Chapter I — Propositions condemned by the Holy See

He condemned the following propositions, which I transcribe in the order observed in the decree.

1. He satisfies the annual precept of confession who confesses to a religious presented to the bishop but unjustly rejected by him. [no. 13]

An opinion is probable which says that the Bull "In Coena Domini" forbids absolution from heresy and other crimes only when they are public; and that this does not derogate from the faculty of Trent, in which there is discourse of hidden crimes; which in the year 1629, on the 18th of July, in a Consistory of the Sacred Congregation, was seen and tolerated by the most eminent Cardinals. [no. 3]

4. Regular prelates can in the forum of conscience absolve any seculars whatsoever from hidden heresy and from the excommunication incurred on account of it.

5. Although it be evidently established to you that Peter is a heretic, you are not bound to denounce him if you cannot prove it.

6. A confessor who in sacramental confession gives to a penitent a paper to be read afterwards, in which he incites to venery, is not reckoned to have solicited in confession, and consequently is not to be denounced. [no. 14]

7. The way of evading the obligation of denouncing a solicitation is that the solicited person confess with the solicitor: the latter can absolve him without the burden of denouncing.

11. Sins omitted or forgotten in confession on account of an instant danger of life, or on account of some other cause, we are not bound to express in the following confession.

12. Mendicants can absolve from cases reserved to bishops, without having obtained for this the faculty of the bishops.

13. He satisfies the precept of annual confession who confesses to a regular presented to the bishop but unjustly rejected by him.

14. He who makes a voluntarily null confession satisfies the precept of the Church.

15. A penitent can by his own authority substitute for himself another who may fulfil his penance in his stead.

16. Those who have a benefice with cure of souls can choose for themselves as confessor a simple priest not approved by the Ordinary.

24. Softness, sodomy, and bestiality are sins of the same lowest species; and therefore it suffices to say in confession that one procured pollution.

25. He who has had intercourse with an unmarried woman satisfies the precept of confession by saying: I committed with an unmarried woman a grave sin against chastity, without explaining the intercourse.

38. The command of Trent made to a priest sacrificing of necessity in mortal sin, that he confess as soon as possible, is a counsel, not a precept.

39. That particle "as soon as possible" is understood as when the priest shall confess at his own time.

41. A concubinary is not to be obliged to cast out his concubine, if she were exceedingly useful for the concubinary's entertainment — commonly a "treat" — when, she being lacking, he would pass his life too wretchedly, and other food would affect the concubinary with great loathing, and another maidservant would be found with too great difficulty.

1. It is not unlawful in conferring the sacraments to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the sacrament, the safer being left aside, unless law, agreement, or the danger of incurring grave loss forbid it. Hence a merely probable opinion is not to be used in the conferring of Baptism, of priestly Orders, or of the episcopate.

56. Frequent confession and communion, even in those who live in the manner of the heathen, is a mark of predestination.

57. It is probable that a natural attrition suffices, provided it be honourable.

58. We are not bound to confess to a confessor questioning us the habit of some sin.

59. It is lawful to absolve sacramentally those who have confessed only by halves, by reason of a great concourse of penitents, such as, for example, can occur on the day of some great festival or indulgence.

60. To a penitent having a habit of sinning against the law of God, of nature, or of the Church, even though no hope of amendment appear, absolution is neither to be denied nor to be deferred, provided he utter with his mouth that he is sorry and purposes amendment.

61. He can sometimes be absolved who is engaged in a proximate occasion of sinning which he can and will not omit; nay, who directly and of set purpose seeks it or thrusts himself into it.

62. A proximate occasion of sinning is not to be fled when some useful or honourable cause of not fleeing occurs.

63. It is lawful to seek directly a proximate occasion of sinning for our own or a neighbour's spiritual or temporal good.

64. A man is capable of absolution, however much he labour under ignorance of the mysteries of faith, and even though through negligence, even culpable, he be ignorant of the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ.

14. The fear of hell is not supernatural.

15. Attrition which is conceived by the fear of hell and of punishments, without a love of benevolence toward God for his own sake, is not a good and supernatural motion.

16. The order of promising satisfaction before absolution was introduced not by the polity or institution of the Church, but by the very law of Christ and the prescription of nature, the thing itself in a manner requiring the same.

17. By that practice of absolving at once the order of penance has been inverted.

18. The modern custom as regards the administration of the sacrament of Penance, although the authority of very many men uphold it, and a long duration of time confirm it, is nevertheless held by the Church not for a use but for an abuse.

19. A man ought throughout his whole life to do penance for original sin.

20. Confessions made to religious are for the most part either sacrilegious or invalid.

21. A parishioner can suspect of mendicants who live on common alms that they impose too light and incongruous a penance or satisfaction for the sake of gain or profit of temporal support.

These propositions and all the rest which throughout this whole work I have recounted, I do not assert as a censor of the men who hold them, but I submit them to the judgment of those to whom it belongs. This protestation, although I have made it several times, it has pleased me to renew again. No one therefore can carp at me, as if I anticipated the judgment and censure of superiors: since I brand these opinions with no censure of my own, but merely submit to the judgment of superiors and of readers those things which seem to my feeble reason false and lax.

I. Fr. Dominic Viva in his Treatise on the Propositions of Innocent XI, no. 16: “Hence, since it seems to be morally certain that there is not required in the sacrament of Penance a formal purpose of not sinning henceforth, but that a virtual one suffices, as may be seen in Dicastillo, AND THAT THERE SUFFICES ALSO A SUPERNATURAL ATTRITION FROM THE FEAR OF TEMPORAL PUNISHMENTS, AS TO BE INFLICTED BY GOD THE AVENGER, and other things of this kind — therefore we lawfully follow opinions of this kind, THE MOST LAX, the safer being omitted.”

II. Fr. Patrick Sporer, On the Sacraments, part 3, chapter 2, section 2, § 2, no. 174: “The precept of contrition, even in the article of death, does not oblige a sinful man justified by the use of the sacrament with attrition; but that attrition itself with the sacrament of Baptism or of Penance is universally and always a sufficient disposition for justification, and consequently even in the article of death. So Henríquez, Vásquez, Cano, and Cardinal de Lugo, citing many, here disputation 11, section 15; Dicastillo here disputation 6; Munito, tract 6, chapter 2, no. 7.”

III. The same Fr. Sporer in the place cited, no. 175: “The precept of contrition does not oblige those who by the use of the sacrament with attrition are justified, or who wish to be justified. So most commonly the authors to be cited below. The reason is, because Christ in the new law by a singular privilege instituted also another means of justification, namely the sacraments of the dead, Baptism and Penance, so that consequently THE NECESSITY of perfect contrition alone MIGHT CEASE: otherwise assuredly Christ, instituting and commanding sacramental confession, a means in itself hard enough and difficult, IF BESIDES THERE WERE STILL REQUIRED PERFECT CONTRITION, itself difficult enough to a sinner, would not have lightened but much aggravated the burden of the law; and Christians would now be of a worse condition than the ancients of old, who, being obliged to contrition alone, were justified by it.”

IV. The same Fr. Sporer in the place cited, § 2, no. 175: “When does it oblige? Per se indeed, probably enough, in the article or peril of death only.” Afterwards, no. 177: “That the precept of contrition per se obliges only in the article of death, and never before, most grave Doctors teach — St. Thomas, Cajetan, Soto, Navarrus, Medina, Adrian, and others heaped together; and Suárez calls it probable; and Dicastillo himself defends it morally. Since this precept is penal and burdensome, it is not to be extended, but rather restricted, to those times only for which its obligation is certainly established to us. But the obligation of this precept is not certainly established to us for any time, except in the article of death. Therefore, and so forth. You see the probability of this opinion.”

V. Fr. George Gobat, tract 6, no. 159: “I say sixthly: It is probable indeed that no precept exists concerning perfect contrition, speaking per se, to be elicited before the article of death; the contrary opinion nevertheless (abstracting from the reception of the sacrament) is more likely, and in practice to be followed. The first part is proved by the authority and the reasons which Suárez, disputation 15, section 6, and Dicastillo, in the cited disputation, part 3, last doubt, adduce for it. Which Dicastillo tooth and nail defends that former part, Suárez holding it only for probable.”

VI. Fr. Dominic Viva, chapter 3, article 3, no. 8, proposes this question: “Whether a sinner who cannot in some year confess for want of a confessor is bound to contrition before the year elapse?” Thus he answers: “Dominic Soto affirms it … because the divine precept of doing penance, which of itself is indeterminate, has already been determined by the Church to individual years … according to that rule, "He who cannot as much as he ought, let him pay as much as he can"; and according to that other, "He who cannot the whole, let him render the part which he can." … I answer indeed with others commonly in the negative. For it is false that the Church determined that indeterminate time of doing penance in general, to which we are obliged by divine precept. For she only determined the indeterminate time of confessing. But since in such a case confession is impossible, the sinner does not seem bound to contrition. And the further reason is, because since to be contrite is something merely internal, it does not fall under the precept of the Church, neither by reason of itself and directly, as is plain, nor by reason of another and indirectly, that is, by reason of the sacrament, and so forth. To the rules adduced — "He who cannot the whole," and so forth — I answer that they hold good when the parts of the whole are homogeneous … but not when they are heterogeneous.”

VII. The same Fr. Viva in the same place: “It is true indeed that the divine precept of contrition obliges sinners not to defer penitence long and up to death. To this nevertheless it does not follow that one unable in some year to receive the sacrament of Penance is bound at least to be contrite.”

VIII. De Lugo, On Penance, disputation 7, section 13, no. 261: “Whether in the article of death it suffices to have known attrition? The fifth doubt is more difficult: whether he who receives the sacrament of Penance with known attrition ought still under mortal sin to have contrition at least in the article of death. Many affirm it — Suárez, Nuño, Sánchez, Granado, Valentia, and so forth. The contrary opinion nevertheless many others teach — Coninck, Becanus, Layman, Fagundez, Faber, Diana, Turrianus, Salas, and other more recent men. No. 262: This latter opinion has always seemed to me the truer.”

IX. The same de Lugo in the place cited, no. 271: “You will say: Neither can it be denied that the contrary opinion is probable, which teaches that there is an obligation of eliciting contrition on account of that danger. One cannot therefore in a matter of so great moment conform oneself practically to our opinion, although it be more probable. Because although in other matters we can follow probable opinions and have a practical judgment according to them for acting lawfully, this nevertheless has no place when it would turn to the detriment of one's own or others' salvation. And therefore we cannot use Baptism with a more probable matter or form, the more certain being left aside, because we should expose eternal salvation to danger, if perchance that opinion were false. Since therefore the opinion which we now impugn is probable, and it is safer, we cannot practically embrace ours, although, speaking speculatively, it be more probable. No. 273: I answer that one must speak otherwise of the opinion which denies that attrition with the sacrament suffices, and otherwise of that which lays down an obligation of having contrition on account of the uncertainty of this remedy. The former indeed is not probable after Trent, as we have said, nor has it foundations which suffice for probability; nay, it is branded with censure by many of the graver men. But the latter is probable. But its probability does not hinder a practical judgment by which someone can in acting embrace our opinion. For that rule, that in acting it is lawful to follow a probable opinion, IS TRUE UNIVERSALLY, if the discourse be of the last judgment concerning what is lawful or unlawful here and now. Nor is that rule an objection which says that concerning the matter and form of the sacrament of Baptism and of Order, at least of the priesthood, it is not lawful to follow a probable opinion. For there the discourse is not concerning the lawful, but concerning validity — for example, of the matter or of the form.”

X. Henry Henríquez, Book 4 of his Summa, chapter 6, no. 5: “He who with attrition is justified through absolution is not bound to the connatural precept of formal contrition, both because he has now obtained remission by the remedy per se instituted, and compensatory from the application of the merits of Christ, and because he has fulfilled in an equivalent, and by a stronger and better title, the whole end to which contrition is ordained. For contrition does not remit sin, nor compensate, save inasmuch as it includes the desire and place of the sacrament of Penance. Wherefore God the creditor is more content with compensation applied through the sacrament than with the compensation of contrition. Otherwise contrition, while it could be had, would be necessary, and would oblige PER SE, even while absolution is received, which then can be had; and consequently CHRIST IN THE EVANGELICAL LAW WOULD NOT HAVE LIGHTENED THE BURDEN, BUT WOULD HAVE ADDED THE GRAVE BURDEN OF CONFESSION besides the necessary contrition.”

XI. Fr. Dominic Viva in his Treatise on Proposition 15 of Alexander VIII, no. 10: “Nor would the law of grace excel the ancient or Mosaic or natural law, in which contrition without sacramental confession sufficed; whence THE YOKE OF CHRIST COULD NOT BE CALLED SWEET AND THE BURDEN LIGHT. … Therefore it must be said that contrition is not prerequired to the sacrament, but that mere attrition conceived from the mere fear of punishments suffices.”

XII. Fr. Tamburini, Book 1, Method of Confession, chapter 1, § 4, no. 2: “Among the motives of attrition, of which we spoke at no. 4, although some do not admit that other fourth one — that is, the fear of a temporal evil — and consequently one who should execrate his sins on account of the fear of infamy, of prison, of sickness, and the like, which are wont to be incurred on account of sins, would not by these Doctors obtain a lawful sorrow for the sacrament of Confession, because sorrow of this kind is natural (they say) and not supernatural, as is required for obtaining supernatural grace: nevertheless in the MOST PROBABLE opinion this also is a sufficient motive, if evils of this kind be feared as inflicted or to be inflicted by God.”

XIII. The same Tamburini in the place cited, § 2, no. 5: “Whence when you observe your penitent to be greatly addicted to some crime, do not inculcate an act of sorrow concerning that particular sin. For a danger will underlie lest he detest it from the heart, while its special memory is rubbed afresh, whereas in general, together with the others, he will feel either no difficulty in detesting it, or a small one.”

XIV. Fr. Patrick Sporer, part 3, chapter 2, section 4, no. 310, page 204: “For a man can truly grieve for and detest a sin, and truly and absolutely purpose that he will not sin henceforth, or conceive a firm and sufficient purpose of abstaining hereafter; although he greatly fear, or even reckon, nay certainly believe, that on account of the experienced inconstancy of his own will and his own frailty he will relapse anew, and will not avoid all mortal sins, or this certain kind of sin. Whence if a penitent say: "I altogether indeed grieve, and firmly purpose to abstain hereafter; meanwhile nevertheless I KNOW that I shall do it again, that I shall fall again, as I have so often experienced" — he is to be ABSOLVED AS WELL DISPOSED, due confirmation and consolation being sent before. Because the sense of the word "I shall do it again" is only indicative or enunciative on the part of the intellect.”

XV. The same Sporer in the place cited, question 2, § 1, no. 324: “For when it is only probable that you will succumb to temptation in such an occasion, certainly it is also probable that you will not succumb. For there occur grave reasons on account of which a prudent man judges that you will fall in this occasion; but on the contrary there are also other grave reasons on account of which another equally prudent man judges that you will not fall. Certainly by following this man's judgment, without the note of rashness, for a reasonable cause you could commit yourself to this occasion, being certainly not about to commit yourself if you knew, or certainly believed, that you would fall. Wherefore a confessor will not judge him to be in a proximate occasion of sinning — for example, of getting drunk, of fornicating, and so forth — who, being tempted in such a place, succumbs only three or four times; otherwise if eight or seven times, and only twice or thrice he avoided the sin and came off superior. Wherefore to this man, not to that, unwilling to leave this occasion, absolution will have to be denied. John Caramuel, Theologia Regularis, disputation 20, no. 1056, will have absolution to be given also to him who is a rare and rarely a victor, as Vismann reports, Fr. Gobat not contradicting, case 16.”

XVI. Fr. George Gobat, tract 5, chapter 3, § 2, section 2, nos. 19 and 20, page 585: “I clearly know that it frequently happens, especially among plebeians and rustics, that a girl lies with her suitor in the same bed for several hours, clothed or unclothed, and yet they do nothing at all unchaste, or exercise only kisses and base handlings. Whence I judge that absolution cannot be denied by a confessor to all those plebeian girls (I think otherwise of noble ones, for various considerations) who do not seem to have a purpose of never again admitting their suitor into their bed.”

XVII. Fr. Dominic Viva, question 3, article 4, no. 17: “Whence Pérez, Leander, de Lugo, and others infer that adolescents can be absolved who are engaged with women labouring in the same house, or conversing with those who do not dwell in the same house: because although sometimes on such an occasion they sin mortally by consent, and even by intercourse, that occasion nevertheless is reckoned remote. Since indeed men are not wont on such an occasion to sin ALWAYS, OR ALMOST ALWAYS, MORTALLY.”

XVIII. Fr. Gobat, tract 6, no. 261: “I say sixthly: although by deferring confession up to the article of death, or up to Easter, you be certain that on account of this delay you will forget many crimes, there does not nevertheless hence arise for you an obligation of confessing sooner. So indeed the common sense holds, as I reckon, both of penitents and of confessors.”

XIX. Leander, tract 5, disputation 3, question 19: Are those who wish to receive the other sacraments (besides the Eucharist) bound by divine law to confess? He writes these things: “But I answer most certainly that they are not bound: because no precept exists imposed concerning this, as is clearly gathered from Trent. … So Victoria, Sylvester, Angelus, Soto, whom Suárez cites and follows, Fagundez, de Lugo, Villalobos, and all commonly.”

XX. Fr. Claude La Croix, Book 6, part 1, no. 944: “Death, the burning of a house, the privation of reason, and venereal motions are called effects of sin; and it is asked concerning them whether and when they are to be explained in confession; whether it be enough to say: "I transfixed him, intending the death of my neighbour"; "I burned my neighbour's house"; "I drank, foreseeing the danger of drunkenness"; "I procured base things, foreseeing venereal motions" — keeping silence that all these things really followed. It seems more probable that there is no obligation, speaking per se, of confessing such an effect. So Vásquez, Salas, Granado, de Lugo, Bonacina, and so forth. … Although the effect was in sin, as foreseen or even intended as a cause, nevertheless such an effect cannot properly be called a sin, as was proved in Book 5, no. 33; since it is neither in itself a sin, nor does it externally complete the sin, according to what was said at no. 945. Therefore there is no obligation of confessing it, because there is no obligation of confessing anything other than sin. Nor is it an objection that he did not retract the cause. For whether he retracted it or not, the effect remains in its own manner equally unchangeable, not as a fault, but only as the effect of a past fault, as was explained in Book 5, no. 42. And consequently such a man will satisfy by saying: "I cast away my Breviary, foreseeing that for so long a time I could not pray"; "I held out poison to my neighbour, intending his death" — keeping silence whether he did not pray for the hours, and whether the death followed or not.”

XXI. Fr. Gobat, tract 7, no. 324: “The malice of a circumstance changing the species is not contracted, and consequently is not to be confessed, unless the penitent, when he was committing the sin, at least doubted whether such a circumstance were not present, and whether on account of it a peculiar sin were not contracted. So the common sense of theologians holds. Use, my good man, this rule FREQUENTLY, especially in hearing the confessions of rustics, and namely when the malice of the circumstance is known to the learned alone.”

XXII. Fr. Dominic Viva in his Course of Moral Theology, Vol. II, part 6, question 5, no. 2: “Although a penitent be bound to answer a confessor questioning him concerning a habit of sin, since the opposite opinion was condemned by Innocent XI … nevertheless, speaking per se, a habit of this kind is not to be laid open.”

XXIII. De Lugo, disputation 16, section 4, § 7, no. 202: “He who through several perjuries procures a habit of perjuring himself, by that very fact constitutes himself in a danger and proximate occasion of perjuring himself afterwards. Therefore he ought in confession to explain that circumstance of habit, inasmuch as it includes at the same time a moral danger and a proximate occasion for subsequent sins, and so forth. … Nevertheless still, as a rule, it does not seem …” … “that circumstance is necessarily to be explained: both because men do not commonly attend to that moral danger of a following sin when they commit some sin, nor can it easily be discerned when a habit arrives at that degree that it induces a proximate moral occasion of other subsequent sins; and also because to expose oneself to the danger of fornication, for example, has not a malice specifically diverse from fornication itself. Since therefore he explained in the preceding confession his own fornication, he has already explained the whole specific malice of that sin. For that circumstance of danger which he underwent of another fornication does not add a malice specifically diverse, although it aggravate within the same species. Whence as a rule the penitent does not seem to be obliged to confess a habit necessarily, unless he be questioned.”

XXIV. The same de Lugo, in the same place, no. 104: “A greater difficulty can be concerning a habit of the latter kind, which namely is the cause of doing like acts without sufficient deliberation or advertence. In which case it seems above all certain that subsequent acts done without present deliberation are not new sins, but are only sins in their cause, namely in the preceding habit freely willed, or are effects of the sin, as with others Thomas Sánchez and Suárez prove. … Whence it will not be necessary to explain in confession subsequent oaths uttered without advertence, but only the cause culpably posited beforehand, namely that habit willed or permitted, as the same Sánchez notes.”

XXV. Fr. La Croix asks, Book 6, part 2, no. 973, whether those things which from a mortally evil habit are afterwards done inadvertently are to be confessed? He answers at no. 974: “If we suppose that when those things are done there is present no advertence at all to the malice, such things will not have any new malice, as is established from what is said in Book 5 from no. 16. And consequently, since these things are not in themselves sins, nor externally complete any internal sin, but are merely effects of sin according to what is said at no. 944, there is no obligation of confessing them … which is true, according to many with Dicastillo, although that habit be not retracted.”

XXVI. Fr. Tamburini, Book 1, Method of Confession, tract 7, § 7, no. 48: “I say it is probable, from St. Thomas, II-II, q. 16, art. 9, and Cajetan in the same place, that consanguinity does not differ in species from affinity, nor one degree of these from the others. So Filliucci, saying that it is the opinion of St. Thomas, Cajetan, Soto, and almost the Thomists; Gregory; Megala … both in Diana. Whence although without doubt it be graver to offend against one degree — for example against the first with a mother — than against another, for example with a cousin, nevertheless because the species is not changed, I think that these are not specially to be manifested in Confession.”

XXVII. The Salmanticenses, tract 24, disputation 8, doubt 4, § 2, no. 202, page 140, say: “In a second way it happens that a confessor inquires concerning these circumstances, not out of some special and accidental motives, such as we have just recounted, but because he is of that opinion, that circumstances notably aggravating within the species ought to be explained in confession. And then a penitent, because he knows at least from the testimony of others that our negative opinion is safe, more common, and more probable than the contrary, is not bound to answer to that interrogation of the confessor; but he can with reverence say that he has explained what he ought, and that he can keep silence about what he keeps silent, nor is he held to more: because he knows that circumstances notably aggravating — for example the quantity of the thing taken away, concerning which inquiry is made — are not necessary matter of confession. And by what has been said the confessor cannot compel him to more, nor deny him absolution by force of this: because the penitent proceeds according to a safe and probable opinion, and therefore acts rightly, and the confessor CAN and OUGHT to conform himself to him.”

XXVIII. Fr. Viva, question 4, article 4, no. 2: “Wherefore it is enough in confession to say: So many times have I taken morose delight in unlawful union, not explaining whether with a married woman, or with a nun, or a blood-relation, and so forth; or, so many times have I taken morose delight in the killing of men, not explaining whether it be about a father, or a priest, or an enemy, or of another condition.”

XXIX. Fr. La Croix, Book 6, part 1, no. 1010: “He who without any desire looks upon a person with a lustful eye is not bound to say (in Confession) of what sort the person was.”

XXX. The same La Croix in the same place, no. 1013: “He who without desire touched a girl lustfully, according to Diana … satisfies by saying that he has so many times touched her basely, saying nothing of the parts which he touched.” He adds: “Others say probably that it is to be expressed if he touched a shameful part.”

XXXI. The same in the same place, no. 1040: “He who has fornicated with three different women, or thrice with one, satisfies by saying that he has thrice fornicated; nor is he bound to say whether it was one or several, whether they were harlots or others, provided he has not cooperated to the hindering of generation. So Bonacina and Tamburini.”

XXXII. The same in the same place, no. 1041: “If a priest fornicate with a daughter of confession, St. Thomas, Soto, Sánchez, and other most grave authors, whom Aversa relates and follows, still say that a new species of malice is contracted, because canon law calls it a certain adultery or incest: and in fact it seems to be a species of irreverence and sacrilege against the Sacrament. On the contrary, that it is simple fornication, and that it can be kept silent that she was a daughter of Confession, teach Ledesma, Vásquez, Sá, Bonacina, Filliucci, John Sánchez, Pontius, Hurtado, Ochagavia, Dicastillo, Tamburini, Diana, de Lugo: because from Confession no spiritual kinship arises, as is certain, nor does it appear why an irreverence should be reckoned to be done to a Sacrament already past, since the sin has no respect to it. Each opinion is probable. The first is more conformable to canon law; but the second seems from reason the more probable.”

XXXIII. De Lugo, On Penance, disputation 16, section 3, no. 142: “Concerning the circumstance of soliciting a woman to fornication, whether it is to be explained, or whether it suffices to confess the fornication: it pleases me, what with others Vásquez teaches, that that circumstance is not to be explained: because that malice is had, although not so grave, when a man does not solicit: for even then he participates with her in her sin, and is a cause of cooperation to her ruin.”

XXXIV. Fr. Viva, question 5, article 4, no. 10: “If a man solicited another and the sin did not follow, it ought to be explained in confession; if nevertheless the sin followed, de Lugo and Tamburini think probably, against Sánchez and Bonacina, that it is not to be explained that you were the first to invite: because although you sinned gravely by inviting, nevertheless you are still a partaker of that sin, even if you had not invited.”

XXXV. Fr. La Croix, Book 6, part 2, no. 1072: “It is indeed probable that kisses, embraces, and even base speech, done publicly in a sacred place, have not the character of sacrilege; and therefore it is not necessary to say that it was done there. So hold Sánchez, Aversa, and others with Diana.”

XXXVI. Leander, disputation 8, question 42: “Whether, if a man commits a sin on the day on which he took the sacred Eucharist, he is bound to confess this circumstance of time? I answer more probably that he is not bound, speaking of itself, because otherwise a priest who celebrates daily would have to explain in every sin that circumstance, that he had celebrated Mass on that day — which no one does. So Homobonus, de Lugo, Diana, Trullench, Vásquez, and so forth.”

XXXVII. The same Leander, tract 5, disputation 8, question 15: “Whether the effect which followed ought to be explained, or whether it suffices to confess the cause: for example, whether it be enough in confession to say that I gave a deadly poison to someone that he might die; or whether it be necessary to add that you killed him with the poison? … I answer more probably that it suffices to confess the action, not the internal one of the will, but also the external, by which you prepared and gave the poison, although you do not confess the effect, that is, the death which followed from it: because in confession only sins must necessarily be explained; but that effect, when it follows, is not actually a sin, but an effect of sin. So Vásquez, Granados, Azor, Bonacina, Diana, and Suárez, Coriolanus, all of whom de Lugo relates and follows, disputation 16, article 1, no. 470, where he treats this point most learnedly.”

XXXVIII. Fr. Viva, question 2, article 2, no. 3: “Whether he who is certain of a mortal sin committed, but doubts positively whether he confessed it, so that he has a probable reason that he confessed it, and probable also, nay more probable, reasons that he did not confess it, is bound to confess it? I answer likewise negatively with the common opinion of the Doctors whom Martin Perez cites against Coninck, in Diana.”

XXXIX. The same Fr. Viva in his Course of Moral Theology, On Penance, question 2, article 2, no. 6: “I answer that it was almost the most common opinion of the ancient Doctors that a man is bound to subject negatively doubtful sins to the keys. And Thomas Sánchez reputes this altogether certain. … For this cause Fr. Matthew de Moya of our Society, who was confessor to Mary Anne Queen of Spain, in his Select Questions on the Sacrament of Penance, after he had asserted that he had taught the contrary opinion for thirty years even in the Schools, disputation 1, inquiry 5, has these things: "Nevertheless, the matter being considered, I judge firmly for the contrary and common opinion asserting the obligation of a doubtful sin: to which I am led by this one efficacious argument, that the Sacrament of Penance could have been instituted by Christ the Lord with this obligation. But that he did institute it, the more common sense of Catholics persuades, and a tradition continued from the time of the Apostles down to our times, by reason of which the Doctors have not so much proved as HANDED DOWN AS AN UNSHAKEN DOGMA the precept of confessing doubtful sins equally with certain ones. For, as Augustine says, Book 4 Against the Donatists, that which the universal Church holds," and so forth. Thus far Fr. Moya. To these add Leander and Tamburini himself, although patrons of the kindlier opinions.”

No. 7: “These things notwithstanding, I think the contrary opinion is probable and safe, asserting that negatively doubtful sins are not necessary matter of the Sacrament of Penance, which very many authors follow in Mendo and Diana and others … whom Caramuel numbers up to twenty-two … to whom add Amicus, Lessius, Sá, Layman, Praepositus, Leander, Hounihl, and also Ferdinand On Scandal, page 77, where he cites the Revisers of the Society of Jesus as permitting that this opinion can now be permitted in our Schools; which Marchant, Joseph de Januario, Martinon, and many other writers openly judge probable. Although formerly, according to the rules of our Society, it could not be permitted; scarcely would one writer be found who openly maintained it, as the same Revisers testify in Tamburini; now nevertheless, as Diana notes, IT DAILY STRIKES DEEPER ROOTS.”

XL. The same Fr. Viva, question 2, article 2, no. 7: “Nor do you say that the practice of the Church and the consent of the Doctors through sixteen centuries, uniformly reckoning that the Sacrament of Penance was instituted by Christ the Lord with the obligation of confessing doubtful sins, renders us certain of such a law and institution. For although it be true that down to the past century scarcely one author is found who openly disobliged us from confessing negatively doubtful sins, yet it did not arise thence because all the writers went over to the obliging opinion with their pen, but because they abstained from that question. But since NOW it is agitated in its own terms, and very many follow the disobliging opinion, this has been rendered probable.”

XLI. Fr. Gobat, tract 6, no. 479: “Fr. Coninck, Book 6, no. 98, denies that the opinion is probable of those who think that, when there is present so great a multitude of persons wishing to confess for some celebrated feast that the priest cannot satisfy all by hearing all entire, he can say to each that they lay open only the graver of their mortal sins and defer the rest to another time. I think, subject to a better judgment, that that opinion can probably be sustained, in the case in which many came from far off for the sake of obtaining some great indulgence which requires Confession and Communion.”

XLII. Fr. John Baptist Gonnaz, disputation 5, on the obligation, section 2, § 2, no. 166, pages 775 and following: “Wherefore even if perchance someone, while actually sinning, be suddenly deprived of his senses, he is regularly not to be dismissed without absolution; since it most rarely happens that a man near to death should not wish to consult his own salvation at least by attrition, which it is not established that he inwardly lacks, although externally he be deprived of sense: for by the condition an injury to the Sacrament is avoided. So Bonagratia cited above. See Gobat, tract 7, nos. 597 to 625.”

XLIII. Fr. La Croix, Book 6, part 2, no. 1288: “The Rigorists say that the cause of relaxing discipline as regards penance is the growing cold of the charity of the faithful. But on the contrary, rather among the causes was: first, lest Confession, impugned by the heretics as impossible, be rendered still more odious by hard penances. Second, because with the passage of time there were more priests, among whom Confessions most useful to amendment were frequented, and who in this internal forum otherwise healed sins by kindlier medicines. Third, because it was observed that kindly penances profit more than rigid ones, because by kindly ones the faithful are the more allured to the Sacrament of Penance and of the Eucharist. Fourth, because on occasion of the sacred war against the Turks the use of indulgences was introduced, which is a manner of satisfying for sins more useful and more certain than the observance of the penitential canons. Fifth, because with the passage of time Religious Orders were instituted, which are most useful for the giving of penances. See Francolinus, Roman Ceremonial, part 2, chapter 1.”

XLIV. Fr. Patrick Sporer, part 3, chapter 4, question 1, § 3, no. 45: “A confessor is excused for enjoining no penance, or a very slight one … when a man gains some plenary indulgence, he can be dismissed without any other penance at all; since by that indulgence the debt of punishment is satisfied. And although this rarely happens for certain, it suffices that it be probably believed.”

XLV. Fr. Viva, question 6, On Penance, article 2, no. 1: “Nay, de Lugo, disputation 27, section 1, no. 24, thinks that he who gains an indulgence is not obliged to penance, even if it be given as a medicine, because a physician does not command but persuades a remedy, and a judge alone commands a penalty. Wherefore if a penitent by reason of an indulgence is not bound to the penalty which is commanded, neither will he be bound to the medicine which is only persuaded, unless perchance he be sometimes obliged to it by natural law, lest he easily fall.”

XLVI. Fr. Sporer, part 3, chapter 4, question 1, § 4, no. 548: “The opinion certainly of grave Doctors — Soto, Cajetan, Sylvester, Medina, and Navarrus, Manual, chapter 26, no. 20 — namely that it is free to a penitent to accept or to repudiate a penance imposed by the confessor, even though after Trent it be not intrinsically but nevertheless extrinsically probable, can serve to this, that the confessor send no one away without absolution who, having followed that opinion, should be unwilling to accept the penance imposed, being prepared to satisfy God in this life or in the other, provided he be willing to undergo some, even the SLIGHTEST, penance — for example, some Our Father and Hail Mary, a beating of the breast, and so forth.”

XLVII. Fr. La Croix, Book 6, part 2, no. 1788: “Lamas and Sioz think that those are sufficiently learned for this office (of confessor) who have diligently read an entire SUM OF CASES, or have attentively heard it explained. But if anyone doubt of himself, let him present himself to the examiners appointed by the bishop or superior; and if they judge that he knows enough, he can acquiesce, and with confidence in God undertake the function, although it be the greatest and gravest of all. So Sioz and Sporer.”

XLVIII. The same La Croix in the same place, no. 1797, page 284: “Here Gobat notes, tract 6, no. 521, that a confessor ought to know SEVERAL OPINIONS which are truly probable concerning moral matters, because often, where it is not a question of the validity of the Sacrament, he cannot nor is it expedient to direct penitents ACCORDING TO A SINGLE DOCTRINE.”

XLIX. Fr. Viva, question 8, article 1, no. 7: “Innocent XI in the year 1679 willed that bishops should not permit confession of venial sins to be made to a simple priest not approved by the bishop or Ordinary. … I think nevertheless with the Cardinal and others in La Croix that it is not invalid, and that the Sacrament would not be exposed to the danger of frustration; for since it is probable that jurisdiction is conferred immediately upon a priest by Christ the Lord, and that with probable jurisdiction the Sacrament of Penance is validly conferred, as we shall say in the ninth question, therefore the Sacrament is validly conferred by a simple priest at least from venial sins, or from mortal sins otherwise absolved.”

L. The Salmanticenses, tract 6, chapter 2, point 2, no. 16: “You will ask first, whether, if it happen that someone confessing in good faith of venial sins only to some simple priest should have perchance a hidden and invincibly forgotten mortal sin, the confession and absolution should still be valid, by which indirectly even the mortal sins are remitted? Candidus denies it. … They affirm nevertheless probably that in the case posited the confession and absolution are still valid, by which indirectly even mortal sins are remitted, with the burden nevertheless of confessing the invincibly forgotten mortal sins to a lawful confessor, when afterwards they come into memory and the time of the precept of Confession is at hand. So Suárez, Granados, Leander, Henríquez.”

LI. Leander, tract 5, disputation 31, question 14: “Whether every priest, in no way exposed, can validly absolve a penitent who in good faith confesses venial and mortal sins together? … I answer more probably that he can in each case validly absolve from mortal sins, although the penitent, being made more certain that that priest has no jurisdiction over mortal sins, is bound to confess again.”

LII. Fr. Viva, question 8, article 1, no. 16: “I answer that jurisdiction is conferred not only when to a common error a coloured title is joined … but also probably if a common error be not conjoined with a coloured title; suppose, if a priest not having jurisdiction should in good or in bad faith expose himself in the confessional to hear confessions, being commonly reckoned an approved confessor. So Diana, Malfesius. … But this error ought to be probable, not indeed rash or gross.”

LIII. The same Viva, question 8, article 2, nos. 1 and 2: “It seems not to be lawful to confect the Sacrament of Penance with probable jurisdiction, at least when certain jurisdiction can be had. Nevertheless I judge it to be lawful to absolve with probable jurisdiction. … Hence it follows that by Innocent XI in the first of his proscribed theses this opinion has not been condemned: because he ought to have CONDEMNED IT OPENLY, if he had wished, that not only in those things which pertain to the matter and form of the Sacrament, but also in those which pertain to jurisdiction, we should follow the safer opinion, the probable being omitted, as many learned men thought.”

LIV. Fr. Francis Fegelli, part 1, tract 2, no. 31, page 14: “The practice and usage of all confessors has obtained that they bestow absolution with probable jurisdiction. Therefore, lest their acts be so often void with the greatest loss to penitents, it is rightly judged that the Church most certainly confers jurisdiction, even if it were not given before.”

LV. Fr. Viva in his Course of Theology, question 9, article 3, no. 1, disputes and resolves these things: “It is asked, secondly, whether those who ignorantly incur a reservation incur it: the same is asked of those not adverting to it while they actually sin.” After many things he thus concludes: “Wherefore from first to last, neither reservation nor excommunication do they incur who are ignorant of them; and because the Doctors commonly equate actual inadvertence and forgetfulness with invincible and inculpable ignorance, it follows thence that he who does not advert to the penalty or the reservation is reckoned not to incur it, no otherwise than if he were ignorant of it. Whence Sánchez, Book 4, chapter 12, teaches that if a man, for example, had vowed to fast as a penalty for perjury, as often as he lies, if thereafter he lie adverting to the vow of not lying but not to the penalty imposed of fasting, he would indeed sin, but would not be bound to fast — from this principle, namely, that an extraordinary and medicinal penalty is not incurred by him who is ignorant of it, or does not advert to it.”

LVI. Fr. Sporer, part 1, chapter 6, section 5, § 3, no. 78, writes roundly: “Ignorance of the reservation, whether of law or of fact, even if it be vincible, excuses from the reservation. And indeed it follows manifestly from what has been said. For if doubt concerning the reservation excuses from it, much more will ignorance of the reservation, even vincible, excuse.”

LVII. The same Sporer in the same place: “Gobat well observes, deservedly judging that a regular confessor would not be faithful to his prelate if, having found a penitent implicated in a reserved sin but ignorant of the reservation, he should not say expressly: "I absolve you indeed this once (namely from a probable opinion and a kindly interpretation of the superior's mind, lest, proceeding in good faith, you should have to confess the same mortal sin twice); but know seriously that I could not have absolved you without the express will of the superior": and that he himself is wont to counsel this to parish priests and vicars solicitous concerning episcopal reserved cases.”

LVIII. Fr. Viva in his Treatise on Proposition 41 of Alexander VII, no. 16: “It is doubted here whether he can be absolved who has been engaged in a proximate occasion of sinning before he take it away, especially if he promised in another Confession; and then if he did not promise. Some — Coninck, disputation 8 On Penance, no. 133, Filliucci, Azor, Sánchez — think that he cannot be absolved outside the case of necessity. Nay, Cardenas, difficulty 40, chapter 5, article 4, no. 108, thinks that this is gathered from proposition 61 of Innocent XI, where it is condemned that he can be absolved who is engaged in a proximate occasion of sinning which he can and will not omit. And the reason seems to be, because he who approaches the Sacrament of Penance before he take away that occasion is reckoned to be unwilling to cast it out, and therefore to approach without the due efficacious purpose of not sinning thereafter; since in this very thing, that the occasion of sinning is not taken away when it can be taken away, he sins. Nor is it an objection that he says he has the purpose of taking it away; for he only purposes to take it away in the future; and if he does not take it away at once, by that very fact he wills to remain for the present in that occasion, and therefore sins; just as he who, when a lion is approaching, purposes to flee and does not flee at once, is reckoned to will to remain in danger of death. More commonly nevertheless with Suárez, disputation 32, section 3, Tabiena, and others think that a penitent of this kind can be absolved once and again, if here and now there appear true signs of grief and of an efficacious purpose of taking away at once the proximate occasion. Nay, Córdoba, Cajetan, and others think that he can be absolved even a third and a fourth time, though it be often expedient to defer absolution until that proximate occasion be taken away. He ought nevertheless altogether to be absolved even before the separation from it, both if danger of death be at hand, and if, absolution being deferred, it be believed that he will not have the opportunity of returning, or from another cause will not return. The reason why he seems able to be absolved the first and second time is because the penitent could, either immediately, or by hearing a sermon, or by hearing the admonitions of the confessor himself, be stirred up to a true and efficacious purpose of not sinning, in which case he is sufficiently disposed. So everywhere penitents are absolved by this, that they purpose to restore, although before Confession they had not restored, as they could: because from the confessor's admonitions there can here and now arise a true purpose of restoring, which before Confession was either weak or was thought sufficient, even though for some opportune time the restitution had to be deferred. Therefore this same thing can be done in him who is bound to take away a proximate occasion. Nor from that proposition 61 of Innocent XI is it drawn that he cannot be absolved: for he who purposes to take away the occasion at once cannot be said to will it for the present, just as neither is he said to will the danger of death who, when a lion is approaching, purposes to flee as soon as he can. Cautiously nevertheless is one to proceed in this, because everywhere a purpose of this kind is not efficacious in him who could beforehand have taken away the occasion of sinning and has not yet taken it away.”

LIX. Fr. Martin Torrecilla teaches many lax opinions concerning the sacrament of Penance. It is to be observed nevertheless that the same are defended by other casuists also, whom I omit to cite for brevity's sake. “In proposition 57 condemned by Innocent XI concerning natural attrition, it seems not to be condemned to say that a supernatural attrition, so reckoned, suffices, even though in fact it be natural.” The same Torrecilla, On Condemned Propositions, upon proposition 57 of Innocent XI, tract 8, conclusion 3, no. 19, folio 461.

LX. The same Torrecilla, Vol. III, Considerations, Consultation 11, Miscellany, no. 1, folio 454: “When the confession is only of venial sins, there is not required that grief or attrition of which Trent speaks, session 14, chapter 4; but it suffices that the penitent approach confession with a desire and will of confessing, without an actual complacency of sinning.”

LXI. The same, Vol. I, Sum, tract 4, disputation 4, section 1, chapter 5, no. 17, folio 418: “Sins under doubt, even if strictly such, positive or negative, are not necessarily to be confessed.”

LXII. The same in the place cited, tract 1, disputation 2, chapter 4, § 2: “It is at least not grave in sacramental confession (especially if it be general, though voluntary) to feign past grave sins never laid open in confession, as though it were done before.”

LXIII. The same in the same place, § 7, no. 512, folio 75: “He who in confession omitted a mortal sin which from a vincibly erroneous conscience he did not think such, is not bound, when he has adverted to it, to repeat the confession, but only to confess the sin which he omitted.”

LXIV. The same in the same place, § 10, no. 635, folio 86: “Generally the rude and ignorant can be admitted to the completing of confession, even if they have sent no examination before.”

LXV. The same, Vol. II, Sum, tract 1, disputation 2, chapter 4, § 10, no. 645, folio 87: “A confessor can absolve a penitent, even if he certainly know him to be in mortal sin which even when questioned he does not confess: for he ought to believe that he has a just cause for denying it.”

LXVI. The same in the same place, tract 4, disputation 4, section 2, chapter 1, no. 50, folio 426: “In three cases a simple priest can actually administer the sacrament of penance. First, if the confession be of venial sins. Second, if it be of mortal sins already confessed, and of those forgotten in other confessions. Third, in danger of death, probably even with the parish priest or an approved priest present.”

LXVII. The same in the same place, chapter 4, no. 18, folio 431: “Any approved priest whatsoever can by force of the Crusade absolve as often as may be from the hidden cases of the Bull In Coena Domini, heresy excepted.”

LXVIII. The same in the same place, section 4, chapter 1, no. 54, folio 442: “A parish priest is eligible as confessor by force of the Crusade or Jubilee in the whole diocese, nay even in others.”

LXIX. The same in the same place, tract 1, disputation 1, chapter 4, § 9, no. 289, folio 57: “Regulars can use the privilege of the Bull of the Crusade, so as to be absolved independently of their prelates by any confessor whatsoever, even from cases reserved to their own Order.”

LXX. The same in the same place, tract 4, disputation 4, section 2, chapter 3, folio 456: “It is probable that approved regulars can still by force of their own privileges absolve from the hidden cases of the Bull In Coena, heresy excepted.”

LXXI. The same, Vol. I, On Condemned Propositions, tract 2, consultation, from no. 54, folio 97: “A priest, at least a regular, approved with a limitation for a certain kind of persons, or for this or that place, can by virtue of the Bull of the Crusade or of the Jubilee be chosen without limitation for Confessions by anyone whatsoever.”

LXXII. The same, On Condemned Propositions, the said tract 2, consultation 1, no. 57, folio 97: “In proposition 13 condemned by Alexander VII there is not comprehended the opinion of those saying that a priest approved for a determinate time, that being past, is eligible by force of the Bull or Jubilee; nay, that this has place when the limitation of time was set without any cause, or by the ill or free will of the Ordinary.”

LXXIII. The same in the same place, tract 4, disputation 4, section 3, chapter 3, nos. 17 and 18, folio 446: “An approbation once absolutely granted to regulars, unless there be just cause of revoking it, is neither justly nor validly revocable, at least by the same bishop who granted it.”

LXXIV. The same in the same place, no. 10, folio 447: “No other cause is to be reckoned sufficient for a bishop to be able lawfully and validly to revoke an approbation once absolutely granted to regulars, save because the regular lives scandalously, sows errors, is utterly filthy, or is out of his mind.”

LXXV. The same in the same place, no. 9, folio 449: “It is probable that a regular approved by a bishop, even if he change his diocese, always and everywhere retains that approbation, and needs only the concession of jurisdiction of that bishop to whose diocese he passes.”

LXXVI. The same, Vol. On Bishops, tract 2, § 3, section 2, difficulty 3, nos. 81, 85, and 88, folio 108: “Regulars once approved by the bishop of one diocese cannot be subjected to a new examination by the same or by his successor; nay, neither can secular priests, unless licence was granted them without examination, or, if an examination preceded, another just cause intervening, that they be subjected to examination.”

LXXVII. The same, On Condemned Propositions, tract 2, consultation 4, from no. 3, folio 107: “A regular priest approved by his own Ordinary for hearing the confessions of religious, where the Constitution of Gregory XV Inscrutabili is not received, can by force of such approbation hear the confessions of nuns, even of those who are subject to the bishop; where it is received, he can do this same thing by virtue of the Crusade.”

LXXVIII. The same, Vol. III, Consultations, Consultation on Penance, nos. 1 and 2, folio 541: “A bishop who at his entry by public edict commands that all confessors, both secular and regular, present themselves, and that, the said term being past, they cease from confessions, proceeds not only unjustly but invalidly.”

LXXIX. The same, On Condemned Propositions, tract 2, On Penance, consultation 1, nos. 26 and 27, folio 96: “All regulars and religious, and even the Knights of St. James, of Calatrava, and of Alcántara, and likewise nuns, by virtue of their own privileges can confess to any simple priest whatsoever, even for the fulfilling of the annual precept; and at the very least this is not condemned in proposition 13 condemned by Alexander VII.”

The propositions which Fr. Francolino detected in Merbesius, Gennet, and Juvenin as more rigid than is equitable are not such as they seemed to me. Nonetheless, that I may again make plain that I am free from party zeal, I have judged it worth the labour to transcribe the same and to subject them to the readers' study, such as they are reported by Fr. Francolino, whose animadversions also I shall report. Fr. Francolino premises that he transcribes these propositions not as a censor, but that from them the reader may judge whether there be in the schools any doctrine more rigid than is just. For he says: If therefore their doctrine is more rigid, then it is already a more rigid doctrine, and consequently the rigorism is of many.

I. Merbesius. Contrition properly so called, or the conversion of the heart necessary to the validity of the Sacrament, demands the love of God above all things. In his Christian Sum, Vol. II, page 57.

II. Francolino: “Although he afterwards says that an initial or inchoate love of God, not a perfect one, suffices, he signifies that an intense love is precisely not required; but for the rest he requires a true theological charity. For it is established that charity, even remiss, is true theological charity, just as remiss heat is true heat.”

III. Merbesius. For true contrition there is required not only a grief for all mortal sins conceived generally and confusedly, but also one conceived specially and distinctly of individual sins, both as to number and as to species. Page 54, column 1.

IV. Francolino, page 115: “Although he admonishes that it is enough that this be done by a single act, he nevertheless wills that that act tend to sins singly recollected according to species and number.”

V. Merbesius. By the holy Fathers four reasons are alleged on account of which a priest is bound to defer the reconciliations of penitents. If anyone shall say that this can now neither be done nor ought to be, although it was practised in former times, I answer that what was formerly practised is to be done in these our times also, if those same reasons on account of which it was formerly used flourish in this our age also. Page 94. And he brings forward there these four reasons only: The first, he says, that from the length of time and the difficulty of the cure the sinner might understand the magnitude of the evil perpetrated by himself. The second, that the sinner himself, having obtained the reconciliation to which he had come through so many groans and labours, might the more studiously flee sin, and most diligently retain the grace gained by so many tears. The third, that thence it might appear what punishments await obstinate sinners, wont to sin one thing after another, if to those hastening so hardly to return to God, and undergoing the labours of penance, the grace of remission is granted. The fourth at last, that the inward conversion of heart, being well examined and known by the searcher of hearts, might at length, through the labours of penance exhibited for some time at least, come into the knowledge of the priests.

VI. Francolino, page 114: “But since these reasons flourish now also as they flourished formerly, it follows that absolution ought also to be deferred. … Speaking of penitents who have an inveterate habit of sinning, he thus discourses (Merbesius): Men of this kind are not to be absolved quickly, because they are converted to God as they ought only with great difficulty. For as St. Thomas says, I-II, q. 78, art. 2, reply 3, "he who sins from habit always rejoices in this, that he acts from habit, so long as he uses the habit; but because he can not use the habit, but through reason, which is not totally corrupted, meditate something else, it can happen that, not using the habit, he grieve for that which he has committed through the habit; and so for the most part such men repent of sin, not because sin displeases them of itself, but on account of some inconvenience which they incur from the sin." Thus St. Thomas. Therefore since with those who sin from a vicious habit the sin does not displease of itself, namely inasmuch as it is an offence of God, but on account of some detriment or temporal inconvenience, and what they perceive from it, if they are so affected, as also any others so minded, sacramental absolution is for a time to be denied and deferred, until their conversion be discerned and appear through worthy fruits of penance and a love of God at least inchoately conceived.”

VII. Francolino, page 124: “I omit that Merbesius here adds of his own that word temporal, which is not in the text of St. Thomas whom he alleges; and that St. Thomas does not there treat of those approaching Confession, to which those who come spontaneously are not wont to grieve for sin in order to avoid some temporal inconvenience, but at least from fear of hell with hope of pardon, and that they may be reconciled to God, and therefore with some love of God. That seems intolerable, that this author demands so many things that these penitents may at last be absolved.”

VIII. Two things I observe in passing in Fr. Francolino's doctrine, by no means that I may undertake the defence either of Merbesius, or of Juvenin, or of Gennet, but lest the unskilled err. Indeed, in the text of St. Thomas that word temporal is not there; but it is in Fr. Viva and others to be cited below. Those who come spontaneously, says Francolino, are not wont to grieve for sin, and so forth. Is the spontaneous approach to the confessional therefore an argument of sufficient grief for receiving the sacrament? This doctrine, which seems to me laxer than is just, and which many probabilists teach, I shall refute below. Now I have only indicated it.

IX. Merbesius: Contrary remedies are to be applied to vicious habits: therefore confessors act perversely who, for the routing of habits of pride, avarice, lust, drunkenness, and evil-speaking which have deeper roots, enjoin only some few prayers. Page 121.

X. Francolino, page 124: “These confessors so generally neither St. Thomas nor St. Antoninus condemns; in whom a confessor is excused, or even praised, who acts more kindly with penitents of weak virtue, in whom a graver burden of penance would extinguish the small fire of contrition.”

XI. Merbesius: If a penitent should fall frequently into mortal sins, he could be proved for two months, or for a whole three months; at whose expiry, if a true amendment were foreseen, proceeding from his entire fidelity and from the force by which he endeavoured to tear out from his soul sins implanted by long custom, he could be absolved. Page 141, column 1.

XII. Francolino, page 124: “But what will become of those who either cannot return any more, or cannot return at the appointed time, who are truly innumerable?”

XIII. Merbesius. A penitent cannot reserve the satisfaction of his offences to the next world, that he may be purged in Purgatory. Page 165, column 2.

XIV. Francolino, page 125: “If the sense be that neither can a part be reserved to the other world, the proposition is opposed to the doctrine of Raymond, Humbert, and Antoninus, as will be plain to one consulting their Sums.”

XV. Merbesius. A penitent to whom it is certainly established that from the practice of the Church a satisfaction lighter than his crimes deserve has been imposed by the priests, is bound to take another upon himself of his own accord, which indeed shall wholly prepare some equality with the temporal punishment owed for his sins.

XVI. Francolino, page 125: “He adds the reason which I was saying, namely the natural and divine precept of satisfying God by a punishment corresponding to the fault. What straits for wretched penitents, who will doubt of this very thing, whether they truly lack this certainty; and who, that they may prudently judge that they themselves observe this divine precept, will be bound to search out what is the practice of the Church concerning this. And here again straits.”

XVII. Merbesius. It behoves every priest desiring rightly to moderate and rule souls in the tribunal of penance to be imbued and instructed with the knowledge of the canons, or rules, which the holy Fathers and the Councils established and promulgated for the punishing of mortal offences; otherwise he will break through the most holy decree of Pope Celestine inserted into the body of law, granted in these words: Let it not be lawful for any priest to change his own, or to do anything which may be contrary to the rules of the Fathers. Page 182, column 2.

XVIII. Francolino, page 125: “It is useful, and assuredly it is, to learn these canons thoroughly, and therefore confessors are admonished to take care to know them; but that this is necessary and commanded by law is not proved by that mandate of Celestine, which either does not now bind, since the penitential canons are not now in use, or speaks of those, since the knowledge of them was not necessary to all the priests whom Celestine there addresses, and perhaps not to all confessors.”

XIX. Fr. Francolino accuses Merbesius of rigorism. But let all hear the judgment which the most wise Cardinal de Aguirre passed upon the Sum of Merbesius, dissertation 1, in the Councils of Spain, excursus 2, where he has this: “Merbesius was a learned theologian and greatly versed in the sacred canons, as his Christian Sum, published in two vast volumes at Paris in the year 1687, shows. I am not unaware that that work is accused by some of too much severity or rigour. But perhaps that they should so judge, the German cause in most matters is the reason, not because his opinions are stricter than is just, but because their conscience is lax; so that here that old saying has in some manner place: Naked feet do not tread upon thorns, but they have.”

I. Juvenin, page 502, Lyons edition, column 2, at the beginning, lays down this conclusion: The hatred of sin ought to be the more intense, the more depraved the crimes are.

II. Francolino, page 126, no. 3: “And he adds that this is under precept according to some, although according to some it is not. He nevertheless already brings in a scruple, when he wills that for the removing of a scruple we ask of God the intensity of contrition due to each sin.”

III. Juvenin: He who grieves from fear of punishment alone will doubt with foundation of the supernaturality of his contrition. Page 509, column 2.

IV. Juvenin: The divine precept obliges the fallen to confess within a short time, so that it is not lawful for one fallen to defer his confession for any long time according to a prudent estimation. Page 664, column 2.

V. Francolino, page 127: “This proposition is contrary to all the Doctors, one or another excepted, as has been said.”

VI. Juvenin: By divine law satisfaction is necessary for those fallen after Baptism. Page 676, column 2.

VII. Francolino, page 127: “And indeed a condign one, so that a light one cannot be enjoined for grave sins, as he afterwards contends to prove. Therefore since the Church cannot dispense in divine and natural precepts, it has ill dispensed in this, as it has assuredly done most often.”

VIII. Juvenin: The danger is great lest nobles, who are held by a great desire of fame, rush to duels, if they remain in those places in which they perceive their fame, which they love, will be brought into peril. They are therefore to be dismissed without the sacrament, if they refuse to depart from those places. Page 712, column 1.

IX. Francolino, page 127: “This danger does not seem proximate, nor does that foresight seem to stand in the way, if otherwise they have a firm purpose of abstaining from every sin. Otherwise scarcely any noble soldier can be absolved.”

I. Gennet, Vol. 4, tract 6, chapter 5, question 19: “It is required that the confessor be able prudently to judge that the penitent's contrition includes the four circumstances which the Tridentine Synod judged necessary, and so forth. The third is a firm and constant, or not wavering, purpose of a new life.”

II. Francolino, Book 2, disputation 10, no. 26, page 99, Venice edition: “But they perchance do not see the consequences of their own doctrine, as certainly Francis Gennet is to be said not to have seen them in his most recent Moral Theology published at Paris in the year 1703. Out of several examples of his most rigid doctrine, whence grave absurdities follow, I shall bring forward one from Vol. 4, tract 6, On the Sacrament of Penance, where, chapter 5, question 19, he teaches that for true contrition in this Sacrament there is required as necessary a constant purpose: he does not say a purpose, but a constant purpose; and that this must be made known to the confessor.”

III. Behold the rigorism of Gennet. For a sinner's true conversion to God he requires not merely a purpose of any sort, as is wont to be done, but a firm and constant, or not wavering, one. But this doctrine, cries Fr. Francolino, is not only rigid but most rigid. St. Paul therefore is a rigorist, who, 2 Corinthians 7, teaches: For the sorrow that is according to God worketh penance, steadfast unto salvation. And yet this is chiefly the example which Fr. Francolino brings forward, that he may demonstrate the doctrine of Gennet to be most rigid, not merely rigid. If anyone should say that the opposite doctrine of Fr. Francolino — namely that for true sacramental penance an inconstant and wavering purpose is enough — is most lax, would he be wide of the truth?

Let the reader now, void of prejudices, compare the propositions which Fr. Francolino reports out of Merbesius, Juvenin, and Gennet with the propositions which I in the preceding section have recounted out of very many probabilists. Then let him conclude which of the two can and ought by the better right to raise the sound of his voice. But we shall give clearer arguments throughout this whole work for the forming of that judgment.