Chapter III: Concerning the Capital Sins, Which Are the Cause of Other Sins

I. How sin has a cause. - Since sin is a disordered human act, it consists of a twofold element: a positive element, which is the material element of sin, namely the act itself tending toward some created good; and a privative element, which in sin is formal, on account of which, namely, sin is sin: it is the disorder or deformity of the act with its rule, that is, with right reason and the eternal law, and an aversion from God, the last end.

Now, on the part of the act, sin has, as every act and every being does, an acting cause per se, namely a power of man, especially the will insofar as it intends some created good; on the part of the disorder it has a cause in that way in which a privation can have a cause, namely a deficient and per accidens cause.

For upon the positing of one effect there follows the absence or privation of another; and thus a cause intending the positing of something is, per accidens, the cause of the privation following, which it does not intend: "as fire, by causing heat by its principal intention, consequently causes the privation of coldness." Thus, therefore, the will, intending some created good which is not conformed to reason but is opposed to the eternal law, and failing from the direction of the rule of reason and of the law of God, causes the act of sin per se; but to this act there is joined the privation of conformity with reason and law, which privation nevertheless the will does not intend; and therefore, together with the act, it causes the privation joined to it, but only consequently, per accidens, and beyond intention.

As is clear from the foregoing declaration, "every per accidens cause is reduced to a per se cause; therefore... it follows that the disorder of sin follows from the very cause of the act." It suffices, therefore, that we consider how one sin can be the cause of another on the part of the act; for in this way it will also consequently be the cause of another on the part of the disorder.¹

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 75, a. 1.

II. One sin can be the cause of another sin, just as one human act can be the cause of another. But this happens in three ways:

1. one sin can be the material cause of another, insofar as it supplies and prepares matter for another, as gluttony prepares matter for lust, and avarice for litigation, because it multiplies temporal goods which are the matter of litigation;

2. it can be the efficient cause of another, and indeed in a twofold way, namely per se and per accidens:

a) per accidens, that is, by the removal of what prohibits: "for when by one act of sin a man loses grace, or charity, or shame, or any other thing drawing him back from sin, from this he falls into another sin (because, namely, he no longer has that which drew him back from sin), and thus the first sin is the cause of the second per accidens";

b) per se, insofar as from some sin, for example of lust, a man is disposed, by way of inclination, to others of the same species: "for from acts there are caused dispositions and habits inclining to like acts";

3. and especially it can be the final cause of another, insofar as for the end of one sin someone commits another sin, as if a woman commits fornication for the sake of theft, or, on the contrary, someone commits theft in order to procure fornication for himself. And because the end in moral matters gives form, because it gives species,² thus one sin which is the final cause is also the formal cause of another, because it gives form to the other: "because the end gives form in moral matters... from this it also follows that one sin which is the end of another is the formal cause of the other; for in an act of fornication which is committed for the sake of theft, fornication is as the material element, but theft as the formal element."³

² The end gives species to human acts because it is the object of the act of the will and the terminus to which the motion of the will tends; but an act has species from its object, and a motion from its terminus. The end gives species and consequently form, not only to the interior act of the will, but also to exterior acts commanded by the will; for the act of the will and the exterior act are one moral act, in which the interior act is the formal element, and the exterior act is the material element which is determined and, as it were, informed by the other. The interior act of the will is the formal element, both because it moves and determines the exterior members to acting, for the intended end is the reason for doing those things which are for the end; and because the exterior act is not voluntary except dependently on the interior will. Hence it is universally true that the species of human acts, formally considered, are considered according to the end. Cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 3, and q. 18, a. 6.

³ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 75, a. 4.

III. Capital sins are naturally apt, for the most part, to be the cause of several others, especially the final cause. - A capital sin is so called from the head, which is the principle and directive of the whole animal: "whence, metaphorically, every principle and directive is called a head; and also men who direct and govern others are said to be heads of others." Therefore a capital sin is that which is the cause or principle, and at the same time the directive, of others.⁴

⁴ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 3.

But this belongs to those sins which, for the most part and frequently, are the cause of several others, especially the final cause, because they have a very lovable object or a most appetible end, whence for the sake of it other sins are easily committed. For sins of this kind are especially the principle and cause of others, for the end is the principle and form in moral matters; whence in this way "sin is caused by sin actually and formally" and perfectly. They are also directive of others: by the end human acts are directed, because the end commands those things which are for the end.

"For it is manifest," says St. Thomas,⁵ "that a prince orders those subject to himself to his own end, as an army is ordered to the end of the commander... Whence according to Gregory, Morals, book 31, c. 45 (or 17), the capital vices are, as it were, commanders, and the vices which arise from them are, as it were, an army."

⁵ St. Thomas, Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 8, a. 1; cf. I-II, q. 84, a. 3.

From these things it is concluded:

A. Not every sin which is the cause of another can be called capital, and indeed:

1. not that which is the material cause of others, because that which ministers matter is not the cause of sin in act, but occasionally and in potency;

2. nor that which is the efficient cause of others per accidens, both because no science considers per accidens causes, and because a head designates a per se cause, which, namely, is naturally apt to cause and rule others, and because in this way any mortal sin can be the cause of any other;

3. nor even that which is the efficient cause of others per se; for every sin inclines to one like itself, and thus again every sin would be capital;

4. indeed, not even that which is the final cause of others but only from the condition of the sinner, because this happens per accidens to the sin itself. For "an origin of this kind can be attended to in a twofold way: in one way, according to the condition of the sinner, who is so disposed that he is most affected toward one end, from which for the most part he proceeds into other sins. But this mode of origin cannot fall under art, because the particular dispositions of men are infinite. In another way, according to the natural relation of the ends themselves to one another; and according to this, as in the majority of cases, one vice arises from another. Whence this mode of origin can fall under art. According to this, therefore, those vices are called capital whose ends have certain primary reasons for moving the appetite."⁶

⁶ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 4.

B. Hence a capital sin is not to be confused with that which they are accustomed to call the dominant vice, or the sin which is wont to be committed more frequently by a determined individual and to whose end he himself orders and commits other sins; for this happens per accidens on the part of the sinner himself, not per se and on the part of the nature of the sin. "One sin is ordered to the end of another in two ways: in one way, on the part of the sinner himself, whose will is more prone to the end of one sin than to that of another, but this is accidental to sins. Whence according to this they are not called capital sins. In another way, from the very relation of the ends, of which one has a certain agreement with another, so that in the majority of cases it is ordered to it... and according to this capital vices must be assumed."⁷ From their own nature, therefore, they have a highly appetible end, and indeed one highly appetible to all; and for this reason they move all men, and frequently, toward other sins.

⁷ St. Thomas, Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 8, a. 1.

C. Nevertheless, capital sins are not the greatest of all, since several others are graver than they, for example those which are directly against God or are directly opposed to the theological virtues; nor are they necessarily grave, even if done deliberately, as is clear concerning anger and gluttony, which often are venial.

D. Nor are the capital sins those which are opposed to the fundamental or cardinal virtues, because "there is not the same account of origin in virtues and in vices. For virtues are caused through the order of the appetite to reason, or also to the immutable good, which is God; but vices arise from the appetite for a mutable good. Whence it is not necessary that the principal vices be opposed to the principal virtues."⁸

⁸ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 4 ad 1.

IV. Seven capital sins are customarily numbered. - A usage has already prevailed from the time of St. Gregory, by whom in the place cited there are enumerated "the principal vices, namely vain-glory, envy, anger, sadness (or acedia), avarice, greediness of the belly (or gluttony), lust."

Nevertheless several place pride first in place of vain-glory; others comprehend both under one word. But St. Thomas, following St. Gregory, has pride as the final cause, the queen and mother of all sins, even capital ones, insofar as all are naturally apt to be done and ordered to the end of pride and thus to arise from pride; but he places vain-glory as a capital sin which is the final cause of several vices:

"Certain men, considering pride according as it is a certain special sin, numbered it with the other capital vices. But Gregory, considering its universal influence, which it has upon all vices,... did not number it with the other capital vices, but posits it as queen of all vices and mother; whence he says...: pride itself, queen of the vices, when it has fully seized the conquered heart, at once hands it over to be devastated by the seven principal vices, as by certain of its commanders, from which multitudes of vices arise."⁹

⁹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, a. 8. Cf. a. 2.

Rightly indeed: for besides pride there are still seven sins of which the definition of capital sins is verified, namely that they are the cause of several others, especially the final cause, since this is true concerning vain-glory; then, the first opinion arises from this, that some authors did not sufficiently consider the universal causality of pride in all vices; finally, by reckoning pride with vain-glory under one word, neither the universal influence of the former nor the special causality of the latter with respect to certain particular sins is sufficiently seen. "And therefore pride, as a quasi-universal vice, is not numbered with the others, but rather is placed as a certain queen of all the vices."¹⁰ It is indeed mother on the part of the end, because it is the principle of all in the order of intention;¹¹ queen on the part of command, because it directs all to its own end.

¹⁰ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 4 ad 4.

¹¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 2.

In practice, nevertheless, as regards the direction of souls in avoiding sins or eradicating vices, it does not matter so very much whether pride is distinguished from vain-glory as the cause of all vices, or, on the contrary, is considered together with it as the first capital sin.¹²

¹² By certain persons there has been doubt concerning the opinion of St. Thomas: 1. because after, in I-II, q. 84, a. 2, he taught that pride as a special sin is the beginning of every sin, since it is naturally apt to be the end of all sins, in II-II, q. 162, a. 8, he seems to suggest the contrary, saying that pride as a special sin is capital, and as a general sin is the mother of all vices; 2. because in several places he reckons pride together with vain-glory as one capital vice. Reply to the first: after in I-II he had refuted the opinion of those who asserted that pride is called both a general sin or condition of every sin, and also an inclination to any sin whatsoever from corrupt nature, and thus is the beginning of every sin, and against them had taught that even as a special sin it is the cause of all the others, this now being supposed, in II-II he teaches that that special sin can be viewed in two ways: a) incompletely, that is, solely as a special sin according to its proper species, abstracting from its general influence upon all vices; and thus it still has a special causality upon certain sins which proximately and frequently arise from it, and can be held as a capital sin; b) completely, that is, also in some way as a general sin; for the special sin of pride has a general influence. If this influence is viewed, it is not a capital sin, that is, the cause of several others, but the beginning of every sin. From these things it is clear that the expression "general sin" is not taken by St. Thomas in the same sense in each place; in the first place it signifies any sin whatsoever or the condition of every sin; in the second place it signifies a special sin insofar as, on account of the diffusion of its command, it extends causality to all. This is clear from the very words of St. Thomas, for in the second place he uses the same words to describe the general sin of pride which in the first place he used to describe the special sin of pride. Therefore it is false that St. Thomas ever denied that pride, as a special sin, is the mother of all the others; indeed it is manifest that he constantly taught this. Reply to the second: When the holy Doctor reckons pride together with vain-glory as a capital vice, he speaks not from the opinion which he chose as his own, but as reciting the opinion of others. Thus in Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 8, a. 1: "To the good of the soul, namely the excellence of honor and glory, pride, or vain-glory, is ordered," that is, according to some, pride; according to others, vain-glory. He speaks in the same way in II Sent., d. 42, q. 2, a. 3; and in I-II, q. 84, a. 4, in the other mode of considering the goods which capital sins pursue (see p. 117, in the note). But if once he wrote (II Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 3) that pride is a capital vice, he did this in passing, nor did he assert it simply, but with a certain addition and quasi-restriction: "as a special sin, seeking one's own excellence especially in dignity and honor," signifying that he was considering it while abstracting from its general influence, insofar, nevertheless, as in a more special sense it is the cause of certain sins, namely presumption, ambition, and vain-glory, which for this reason are specially called daughters of pride. Besides, St. Thomas is not to be opposed to St. Thomas, but reconciled with himself. Whenever he treats the question expressly, he manifestly inclines to the opinion of Gregory and simply prefers it. Thus he did in I-II, q. 84, a. 2, teaching that pride, as it is a special sin, is the beginning of all the others; likewise in Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 8, a. 1: "Charity, which is love of God, commands all the other virtues. And thus, although it is a special virtue if its proper object is considered, nevertheless, according to a certain diffusion of its command, it is common to all virtues; whence it is called the form and mother of all virtues. And similarly pride, although it is a special sin according to the account of its proper object, nevertheless according to a certain diffusion of its proper command is a common sin with respect to all. Whence also it is called the root and queen of all sins"; likewise in the reply to the fourteenth. Then in I-II, q. 84, a. 4, he proves the statement of Gregory placing vain-glory among the seven capital sins; and to the fourth objection: "As avarice is the root of sin, so pride is the beginning of sin... But avarice is posited as one of the seven capital vices. Therefore pride should be numbered among the capital vices," he replies by denying the consequence, because pride is rather the beginning of all vices than a capital vice: "pride, as a quasi-universal vice, is not numbered with the others, but rather is placed as a certain queen of all the vices." In the same way in Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 9, a. 3, ad 1: "It must be said that pride ... is placed generally as the mother of all vices, and under it are placed the seven capital vices, among which vain-glory is most akin to it." Similarly in II-II, q. 162, a. 8, although he reports each opinion, he manifestly prefers the opinion of Gregory, as is clear to one reading, and besides it is clear both from the fact that the objections of the article intend to prove that pride is a capital vice, which objections nevertheless he judged should be solved, and from the fact that he says: "but on the contrary is that Gregory does not number pride among the other capital vices," which assertion, since he lets it pass without response, he approves. Still more clearly in II-II, q. 132, a. 4: "I answer that certain persons speak about the capital vices in two ways. For some posit pride as one of the capital vices; and these do not posit vain-glory among the capital vices. But Gregory posits pride as queen of all vices; and vain-glory, which immediately arises from it, he posits as a capital vice. And this reasonably: for pride ... imports an inordinate appetite for excellence. But from every good which someone desires, he obtains a certain perfection and excellence; and therefore the ends of all vices are ordered to the end of pride; and on account of this it seems that it has a certain general causality over the other vices, and should not be counted among the special principles of vices which are the capital vices." Therefore there can be no doubt concerning the mind of St. Thomas.

That there are seven capital vices St. Thomas shows nearly as follows, I-II, q. 84, a. 4: Capital sins are those from which others arise chiefly according to the account of final cause, whose ends, namely, are most appetible and have, as it were, principal reasons for moving the appetite. But something moves the appetite either directly and per se, namely a good to be pursued and an evil to be fled; or indirectly and, as it were, through another, when someone pursues an evil because of a good joined to it, or flees a good because of an evil joined to it.

Now:

a) The good which man most desires is:

1. a good of the soul, namely the excellence of praise and honor, which vain-glory inordinately desires (1);

2. a good of the body by which the individual is conserved, namely food and drink, which gluttony inordinately desires (2);

3. a good of the body by which the human species is conserved, namely the use of venereal things, which lust inordinately desires (3);

4. an external good, namely riches; and avarice is concerned about this (4).¹³

¹³ St. Thomas adds: "Or otherwise. Good chiefly moves the appetite from this, that it participates in something of the property of happiness, which all naturally desire. Of its account, first, is a certain perfection; for happiness is a perfect good, to which excellence or clarity pertains, which pride or vain-glory desires. Secondly, of its account is sufficiency, which avarice desires... Thirdly, delight is of its condition... and gluttony and lust desire this."

b) But the good which man flees because of some evil which he greatly fears is:

1. either a proper spiritual good, which acedia flees because of the bodily labor joined to it (5);

2. or another's good which impedes one's own excellence, from which a man flees by envy (6);

3. or against which anger rises up (7).

The same can also be shown in another way. The principle of every sin on man's part is inordinate love of self, which inordinately desires temporal goods and is the root of the threefold depraved concupiscence: the concupiscence of the flesh tending inordinately toward a good of the body, the concupiscence of the eyes or cupidity inordinately desiring external goods, and the pride of life tending inordinately toward a good of the soul.¹⁴

¹⁴ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, a. 4 and 5.

Now inordinate love of self is the cause of sin insofar as man turns himself unduly toward a created good:

A. Either toward a good of the soul:

a) whether considered in itself:

1. as excellent, through pride and vain-glory (1);

2. as contemning a participated divine good, through acedia (2);

b) or considered in another:

1. as possessed by him, through envy (3);

2. as injured by him and inordinately avenged, through anger (4).

B. Or toward a good of the body:

1. in the delight of food or drink, through gluttony (5);

2. in venereal delight, through lust (6);

C. Or toward an external good, through avarice (7).

The last sin belongs to the concupiscence of the eyes, the two preceding to the concupiscence of the flesh, the first four to the pride of life.

V. Practical importance of the doctrine. - For healing sins it greatly matters to know the origin and genealogy of sins; wherefore it is of great interest to the director of souls to know which sins are wont to be the cause of others, and which arise from them. For when the cause has been removed, the effect also is taken away; but one who tends wholly to healing the effects, and does not care to eradicate the cause, will provide a remedy neither for the cause nor for the effects.