Chapter X — It is licit to embrace an opinion evidently more probable for liberty, the less probable and safer opinion for the law being left aside

I. This word "safer" can signify a greater security from the danger of sinning even materially; and in this sense we are not always bound to the safer courses. Again, this term "safer" can signify security from falsity; and in this sense the more probable opinion is also the safer. Truth alone is the legitimate rule of an honorable conscience; and therefore the opinion which approaches the truth more is the more probable, and the safer. The opinion which more removes one from the danger of sinning is assuredly safer; but if you should say that the precept of embracing such an opinion always presses, then this position is false. The religious state is safer than the lay, because it more removes a man from the occasion of sinning; but if you should say that Christians are bound to take up this state, this "safer" opinion is false.

II. Further, that it may be licit to embrace the more probable opinion, the less probable and safer being left aside, it is required that this greater probability be notable, and that it rest upon weights of reasons which greatly excel the reasons of the less probable, safer opinion. These things touched upon, the proposed thesis is proved.

III. It is licit to execute that which, all things seriously weighed, appears prudently true and honorable. But when the opinion affirming that such an action is honorable appears to me, after all necessary diligence has been applied, more verisimilar than its opposite, by reasons gravely preponderating, I prudently judge that such an action is honorable, and that such an opinion is true. For although, through the weakness of the human mind, false things sometimes appear more verisimilar, yet commonly and for the most part what is more probable is true. In our case the opposite opinion is less probable, and that greatly: therefore I cannot prudently judge it to be true. And truth, as I have said, is the rule of a right conscience.

IV. It is confirmed by the authority of Alexander VIII, condemning this thesis: It is not lawful to follow an opinion even the most probable among the probable. The obvious sense of the condemned thesis is that it is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion, even though it be most probable [i.e., this is what stands condemned]. Therefore it is licit to follow the less safe opinion, provided it be much more probable than the opposite, safer, less probable one. Read Tome 2 of the Apparatus, book 3, disputation 10, chapter 1.