Section — Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910)
V. On the Doctrine of St. Alphonsus Concerning Probabilism
114.
- Since in moral matters the authority of St. Alphonsus is very great, and several more recent authors deny that the Holy Doctor stands for probabilism simply such, but affirm that he teaches equiprobabilism, and indeed rejects probabilism as a lax doctrine; hence here especially we raise the question concerning the mind of the holy Doctor, although in the preceding article we have almost constantly used his sentences and even words for establishing the doctrine of probabilism. But it will be very useful, as it were under one view, to set forth his doctrine, in order to understand it fully.
115.
- Lest there be doubt in this matter, and that we may faithfully expound the mind of the Holy Doctor, we take his doctrine from the tract On Conscience in his work Homo Apostolicus, which he himself declares in the same place, n. 79, that he wrote when near death. Now these things are had in nn. 33, 77: "The third sentence, which is ours, says that when the opinion which favors liberty is equally probable as the opinion which favors the law, it can without doubt and licitly be followed... Here it is necessary that I warn about something concerning my system, which is altogether to be warned, and it is this: that when it is doubted whether the opinion favoring the law is equally probable or a little more probable, then the same principle has place, that a doubtful law does not oblige; for in such a case the law itself does not cease to be strictly doubtful; for then, although some greater probability should be present for the law, since it is doubted whether this greater probability is present or not, the preponderance will be so light and minimal that it is to be considered as nothing, before that saying commonly admitted by the adversaries themselves, that a little is reckoned as nothing. But it would be otherwise when the excess were evident and certain; because then the opinion favoring the law will be certainly and much more probable; and therefore then, as was said at the beginning, the law is now morally promulgated, and therefore obliges, and is without doubt to be observed."
116.
- Two things are to be investigated here. The first is what St. Alphonsus understands by an opinion evidently and certainly much more probable. For if he understands an opinion truly and properly probable, he is against us; but if he understands an opinion which passes beyond the limits of probability and reaches certainty, he will be for us. The other is what again the Holy Doctor understands by an opinion equally probable or a little more probable; for if that little more probable denotes a slight excess of probability, as it is distinguished from a greater excess of true probability, again the Holy Doctor is against us; but if it denotes simply an excess of probability, the Holy Doctor will be for us.
117.
- As regards the first, the Holy Doctor refers himself to those things which were said at the beginning. These things are had at the beginning, n. 31: "Whether it is lawful to operate with a probable opinion, three sentences are present. The first of these is that someone can licitly follow an opinion even less probable for liberty, although the opinion for the law is certainly more probable. The authors of the past century held this sentence as if commonly, but we say that it is lax and cannot licitly be embraced. The reason is that when the opinion for the law is certainly more probable, then the law is no longer doubtful by a strict doubt, as happens, as we explain afterwards, when the opinions both for the law and for liberty are equally probable; but it is morally certain, since it has for itself a certain foundation that it is true, while, on the contrary, the less probable opinion which favors liberty has such a foundation that it is not true, so that it remains slightly or at least doubtfully probable before the safer opinion; and therefore it is not prudence, but imprudence, to wish to follow it. For since it appears certainly to the intellect that truth stands more for the law than for liberty, then the will cannot prudently and without fault follow the less safe part; for then he would not operate from his own judgment, or his own belief, but by a certain effort which by his will he would make upon the intellect, removing it from that part which seems truer to it, and bending it toward that part which not only seems to it not true, but does not even show that it has a certain foundation by which it could be true."
118.
- Now from these things it is openly clear that the Holy Doctor, by an opinion certainly more probable, understands in fact an opinion morally certain. For he says that then the law: 1. is not doubtful by a strict doubt, but is morally certain; 2. that the same law then has for itself a certain foundation that it is true; 3. again, that the said law has against itself only an opinion which has such a foundation that it is not true; 4. that the less probable opinion opposed to the law is slightly or doubtfully probable, so that it would be imprudence to wish to follow it, and it not only seems not true, but does not even show that it has a certain foundation by which it could be true. - But a slightly probable opinion is not an opinion truly probable, and the same St. Alphonsus hands this down in n. 65: "slight probability is not true probability, but is only a certain false or vain appearance of probability." Likewise a doubtfully probable opinion is not truly and properly probable, which we contend that it is licit to follow even in the concurrence of a more probable one. For if it is doubtfully probable, it participates doubtfully in the nature of probability, and therefore, properly speaking, is not probable. And indeed an opinion truly and properly probable is defined by the same St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., n. 21, as "that which rests upon some grave foundation, apt for inclining the assent of a prudent man." Therefore a doubtfully probable opinion will be an opinion which has a doubtfully grave foundation, and therefore does not merit the assent of a prudent man, who would be exposed to the danger of acting imprudently. "Doubtfully probable," says St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., n. 65, "which no one can follow, but if it is not probable, has only some prudent reason that it may be true... the doubtfully probable has some prudent reason, although not wholly stable, that it is probable." - And hence it is clear that that opinion, which it is imprudence to wish to follow, and which not only seems not true, but does not even show that it has a certain foundation by which it could be true, is not an opinion truly and properly probable. Therefore, if the less probable opinion, opposed to the certainly more probable, is not truly and properly probable, the certainly more probable opinion by no means subsists within the limits of probability, but now reaches certainty.
119.
- The same is confirmed from the Dissertation inserted in Op. Mor., l. 1, n. 55 of the sixth and seventh edition, and reported in the edition of Father Gaude, p. 25, as a commentary on the doctrine of St. Alphonsus in the text. The Holy Doctor explains that certainly more probable. "I say," he says, "certainly, because when the opinion for the law is certainly and without any hesitation more probable, then that opinion cannot be anything except notably more probable. And in that case the safer opinion will not now be doubtful (understanding doubt strictly so called...) but is morally or quasi-morally certain; at least it can no longer be called strictly doubtful, since it has for itself a certain foundation that it is true. Hence then it comes about that the less safe opinion, which lacks a certain foundation, remains either slightly or at least doubtfully probable in respect to the safer one; and therefore it is not prudence, but imprudence, to wish to embrace it," etc. - Note first that from the Holy Doctor, if an opinion is certainly more probable, it is notably more probable, because a small excess is either not perceived by the intellect, or is not perceived without fear of erring. Hence, if an opinion is certainly more probable, it is also notably more probable. - Note then, as regards that quasi-morally certain, that for the Holy Doctor in this matter, where there is question of a certain moral estimation, a little is reckoned as nothing. - Besides, the Holy Doctor does not speak of any probability whatsoever, but of that which appears certainly to the intellect; and he speaks of the one who, if he withdrew from this probability, would withdraw from his own judgment by a certain effort of the will, and would act against his conscience. To such a one, accordingly, he applies that saying of the Apostle to the Romans 14:23, what is not from faith is sin, ibid. and H. A., tr. 1, n. 31, "from which it is deduced that we, in order to operate rightly, ought to be morally certain concerning the honesty of the action."
120.
- Finally, the Holy Doctor calls that sentence lax which defends even the less probable opinion for liberty without any distinction, which namely has only some foundation of reason and authority, and therefore he distinguished by saying that one cannot follow this less safe opinion when there is a great and certain preponderance for the safer. Apology against Father Patuzzi, year 1765. But the true doctrine of probabilism, which we follow, does not defend indiscriminately just any probable sentence, but a certainly and gravely probable one, which alone is truly probable. Likewise the Holy Doctor calls that doctrine lax which the authors of the past century handed down as if commonly, namely in the latter part of that century, in which several lax opinions of probabilists were condemned by the Holy See; but certainly not Sanchez, Suarez, Lessius, Palaus, Laymann, Lugo, Pallavicini, and very many others, whom St. Alphonsus himself approves and praises for his own opinion not only in his Moral Works, but in that very Dissertation on his Moral system. This he himself defends, and repeatedly champions, not against probabilists, but against rigid tutiorists, and affirms that it was without doubt common among all for a series of many years. Breve Dissertaz. dell'uso moderato dell'Opin. Probab., Naples, 1762, p. 48; Op. Mor., l. 1, n. 59, 68, 73, 84.
121.
- As regards the other point, it is an evident matter that, if the Holy Doctor by a much more probable opinion understands an opinion morally certain, or quasi-morally certain, against slight or doubtful probability, by a little more probable opinion he understands simply an excess of mere probability. Otherwise the Holy Doctor himself certainly could not admit that a probable opinion can at least sometimes retain its probability, and that someone can follow it, although the opposite is notably more probable, as he himself in fact admits several times. Cf. here n. 104 seqq. Otherwise again it would have to be said from the Holy Doctor that there is not in fact given a probable, more probable, most probable opinion, and a more probable opinion in various degrees, but only a probable opinion; which is both false in itself and altogether foreign to the doctrine of the Holy Doctor. Cf. here n. 33 seqq. - But if it is asked why the Holy Doctor then designates that excess by saying, a little more probable, and not simply by saying, more probable, the reason is that the Holy Doctor considers the matter more practically than speculatively, with attention to the nature of the thing and of the principles, and also to the rigor of the words; and thus he distinguishes between a small and a notable excess of probability. A notable excess truly such is had when it is evident and certain, and then, from the Holy Doctor, probability in fact ceases and reaches certainty. And so indeed it is, at least practically and regularly speaking; for such probability, at least practically, is confused with moral certainty, which is certainty in a certain broader sense.
122.
- And in very truth, the Holy Doctor speaks of a much greater probability certainly and evidently such. Certainly and evidently to whom? Certainly not to the opiner alone, since all know well that one and the same opinion appears less probable to one, more probable to another, indeed even to the same person in diverse circumstances; but to all, or by the common judgment of the wise. And in fact if a proposition is certainly and evidently much more probable to all, or by the common judgment of the wise, it is now, practically speaking, morally certain. For in things to be done we often use both most probable and more probable opinions as if true, and as if morally certain, when greater certainty cannot be had. - Every other excess, although perhaps it may be notable, if nevertheless it is not so evident and certain, cannot in fact properly be called notable, since then there is doubt about such a notable excess, and the proposition which seems much more probable to one perhaps, indeed perhaps even to the same person, the matter having been weighed better, as St. Alphonsus himself confesses about himself, l. 1, n. 86; H. A. 1, n. 78, appears much less probable. - Therefore, if that notable excess of probability is so evident and certain, then it now reaches certainty, and by right and deservedly the opposite can only be slightly or doubtfully probable. But if, although notable, it is nevertheless not so evident and certain, that excess in fact, as regards us, cannot be held as notable, but remains within the limits of equal probability or of a little greater probability. And indeed, if to the opiner himself alone a sentence seems notably more probable, or if regarding it doctors fall into various opinions, can that sentence prudently be held as certainly and evidently more probable? Certainly not. - Hence again it is established that by that a little greater excess the Holy Doctor in fact understands simply an excess of probability.
123.
- For this reason the Holy Doctor openly confesses that he does not dissent from the probabilists. "These authors, our probabilists, say that the opinion for the law is to be followed when this is notably and with excess more probable, because in that case the law is morally sufficiently promulgated." Letter of May 25, 1767. And thus Suarez, De Leg., l. 8, c. 3, n. 9: "Greater probability," he says, "is a certain moral certainty, if the excess of probability is certain." Therefore St. Alphonsus did not found a new system, as he himself confesses, but only in the sixth edition and following handed down a practical rule for discerning true and real probability from false and only apparent probability, openly rejecting doubtful and slight probability, and deciding that the certainly more probable is then to be followed. And this in fact is that singular thing which, as the Holy Doctor wrote to Remondini, "is not found in other books." Theol. Mor., ed. P. Gaude, p. XIX.
124.
- But Rev. Father Wouters objects, p. 67, that the Holy Doctor speaks of an opinion certainly notably more probable to the opiner. - To the opiner alone: this is not true, and cannot be affirmed. For a sentence certainly and without any hesitation more probable is well understood if there is question of a certain and notable preponderance of probability as regards all. But if it is restricted to a notable preponderance of probability as regards the opiner himself alone, who is so ignorant of notions that, from the fact that he himself holds some sentence as notably more probable, he is persuaded that it is now certainly more probable, so that the opposite sentence is to be held as slightly and doubtfully probable? That one certainly is not St. Alphonsus, with whom we are dealing at present. St. Alphonsus establishes generally that for this reason we can follow a most probable opinion against the law, because the law is doubtful. Therefore a most probable opinion, which remains within the limits of probability, and much more an opinion only certainly notably more probable to the opiner, remaining within the limits of probability from the Holy Doctor, cannot make the law certain to the opiner. And consequently, speculatively and doctrinally, the axiom of the Holy Doctor has force: A doubtful law does not oblige. Op. Mor., ed. P. Gaude, vol. 1, l. 1, n. 78, p. 58; n. 81, pp. 60-61. - Besides, St. Alphonsus himself, as has already been demonstrated, in several particular cases, although he judged one opinion much more probable, did not for that reason reject the other opposite opinion, and on the contrary held it as sufficiently probable and useful for practice. Behold, we have an opinion much more probable to the opiner, St. Alphonsus, who nevertheless holds the opposite as probable. Cf. n. 104 seqq.
125.
- Moreover what kind of rule indeed would this be, by which someone, after a question has been raised about the value of sentences, could not be ruled except by his own individual judgment? Is this a true rule? It is not a true rule, nor certainly is it the rule of St. Alphonsus: "Such an appearance (of greater probability) cannot constitute a certain rule of operating, since it can deceive in many ways. For not rarely some opinion which will appear more probable to one will appear less probable to another; indeed, to himself an opinion which yesterday was less probable will today appear more probable." Therefore that opinion which appears more probable to someone cannot be a true rule of acting, because "the law would be particular only for him to whom that opinion appeared more probable. But this certainly would be against the nature of law, which for the common good must necessarily be universal and universally proposed, lest the people who are bound to observe it be more often divided and perplexed about the truth to be embraced, while each preacher or confessor from the diversity of opinions would often instruct the faithful according to his own sense." Nor is it of force to say that in following the benign sentence (namely the probable one even in concurrence with the more probable for the law) deformity can also intervene, since the same opinion can seem probable to one, improbable to another. It is not denied that this can happen; but it will always be true that when some opinion is strong with solid probability and rests upon a certainly grave foundation, it will be judged probable among the greatest part of the wise. And this will already be enough for preserving the universal uniformity of observance of the law, notwithstanding that among some particular person that opinion is not probable; for that which rarely happens does not remove universal conformity. However, this does not happen concerning the estimation of more probable opinions; because since greater or lesser probability depends upon moral motives, namely upon judgment and the weighing of reasons, which some draw from one principle, others from another, it happens not rarely, but commonly, that what is stronger to one appears weaker to another... "But that we should become certain that some opinion... is truly more probable or has the required preponderance, this is morally impossible. For either that preponderance is small, and who will be secure that the opinion is truly more probable? For since the excess is modest, it can with difficulty be perceived certainly. Or the preponderance is great; and who will be able to judge that it reaches a sufficient measure, so that the opposite is judged false or slightly probable? And thus we would always have to act with a practical doubt. - Either I am bound to follow opinions more probable in themselves, and then when shall I know which opinion is truly more probable in so many cases where grave reasons and authorities occur opposed on both sides? Or opinions more probable to me, and anxieties would be increased, for often I would have to judge my opinion to be more probable against another sentence of many wise men; and then who will render me safe that my opinion is certainly more probable, and more notable with that notable preponderance which some of the adversaries require? How shall I become certain that I have understood the opposing reasons well and solved them well? That the dictate of conscience which I formed for myself is sufficiently certain and safe? That I was not deluded by my own sense, so that if I err, my error is truly invincible and inculpable?" St. Alphonsus, Dissertation, year 1755, n. 3, 17, 42, 43, 48, 50, 52.
126.
- St. Alphonsus himself tells us "that several opinions which he at some time held as probable, he was afterwards not ashamed to retract." Op. Mor., l. 1, n. 82, p. 62, ed. P. Gaude. - The sentence of Lessius, that it is not illicit to advise a lesser evil to one prepared to inflict a graver one, seemed to the same St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 57, p. 353, ed. P. Gaude, more probable; l. 5, n. 77, p. 763, ed. P. Gaude, sufficiently probable; and H. A., tr. 8, n. 7, not improbable. And on the contrary the sentence of St. Thomas, that that thing frees from the obligation of a vow which, if it had been known from the beginning, would have impeded the vow from being made, seemed to St. Alphonsus probable, l. 3, n. 187, 198, pp. 488, 498, ed. P. Gaude; soon perhaps more probable, the same l. 3, n. 226, p. 518, ed. P. Gaude; finally as certain, the same also l. 3, n. 720, p. 186, ed. P. Gaude. - Can even learned men fully confident in their own knowledge and free from every prejudice rightly weigh the aforesaid excess? St. Alphonsus speaks of a most probable opinion for liberty, note well, against which from the same Holy Doctor there is only the doubtfully probable; and nevertheless against those who say that it is not lawful to follow any except the most probable, behold what he says: "Where will they find so exact a balance which will render them secure that the opinion standing for the law lacks indeed so much weight of probability as would make it probable, and thus they themselves may operate safely and free from danger?" L. 1, n. 81, p. 61, ed. P. Gaude.
127.
- Nevertheless, a sentence will sometimes be certainly and evidently more probable to the opiner himself, with sufficient foundation, "when namely he himself finds a convincing reason which is opposed to liberty, and judges that to such a reason an adequate response cannot morally be given." St. Alphonsus, Dell'Uso moderato dell'Opinione Probabile, cap. 5, n. 26. But when this case occurs, that opiner is now again not found in the case of a probable opinion, but of moral certainty, although perhaps only subjective.
128.
- And if it is asked why the Holy Doctor made this distinction between a little more probable, and notably, much, evidently, certainly more probable, the reason is this: because the Holy Doctor, as is clear from loc. cit., H. A., n. 31, and from the Apology against Patuzzi, 1762, wished to oppose himself to those probabilists who extended probabilism even to slight and doubtful probability, and therefore contended that it is licit to act when there is present any apparent, but not firm, reason or authority. Hence, from the opposite side, the Holy Doctor established that then one must follow the opinion certainly, evidently, notably, much more probable, which, as is clear, in comparison with the slightly or doubtfully probable, is rightly and deservedly called morally certain by the Holy Doctor. Therefore, since St. Alphonsus designated such an opinion, in comparison with the doubtful and slightly probable, by notably more probable, it remained that he should designate any other more probable opinion, in comparison with the truly probable, by a little more probable. Cf. Breve Dissertaz., etc., cited above, at the end of n. 133, p. 51; Op. Mor., Roman ed., year 1757, l. 1, n. 33.
129.
- Behold the very words of the Holy Doctor in the Apology of the year 1765: "I never contended, nor do I now contend, to found new systems; I well know that no probabilist of solid doctrine holds as licit the use of an opinion slightly or doubtfully probable. But because many probabilists indiscriminately say that it is lawful to follow the less probable opinion when it has some foundation from reason or from authority, therefore I wished to distinguish, saying that it is illicit to follow the less safe opinion when there is much and certain preponderance on the part of the safer opinion; because then the less safe opinion cannot be called certainly probable."
130.
- And Joseph Aertnys, C.Ss.R., in his Moral Theology, Tournai, 1890, On Conscience, n. 69, says that according to the mind of St. Alphonsus "to the probable, very probable, more probable, there is opposed the probable or sufficiently probable; to the notably more probable, the most probable, there is opposed the slightly or doubtfully probable." This once established, who can any longer understand equiprobabilism according to the Holy Doctor? The same Rev. Father Aertnys, explaining the sentence of the Holy Doctor, says that the notably more probable opinion, about which the whole question is, and which one is bound to follow from the Holy Doctor, is in reality an opinion morally certain; "wherefore an opinion is not truly probable when the opposite is notably more probable, n. 80." But probabilists do not say that it is lawful to follow an opinion not truly probable, but an opinion truly probable. Equiprobabilism is thus reduced to a mere abuse of words, by still calling an opinion morally certain probable. The question would no longer be a question of a moral system, but at most would be a logical question of the nature of probability: namely, whether it is always true that an opinion notably more probable renders the opposite not truly probable. This, as has already been said, regularly and practically speaking, is true only when that opinion is certainly notably more probable to all. Cf. here n. 122 seqq. But if the question is made speculatively and doctrinally, this is altogether false, and will not be proved for all eternity. For probability of itself does not exclude opposite probability; probability is not excluded except by opposite certainty.
131.
- From the tract On Conscience in Homo Apostolicus and in the Moral Theology, according to St. Alphonsus it is lawful to follow an equally or nearly probable opinion for liberty, "because a doubtful law does not oblige... Hence all agree in asserting that law, in order that it oblige, must be certain and manifest, and must as certain be manifested or become known to the man to whom it is promulgated... whence no one is bound by any precept except through the mediation of knowledge of that precept," l. 1, n. 57, p. 26; n. 58, p. 27; n. 59, p. 29, ed. P. Gaude. But this is the very principle of simple probabilism itself. And from it, in fact, not equiprobabilism but simple probabilism is deduced: "because opinion denotes doubtful or probable cognition of some truth, but science signifies certain and evident cognition," l. 1, n. 53, p. 28, ed. P. Gaude. Therefore, with an opinion standing for the law, even certainly and notably more probable, the law does not become known as certain; nor is knowledge of the law had; and therefore it is doubtful, and even practically does not oblige, if against the law there stands, as well can stand, a truly probable opinion.
132.
- The same is wholly evinced from the general rule which the Holy Doctor hands down for the choice of opinions. "For the rest, I protest that just as I do not approve those confessors who, adhering to excessive austerity, easily condemn the use of several opinions which rest upon a grave foundation; so, on the contrary, neither can I approve those who easily acclaim opinions without certain foundation as probable," l. 1, n. 82, p. 62, ed. P. Gaude. - "For the rest, in discussing doubtful matters I had equal scruple both about admitting as probable sentences favoring liberty and foreign to reason, and about condemning as improbable those which seemed to me to rest upon some valid foundation," l. 3, n. 547, ed. P. Gaude, p. 33. - This rule of acting practically is certainly the rule of simple probabilism.
133.
- The system of equiprobabilism also cannot be understood from the Admonition prefixed by the Holy Doctor to his work, at the end of the preface, ed. P. Gaude, p. LVI, so that the reader may be able to understand which opinions the Holy Doctor approves in his work and which he reproves. It was certainly the place for affirming the system of equiprobabilism, and yet not even a word is had favoring equiprobabilism. - Finally, both in the Homo Apostolicus and in the Moral Theology, the Holy Doctor pursues with the greatest diligence not only the more common and more probable opinions, but also the less and much less probable and common. For this reason the Holy Doctor does not consider whether a sentence is notably or certainly more probable, but whether it is probable; and if he judges it probable, he exhibits it as a norm of acting.
134.
- If therefore someone still wishes to contend that St. Alphonsus speculatively champions another system, different from true probabilism, he must certainly confess that practically St. Alphonsus is a true probabilist. And indeed, if, in order that we be bound to follow the more probable opinion according to the system of St. Alphonsus, that excess of greater probability must be commonly evident and certain, cf. here n. 124 seqq., you will scarcely perhaps find one or another such opinion in moral matters, since, as we have already observed, where there is question of probability, even the judgments of very grave theologians are very diverse, and therefore that excess cannot prudently be held as evident and certain. Indeed, as Ithur. observes, Cas. 44, n. 5: "scarcely any question is discussed among doctors in which there are not both probabilists who embrace the stricter sentence against other probabilists, and probabiliorists who embrace the more benign sentence against other probabiliorists." - L. l. 3, n. 930, dub. 1.
135.
- Therefore the doctrine which St. Alphonsus holds as lax is not true probabilism, which remains within the limits of true and proper probability; but it is that probabilism which goes beyond these limits and extends itself even to slight and doubtful probability. Hence the Holy Doctor does not absolutely say that this doctrine is commonly held, but as if commonly by the authors of the past century; for at that time it was in fact held by many. But it would be wholly and wrongly confused with the doctrine of true probabilism, which was truly commonly, indeed most commonly, handed down. Hence the same St. Alphonsus called this most common and most probable, Dissert. de Usu moder. opin. probab., 1755, which through almost two centuries exhausted the labors of so many wise men, and which, if it had been false, the Church would not have tolerated.
136.
- And if indeed the matter is not so, where is that moral system which in the Catholic Church could be defended in Catholic fashion, as Clement XIII replied to St. Alphonsus himself in the year 1761? l. 1, n. 84, 85, p. 66, ed. P. Gaude. For before St. Alphonsus there was nothing intermediate between true probabilism and tutiorism or probabiliorism; nor then was equiprobabilism even counted among the moral systems. But the Holy Doctor perpetually refuted tutiorism or probabiliorism. But the Holy Doctor asserts that he hands down only the common doctrine, l. 1, n. 59, 84. But the Holy Doctor perpetually taught: In order that there not be grave sin, it suffices that true probability be had, I understand that which rests upon a foundation NOT SLIGHT, etc., l. 3, after n. 139, Epist. Resp. Wherefore it is immediately to be noted that the Holy Doctor very rarely uses this note, certainly, notably, more probable, etc., which the Vindic. Alph., Appendix 1, Clavis operum, etc., themselves noted; and this indeed would be very strange if his system had been so little practical for the Holy Doctor himself. Nothing, on the contrary, would have had to be expressed more frequently and clearly in individual questions. The Holy Doctor did not reject true and proper Probabilism, but broad Probabilism, extended namely even to slight probability, which the Church certainly did not tolerate. Cf. following n. 138.
137.
- But it is objected: From the Holy Doctor, "for acting licitly we ought in doubtful matters to inquire into and follow the truth; but where the truth cannot clearly be found, we are bound to embrace at least that opinion which approaches nearer to truth, such as the more probable opinion." L. 1, n. 54, p. 25, ed. P. Gaude. - The Holy Doctor himself solves this objection in advance, by simply denying that we are practically bound to follow the opinion approaching nearer to truth: "When truth appears for the law, we are certainly bound to follow it, because then the law manifestly appears, whence no one can form for himself a right conscience (concerning the non-existence of the law). Otherwise, if the thing only appears more likely; for then, since truth likely stands also for the other part, the law is doubtful, and therefore in that case either the law is not present or it does not oblige." Dissertation, year 1755, n. 35. "When the opinion for the law appears more likely, such an appearance cannot constitute a certain rule of operating, since it can deceive in many ways." Loc. cit., n. 17. "Certainly we are bound to follow what appears more likely concerning the truth of the honesty of the use of an opinion, but not always what appears more likely concerning the truth of an opinion... because often, granted, the law more probably seems to be present, nevertheless it will be more probable that it does not oblige; and from this we form a practical judgment morally certain concerning the licit... the law in that case, since it is doubtful, does not oblige." Loc. cit. 54, 17.
138.
- Are all opinions which St. Alphonsus reports and does not expressly reject, although neither does he expressly approve them, to be held as probable according to St. Alphonsus? - On this matter St. Alphonsus himself thus declares his mind: "I judged that the Medulla of Hermann Busembaum should be placed before my work, not now so that I might approve all the opinions of that author himself, but only so that I might follow his method, which among the methods of other doctors for expounding moral matters seemed to me very suitable... For the rest, kindly reader, I wish you to be warned, lest you think that I approve those opinions from the fact that I do not reprove them; for sometimes I shall faithfully set them forth with their reasons and patrons, so that others, according to their prudence, may judge of what weight they are. Then note that when I call some opinion truer, then I do not hold the contrary as probable, even if I do not expressly condemn it as improbable. Moreover, when I call one of the sentences more probable, without giving any judgment about the probability of the other, or use this phrase, I do not dare to condemn, I do not for that reason understand myself to call it probable, but to refer it to the judgment of the more prudent." Author's Admonition to the reader, at the beginning of the work. And again, l. 5, n. 76: "And here again I repeat what I protested at the beginning, namely that when I call some opinion only more probable, I do not therefore understand myself to call the contrary probable. Likewise, when I say concerning some opinion, I do not dare to condemn it, or to call it improbable, I do not therefore admit it as probable; but I doubt concerning its probability. Likewise, when I call some sentence truer, I understand the opposite not to have solid probability for me, although I do not altogether reprove it." - Nevertheless it can in no way be denied that in fact certain opinions are held by the Holy Doctor, at least implicitly, as sufficiently probable, which he not only reports, but also weighs their reasons, and to which he himself seems to add strength, if, in enumerating grave theologians, he says, for example, the Salmanticenses judge it probable, etc., or adds at the end, indeed Palaus says, Lugo adds, notes, etc. St. Alphonsus also holds as sufficiently probable the opinions which he says are not improbable, l. 3, n. 1012. - Acta S. Sed. vol. 1, p. 467 seqq.