Question Two: Concerning Actions Harmful to Human Life or Integrity — Theological Principles

I. In order to solve the preceding questions rightly, it is necessary to recall certain principles of moral theology: namely, one from the general doctrine concerning human acts, and several other special principles from the particular matters concerning justice and charity.

II. From the doctrine concerning human acts we know that it is licit to place a cause which produces at the same time a good effect and an evil effect, if four conditions are present:

1. if the action in itself, that is, circumstances set aside, is not evil, but honorable or at least indifferent;

2. if the good effect follows from the cause at least as immediately as the evil one, or does not follow by means of the evil; otherwise it would be to work or effect good through evil, and therefore to will evil in some way as a means to good, although evils are not to be done that goods may come about;

3. if the evil effect is not intended, but only the good one; otherwise the evil effect would be voluntary in itself, or at least willed;

4. if there is a reason for placing the cause, and indeed a proportionately grave one, that is, so that the good procured exceeds or equals, and thus compensates for, the evil.

On the contrary, it is illicit if the action is evil in itself or has only an immediate evil effect, even if further from it there is procured, and intended by the agent, a much greater good effect. For although in judging the morality of the interior act of the will, it is necessary above all to regard the intention, nevertheless in judging the morality of the exterior act, one must consider not so much where it is ultimately terminated or what is intended by the agent, but first of all what is immediately done; and if that is evil, or if it immediately produces only an evil effect, even if further it tends or is ordered to some greatest good, it will always remain intrinsically evil.

III. From the doctrine concerning justice we know that man does not have dominion over the human body and life, but only its author, God, has it. Hence man cannot directly dispose of life, whether his own or another's, except according as it has been conceded to him by God. Now:

1. God has conceded this for the public good, but only to public authority, whether a) in a just war to be carried on by that authority, or b) for punishing evildoers by that authority, and perhaps c) for a private good to individual men for defending life against unjust aggression, although this rather seems to be, and is better called, indirect killing:¹ for this is permitted only because from the action there follows equally immediately a compensating good effect, namely the defense or preservation of the one attacked;

¹ Thus Saint Thomas explains it, II-II, q. 64, a. 7.

2. God has conceded no right over the life of an innocent person, which therefore in no case can be directly taken away, because this is always gravely unjust;

3. indirect killing can be licit if it follows from a legitimate action which equally immediately produces a greater, or at least equal, good effect; namely, this is not directly to kill, but to expose oneself to the danger of killing.

A fortiori, one's neighbor has a right to the salvation of the soul, and it is unjust to impede it.

IV. From the doctrine concerning charity we know that we are bound to love our neighbor more with respect to his soul and salvation than our own body and bodily life; likewise more with respect to the life of the body than our own temporal goods, but not more than our own life. Although licitly we can expose that life, this is not because we love another's life more, but because of the good of virtue, which is a spiritual good of the soul and thus surpasses bodily life. Hence:

1. In the extreme danger of our neighbor's salvation, we are bound under grave obligation to aid him even with certain danger of life, provided there is probable hope of helping him and no graver evil is feared.

2. In grave danger of our neighbor's salvation, we must aid him under grave obligation with some rather great detriment in temporal goods, but not with danger of life, unless someone is bound from justice by reason of office.

3. In extreme danger of our neighbor's life, we are bound under grave obligation to aid him with notable temporal detriment of our own, but not by extraordinary means nor with danger to our own life.

4. Although we are not bound, nevertheless we can licitly, charity persuading it, expose our life in grave danger of another's salvation, because this is worth more than our life; likewise in grave danger of another's life, because of the good of virtue, gratitude, friendship, the honor of God, or the public good; not because we esteem another's life more than our own, but because the good of virtue, which is spiritual, can be preferred to the good of one's own life, which is bodily.

Fortified with these principles, we now approach the solution of the questions.