1, n. 63.

85. Probabilism is the art of evading moral duties by means of syllogisms. - Probabilism and probabilists, on the contrary, very commonly teach that it is altogether illicit both to act directly against the law and to act in fraud of the law. - It is indeed an art, or rather a moral system, and it is the science of evading moral duties or the law by means of syllogisms; but uncertain moral duties, a doubtful law. A doubtful law, St. Alphonsus cries out, does not oblige. An uncertain law cannot beget a certain obligation.

86. Probabilism selects means which render the attainment of the final end less safe. - Nothing is safer for the attainment of the final end than to remove the sins of an erroneous conscience; as, for example, the conscience of one would be erroneous who, in order to judge himself bound, would consider it sufficient that the law be uncertain and ambiguous. In the whole third chapter of the first book St. Alphonsus cries out against this, repeating, declaring, and proving a hundred times: A doubtful law does not oblige; An uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation.

87. Let St. Alphonsus be heard, following and reporting the doctrine of Father Bancel, the Dominican: "Since we ought not to form our conscience about obligation to something under penalty of sin, unless the existence of such obligation is morally established, we ought not to impose that burden upon ourselves; when, on the contrary, exemption from such obligation is morally established, ... it is morally established for us that liberty remains to us of embracing whichever of such probable opinions we wish." L. 1, n. 82, p. 62, ed. 6, Gaude. "That saying, He who acts probably acts prudently, can be taken in two ways. If it is taken as resting upon other reflex principles, it is truly prudent and certain; but if it is taken as a direct principle, with reflection of judgment excluded, it is false." It is false, namely, as the same St. Alphonsus immediately says, "of one operating with a practical doubt, having no principle by which he could lay aside the doubt." On the contrary, it is true "of one operating who forms the ultimate judgment not from the probability of the opinion alone, but from another certain reflex principle." L. 1, n. 79, p. 59; n. 65, pp. 35-36, ed. 6, Gaude. But this certain principle from the same Holy Doctor is: "Law, in order that it may oblige, must not only be promulgated, but also promulgated as certain." L. 1, n. 58, p. 27. "No one is bound by any precept except through the mediation of knowledge of that precept." L. 1, n. 59, p. 28. And consequently, "A doubtful law does not oblige." L. 1, n. 60, p. 30; n. 64, p. 34. "An uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation." L. 1, n. 61, p. 31; n. 73, p. 48.

88. Many canons prescribe that IN DOUBTS THE SAFER PART IS TO BE HELD. - St. Alphonsus himself replies: "What do the canons prescribe? They prescribe that in doubts the safer way is to be chosen. Therefore it is said, in doubts: What obstacle is that rule, if a man rests upon some certain principle? Then he already forms for himself a morally certain conscience about the honesty of the action, and he leaves the bounds of doubtfulness; nor can it any longer be said that he is in doubts. - Besides, the adversaries themselves concede that the aforesaid rule of following the safer part has no place in the matter of justice. But if the rule of the canons of following what is safer were universal for all doubts, even one who legitimately possesses a thing, in doubt whether the thing is another's, would be bound to be stripped of it. But St. Augustine teaches the contrary, saying: 'In the law of estates, each one is most rightly called a possessor in good faith so long as he is ignorant that what he possesses is another's,'" l. 1, n. 78, ed. 6, Gaude, p. 58.

89. But Probabilism renders the attainment of the final end less safe. - Nevertheless it renders it safe, and this suffices. But it is false and absurd by reason that that attainment must be rendered safer. Indeed, this is impossible; because, whatever safer means has been devised, another still safer could always be brought forward. Someone approaches confession with attrition. Is this not safe, and does it not suffice? Yet it is safer to approach with contrition. It is safer; but is it not still safer to approach with contrition perfect at the same time appreciatively and intensively? It is still safer; and would it not be much safer also to premise before confession the strictest bodily penances, fasts, scourgings, hair-shirts, alms, daily and nightly prayers and meditations?

90. Let St. Alphonsus be heard: "It was always a fear for me lest God require an account from me equally if I approved lax opinions as probable, as if I rejected probable opinions as lax. Looking at the present frailty of the human condition, it is not always true that it is safer to direct souls by the narrower way, since we see that the Church has often proscribed both too much liberty and too much rigor." L. 3, n. 547, p. 53, ed. Gaude. - Probabilism renders safe the attainment of the final end, because it directs conscience in doubtful matters, lest it practically err by affirming that something is sin which is not sin, and thus in fact by sinning. "But someone will object," says St. Alphonsus, "how can reasons which are only speculatively probable become morally certain in practice? This happens... not because the speculatively probable reasons themselves of some opinion become morally certain in practice, but because there are other reasons of a reflex principle, by which in practice the ultimate morally certain judgment is formed from that certain principle; and thus an action which speculatively is only probably honest, in practice becomes certainly morally honest." Loc. cit., p. 36, n. 65, par. Et sic.

91. Through probabilism man constitutes himself judge concerning divine precepts. - A distinction certainly must be made: As regards themselves and their objective existence, it is denied; As regards us, and as regards our obligation, it is conceded. And so it wholly must be; because what is not from faith is sin. Let St. Alphonsus be heard: "When an opinion turns around the mode of a thing, whether it is honest or not, then a probable opinion does well bring it about that the action is honest, although perhaps in itself it is not. The reason is that (as has been proved at length in the Dissertation on the use of probable opinion...) in those cases in which we probably opine that a prohibiting law is not present, or at least has not been proposed sufficiently manifestly, then the law does not oblige; and therefore the operation, because we do not sufficiently find it prohibited by law, certainly remains honest and free." L. 3, n. 700, note, p. 168, ed. Gaude. Through probabilism, therefore, man does not constitute himself judge concerning divine precepts, but concerning his own human actions.

92. By probabilism equivocation and mental restriction are legitimized; whence it is clear that the judgment of conscience is perverted by probabilism. - Equivocation and mental restriction are sometimes affirmed to be licit not by probabilists, but by all. If this licitness was affirmed beyond due limits by some probabilists, the abuse and error of probabilists, not the deceitful norm of probabilism, was the cause. Do equiprobabilists and probabiliorists have a privilege of infallibility, and are they not also sometimes deceived? Therefore from some errors of probabilists it does not follow that the judgment of conscience is perverted by probabilism. Otherwise, would this not have to hold also of the moral system of St. Alphonsus himself, whatever in the end this system may have been? For all know well that, with the progress of time, the Holy Doctor reprobated several sentences which he himself had previously embraced. Most certainly the Holy Doctor erred either the first time, when he had taught those opinions, or afterwards, when he retracted them. Therefore, if from the fact that some probabilists erred about equivocation and mental restriction, one must say of their moral system that the judgment of conscience is perverted, the same surely will have to be asserted of the moral system of St. Alphonsus himself, whatever in the end it may have been.

93. Adversaries of the Christian religion abused the placita of probabilists in order to attack the Christian religion. - This indeed is true; but did they not also sometimes bring forward the doctrines of St. Alphonsus himself in order to mock the same religion?

94. The Church has never authentically proposed probabilism. - This is wholly true, that the Church has never explicitly proposed probabilism as a moral system. But although it has not proposed it explicitly, nevertheless it has always proposed and does propose it implicitly. - For first, when it condemned various opinions concerning probable sentences, nevertheless it never condemned this proposition, that a doubtful law does not oblige, to which probabilism in fact, whole and entire, is reduced. Likewise it never condemned this other proposition, that with a true probable sentence standing against the law, the law becomes doubtful. And this second proposition together with the first enunciates simple probabilism.

95. Besides, it implicitly proposed probabilism by the proposition condemned by Alexander VIII: "It is not lawful to follow an opinion, even the most probable among probable opinions." For, if it is lawful to follow the most probable opinion, it is also lawful to follow a probable opinion. For, as St. Alphonsus himself expressly affirms, l. 1, n. 78, p. 58, ed. P. Gaude, n. 81, pp. 60-61, a most probable opinion remains within the limits of probability, and nevertheless it is lawful to follow it, the safer one for the law having been omitted, for this reason, which the same Holy Doctor weighs, because the law is doubtful. But it is also doubtful when against the law there is only a truly probable opinion. Behold what Suarez has, whom St. Alphonsus reports and wholly approves, loc. cit., n. 60, p. 31: "So long as there is a probable judgment that there is no law prohibiting or commanding the action, such a law has not been sufficiently proposed or promulgated to man; whence, since the obligation of law is of itself burdensome, ... it does not urge until it is established more certainly." And Benedict XIV writes in his Notifications: "Bonds must not be imposed when there is no clear law which imposes them." Apud St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.

96. The Church also implicitly approves probabilism by often approving probable opinions and confirming them for practice. And thus, for example, the Church supplies jurisdiction when a probable opinion is had for it. Nor certainly has anyone up to now required, nor does St. Alphonsus himself require this, that the opinion for jurisdiction be either certainly more probable, or at least equally probable as the opinion for its defect. Thus also the Church often refers to approved Authors; and certainly Suarez, Lugo, Laymann, Lessius, Castropalaus, and six hundred others are approved authors, and they are probabilist authors.

97. And by approving the Moral Works of St. Alphonsus, the Church implicitly approved probabilism also. For the Holy Doctor, apart from his own system itself expounded in his various Dissertations, follows only opinions simply probable, and approves them for practice although the opposite seems to him more probable. If St. Alphonsus had never written Dissertations about his moral system, surely no one could deduce probabiliorism or equiprobabilism from his moral works, as is demonstrated even from the very exquisite diligence by which he weighs the probability of each sentence.

98. Moreover St. Alphonsus in fact speculatively proposes the moral system of simple probabilism. For his system rests upon the aforesaid principle: a doubtful law does not oblige; and upon the aforesaid proposition, that when against the law there is a truly probable proposition, although for the law there is a truly and equally probable proposition, the law becomes doubtful and consequently does not oblige.

99. Nor indeed is the probabilism of St. Alphonsus converted into another moral system by another proposition which the Holy Doctor adds for completing his system, namely that when for the law there is a sentence certainly notably, or certainly evidently much more probable, we must follow it. For then there would be a different moral system of the Holy Doctor, as equiprobabilists pretend, if from the Holy Doctor the contrary sentence for liberty remained itself probable, although in an inferior and notably inferior degree. But the Holy Doctor does not hold some sentence for the law as certainly and much, or notably, more probable unless when through it the law already appears at least morally sufficiently promulgated, and therefore by no means doubtful; and consequently the opposite sentence for liberty cannot be called certainly probable. This the Holy Doctor wished explicitly to note in order to remove from his system slight and doubtful and uncertain probability. And this whole thing is certainly not against probabilism, but against laxism.

100. Behold how the Holy Doctor embraces his whole system in a few words, speculatively and practically, in his Moral Theology recently edited by Rev. Father Leonard Gaude of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, book 1, tract 1, On Conscience - Chapter 3, On Probable Conscience - Moral System, n. 82, p. 62: "There are many things which it is safer to do; but at the same time it is also safer not to believe oneself obliged to do them... unless such obligation is morally established for him." These things are from Father Bancel, the Dominican; and a little after the Holy Doctor adds: "For the rest, I protest that just as I do not approve those confessors who, adhering to excessive austerity, easily condemn the use of several opinions which rest upon a grave foundation; so, on the contrary, neither can I approve those who easily acclaim opinions without certain foundation as probable. - A confessor, before he embraces some opinion, is certainly bound to weigh the intrinsic reasons; and when some convincing reason occurs to him for the safer opinion, then he cannot embrace the opposite, less safe opinion." But does not this whole thing contain simple probabilism? Do probabilists say that it is lawful to follow opinions against the law, although for the law there is a convincing reason, and against the law no grave foundation is present? And when true or grave probability is present against the law, can it be said that its obligation is morally established?

101. Besides, in the same Moral Theology and new edition of Rev. Father Gaude, l. 4, c. 1, Epist. Resp. after n. 132, p. 456, the Holy Doctor thus expounds his moral system: "In order that it may be said that some action is not a grave sin, it suffices that true probability be had that it is not such, AS ALL ADMIT: I understand that probability which rests upon a foundation not slight, to be such that safely (according to the common sentence, the question of the more probable and the less probable having been set aside) it can be held and taught... Therefore, in order that some action be gravely illicit, certainty is required, as all teach." Does not probabilism teach and hand down the same thing? Does it not contend that certainty is required for affirming sin? Does it not also, the question of the more probable and less probable having likewise been set aside, constantly affirm this, that for removing grave sin true probability suffices, namely one which is not slight, but rests upon a grave foundation, so that it can safely be held and taught?

102. And in the same place, p. 457, he thus concludes his doctrine concerning the norm of human actions: "Hence Benedict XIV, in his work On the Synod, in very many chapters admonishes bishops of nothing else than that they never condemn as grave sin those opinions which doctors of either side defend as probable." Behold again simple probabilism. Probabilists say this same thing, and nothing else, neither more nor less. And the Holy Doctor repeats this a thousand times:

"It is certain, or to be held as certain, according as the doctors commonly teach... that things are not to be imposed upon men under grave fault unless an evident reason persuades this." L. 3, n. 547, p. 53, vol. 2, ed. P. Gaude. And this is simple probabilism.

103. Nor indeed is it of force to object that St. Alphonsus limited common probabilism, and that the whole hinge of the question turns on this limitation. For he says: "that if an opinion which stands for the law seems certainly more probable, we are altogether bound to follow it, nor can we then embrace the opposite opinion which stands for liberty." Loc. cit., n. 54, p. 25. Certainly more probable, as Rev. Father Gaude notes in the Preface, p. XX, is the same for St. Alphonsus as notably more probable. But this certainly or notably more probable opinion, for the Holy Doctor, is the same as a morally certain sentence, so that the opposite is only doubtfully or slightly probable; and therefore that former one is called by the Holy Doctor certainly or notably more probable. Behold how, says the same Rev. Father Gaude, "the Holy Doctor in the sixth and seventh edition, n. 55, expounded that principle," p. 25. But this exposition the Holy Doctor, with the same Rev. Father Gaude as witness, p. XIX, did not afterwards change substantially. This exposition is: "I say... certainly, because when the opinion for the law is certainly and without any hesitation more probable, then that opinion cannot be anything except notably more probable. And in that case, the safer opinion will no longer be now doubtful (understanding doubt strictly so called), but is morally or quasi-morally certain; at least it can no longer be called strictly doubtful, since it has for itself a certain foundation that it is true. Hence then it comes about that the less safe opinion, which lacks a certain foundation, remains either slightly or at least doubtfully probable in respect to the safer one." But it is said by the Holy Doctor, "which lacks a certain foundation"; because if in truth, notwithstanding that greater probability of the sentence for the law, the opposite for liberty rests upon a sufficient foundation, the Holy Doctor himself will say that this is probable or sufficiently probable, and that we can follow it.

104. And thus, loc. cit., l. 3, n. 404, p. 660, concerning the question there proposed: Can a prince with only a probable opinion for himself wage war against another, who possesses a kingdom in good faith? the Holy Doctor reports three sentences: the first affirming, the second holding that in order that a prince, not possessing, can wage war, he must be supported by an opinion at least more probable; finally, the third sentence requiring certainty of his right. He says that this third sentence is by far more probable to him, adding also that Elbel holds it as certain, and Tamburini thinks the contrary opinion improbable from intrinsic principles. And nevertheless immediately the Holy Doctor says that the second sentence is sufficiently probable to him, speaking speculatively, even intrinsically. Behold therefore how from the Holy Doctor a sentence not improbable, but sufficiently probable intrinsically, is opposed to a notably more probable sentence.

105. In the same place, n. 649, p. 127, concerning the question: Is a man having a vow of chastity or religion bound to marry a deflowered virgin after a true or fictitious promise of marriage? St. Alphonsus reports the first sentence denying, the second more probable sentence affirming; and then he says: "This second sentence seems to me certainly and by far more probable. But whether the first sentence is probable, Tamburini doubts; indeed Sporer says that Diana, who defends it, is not to be heard. I do not dare to call it either probable or improbable." - Behold again how from the Holy Doctor himself, from the fact that some sentence is certainly and notably more probable, it does not follow that the opposite is improbable.

106. In the same place, n. 293, p. 561, it is asked: Is it lawful on feast days to work because of piety alone, without actual necessity? St. Alphonsus reports the affirming and the denying sentence. Concerning the denying one he says: "This second sentence seems to me certainly more probable, with Sanchez... and commonly." But concerning the affirming one he does not say that it is improbable or slightly or doubtfully probable. Rather, on the contrary, he expounds its reason from cap. Conquestus de Ferris, where judicial acts are excused, "if necessity urges or piety persuades." And then the Holy Doctor adds: "And this reason does not seem to be despised, since judicial acts and servile works are forbidden by the same ecclesiastical law; but in things equiparated, where the same reason runs, the same disposition of the law runs, as we have said from the common doctrine, l. 1, n. 200, v. Haec tamen." Hence therefore we also have that the Holy Doctor, notwithstanding an opinion certainly more probable, still judges the opposite not to be despised, and consequently sufficiently probable.

107. In the same place, l. 3, n. 520, q. 4, St. Alphonsus asks: Is a thief consuming a thing taken away in extreme necessity always bound to restitution? The Holy Doctor brings forward the first sentence denying, and the second sentence affirming, which he calls most grave and more common; and, the reasons of this latter having soon been explained and handed down, he then adds: "Nevertheless, these things notwithstanding, I do not think the first sentence improbable." Therefore a sufficiently probable sentence at least is had, notwithstanding the opposite notably more probable, for it is called most grave. - But let us proceed to other things.

108. It is insisted: St. Alphonsus reproved probabilism as a lax doctrine, for he asserts that the doctrine which Theologians of the seventeenth century commonly held on this matter was lax. Likewise he asserts that he does not follow the system of the Jesuits. - The Holy Doctor holds as lax not probabilism simply, but broad and lax probabilism, which is extended even to doubtful and slight probability. Let the Moral System of St. Alphonsus be read, as it is expounded in the very edition of the Moral Theology of Father Gaude. In that whole Dissertation the Holy Doctor does not attack a truly probable opinion, but an opinion which, although it is called probable, in reality is not probable, since it is only slightly, or at least doubtfully, probable; as Rev. Father Gaude himself, p. 25, interprets St. Alphonsus, with the note added from St. Alphonsus himself in the sixth and seventh edition. And indeed St. Alphonsus, on the contrary, in that whole Dissertation does nothing else except defend ex professo and diffusely probable opinion against probabiliorists, from the fact that knowledge, or certain notice of the law, is required for affirming obligation; whence a doubtful law does not oblige, an uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation. - Nor indeed does the Holy Doctor say that the doctors of the seventeenth century commonly held that lax sentence which he reproves; but that those authors held it as if commonly, therefore not commonly. As if commonly, not because all or almost all, or the greatest or greater part held it, but only because many held it. The Holy Doctor himself declares his assertion in the Dissertation of the year 1765, in which he says: "I did not pretend, nor do I pretend, to establish a new system; I also know well that no probabilist of solid doctrine declares licit the use of an opinion only slightly or doubtfully probable. But because many probabilists without distinction say that it is lawful to follow an opinion less probable if it is founded in reason or authority, I wished to distinguish, etc." And from these things it is openly clear that the Holy Doctor holds and defends only probabilism of solid doctrine, which excludes sentences slightly and doubtfully probable. Besides, it is clear that the Holy Doctor does not disapprove probabilism, but only its abuse. For this reason, H. A., tr. 1, n. 73, he says: "And in truth, in the past century very many abused matters in opining, in approving as probable many lax opinions; and therefore the Church proscribed several opinions, because they were undeservedly called probable." But how could the Holy Doctor have disapproved probabilism, when he defends it against its detractors who assert that it had already been condemned by the Church? Cf. l. 1, n. 85, 70, pp. 66, 70, ed. P. Gaude. Finally, if in truth the Holy Doctor had held the authors of the seventeenth century as lax, at least in the greatest or greater part of them, how would he not have contradicted words by deed? For the greatest part of the authors whom St. Alphonsus praises and follows belong to the seventeenth century. To this century, among other probabilist doctors, belong Gregory of Valencia, S.J.; John Azor, S.J.; Gabriel Vasquez, S.J.; Dominic Bannez, O.P.; Peter Lorca, O. Cist.; Thomas Sanchez, S.J.; Francis Suarez, S.J.; Vincentius Fillucius, S.J.; Leonard Lessius, S.J.; Martin Becanus, S.J.; Basil Pontius, O.S.A.; the Salmanticenses, Discalced Carmelites; Martin Bonacina, doctor of Milan; Aegidius Coninck, S.J.; Ferdinand de Castropalao, S.J.; Didacus Alvarez, O.P.; Paul Laymann, S.J.; Augustine Barbosa, Bishop of Ugento; Francis Amicus, S.J.; Cardinal De Lugo, S.J.; Peter Marchant, O.S.F.; Hermann Busembaum, S.J.; Anthony de Escobar and Mendoza, S.J.; Christian Lupus, O.S.A.

109. Nor indeed, when the Holy Doctor says that he does not hold the doctrine of the Jesuits, does he intend to say of all or almost all Jesuits, but only of some one or of a few. And St. Alphonsus himself expressly affirms this in the letters to Remond, March 30, 1756, and June 30, 1768. Besides, he often praises Jesuit authors, and he himself clearly says in the cited letter of March 30, 1756, that he took from the Jesuits the things which he wrote. "For, that which I always say, they were and are masters in moral theology."

110. The principal schools reproved probabilism. - St. Alphonsus in the Dissertation on the less probable opinion of the year 1755, n. 8, says that probabilism, expounded in terms, was first from Medina, a Spaniard, of the Order of St. Dominic, in the year 1577; nevertheless, in substance and in equivalent terms, ancient authors handed it down, and used it commonly in practice. And then in n. 9 he adds: "But it cannot be denied that for the space of a hundred years, or at least until the middle of the seventeenth century, the benign sentence (of probabilism) was received by all doctors." And indeed, as D'Annibale says, Summ., ed. 4, P. 1, n. 10 seqq., probabilism, namely in terms, according to the expression of St. Alphonsus, "having gone out from the borders of Spain from about the year 1610 until the year 1650, held sway over almost all the schools... All the disciples of St. Thomas, with one or another exception, gave their name to it; the disciples of Scotus, with Mastrius as witness, who calls the sentence of the probabilists most common and most received in every school; all the Fathers of the Society of Jesus entirely (with very few exceptions), to whom, excepting the Theatines, almost all theologians gave their vote." The same D'Annibale counts among these St. Alphonsus, "who undertook to defend: that it is licit to use a probable opinion, even in the occurrence of a more probable one for the law, whenever that opinion has a certain and grave foundation." Which is, as is clear, to defend probabilism in terms. Nor indeed did St. Alphonsus ever desert this probabilism. For when did St. Alphonsus teach that it is illicit to follow an opinion which has a certain and grave foundation? More than enough is even the conclusion alone of the Holy Doctor in the tract On Conscience, as it is had in the edition of Father Gaude, l. 1, n. 76, p. 53: "It must be concluded that the divine law does not oblige unless when it is known, unless when it is MOST CERTAIN, unless when KNOWLEDGE is had of it, unless it itself BECOMES KNOWN."

111. After Bartholomew Medina, almost all Bishops, universities, and doctors from every nation and religious order indeed embraced probabilism in terms. Cf. Franc. Ant. Zachar., De Locis Moralis Theologiae, tr. 5, c. 3, and St. Alphonsus, Scholastico-moral Dissertation for the moderate use of probable opinion in the concurrence of a more probable one, Naples, 1755. But before Medina, the ancient doctors truly handed down probabilism in substance, and used it. And thus St. Antoninus, part 1, tit. 3, cap. 10, Sect. 10; p. 2, tit. 1, cap. 11, Sect. 28, says that there are contrary opinions among doctors especially in moral matter, and that anyone can follow any opinion, provided he forms for himself a good conscience, when no express authority and sufficient reason to the contrary is had. And St. Thomas, Ulricus, Albertus Magnus, Hostiensis, William, Peter de Palude, and Godfrey of Fontaines, reported by the same St. Antoninus in the cited places, also held this. And Christian Lupus, Opp., tom. 11, disp. 1, shows that the reason for resolving moral questions in doubtful matters by the principles and method of probabilism was familiar even to the most ancient Fathers.

112. The Church solemnly condemned probabilism. - Nothing is more foreign to the truth than this affirmation. The Church, as has already been declared a little above, if it did not approve it explicitly, at least approved it implicitly, and continually approves it. For the rest, when the condemnation of probabilism was brought forward against St. Alphonsus himself, reply was made to the Holy Doctor by the Consultors of the Holy Office and by the Cardinal Major Penitentiary that probabilism had by no means been forbidden, even as regards the less probable opinion for liberty, l. 1, n. 85, 88, ed. P. Gaude, pp. 66, 70.

Nor indeed did the Church solemnly condemn probabilism, as is objected by equiprobabilists, by the Decree issued by Innocent XI, June 26, 1680. - From the very publication of that Decree in the year 1902, which had never before been authentically published, it can perhaps appear to someone that there is some aversion of the Holy Office toward probabilism. If anyone thinks this, he is wholly deceived. For that publication was not made by the motu proprio of the Holy Office, but at repeated prayers made by me in the name of the Superior General of the Society of Jesus. Besides, it suffices to read that Decree so that one may see with his own eyes that nothing is contained in it against probabilism. - There are two parts of the Decree. In the first, Thyrsus Gonzalez is praised, who undertook to attack probabilism, and to defend the more probable opinion as practically to be followed, or probabiliorism, thus doing a thing pleasing to the Supreme Pontiff. In the second, the General of the Society of Jesus is commanded that anyone in the society freely write for the more probable opinion and attack probabilism.

113. Now indeed these things would favor at most probabiliorism, which Thyrsus Gonzalez defended, but in no way equiprobabilism, wholly unknown to Thyrsus Gonzalez, indeed even to Innocent XI himself. Wherefore, if from that Decree probabilism is reproved, equiprobabilism also is reproved. - Nevertheless from that Decree, as is clear, no reprobation of probabilism is had; indeed rather an approbation. For the Supreme Pontiff commands that in the Society of Jesus each one have full liberty of defending probabiliorism and attacking probabilism, as it shall please him. If the Supreme Pontiff had really by that Decree reproved probabilism, and had not rather on the contrary at least implicitly approved it, how could he impose that liberty be granted for defending probabiliorism? He surely ought to have imposed the obligation of defending probabiliorism alone. Wherefore the Decree not only does not contain a condemnation of probabilism, but on the contrary contains its implicit permission and approbation. - Besides, Thyrsus not only defended probabiliorism, but on the contrary attacked probabilism, and consequently, as much as he could, acted with Innocent XI by letters given to him July 29, 1679, and in the month of May in the year 1680. But Innocent XI in his private sentence inclined toward a more severe mode of opining. Wherefore, if notwithstanding these things Innocent XI brought no condemnation against probabilism by his Decree, he implicitly held it as permitted and approved in the Church. - Finally, the aforesaid Decree was not a universal and doctrinal Decree directed to the whole Church, but a wholly particular and merely disciplinary Decree directed to the Society of Jesus alone. Hence St. Alphonsus, replying to Father Patuzzi, who attacked probabilism and objected the aforesaid Decree to the same St. Alphonsus, responds:

"But if the Supreme Pontiff ordered the Jesuits no longer to write for the less probable sentence, this was enjoined upon the Jesuits alone, and that perhaps because of particular reasons which the Supreme Pontiff had at that time." And so true is it that the aforesaid Decree was not a General and doctrinal Decree simply condemning probabilism, that when it was first issued it lay hidden secretly, and not many years later was completely unknown; and when recalled to memory by adversaries, only apocryphal and corrupted copies were had.