Case LXXV: Confession Before Celebration

Peregrinus, a parish priest, invited his nephew Juvenal to spend a few days with him. Juvenal had been recently ordained and had just been appointed to the cure of souls. He gladly accepted the invitation, for he regarded his uncle as his greatest benefactor, and owed him a debt for having in many ways shown himself a wise friend and counselor. On the last day before his nephew's departure (Saturday), Peregrinus committed a peccatum turpe ex fragilitate carnis, and this caused him the greatest distress.

What was he to do? As parish priest he was well aware of the strict command of the Church, requiring him to confess a mortal sin before saying Mass; but it was unspeakably repugnant to him to confess such a peccatum turpe to his young nephew, to whom he has stood in so close a spiritual relationship.

As there was a vera necessitas celebrandi on the following Sunday, Peregrinus did not feel himself bound under the circumstances to make his confession to Juvenal before celebrating, so he contented himself with perfect contrition. Quid ad casum?

Answer.—The rule laid down by the Council of Trent (sess. 13, c. 7), that mortal sins must be confessed before a priest celebrates Mass (Holy Communion), is generally regarded as a lex ecclesiastica, but not as a praeceptum divinum, perhaps in the sense of an official explanation of the probatio required by St. Paul (1 Cor. xi, 28). A difficulty connected internally and inseparably with the fulfilment of such an order certainly forms no ground of excuse, e. g., no kind of shame, however great, justifies a breach of the law; otherwise no priest would be bound to confess any particularly shameful sin. It is, however, possible for a verecundia extraordinaria not to have its origin so much in confession of the sin as in some external circumstance, not essentially connected with the confession, but conditioned by some peculiar chain of events. This is true in the case under consideration. We have present in it the near relationship (uncle, nephew), and the particular bond of affection between Peregrinus and Juvenal (the former has been the benefactor, friend, and spiritual adviser). These circumstances give rise to a verecundia extraordinaria, and many of the more important recent moralists regard them as a ratio excusans a lege Tridentina. Father Génicot, S.J., in his Institutiones theol. mor., II. n. 193, says: “We judge the opinion of certain authors sufficiently probable: that extraordinary and truly invincible shame excuses, for example, if an uncle had to confess a very shameful sin to his nephew. The reason is that in such cases making a confession is exceedingly difficult because of the enormous repugnance that must be overcome. For, as St. Thomas testifies: ‘Many are so weak that they would rather die without confession than confess to such a priest.’ Nor does this hardship seem intrinsic to confession. For loss of reputation before the confessor is indeed intrinsic to it, but by no means the difficulty arising from the fact that here and now someone has no other confessor besides this one, whom for just reasons he greatly dreads. Or, even if it should seem intrinsic to someone, it does not appear why, in a law that is probably merely ecclesiastical and in which authors admit excuses for a cause not so grave—for example, a distance of one or two leagues—a case most harsh to human weakness cannot be excepted by epikeia.”

Aemilius Berardi, the well-known Italian writer on pastoral theology, expresses himself in very much the same way in his Praxis Confessariorum (p. 558, etc.); he denies that the copia confessarii, presupposed by the rule of the Council of Trent, exists in a case where a confessor was indeed at hand, but invincible repugnance prevented confession from being made to him. For what if an uncle were forced to make confession of a most shameful sin to his nephew? Uncles are not accustomed to make confession to nephews, and consequently the means in question would be excessively abnormal. Besides, contrary to Gury and others who think most rigorously on this point, the following theologians speak more leniently. Voit openly supposes that shame alone can sometimes be so great that it excuses.... Gousset (n. 193) ait: “A confessor would be judged lacking when only such a priest was present before whom confession could not be made because of a more or less legitimate but insurmountable repugnance.... I would say that truly great and extraordinary shame suffices so that, in urgent necessity, Mass may on some occasion be celebrated with contrition alone, with the intention of approaching one’s proper confessor as soon as possible. Nor is the reasoning valid that shame alone never suffices for making a partial confession; for it can more readily be conceded that some Mass be celebrated with contrition alone, provided the sin is certainly accused as soon as possible, than that an opening be made for partial confessions from a motive of shame.... Finally, what if the wretched priest, in so straitened a case, were prepared rather to undergo disgrace or permit other disadvantages than to endure so hard a sacrifice?”

Views equally lenient are taken by Fr. Kenrick, who died in 1863 as Archbishop of Baltimore (Theol. mor. de euch., p. 1, c. 4, § 2) and Noldin (Summa theol. mor., III. n. 141); the latter refers to Berardi and Génicot (ll. cc.) in support of his opinion.

The reasons adduced by these eminent theologians certainly enable us to claim probability for their theory. In the case under consideration there is an incommodum gravissimum due, not to the confession itself, but to purely exterior considerations of kinship and affection, and therefore we may probably apply here the general principle: "lex humana (positiva) non obligat cum gravi incommodo." The Council of Trent, in making this law, certainly had in view ordinary circumstances, in which a verecundia extraordinaria is connected internally with the duty of confession, not those in which it is connected with this duty in a purely external way.

It is true that this distinction may be abused, and the plea of verecundia extraordinaria be put forward too lightly; such an abuse, however, would not be due to the theory, but to too lax an application of it in practice.

The question resolves itself finally into this:

Rigorism when pushed too far (as Berardi says, and as was suggested even by St. Thomas, l. c.) often leads to sacrilege, because a priest cannot make up his mind to go to confession; ought we not therefore to prefer to avoid it, by adopting a rational and justifiable application of a theory which, though less stringent, is probable, both for internal and external reasons?

Such a case of verecundia extraordinaria occurs very seldom, and priests may be trusted to have enough prudence and conscientiousness to prevent too lax an application of the principle. In my opinion Peregrinus was quite justified in being contented with contritio perfecta, although he was bound nevertheless to confess the sin committed quam primum, i. e., within three days.

This more lenient opinion is obviously not to be limited to priests. For instance, a priest's sister, acting as his housekeeper, after making her confession on the day before Communion to a priest in another parish, might commit a similar peccatum probrosissimum. Could she be bound to confess it to her own brother? No one could seriously require this of her; there is not only such a thing as vera necessitas celebrandi, but also necessitas communicandi.

We are far from wishing to tolerate laxity too freely, but a knowledge that there is a more lenient view may be of assistance to confessors and help priests, who are their penitents, to avoid a conscientia erronea.—Dr. Johann Gföllner.