Moral Part — Chapter I: On the Duties of the Penitent

202. All the duties of the penitent are reduced to three, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction, concerning which we shall speak separately.

The notion and necessity of contrition having been declared above, n. 127, it will be enough to weigh two things, namely the qualities with which contrition must be clothed for obtaining pardon of sins, and also the qualities of the purpose included in contrition.

203. Contrition, whether perfect or imperfect, must be clothed with certain conditions, so that it may produce its effects with or without reception of the sacrament. Namely it must be (a) sincere, or internal, since it is sorrow of the soul; (b) supernatural, that is, elicited under the influence of actual grace, and conceived from a supernatural motive, since it is ordered to a supernatural end, namely the remission of sins; (c) universal, namely extending itself to all mortal sins, since the reason is the same for all, nor can one be remitted unless all are remitted, and consequently retracted; (d) appreciatively highest, insofar as sin must be esteemed and detested as the highest evil, and therefore more than any other evil; (e) in order to the sacrament, whenever the remission of sins is to be obtained by absolution. - Concerning these we shall speak separately.

¹ St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 2-3; Suarez, disp. XX, sect. 2; Lugo, disp. V and XIV; St. Alphonsus, H. A., tr. XVI, ch. 2; Collet, in Migne, Theol. Curs., XXII, 196-214; Lehmkuhl, n. 283 sq.; Hilarius Sexten., § 37, n. IV; Konings, n. 1349-1350; Ball. P., n. 42-142; Genicot, n. 272-279; Noldin, n. 244-251.

204. 1° Principle: Contrition must be sincere or internal, that is, truly conceived in the heart or will; and consequently merely external or feigned contrition does not suffice. It is certain.

(a) According to Trent,¹ contrition is sorrow of soul, and therefore must be conceived in the mind; and also detestation of sin: but detestation is an act of the will.

¹ Sess. XIV, ch. 4.

(b) Whenever contrition is treated in Scripture, the conversion of the heart is required, which, according to biblical usage, signifies the conversion of the will: "Be converted to me with all your heart... and rend your hearts, and not your garments."² - "Make yourselves a new heart and a new spirit."³

² Joel 2:12-13.

³ Ezek. 18:31.

(c) This is otherwise consonant with reason; for contrition, as the reparation of sin, ought to proceed from that source from which sin came forth; but sin proceeds from the heart or from the will, as Christ Himself bears witness: "For from the heart come forth evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false testimonies, blasphemies";⁴ therefore contrition ought to proceed from the heart, or will.

⁴ Matt. 15:19.

205. 2° Corollaries. (A) Merely estimated contrition does not suffice; in other words, he who in good faith thinks himself to be attrite, while in reality he is not, does not obtain the remission of sins, although, on account of good faith, he is immune from the sin of sacrilege. Thus commonly against certain ancient theologians, whom Ballerini follows.⁵ For merely estimated contrition is not true sorrow of soul, which Trent requires for the remission of sin; it does indeed suffice that someone be in good faith, and consequently immune from the sin of sacrilege; but it does not suffice for taking away the aversion from God already existing, and consequently not for the remission of sin.

⁵ Ball. P., n. 52 sq., with the authors cited there. - Palmieri, who edited the Opus Morale of Ballerini, notes (in the note to n. 76) that this opinion, although formerly defended by theologians of great name, is today deservedly commonly rejected.

Sometimes, however, there are found sinners of timorous conscience who desire to have sorrow and grieve that they do not grieve, namely who have tried to elicit attrition, but fear lest the proper disposition be lacking to them; then the confessor should inquire whether they seriously will to abandon sin and to use the means for avoiding occasions of sin. If they answer affirmatively, it can be judged that they are truly attrite, although their sorrow is not sensible.

206. (B) The mere affirmation of the penitent does not always suffice for judging that he is attrite; but, in order that a prudent judgment be formed, it is necessary to attend to several circumstances. (a) The reason for the former is that the penitent can either be deceived or deceive the confessor; this can happen especially when he approaches the sacred tribunal not by his own motion, but because he is urged to this by the persuasion of superiors, or parents, or friends, or from habit, or from rule; or when he is moved by imagination and sensibility rather than by a reasonable motive.

(b) The reason for the latter is that the true disposition of the penitent can be discerned from many circumstances: from the character of the penitent, from the motives by which he is impelled to confessing, from the care which he used in preparation, or from a change of life, or flight from occasions of sinning, or use of remedies previously prescribed. And so in doubtful cases let the confessor attend to all these things, as will be declared more fully below, where we treat of the duties of the confessor, namely concerning absolution to be denied or deferred.

207. (C) Contrition, in order to be part of the sacrament, must be manifested by some sensible signs; this is done regularly by the recitation of some formula. No special formula is required, but it is very expedient to recite that which is found in the catechism; yet care must be taken that children and the uneducated do not place their whole contrition in the external recitation of it.

208. 3° Controversy. Here it can be asked whether a formal act of contrition is required for rightly receiving the sacrament of penance, or whether virtual contrition, included in the love of God, suffices. This indeed, if it is perfect, suffices for the remission of sin outside the sacrament; but it is controverted whether it suffices for the reception of the sacrament. Theologians more commonly deny it with Suarez;¹ for contrition is an essential part and the proximate matter of the sacrament; but the proximate matter of the sacrament ought to be the formal act instituted by Christ Himself, nor does another act that only virtually embraces contrition suffice. - Yet some, such as Lugo and Ballerini,² affirm it; for those who elicit an act of love certainly place no obstacle to the sacrament; therefore they receive its effect. - But this controversy seems rather useless; for he who loves God above all things and confesses his sins by that very fact formally detests his sins, although he does not express this detestation by explicit words.

¹ Suarez, disp. XX, sect. 6, n. 2.

² Lugo, disp. V, n. 92 sq.; Ball. P., n. 80 sq.

209. 1° Principle: Contrition must be supernatural by reason of the principle and by reason of the motive. It is certain.

(A) By reason of the principle, that is, elicited under the influence of actual grace enlightening the mind and assisting the will. For contrition, as a proximate disposition for obtaining or increasing justification, is a supernatural work; but, from the things said in the Treatise on Grace (n. 50), no supernatural work can exist without actual grace. - But this grace is denied to no one who prays; whence it must be trustingly sought from God.

(B) By reason of the motive, or on account of a motive which is referred to God, according to all, and moreover apprehended by the light of faith, as is commonly held against a few, as Ballerini.¹ For (a) there ought to be a proportion between the means and the end to be obtained; but the end to be obtained, namely the remission of sin through the infusion of sanctifying grace, is altogether supernatural; therefore the act of contrition must be supernatural; but it would not be wholly supernatural unless it were elicited under the influence of a motive known by faith; for on the one hand, an act takes its value chiefly from the motive, and on the other hand, the motive is not supernatural unless it is known by revelation. (b) Besides, Innocent XI, on March 2, 1679, condemned this proposition (57):² "It is probable that natural attrition, provided it is honorable, suffices"; therefore it is not probable that such attrition suffices.

¹ Ball. P., n. 48.

² In Denzinger, n. 1074. - See this proposition clearly set forth in Viva, Damnatae Theses, on propos. 57.

Ballerini indeed contends that it suffices that the motive be apprehended by one who is endowed with supernatural faith, without, however, that motive being perceived by faith properly so called. But in practice there is scarcely any difficulty; for in fact all the motives of contrition which Trent enumerates and which are proposed to the faithful are an object of faith properly so called, and can and usually are apprehended by the light of faith. Therefore no difficulty arises from the common opinion.

210. 2° Corollaries. (A) For truly supernatural contrition all motives which are known by faith suffice, namely not only perfect and imperfect love of God, but also the turpitude of sin, fear of hell and of punishments. - For these are truly supernatural, as will be clear from their exposition.

(a) The turpitude of sin is that moral foulness which arises from opposition to the supernatural order, and can be considered on the part of God, on the part of Christ, and on the part of the sinning soul.¹

¹ Cf. Lehmkuhl, vol. I, n. 225-226; Reuter, Neo-conf. n. 12; Manning, The Love of Jesus to Penitents, ch. III; Tanquerey, De peccatis, n. 463-465.

On the part of God, mortal sin, of which there is chiefly question, is rebellion against God, who is the supreme Lord; injustice, because it is opposed to the strict right which God has to be our ultimate end; irreligion, because it is opposed to the right which He has to be honored: "by the transgression of the law you dishonor God";² ingratitude, because He is the supreme benefactor (creator, conserver, redeemer, sanctifier), and we use His benefits for offending Him, and indeed at the very time when He heaps benefits upon us; insult, since we commit sin in the sight of God: "against Thee alone have I sinned, and I have done evil before Thee";³ contempt of God, since the vilest creature is preferred to God, according to that saying:⁴ "They have forsaken me, the fountain of living water, and have dug for themselves broken cisterns, which cannot hold waters"; impenitence, if someone adheres to sin for a long time.

² Rom. 2:23.

³ Ps. 50:6.

⁴ Jer. 2:13.

On the part of Christ, mortal sin is deicide, since it caused the death of the Lord and, insofar as can be done, renews it: "crucifying again to themselves the Son of God";⁵ sacrilege, since it is the violation of the divine temple, according to that saying:⁶ "the temple of God is holy, which you are."

⁵ Heb. 6:6.

⁶ 1 Cor. 3:17.

On the part of the soul, mortal sin is spiritual suicide, since it brings death upon the soul; deformity and defilement, since it deprives the soul of its supernatural beauty; submission to diabolical tyranny, since the sinner makes himself the servant of the devil: "for by whom a man is overcome, of him also he is the servant."⁷

⁷ 2 Pet. 2:19.

211. (b) Fear of eternal punishments, and the hope of obtaining eternal beatitude, are certainly, according to all, supernatural motives.

But it is controverted whether fear of the punishments of this life is also supernatural and sufficient for contrition. Now it is certain that temporal punishments considered in themselves, insofar as they afflict the sinner with natural evils, are not a supernatural motive; thus the loss of reputation, health, or merely temporal goods, or fear of prison or a fine, and other motives of this kind, do not suffice of themselves for contrition: for they do not cause detestation of sin insofar as it is an offense of God, nor do they convert the sinner to God, as is seen in the example of Antiochus, who in vain grieved over sins on account of the very bad illness by which he was afflicted.¹ - But if temporal punishments are considered in the light of faith, as chastisement intended by God the avenger for sins, and as, so to speak, the beginning of eternal punishments, they already offer a supernatural motive, and, according to the common and morally certain opinion, suffice for attrition. Thus, for example, the Ninevites did penance on account of fear of the destruction of the city,² and, according to Trent,³ obtained mercy from the Lord; likewise God often threatened temporal chastisements to the Jews, in order to lead them back to Himself.

¹ 2 Macc. 9:11-29.

² Jon. 3:4.

³ Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 4.

Whatever may be the case, it is certain that consideration of temporal losses is most useful for leading hardened sinners to higher and better motives: for if they are terrified by these passing evils, why would they not fear eternal ones, if, at the suggestion of the confessor, they think about them?

212. (B) An explicit act of faith and hope, distinct from the act itself of contrition, is not required. A few theologians had affirmed that this is required, because Trent, discussing the dispositions for justification,⁴ enumerates these acts of faith and hope. But this is commonly rejected by theologians, because the Council, discussing contrition, does not require them; moreover, according to St. Alphonsus (n. 439), he who approaches confession truly penitent necessarily elicits explicitly (if not reflexively, at least exercitively) acts of faith and hope; for since he approaches to receive the remission of sins, without doubt he also explicitly believes that they are to be remitted by the power of the sacrament, and explicitly hopes that God will remit sins to him on account of the merits of Christ. Therefore an act of faith or hope distinct from the act itself of contrition is not required. - Yet it is expedient that acts of this kind be recited as a preparation for contrition.

⁴ Trent, sess. VI, ch. 6.

213. 1° Principle: Contrition must be appreciatively, but not intensively, highest. It is certain.

Appreciatively highest contrition is that by which the penitent practically esteems mortal sin as the greatest of all evils, and is prepared to sustain all things rather than offend God. Intensively highest contrition is that which by its vehemence surpasses every other sorrow.

An act of contrition intensively highest is not required, but an act even remiss suffices, provided that it excludes every affection for mortal sin. For the intensity of an act does not vary its species; and, as St. Thomas rightly says,¹ "however small the sorrow may be, provided it suffices for the character of contrition (i.e., provided we detest sin above all things), it blots out every fault." - Therefore it remains to be proved that contrition appreciatively highest is required.

¹ Supplement, q. 5, a. 3.

(a) Contrition ought to involve that disposition by which, at least through absolution as mediator, the sinner pleases God; but unless someone loves God more than father, i.e., unless he consents to be deprived rather of every created good than of the friendship of God, he cannot please God, according to that saying of Christ:² "He who loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me." (b) From Trent,³ contrition ought to exclude every affection for sin and every will of sinning; but it cannot accomplish this unless it is highest appreciatively; for unless someone esteems sin as the greatest of all evils, at some time he will choose sin rather than the evil which is apprehended as greatest; therefore. (c) Right reason demands that we pursue with appreciatively greatest hatred that which is truly the greatest evil; but sin, as at least objectively infinite offense of God, and as depriving man of the greatest goods, is the greatest of all evils; therefore it must be supremely detested.

² Matt. 10:37.

³ Sess. XIV, ch. 4.

214. 2° Corollaries. (A) For contrition appreciatively highest, there is not required, nor is it expedient, an explicit comparison of sin with other evils in particular. (a) It is not required; for just as by faith we firmly believe revealed things without comparing divine authority with other authorities, and we love God above all things without comparing Him with creatures, so likewise we can detest sin above all evils without comparing it with the other evils.

(b) It is not expedient; for, as St. Thomas says,¹ just as delectable things move more when considered in particular than in common, so terrible things terrify more if they are considered in particular; therefore it would be imprudent to propose certain evils in species, for example the cruelest kind of death, a most grave injury, or the loss of one's whole fortune, lest perhaps these particular evils move the penitent more than spiritual losses. For all these evils are hypothetical, not impending, nor even probable; if sometimes they occur, the grace of God will be given for patiently undergoing them; meanwhile each day has enough of its own evil. It is enough that penitents resolve within themselves to do, when occasion is given and with the help of the grace of God, all those things which conscience will dictate at that time; for many things appear impossible which, when they occur, become easier by the grace of God.²

¹ Quodlibet, I, a. 9.

² Therefore the confessor would act imprudently who would address a fragile penitent, asserting that he is well disposed, in this way: "Are you truly prepared to abstain from all and each of these sins, not only for some days, but also through your whole life? If such and such temptation occurs, what will you do? Consider how much violence you must inflict on yourself, how much vigilance, and indeed continual vigilance, you must exercise; think that ordinary means do not suffice, but extraordinary ones are desired, fasts, mortifications, etc. Are you prepared for all these things?" For these or similar words are suited not to arousing contrition, but rather to destroying it. But rather he should be exhorted to use means proportioned to his strength, and confidently to have recourse to God in graver temptations. - Thus almost Berardi, De Recidivis, 5th ed., n. 49.

215. (B) For contrition appreciatively highest, sensible sorrow is not required, or sorrow which overflows into the sensitive appetite and breaks forth into tender affections of the heart, sighs, and tears; and consequently neither is sorrow required which is more sensible than that which is often felt on account of temporal losses, for example, the death of relatives and friends. For contrition does not reside in sensibility, but in the will, with the judgment of the intellect going before; moreover, sensible emotion is not in our power, and it can happen that someone, without sensible sorrow, grieves more vehemently than another who is prone to emotions of this kind. Sensible signs of sorrow are indeed not to be despised; indeed sometimes they are true indications of more vehement contrition; but what must especially be weighed is whether the penitent esteems sin as an evil more grave than the others, and therefore is prepared to suffer other losses in general rather than gravely offend God.

216. 1° Principle: Contrition must be universal with respect to mortal sins, but not necessarily with respect to venial sins. It is certain.

(A) With respect to mortal sins, we must detest not only all those which have been declared, but also those which have been omitted on account of forgetfulness or a legitimate reason. For (a) we must detest sins insofar as they are an offense of God and deprive us of His friendship; but this reason extends itself to all mortal sins, even those which could not be declared on account of a legitimate reason; for each and every mortal sin grievously offends God, and indeed in such a way that they deprive us of divine friendship, as is clear from what was said above (n. 210); therefore we must detest all and each.

(b) Moreover, contrition is ordained to the remission of sin; but, in the present order of things, one mortal sin cannot be forgiven without the others, since it is not remitted except through the infusion of sanctifying grace, which cannot enter a soul in which one mortal sin remains; in truth no one can be both friend and enemy of God at the same time: now he who is adorned with sanctifying grace, by that very fact, is the friend of God, while he who retains one mortal sin is His enemy; therefore one mortal sin cannot be forgiven without the others; therefore contrition must extend to all mortal sins, since no mortal sin is remitted without contrition.

(c) Hence Scripture often urges sinners to retract all sins, so that they may be able to obtain pardon:¹ "Be converted, and do penance for all your iniquities, and iniquity shall not be your ruin. Cast away from you all your transgressions... and why will you die, O house of Israel?"

¹ Ezek. 18:30-31.

217. (B) With respect to venial sins, it is not required that contrition extend to all; for venial sins do not destroy the friendship of God, nor separate us from the ultimate end, so that one can be remitted without another. Besides, genuine sorrow can be conceived for one venial sin without being conceived for another, at least when these sins are of diverse kinds; for example, I can grieve over a lie, on account of the special malice inherent in it, without grieving over a slight act of pride or of intemperance.

218. 2° Corollaries. (A) It is not required that the penitent run through each mortal sin and grieve formally and distinctly for each, but it suffices that he detest them virtually and implicitly by a motive common to all. For the motives of contrition are of themselves universal, namely those on account of which we detest sin insofar as it is opposed to the attainment of the ultimate end, or insofar as it offends God, infinitely good and infinitely perfect, etc.; moreover these motives, when they are truly conceived, extend themselves to all and each of the sins, and that sufficiently, although virtually and implicitly; therefore it is not necessary that each be run through in the mind, and that a formal act of contrition be elicited for each. This, moreover, is often very difficult, and in some cases, for example, in the matter of chastity, dangerous. But as often as it can be done without danger, it is to be recommended, as useful for exciting a more vivid contrition.

This reason, however, evidently does not hold if someone hates some mortal sin on account of its special turpitude; for such a motive does not extend itself to other sins of diverse species; for example, if someone hates theft on account of its special turpitude, it does not follow from this that he detests an act of intemperance.

Hence it is altogether expedient that penitents, for the sake of greater security, conceive sorrow from a universal motive, so that in this way even those sins about which they are not actually thinking can be retracted. And this, moreover, is altogether easy for him who already sincerely grieves over one mortal sin: as soon as he no longer adheres to sin, he does not with difficulty reject all those things which are able to cause the loss of eternal beatitude.

219. (B) He who knowingly and willingly accuses only venial sins, having no contrition for them, sins gravely; for by that very fact he renders the sacrament null, on account of the defect of contrition, and so commits a grave irreverence. - Yet this will scarcely ever happen in practice, since such a man, by the very fact that he avoids mortal sins, is habitually well disposed; whence it will happen most rarely that he approaches the sacred tribunal knowingly and willingly lacking contrition. - For the rest, for the validity of the sacrament, it suffices that in such a case he accuse some sin of his past life for which he sincerely grieves.

220. (C) He who, knowingly and willingly, indiscriminately accuses venial sins for which he grieves and others for which he certainly knows that he does not grieve, more probably does not sin. Some indeed contend that he sins venially, because in some way he deceives the confessor, implicitly saying that he grieves for these sins by the very fact that he confesses them, while in reality he has conceived no contrition for them. - But this reason does not hold; for the confessor can understand, from things commonly occurring, that a penitent of this kind accuses certain venial sins not as matter of the sacrament, but so that he may be better known by the director, or for the sake of humility, or for other reasons. It would indeed be better in this case for the penitent openly to declare that he is not contrite for such or such a sin which he accuses; but he is not strictly held to this. In practice let him try to conceive contrition from a universal motive, which of itself embraces all venial sins, for example, to avoid the punishments of Purgatory, or because sin displeases God; then certainly there will be no sin, and in addition a richer fruit will be received from the sacrament.

221. After what has been said concerning the qualities of contrition, it can briefly be weighed whether the sacrament of Penance can be valid as a sacrament and at the same time formless, i.e., not producing grace, on account of some obstacle; and consequently whether, when the obstacle has been removed, the grace of the sacrament revives. On this matter there is controversy among theologians.

(A) Some¹ say that there is one single case in which this can occur, and they explain their opinion thus: if someone has committed two mortal sins, for example one of theft, the other of blasphemy, and afterward, forgetful of the blasphemy, accuses only the theft and grieves over it on account of the special turpitude of this sin, the sacrament is truly confected, since there are found there all the elements necessary for its validity (on the part of the penitent, a formally integral confession, contrition, and the will of making satisfaction, and on the part of the priest, absolution duly pronounced); nevertheless it does not produce its effect, because the sin of blasphemy is not retracted, and consequently is not remitted. Hence, if afterward the obstacle is removed through detestation of the blasphemy, nothing prevents the grace of the sacrament from reviving. - Some theologians,² however, hold that in this case the sacrament is not formless, but immediately produces its effect, because, while the sinner grieves over the theft, he grieves so that he may recover divine friendship and avoid eternal damnation, and therefore his sorrow implicitly extends itself also to the sin omitted through forgetfulness. And this opinion is truly probable, because it happens most rarely that a penitent so considers the special motive of attrition that he does not ascend to another more general one.

¹ Suarez, disp. XX, sect. 5; Lugo, disp. XIV, sect. 6, n. 65 sq.; Salmantic., cap. 5 n. 1-21; St. Alphonsus, n. 444.

² D'Annibale, p. III, note 19 to n. 312; Genicot, n. 275; Billot, th. 16, § I.

222. (B) But others¹ admit that the sacrament of Penance can be valid and formless whenever the penitent has attrition which is indeed true and sincere, but not appreciatively highest. According to them, namely, there are sinners who are so attrite that they grieve over all past sins, but not in an appreciatively highest degree, and yet are not conscious of such a defect; now that act of attrition, as being sincere and elicited in good faith, indeed suffices as an integral part of the sacrament, although it does not suffice as a disposition for obtaining absolution from sin: therefore the sacrament is indeed valid, since in it all essentials are found, but formless, because, on account of the defect of full disposition, grace is not produced; but when the obstacle has been removed through appreciatively highest attrition, then grace will be produced through the reviviscence of the sacrament. - That opinion does not lack probability, both because of the authority of the theologians who defend it, and because it rests upon the general principle that the sacraments confer grace, whether immediately or when the obstacle recedes, on all those who do not place a voluntary obstacle; nevertheless it does not pass beyond the limits of probability, because it remains uncertain whether that attrition, sincere but not appreciatively highest, suffices as an integral part of the sacramental sign.

¹ Cajetan, Opusc. de confessione, q. 5; Billot, th. 16, § I, with other authors cited in the same place. Some understand in this sense what St. Thomas writes, Supplement, q. 9, a. 1.

223. Besides, this controversy does not contribute much to practice, unless you say with Billot that in this way there is better understood the commonly received custom of absolving penitents as often as they sincerely confess their sins with the purpose of not sinning hereafter, without its being morally certain that their attrition is appreciatively highest; for, granted that absolution in this case is valid, sacramental grace, if it is not received here and now, will afterward be received as soon as the penitents have become better disposed.

224. 1° Principle: Contrition must be elicited in order to the sacrament, or a certain moral union is required between the act of contrition and absolution. It is certain.

² Suarez, disp. XX, sect. 4, n. 27-30; Lugo, disp. XIV, n. 36-50; Salmantic., cap. 5, n. 22-27; St. Alphonsus, n. 445-448; Billuart, diss. IV, art. 8; Lehmkuhl, 280-282; Genicot, n. 278; Morino, n. 431-434.

For contrition is an essential part or at least an integral part of the sacrament, and consequently must be so united with the sacrament that with it it forms some whole; but the sacrament is a moral whole, not a physical one; therefore a moral union between sorrow and absolution suffices.

225. 2° Corollaries. This union, however, regards both intention and time.

(A) With relation to intention, sorrow conceived for sins must in some way be referred to absolution; otherwise absolution would become invalid or doubtful, on account of the defect of moral union among the various parts of the sacrament.

It is not required, however, that contrition explicitly and reflexively arise from an intention, previously conceived, of receiving the sacrament, whatever a few may have said to the contrary with Lacroix;¹ but it suffices that sorrow conceived before the purpose of confessing flow virtually into confession, and be morally connected with absolution. Thus, for example, he who, on the occasion of a sermon or of pious reading, conceives sorrow without thinking about confession, and afterward, by the force of sorrow thus conceived and persevering, makes a confession, or at least gives some sign of the sorrow previously conceived before absolution, sufficiently orders his contrition to the sacrament. Yet it is better that penitents explicitly elicit or renew an act of contrition in order to confession, before they enter the sacred tribunal, so that their sorrow may be more vivid and richer fruits may be received.

¹ Lacroix, n. 687.

226. (B) With relation to time: (a) contrition must precede absolution, or at least be elicited at that point of time at which absolution is given, because it is certainly a necessary disposition for absolution, and also very probably the proximate matter itself of the sacrament; if therefore contrition does not exist at least at that instant at which I absolve you is said, the sacrament will lack its effect.

227. (b) But it need not necessarily precede confession, although this is much better and more prudent. For the Roman Ritual admonishes the confessor that, after the confession has been heard, he should try by efficacious words to lead the penitent to sorrow and contrition;² therefore it supposes that the penitent is sometimes not contrite while he confesses his sins, and nevertheless can be absolved, provided that before absolution he is sincerely contrite.

² Ordo ministrandi sacram. Paenitentiae.

Some contend that this cannot be done, because the confession then is not sorrowful, and in addition the sorrow conceived after confession is not manifested by a sensible sign. But this difficulty, when the matter is carefully inspected, entirely vanishes. Confession indeed must be sorrowful, but for this it suffices that it not be a merely historical account of sins, but be made in order to the sacrament, with hope of conceiving contrition before absolution. But contrition, even if it is conceived after confession, becomes sensible by the fact that the penitent manifests internal sorrow either by asking for absolution, or by reciting an act of contrition, or by other external signs. - Whence the opinion which we defend is morally certain.

228. (c) An act of contrition once elicited in order to absolution can persevere not only for several hours, but even for several days, provided that it is not retracted by a new mortal sin, and that it perseveres in some effect, for example, the will of confessing, flight from occasions, etc. The reason is that such an interval does not destroy the moral union which must exist among the various parts of the sacrament; for that delay is permitted which can exist among the various judicial acts, since this sacrament is administered after the manner of a judgment.

This indeed can serve to calm the scruples of those who did not renew an act of contrition before confession, and, at that instant at which absolution was conferred, did not think about contrition. But in practice it is certainly expedient that an act of sorrow be elicited in preparation for confession, both so that greater fruit may be received from it, and also for the sake of security, lest perhaps a penitent who, on account of disturbance of mind, does not renew sorrow at the time of absolution, be troubled by anxieties.

229. (d) It is not required that contrition endure after absolution has been received; for true contrition, with grace helping, can be conceived in one instant, and provided that it is conceived and endures at the time when absolution is conferred, the penitent is justified; if afterward he is overcome by temptation, he indeed sins, but the sins remitted do not revive. Yet if it quickly vanishes, it can deservedly for the most part be regarded as suspect.

230. 3° Disputed questions: (a) When a penitent, immediately or a little after absolution, accuses a grave sin omitted through forgetfulness, it is controverted whether or not a new act of sorrow is required for receiving a new absolution. The more probable opinion denies this, provided, however, that contrition was elicited from a universal motive which also embraces the sin given over to forgetfulness; for in this case the judgment had not yet been objectively completed, and besides the contrition previously conceived still perseveres. Some, however, affirm with probability, with St. Alphonsus (n. 448), because the judgment has already been completed, and consequently new proximate matter is required for a new sentence to be pronounced. - Whence, in practice, penitents are to be induced to elicit a new act of contrition; but if this has not been done, penitents are not to be disturbed, since the sin has already been remitted indirectly by the first absolution.

(b) But when, after a long interval, sins already absolved are accused anew, it is doubtful whether the sorrow elicited in the prior confession and not yet retracted perseveres sufficiently for absolution without being actually renewed. More probably a new sorrow is required, because, after a long interval, the sacramental judgment has been completed; therefore, in order that a new one may be begun and completed, there is required not only a new accusation, but a new act of contrition and a new absolution. - Whence in practice penitents are to be admonished to renew their sorrow; this they will gladly do. But if certain devout persons fear that they omitted this in their past life, they are not easily to be disturbed, since one must stand for the validity of the act until the contrary is proved.

231. The purpose of not sinning hereafter is required for the validity of the sacrament of Penance, as is evidently gathered from Trent, which declares contrition to be sorrow of soul and detestation, with the purpose of not sinning hereafter. In truth the sinner cannot sincerely detest the sin committed and at the same time will to commit the same sin in the future: for each equally is an offense of God, each is opposed to the obtaining of the ultimate end.

¹ Suarez, disp. XX, sect. 4, n. 31-33; Lugo, disp. XIII, n. 51-64; Salmantic., cap. 5, n. 52-69; St. Alphonsus, n. 450-451; Scavini, n. 292-293; Lehmkuhl, n. 292-298; Muller, § 117; Haine, q. 33-34; Genicot, n. 280-282; Noldin, n. 252-254.

This purpose, however, with respect to mortal sins, must be universal, firm, and efficacious.

232. 1° Universal, that is, extending itself to all mortal sins, not only to those which have been committed, but to any others whatever, as is gathered from Trent saying "with the purpose of not sinning hereafter." - Yet the purpose of avoiding all mortal sins in general suffices, without each being explicitly run through. Hence often the confessor would act imprudently if he demanded from the penitent that he promise to avoid this or that sin in particular, in such or such a difficult circumstance, unless the common good specially requires it, for example, in the case of scandal to be repaired, or the good of a third party, for example, when restitution is necessary, or another grave reason of this kind. Outside these or similar cases, the confessor would act imprudently by demanding a special promise, because the penitent, otherwise sufficiently disposed but still weak, could be terrified by this special difficulty and become indisposed, as we said above (n. 214).

233. 2° Firm, that is, so rooted in the will that the penitent is truly and deliberately prepared to commit no grave sin through fear of any evil or through desire of any good.

(A) To this firmness there is no obstacle from an estimation or fear lest someone in fact fall back into sin: for this disposition is rather an act of the intellect, by which relapse is foreseen, on account of the mutability of the human will, and therefore can exist at the same time with an act of the will by which someone sincerely does not wish to relapse. Penitents, therefore, who are so disposed can be absolved, provided that for the present they sincerely resolve to avoid sin according to their strength, and to trust in the grace of God for the future.

(B) But if a penitent certainly believes that he will relapse, according to St. Alphonsus (n. 451), he lacks a firm purpose; according to Lugo,¹ he can have a firm purpose. With Lehmkuhl (n. 296) and others, we think the distinction must be made in this way: (a) if this persuasion arises only from experienced inconstancy and fragility, and the penitent at the same time trusts in God and wishes to try to avoid sin, he is not for that reason to be judged indisposed; for this persuasion, which often does not differ from a great fear of relapsing, is an act of the intellect foreseeing the future with a certain moral certitude, and can exist with an actual will of fleeing sin. In truth confessors often absolve penitents whom they foresee with moral certitude will relapse, and this foresight, according to all, can be reconciled with the sincere purpose of penitents; why can the same not be said of the foresight itself of the penitent? Whence the sinner is to be exhorted to confidence and prayer; and if he promises to make efforts, he can be absolved.

¹ Lugo, disp. XIV, n. 137; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 161.

(b) But if that persuasion arises from despair, he indeed lacks a firm purpose, because he does not have hope. Nor nevertheless is he to be dismissed at once, but he is to be exhorted to consider again the divine mercy, and also the efficacy of divine grace, by whose help he can overcome all difficulties. "But God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able"... "I can do all things in Him who strengthens me."¹ If in truth he conceives confidence in God, and, although he foresees that he will fall, sincerely grieves over his sins and firmly proposes to abstain from them, he can now be absolved.

¹ 1 Cor. 10:13; Phil. 4:13.

234. 3° Efficacious, or having the force of doing what is proposed; now such a purpose can be judged to exist when the penitent sincerely and seriously wills to employ the means for avoiding sin, especially to flee proximate occasions. But it suffices that the purpose be efficacious affectively, so that in soul he is prepared to employ the means; nor is it required that it be efficacious effectively, that is, that sins in fact be avoided. For relapse is not always and of itself a sign of a weak purpose, but more often arises from a change of will; for by nature we are so constituted that easily, when circumstances have changed, we change our counsel; and therefore a firm purpose does not make a man impeccable; thus Peter, who had promised rather to die than to deny Christ, a few hours afterward, from fear of a maidservant, in fact denied Him.

235. 4° But it is controverted whether the purpose must be formal and explicit, or on the contrary a virtual purpose suffices, which is contained in the act of sorrow.

(A) A few affirm that a formal purpose is required, especially because Trent distinguishes this purpose from detestation of sin: now there would have been no necessity of making this distinction, unless the Council had wished to suggest that such a purpose must be explicit. Yet this argument does not hold; for the same Council distinguishes between sorrow and detestation; now, according to all, sorrow implicitly contained in detestation suffices for contrition, without being explicitly elicited.²

² Thus Canus, Relect. de Paenit., p. 1, q. 2, concl. 1, n. 10; Soto, in 4, dist. 15, q. 1, a. 2; Bellarmine, De Paenit., lib. II, cap. 6.

(B) Others more commonly hold that the purpose virtually included in contrition suffices, provided that contrition is conceived from a universal motive;³ for if the motive were not universal, but special to the sins accused by the penitent, perhaps it would not extend to all future sins. - The reason is that Trent, although it explicitly mentioned the purpose in the definition of contrition, nevertheless in no way declared that this purpose must be explicit, but rather taught that attrition suffices if it excludes the will of sinning; but sorrow conceived from a universal motive necessarily excludes every will of sinning, since sin is as hateful in the future as in the present or the past.

³ Suarez, disp. VII, sect. 3, n. 7; Cardenas, p. IV, diss. 2, n. 80, and many others whom Ballerini cites, t. V, n. 97 sq. - St. Alphonsus (n. 450) grants that it is the more probable opinion, but in practice does not permit it to be followed, because the first opinion is probable: now, where validity is at issue, it is not permitted to follow even the more probable opinion.

(C) Others, finally, distinguish:¹ (a) if someone, thinking about the future, does not wish to elicit an explicit act of purpose, this is a sign that his contrition is not sincere, and consequently that he does not even have a virtual purpose; - (b) but if someone sincerely detests sin and yet does not elicit an explicit purpose, because he is not thinking about the future, the sacrament will be valid. - We observe that this third opinion does not differ substantially from the second, since it grants that an explicit purpose does not pertain to the essence of the sacrament.

¹ Holzmann, n. 401.

236. Whence in practice these things seem to be established: (a) before the fact, an explicit purpose is altogether to be counseled, both for the sake of greater security, and so that the fruits of the sacrament may be richer; (b) after the fact, if someone has elicited a sincere act of attrition without thinking about an explicit purpose, he ought not be compelled to repeat his confessions, because most probably his sins have been remitted; now no one can be compelled to accuse again sins most probably dismissed; besides, sins of this kind, if not yet dismissed, will immediately be remitted and the penitent will receive valid absolution, since he is in good faith. - Moreover, it can deservedly be said with Scavini:² "In practice no one ought to be disturbed about this; since it scarcely, and not even scarcely, happens that a truly contrite penitent omits even an explicit purpose, although he does not reflect upon this, which is not necessary."

² Scavini, n. 292.

237. 1° Principle: The purpose of avoiding venial sins must indeed be firm and efficacious, but not necessarily universal; for one venial sin can be remitted without another, and consequently with a habitual or even actual affection for other venial sins.

238. 2° Conclusions: (a) The purpose of avoiding one of the venial sins declared is required and suffices. It is indeed required, if other sins are not accused, at least sins of the past life; otherwise absolution would be invalid on account of the defect of purpose and consequently of contrition; and he who knowingly lacked a good purpose would commit sacrilege. - But it suffices, because as soon as one venial sin is held in hatred, it can be remitted without the others. Yet it is better that it be extended to all venial sins which have been accused; and this certainly will not be difficult if a motive of contrition embracing all venial sins is proposed.

239. (b) When the same venial sins are often accused, it suffices to conceive sorrow and purpose concerning their frequency, by firmly resolving to lessen this frequency. For since we cannot avoid all venial sins taken collectively, as was said in the Treatise on Grace (n. 63), it is enough to lessen their number. - Yet it is expedient to conceive sorrow and purpose concerning certain sins in species, especially concerning those which are more deliberate, since they more greatly hinder Christian perfection. Therefore pious penitents who are accustomed to accuse only venial sins are to be admonished to detest specially one or another and to try to amend it, by determining certain means for attaining this end.¹

¹ Cf. Pratique progressive de la Confession, 2nd ed., Paris, 1900, t. I, p. 62 sq.; t. II, p. 115-144.

240. (c) Absolution is more easily to be granted to those who frequently relapse into the same venial sins than into the same mortal sins.² For the occasions of committing venial sins are much more frequent and much more difficult to remove; whence relapse is not a very probable indication that true sorrow is lacking. Besides, if it is lacking with respect to these venial sins, it is easier to excite contrition with respect to the graver faults of the past life, which the pious are accustomed to accuse.

² Recidivists are treated below, n. 478, where the office of the confessor with respect to various kinds of sinners is treated.

241. Since contrition is altogether necessary for obtaining the remission of sins, and besides not a few penitents, even among the pious, are accustomed to spend a longer time in searching conscience than in exciting contrition, let preachers carefully and often instruct the faithful that, when they prepare themselves for confession, they not neglect to conceive sorrow and purpose. Moreover let the confessor ask penitents whether they are truly contrite, at least when he doubts concerning their dispositions; and if he finds certain ones unprepared, let him propose to them motives of contrition adapted to their understanding.³

³ St. Alphonsus piously proposes some of these motives in the golden little work Praxis Confessarii, ch. I, § 2, n. 10; for example, the confessor can use these or similar words: "My son, what have you done? You have sinned against God, the highest and infinite good; you have turned your face away from Him, you have despised His friendship and grace; you have crucified Christ, His Son. Come then, because you have offended God, infinite goodness, and His infinitely lovable Son, now repent from your whole heart; detest, above all evils, all the injuries by which you have affected God. Are you not now prepared to suffer all things rather than commit these things hereafter?"

242. We have already proved that sacramental confession is necessary by divine right (n. 97); but it remains to speak concerning the extension of this precept.

Division:

On the precept of confession.

On the integrity of confession.

On the causes excusing from integrity.

On the means for procuring this integrity.

There is a twofold precept concerning confession: divine, which determines the obligation, but not the time in which it must be fulfilled; ecclesiastical, which fixes the time and the other circumstances. By way of corollary, we shall add a few things concerning the qualities of confession.

¹ St. Thomas, 3, q. 84, a. 5; Suarez, disp. XXXV-XXXVI; Lugo, disp. XV, n. 26-183; Salmantic., cap. II, n. 18-23; Lacroix, lib. VI, p. 11, de Paenit., n. 2002 sq.; Billuart, diss. I, a. 4, § 2; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 1059-1084; Lehmkuhl, t. I, n. 1202-1205; Marc, n. 1685; Genicot, n. 321-323.

243. 1° On the divine precept. Although Christ did not explicitly define when the precept of confession obliges, from the very nature of this precept and from the doctrine of the Fathers it can be inferred that the divine law of confession obliges sometimes, both per se and per accidens.

(A) It obliges per se: (a) certainly in the article and in very probable danger of death, from whatever cause this danger arises, whether from illness, or from battle, or dangerous childbirth, or from a surgical operation; for he who, placed in such danger, does not fulfill the divine law, rashly exposes himself to the danger of never fulfilling it: and this certainly is the same as violating the divine precept.

Hence the same must be said concerning the case, most rare today, in which someone would foresee that for the rest of his life he would have no opportunity of a confessor.

(b) Probably, according to St. Alphonsus (n. 663) and many others, that precept also obliges sometimes in life, because a sinner is bound not to remain long in mortal sin. - But not a few theologians, both ancient and modern, deny this, because the sinner can be reconciled to God in another way, namely by perfect contrition with the will of receiving the sacrament at a suitable time. - Whatever may be the case, in practice there is no difficulty, since the Church has decreed that all the faithful are bound to confess once a year.

(B) But per accidens it obliges: (a) when holy communion is to be received, if the one about to communicate is in mortal sin, as we said in the Treatise on the Eucharist, n. 140; (b) when the state of grace is required, and at the same time the sinner cannot elicit an act of perfect contrition; (c) when a grave temptation or a depraved habit cannot be overcome without confession; this, however, rarely occurs, since there are other means for overcoming temptations. Whence sinners are to be exhorted, but not compelled, to frequent reception of this sacrament.

244. 2° On the ecclesiastical precept.¹ There have been various ecclesiastical laws concerning this matter at various times; but already from the thirteenth century there has been in force the universal law² of confessing sins once a year, promulgated by the Fourth Lateran Council (1215),³ and its words, somewhat changed in the Code (can. 906), are reported thus: "Every faithful person of either sex, after he has reached the years of discretion, that is, the use of reason, is bound faithfully to confess all his sins at least once a year." Four things are declared there:

¹ Suarez, disp. XXXVI; Lugo, disp. XV, n. 88-183; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 1059-1084; Lehmkuhl, vol. 1, n. 1202-1205; Marc, n. 1685; Konings, n. 547-548; Genicot, n. 323.

² I say universal, for particular laws were already in force before, by which the faithful were commanded to confess sins to their own bishop or priest: concerning this see P. A. Kirsch, in Archiv fur katholisches Kirchenrecht, 4th trim. 1904: Des sacerdos proprius in der abendlandischen Kirche vor 1215.

³ In Denzinger, n. 363.

(a) The subject of the precept: "Every faithful person of either sex"; by these words are indicated all the faithful, or the baptized, who are conscious of mortal sin not yet declared in a valid confession; also children who have reached the years of discretion, that is, who are capable of mortal sin. Hence pastors of souls are bound to instruct children concerning confession already from the seventh year of age, and sometimes before they have reached it, if they already enjoy the use of reason; they must absolve those who have accused a mortal sin, even a doubtful one, provided they are well disposed, lest perhaps they waste away in sin. This obligation especially presses in danger of death. But in doubt whether or not they have attained sufficient discretion, they can be absolved conditionally. Therefore confessors who refuse to absolve children committed to them before solemn first communion gravely err: this abuse, already reproved by Pius IX in the year 1855, Pius X again condemned by a decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments, August 8, 1910.

245. (b) The object of the precept: "let him confess all sins." This certainly is to be understood of mortal sins alone; for the Church by its precept only determined the time at which the divine precept obliges; now the divine precept obliges only to the confession of mortal sins, as Trent openly declares, below, n. 256.

From this it follows that he who has not sinned mortally during the year is not bound, strictly speaking, to confess. Yet it is expedient that even those who have committed venial sins only not abstain from annual confession, lest perhaps, deprived of the grace of the sacrament, they more easily fall into mortal sin.

From this also theologians more probably and more commonly infer that the law of annual confession is not satisfied by a confession of venial sins. Therefore, if at the beginning of the year or at Easter time someone has confessed only venial sins, and afterward, before the end of the same year, falls into mortal sin, he is bound to confess again; for, by accusing venial sins in the previous confessions, he did not fulfill the precept of annual confession, which is restricted to mortal sins. - Some theologians,¹ however, both ancient and modern, with probability think that the law is fulfilled by any valid confession whatever, even of venial sins: and in truth the faithful who have confessed once, whatever sins they have accused, generally think that they have satisfied the precept. Whence in practice a new confession is indeed to be counseled in this case, but not strictly urged.

¹ Thus Palaus, tract. 23, disp. unic., punct. 20, § 3, n. 3, p. 177, where likewise Victor, Reginald, Coninck, Laymann, Bonacina are cited. Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 1061 and Genicot, n. 323.

246. (c) The manner of confessing: "let him confess faithfully"; by this is signified that the precept is not satisfied by a voluntarily invalid confession, as is clear from the Code, can. 907: "He does not satisfy the precept of confessing sins who makes a sacrilegious or voluntarily null confession."¹ And deservedly; for he who voluntarily makes an invalid confession, by that very fact commits sacrilege; now the ecclesiastical law of confession, which is determinative of the divine precept, cannot be fulfilled by the sin of sacrilege.

¹ Cf. Viva, Damnatae Theses, Alex. VII, prop. 14; Vacant, Dict. de Theol., I, col. 737.

247. (d) The frequency of confession is determined by these words: "at least once a year." But since the Council does not determine the time at which this obligation must be fulfilled, there are various opinions concerning the manner of computing the year. Some think the year begins from the time at which the first mortal sin is committed, - others from January to the following January, - others finally from Easter to the following Easter. This last opinion seems more probable, and in practice easier; for since the faithful are bound to receive communion at Easter time, the usage prevailed that annual confession be made at the same time; this custom Trent approved as pious and deservedly to be retained.²

² Sess. XIV, ch. 5, at the end.

Hence he who, with the year begun, foresees that he will not have thereafter an opportunity of a confessor before the year has elapsed, and besides is conscious of mortal sin, is bound to make confession while he has the opportunity of a confessor; for since the precept obliges once a year, it must be fulfilled at the time when this is morally possible.

If someone, conscious of mortal sin, has not confessed within the prescribed time, he must confess as soon as morally possible, according to the common opinion, since the law assigns the time for determining the obligation, but not for ending it. A few grave Doctors³ indeed contradict this, who think that when the time fixed has passed the obligation ceases. But in practice there can scarcely be a difficulty; for St. Alphonsus more probably teaches (n. 669) that he who had not confessed his sins in the preceding year, and in confession manifests mortal sins of both the preceding and the present year, satisfies the obligation of each year, and consequently is not bound to confess twice.

³ See them apud St. Alphonsus, n. 297 and 668.

248. (e) Formerly it was prescribed to confess to "one's own priest," or pastor, or at least to obtain his permission for confessing to another; but today, the new law being silent, this disposition has been abrogated, so that anyone can confess to any duly approved priest. Whence pastors not only ought not oblige their parishioners to confess to them, but act rightly if they advise them sometimes to approach another confessor, so that sacrilegious confessions may thus more easily be avoided.¹

¹ St. Thomas, writing at the time when the law of confessing to one's own priest was still in force, has this: "a priest would sin if he were not easy in granting permission to confess to another, because many are so weak that they would rather die without confession than confess to such a priest. Whence those who are too solicitous to know the consciences of subjects through confession cast a snare of damnation upon many, and consequently upon themselves." (Supplement, q. 8, a. 4 ad 6.)

(f) Finally, a twofold penalty was inflicted upon those transgressing the precept, namely prohibition from entrance into the church, or excommunication, and privation of ecclesiastical burial; but each, which was ferendae sententiae, has likewise been abrogated.

249. 3° On the qualities of confession. Confession, which Christ and the Church require, must be clothed with certain qualities, of which some are necessary, others useful. No fewer than sixteen are numbered by theologians, expressed in these verses:

Let confession be simple, humble, pure, faithful,
And frequent, bare, discreet, willing, modest,
Integral, secret, tearful, hastened,
Strong and accusing, and let it be ready to obey.²

² In St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 9, a. 4, where you will find these conditions accurately explained; cf. Opusculum LVII (ed. Rom. LXIV), p. 416-444: t. XXVIII, ed. Vives, De modo confitendi.

But since certain of these qualities almost fall back into others, we shall explain only the principal ones. Confession, namely, must be:

250. (a) Pure, that is, made with a right intention, not for moving the compassion of the confessor, or for capturing his benevolence, a fortiori not from jest or mockery, but for obtaining the remission of sins. Hence if it is made exclusively for a mortally evil end, for example, for extorting a sum of money from the confessor, or for seducing him, it will be invalid; but if it is made principally for a good end, and secondarily for an evil end, for example, on account of vainglory or from excessive affection for the confessor, it will be valid although illicit.

(b) Simple and bare, namely not artfully composed, nor embracing superfluous things which do not pertain to confession, such as, for example, the sins of others, or long narrations altogether useless; hence the confessor should not ask concerning the name and family of the penitent, but only concerning his state and condition, insofar as these can serve for knowledge of his sins.

251. (c) Humble and sorrowful, or with a sense of one's own unworthiness and sincere sorrow, after the example of the publican, who struck his breast, saying: "O God, be merciful to me a sinner";¹ not however by boasting about sins or good acts; hence penitents should not excuse their sins by attributing their malice to others (for example, to a spouse, parents, brothers, neighbors).

¹ Luke 18:13.

But if someone has already narrated his sins to a priest in a historical manner, without sorrow, he is not bound distinctly to accuse the same sins to the same priest, who afterward is chosen as confessor, provided that this priest retains a distinct memory of these sins; but it suffices to accuse universally what had previously been narrated. But if the confessor has retained only a confused knowledge of them, it is controverted whether a new distinct accusation is required: St. Alphonsus affirms (n. 502), because the first confession was not sacramental, while the second is not integral unless it is distinct; Lugo,² however, denies this, because "the later accusation, referred to the memory which the confessor has of those sins distinctly heard before, is sufficient knowledge, such as is desired in the confessor." - Whence the matter is truly doubtful, and consequently the penitent is not to be compelled, but is to be exhorted to accuse his sins distinctly anew, especially since the confessor can from this make suitable questions and provide salutary admonitions.

² Lugo, disp. XVI, n. 638; cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 468-471; see, however, what the Vindiciae Alphonsianae, p. 480-484, teach to the contrary.

(d) Faithful and integral, that is, true and sincere, retaining no grave sin, nor likewise accusing sins which in reality were not committed, but candidly setting forth certain things as certain, doubtful things as doubtful, as they are known; concerning which more fully below.

(e) Discreet or prudent, not manifesting the sins or defects of others without necessity; expressing even shameful sins with modest and cautious words, insofar as can be done; omitting useless circumstances, especially if they are dangerous, odious, or scandalous.

252. (f) Vocal, that is, expressed in words, but not by nod, signs, or writings; this is required not from the very essence of the sacrament, or by divine precept, but from custom which has obtained the force of law, so that, according to the common opinion, he would sin gravely who, without any cause, wished to confess only by a sign or writing, when he can easily use his voice. But when a just cause exists, confession can licitly be made by signs or in writing, for example, if the penitent is mute or, on account of illness, can speak only with great difficulty; - or, on account of excessive shame or scruples, could not declare his sins integrally; - likewise if the confessor is somewhat deaf and cannot hear the penitent without bystanders also hearing him. In these cases, however, the penitent, if he is not mute, should at least say: "I accuse myself of the sins which are written on this paper": yet this is not absolutely required for validity.

253. (g) Secret, but not public, and made to the priest alone. Public confession would indeed be valid, and in truth it flourished in the first centuries: but, with Trent as witness (ch. 5), no one is held by divine precept to confess his offenses publicly, nor would it be sufficiently advisable for this to be prescribed by any human law, namely that offenses, especially secret ones, should be opened in public confession. This indeed is so true that, according to the common doctrine of theologians, the penitent is dispensed from the law of integrity when he cannot confess his sins except publicly, with others hearing.

254. 1° State of the question. (A) A twofold integrity can be found in confession: (a) material, or objective, which is the accusation made to one and the same priest of all and each of the grave sins which have been committed after baptism and have never been declared in a valid confession; (b) formal, or subjective, which is the accusation of all mortal sins which the penitent here and now morally can and is bound to confess. Indeed it can happen that, on account of a just cause, for example, ignorance, forgetfulness, or moral impossibility, someone does not confess all the mortal sins committed since the last confession: then the confession will indeed be formally, but not materially, integral.

¹ St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 6, a. 1-3; q. 9, a. 2; Suarez, disp. XXII; Lugo, disp. XVI; Salmantic., cap. 8; Lacroix, n. 915-1139; Billuart, diss. V; St. Alphonsus, n. 465-478; Elbel-Bierbaum, Confer. VI-VII; Konings, n. 1359-1366; Kenrick, n. 36-57; Lehmkuhl, n. 301-326; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 346-364; Berardi, Praxis, n. 4488-4531; Genicot, n. 283-291; Noldin, n. 261-270.

Now material integrity is not always required for valid absolution: for Christ, according to His wisdom and mercy, did not will to oblige us to that which is physically or morally impossible; and therefore there are causes excusing from material integrity, as we shall say below. But formal integrity is necessary by divine right for valid absolution of sins, as will appear from the following principle.

255. (B) The necessary matter of confession is all and each mortal sin, committed after baptism and not yet declared in a valid confession. But venial sins committed after baptism, and sins already remitted, are sufficient and free matter, insofar as they can be subjected to the power of the keys and absolved. Whence there will be a twofold principle: the first concerning necessary integrity, the second concerning sufficient and free matter.

256. 2° First principle: By divine right it is necessary to confess all and each mortal sin, even hidden ones, committed after baptism, of which memory is had after diligent examination.

(A) Trent¹ thus defines this necessity of integral confession: "If anyone shall say that in the sacrament of Penance, for the remission of sins, it is not necessary by divine right to confess all and each mortal sin, of which memory is had with due and diligent premeditation, even hidden sins, and those which are against the last two precepts of the Decalogue, and the circumstances which change the species of the sin... let him be anathema." Yet the Council acknowledges that sins which escape the memory are remitted by God:² "But the remaining sins, which do not occur to one diligently thinking, are understood to be included universally in the same confession: for which we faithfully say with the Prophet:³ 'Cleanse me, O Lord, from my hidden sins.'" Concerning this exception and others of this kind we shall speak below.

¹ Sess. XIV, can. 7.

² Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 5.

³ Ps. 18:13.

257. (B) The reason for this necessity is drawn from the very will of Christ, who decreed it thus, as is clear from what was said above, n. 97. - But the fittingness of this perfect integrity is drawn from the twofold office of the confessor: (a) insofar as he is judge, the priest cannot render an equitable sentence unless the case has been known integrally, at least substantially; and this indeed is so true that, in human judgments, if some substantial omission is found, the judgment is declared null or is reformed by a higher authority; but the confessor cannot know the case integrally, even substantially, unless the penitent manifests all and each mortal sin, even hidden ones; for one mortal sin is of such great moment that it is able to cause eternal damnation; besides, one is not remitted without the others; therefore all and each must be sincerely set forth.

(b) As physician, the priest cannot heal the spiritual wounds of the penitent unless he knows at least all those which are able to bring death upon the soul; for a bodily physician generally cannot heal a wound or illness unless he has known the other grave ailments of the sick person, since one disease is made worse by the addition of another, and the medicine which is suited to one disease can furnish harm to another; so likewise the spiritual physician can scarcely cure the penitent unless he knows all his grave spiritual diseases, or all mortal sins, since one is likewise aggravated by the addition of others, and that which would be a suitable medicine for one sin would furnish an incentive to another. Therefore it is necessary to declare all mortal sins, so that remedies may be proportioned to the various sins.¹

¹ Thus almost St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 9, a. 2.

258. Note. Since material integrity of confession is necessary by necessity of precept, but not by necessity of means, truly and solidly probable opinions can be admitted in the interpretation of this law, as St. Alphonsus² rightly notes: "Nor does it avail to say here that in the matter of the sacraments we cannot follow opinions only probable, because this proceeds when there is question of the value of the sacrament, otherwise concerning integrity; and as regards the value, it is certain that formal integrity suffices."

² St. Alphonsus, H. A., tr. XVI, n. 29.

259. Corollaries. From this two questions disputed among theologians can be solved: (A) Whether sins committed in baptism itself must be accused,¹ for example on account of a defect of faith or of attrition in an adult baptized person?

¹ St. Thomas, 3, q. 69, a. 10, ad 2; Lugo, disp. XVI, sect. 1; St. Alphonsus, n. 427; Lehmkuhl, n. 262; Genicot, n. 258; Noldin, n. 224; Muller, lib. III, § III, n. 6.

In this case baptism is indeed valid and imprints the character, but does not produce grace, on account of the obstacle. According to the principle explained above, the sin which was completed before the impression of the character ought not be accused, because it was truly committed before baptism; but the sin which persevered after the impression of the character must be accused, as having been committed after baptism or at least continued. Now the sin of sacrilege, committed in the reception of baptism, was indeed begun before the impression of the character, but, at least for the most part, endured after the character had been received; and consequently under this respect it must be accused. - Some, however, say that it can scarcely be discerned whether a sin of this kind persevered after baptism had been received or not, and therefore that it must be regarded as doubtful matter and need not necessarily be declared. But it is certainly expedient that it be accused in the following confession; and for the most part the faithful who are conscious of such a sin think that they are bound to declare it.

260. (B) Whether an adult who has been rebaptized conditionally is bound to confess sins committed before the conditional baptism?

A distinction must be made: (a) A Catholic adult, rebaptized conditionally, is not bound again to confess sins already sincerely accused: for if the prior baptism was valid, the absolutions given were likewise valid; but if it was invalid, the later baptism will wash away all sins. - But sins not yet accused by him must be declared, on account of the reason soon to be given concerning a non-Catholic.

(b) A non-Catholic adult, converted to the true faith and rebaptized conditionally, must regularly confess the sins of his past life. For the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, in the case of Charles Wipperman, who was rebaptized conditionally after conversion from Lutheran errors, declared on June 17, 1715:¹ "let him confess the sins of his past life, and let him be absolved from them conditionally." So likewise it was decreed in the First Synod of Westminster, for England, with the approval of the Holy Office, December 17, 1868;² for the United States of America, in the Instruction given to the bishop of Philadelphia, July 20, 1859.³

¹ Acta S. Sedis, IV, 320-324; cf. Collectanea P. F., n. 644.

² Ibid., n. 955.

³ Ibid., n. 1689.

In the aforesaid regions, therefore, confession is regularly to be imposed, yet with that moderation which is proper to positive laws. In other regions, this confession is strongly to be counseled, so that the remission of sins previously committed may be more certain.⁴

⁴ Recently indeed there was published (Analecta eccles., 1899, p. 489) a decree of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide, already given July 12, 1869, where it is said: "As regards the doubt proposed by letters of the 29th day of last May, and touching sacramental confession to be required from new converts, it occurs that the response of the Holy Office, feria V, place IV, of the day December 17 of the past year, although given only to the bishops of England who were asking, contains a universal law, and therefore obliges not only in England, but also in other regions." But Roman professors of moral theology think that this is not properly a decree, but only a private response of the Eminent Prefect of this Congregation, and therefore does not have the force of law. Cf. Bucceroni, Casus conscientiae, 120, p. 517-521.

The reason for this decision seems to be this: he who receives baptism, whether certainly or doubtfully valid, is presumed validly baptized until the contrary is proved, and therefore is subject to the jurisdiction of the Church; for, by receiving the external rite, he has entered the visible Church, and subjects himself to all the obligations by which the members of the Church are bound, and is bound to fulfill them until it is proved that the baptism was invalid; but one of these obligations is to confess sins; therefore he is bound to fulfill this obligation.

The order to be followed in the reconciliation of heretics concerning whose baptism there is doubt is this: let them abjure heresy and make profession of faith; then let them be baptized conditionally, and finally absolved conditionally. Yet the confession itself can precede baptism, provided that absolution is given after baptism, the penitent summarily repeating the sins accused before baptism.⁵

⁵ Thus the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, December 7, 1874, apud Collectanea P. F., n. 957.

261. Second principle: All venial sins committed after baptism, and sins both mortal and venial sins already directly remitted are sufficient and free matter of confession.

(A) That sins of this kind are free matter, that is, not necessarily to be accused, is manifestly clear; since Trent declares that venial sins can be kept silent without fault and expiated by many other remedies;¹ but sins already remitted, by the very fact that they have been remitted, need not necessarily be subjected again to the keys of the Church.

¹ Sess. XIV, ch. 5.

(B) That the same sins are sufficient matter, that is, matter from which absolution can be obtained, is demonstrated thus.

(a) With respect to venial sins, we have first of all the practice of the faithful, who for a long time have accused venial sins: moreover the Church not only does not reprove this practice, but rather promotes it; for Trent says:² "Venial sins, by which we are not excluded from the grace of God, and into which we fall more frequently, although they are rightly and usefully, and without any presumption, said in confession, as the usage of pious men demonstrates, nevertheless can be kept silent without fault and expiated by many other remedies." And deservedly indeed venial sins are sufficient matter of sacramental confession; for if only mortal sins were accused, whoever had recourse to the sacred tribunal would be judged guilty of grave faults; and thus the burden of confession would be made more grave.³

² Sess. XIV, ch. 5.

³ St. Francis de Sales discusses excellently the utility of accusing venial sins, Introduction a la vie devote, p. II, ch. 19.

(b) With respect to sins already remitted, Benedict XI has these words:⁴ "For the rest, although it is not of necessity to confess the same sins again; nevertheless ... on account of shame, which is a great part of penance, we consider it salutary that the confession of the same sins be repeated." In truth, since acts of penance can be repeated so that the remnants of sins may more and more be wiped away, why cannot faults already remitted be subjected again to the keys, so that they may more and more be blotted out and expiated? Nor should it be said that in human matters no one can be judged and absolved twice in the same tribunal; for, since the remission of sin is made through the infusion of grace, and at the same time is joined with the diminution of punishment, sins already remitted can be accused again for a greater infusion of grace and remission of punishment; besides, the judgment can be repeated, insofar as the confessor is able to judge whether the dispositions of the penitent suffice for absolution or not.

⁴ Const. Inter cunctas, 1304, Extravag. Comm., l. 5, t. 7, c. 1.

262. From this it follows that in ordinary confession venial sins, either all or a few, can licitly be omitted; likewise, in general confession, not necessarily, those mortal sins can be omitted which have already been directly remitted by sacramental absolution. Besides, if free matter is declared, it is not necessary that the lowest species of each sin be set forth; for if there is no obligation of accusing these sins, a fortiori it is not necessary to declare them in species.

263. Corollaries. (A) But insufficient matter of confession consists of all those moral defects, or imperfections,¹ which do not reach the malice of sin, or indeliberate acts, for example, neglect of a divine inspiration concerning a work of supererogation, involuntary distractions whether in themselves or in their cause. For an imperfection is a voluntary action or omission which is opposed to a divine counsel, but not to a precept; for example, when someone, solicited by grace, neglected to hear Mass during the week, or to visit the Most Blessed Sacrament, while he was being drawn by grace to do this; now such an act, since it is not opposed to a precept, is not a sin. Likewise an indeliberate act, even if it is opposed to a law or precept, is not a sin, because it is not a human act. Now whatever is not a sin cannot be matter of the sacrament of Penance.

¹ On the concept of imperfection cf. L'Ami du Clerge, 1901, p. 337-342; Revue du Clerge Francais, Dec. 1900, p. 71-84.

Yet often in these imperfections there lies hidden some venial sin of a slightly evil intention, for example, of vanity, of sloth, of which penitents who accuse themselves of these things are more or less conscious. Hence the confessor ought not prevent pious penitents from declaring these imperfections, both because venial fault is accustomed to be mixed with them, and so that they may be better directed; but rather they are to be exhorted to say by what motive they performed these acts; and, if they accuse nothing else, they should kindly be induced to confess again some sin of their past life.

264. (B) The matter of confession is called doubtful if it is not clear whether the act is a sin or not, whether, for example, it is deliberate or not, whether it is a venial sin or a mere imperfection.

Now he who accuses only doubtful matter cannot be absolved absolutely, because the sacrament would be exposed to the danger of nullity; indeed he ought not regularly to be absolved conditionally without a sufficient reason, as we shall explain below where conditional absolution is treated.

Therefore in practice, when a penitent either accuses no sin, or only a sin doubtfully committed, (a) let the confessor ask him about sins which are more commonly committed, for example, against charity, or patience, or truthfulness, or the duties proper to his state; (b) if he obtains nothing certain, let him advise the penitent to declare some certain sin of his past life, whether mortal or venial; this will be easier if the confessor himself proposes these or similar questions: "Have you not in your past life sinned against obedience due to parents, or charity toward neighbor? Have you not consented to motions of anger, etc.?" - If the penitent then accuses no certain sin, let him be questioned concerning the things necessary for salvation; for there is a not improbable suspicion that perhaps he is ignorant of those things which are necessary by necessity of means: in which case, he cannot be absolved unless he is first instructed, as will be said below.¹

¹ Cf. Reuter, Neo-Confessarius, n. 117.

265. (C) From this it can be understood in what sense a generic accusation suffices when there is question of free matter.

There can be a threefold accusation of this kind: (a) an accusation altogether vague and indeterminate, expressed by words or signs, for example, I have sinned, I accuse myself of all the sins of my past life, without its being determined whether these sins were grave or not; this can likewise be done by signs, for example, by striking the breast, or by sighs or tears; (b) accusation of a grave sin in general, for example, I have sinned gravely, without however the genus or species of the sin being determined; (c) generic accusation simply, by indicating the virtue or law against which offense was committed, without the lowest species being determined, for example, I have sinned against charity, against justice, or against the fourth precept.

(a) If there is question of an altogether indeterminate accusation, there is a threefold opinion:

1. Some, with Ballerini,² think that this accusation suffices both for validity and for liceity. For that which in necessity suffices for the validity of the sacrament must suffice even outside necessity, since the essence of the sacrament remains the same in each case. Besides, it suffices for liceity; for, as Bucceroni says,² with the certain validity of the sacrament standing, illicitness can arise from no other source than from a positive divine precept; but this precept is not had in the case of free matter; therefore in this case an indeterminate accusation is licit. - 2) Others, on the contrary, hold that an indeterminate accusation not only is not licit, but even renders the validity of the sacrament doubtful; thus Laymann, Suarez, Lehmkuhl:¹ for, from the usage and practice of the Church, specific confession of sins, even venial ones, has flourished for a long time outside the case of necessity; now this custom seems to be the interpreter of the divine law; therefore, although accusation of venial sins is not necessary, if someone wishes to be absolved from them he is bound to explain them in species. - Besides, the sacrament of Penance is conferred after the manner of a judgment; but the nature of a judgment demands that the matter be determined, insofar as can be done; in the case of necessity, essential formalities indeed can suffice, but in the ordinary case even less essential ones are required: whence from the fact that in the article of death an indeterminate accusation suffices, it by no means follows that the same suffices outside the case of necessity, even for validity.

² Gury-Ballerini, n. 421, n. b.

² Bucceroni, n. 675.

¹ Laymann, lib. V, tr. 6, ch. 5, n. 14; Suarez, disp. XXIII, sect. 1, n. 10; Lehmkuhl, n. 255.

3. Finally, a third opinion, which Noldin (n. 228-229) defends, contends that an indeterminate accusation of this kind does indeed suffice for validity, on account of the arguments of the first opinion, but not for liceity, as is clear from the arguments of the second opinion.

Whence in practice it is altogether to be advised that, even in free matter, at least one sin be declared specifically; for thus the validity of the sacrament is better provided for, and also the spiritual good of penitents, since they conceive contrition more easily and are able to receive more practical counsels if they accuse sins more determinately. - Yet, if penitents are so rude or lacking in memory that nothing can be drawn from them except a generic confession, they can sometimes be absolved conditionally, lest otherwise they remain long without the benefit of the sacrament.

266. (b) An accusation of the second kind, namely I have sinned gravely, or I accuse myself of my mortal sins, is much more probably valid, indeed also licit, when it is made as a safeguard, after sins not yet remitted have been declared; for mortal sin, even declared in a general way, is not indeterminate matter, but sufficiently concrete, so that judgment can be rendered concerning it; besides, since there is question of free matter, by no law

is it prescribed that sins be declared more specifically. Thus Lehmkuhl (n. 264) with many others.

267. (c) According to all, the accusation of the third kind, namely "I have sinned against such a virtue," without the lowest species and number being declared, altogether suffices in free matter, since certainly a judgment can be pronounced concerning such matter. Indeed this practice is to be recommended to all who accuse only venial sins, especially if they were doubtfully committed, so that the validity and efficacy of absolution may thus be more safely provided for. Yet let care be taken that this declaration not be made by mere custom, but with due attention and with sorrow sincerely conceived.

The question can be weighed with respect to 1° the species of sins, 2° their number, 3° circumstances, 4° doubtful sins; 5° by way of conclusion, we shall speak about a lie committed in confession.

268. Principle: For the integrity of confession it is required that mortal sins be accused according to their lowest species, insofar as this can morally be done. It is certain.

(A) It is proved: (a) For Trent declares:¹ "priests could not have exercised this judgment when the cause was unknown, nor indeed could they have preserved equity in imposing penalties, if they [penitents] had declared their sins to them only in general, and not rather in species and individually." Now the expression in species is properly understood of the ultimate, or the lowest, species.

¹ Sess. XIV, ch. 5.

(b) The reason is that sins diverse in species carry before themselves an entirely distinct malice, as is explained in the Treatise on Sins; thus, for example, the malice of rash judgment is diverse from the malice of detraction or insult; but the confessor cannot judge rightly concerning the state of the penitent unless he knows the special malice of the sins which are declared; therefore.

Consequently it does not suffice to say: I have sinned against charity; but it must be set forth whether someone sinned by rash judgment, or hatred, or discord, or scandal, etc.

269. (B) It is explained. Yet I said "insofar as this can morally be done"; for (a) there are many penitents who, on account of ignorance, do not distinguish the more minute species of certain sins; these cannot accuse the special malice which they do not know, and of which very probably they are not guilty, since they did not apprehend it. Whence the confessor is not bound to question them minutely about these things, lest he render confession hateful, contrary to the intention of Christ.

This especially occurs with respect to sins of the heart and of the mouth; thus, for example, many do not distinguish among morose delectation, complacency in a sin committed, and desire of committing sin, and think that they accuse all these sufficiently if they say: I had shameful thoughts in my mind and gave consent to them; likewise, with respect to depraved conversations, they establish no distinction among obscene narration, boasting about sins committed, and provocation to evil, and they comprehend all these under this general accusation: I had shameful conversations. Now, if it is clear that they did not apprehend the diverse malices of these sins, and it is feared that minute questions would disturb them or afflict them with weariness, the confessor can for the time abstain from these questions;¹ afterward, however, when occasion is given, he will try to instruct them better.

¹ Thus Berardi, Praxis, n. 4505; Genicot, 284; Morino, note 1 to n. 453. Lugo had already gone before them, who in the Preface to the Treatise on Penance writes: "For the practice of this sacrament there must be considered not only what is in some way true as though in the abstract, but also what can and ought to be done morally and in a human way; so that this remedy, full of sweetness and gentleness, not by its difficulty become impossible, or bring excessive horror upon human frailty."

(b) Sometimes also the penitent is excused from accusing the lowest species on account of defect of memory. But he who does not remember the lowest species is bound to declare the generic species; for example, he who knows that he sinned against charity, although he does not remember how, is bound to say: I have sinned gravely against charity. Again, he who is conscious that he has sinned mortally, although he does not remember what kind of sin he committed, must say: I have sinned gravely.

270. Corollaries: (a) For the integrity of confession it does not suffice to express the internal act, but the external act of sin must be declared; for example, he who unjustly killed his neighbor does not satisfy the precept of integrity by saying: I had the desire of killing an innocent person. For although the internal act, with respect to malice, is of the same species as the external act, nevertheless, according to the common estimation of wise men and of the faithful, it differs morally from it; and deservedly, for words or deeds certainly differ from thoughts and desires, and suppose greater malice; moreover they frequently increase the internal malice, as was said in De Actibus Humanis, n. 162. Besides, without declaration of the external act, the confessor can scarcely fulfill his office concerning occasions to be avoided, restitution to be imposed, and remedies to be provided: for all these depend on the external act.

This is true not only of sins of commission, but also of sins of omission; for example, he who omitted Mass on a feast day would not satisfy by saying: I had the desire of omitting Mass.

271. (b) But it is controverted whether an effect mortally evil, foreseen from sin, must be expressed, for example, blasphemy uttered in drunkenness, death following from poison administered. - According to all, per accidens there is an obligation of confessing such an effect, if from the effect that followed a censure, or reservation, or obligation of making restitution is incurred; thus if someone procured an abortion, with the effect following, he must declare this, on account of the censure annexed to this effect.

With these cases set aside, there is a threefold opinion; others more probably with St. Alphonsus (n. 149) affirm, provided the evil effect was foreseen, at least confusedly,¹ and the depraved will was not retracted before the effect was produced; for such an effect, as foreseen, is voluntary in its cause, and consequently a sin. Thus he who becomes drunk while foreseeing that he will omit Mass is bound to confess both the drunkenness and the omission of Mass. Yet the case is excepted in which the evil will was retracted before the effect, for example, if a drunken man, before he has lost the use of reason, has already retracted his sin, although afterward, on account of the absorbed liquor, he loses the use of reason and omits Mass: for then the effect is only materially evil; therefore it suffices to declare: I was drunk and wished to omit Mass.

¹ Yet it must be noted that what is foreseen only confusedly is not as sinful as what is foreseen clearly and distinctly. Cf. Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XX (1898), p. 1025-1030 and 1121-1129.

Others, with Lugo,² probably deny this, because the whole malice of the act is in the cause, but not in the effect which follows from it; since he cannot actually sin who does not actually act morally; but he who placed the sinful cause does not morally act at the time when the effect is produced, since he is actually sleeping or distracted; therefore that effect is not properly a sin; therefore it suffices to accuse the cause, without the effect being declared.

² Lugo, disp. XVI, sect. 9, with the authors whom he cites, n. 440.

272. Some, with D'Annibale,¹ distinguish thus: if an effect of this kind introduces a new sin, and is such that it could follow or not follow from the cause placed, it must be declared; for example, if someone, on account of drunkenness, omitted Mass on a feast day, or blasphemed, or killed, he must signify that, by indulging in wine, he foresaw these dangers, and that in truth while drunk he omitted Mass, blasphemed, killed. Otherwise, the evil effect is not necessarily to be declared: for example, for him who set fire to another's house, or administered poison to a man, it will be enough to say: I set fire to another's house, or I gave poison to someone.

¹ D'Annibale, n. 303 and note 23; Morino, n. 453.

In this variety of opinions, penitents are not to be compelled, but only exhorted, to declare the evil effect. In practice there is scarcely any difficulty, since most of the faithful, ignorant of these distinctions, generally declare those evil effects of which they are conscious.

273. (A) Principle: For the integrity of confession, the penitent is bound also to manifest distinctly the number of mortal sins, insofar as it can morally be known. It is certain.

This is clear from Trent, which defines that all and each mortal sin, of which memory is had with due and diligent premeditation, must be accused; and which declares that those who do otherwise and knowingly retain anything obtain pardon of no sin.²

² Trent, sess. XIV, can. 7 and ch. 5.

274. (B) Corollaries: (a) When the penitent certainly knows the number of sins, he must sincerely confess it, neither greater nor lesser; otherwise it would be a sacrilegious lie. Hence one must not say: I blasphemed about six times, when the number is certainly known; for the word about makes the matter doubtful, and so the confessor is deceived.

(b) When, after diligent examination, he does not know the certain number, he must accuse the more probable number, that is, the one which comes closer to the truth, adding the particle about, or more or less. But this clause, according to St. Alphonsus (n. 466), does not have an absolute sense, but a relative one with respect to the number to which it is added; namely about three times is understood as 2-4; about ten times: 8-12; about thirty: 27-33; about one hundred: 95-105; about one thousand: 950-1050. Now if the penitent afterward knows that he erred by lessening the number, he is not bound to correct the error in another confession unless the number notably exceeds the approximate number, so that it cannot be included under the particle about; thus, if he said about ten, and afterward knew that he had sinned twelve times, he is bound to nothing; otherwise, if in fact he had sinned fifteen times. - But he who in good faith notably exaggerated the number is not bound to repeat the confession, because the greater contains the lesser.

(c) If the penitent cannot even recall the approximate number, because he long fostered a habit of sinning, it suffices that he indicate the duration of the habit, adding, if it can be done, about how often in a day, or week, or month he sinned: for this is more easily recalled than the whole sum of sins. - Indeed, when the habit is such that the individual acts are indeliberate, although the habit itself is gravely culpable, as being not retracted, as often occurs in those who blaspheme, it is not necessary to explain the number of blasphemies, but it suffices to say: I have an inveterate habit of blaspheming inadvertently whenever the occasion presents itself.¹ Likewise, according to Lugo,² when rustic or common men confess conversations about shameful matters with companions, which certain men are accustomed to mix in here and there through the whole day while they labor together, both concerning men and concerning women, both concerning married persons and unmarried ones, it suffices to explain the habit and the principal species, without the number being declared, since this is morally impossible.

¹ Thus Sporer, Theol. Sacram. de Paenit., n. 455; Genicot, n. 285.

² Lugo, disp. XVI, n. 575.

275. (d) When there is question of internal sins, whether thoughts or desires, which were very frequent daily, it suffices to express this frequency in a general way, by saying, for example: for one month I frequently in a day called down grave evils upon an enemy; or, for two months, often in a day I gave consent to depraved desires. For then the confessor, having heard the space of time, morally speaking, can conjecture what the number of sins was. - Speculatively speaking the penitent would have to say how often, approximately, desires of this kind were interrupted; but in practice the uneducated cannot do this, since they do not advert to this.

276. (e) Those who in good faith accused their sins in an indeterminate and confused way with respect to number, because at that time they could not explain them better, probably are not bound to repeat the confession, if afterward, having become more instructed, they apprehend this

number more distinctly; for the sins which they declared, according to the knowledge which they had at that time, were directly remitted, as being sufficiently contained in this confused accusation; but there is no obligation of again confessing a sin already directly remitted through absolution.¹

¹ Thus Lugo, disp. XVI, n. 577-588; Genicot, n. 285.

277. Among circumstances, some change the species of the sin, because namely they constitute a new malice specifically distinct from the malice of the sin itself: for example, the circumstance of a sacred thing in theft adds to the sin of injustice the special malice of sacrilege; but others only aggravate the malice within the same species, whether by reason of intensity, or by reason of duration, or of mode, etc.: thus the sin of homicide is certainly aggravated by the circumstances by which death is inflicted, for example, by first amputating hands and feet, or gouging out the eyes.

278. Principle: For the integrity of confession it is necessary to accuse circumstances which change the species of the sin, if the new malice thus introduced is grave and is apprehended as such. It is certain.

For Trent defines² that it is necessary to confess "the circumstances which change the species of the sin." The reason is that those circumstances, by the very fact that they change the species, constitute a new and distinct sin, since they violate a distinct law or are opposed to a distinct virtue.

² Sess. XIV, can. 7.

But if the new malice, superadded to the sin, is not grave, or, even if objectively grave, is not apprehended as such by the subject, it does not constitute a grave sin, and consequently need not necessarily be declared.

279. Corollaries. The principal circumstances which are able to change the species are explained here only briefly,³ since they are declared more fully in various Treatises:

³ For a fuller exposition of this matter cf. Lugo, disp. XVI, n. 144-390; Suarez, disp. XXII, sect. 4; Salmantic., cap. 8, n. 51-114.

(a) The circumstance of the person sinning changes the species when an external sin against chastity is committed by a person consecrated to God by vow of chastity or by sacred order: for then it is personal sacrilege; - or when the person sinning is married: for it is adultery; - or when someone scandalizes a person whose spiritual care he has by force of his office, for example, if a pastor sins with parishioners, parents with children, a teacher with pupils: for these are bound by justice or piety to promote the spiritual good of subjects, and therefore they sin against one or the other virtue.

(b) Likewise the circumstance of the person with whom or against whom sin is committed changes the species in the matter of chastity, if someone sins with a married person (adultery), or with one related by blood or affinity (incest); - in the matter of charity or justice, if someone has hated, or struck, or calumniated parents, or children, or grandparents, grandchildren, or relatives by affinity in the first degree: for then piety is offended.

(c) The circumstance of place changes the species when sacrilege is introduced from this, for example, when an external act against chastity is committed in a church, or sacred things are stolen there.

(d) The circumstance of end changes the species when in itself it is gravely sinful, for example, if someone utters shameful things with the intention of seducing an innocent person.

280. What is certain? In order to separate certain things from uncertain ones, we establish these points: according to all, circumstances which do not notably aggravate the malice of a sin are not necessarily to be accused. Besides, circumstances whether of scandal, or of erroneous conscience, or of quantity, etc., which make some sin mortal from venial, must be accused; for example, to speak slightly shameful things before innocent children, who from this will take occasion of sinning gravely; - to steal ten asses when someone thinks this is a grave sin; - the quantity of the theft, insofar as it is necessary for discerning whether the sin is grave or slight. Likewise, circumstances which import a censure or reservation must be manifested.

281. What is disputed? But setting aside these cases, it is controverted whether circumstances notably aggravating the malice of a sin within the same species must necessarily be accused.

(a) Suarez, Billuart, Collet, Lacroix, and others¹ affirm. 1) For although Trent does not expressly teach this, nevertheless it insinuates it; since it declares that the circumstances of a sin are to be accused because otherwise it cannot be done that confessors "can rightly judge concerning the gravity of crimes, and impose the penalty which is fitting for those penitents"¹; but the same reason has force for notably aggravating circumstances; for some of these seem to increase the malice of sin more than some circumstances which change the species; thus he who deliberately and cruelly mutilates an innocent person, by amputating his hands and arms and gouging out his eyes, and afterward kills him, sins more gravely than he who, suddenly moved by anger, kills another with one blow in a church. Besides, a much greater penance must be imposed upon him who stole a thousand gold pieces than upon him who stole only twenty.

¹ Suarez, disp. XXII, sect. 3, n. 5; Billuart, diss. VII, a. 2, § 3; Collet, VI, 321, apud Migne, p. 484; Lacroix, n. 977, and others cited by these authors.

¹ Sess. XIV, ch. 5.

2. The Roman Catechism, the best interpreter of the Council, expressly teaches this:² "Nor indeed is it fitting only to explain grave sins by narrating them, but also those things which surround each sin, and greatly increase or lessen its depravity."

² De Sacram. Paenitent., n. 39.

3. Reason itself agrees; for, if the penitent is silent about these circumstances, he implicitly denies that his sin has such great gravity: for since there is a twofold manner of committing that sin, one ordinary, the other extraordinary and with peculiar deformity, when the penitent confesses the sin in a simple manner, the confessor neither can nor ought to understand that he sinned otherwise than in the ordinary manner, and so he is deceived with respect to the gravity of the sin.³

³ Thus almost Suarez, n. 10.

(b) A few others with Sporer (n. 410) think that the circumstance what, for example, the quantity of the theft, must necessarily be confessed, because it touches the substantial integrity of the sin, but not the others.

282. (c) Yet the more common opinion denies this,⁴ with St. Thomas, St. Alphonsus, and most moderns. For 1) while Trent explains the necessity of confessing mortal sins and their circumstances, it always adds this limitation: "circumstances which change the species of the sin"; but such a limitation seems to exclude other circumstances; for if someone, explaining the necessity of confessing sins, were always to add this limitation, "sins which are mortal," he would certainly seem to exclude all venial sins; so likewise the Council, by limiting the obligation of confessing circumstances to those which change the species, deservedly seems to exclude others.

⁴ St. Thomas, in 4 dist. 16, q. 3, a. 2, quaestiunc. 5; Opusc. 7 (alias 10) ad Lectorem Bisunt., q. 6. After the instruction given for the Roman clergy by Benedict XIII "concerning this matter I think there must not even be disputation" (D'Annibale, III, n. 303, note 20).

Nor should it be said that the Council implicitly taught the obligation of confessing other circumstances, on account of the argument brought above (n. 281); for the confessor can form a prudent judgment as soon as he knows the species of the sin, since circumstances, even notably aggravating ones, do not substantially increase the malice of the sin; for the quiddity of the sin is taken from its specific determination; therefore, by declaring the species, the essence of the sin is sufficiently declared. With respect to penance to be imposed, an equality in every respect is not required, but only a certain equality or proportion between the sin and the satisfaction; moreover this proportion can certainly be determined once the species of the sin is known, without circumstances, even notably aggravating ones, being manifested.

2. The Roman Catechism, when the context is inspected, is not opposed to our opinion, because from the examples adduced there it is clear that there is question here of those circumstances which make a sin mortal from venial, or change the species; for it says, after the words cited by the adversaries: "for certain circumstances are so grave that the character of mortal sin is established from them alone"; afterward it asserts the necessity of declaring the circumstance of a sacred person in homicide, or of a married person in fornication; and it adduces other examples pertaining to those circumstances which change the species. In the same place it prescribes that circumstances greatly lessening the sin are to be confessed: moreover all acknowledge that this is true only of those which change the species, or make a sin venial from mortal. Therefore the Catechism, rightly understood, rather favors our opinion.

3. Besides, Christ did not will confession to be a torture chamber of consciences, with Trent as witness; but if it were necessary to declare all circumstances notably aggravating the sin, both confessors and penitents would be in straits, since it is often difficult to determine which circumstances are notably aggravating, and consequently necessarily to be accused.

283. As regards practice, the faithful are accustomed to declare the more notable circumstances; and this indeed is generally to be advised to the faithful, not as a precept but as a counsel, both for greater peace of conscience and for receiving richer fruit from absolution. Yet the matter of chastity is excepted, concerning which nothing further is to be inquired beyond that which is necessary for knowing the species of the sin, lest perhaps penitents be scandalized¹ and the confessors themselves be exposed to temptations. - Hence, if penitents in good faith have been silent about circumstances of this kind in previous confessions, they are not to be compelled to repeat confessions, since the obligation of accusing them is at least very doubtful.

¹ Not only can penitents be scandalized in this case, but they can also make sacrilegious confessions; for certain persons are extremely ashamed to report these aggravating circumstances in shameful matter and are silent about them, even if they falsely think that these pertain to the integrity of confession and must be set forth. Cf. Gaume, Manuel des Confesseurs, n. 60.

284. Yet, according to all, per accidens there is an obligation of declaring them when the confessor legitimately asks about them. Now he has the right of asking about them when this is necessary for rendering a right judgment concerning the state of the penitent, for example, for knowing whether the penitent is a habitual sinner or not, whether he is in a proximate occasion, or is a recidivist. This is clear from the condemnation of proposition 58 by Innocent XI (March 2, 1679): "We are not bound to confess to a confessor asking us the habit of some sin";¹ for the same reason holds concerning a proximate occasion and frequent relapse as concerning habit.

¹ Apud Denzing., n. 1075. - See this proposition explained apud Viva, Damnatae Theses, in prop. 60, n. 16-18.

285. For the perfect sincerity of confession it is certainly to be desired that sins be accused as they are known: certain things as certain, doubtful things as doubtful. According to all, this is to be recommended to all, except the scrupulous, for tranquility of conscience and for receiving richer fruits from the sacrament. - But theologians further ask whether there is a strict obligation of declaring doubtful sins.

286. Principle: When a sin is truly doubtful, or doubtfully mortal,² after diligent examination, there is no strict obligation of confessing it. Thus commonly.

² A sin is truly doubtful when it is seriously doubted whether it was committed, for example, whether someone gave consent to a depraved thought; doubtfully mortal, when it was certainly committed, but there is serious doubt concerning its gravity, for example, on account of lightness of matter, or on account of imperfection of advertence or consent.

For the law of material integrity in confession regards the licit, but not the valid, administration of the sacrament, and consequently the principles of probabilism explained in the Treatise on Conscience can be applied here. According to probabilists, a doubtful law does not oblige; but in this case the law of confessing is doubtful, since there is doubt either about the very existence of the sin, or about its gravity. This can be confirmed from Trent, where it declares that mortal sins must be accused of which, after diligent examination, consciousness is had; but consciousness supposes knowledge, or morally certain knowledge: and therefore consciousness is not had of sins doubtfully committed; but if sins were certainly committed and are doubtfully mortal, consciousness of their gravity is not had. According to equiprobabilists, in the conflict of two opinions equally or almost equally probable, better is the condition of the possessor; moreover in this case liberty possesses, not the law, since the law cannot bind unless it is clear that the sin was committed and at the same time is grave.

Yet equiprobabilists and probabiliorists contend that sins of this kind must be accused if it is more probable that they were committed and at the same time are grave.

287. Practical conclusion. In practice the accusation of doubtful sins is generally to be recommended. But if the doubt turns upon the gravity of a sin certainly committed, a distinction must be made: (a) if it is doubted whether the matter is grave, the uneducated and ignorant are to be admonished to confess doubtful sins, unless they are scrupulous, because they can scarcely discern mortal sins from venial ones; but the learned can indeed form a conscience for themselves, yet are gently to be exhorted to declare doubts.

(b) If it is doubted whether there was full advertence or full consent, the timid can abstain from accusing doubts, because it is presumed that they did not consent gravely; the scrupulous must altogether abstain from this accusation; the lax, or those frequently falling into mortal sins, are to be induced to confess doubts, because, from things commonly occurring, these are judged to have given full consent.¹

¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 476; Lacroix, n. 612.

288. Disputed questions. (A) If the sin was certainly committed and mortal, but it is doubted whether it was accused: (a) according to all, it must be declared if the doubt is merely negative, i.e., if there is no positive reason at least probable that such a sin was already accused; for a merely negative doubt does not destroy the morally certain obligation of submitting such a sin to the keys.

(b) But if the doubt is truly positive and seriously probable (which is verified when someone is accustomed diligently to make examination and confession), there is controversy. According to probabilists, the law of confessing in this case is doubtful and consequently does not oblige; according to equiprobabilists, the obligation of confessing such a sin remains; for in doubt better is the condition of the possessor: moreover the obligation of confessing in this case possesses, since grave sin certainly was committed. Yet St. Alphonsus moderates this opinion, adding (n. 477) that he who was diligent in confessing his sins is not bound to confess, if he doubts whether he omitted some mortal sin, after much time has elapsed from the time when he committed it, since in this case he can believe with moral certitude that he has already confessed it.

In practice we think the penitent is not to be compelled, but only gently induced, to confess sins certainly committed and probably accused.

289. (B) If a sin was accused as doubtful and afterward is known as certain, it is controverted whether there is an obligation of accusing it again as certain.

(a) Many theologians more probably affirm with St. Alphonsus (n. 478), because a doubtful accusation differs substantially from a certain accusation; when therefore the error is recognized, it must be repaired.

(b) Some, however, probably deny this with Lugo and Lehmkuhl,¹ since this sin has already been directly remitted; for the confessor, on hearing it, implicitly said: if you have truly committed the sin, I absolve you; but the sin in fact had been truly committed; therefore it was directly remitted; now a sin directly remitted need not necessarily be subjected again to the keys. - This is confirmed by analogy; he who said that he had sinned about ten times is not bound to repeat the accusation if afterward he becomes more certain that he sinned eleven times, although the eleventh sin was declared as doubtful in the formula about; therefore by parity he who accused a sin as doubtful is not bound afterward to manifest the same as certain.

¹ Lugo, disp. XVI, n. 78-83; Lehmkuhl, n. 318; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 381; Genicot, n. 291.

This reason seems altogether solid, and therefore the faithful who have neglected to accuse a sin of this kind again are not to be disturbed. - For the rest, St. Alphonsus grants (l. c.) that a penitent is not bound to repeat the accusation who confessed a sin which neither he nor the confessor knew to be mortal, although afterward he knows it to be mortal from its kind; for example, one who in good faith had accused pollution as a slight sin of touch: for he declared the sin as it was then in his conscience, and as it now is, and nothing new occurs except that he now knows the matter of this sin to be grave.

With these things set forth concerning the scope of integrity in confession, a few things remain to be said concerning lying and other defects contrary to this integrity.

290. A lie, or silence, in matter pertaining to confession, is grave sacrilege whenever it turns upon matter necessary for the integrity of confession, or upon dispositions necessary for absolution. It is certain.

For a lie or silence is injurious to the sacrament and destroys its efficacy: for if a mortal sin which must be declared is denied or kept silent, or it is affirmed that contrition is present when in reality it is not had, no sin is remitted, and so an injury is done both to the sacrament and to the blood of Christ from which the sacraments derive their power; - it is pernicious to the penitent himself, who is deprived of the grace of the sacrament.

It is said: a lie in matter pertaining to confession; for a lie in other matters, for example, by narrating a false history, although it is said in the sacred tribunal and while confessing, does not receive mortal gravity from that circumstance of time and place. It is added: whenever it turns upon necessary matter or dispositions; for to deny some venial sin, or a mortal sin which in no way pertains to the present confession, does not seem to be a grave sin, since of itself it does not impede the effect of the sacrament.

291. Corollaries: (A) He who accuses a recent mortal sin as an old one, not by positively lying, but by leaving the matter in doubt, for example, by making a general confession in which by design he does not distinguish mortal sins committed after the last confession from those which had been committed before, - per se satisfies the substantial integrity of confession, because the circumstance of time in this case does not change the species of the sin; besides, if the confessor does not know sufficiently, from this confused accusation, the state of the penitent, he can question him, and then the penitent is bound to answer sincerely.

I said per se; because per accidens such a way of acting would substantially vitiate the confession, if the species of the sin were not understood; if, for example, the confessor could not discern whether a shameful sin was committed before or after marriage, before or after a vow of chastity.

For the rest, such a way of acting is to be reproved, since it is opposed to perfect sincerity and can prepare a way to sacrilege.

292. (B) On the contrary, according to the common opinion, he sins gravely who confesses a mortal sin not yet accused as an old one already declared before, whether explicitly by saying: "I accuse myself of such a sin which I already declared before"; or equivalently, by using this formula: "then I accuse myself of the sins of my past life, especially of this..." For this manner of speaking is not a mental equivocation, but a true lie, by which the confessor is truly deceived in a grave matter pertaining to confession; for from this he concludes that such a grave sin is not necessary matter.

Some after Ballerini¹ contradict this, because they judge this lie to be slight, since the confessor is not deceived concerning things necessary to be known; yet they grant that he sins gravely who, burdened with one sole mortal sin, would accuse it as remitted before, because then he would deceive the confessor concerning the state of his conscience.² This reason seems to militate against their opinion; for even when other mortal sins are present, the confessor is deceived concerning a matter necessary to be known, namely the existence of one mortal sin in the conscience of the penitent. - Whence there must be no departure from the common opinion.

¹ Ballerini-Gury, note to n. 448; Bucceroni, n. 715; Genicot, n. 288.

² Genicot, n. 288.

293. (C) He who accuses venial sins to his ordinary confessor, but mortal sins to another, (a) certainly sins mortally if he obtains absolution from the venial sins before he has been absolved from the mortal sins, because he sacrilegiously receives the former absolution without due dispositions; (b) but if he is first absolved from the mortal sins and afterward from the venial sins, he per se does not sin, provided that he does this for the sake of shame or lest perhaps he be exposed to the danger of keeping back a grave sin, but not for sinning more freely. - It is said per se, because young men who act thus so that they may embrace the clerical state or a religious order,³ from which otherwise they would be barred, sin gravely per accidens: for then they deceive the confessor in a grave matter pertaining to vocation.

³ Thus Sabetti, p. 743, q. 5.

Whence in practice the confessor should not curiously inquire whether perhaps the penitent has approached another priest, but on the contrary by his whole manner of acting should show that it is in no way displeasing to him that penitents approach another confessor; indeed sometimes he should offer them the occasion of approaching outside confessors; otherwise, not a few are exposed to the danger of making sacrilegious confessions.¹

¹ Cf. Zelle, La Confession, p. 205 sq.; Brahim, De reticentia volunt. peccat., p. 73 sq.

294. (D) Per se he does not sin who disguises his voice lest he be recognized by the confessor, provided that he opens all his mortal sins; for it is not necessary that the penitent be recognized by name. Indeed it is often expedient that the confessor say nothing from which it would appear that the penitent is known to him, since not a few confess more freely to a priest by whom they think they are not known. - It is said per se, because if this is done by design by a habitual sinner or recidivist, in order to deceive the confessor and more easily extort absolution, it is a sin per accidens.

(E) The penitent is bound to respond sincerely to the confessor asking, as often as the latter legitimately asks, for example, about habit, relapse, proximate occasion, in a word, about those things without which a prudent judgment cannot be rendered. But if the question is indiscreet, for example, concerning name, country, place of dwelling, etc., the penitent is not bound to respond, since these things do not pertain to sacramental confession.

295. General principle: Physical or moral impotence excuses from the material integrity of confession as long as it perseveres. It is certain.

² Suarez, disp. XXIII; Lugo, disp. XVII; Salmantic., cap. 8, n. 115-137; Lacroix, n. 1140-1164; Billuart, diss. VII, a. 2, § 1-2; Kenrick, n. 61; Marc, n. 1697-1702; Muller, § 122; Konings, n. 1367-1369; Sabetti, n. 750-751; Scavini, n. 306-307; Lehmkuhl, n. 327-340; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 349-449; Haine, q. 47-52; Genicot, n. 292-297; Noldin, n. 271-276.

It is proved. For the law concerning the integrity of confession is indeed divine, but positive; but a positive law, even a divine one, does not oblige to that which is impossible or even very difficult, according to that saying: no one is held to the impossible.

It is explained. But impossibility, whether physical or moral, must be true, and indeed not only with respect to one, but also with respect to any confessor who without grave inconvenience can be approached. - Besides, no inconvenience intrinsically annexed to confession excuses from material integrity; such is, for example, even the greatest shame, fear of rebuke, loss of reputation with the confessor, etc. For Christ, in instituting confession, willed to impose upon the penitent all those inconveniences which are intrinsic to confession and necessarily connected with it. Whence only those great inconveniences excuse from integrity which are extrinsic to confession itself, and are not necessarily connected with it.

296. This impotence excuses only as long as it perseveres, so that, when the impotence ceases, the obligation of declaring the sins in the next confession is now in force. For sins omitted on account of a legitimate cause are indeed remitted indirectly, but not directly; but every sin not yet directly remitted must be subjected to the power of the keys. - Hence proposition 11 was condemned by Alexander VII (September 24, 1665): "Sins omitted or forgotten in confession, on account of instant danger of life, or on account of another cause, we are not bound to express in the following confession."¹ Therefore penitents who cannot make an integral confession are to be admonished concerning this obligation.

¹ Apud Denzing., n. 982. - Cf. Viva, Damnat. Theses, on this proposition; Vacant, Dict. de Theol., t. I, col. 736.

But this obligation does not press immediately, but only at the time of the next confession, unless perhaps the excusing cause still perseveres; but when it has ceased, sacrilege would be committed if a sin not yet directly remitted were knowingly and willingly kept silent.

Since the cause excusing from material integrity is twofold, namely impotence both physical and moral, each must be spoken of separately.

This impotence arises especially from a threefold cause: from lack of time or strength, - of knowledge - or of speech.

297. 1° From lack of strength or time, namely (a) if a sick person fails after confession has been begun, or is in danger of failing before the confession is finished, or a fortiori if he is already destitute of his senses; (b) if the priest himself will probably die before he is able to hear the whole confession; (c) when shipwreck, fire, or battle is imminent, so that all upon whom death threatens cannot be heard. In this case a brief confession of some less infamous sin can suffice, or even the mere request for absolution with contrition manifested by some sensible sign, for example, by raising the hands or striking the breast; then all can be absolved at the same time by a general formula: I absolve you from all your censures and your sins. - Yet if soldiers could be heard individually, for example, on the day or night before battle, that would certainly be better, even if they could not confess all sins, because they could prepare themselves better for absolution.

For the rest, in all the aforesaid cases, more care must be taken to excite contrition, which is altogether essential, than for material integrity, which in these circumstances is not absolutely required.

But a great concourse of penitents on some more solemn feast day by no means excuses; for if this reason were admitted, many would approach the sacred tribunal by design at a time of great concourse, and there would be danger of absolving the unworthy; besides, penitents whose confession cannot be heard can be deferred to another day.

For practice, in regions where there is a great concourse of penitents either every Saturday or on the eve of Feasts, as often happens in the great cities of the United States, it is most expedient that confessors choose other days for hearing the confessions of the pious.¹

¹ Therefore rightly the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore, n. 291: "We earnestly exhort and beseech pastors of souls that they be ready at the confessionals to hear penitents every Saturday, and on the vigils of Feasts, at least in the evening time, and on Sundays and feast days in the morning before first Mass. For at these hours penitents will not be lacking, provided the confessor himself is not lacking to his office. But if the number of the faithful is greater than that all who approach can be heard in one day, let him also choose other times, other days, which he may devote to this so necessary work. For it would be a most grave crime if by the negligence or idleness of the pastor even one from the flock of the faithful were defrauded of this sacrament. Nor will those who once and again have found that this ministry is unwelcome and troublesome to the priest easily bring their soul to return to confess."

298. 2° From defect of knowledge, namely (a) when someone, after a serious examination has been made, does not remember some mortal sin, from forgetfulness, from inadvertence not gravely culpable, which does not arise from negligence, or from infirmity of nature. Nor is he who is endowed with a weak memory bound to write his sins so that he may accuse them more diligently: for this is an extraordinary means to which no one is obliged; (b) if someone, from ignorance not gravely culpable, thinks that a mortal sin which he committed is either venial, or is not here and now to be accused; but when ignorance of this kind ceases, the precept of declaring it now presses.

299. 3° From defect of speech, if namely someone is mute, or ignorant of the language of the region in which he lives: - (a) if someone is mute and not sufficiently instructed so that he can confess integrally by signs, he is bound to manifest his sins by nods, insofar as can be done; indeed, according to many,¹ he must write them. Yet this obligation of manifesting sins in writing is not to be urged; for it is denied with probability by others,² because it seems to be an extraordinary means, and not sufficiently consistent with the secrecy of confession. Hence if the confession is written, let the confessor take care that the writing be destroyed at once, lest perhaps it come into the hands of others. - For the same reason the confessor generally will rightly abstain from making questions in writing, unless however the mute person himself asks this, for the sake of greater consolation and utility.

¹ Thus Lugo, disp. XV, n. 87; St. Alphonsus, n. 479; Lacroix, n. 1194.

² Thus Toletus, lib. V, ch. 6, n. 3; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 391; Lehmkuhl, n. 328.

300. (b) If someone is ignorant of the confessor's language, and cannot approach another confessor by whom he may be understood, let him confess his sins in the best way that can be done, by words or signs. It is indeed permitted, but not necessary, to use an interpreter, on account of the danger of revelation; and if no sin can be manifested in species, for absolution it suffices to manifest sin in general, as is clear from the response of the Holy Office, February 28, 1633.³

³ "Whether in distant regions a Catholic, unconfessed for many years, asking absolution only by signs, on account of defect of language, can be absolved without the help of an interpreter? - R. There is no need of an interpreter in the proposed case, just as also absolution of sins can and must be imparted to one exhibiting the signs which he can... provided they suffice for expressing some sin in species. But in the case in which someone tries as much as he can to exhibit signs of sins in species, but they cannot be understood at all, he can be absolved by the sole manifestation of sins in general." Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, apud Bucceroni, Enchiridion, n. 504. You will find another decree of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide apud Collectanea, n. 951.

Yet, in the article of death, it is safer to declare at least one venial sin through an interpreter, if the penitent doubts concerning his perfect contrition: indeed St. Alphonsus (n. 479) thinks that this is prescribed by charity toward oneself, which demands that safer means be employed if they are probably necessary for salvation: yet this is rejected by many, as resting upon an antiquated opinion which regarded the value of the sacrament as doubtful, even in danger of death, when no special sin is subjected to the keys. Whence, in practice, a practice of this kind is indeed to be counseled, but not urged.

For the rest, if confession is made through an interpreter, he should be admonished concerning the obligation of preserving secrecy; and, so that the interpreter himself may not know the sins of the penitent, one can proceed thus: let the interpreter turn his face away from the penitent, and recite to him in his own language the general questions proposed by the confessor concerning the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church; meanwhile let the penitent at each question signify to the confessor by a conventional sign, for example, by compression of the fingers, whether he has sinned or not, and how often, insofar as can be done.¹

¹ Cf. Haine, q. 49.

301. Notion and conditions. This is present as often as integral confession cannot be made without grave spiritual or temporal harm extrinsic to confession itself. Concerning this, however, these things must be noted:

(a) The danger of such harm is not easily to be imagined, but must rest upon a solid foundation. (b) When such danger exists, the penitent is bound to seek another confessor to whom he can confess integrally without harm; this, at least in cities, is generally altogether easy. (c) If confession can conveniently be deferred, with hope of making it integral without grave harm, the penitent is bound to defer it; but there is sufficient reason for not deferring it if the precept of annual confession presses, or the moral necessity of communicating or celebrating, or if otherwise the penitent would be compelled to remain for a long time (beyond three days, according to some; for one day, according to others²) in the state of mortal sin. (d) Only those sins should be kept silent which it is necessary to conceal in order to avert the harm; all the others should be candidly declared.

² Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 487; Noldin, n. 273.

It must likewise be noted that to explain in preaching to the faithful the various causes of moral impotence is generally not expedient, lest perhaps, deceiving themselves, they be exposed to the danger of keeping many things silent: these things are necessary to be known by the confessor, not by the faithful.

302. 2° Principal causes. With these things set down, grave harm, sufficient for keeping some sin silent, can arise from a threefold cause: on the part of the penitent, of the confessor, or of a third party.

(A) On the part of the penitent, when it is reasonably feared lest, from integral confession, the penitent be gravely defamed, not indeed with the confessor (for this is intrinsic to confession), but with others: (a) if the penitent confesses in those circumstances in which bystanders, who cannot be removed, will hear the sins, for example, in a hospital, when another sick person lies near the one confessing. This is verified also in the case of a deaf or somewhat deaf person, whose deafness the confessor notices only in the course of confession, and indeed in such circumstances in which this person could not be led to the sacristy without a suspicion arising that he had committed grave sin; for then the confessor must abstain from questions and impose a light penance,¹ lest otherwise the bystanders understand that grave sins had been committed by the penitent. But when deafness is noticed before the beginning of confession, the penitent is regularly to be led to the sacristy or to another place, where he can be questioned without danger of revelation, unless custom or prudent reason is an obstacle.

¹ Often the confessor can impose a penance which is not noticed by the bystanders, for example, by showing the penitent a rosary or a chaplet.

303. (b) If confession, in order to be integral, must be very long, and indeed in those circumstances in which bystanders would very probably be able to infer from that length that the penitent is guilty of many and grave sins; for example, if a sick person, who has already confessed and is about to receive viaticum, recognizes that he is guilty of sacrilege and has several confessions to repeat, it suffices for the time to hear a few mortal sins, lest otherwise the bystanders be able to suspect the matter; likewise a priest about to celebrate immediately and needing a lengthy confession, which would excite the wonder and suspicions of the people; or also a boy who before first communion, with the faithful already gathered in the church, would have to repeat his confessions on account of sacrilege committed. In these or similar cases, it suffices to declare a few mortal sins, and to accuse the rest in the next confession.

(c) If for a grave reason the penitent fears lest the confessor break the law of the seal, either directly (which happens most rarely), or indirectly, for example, by raising his voice higher when mortal sins are accused, so that bystanders can hear him; or lest, from the indiscretion of the confessor, the penitent undergo privation of office or of support.

(d) If he seriously fears that, by recalling sins minutely, especially shameful ones, he may indulge in morose delectation; or lest certain sins

by declaring them, he may be solicited by the confessor to shameful things, because, for example, he knows that this has already happened to himself or to others. These things, however, happen very rarely.

(e) If there is question of a scrupulous person, who, by insisting upon material integrity, will experience greater anxieties.

304. (B) On the part of the confessor: (a) if, in hearing an integral confession, death or a lethal disease threatens the confessor, for example, in time of plague, fire, shipwreck, or because enemies are pursuing; (b) if the confessor, on account of his own frailty, fears very probably that by questioning more diligently he may scandalize the penitent or himself; (c) if the penitent himself seriously fears lest, by an integral confession, the confessor whose frailty he has clearly known be induced into sin; this certainly will occur most rarely.

305. (C) On the part of a third party: (a) if there is grave danger lest the confessor use knowledge acquired through confession to the temporal or spiritual harm of the neighbor, for example, by casting out of his house a maidservant with whom the penitent sinned; (b) or if the confessor could not confess his own sin without manifesting sins heard in confession, for example, if, immediately after hearing confession, he were to say that he had sinned gravely by asking the name of the accomplice: for thus it would be manifested that the penitent had committed some mortal sin with an accomplice.

306. 3° Disputed question. It is controverted whether there is an obligation of confessing a sin which cannot be explained integrally without the defamation of an accomplice or of a third person before the confessor. This can happen with sins committed between spouses, parents and children, blood relatives or relatives by affinity, or partners in the same affairs. - The question is also extended to the case in which a sin cannot be declared integrally without manifestation of the person against whom the sin was committed, for example, if someone struck his sister, pregnant from sin, and so procured an abortion.

Now all grant that then the penitent is bound to approach another confessor, to whom the accomplice is unknown, if this can conveniently be done. Yet necessity or great utility excuses from this obligation, for example, if danger of death presses, or the precept of annual confession, - if there is a special utility of receiving holy communion soon, - if otherwise someone would be compelled to remain in mortal sin through the whole day, - or if the penitent could open his conscience to another confessor only with reluctance, - or would be deprived of the special consolation which he finds with his ordinary confessor. - All likewise say that the penitent neither can nor is bound to declare a sin which is not necessary matter of confession (because it has either already been accused, or is only venial), if by confessing it the grave sin of the accomplice is manifested. Outside these cases, the matter is controverted.

307. (A) Not a few hold, with Navarro, Valentia, Medina, Ballerini, and others,¹ that the circumstance from which the accomplice would be detected can and must be kept silent, for example, the circumstance of incest in a sin of lust; for the natural precept of preserving the reputation of the neighbor is to be preferred to the positive law of the integrity of confession, especially since the observance of this law is only deferred for a time.

¹ The older authors who follow this opinion are reviewed by Lugo, disp. XVI, n. 393; cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 442-444.

308. (B) Yet the more common and truer opinion, with St. Thomas, Lugo, St. Alphonsus, and most moderns,² teaches that an integral confession is required in this case. For the precept of charity forbids only that the reputation of another be injured without a legitimate cause; but here there is a legitimate cause; for on the one hand the injury to reputation is done before the confessor alone, who is bound to keep the matter entirely secret under the most secret seal, and therefore it cannot be regarded as a grave inconvenience; besides, grave inconveniences follow if sins committed with a known accomplice are kept silent; for since there are many sins of this kind (between spouses, between parents and children, between blood relatives and relatives by affinity), occasion would often be given to anxieties and doubts which the penitent himself would have to solve; penitents would be deprived of those benefits which arise from integral confession, particular counsels, exhortations, etc.; those who have a lax conscience would keep silent about many sins under the pretext that the accomplice could become known to the confessor, and so little by little the law of integrity would be weakened.

² St. Thomas, In 4, dist. 16, q. 3, a. 2, quaestiunc. 5, ad 5; Lugo, disp. XVI, n. 394; Suarez, disp. XXXIV, sect. 2, n. 3; St. Alphonsus, n. 409.

Besides, in practice, the faithful, ignorant of these distinctions, for the most part declare sins of this kind without hesitation, and if they keep them silent, they are often in bad faith and think that they have confessed sacrilegiously. - If, however, some ask explicitly about this matter and very much resist manifesting those circumstances from which the accomplice would become known, the obligation of confessing them is not to be urged, because the former opinion does not lack probability.

From this it also follows that mothers and wives are often excused when in confession they manifest the sins of sons and husbands, in order to ask counsel or lessen sorrow; yet they should not be permitted to do this except insofar as it truly contributes to their spiritual good.

309. 4° Scholion. On this occasion it is asked whether it is licit for the confessor to inquire the name of the accomplice.

(A) He sins mortally who inquires the name of the accomplice under penalty of denial of absolution, and even in any way whatever, unless for a most grave cause. Thus Benedict XIV in various Constitutions, the Brief Suprema, July 7, 1745,¹ the Constitution Ubi primum, June 2, 1746, the Constitution Ad eradicandum, September 28, 1746; indeed he established suspension ferendae sententiae against delinquents in these words: "Confessors requiring the name of the accomplice under penalty of denial of absolution sin gravely and incur suspension from hearing confessions, but only ferendae sententiae."² - If the confessor requires the name of the accomplice without threat of denial of absolution, he also sins mortally, unless there is a grave excusing cause, yet without incurring the canonical penalty. - The reason for this prohibition is that a practice of this kind renders the sacrament hateful, and without cause induces penitents to defame the accomplice.

¹ Apud Denzing., n. 1323. - The two former documents are directed to the bishops of Lusitania; but the latter to the universal Church.

² Constit. Ad eradicandum.

310. Yet the confessor is not prohibited from making those questions which seem necessary for the integrity of confession, or for detecting the nature of the proximate occasion, even if per accidens the accomplice becomes known from this: for example, whether the accomplice remains in the same house, whether he is bound by vow, related by blood or by affinity; for these and similar things the confessor must know for the good of the penitent, and from what was said above (n. 197) this is licit.³

³ That this was not reproved by Benedict XIV is clear from the words in which the Pontiff describes the abuse which he condemns: "If perhaps they had fallen upon penitents having an associate in crime, from the same penitents they would commonly inquire the name of such an associate or accomplice... indeed they would require that not only the name of the same accomplice, but in addition the place of habitation, be designated to them." Apud Denzing., n. 1323. Hence the same Pontiff (De Syn. dioeces., lib. VI, ch. 11, n. 1) acknowledges that sometimes, although rarely, it is licit to inquire the name of the accomplice: "Yet it is certain that it can rarely happen that it is licit for the confessor to ask the penitent for the name of the accomplice, much less to oblige the same to disclose it to him."

The confessor must also, for a most grave cause, for example, lest a member of some community or college corrupt his companions, oblige the penitent to denounce the accomplice to superiors, for example, to father, master, teacher, etc. Yet it is not expedient that the confessor offer himself for making this denunciation, nor, if asked, should he assume this duty, unless however the penitent does not wish to manifest the matter to another; in which case let him ask the penitent to speak to him about this outside confession. The reason is that otherwise confession becomes hateful, at least to others who hear of this matter. - Hence, if the confessor is at the same time the superior who alone can effectively meet the threatening evil, he can require that outside confession the name of the accomplice be manifested to him.

311. (B) Moreover, in the Bull Apostolicae Sedis, promulgated by Pius IX on October 12, 1869, an excommunication latae sententiae, simply reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, is brought against those "teaching or defending as licit the practice of inquiring from the penitent the name of the accomplice, insofar as it was condemned by Benedict XIV." Hence three things are required for incurring this excommunication: (a) to teach that this practice is licit: therefore those who in fact inquire the name of the accomplice, yet without teaching that this is licit, do not incur the censure; (b) to teach that it is licit under penalty of denial of absolution, for these words are found in the Constitution of Benedict XIV; (c) to teach this rashly, i.e., knowingly and willingly, so that fear or ignorance excuses from the censure, even crass and supine ignorance, provided that it is not affected.

Besides, those who have known that someone has offended in this doctrine, or in practice which introduces suspicion of depraved doctrine, are bound, with the exception of penitents in their own cause, to denounce the guilty person within a month to the Holy Office or to the Bishop.

There are two means necessary for procuring the integrity of confession: the first is ordinary and necessary per se, namely the examination of conscience; the latter is extraordinary and necessary per accidens, namely the repetition of previous confessions or general confession.

Three things are to be explained: 1° the necessity of this examination; 2° diligence; 3° the method to be employed in it.

¹ Suarez, disp. XXII, sect. 11; Lugo, disp. XVI, n. 590-595; Salmantic., cap. 6, n. 3-7; Collet, n. 297, apud Migne, C. Theol., col. 478; Stoz, Tribunal Paenitent., p. I, p. 1, n. 1-119; St. Alphonsus, n. 471; Konings, n. 1372-1374; Hilarius a Sexten, § 38, p. 267; Marc, n. 1703-1704; Lehmkuhl, n. 341-344; Genicot, n. 301-303; Noldin, n. 277-278.

312. 1° Necessity of this examination: A penitent who has sinned gravely is regularly bound under grave obligation to make a diligent examination before confession. It is certain.

(A) It is proved. This obligation is logically deduced from the very law of integrity, as is clear from Trent itself:¹ "From these things it is gathered that all mortal sins, of which after diligent discussion of themselves they have consciousness, must be recounted by penitents in confession."

¹ Sess. XIV, ch. 5.

For he who is bound to an end, by that very fact is bound to the means necessary per se for attaining the end; but a diligent examination, regularly speaking, is a necessary means for procuring the integrity of confession for those who have sinned gravely; for if they have committed several mortal sins, they generally cannot remember all of them, on account of the weakness of human memory, unless for some time they have diligently explored the inner recesses of conscience.

Moreover, if a penitent of this kind fails in examination, many inconveniences follow: loss of time for the confessor, who then must propose many questions, and also for other penitents who are compelled to wait longer, - and for the penitent himself the danger of omitting mortal sins through forgetfulness, with the anxieties which follow from this and the obligation of accusing sins so omitted. - Therefore the faithful should be carefully instructed concerning this obligation.

(B) It is explained. It was said: (a) who has sinned gravely; for he who is morally certain that since the last confession he has not sinned mortally is not bound, strictly speaking, to a diligent examination, but only to detecting sufficient matter for the validity of the sacrament; yet he is to be exhorted to make a diligent examination concerning venial sins, so that he may receive richer fruits from absolution.

(b) He is regularly bound; for exceptions are given from a twofold head, both because time is lacking, as can happen with the dying, and because this examination is not necessary, considering the dispositions of the penitent, for example, because he is accustomed daily to examine his sins seriously, or, after their commission, immediately to have recourse to confession.

313. 2° Diligence to be had in the examination: For that examination there is required that diligence which prudent men are accustomed to employ in a grave matter; that is, the highest diligence is not strictly required, which in a matter of the greatest moment is employed by the most cautious men, but ordinary, or moderate, diligence suffices, such as prudent men have in matters of grave moment.

For Christ did not will confession to be a grave and hateful burden, but willed to adapt it to the human condition and infirmity; but if the highest diligence were required in the examination of conscience, confession would be too troublesome and would offer occasion for many anxieties concerning the validity of the sacrament, since there are few who are habitually capable of this diligence. - Hence someone is not strictly bound to the highest diligence, even if he foresees that new mortal sins could thus be detected. - Likewise no one is bound to write his sins, especially since there is some danger that the writing might fall into the hands of others.

Whence he who commits grave negligence in the examination concerning mortal sins, per se sins gravely and is guilty of sacrilege, since he knowingly and willingly exposes himself to the danger of omitting certain mortal sins in his confession. But slight negligence does not invalidate the sacrament, even if in fact certain mortal sins were omitted. But for discerning whether the negligence was grave or slight, this rule is handed down by some theologians:¹ if after confession it is found that more mortal sins were omitted than accused, the negligence can be regarded as grave; but if many more were declared than omitted, the negligence can be judged slight. This is the objective rule; but attention must also be paid to the subjective dispositions of the penitent, whether or not, at the time of the examination, he was conscious of grave negligence, and foresaw that he would omit several mortal sins.

¹ Stoz, l. c., 16; Sporer, n. 367; Noldin, n. 2.

I said per se sins gravely; because not a few are excused from grave sin by the fact that, on account of ignorance or levity of soul, they thought it enough to respond sincerely to the questions of the confessor: these indeed must be instructed; but, good faith standing, they were not guilty of grave sacrilege.

314. Corollary. The diligence required is different according to the different conditions of penitents, namely according to the different state of conscience, the length of time which has elapsed from the last confession, bodily health, and the diverse instruction of penitents.

(a) Those who confess frequently, rarely commit mortal sins, and daily examine their conscience, can be content with a shorter examination, because grave sins, if perhaps they were committed, will easily occur to the memory. - Yet in practice they are gently to be induced to a diligent discussion of conscience, so that they may detect not only the principal venial sins, but also the causes of the same, by which they may more easily root out their defects.

Hence the timid and the scrupulous ought not spend a long time in examination: for if they had sinned gravely, this certainly would be before their eyes; besides, minute examination can increase scruples. Whence sometimes it is expedient to determine the time which they are prohibited from exceeding in such an examination.

(b) Those who confess rarely, especially if they are involved in various secular affairs and live among many occasions of sin, must examine themselves longer, and diligently reconsider the principal occasions in which they are accustomed to sin; for otherwise they would omit several sins.

315. (c) The sick are not bound to an examination as accurate as those in good health; indeed sometimes they are dispensed from every examination, on account of their excessive weakness; in this case they are kindly to be questioned by the confessor himself with respect to substantial things, since the dying are in some way excused from material integrity, on account of the grave harm which then often arises from a long examination and a lengthy confession. - Therefore the sick should not easily be permitted to defer confession from day to day, under the pretext that they have not sufficiently examined their conscience; but they should be kindly questioned at once by the confessor; it is certainly better to restore them, even imperfectly confessed, at once to the state of grace than, by deferring from day to day, to leave them in the state of damnation. For the rest, if they survive, they will afterward be able to complete their confession.¹

¹ Cf. Elbel-Bierbaum, Conf. VI, n. 153; Genicot, n. 302.

316. (d) If penitents, otherwise sufficiently instructed, approach the sacred tribunal prepared by no or by insufficient examination, they can kindly be dismissed, so that they may discuss their conscience more accurately before they begin confession, especially if there is question of a long confession; for it is almost impossible that a penitent respond accurately to the confessor asking questions without a prior examination. Yet if it could be foreseen that they would not return, they are to be examined by the confessor himself in the best way that can be done; and if they grieve over their negligence and show forth some zeal for amending life, they can be absolved.²

² To the point the Roman Catechism, De Paenit., n. 50: "Wherefore if the priest has known that men of this kind are wholly unprepared, he will dismiss them from himself with most humane words, and will exhort them to take some space for thinking about sins, and then return: but if perhaps they affirm that they have applied all their zeal and diligence to that matter (since the priest must fear greatly lest, once dismissed, they return no more), they are to be heard, especially if they show forth some zeal for amending life... For if, once the confession has been heard, he judges that neither diligence in enumerating sins, nor sorrow in detesting them, was altogether lacking in the penitent, he can be absolved."

But if there is question of the uneducated and ignorant, who already made some examination beforehand, although insufficient, generally it is not expedient to dismiss them, because they can scarcely examine themselves better; whence the confessor, by prudent questioning, will obtain more than penitents could detect by a long examination; besides, especially in our times, a dismissal of this kind would often be regarded as a great injury and would keep not a few away from confession. Hence penitents in this case are not to be dismissed unless it is impossible to prepare them for a good confession.

317. (a) First, let the penitent choose a suitable time, free from other occupations, and implore divine light, since without the grace of God he cannot salutarily explore the hiding places of his conscience.

(b) So that he may more easily come to knowledge of his sins, let him observe some order; if he has not confessed for a long time, let him successively run through the precepts of God and of the Church, the capital sins, and the obligations of his own state: let him especially insist on these, with the confessor admonishing him, since, as experience bears witness, there are many who scarcely think of the duties of their own state. - If he has confessed a short time ago, let him examine himself concerning duties toward God, neighbor, and himself: for this is shorter and in this case fully suffices.

318. (c) Concerning each precept, or each virtue, let him weigh what sins he committed, and how often, by thought, word, and deed, searching his conscience especially about those sins into which he is accustomed more frequently to fall. Besides, he must diligently investigate circumstances changing the species, insofar as this can be done. - It is expedient for the uneducated to begin the examination from deeds, and from these ascend to words and thoughts or desires, because often they do not reconsider internal sins except insofar as they are connected with external ones.

Those who wish to employ the highest diligence in examination not only run through the various precepts of the Decalogue, but also try to recall in what places they were, what affairs they conducted, and how they conducted themselves daily at home, in church, and in their relations with neighbor; but, as we have noted, this exquisite diligence is not of precept.

(d) Many, especially the ignorant, more easily detect their sins if they use some catalogue of sins which is neither too long nor too short: not too long indeed, lest they be compelled to spend much time in this examination; nor too short, so that there may be found there at least the principal sins of which they could have been guilty. Hence a catalogue of this kind, to be truly useful, must be adapted to the various classes of penitents.¹

¹ Thus, for the younger, cf. Timon-David, Traite de la Confession des Enfants et des Jeunes Gens, Paris, 1875, t. I, p. 150-177; Jaggers, Instructions for first confession, St. Louis, 1890, p. 133 sq.; Mother M. Loyola, First Confession, New York, 1901, p. 34-37; - for pious persons, cf. Pratique progressive de la Confession, Paris, 1900, t. I, p. 20-24; t. II, p. 19-23; for priests, cf. Gaduet, Avis et Examen de conscience, rendered in English: Examination of Conscience for the use of priests, New York, 1885; - for the faithful in general, who make a general confession, cf. How to make the Mission, by a Dominican Father, New York, 1897, p. 62-73; Konings, General Confession made easy, New York, 1879.

When a substantial defect has been committed in confession, it must be repaired either by repetition of confession, or by general confession.

² Suarez, disp. XXII, sect. 6-7; Lugo, disp. XVI, n. 596-663; Salmantic., c. 9; Lacroix, n. 1203-1228; St. Alphonsus, n. 498-505; Marc, n. 1706-1713; Lehmkuhl, n. 345-351; Konings, n. 1375-1380; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 460-477; Hilarius a Sexten, § 38, p. 270-278; Genicot, n. 305-310.

319. Things to be noted beforehand. Confession can be only incomplete, or invalid. (A) It is called incomplete, or materially not integral, when some mortal sin has been omitted from a legitimate cause, for example, from ignorance or inculpable forgetfulness. In this case the confession must indeed be completed by declaring the sin not yet accused; but properly it is not to be repeated, since it was valid, and consequently sins already accused are not necessarily to be repeated.

If a penitent, immediately after absolution, confesses a mortal sin inculpably omitted, he must be absolved again, so that this sin may be remitted directly by absolution. For although, strictly speaking, this absolution could be deferred to the next confession, if it is foreseen that the penitent will return to the same confessor, nevertheless it is better to repeat the formula of absolution; for otherwise the penitent is compelled either to return to the same confessor, or, if he approaches another confessor, to accuse the same sin.

320. (B) A confession, moreover, is invalid when one of the essential conditions necessary for its validity is lacking. Now such invalidity can occur either on the part of the confessor, or on the part of the penitent: -

(a) On the part of the confessor, if he lacked the power of order or of jurisdiction, - or omitted the form or changed it substantially, - or did not have the intention of absolving, - or heard or understood no sin, because of deafness, sleep, drunkenness, distraction, or some other reason of this kind. Yet the penitent cannot and is not bound to correct these defects except insofar as they are known to him.

(b) On the part of the penitent, by defect of examination, if he was gravely negligent in investigating mortal sins, - by defect of sincerity in confession,¹ if knowingly and willingly he concealed some grave sin, or lied in a grave matter pertaining to confession, - by defect of contrition or of firm purpose, - by defect of knowledge, if someone was ignorant of truths which are necessary by necessity of means.

¹ This defect of sincerity, which occurs not rarely, especially in the young and in women even devout ones, with regard to shameful sins, arises chiefly (a) from a certain shame, by force of which penitents blush to declare sins of this kind to a confessor to whom they are known, especially in places where there is only one confessor; (b) from a certain haste in hearing confessions, or harshness or rigor, or on the contrary from the custom of excusing penitents (by saying, for example, you did not do it voluntarily, etc.), so that they, not wishing to contradict the confessor, scarcely dare to confess consent really given. Cf. Camele, Opusc. de reticentia peccatorum, 1897; Zelle, La Confession, Paris, 1897, book I, p. 15-81; Drahm, Opusc. de Reticentia volunt. peccat., Brussels, 1900; Mach, Tresor du Pretre, Treatise XIV, ch. 10. - Yet certain authors exaggerate the frequency of sacrilegious confessions, because from a few facts known to them, at the time when a mission is being given, they infer that the practice is common; this is contradicted by most experienced and most pious confessors, as Bucceroni rightly notes, at the end of Instit. Theol. Moral., vol. II, p. 537, ed. 1900; cf. Genicot, n. 305, at the end, note 1.

Again, confession is either simply invalid, when the penitent, at the time when he receives absolution, is not conscious of this substantial defect; or invalid and at the same time sacrilegious, when the penitent knows and wills such a defect, so that he truly commits sacrilege by receiving absolution.

321. Principle: Sacramental confession per se must be repeated whenever it is morally certain that it is sacrilegious or invalid. It is certain.

For by the precept of Christ all mortal sins must be subjected to the keys of the Church, so that by virtue of absolution they may be absolved directly; but sins declared in a sacrilegious or invalid confession were not remitted by virtue of absolution; therefore they must again be subjected to the power of the keys, so that they may be absolved.

But if there is only doubt concerning the validity of confession, the repetition of confession is to be counseled, but not strictly imposed; for when an act has certainly been placed, and there is doubt whether it is valid or not, one must stand for its value until the contrary is proved. In practice, moreover, when such a doubt arises, it can be resolved from the manner of acting and the dispositions of the penitent: if he is diligent and of a timorous conscience, he is not bound to repeat the confession, because he is deservedly presumed not to have lacked the essential dispositions; if he is of a lax conscience and very negligent in preparing for confession, the presumption stands against him, and therefore he is to be gently induced to repeat the confessions.

It was said: per se must be repeated; because if the penitent is in good faith (which easily occurs when the confession was simply invalid), and at the same time it is foreseen that perhaps he will not assent to the command of repeating the confession, it is expedient not to warn him concerning the invalidity of this confession, at least here and now: for then he does not sin formally, and the sins not yet validly accused are remitted indirectly through the absolution which he receives in good faith in a subsequent confession.

322. The mode by which confession is to be repeated. (A) If the confession is repeated before a new confessor, one must distinguish: (a) if the confession was not only invalid, but also sacrilegious, the sacrilege voluntarily committed in the previous confession must be accused, - then the sin or sins concealed in that same confession, if it was invalid from defect of sincerity, - afterward all mortal sins invalidly declared in this and in subsequent confessions, and also the various sacrileges which were committed by receiving the sacraments in the state of mortal sin. The reason is that the new confessor, having no knowledge of the previous confessions, must know all mortal sins which have not yet been duly accused in a valid confession.

Yet I said that all mortal sins must be accused which were invalidly declared; for, if someone, unmindful of the sacrilege because of weakness of memory or levity of soul, made certain valid confessions, he is not bound to repeat them, since the sins accused in these were duly absolved.

(b) But if the confession was only invalid, and not sacrilegious, that confession alone must be repeated when such a defect is recognized, but not the subsequent ones, which were valid.

323. (B) If the confession is made before the same confessor, who has already heard the individual sins, has already judged concerning them, and remembers them at least confusedly, or at least remembers the penance imposed for them, one must distinguish thus: - (a) when the confession was sacrilegious, it suffices for the penitent to say: I accuse myself of the sacrilege which I committed in such a confession, by keeping silent about such a sin, which I now accuse (if it was sacrilegious from defect of sincerity), and again I accuse myself of all sins already declared in that same confession and in subsequent confessions, and also of the sacrileges which I committed, for example, by receiving absolution and communion ten times ... The reason is that the preceding confessions, although invalid, were sacramental; hence if the confessor remembers at least confusedly the sins previously accused, he has knowledge sufficient for passing judgment.

(b) If the confession was not sacrilegious, but simply invalid, it suffices for the penitent to accuse himself in a general way of the mortal sins accused in such a confession, which was invalid for such or such a reason, which he explains.

324. But if the confessor does not remember the state of the penitent, nor the penance imposed, and cannot be informed of these things by the penitent, all indeed admit that the absolution will be valid without the distinct confession being repeated; but it is disputed whether in this case the confessor absolves licitly: St. Alphonsus denies it (n. 502), because the priest must form for himself a judgment, at least confusedly, concerning the state of the penitent before he absolves; Lugo and Ballerini affirm it,¹ because it suffices that the priest know that he previously judged concerning these sins and determined that the penitent was to be absolved. This opinion is truly probable, and therefore, since there is question of what is licit, penitents are not to be compelled to repeat a distinct confession.

¹ Lugo, disp. XVI, n. 636; Ballerini P., n. 472; Genicot, n. 306.

325. Corollaries. (A) If a penitent declares sins to a deaf, or hard-of-hearing, or distracted, or sleeping confessor, one must distinguish: (a) if he did this in good faith, the confession is valid, provided the confessor understood at least some sins, and then only those sins must be repeated which it is clear were not heard; but if it is not known which were heard, the whole confession must be repeated, if it is shorter; but if it is longer, it is not necessarily to be repeated integrally, because the law of integrity is not judged to oblige with so great an inconvenience. (b) But if someone deliberately confesses to a deaf, or distracted, or sleeping confessor, so that he cannot hear all the sins, the confession per se is sacrilegious, because of defect of sincerity, and therefore is to be repeated. It is said per se, because if someone did this because of ignorance, not knowing such a confession to be sacrilegious, the same can be said as concerning him who is in good faith.

326. (B) Rustics, children, and the unlearned, who in good faith confessed their sins only in a confused way, not distinctly explaining the species and number, were indeed validly absolved, because material integrity does not pertain to the essence of the sacrament; but the question is whether afterward they are bound to complete their confessions, if they become more learned, by explaining the species and number omitted. St. Alphonsus (n. 504) affirms it with most theologians, because otherwise the present confession would not be truly integral; yet a few deny it with Tamburini, Berardi, Ballerini,² for various reasons: (a) because, since these rustics are accustomed to have a uniform life, a prudent confessor, from the confession of one year, can easily conjecture how much they sinned in preceding years; (b) because sins accused in a confused way, as they were then known, were directly absolved, and therefore do not need to be subjected to the power of the keys. - Therefore in practice these certainly are to be induced, if it can be done, to complete past confessions; but if this seems too burdensome to them, they are not to be disturbed.

² Tambur., Methodus Confess., book 3, c. 2, n. 9; Berardi, n. 4522; Ball. P., n. 475; Genicot, n. 307. - Lugo, however (disp. XVI, n. 588), distinguishes between number and species: if the number was accused in a confused way in good faith, the penitent is bound to nothing, as we said above (n. 158); but if the confusion concerns species, the penitent, having become more learned, must complete his confession; for in the former case the sins, as having been accused specifically, were remitted directly; in the latter, only indirectly.

327. (C) When the penitent has frequently relapsed into the same mortal sins, without any amendment, and without any resistance to the first temptations which occur, it must often be presumed that the previous confessions were made without sufficient sorrow and purpose, and therefore are to be repeated; for he who in confession truly grieves and resolves amendment applies at least some effort before the relapse, and generally abstains from sin for some time. But it must be said otherwise if he has persevered for some time, or before the fall resisted the first temptations.³

³ Thus St. Alphonsus, n. 505; concerning this more fully it will be said below, where there is question of recidivists.

328. Notion and usefulness. General confession is the repetition of all or of several confessions, and therefore completes either the whole life, or a notable part of life. It can be necessary, useful, or harmful according to various circumstances.

¹ Besides the authors cited where the repetition of confession was treated, cf. Aertnys, Theol. Pastoralis, n. 245-261; Marc, Tresor du Pretre, Tr. XIV, c. 10; Gousset, n. 443-447; Gaume, Manuel des Confesseurs, ch. V, a. 10, where (n. 428) you will find a method of making a general confession, taken from the works of St. Leonard of Port Maurice.

(A) It is necessary, and therefore regularly to be enjoined, when it is morally certain that several of the previous confessions were invalid or sacrilegious, as was explained above (n. 211).

(B) It is useful, and therefore to be counseled, for all those who, although they are not strictly bound to it, can receive richer fruits from it, namely: -

(a) For those who reasonably doubt concerning the value of past confessions, in order to obtain peace of conscience and to remove anxieties of soul, which often hold one back from good, provided however that they are not scrupulous.

(b) For those who wish to establish a new and more perfect manner of living, for example, recent converts, those who enter the religious or clerical state; for by making a general confession then, the malice of sin appears much more manifestly, and a greater horror against sin arises; humility greatly increases from the knowledge of our infirmity; more intense contrition and a firmer purpose are conceived; occasions of sin are better foreseen and guarded against; greater graces are received, and therefore strength is increased; a most pleasant peace and tranquility comes to the soul, and a new impulse is given for leading a more perfect life.

329. (c) In certain periods of life, in which a greater infusion of grace is desired, for example, before first communion, before contracting marriage, at the time of a public mission, of spiritual exercises, or of a jubilee. Yet in these or similar circumstances it is not to be proposed as necessary, especially to those who have already once or a second time made a general confession: for it suffices for these to repeat their sins from their last general confession. Therefore those confessors are to be reproved who regularly demand from new penitents a general accusation of sins, under the pretext of directing them better: for this often renders confession odious, and the intended end, namely the direction of souls, can be obtained in other ways. Likewise it must be noted that a general confession which is imposed on the unwilling, when it is not necessary, often does more harm than good.

330. (d) In a dangerous illness, if the sick person has strength; for it happens not rarely that some of those who had previously made sacrilegious confessions wait until their final illness to repeat them. Hence they are kindly to be asked whether they have anxieties concerning their past life, or whether they fear to present themselves before the Supreme Judge, and they are gently to be exhorted to a general confession, so that they may be able to meet death quietly and confidently. Sometimes also it is expedient that a confessor unknown to them be sent to them, to whom, if they wish, they may manifest their conscience more freely.

331. (C) But general confession can be harmful, and therefore regularly to be prohibited: (a) to the scrupulous and the excessively fearful, who have already once completed a confession of this kind; for after any new general accusation new anxieties and new scruples arise, because they fear that they have not set forth some sins, or have not set them forth duly.

(b) To those who are endowed with a vivid imagination (especially women), and at the same time have sinned much and gravely against chastity, especially if some inclination toward carnal pleasures remains; for the distinct and minute recollection of those sins, with the aggravating circumstances which would then naturally occur to the imagination, would probably lead these penitents into danger of sinning internally.

332. Mode of receiving a general confession. (a) First of all let the confessor kindly inquire why the penitent wishes to make a general confession, so that he may know whether it is necessary, or only useful: for if it is necessary, it must be more accurate. Sometimes, however, he discovers that a confession of this kind, which was thought only useful, is in fact necessary; hence let him permit the penitent to set forth all those things which burden his conscience, and let him kindly assist him by opportune questions.

(b) From the very beginning let him exhort the penitent with most humane words to perfect sincerity, and suggest that he first accuse those things by which he is more troubled, or the accusation of which seems more troublesome to him, for example, sins against chastity; for when these have been set forth, the heart of the penitent is unloaded, and the rest of the confession is rendered easier.

333. (c) Let him assist the penitent by asking questions discreetly and kindly, especially if he is uneducated and ignorant: but if he sees that the penitent has prepared his accusation in order, generally let him not interrupt him with many questions, lest perhaps afterward he be disturbed, thinking that he omitted something. Likewise let him grant the penitent sufficient time to explain those things which seem necessary to him; otherwise he perhaps will not be tranquil, because he could not say all those things which were troubling his mind. - A fortiori let him not rebuke him harshly when a graver sin is accused, lest perhaps the penitent, terrified by this severity, keep something silent; but on the contrary let him encourage him with paternal affection to open all things candidly, since God is ready to pardon even the gravest offenses to those who sincerely repent.

(d) If the confessor, in asking about sins, himself proposes a number, for example, did you do that ten times, a hundred times? generally it is expedient to propose a greater number rather than a lesser, since it is easier for the penitent to lessen it than to increase it. Indeed, if the penitent immediately assents once such a number has been proposed, it will be opportune soon to add: did you not do that more often?

(e) When the accusation of sins has been finished, let the confessor gently say: does nothing else trouble your conscience? If so, say it, and I will question you again. - If nothing seems to remain, the penitent must be warned not to be disturbed if afterward he remembers a grave sin which he did not declare: for it suffices to confess it in the next confession, if it has not yet been validly accused; but if it had previously been validly declared, it is not necessary to repeat it.

334. N. B. Here we do not append a Catalogue of sins, according to which the confessor may question penitents: for this, as to its form, must be different according to different regions and the various conditions of penitents. Younger confessors indeed act very well who compose for themselves such a catalogue in the vernacular language, accommodated to the character of the penitents; in order to write it more diligently, they will usefully read the works indicated above where the examination of conscience was treated (n. 318), and will take counsel from senior priests, who, in that region, have heard confessions for a long time, the more so because in some places a special manner of speaking is employed for declaring this or that sin.

335. After the confession has been heard and opportune corrections and warnings have been given to the penitent, the confessor enjoins a salutary satisfaction, which is called sacramental penance. Satisfaction, insofar as it is a part of the sacrament, is defined: the voluntary endurance of a penalty, imposed by the confessor, for compensating the injury brought upon God, and for redeeming the temporal penalty ordinarily due even after sin has been remitted. - It is therefore distinguished from those penalties which are voluntarily assumed or are sent by God: for these indeed have a satisfactory force ex opere operantis, but they are not sacramental, and therefore they do not operate ex opere operato.

A twofold satisfaction is distinguished: (a) satisfaction in voto, which is nothing other than the sincere will of accepting and fulfilling the penance to be enjoined by the confessor; this is an essential part of the sacrament, according to the Thomists, or at least a necessary disposition, according to the Scotists, so that, if it were lacking, the sacrament, according to both schools, would be invalid; (b) satisfaction in re, which is the actual fulfillment itself of the penance enjoined: this is not an essential part, or a necessary disposition, but only an integral part of the sacrament, so that, if it is lacking, the sacrament is not invalid, but only incomplete; hence sins remitted by absolution do not revive, even if the penance is voluntarily omitted, but in this case a new sin is committed, as will be clear from what is to be said below.

Since the necessity of satisfaction was proved elsewhere (n. 149), four things remain to be explained: -

1° The obligation of imposing sacramental penance;

2° The qualities of this penance;

3° Its commutation;

4° Its fulfillment.

336. I. Existence of this obligation. The confessor is regularly bound to enjoin satisfaction, or penance, upon the penitent whom he absolves. It is certain.

¹ Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 8; Ritual, Order for the ministering of the Sacrament of Penance; Suarez, disp. XXXVIII, sect. 3; Lugo, disp. XXV, n. 47-58; Salmant., n. 15-25; Lacroix, n. 1229-1250; Billuart, Diss. IX, art. 2; Stoz, book II, n. 110-111; Elbel-Bierbaum, conf. IX, n. 223-224; St. Alphonsus, n. 506 sq.; Kenrick, n. 99; Marc, n. 1715-1718; Konings, n. 1391; Muller, § 126; Lehmk., n. 353-355; Baller. P., n. 478 sq.; Hilar. a Sexten, § 39; Genicot, n. 311; Ami du clerge, t. XXII (1900), p. 906-907.

1° It is proved. (A) For the Council of Trent openly teaches this (l. c.): "Therefore the priests of the Lord must enjoin salutary and fitting satisfactions, according as spirit and prudence shall suggest, in view of the quality of the crimes and the ability of the penitents; lest perhaps, if they connive at sins and deal too indulgently with penitents, by enjoining certain very light works for very grave offenses, they be made participants in others' sins."

(B) The same is clear from the various offices of the confessor. (a) As minister of the sacrament, he must procure not only all things which regard its essence, but also its integrity: otherwise he would not be a faithful minister of sacred things; but satisfaction, from what has been said, is an integral part of the sacrament, since it is intended for extinguishing or lessening the temporal penalty due to sin. (b) As judge, he is bound to punish sin with a suitable penalty; otherwise equity would be harmed, since the order of divine justice requires some reparation for sin. (c) As physician, he must cure the wounds already inflicted upon the penitent and guard against future ones; but both are done by imposing salutary penalties; for penitential works, according to Trent (ch. 8), "also heal the remnants of sins, and remove vicious habits acquired by living badly, by contrary actions of virtues"; moreover they make penitents more cautious and more vigilant for the future, since they do not return so easily to sins from which they have experienced penalty.

337. 2° It is explained. Yet I said "regularly," because per accidens the confessor is not bound to enjoin satisfaction when the penitent morally cannot fulfill it, for example, if he is deprived of his senses, or near death and at the same time very weak; in this last case, however, it is better to enjoin a light penance, for example, a striking of the breast, an act of love of God, an invocation of the Most Holy Name of Jesus, at least in the heart, or only patience in bearing pains. - Likewise, if a scrupulous person returns more often within a brief interval of time with new faults omitted through forgetfulness, and is absolved, it is not necessary to impose a new penance, when the confessor judges that the one already enjoined suffices for this new absolution. But for the most part it is not expedient to impart absolution so frequently to the scrupulous. - Certain authors also say that the same penance can be imposed on a penitent who, immediately after absolution, accuses a sin omitted through forgetfulness,¹ because the confessor can judge that it suffices also for the new sin recently accused; and we think this truly probable whenever this sin does not substantially change the state of the penitent's conscience. Nevertheless St. Alphonsus (n. 513) contradicts it, because the same work, already enjoined by way of satisfaction, cannot again be imposed under the same title. Hence in practice it is better to impose at least a light penance, provided it is foreseen that the penitent will willingly accept it.

¹ Lacroix, n. 1239; Ball. P., n. 494; Genicot, n. 311.

It was also said "upon the penitent whom he absolves," because, if no absolution is given, it is not necessary to enjoin a penance, since the sacrament is not effected; yet this is very useful, so that the penitent may thus be better prepared for absolution and a shorter satisfaction may be imposed when he completes his confession.

338. II. Gravity of this obligation. (A) If there is question of mortal sins not yet declared, this obligation per se is grave; for in this case a grave injury is done to the sacrament, - and also to the penitent, who remains liable to undergo heavier temporal penalties, and is deprived of an opportune remedy against future sins.

(B) But if there is question only of venial sins, or of mortal sins already declared, for which a penance was formerly enjoined and fulfilled, it is disputed; some say that the obligation even in this case is grave, lest the sacrament remain defective; more probably, however, with Lugo,² others hold that the confessor then does not sin mortally if, contempt aside, he does not enjoin a penance; for it does not seem to be a grave disorder to absolve light sins without any satisfaction, since the sacrament in this case remains incomplete only in a light matter. - Besides, this controversy scarcely concerns practice; for a prudent confessor will not voluntarily omit imposing a light penance in this case, and, if he omits it through forgetfulness, he commits no sin.

² Lugo, disp. XXV, n. 49.

339. III. On the time at which it must be imposed. Regularly speaking, penance must be enjoined before absolution, as is clear from the Roman Ritual, according to which the imposition of satisfaction follows opportune corrections and precedes absolution. And deservedly; for the judicial order demands that the accused promise satisfaction before he is absolved. If, however, it was omitted through forgetfulness, it can be enjoined immediately after absolution, because then it is morally united to the absolution. But if this defect is noticed only after a few days, in the next confession a penance can be imposed which extends to the sins declared in both confessions; but it is not certain that the sacrament which had been incomplete because of the defect of satisfaction is thereby made integral, because the moral union between the absolution previously given and the imposition of penance is now lacking. Whatever the case, penitents are not to be disturbed about this, since satisfaction in re is not required for the validity of absolution.

340. I. Principle: The confessor must enjoin salutary and fitting satisfactions, according to the quality of the crimes and the ability of the penitents. It is certain from Trent, cited above (n. 336).

¹ St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 15; Suarez, disp. XXXVIII, sect. 4-6; Lugo, disp. XXV, n. 60-67; Salmant., cap. 10, n. 26-47; Lacroix, n. 1233 sq.; Billuart, l. c.; St. Alphonsus, l. c.; Lehmk., n. 355-362; Ballerini P., l. c.; Hilarius a Sexten, l. c.; Genicot, n. 312 sq.; Noldin, n. 289 sq.; Ami du Clerge, l. c., 1048 sq.; Gaume, Manuel, n. 402 sq.

1° Satisfactions of this kind must be salutary, that is, apt for promoting the salvation and spiritual good of the penitent; and therefore both vindicative, for punishing and expiating past sins, and medicinal, for guarding against future relapses. Now every supernaturally good work is penal or vindicative, since it is arduous to refer our works to God. But in order that it be medicinal, it must heal the wounds of the soul and remove vicious habits, acquired by living badly, by contrary actions of the virtues. Therefore let the confessor take care, "as far as can be done," says the Ritual, "that he enjoin penances contrary to sins: for example, alms upon the avaricious, fasts or other afflictions of the flesh upon the lustful, offices of humility upon the proud, exercises of devotion upon the slothful." Yet this is not to be understood in such a way that different satisfactions are enjoined for each sin accused by the same penitent, but that a contrary penance is imposed for the graver sin into which the penitent will relapse more frequently.

341. 2° They must be fitting, that is, proportioned to the gravity of the crimes, to the quantity of penalty which remains to be paid, and also to the ability of the penitents.

(A) Proportioned to the gravity of the crimes: for the confessor is bound to this as judge and physician. Hence a confessor sins gravely who, without just cause, enjoins a light penance for sins certainly mortal;¹ for if they are doubtfully grave, a grave satisfaction is not required, since in doubt odious things are to be restricted.

¹ According to D'Annibale (n. 347), then only does the confessor sin mortally when he enjoins the very lightest penances for the gravest sins.

Now, according to present discipline, that penance is judged grave which corresponds to a work which is imposed or can be imposed under grave obligation by the Church, for example, to hear Mass once, to fast, to recite the rosary, indeed even a third part of the rosary, or five decades, to read the Office of the Blessed Virgin Mary, or the seven Penitential Psalms, the Litany of the Saints with the prayers that follow, to make the way of the cross, to meditate or read a pious book or perform other works for a quarter of an hour. But a light penance is judged to be the psalm Miserere or one of the customary psalms, the Litany of Loreto or of the Most Holy Name of Jesus or of the Sacred Heart, acts of faith, hope, and charity, five times the Our Father and Hail Mary. Nevertheless a penance light in itself can become grave if the penitent must recite it not once, but several times.

If not one, but several mortal sins have been committed, regularly a graver penance must be enjoined, and indeed one graver in proportion as the sins are more numerous and graver; not, however, in an arithmetical proportion, so that for one hundred mortal sins it would be one hundred times greater; for if the matter were so, already it would be morally impossible to fulfill the penance.

342. (B) Proportioned to the quantity of penalty which remains to be paid: -

(a) Granted that the contrition was more vehement, by that very fact the temporal penalty to be paid is lessened, and therefore the penance can be less. From this, however, it does not follow that no satisfaction is to be enjoined when sorrow is very intense, because the confessor does not know whether it is so vehement that it deletes the whole temporal penalty. Besides, one so disposed will willingly accept a grave penance.

(b) A lighter satisfaction can also be enjoined at the time of a Jubilee, or on the occasion of gaining a plenary indulgence, because by indulgences the temporal penalty is extinguished or lessened. Indeed, formerly certain theologians contended that in these circumstances sacramental penance could be altogether omitted: yet Benedict XIV and Leo XII rejected this, warning that some penance must be imposed on those who are to gain the jubilee.¹

¹ Benedict XIV, Constitution Inter praeteritos; Leo XII, Constitution Caritate Christi.

(c) Certain saints were accustomed to enjoin a light penance, because they themselves made satisfaction for penitents by fasting, mortifications, and other arduous works; this can be done, for, by virtue of the communion of saints, the satisfactions of one can profit another.

343. (C) Proportioned to the ability of the penitents, or, as the Ritual says, "with regard had to the state, condition, sex, age, and disposition of the penitents"; in other words, according to their strength and dispositions.

(a) According to the penitent's strength; thus a light penance is to be enjoined upon the sick, because they are not capable of fulfilling a graver one; but if hope of recovering health shines forth, it is expedient that another work be enjoined to be performed conditionally (that is, if he recovers). When the sick are very weak, the confessor laudably assists them to fulfill the penance immediately; otherwise they could forget it. - Likewise, fasts are not to be imposed on children or youths who are not robust, or on workmen wearied by continual labor; nor lengthy prayers or pilgrimages on servants and maids, or even on women placed under the authority of a husband; nor alms on the poor; nor any work which conflicts with the duties of one's own state.

Nor should perpetual penances be enjoined, for example, entrance into a religious order, - or penances for a long time, for example, for a year, for five months, etc., because such penances generate anxiety, and, after some time, easily fall into oblivion; and if various confessors were to do this, penitents would be bound by innumerable bonds, to the great detriment of souls. Nor should penances be intricate; otherwise they will be given over to oblivion. - Hence, if the recitation of some prayer is prescribed for six or eight days, it is expedient to warn the penitent that, if he omits to recite it on one day, he can recite it on the following day, so that anxieties may thus be avoided. In one word, let nothing too arduous be imposed, either in itself or relatively to various penitents; for example, regularly children should not be ordered to ask pardon from their parents for disobedience or for petty thefts, lest confession be rendered odious to them.

344. (b) According to the dispositions of the penitent; namely, no satisfaction should be enjoined which the penitent probably will not accept or will not perform; for example, he should not be ordered, by way of penance, to visit enemies or to ask pardon from the one whom he offended, when it is foreseen that this is altogether repugnant to him.

Hence, with St. Charles Borromeo and St. Francis de Sales admonishing,¹ sometimes it helps to ask him whether he can perform the penance imposed on him; otherwise the confessor will lessen or change it. "It is safer," says Gerson,² "with a small penance which is willingly undertaken and will likely be fulfilled, to lead the confessed to purgatory, than with a great one not to be fulfilled to hurl them into hell." For experience shows that many are deterred from confession by fear of receiving an excessive penance.³

¹ St. Charles Borromeo, Instruct. Confess., ap. Acta Eccles. Milan., t. I, p. 655-656, Lyons edition, 1683; St. Francis de Sales, Avertissement aux Confesseurs, Oeuvres, t. VI, p. 143, Vives edition.

² Regula Mor., p. 2, c. de Poenit., ap. St. Alphonsus, n. 509.

³ To the point St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 18, a. 4: "And because satisfactory penalties to be inflicted are medicines, just as medicines determined in the art are not suited to all... so also satisfactory penalties determined in the canons are not suited to all, but must be varied according to the judgment of the priest regulated by divine instinct. Therefore, just as a physician sometimes prudently does not give a medicine so efficacious that it suffices for curing the disease, lest because of the weakness of nature a greater danger arise, so also the priest, moved by divine instinct, does not always enjoin the whole penalty which is due to one sin, lest someone weak, from the magnitude of the penalty, despair and withdraw wholly from penance." Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 510, with the authorities cited there.

From what has already been said, it is clear that there are causes which excuse from enjoining a penance proportioned to the sins, either by imposing a moderate one for grave offenses, or one less grave than the multitude of sins deserves. It will be helpful to explain these.

345. 1° On the part of the penitent, the principal causes are: (a) bodily infirmity, or weakness of mind, from which it happens that he can fulfill a proportionate penance only with difficulty.

(b) Moral infirmity, from which it is greatly feared that the penitent, although sufficiently attrite, will not pay a grave penance; then, moreover, it is expedient that, besides a light supererogatory work enjoined, another work be added which is already prescribed from elsewhere, for example, hearing Mass on Sunday, abstinence from meat on Friday.

(c) Extraordinary contrition, by which the penalty to be paid is lessened, as above.

(d) A founded hope of enticing the sinner to more frequent use of the sacraments, if a lesser penance is enjoined, since by reception of Penance and the Eucharist the temporal penalty due to sins is lessened; or of inducing him voluntarily to inflict greater penalties upon himself.

346. 2° On the part of the confessor, the will of making satisfaction for penitents, such as there was in certain saints, for example, St. Francis Xavier, who was accustomed to expiate the offenses of penitents by bloody scourgings.

3° On the part of the Church, which on certain occasions grants a plenary indulgence either in ordinary form, or under the form of a Jubilee, through which the penalty due to sin can be paid in full, when the things to be placed have been placed.

In these various cases, however, it is expedient to warn penitents concerning the insufficiency of the work enjoined, so that they may voluntarily make satisfaction in other ways.

From these things it is given to understand 1° what kind of work can be enjoined by way of satisfaction, and 2° what the principal penances are which should be imposed.

347. 1° Sacramental penance can be any good and supernatural work: (a) whether external or internal, because, although it is doubted whether a merely internal work, for example, meditation, can be enjoined by human authority, this difficulty is not verified in the case, since the priest in the sacred tribunal exercises not human, but divine authority. Nor can it be said that a merely internal act is not sensible matter of the sacrament; for an act of this kind is made sensible through the imposition of the priest and the acceptance of the penitent. - Yet it is generally fitting to enjoin some external work upon the uneducated and unlearned, since merely internal acts are more difficult for them.

348. (b) Public or private; yet confessors "should not impose manifest penance for occult sins, however grave," as the Ritual rightly says; for otherwise a suspicion of grave sin committed would easily arise, and thus the seal of confession would be violated; for example, if a wife is ordered to fast for two or three days after confession, the husband will suspect that she has sinned gravely. But for public sins a public work can be enjoined, especially if some reparation is necessary for removing scandal, as happens, for example, when someone has contracted marriage before a non-Catholic minister. Sometimes, however, even for public offenses, prudence suggests that public penance should not be imposed on one who is reluctant, lest sinners thereby be deterred from the sacred tribunal, especially since often the reparation of scandal can be made in another way, for example, by public reception of the sacraments, hearing Mass, or visiting a church.¹

¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 512; Ciolli, I, n. 39. - Nor should satisfactions be imposed which expose the penitent to the mockery of others, for example, to pray in church with arms extended, or publicly to ask pardon.

349. (c) A supererogatory work or a work otherwise due; for even a work prescribed from elsewhere is satisfactory by its nature, and its satisfactory value can be elevated to the efficacy of sacramental satisfaction by the power of the keys. Nevertheless it is generally expedient to enjoin supererogatory works, so that an occasion of doing more good may be given to penitents. Hence a work imposed by way of satisfaction is not judged to be the same as that which is already prescribed by law, unless this is expressly declared by the confessor; for example, if hearing Mass is enjoined, the penitent is understood to be bound to hear Mass outside the prescribed time. - But if a work otherwise prescribed is explicitly imposed, for example, hearing Mass on Sunday, its culpable omission will be a twofold sin, because a twofold precept is violated, one general, imposed by way of law, the other particular, by way of command. - The cessation from some good work can also be prescribed, for a brief time, not because such cessation is good in itself, but insofar as it gives occasion for cultivating other virtues, especially obedience and humility.

350. (d) A conditional work can also be enjoined, for example, a prayer to be said or a confession to be made under the condition of relapse. It is certain that this is licit, if at the same time another absolute penance is prescribed.

According to a few,¹ this is also licit if it alone is enjoined; for, as they say, the special effort applied to guarding against the fall is a sufficient penance. Yet this reason does not seem solid; for this effort was not elevated to the efficacy of sacramental satisfaction by the fact that the priest prescribed a prayer under the condition of relapse. Hence prudent confessors will follow the common opinion.

¹ Ballerini P., n. 524; Genicot, n. 314.

351. 2° The principal penances which can be enjoined are reduced to four heads: almsgiving, fasting, prayer, and patience in penalties inflicted by God.

(A) It is proved. For (a) as St. Thomas rightly argues,² satisfaction must be such that through it we subtract something from ourselves for the honor of God; but we have only three goods, namely goods of the soul, goods of the body, and goods of fortune; from goods of fortune indeed we subtract something through almsgiving; from goods of the body, through fasting; from goods of the soul, through prayer, by which we submit our faculties to God. (b) Moreover there are three roots of sins, namely concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life; but fasting is ordered against concupiscence of the flesh; almsgiving is ordered against concupiscence of the eyes; prayer, against pride of life.

² St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 15, a. 1 and 3.

Yet to these penalties, voluntarily undertaken, there must be added, according to Trent (can. 13), penalties inflicted by God and patiently tolerated: for often the Lord permits us to be troubled by various adversities, hardships, and pains of soul or body, and by patiently tolerating these, especially in union with Christ, we have a very ample opportunity of making satisfaction. Therefore patience in adversities can also be enjoined as sacramental penance.

352. (B) It is explained. (a) Under the name of almsgiving are comprehended all works of charity, whether corporal or spiritual; corporal, for example, to visit the sick, the poor, those detained in hospitals or in prison; to serve them and provide help; to give food to the hungry, drink to the thirsty, clothing to the naked, freedom to captives; - spiritual, for example, to instruct the ignorant, to teach Christian doctrine, to give counsel to those who labor under doubt, to correct delinquents, to console the sorrowful, to forgive injuries, to bear patiently the defects of others, to pray for others.

But as to alms, let these words of the Ritual be noted: "Let confessors not apply pecuniary penances to themselves; nor let them ask or receive anything from penitents as the reward of their ministry."

353. (b) Under the name of fasting are understood all acts of mortification, whether external or internal, such as: fasting, whether entire (which today it is often not expedient to impose), or partial, by subtracting a part of breakfast or supper; - abstinence from meat, or from a certain food, but especially from intoxicating drink; - moderation in sleep, play, hunting, banquets; - abstinence from dances and the theater, from useless and dangerous conversations; mortification of excessive curiosity in sight, hearing, and in reading books or newspapers; - interior acts of obedience, humility, charity, etc.

354. (c) Under the name of prayer can be understood: prayers properly so called, for example, to recite five Our Fathers and Hail Marys, acts of faith, hope, and charity, the rosary, litanies, certain psalms, hymns, morning and evening prayers, the Office of the Blessed Virgin Mary, or a part of the Breviary; to say ejaculatory prayers from the heart; to hear Mass; - mental prayers, namely to make some meditation on the last things, or on the Passion of Christ or on other mysteries of faith; pious reading of some chapter of Sacred Scripture, especially of the Gospel, or of the excellent book The Imitation of Christ, etc., with some meditation upon the things which are read; - to repeat the offering of oneself and of all one's acts early in the morning and often during the day; - practices adjoining prayer, such as the visitation of churches, the exercise of the way of the cross, the hearing of a sermon, frequent reception of the sacraments, sacramental confession immediately after a fall.

355. (d) Finally, patience can be specially enjoined, for a determined time, upon those who labor much, or sustain bitter pains, or suffer persecution; then it is expedient to suggest a brief act of resignation, for example, Into thy hands, O Lord, I commend my spirit; not my will, but thine be done; for thee, O Jesus, to suffer and be despised.

356. 3° So that these penances may be medicinal, the prudent confessor will select those which are more directly opposed to the vices of the penitent, according to that saying: contraries are cured by contraries. We append certain examples with respect to the capital sins: (a) To the proud can be enjoined an attentive consideration of their own misery and infirmity, and of their own sins, so that from this they may more easily elicit an act of humility; to those who glory in their qualities and merits he will propose for meditation these or similar words: "For what hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received?"¹

¹ 1 Cor. 4:7.

(b) Upon the avaricious, and those retaining another's goods, he will impose certain alms or restitution, together with meditation on death, which separates us from all things, or on the poverty of Christ.

(c) For the lustful can be prescribed flight from proximate occasions, mortification of the senses, avoidance of idleness, frequent consideration of the penalties of hell, prayer to the Blessed Virgin which begins: O Domina mea...

(d) For the gluttonous and drunken: some subtraction of food and drink, abstinence from intoxicating drink, flight from taverns or companions with whom they are accustomed to become drunk.

(e) For the envious: reparation of the harms which by their envy they have brought upon others, prayer for those whom they envy, some meditation or pious reading on the motives of charity.

(f) For the angry: to be silent for some time when the first movements of anger arise, flight from occasions, mortification of pride which often moves to anger, consideration of the evils which frequently follow from anger.

(g) For the lazy and slothful: consideration of the brevity of this life and therefore of the necessity of doing good while there is time; assiduity and perseverance in certain prayers to be recited for some time, a greater effort for two or three days.

These indeed are by way of example;¹ the rest you will find among the authors of ascetical theology.

¹ Cf. Ami du Clerge, t. XXII, 1900, p. 1049-1050.

When an enjoined penance morally cannot be fulfilled, under certain conditions it can be changed.

² Suarez, disp. XXXVIII, sect. 10; Lugo, disp. XXV, n. 95-113; Salmant., n. 71-99; and other authors cited above.

357. I. Principle: Sacramental penance already enjoined can be changed for a just cause, not indeed by the penitent himself, but by a confessor having authority. It is certain.

1° It cannot be changed, even into a more perfect one, by the penitent himself; for the changing of penance imports a new judgment, which cannot be passed except by a judge; moreover no work can be elevated to the dignity and efficacy of sacramental satisfaction except by the authority of the minister himself.

2° It can be changed either by the same confessor or by another having jurisdiction; for penance is enjoined by way of a particular law; now a law can be changed either by the legislator or by his successor, but in sacramental confession.

It is controverted whether a penance imposed by a superior on account of reserved cases can be commuted by an inferior. Some affirm this probably with Vasquez;³ for, once the reservation has been removed by the absolution of the superior, any confessor can pass judgment concerning these sins and therefore impose a new penance. But many more probably deny this with Lugo and St. Alphonsus;⁴ for the accessory follows the principal; but judgment in the principal cause, namely in reserved sins, pertains only to the superior; therefore likewise judgment concerning the accessory, namely concerning the penance. - Nevertheless St. Alphonsus concedes that this can be done if a grave cause is present and access to the superior is not easy: for then the consent of the superior is deservedly presumed. For the same reason this can be admitted if the penitent would approach the superior only reluctantly.

³ Vasquez, q. 94, a. 2, dub. 3, n. 9; Elbel-Bierb., n. 242; Ball. P., n. 533.

⁴ Lugo, n. 104; St. Alphonsus, n. 529.

358. II. Conditions so that penance can be changed. 1° There must be a moral union between the commutation of penance and absolution; for the elevation of some work to the dignity of sacramental satisfaction cannot be done, even by the minister, except insofar as he is judge, or insofar as he pronounces absolution.

Hence (a) the same confessor can certainly change the penance immediately after absolution, before the penitent departs, because the judgment already pronounced still morally perseveres. Indeed grave authors, such as Lugo,¹ probably hold that this can be done outside confession, even after a notable time, provided the confessor remembers the sins at least confusedly; for even in this case the penance is morally united with the absolution: for if today's absolution can be united with a confession made eight days before, the changing of penance, even after eight days, is morally united also with the past absolution; nor can the judgment be said to be altogether complete except by the execution of the sentence, or the fulfillment of the penance. Nevertheless St. Alphonsus contradicts this (n. 529, dub. 3), because, if such an interval is present, a new judgment is made and a new absolution is required so that the penance can be changed. It is expedient to follow this opinion at least with respect to those who confess frequently; but if there is question of those who approach the sacred tribunal only rarely, Lugo's opinion can be brought into practice without scruple, since here there is no question of the validity of the sacrament.

¹ Lugo, disp. XXV, n. 112.

(b) But if the commutation of penance is sought from another confessor, he cannot change it except in the sacred tribunal, after some confession has been heard, and with a new absolution: otherwise there would be no union between satisfaction and absolution.

359. 2° For making a commutation there is further required sufficient knowledge of the state of the penitent; otherwise the new penance can be neither proportioned nor medicinal.

Hence, if the penitent approaches the same confessor, who remembers the state of the penitent at least confusedly, it is not necessary to repeat the confession; if he approaches another confessor, more probably it is not necessary to repeat the entire confession, but it suffices either to declare the penance already previously imposed, or to make a summary confession: for this suffices for knowing the state of the penitent with respect to the penance to be enjoined.

360. 3° A just cause is also required, which can be either notable usefulness for the penitent, or difficulty in the execution of the prior penance. Hence a change can be made even if it is not requested by the penitent, provided however that he consents; for he can indeed oppose the change if he regards it as a burden.

But once the commutation has been made, much more probably the penitent can, if he wishes, choose the satisfaction previously enjoined, because the commutation, as favoring the penitent, is judged to be made under this condition: unless the penitent wishes to return to the former one.¹

¹ Thus St. Alphonsus, H. A., tr. XVI, n. 61, with the authors cited there.

We shall speak both of the obligation and of the manner of fulfilling penance.

² Suarez, disp. XXXVIII, sect. 7-9; Lugo, disp. XXV, n. 68-94; Salmant., n. 48-70; Lacroix, n. 1273 sq.; St. Alphonsus, n. 515-527; and the other authors already cited.

361. 1° Existence of this obligation: The penitent is bound to accept and fulfill the penance reasonably enjoined upon him by the confessor. It is certain.

For (a) the Fourth Lateran Council, after enunciating the law of annual confession, adds:³ "and let him strive according to his strength to fulfill the penance enjoined upon him." Moreover, according to the testimony of Trent (above, n. 336), the confessor has the right and office of imposing penance; but such a right would be useless unless the penitent were bound to accept and fulfill it. (b) Moreover, the penitent, no less than the confessor, is obliged to procure the integrity of the sacrament; but, from what has been said, sacramental penance is an integrating part of the sacrament; therefore.

³ Ap. Denzing., n. 363.

362. Corollaries. (a) Yet this obligation does not bind if the confession is invalid, or absolution was not given: for then the sacrament does not exist, and therefore no obligation arises from it.

Nevertheless, if the confessor imposes some medicinal penance as a condition of future absolution, it must be performed, not indeed as an integrating part of the sacrament, but as a preparation for absolution. The same must be said if a penance is prescribed in a confession which absolution does not follow, for the purpose that a lesser one can be enjoined at the time when the penitent is absolved, as often happens: for then it must be fulfilled by reason not of absolution received, but of absolution to be received.

(b) If the penitent thinks that the satisfaction is too burdensome, he can ask that it be changed or lessened, and regularly the confessor will acquiesce in his desire. Yet if the confessor is unwilling to moderate it, the penitent can depart without absolution and confess his sins to another priest, or accept the penance and ask from another confessor that he commute it.

363. 2° Gravity of this obligation: The penitent is bound under grave obligation to fulfill a penance which is legitimately enjoined under grave obligation. It is certain.

(A) It is proved. For the confessor, as judge, has the power of commanding under grave obligation those things which in a grave matter pertain to the integrity of the sacrament; but penance pertains to the integrity of the sacrament, and indeed in a grave matter, when it is imposed for grave offenses; therefore.

364. (B) It is explained. Now the confessor is judged to oblige under grave obligation when he imposes a grave satisfaction for mortal sins not yet accused, unless he says the contrary; for the gravity of the obligation must be proportioned to the gravity of the matter.

Yet the confessor can, according to the more common opinion, impose for grave sins a grave penance under light obligation only, because any legislator can prescribe grave matter under light obligation. Yet this is not expedient, according to St. Alphonsus (n. 518), except when another penance has already been imposed under grave obligation; then another, graver one can be added under light obligation, in order to consult the penitent's weakness.

When the penance is light, it obliges only under light obligation. But if a satisfaction grave in itself is imposed for venial sins or for mortal sins already remitted, more probably it obliges only under light obligation, because the confessor is judged not to have wished to oblige under grave obligation; or if he did wish it, he exceeded his power, since penance must be proportioned to the gravity of the sin. Yet the case is excepted in which a grave penance is enjoined for light sins which strongly dispose toward mortal sins, so that this danger may be removed; but this is done not by way of satisfaction for sins, but for urging the natural obligation of avoiding proximate occasions.

365. Corollary. He who culpably omits either a part or a circumstance of the penance sins gravely or not, according as this part or circumstance is notable or not. But in order to judge whether it is notable or not, one must inquire whether, all things considered, in itself or in relation to the penitent, it causes grave or light trouble, according to the judgment of prudent men; for example, if someone is ordered to recite the rosary before an image of the Blessed Virgin, this circumstance is light; if he is ordered to recite it with arms extended, it seems to be grave. In practice, circumstances of this kind should be imposed only with great circumspection.

366. 1° Principle: Penance must be paid in that manner, in itself or in its circumstances, in which it was enjoined by the confessor. It is certain.

For penance is imposed by way of an ecclesiastical precept, and therefore, as an ecclesiastical law, it must be fulfilled both in itself and in its circumstances.

367. 2° Corollaries. (A) As to time: (a) the penance must be fulfilled at the assigned time, or, if no time was set, as soon as morally possible: for the intention of the confessor, the integrity of the sacrament itself, and the good of the penitent require this. - Yet it is not strictly required that it be fulfilled before absolution or communion.

(b) Therefore he sins gravely who, without reason, defers for a long time a grave penance imposed under grave obligation. But what time is long, theologians dispute; a delay for three or six months seems grave to many, while some think it is grave only when the penitent is thus exposed to the danger of omitting it altogether. - Even when a time has been determined by the confessor, a brief delay will not be a grave sin. - But if the penance is light, no delay, however great it may be, will be a grave sin. Yet all are to be advised to fulfill it immediately after confession has been completed, lest perhaps it fall into oblivion.

(c) If the penance has not been paid at the set time, the burden of performing it as soon as possible remains, since the time was prescribed not for ending the obligation, but for urging it.

368. (B) Strictly speaking, penance is validly fulfilled, according to the common opinion, by one who is in the state of mortal sin; for penance, even fulfilled in this state, is a good and penal work, and therefore suffices for satisfying the precept.

Nevertheless, according to St. Alphonsus (n. 523), he who acts thus sins venially, because he places an obstacle to one of the effects of the sacrament, namely, remission of penalty. But Lugo¹ holds very probably that this is free from all fault; it is true indeed that penance in this case is not satisfactory de condigno; but as soon as the sinner, by recovering the state of grace, removes the obstacle, satisfaction produces its effect, that is, remission of penalty.

¹ Lugo, disp. XXV, n. 40, with the authors cited there.

He who, while fulfilling penance, sins venially, for example, by distractedly reciting the prayers enjoined, is not deprived of the fruit of satisfaction ex opere operato, because venial sin does not prevent the remission of temporal penalty due to other sins.²

² Lacroix, n. 1247; Muller, § 127, n. 6.

369. (C) Regularly satisfaction is to be performed by the penitent himself, and not by another, unless with the consent of the confessor; for it is an integral part of the sacrament, and therefore must be performed by the penitent himself, just as contrition and confession; hence this proposition 15 was condemned by Alexander VII (24 Sept. 1665):³ "The penitent can by his own authority substitute another for himself, who may fulfill the penance in his place." - Yet the confessor can permit satisfaction to be performed by another when there is question of almsgiving; but it is controverted whether he can permit this with regard to other works, such as fasting, a pilgrimage, etc., when a just cause is present.⁴ Whatever the case, this is not expedient, at least generally, and if someone cannot pay the penance, it is better that another be imposed which he can perform.

³ Ap. Denzing., n. 986; cf. Viva, in Propos. XV; Vacant, Dict. de Theol., I, 738.

⁴ Suarez affirms it, disp. XXXVIII, sect. 9; Lugo denies it, disp. XXV, n. 82.

370. (D) It is controverted whether the enjoined work must be performed from the intention of fulfilling penance. (a) Not a few deny this with Lugo;⁵ for by the very fact that the work imposed by the confessor and accepted by the penitent is performed, it attains to the dignity and efficacy of sacramental penance, even if it is carried out from mere devotion and not from the intention of making satisfaction.

⁵ Lugo, disp. XXV, n. 34.

(b) Many others affirm it with Vasquez and Lacroix;⁶ for, in order that some work can be a sacramental satisfaction, it must be connected with the sacrament by the penitent, explicitly or implicitly; but it is connected with the sacrament only by force of intention; therefore.

⁶ Lacroix, n. 1286, with the authors cited there; Berardi, Praxis, n. 4547.

In our judgment, the matter can be arranged thus: if someone performs the work imposed by the confessor, not indeed thinking of paying the penance, but nevertheless not ordering that work to another end, he truly fulfills the penance by force of the intention which he had in accepting the satisfaction; but if he positively orders this work to another end, for example, to fulfilling some precept, the penance is not fulfilled, since the penitent positively intends something else; thus, for example, if the rosary is imposed on him who recites it daily, the penitent can at his own judgment choose that the first rosary be said for the sake of devotion, and the second as sacramental penance.

371. (E) If someone has forgotten the enjoined penance, even culpably, he is not bound to repeat the confession in order to receive another penance, according to the common opinion;¹ for no one is bound to repeat his sins when they have already been directly remitted: for this would be a most grave burden; and therefore the fulfillment of the penance can be regarded as morally impossible. But if someone is guilty of culpable forgetfulness, it will be enough to accuse this sin of negligence. Yet he is bound to approach the same confessor, if he conveniently can, and presumes that he is still mindful of the penance: for this is not a grave burden; but he is not strictly bound to request a commutation of the penance from another confessor, although this is laudable, useful to the penitent himself, and therefore to be recommended.

¹ Cf. Lugo, disp. XXV, n. 87; St. Alphonsus, n. 520, with the authors cited there.