On Human Acts — Chapter I: On Free Acts

66. State of the question. Among the acts which are performed by man, some are voluntary, others involuntary. The former are performed by the will with a previous cognition of the intellect. But the latter are done without previous cognition or will. Of this kind are the acts of one fully dreaming, drunk, or delirious, who are incapable of conscious cognition;¹ likewise the acts of vegetative life, such as the digestion of foods or the circulation of the blood, which are not subject to the will; and also the acts of a fully distracted man who, although he is capable of attention, in fact does not notice those things which he does, because his attention is turned aside to other things. - The former acts, namely voluntary acts, can be called human acts, because they proceed from man insofar as he is rational man; but the latter are called acts of man, because they indeed proceed from man, but not insofar as he is rational, since they are done without advertence and will.²

¹ Thus voluntary acts are distinguished from spontaneous acts, which are done with merely sensitive cognition, such as the acts of infants or the mentally unsound.

² Sometimes, however, only those acts are called human which are truly free, and therefore proceed from the deliberate will, according to those things which are set forth below. To the point St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 1: "Of the actions which are done by man, those alone are called human which are proper to man insofar as he is man. But man differs from other irrational creatures in this, that he is master of his own acts. Whence those actions alone are properly called human of which man is master. But man is master of his own acts through reason and will... therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from deliberate will."

Here we treat concerning voluntary acts; nor will there be discussion of the others, except that they may be distinguished from the former. Among voluntary acts, some are necessary, but others free or deliberate. The former indeed proceed from the will with previous cognition, but in such a way that the will cannot abstain from them; thus we necessarily will good in common;¹ for we do not embrace evil except under the species of good, or insofar as in some way it appears to us to be good. On the contrary, free acts so proceed from the will that the will according to its own pleasure can posit the act or not posit it. Thus the voluntary is, as it were, a genus which contains under itself two species: the necessary voluntary and the free or deliberate voluntary; but, since the former is occupied only with good in common, often voluntary and free are taken promiscuously. - We shall declare this more fully by setting forth: 1. the notion and species of a free act; 2. the principles which concur toward its production; 3. the causes which influence a free act.

¹ Certain ones, however, think that man is free even concerning good in common, because, they say, he tends toward it naturally indeed, but not from necessity; thus Piat, La Liberte, t. II, Le Probleme, p. 262-269. - Nevertheless it is established psychologically that there is some distinction between the desiring of beatitude, which all elicit at least implicitly, and the willing of the means which lead to it: for since these are diverse, and consequently limited goods, they do not solicit our assent necessarily. - For the rest, in practice, it matters little, provided it is admitted that we are truly free concerning the choice of means for obtaining beatitude.

67. 1. Definition. An act is called free which is immune from coercion and necessity.

² St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 8-17; Suarez, Tr. de voluntario et involuntario, disp. I, II, VI-X; Salmanticenses, De principiis moralitatis, cap. I, n. 9-21; Billuart, De actibus humanis, diss. I-III; Bouquillon, n. 318-330; Ballerini-Palmieri, t. I, n. 1-34.

(a) Liberty or immunity from necessity, which is also called liberty of exercise, or free will, is the faculty of choosing one thing before another, so that the agent is not intrinsically determined to one thing. For liberty it is by no means required that the will be in a state of indifference; but it suffices that, notwithstanding various causes, whether external or internal, which influence it, it ultimately be able to choose either part. - It is threefold: liberty of contradiction, which is exercised concerning contradictories, for example, when we can choose between loving and not loving; liberty of contrariety, which chooses between contraries, for example, between loving and hating, good and evil; liberty of specification, to which belongs choosing between objects diverse in species, such as eating and walking. Now for the essence of liberty the sole faculty of choosing between contradictories suffices, or between acting and not acting.

(b) Liberty from coercion, or liberty of execution, is the unimpeded faculty of acting according to one's pleasure, so that the agent is not forced to act by external violence, nor impeded from acting. Necessity therefore affects the very internal faculty of choosing, while coercion only binds the external power of executing.

68. 2. Existence. (A) The existence of liberty today is denied by determinists,¹ who contend that all actions of man depend on antecedent or concomitant circumstances in such a way that they are truly determined by them, but are not freely chosen by the will. It is not our purpose to vindicate against them the existence of free will; Philosophers do this.

¹ Thus, among others, A. Fouillée, La liberté et le déterminisme, 4th ed., Paris, Alcan, 1895. Yet he himself confesses that we become free little by little: for we have the concept of liberty; but every concept tends to burst forth at some time into act and to become real. For the rest, most determinists confess that there is in us some power of changing circumstances, and so of indirectly attaining what we will.

69. Let it suffice to recall their principal arguments to memory:

(a) Psychological.² From the inward testimony of conscience it is established that we, at least in many acts, are truly free. For notwithstanding the various motives which impel us to acting in this or that way, we can, according to our own judgment, consider these motives attentively or not, and make a practical judgment about them; we are conscious that we can choose between delightful good and honorable good; at the very instant in which we choose good, pleasure often allures us to evil, and therefore the fulfillment of duty requires an effort, that is, an act of the will contrary to pleasure; if we do good, we impute the action to ourselves as to true authors, as worthy of praise; if we have acted badly, conscience reproves us as worthy of blame. At length sometimes we perceive the distinction between acts arisen from an invincible propensity and those which are performed freely. Therefore unless conscience manifestly deceives us, we are truly free at least in many things.

² Piat, Le problème de la liberté, p. 37-127; Mercier, Psychologie, t. II, n. 203-206; Meyer, op. cit., n. 109-114; Fonsegrive, Essai sur le libre arbitre, 2nd ed., Paris, Alcan, 1896, p. 434-452, where he joins the psychological and the metaphysical argument together.

This is confirmed from the concept of duty to be fulfilled, which is present in all, as was shown above. For by duty we are not forced nor determined, but solicited to acting; hence sometimes we resist the command of duty, while conscience resists; sometimes we give consent to it, while concupiscence resists; in the former case, we repent that we have violated the order of nature; in the latter, we rejoice concerning good freely chosen.

(b) Metaphysical. The proper and adequate object of the will is universal good; wherefore, if some object is proposed to the will which is, and evidently appears to be, universally good, according to every consideration, of necessity the will will tend toward it, if it wills anything; for it will not be able to will the opposite. But if some object is proposed which is not, and does not appear, good according to every consideration, the will is not of necessity borne toward it. Now any particular goods, insofar as they are not the universal good, but are deficient from some good, can be taken as not good; and according to this consideration, they can be rejected or approved by the will.¹

¹ Thus St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 10, a. 2.

Therefore the subject of liberty is properly the will, to which belongs choosing between acting and not acting, doing this or that. But the root of liberty is reason, which can have diverse conceptions of good:² it conceives the highest good and proposes it to the will as something necessary; but particular goods it conceives and proposes as desirable insofar as they are more or less connected with beatitude.

² St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 17, a. 2 ad 2; I, q. 83, a. 1.

70. (B) Theologians likewise, against Lutherans, Calvinists, and Jansenists, prove that the human will, even in the state of fallen nature and under the influence of grace, remains free from necessity.³ (a) This surely is established from the general manner of speaking of Scripture; for precepts are given to man; rewards are promised to those doing good, but punishments are inflicted on the evil; sinners are called to penance, the just are warned lest, trusting too much in themselves, they fall into sin; there are in us two kinds of propensities mutually opposed to one another, by which we are allured to good and to evil;⁴ but, if without God's help we can do nothing from ourselves, we can do all things in Him who strengthens us.⁵

³ Which we proved in the treatise concerning Grace, n. 94-98.

⁴ Rom., VII, 15-25.

⁵ Philip., IV, 13. - Fonsegrive sets forth the doctrine of Scripture and the Fathers concerning liberty, op. cit., p. 79-124.

(b) Therefore the Council of Trent deservedly declares that by Adam's prevarication the free will of man, although weakened and inclined in its powers, was by no means extinguished, and that it can dissent from the grace of God, if it wills.¹ Likewise, as heretical, the third proposition of Jansenius was reproved: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, liberty from necessity is not required in man, but liberty from coercion suffices."

¹ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 1 and can. 4-5 (Denzing., nn. 675, 696, 697).

71. The primary distinction of free acts is taken from the principle from which they proceed: some indeed are elicited and others commanded. Elicited or immanent acts proceed immediately from the will and are perfected and consummated in it,² such as volition, intention, election, etc.; commanded acts are those which do not proceed immediately from the will, but, from its command, from another power, whether internal or external, such as thinking, walking, etc. A few things must be said concerning these, so that the nature of the free act may be better understood.

² In a general way those acts are called elicited which are performed by that faculty which is the proper subject of those acts; thus an act of faith is elicited by the intellect and commanded by the will. But in moral matters, an elicited act is so called in relation to the will, to which it belongs to act morally.

72. 1. Concerning elicited acts. Six elicited acts of the will are generally distinguished, when we act not precipitately, but prudently and maturely: simple volition, intention, consent, election, use, fruition.

(a) When the intellect apprehends something as good, the will is borne toward it as lovable in itself, and that inclination is called simple volition, or complacency, or love.

(b) But this volition moves the intellect to weighing whether that good is fitting and possible for the subject; and if the intellect truly judges that the matter is so, intention is born, by which the will tends toward the end as attainable.

(c) By force of this intention, the intellect inquires concerning means suited to obtaining the end, and the will gives consent, or desires the means useful for attaining the thing.

(d) By force of this consent, the intellect is applied to discerning what are the more apt means for attaining the object, and on the part of the will there is election, by which it approves one means before others.

(e) When the means has now been chosen, the will, with the intellect directing, commands the execution of this means, and consequently applies the executive powers to the act; this indeed is called active use, or the command of the will for acting.

(f) Finally, when the will has attained the good, it rests in it and enjoys it, and from this is born fruition, or joyful rest in the possessed end.

73. 2. Concerning commanded acts. For judging rightly concerning the liberty, and consequently concerning the morality, of these acts, it is of the greatest importance that it be defined over which faculties the will can command, and by what kind of command. For a twofold command is distinguished: one absolute, or despotic, which cannot be resisted; and another non-absolute (which was called political by the Scholastics), which we can resist.

(a) Now the will exercises no command over those apprehensions of the intellect which precede every volition; for example, it cannot prevent reason from perceiving the truth proposed to it; directly it does not influence the judgment which is made concerning a thing evidently true or false, but indirectly, insofar as affections of soul incline the judgment in some way toward that part which is more pleasing. - The intellect is subject to the free will as to application, insofar as it can be applied to this or that object, but not absolutely, as is clear from the wanderings of mind to which we are subject; and in some way as to adherence, when the truth is not evidently clear, for example, in the mysteries of faith; for then the will is able to command an assent firmer than the weight of the reasons which are brought forward deserves.¹

¹ It is clear from the condemnation by Innocent XI of this proposition: "The will cannot effect that the assent of faith in itself be firmer than the weight of the reasons impelling to assent deserves." (Denzing., n. 1036.)

74. (b) The will cannot exercise command over the first representations of imagination or recollections of memory, which moreover were not willed, nor over the first movements of the sensitive appetite (or of the passions); for all these things anticipate its act. But as to the other acts of these faculties, it is able to exercise some command; for it can excite phantasms, recollections, or passions, and on the contrary in some way restrain the movements of concupiscence, by commanding these faculties that they turn themselves aside to other objects. Often, however, phantasms, recollections, or movements of the passions return even against the command of the will: "But I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, which is in my members."¹

¹ Rom., VII, 23.

(c) Almost the same must be said concerning the external senses: they depend on the will as to application, or turning away from objects, but not as to sensation, or impression: for the senses are so disposed that sensation is produced whenever a sensible object strikes the organs; but from that sensation there necessarily follows some pleasure or sadness. Nevertheless, often the will, when there is place for deliberation, can indirectly prevent sensations and the movements following from them, by commanding the senses to turn themselves away from certain objects. But when pleasure or sadness has arisen, the will can freely consent or dissent.

75. (d) But the motive power of the external members of the body is subject to the command of the will almost absolutely, provided only that it is not impeded by some defect, such as paralysis, or by some extraordinary state, such as hypnotic sleep or diabolical obsession.

(e) Certain functions of vegetative life, such as nutrition, depend on the will only indirectly, insofar as, for example, it can command that this or that food be eaten; certain functions, however, such as respiration, are directed by the will; all are remotely subject to some command of the will, insofar as dispositions of soul, such as joy or sadness and other passions, influence not a little the exercise of these faculties.

All these things indeed must be kept before the eyes for judging rightly concerning the liberty and morality of acts which are more or less commanded by the will.

76. By reason of manifestation, human acts are merely internal, when they are performed by the powers of the soul without any exterior sign, such as thought, imagination, volition; external, when they are exercised through the external organs of the body, such as walking, inclination of the head, etc.; mixed, which are exercised by external and internal powers together, such as pious recitation of the rosary, devout genuflection, etc. - There are other divisions, concerning which we shall speak below in their own place.

77. When it is a question of a merely natural act, the internal principles which concur toward its production are the various faculties which are described in Psychology; if it is a question of a supernatural and meritorious act, there are required besides certain supernatural gifts, by which the faculties are completed and elevated; these are declared more fully in the treatise concerning Grace. Here it is sufficient to recall to memory those things which are more useful for the understanding of a free and meritorious act.

Although all the faculties of man concur in some way toward the production of a free act, nevertheless there are two which proximately produce it, namely the intellect and the will: the former knows the object, judges concerning its moral goodness or malice, and proposes it to the will: nothing is willed unless previously known; the latter pursues the good proposed by the intellect. - The other faculties indeed concur toward a free act, but only insofar as they are directed by the will, from what was said above, n. 73-75.

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 9-15; Suarez, op. cit., disp. VI, VIII; Billuart, diss. III. Confer the Philosophers, where they discuss Psychology.

78. That an act may be truly and in all respects free, cognition or advertence of mind ought to precede the election of the will; and the agent ought to advert to two things: the act itself as moral, and the various elements which can affect its morality: and the more perfect the cognition, the freer the act is, because the will elicits the act more freely the more lucidly the motives of acting are proposed to it.

1. The agent ought to be conscious of the action itself which he elicits, that this may be free; for since a free act is in the power of the one operating, the agent ought to be so disposed that he can posit or not posit the act, continue or interrupt it; but he cannot do this unless he is conscious that he is acting and performing such an act. Nor does it suffice that he advert to the material act itself, but it is required that he perceive its morality.

79. (a) By reason of the subject itself, advertence is full or semi-full: full, when nothing on the part of the intellect impedes the eliciting of the act of adverting, with that perfection which prudent persons are accustomed to employ in matters of some moment, for example, when someone, awake, in possession of himself, neither disturbed nor distracted, attends to a matter; - semi-full, or rather non-full, when something impedes the mind so that the act of adverting is not perfect, for example, when someone thinks about some matter while not yet fully aroused from sleep, or not fully in possession of himself, or distracted by other matters.

According to diverse advertence of mind, three kinds of acts are usually distinguished: first-first movements, or indeliberate ones, which precede all advertence, for example, the natural movement of aversion, anger, revenge when they are excited before they are adverted to; second-first movements, or semi-deliberate ones, of which we are conscious only imperfectly, because we are not fully awake, or are distracted in some way; second movements, or deliberate ones, which are elicited with full advertence, namely by one who is altogether in possession of himself and fully attends to the matter.

80. (b) By reason of the object, advertence is distinct, when the morality of the object is clearly perceived; confused, when it is apprehended only obscurely. Thus one who throws a stone from a window, foreseeing that from it a passing enemy will be wounded, distinctly adverts to the malice of this action; but if he does this, indeed suspecting that perhaps someone passing by can be wounded, but not knowing whether someone in fact is passing, he adverts only confusedly to the wounding of the neighbor. - This distinction indeed is of the greatest moment, since an effect only confusedly foreseen is much less imputable to the agent than one which is clearly perceived.¹

¹ Which Vieux Moraliste lucidly sets forth, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XX, 1898, p. 1025-30.

81. 2. That the agent may freely will all the circumstances of the act, he ought to advert to them; for since nothing is willed unless previously known, if in some object there are several moral elements which the agent does not perceive, he does not freely will the same. Thus if someone kills his father, thinking him to be a man hostile to himself, he is indeed guilty of homicide, but not of parricide, because, on account of darkness or another cause, he did not advert that this man was his father; if he kills him while hunting, thinking that what he saw was a wild animal, he is guilty neither of parricide nor of homicide.

Since a free act is directly elicited by the will, it remains to speak concerning volition itself, so that it may be better discerned when it is truly free.

82. 1. By reason of deliberation and adherence, volition, like cognition itself, is called perfect or imperfect, according as it is done with full or semi-full advertence, and at the same time with full or semi-full consent. Therefore in the voluntary, or free, there can be several degrees, according as cognition or volition is more or less perfect. Certain ones think that the perfection of volition depends on cognition alone; but others, whom we follow, judge that there are degrees in consent itself. For sometimes no consent is given, although advertence is full, as in the case of abulia, below, n. 128. Sometimes consent is semi-full, although advertence is full, as in the case of a habit already retracted, n. 125. At other times the will consents only reluctantly, under the influence of fear: thus a Christian who, from fear of death, externally denies the faith; or an official who, in order to preserve an office, reluctantly acts against conscience. In this case, if advertence is full, volition does not cease to be free, and indeed sufficiently full for committing mortal sin: for then the agent deliberately prefers a temporal and transitory good to a spiritual and eternal good, which is commanded under grave obligation. This is illustrated by a comparison: a merchant who, when a storm has arisen, throws his merchandise into the sea to save his life, does this indeed reluctantly, but nevertheless freely and efficaciously, because he places life before riches; thus one who consents to sin from fear acts freely, although reluctantly. - But at other times consent is given with the whole soul, with the whole heart. Therefore there are various degrees in consent itself.

83. 2. By reason of manifestation, volition is express, when it is distinctly declared externally by words or other signs; tacit, when consent is indeed elicited, but is not distinctly manifested, and is gathered to be present only from some fact or omission of fact: thus, if a superior, knowing that something is being done against the law, does not prohibit it when he easily can, he seems to consent. - From this was born the axiom: he who is silent seems to consent; it must be noted, however, that silence alone of itself does not signify consent, but that its sense is to be defined from the adjuncts, according to the rules which will be handed down in the whole course of the work.

From the voluntary or tacit consent there must carefully be distinguished the presumed voluntary, which someone in fact did not elicit, but would have elicited, if the matter had been proposed to him; for example, if in a particular case a positive law cannot be observed without grave inconvenience, the dispensation of the legislator can be presumed.

84. 3. By reason of the mode in which it is expressed, volition is positive, when it is terminated to some act; negative, when it consists in some omission; for example, a father who adverts that his son is stealing another's good, and does not impede it, negatively wills to cooperate in this theft. But this omission is truly free and imputable when someone can and is bound to act.

Here it can be noted that a voluntary omission can happen in manifold ways. If it is a question, for example, of hearing Mass: (a) someone can expressly say: I do not wish to hear Mass; (b) or choose an action incompatible with hearing Mass, for example, hunting; (c) or positively determine himself to elicit no act, whether of volition or nolition; (d) or behave altogether passively, as happens to those who are found in a state of indifference or abulia, as they say. In the first three ways, the omission is free; in the fourth, it is controverted: for abulia is a psychological disease, which often was voluntary in the cause, but greatly diminishes and sometimes removes liberty.

Other divisions of the voluntary or free, direct and indirect; actual, virtual, and habitual, will more opportunely be declared below.

85. Natural faculties, aided by divine concurrence, indeed suffice for eliciting an act naturally good, provided it is not too arduous;¹ but, since in fact we have been ordered to a supernatural end, it is useful to say certain things in passing concerning those principles which are superadded to our nature for making a meritorious act.

¹ What fallen man can and cannot do, without grace, as to ethically good works, was declared in the treatise concerning Grace, n. 33-48. - In the same treatise all those things which concur toward a meritorious act are set forth more fully.

1. The Christian, by receiving baptism, is constituted an adoptive son of God and heir of the heavenly kingdom, and receives a certain participation of the divine nature, namely habitual grace, by force of which human nature is elevated to the supernatural state, and radically becomes capable of acting meritoriously; at the same time virtues are infused into the powers of the soul, which perfect them and render them proximately apt for eliciting supernatural acts; to these are added the gifts of the Holy Spirit, for performing more perfect and more arduous works by a certain divine instinct. Finally, that our faculties, already adorned with supernatural virtues and gifts, may break forth into act and in fact elicit supernatural works, undeserved helps are provided to them, which are called actual graces. Thus in Christians nature is perfected by grace; faculties are completed by infused virtues and gifts; the concurrence by which God cooperates with our acts is supernatural; thus we are able to act not only honorably, but also supernaturally and meritoriously.

But when habitual grace and charity are lost by mortal sin, faith and hope remain in the soul, provided someone has not sinned gravely against these virtues; nor are actual graces denied to him, by whose aid he is able to elicit supernatural acts¹ of fear of God, hope, penance, and love, and to recover sanctifying grace.

¹ These acts of the sinner are indeed supernatural, but not meritorious de condigno, as is declared in the treatise concerning Grace.

86. 2. But infidels, who have not been justified by baptismal regeneration, receive at the opportune time undeserved helps, by whose aid they can fulfill the natural law. When for some time they have observed this law, God, according to the common opinion, kindly bestows on them, not from justice, but from mercy, certain actual graces of illumination; if they consent to these, they will be led step by step to faith, hope, charity, and justification; but once justified, they are equated with Christians, and can truly merit. - All these things indeed are set forth at length in the treatise concerning Grace.²

² Since in the present Treatise we are able to touch these things only in passing, the professor, according to various circumstances, will explain the same things more or less to his students.

87. After those things which we have set forth concerning the principles which produce a free act, it remains to inquire concerning the causes which influence the same, for increasing its liberty, or diminishing it, or wholly taking it away. Generally theologians treat only concerning the impediments of a free act, four of which are enumerated by St. Thomas: ignorance, concupiscence, violence, and fear. Yet elsewhere others are listed, concerning which it is useful to say a few things here, so that the confessor may be more equitable in judging the works of penitents. But we consider it more opportune here to treat not only concerning the impediments of liberty, but concerning the principal causes which influence it for diminishing or increasing it. Now certain causes influence the voluntary more proximately: 1. indeed directly in the intellect, and indirectly in the will, such as error and ignorance; 2. directly and principally in the will, such as the passions; 3. directly in the execution of volition, and indirectly in the intellect and will, such as violence. - But other causes influence the intellect and will more remotely, such as heredity and temperament, education, habit, and also certain morbid states affecting body or soul. Concerning these we must speak separately.

Since a free act depends on intellect and will, everything which affects either faculty by that very fact can benefit or harm liberty.

88. There are certain dispositions of mind and body in which man is not in possession of himself, and concerning which nothing special occurs to be said here, namely: the defect of reason in infants; but in adults, insanity whether total or partial (monomania), sleep whether full or semi-full, drunkenness, hallucination, diabolical obsession. In all these, if the use of reason is wholly lacking, liberty will be lacking; if some advertence remains, the act will be more or less free according to the very degree of cognition. - But since ignorance and error much more frequently influence human acts, these must be treated especially.

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 76; Suarez, disp. IV; Salmanticenses, op. cit., cap. XIV; St. Alphonsus, De act. hum., n. 26-29; Billuart, diss. I, art. 9; Bouquillon, n. 332-334; Ballerini P., n. 35-58; Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du clerge, XX, 1898, p. 1153-1161; Didiot, Morale surnaturelle Fondamentale, n. 383-432.

89. (A) Notion. Ignorance in general is the lack of some knowledge in a subject otherwise capable; it is called negative, or simple nescience, when it is the lack of knowledge which we are not bound to acquire, for example, ignorance of medicine in a rustic; it is called privative if it is the lack of due knowledge, as is ignorance of theology in a priest; concerning the latter we treat here.

Ignorance differs from error, which, beyond the lack of knowledge, involves a judgment contrary to truth, as if someone thinks hatred of enemies to be something honorable. It differs also from inadvertence, which consists in this, that the mind does not actually attend to a matter, although it habitually knows it, as occurs in distractions: consequently inadvertence is the lack of actual attention, while ignorance denotes a habitual state. - But, in moral matters, the principles which we shall hand down concerning ignorance can be applied to error, forgetfulness, and inadvertence, with this distinction however, that inadvertence is more easily excused because of the weakness of the human mind.

90. (B) Division. (a) By reason of the object, ignorance is twofold: ignorance of law, when the law itself is unknown, for example if someone does not know that on the vigil of the Assumption fasting must be observed; and ignorance of fact, when someone does not know that the law, otherwise known, must be applied in the case, because, for example, he does not advert that this day is the vigil of the Assumption.¹

¹ Certain ones besides admit ignorance of the penalty attached to the delict, for example, if someone does not know that the reading of a book defending heresy is punished by excommunication: but this can be referred to ignorance of law.

91. (b) By reason of the subject, ignorance is: 1) vincible, and therefore culpable, when with moral diligence applied it can and ought to be driven away. The moral diligence of which there is question is not the highest diligence, but that which prudent persons are accustomed to apply in matters of this kind: for this ought to be diverse according to the various circumstances of person, thing, place, etc., nor can it be defined mathematically, but morally from the manner of acting of prudent persons in the same adjuncts. - Moreover, ignorance is not morally called vincible unless when the agent notices or at least suspects the obligation of putting it away, and voluntarily lets go the occasion of inquiring: for of what is unknown there is no desire.

Therefore there can be degrees in vincible ignorance; if someone deliberately wills ignorance, so that he may more freely violate the law, if perhaps it exists, this is called affected ignorance; for example, if someone doubting whether today one must fast does not wish to ask, although he easily can, lest perhaps he become conscious of the obligation of fasting. - But when someone omits due inquiry, not because he wishes to be ignorant of the matter, but from negligence, shame, lightness of soul, or another similar cause, the ignorance is called simply vincible; if no diligence or almost none has been applied, it is called crass or supine.

92. 2. Ignorance is called invincible, and therefore inculpable, when, with moral diligence applied, it cannot be expelled, and a fortiori that which is so rooted that not even a suspicion of inquiring arises. If knowledge could in no way have been acquired, the ignorance is absolutely invincible (concerning which, however, there is scarcely question in moral matters); if it could be put away only with difficulty and with extraordinary diligence, it is morally invincible. - Now that today there are many who labor under this ignorance in religious and moral matters, not only among rustics, but also among men otherwise learned in profane matters, those who have given labor to the sacred ministry for some time know very well. And this ignorance indeed is occupied not only with merely positive laws, ecclesiastical or divine, but also with the secondary principles of natural right.

93. (C) Another division, although of lesser moment, is found among theologians, namely into antecedent, concomitant, and consequent ignorance; this, however, is not opposed in its members, but is taken in a diverse way.

1. By reason of the work concerning which it is occupied, ignorance is antecedent when it is truly the cause of the work, so that the agent would not posit the action if he knew the truth; thus the hunter who kills a friend whom he thinks to be a wild animal, and certainly would not have killed him if he had known him to be a friend; - concomitant, when it is not the cause of the work, because the one operating is so disposed that he would posit the action even if he knew the matter: such is the hunter who kills an enemy whom he thinks to be a wild animal, but otherwise would have killed him if he had known.

2. By reason of the will, ignorance is antecedent when it precedes every act of the will, and therefore is altogether invincible, as is ignorance of fasting in him who by no means thinks of fasting; consequent, which is in some way willed, and consequently vincible, as it exists in him who, thinking about fasting, neglects to inquire concerning it, when he easily can.

94. (A) Ignorance morally invincible, whether actually or in the cause, removes the free, and therefore imputability, concerning that which is unknown. For, by force of the principle that nothing is willed unless previously known, we do not freely will that which we do not know; but that which is invincibly unknown is not known in itself, as is clear, nor even in the cause, since the ignorance is supposed to be invincible, and consequently cannot morally be dispelled.¹

¹ What is voluntary in itself and in the cause, and also imputability (responsabilite), will be set forth more fully where the morality of human acts is treated.

It is said concerning that which is unknown; for it can happen that the one operating perceives some morality of the act, although not the whole: thus one who kills an innocent person whom he does not know to be a priest is not indeed guilty of sacrilege, but of homicide, because he knowingly killed a man unjustly.

On this head, often children and the rude, who do dishonorable things, whose malice they do not well understand, are excused more or less from grave sin according to the degree of ignorance.

95. (B) Ignorance actually vincible does not remove the free, but diminishes it, at least if it is not affected. - It is said actually vincible, that it may be distinguished from ignorance which formerly was vincible, although here and now it is invincible.

(a) The reason for the former is that vincible ignorance, as is clear from the notion itself, supposes at least some cognition or thought concerning the obligation of inquiring; now he who neglects to inquire, when he is bound to do so, by that very fact freely intends, at least confusedly, the effects which are foreseen to follow from his action. Thus, if a hunter discharges a gun at some object, not knowing whether it is a wild animal or a man, he rather freely consents to homicide; if he thinks it is a wild animal, while suspecting it to be a man, he consents less freely, but nevertheless in some degree.

96. (b) The reason for the latter is that something is less free the less knowledge there is of it; but, in our case, there is only confused or probable knowledge, or even mere suspicion; therefore the free and the fault are diminished, and indeed the more so the less the cognition is.

It has been said at least if it is not affected; for more commonly theologians, after St. Thomas,¹ hold that affected ignorance does not diminish, but increases sin, since the agent intends to sin more freely. Yet some deny this with Lugo,² because, they say, it is worse to violate a known precept than not to wish to know it in order that it may be violated without remorse: for something of reverence and fear is shown in the second case. - In practice, the matter depends on the intention of the agent at that instant when he does not wish to inquire: if in reality he intends nothing except to sin more freely and boldly, his culpability is not diminished; but if he neglects to inquire from a certain reverence toward the law, which he fears to violate, the fault is diminished.

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 76, a. 4.

² Lugo, De Paenitentia, disp. XVI, n. 183.

97. (C) Ignorance here and now invincible, which nevertheless formerly was vincible, indeed removes the actual free and the free in itself, but leaves the voluntary in the cause.

For it can happen that ignorance was formerly vincible and culpable, without nevertheless being adverted to here and now; suppose, if a confessor has not sufficiently cultivated theology, or has for a long time and culpably interrupted the study of it, he can hand down an erroneous decision to a penitent, without being conscious of this error. In this case he is not free, nor does he incur sin at that instant in which he inadvertently deceives the penitent; but if, while he was studying theology, he was conscious of omitted diligence and foresaw, at least in a confused way, the evil effects that would follow from negligence, by that very fact he willed those effects, more or less freely and culpably according to the degree of cognition; and thus those effects are not actually and in themselves free, but only in the cause.

Hence, if someone has retracted the fault of ignorance formerly committed, by suitable penance and due diligence, he can be equated with one who labors under invincible ignorance.¹ Nevertheless, if even after penance he is ignorant of those things which are necessary for undertaking his office,² he ought to abstain from exercising it until he has acquired the necessary knowledge; for by freely exercising an office without competent knowledge, he would commit a new sin.

¹ Gury-Ballerini, t. I, note to n. 37; Bouquillon, nn. 277, 333.

² Here it is a question of competent knowledge, not of eminent knowledge, which is found in the most learned; the confessor, judge, physician, etc., who possess the former and use proportionate diligence, can exercise the office without fault, even if sometimes they err.

98. Corollary. Since the will is freer the more perfect cognition is, it is of the greatest interest to acquire true knowledge, especially of those things which are useful for living honorably and religiously. But because knowledge influences the will the more as it occurs more vividly to the agent, frequent reconsideration or meditation of noble things serves not a little for living rightly; for since the will is blind and is illuminated only by the intellect, he who thinks rightly is inclined to acting rightly; and by frequent meditation of honorable things the custom of living honorably is gradually formed.³ It is likewise very expedient to think seriously concerning the morality of the act in itself and in its effects before we act, so that, with all things carefully weighed, we may choose what is better.

³ Not only mystics, but also rationalists and positivists have recognized this utility of meditation, such as J. Payot, Education de la volonte, Paris, 1904, p. 92-134, and Fouillee, in the cited work, Les idees-forces.

The internal causes which principally move the will are the passions: they indeed influence the intellect, by disturbing the judgment more or less, but besides and especially they add to or diminish the powers of the will, by vehemently impelling it toward good or evil.

⁴ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 22-48; q. 6, a. 6-8; Suarez, disp. III; Senault, De l'usage des Passions, Paris, 1664; Billuart, Tr. de Passionibus, diss. I; idem, De Actibus hum., diss. I, art. 7-8; Meyer, I, n. 119-129; Bouquillon, n. 335-343; Alibert, Physiologie des Passions, Paris, 1827; Letourneau, Physiologie des Passions, Paris, 1868; Belouino, Des Passions, Paris, 1883; A. Bain, The Emotions and the Will, rendered into French by P. Le Monnier, Les Emotions et la volonte, Paris, 1885; Mercier, Psychologie, 6th ed., Louvain, 1904, n. 134-137; Ribot, La psychologie des sentiments, Paris, Alcan.

99. 1. Notion and division of the passions. (A) In a broad sense, passions are called any affections whatsoever of the soul, even merely internal ones. Among the common people, passion denotes any inordinate or excessive propensity of the will: in which sense avarice is called a passion.¹ Philosophically, passions commonly are called affections of the soul which arise from the sensitive appetite with some organic commotion of the body; thus love, hatred, anger, etc., move not only the sensitive appetite, but also the body; for example, the heart is dilated by joy, contracted by sadness.

¹ Certain modern philosophers make this notion their own, such as Rabier, Psychologie, 6th ed., Paris, 1898, p. 516.

100. Concerning the division of the passions, which by many moderns are also called emotions, philosophers do not agree.

The more common division is that which St. Thomas hands down, after Aristotle. Eleven are distinguished, six of which look to the concupiscible appetite and pursue delight: love and hatred, desire (or concupiscence) and horror or flight, joy and sadness; but five are referred to the irascible appetite, which tend toward arduous good and toward battle against obstacles: hope and despair, daring and fear (or dread), and also anger, to which there is no contrary.

The reason of the division is this: in man, as in animals, there are two kinds of inclinations, by which we are moved toward sensible good, according as it is simply delightful or arduous. By the concupiscible appetite we tend toward good insofar as it is delightful; namely by love we are inclined toward good, abstracting from whether it is present or absent; by desire we pursue good insofar as absent, and by joy we are delighted in present good; on the contrary, by hatred we absolutely turn away from evil, by horror we flee absent evil, and by sadness we grieve over present evil. But when it is a question of sensible arduous good, which we are able to attain only with strenuous effort, by the irascible appetite we pursue it: if the good, although arduous, is possible to obtain, hope arises; if it appears impossible, despair is born; if it is a question of future evil easily to be fled, daring arises; but if it appears difficult to repel, fear creeps in; finally if a present evil pressing for vengeance is present, anger blazes forth.

Bossuet shows brilliantly how all passions proceed from love and are caused from love;¹ St. Thomas and St. Augustine had already gone before him; for the latter says:² "Love longing to have what is loved is cupidity; but having this and enjoying it is gladness; fleeing what is adverse to it is fear; and feeling it if it should happen is sadness."

¹ Bossuet, Connaissance de Dieu et de soi-meme, ch. I, n. 6.

² St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, lib. XIV, c. 7, apud Migne, P.L. XLI, 410.

101. Other divisions have been proposed by moderns, without nevertheless explaining the matter more clearly. Thus Descartes³ lists six original passions: admiration, love, hatred, desire, joy, and gladness. According to Hume,⁴ there are two species of passions: some direct: desire, aversion, sadness, joy, hope, fear, despair, and security; others indirect: pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, commiseration, malice, generosity. According to Ribot,⁵ there are five original ones, namely fear, anger, sensitive love (tendresse), love of oneself, sexual love: from which others are derived by a certain evolution.⁶

³ Descartes, Les passions de l'ame, 2nd part.

⁴ Hume, Tr. on human nature, B. II, p. I, sect. I.

⁵ Ribot, La psychologie des sentiments, Introduction.

⁶ Other divisions are set forth apud A. Bain, op. cit., pp. 68-75 and 568-581.

102. (B) In moral matters, a careful distinction must be made between voluntary and non-voluntary passions. (a) They can be voluntary in a diverse degree: directly and in themselves, 1) when they are deliberately excited, 2) when, having arisen spontaneously, they are freely admitted, 3) when they redound from a vehement voluntary affection; - sometimes they are indeed actually voluntary, but only indirectly, as if someone reads a book from mere curiosity, foreseeing that evil thoughts will arise from it; sometimes they are previously voluntary, but not actually, namely because the cause formerly freely posited has been retracted. (b) They are called involuntary when neither formerly nor actually, neither in themselves nor in the cause, were they willed, but they arise spontaneously either from a fortuitous occasion or from a disposition of the body, without deliberation and consent.

According to the manner of speaking of theologians, passions are called antecedent when they precede the will and allure it to the act; consequent, when they are excited by the will itself, and therefore follow the consent of the will.

103. 2. The influence of the passions on a free act.⁷ (A) Antecedent passion indeed increases the intensity of the act, but diminishes the free, and sometimes takes it away.

⁷ Concerning this theologians discuss where they treat of concupiscence; for often by this name they designate all the passions of the concupiscible appetite.

(a) The reason for the first assertion is that, under the influence of passion, we apprehend sensible good more vividly, so that it appears greater than before, and our will is borne toward it with a more vehement propensity, as each one can gather from an attentive consideration of himself.

(b) But from this the free is diminished; for liberty is less the more reason is impeded from deliberating quietly and wisely, and the more the will is inclined toward one part; but the antecedent movement of passion more or less disturbs reason and impedes it from considering opposed motives attentively and perseveringly; it also vehemently solicits the will to consenting, and while it increases the powers for pursuing the proposed good, it diminishes not a little the force of resisting.¹ This indeed is established psychologically from the fact that, when the movement of passion has been calmed, the matter is now perceived by reason in a diverse way, and often the will vehemently grieves concerning the consent given.

¹ Which St. James (I, 14) indicates: "But everyone is tempted by his own concupiscence, drawn away and allured."

(c) Indeed sometimes, although rarely, passion is so vehement that it wholly disturbs the mind and impedes the judgment of reason concerning the morality of the act: then the agent is not properly in possession of himself, but for some time is, as it were, insane. Now where no deliberation is present, the action is not truly free.² Thus especially in those who suffer from hysteria, as will be said below, or who are inflamed by anger vehemently.

² "If concupiscence totally took away cognition, as happens in those who become mad because of concupiscence, it would follow that concupiscence would take away the voluntary." (St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 6, a. 7, ad 3.)

Usually, however, passion does not wholly take away the use of reason; and then liberty is only diminished. Wherefore, in practice, if penitents say that they could not resist a vehement passion, they must be asked whether they employed means or not for conquering it, and from all the adjuncts it will be judged whether and to what extent they were free and culpable.

104. (B) Consequent passion, which arises from the command of the will, does not diminish the free, but is a sign of intense volition.

(a) The reason for the former is that the passion was freely willed; for example, if someone deliberately recalls an injury done to him so that from this he may conceive anger, he now freely wills to consent to anger.

(b) Indeed such a manner of acting is a sign of intense volition; for someone excites passion in himself for this reason, that he may attain the intended object more efficaciously and vehemently.

Nevertheless it can happen that, once a vehement passion has been excited, the agent is less in possession of himself and proceeds further than he had previously foreseen, for example, that he kills one whom he wished to wound; in which case the aforesaid passion, insofar as it moves to acts not foreseen nor intended, can be called, as it were, antecedent in relation to those acts.

105. Especially concerning fear. (A) Among the passions which disturb the mind and lessen the powers of the will, fear is deservedly numbered; but in moral matters fear is not only a passion, but also a certain spiritual affection, which is customarily defined as trepidation of mind, by reason of an impending or future danger. It arises indeed from the apprehension of an evil perceived by the intellect, but it affects the will, and indeed in a twofold way: it depresses its powers, and at the same time moves it to flee strenuously the imminent evil;¹ wherefore the will, under the influence of fear, often chooses what otherwise it would not have willed; thus a sailor, from fear of shipwreck, casts into the sea those things which otherwise he would have wished to preserve; a sick man, on account of fear of death, chooses the amputation of an arm, although reluctantly.

¹ A. Bain describes the psychological notion, nature, and effects of fear, Les emotions et la volonte, p. 147-167.

By reason of intensity, fear is grave or light, according as it disturbs the mind much or not. Generally for grave fear two things are required: apprehension of a grave evil, with a truly probable danger of incurring it; for we do not greatly fear evils which are possible, but not probable. Nevertheless, for judging concerning the gravity of fear, attention must also be given to the character of the person; for evils which move one person only lightly can gravely disturb another; whence in moral matters fear absolutely grave is distinguished, which can seriously disturb even a strong and constant man, such as fear of death or exile; and fear relatively grave, which, all circumstances of sex, age, character, etc. being considered,

can gravely disturb the person concerning whom there is question. Hence also reverential fear, by which the indignation of parents or superiors is feared, can sometimes be judged grave from the adjuncts. - By reason of influence on the act, fear is called antecedent when it truly is the cause of the act, which consequently is elicited from fear; or concomitant, which is not the cause of the action but nevertheless coexists with it, so that this is done with fear. Thus a traveler who gives his purse to a robber acts from fear of death; but a robber who despoils a traveler sometimes acts with fear lest he be seized by guards.

106. (B) Concerning the influence of fear on a free act. (a) Fear which is so vehement that it altogether disturbs the use of reason takes away the free. For where there is no deliberation on the part of the intellect, there is no liberty; but he who is so vehemently disturbed acts not deliberately but under the influence of a vivid impression. - Yet this rarely happens; for generally fear does not take away every faculty of deliberating, but only impedes it somewhat.

(b) An act posited from fear, even grave fear, does not take away the free, but ordinarily diminishes it. For one operating from fear deliberately chooses the action as a means for avoiding a greater evil and therefore truly wills what he does, although he retains affection toward the opposite; thus the merchant who, from fear of death, throws goods overboard does this freely, although reluctantly, because he deliberately places life before riches.¹

¹ But when fear excuses from the obligation of observing the law and from sin will be declared below, where we treat concerning Sins, concerning Faith, concerning Contracts, concerning Marriage, etc.

Nevertheless fear diminishes liberty, and indeed the more so the graver it is; for it diminishes the indifference of the will, and moves it toward eliciting what otherwise it would not have chosen. - It is said ordinarily, because sometimes an act begun from grave fear is completed without any repugnance; for example, someone can, from fear of hell, withdraw from an occasion of sin, and afterward altogether freely detest sin.

(c) Light fear, whether in itself or relatively, indeed diminishes the free, but much less than grave fear, since it by no means impedes the use of reason and deliberation; wherefore in the external forum it is not attended to, because a little is reputed as nothing.

107. Concerning the right use of the passions.¹ The passions, considered in themselves, bear nothing dishonorable before them, since they arise from man's sensitive-rational nature, namely from the intimate union of the organic body with the spiritual soul, and moreover were placed in us by the author of nature Himself; in reality they add powers and constancy to human activity, so that a man wholly deprived of these appears, as it were, unarmed, and given over to apathy. Often, however, when they are not rightly ordered, they allure us to sin, against the dictate of reason. Wherefore no less faith than reason commands us to conquer them and subject them to the command of the will: "But they who are Christ's have crucified their flesh with its vices and concupiscences; if we live by the spirit, let us also walk by the spirit."² For since reason excels the body and the sensible appetite, the passions ought to obey reason.

¹ Mystics discuss this matter, such as Schram, Instit. Theologiae mysticae, Paris, 1868, t. I, § 90; and also philosophers, such as Payot, L'education de la volonte, p. 66-108, where he, although a positivist, borrows not a few things from Catholic ascetics; also physicians, such as Descuret, La medecine des passions, 3rd ed., Paris, 1860; and Surbled, La Morale dans ses rapports avec la Medecine, t. III, p. 16-56.

² Galat., V, 24-25.

But the means by which we can rightly order the passions are: (a) immediately and strenuously to turn the mind away from the delightful object which sense or imagination proposes to us, and indeed not only negatively, but also positively, by thinking attentively about an honorable thing and by revolving in the soul those motives of a superior order which dissuade us from dishonorable delights.³ (b) Carefully to abstain from external acts to which passion provokes, and to exercise contrary acts: for since internal acts of the same kind are excited through external acts, he who externally behaves lasciviously indulges lust much more easily than he who cultivates modesty.⁴ (c) To flee external occasions which, from what commonly happens, are accustomed to move the passions;¹ thus the irascible ought to be silent concerning those matters by which they are more easily and vehemently provoked to anger. (d) Finally, the best means is to order the passions to better goods: for since they add powers to the will, the will will profit much if it uses them for pursuing good strenuously. Thus those who are more easily captured by sensible love should turn themselves to Christ, hiding under the Eucharistic species, and sweetly recline in His bosom; let the ambitious promote the glory of God and the salvation of souls with flaming zeal; let the fearful fear not men and their vain judgments, but "Him who can destroy both soul and body in hell";² and thus let them prudently flee occasions of sin; let the daring cultivate fortitude; let envy be turned into noble emulation; sadness into penance, and so concerning the rest.

³ To the point even the agnostic Payot, op. cit., p. 87: "One must even often renounce direct struggle, and for example calm sensual disturbance by getting up, by going out to walk, by going to pay a visit, etc.; in a word, by trying to eliminate the fixed idea, to wear it out, to disturb it, or at least to oblige it to share consciousness with other states introduced thus artificially."

⁴ Payot illustrates this thus, op. cit., p. 80: "A desire, a tendency, are absolutely separated from the external world; they can be satisfied only by muscular acts: anger satisfies itself by insults or blows; love by embraces, kisses, caresses; but our muscles depend in large measure on our will: and since we all can momentarily refuse the ministry of our members to a passion, it is clear that we will be able to develop our power and succeed in burying the emotion within ourselves."

¹ More fully concerning these in the moral part of the treatise concerning Penance, n. 451-469.

² Matt., X, 28. - Cf. Feuchtersleben, Hygiene de l'ame, Paris, 1904, p. 188-247; Senault, op. cit., p. 132-140.

108. 1. Notion. Besides the causes which act upon the intellect and will, there are those which directly impede the execution of volition and indirectly influence the will itself: such is violence, which is defined as a certain motion impressed from without against the inclination of the will.⁴ This is physical violence, and is distinguished from moral violence, which consists in threats, reproaches, and other things of this kind, and falls back into fear: for from these threats arises trepidation of mind. From this it is clear that violence does not properly coerce the will, but falls only upon those acts which can be commanded by the will. Nevertheless it can indirectly influence consent, insofar as the external act which the agent is forced to effect solicits the consent of the will. Thus, if someone is forced to drink sweet and generous wine, he experiences sensible delight, to which the will is in some way inclined to consent; thus a woman, oppressed by force, falls into the danger of consenting interiorly to pleasure.

³ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 6, a. 4-5; Suarez, De voluntario, disp. II; Salmanticenses, De volunt. et involunt., disp. V; Billuart, diss. 1, art. 5-6; Frins, De actibus hum., n. 247-280; Bouquillon, n. 344-346; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 67-72.

⁴ A few indeed say that violence is present whenever imagination experiences base phantasms, or the appetite suffers movements of inordinate concupiscence, against the inclination of the will; but all these things are better called first-first acts, concerning which above, n. 79.

109. 2. Concerning the influence of violence on free acts. When violence is done to someone, his will can have itself in a diverse way.

(A) If he resists internally and externally, as much as he morally can, the violence is called absolute, and the act so perpetrated is in no way free, nor consequently imputable: such is he whose knees by external force are bent before an idol, and whose hands are moved to offering incense to false gods, against his inclination; or he who is violently forced to sign a contract or testament, against his assent.

110. (B) But if the agent indeed resists externally the force brought upon him, but inwardly consents, the free indeed is diminished, but of itself is not removed.

(a) The free is diminished, for in such a case the mind cannot deliberate quietly, nor is the will left to its own indifference, but is allured to giving consent, and indeed the more vehemently the more vividly the delight is felt which, as it were necessarily, accompanies the external act; whence liberty and imputability are much diminished; such is the case of a woman to whom force is brought.

(b) Yet it is not removed of itself; for, even if the will is powerfully allured, and the mind cannot deliberate so easily, nevertheless, provided the exercise of reason is not wholly impeded, the will can dissent, as St. Anselm¹ excellently notes: "A man can be bound unwillingly, because he can be bound when he is unwilling; he can be tortured... but he cannot will unwillingly, because he cannot will when he is unwilling to will; for everyone willing wills his own willing."

¹ St. Anselm, De lib. arb., c. 5.

111. (C) If the agent outwardly behaves altogether passively, neither consenting nor resisting, although inwardly dissenting, he freely permits the external act, which consequently is imputed to him whenever there is an obligation of resisting.

It can indeed happen that there is an obligation also of resisting externally, whether on account of scandal to be prevented, for example in the cause of faith, or in order to remove an interior danger of consenting, as in the matter of chastity; in which case it is not lawful to behave permissively, as is clear. But if no obligation of this kind is present, external resistance can be judged useless, and therefore not imputable. Wherefore from all the circumstances it must be judged whether the agent has sinned or not.

In practice, when the delight which accompanies the external act is vehement, the obligation falls upon one of resisting externally, insofar as it can be done, lest the will, allured by pleasure, consent interiorly.

The principal ones are: 1. heredity and temperament; 2. education; 3. habit; 4. certain pathological states, in which the exercise of liberty is diminished or removed.

We comprehend these two together, because what is called temperament is often handed down from the parents themselves, by force of heredity.

112. (A) The facts are set forth. All admit that certain propensions are transmitted by heredity, and there is controversy only concerning the extension of this law.

¹ Theologians have few things concerning this matter, especially where they treat concerning the transmission of original sin; thus St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 81, a. 1; among moderns, cf. Ribot, L'hérédité psychologique, 4th ed., Paris, 1890; M. Guyau, Education et hérédité, 4th ed., Paris, 1895; P. Vallet, La vie et l'hérédité, Paris, 1891.

Now, although many things concerning this matter are uncertain, generally propensions are handed down more easily and more efficaciously the more nearly they depend upon the organism; thus physical diseases or defects and also bodily qualities are frequently transmitted to descendants, so that certain families are marked for several centuries by certain anatomical and physiological characters;² in almost the same way, although not so efficaciously, certain sensitive faculties are handed down, such as keenness in sight, a ready memory, etc.¹ - Mental aptitudes also not rarely pass by heredity from parents to children, although less frequently, such as a special ability for musical art, or for solving mathematical problems.² - As regards moral propensions, it seems certain that certain ones likewise are transfused into children, especially those which depend more upon the organism, such as inclinations to anger, drunkenness, vices of the flesh, etc.; in reality, in most regions, examples are alleged of families in which certain virtues or vices were transmitted through many generations.³

² You have examples in Ribot, p. 3-14; P. Lucas, Traité philosophique et physiologique de l'hérédité naturelle, Paris, 1847-1850.

¹ Cf. Ribot, p. 38-64; Darwin, The descent of man; in French: La descendance de l'homme; H. Spencer, Principles of Biology, § 82; in French: Principes de Biologie, Paris, Alcan.

² Ribot, p. 65-85; Galton, Hereditary genius, London, 1869.

³ Ribot, p. 86-102; Aubry, La contagion du meurtre, 2nd ed., Paris, 1894, p. 17-51; R. L. Dugdale, The Jukes, New York, where through five generations the history is described of an American family, almost all of whose members publicly indulged in vice.

113. Both parents concur in this transmission of qualities or defects, though not in the same degree: not rarely sons receive the endowments of the mother by heredity, while daughters receive the propensions of the father; nevertheless, for the most part the inclinations of the offspring are tempered by a certain, as it were, mixture of the qualities of each parent. Sometimes also hereditary transmission is not immediate, but mediate, namely from grandparents to grandchildren; in which case it is called atavism.⁴

⁴ Ribot expounds the laws of hereditary transmission known hitherto, p. 157-262.

It is indeed easily understood how physical endowments are handed down together with bodily substance and blood; but others pass into offspring mediately, on account of the intimate and substantial union of body and soul, from which it happens that the physical organism, and especially the nerves and brain, have the greatest influence upon the senses both external and internal, and, through the mediation of the senses, upon the intellect and will.⁵

⁵ St. Thomas declares this, Ia, q. 118, a. 1-2 and q. 119, a. 1-2, ad 2, where among other things he has these words: "The assimilation of the generator to the generated does not take place on account of matter, but on account of the form of the agent, which generates something like itself. Whence it is not necessary, in order that someone be assimilated to his grandfather, that the bodily matter of the seed have been in the grandfather, but that there be in the seed some power derived from the grandfather through the mediation of the father." And elsewhere, Quaest. disp., De Pot., q. III, a. 9, ad 7: "It must be said that the very disposition of the body is followed by the disposition of the rational soul, both because the rational soul receives from the body, and because according to the diversity of matter forms also are diversified." Cf. P. Vallet, op. cit., p. 315-334. - Ribot lists and weighs various hypotheses for explaining hereditary transmission, p. 385-409.

114. (B) Concerning the influence of heredity on liberty. (a) Not a few modern determinists contend that by the law of heredity liberty is destroyed: for, on the one hand, propensions are handed down into children without their consent, and on the other hand, it is morally impossible to resist these; to prove this, they bring forward certain examples of families in which vice seems to have been hereditary through several generations.

Yet this is opposed no less to historical facts than to the testimony of conscience. We indeed admit that free will is diminished by hereditary propensions, insofar as reason is darkened by them and the power of the will is in some way weakened, according as we have said concerning the passions to which hereditary inclinations can be assimilated. Nor do we deny that sometimes from vicious parents a certain species of madness is handed down, which wholly takes away liberty. But as often as the use of reason remains, by that very fact there remains the power of deliberating and choosing. This is evident historically; for, even in those families which seem given over to vice, children are found who live rightly,¹ especially when they have obtained a good education; while conversely among very honorable families there are found children who act basely. - Besides, even when propensions of this kind press urgently, some consent to them, while others resist them; indeed one and the same man sometimes allows himself to be overcome, but at other times strenuously resists; therefore even psychologically it is evident that liberty is not wholly extinguished.²

¹ You have examples in Aubry, op. cit., pp. 42, 48, 50.

² Ribot admits this (op. cit., p. 324), at least for many cases: "The first case is that in which inherited tendencies do not have an irresistible character. Man, inheriting modes of feeling and thinking from his fathers, is solicited to will and consequently to act as they did. This heredity of impulses and tendencies constitutes for him an order of internal influences in the midst of which he lives, but which he has the faculty of judging and conquering. They no more entail than other internal or external circumstances the suppression, the annihilation of the personal factor (whatever its nature may be), the irresistible necessity of acts." - Afterward, however, he adds that in certain cases those propensions are irresistible; yet this does not occur except when the exercise of reason is suspended. - Cf. Guyau, op. cit., pp. 16-32 and 70-80, where he shows that hereditary propensions can be reformed through education.

115. (b) Nevertheless, since liberty is attenuated by these things and is inclined toward evil, those who have received depraved inclinations from their parents are to be received with great kindness, and gently exhorted that by diligent and constant effort they strive to conquer them, using the means described above, where we treated concerning the passions. - Moreover, where it is a question of the choice of a state of life which requires special virtues, directors of souls ought to attend to these propensions; thus the Church does not readily enroll illegitimate sons in the priesthood, lest they imitate paternal incontinence; the same can be said of the sons of drunkards, who not rarely are vehemently inclined to drunkenness.

116. (A) Notion. The complex of those propensions which, whether from heredity or from the organism proper to each one, belong to some individual and constitute his special disposition is called temperament. But native dispositions of this kind are in some way changed by education, external circumstances, and one's own efforts. From this arises character, or the complex of native propensions insofar as they have been changed by education or by one's own will, and have acquired some stability. - Sometimes, however, temperament and character are taken promiscuously.²

¹ As regards ancient systems, cf. Debreyne-Ferrand, La Théologie morale et les sciences médicales, Paris, 1884, p. 9-46; as regards new systems, cf. Fouillée, Tempérament et Caractères, Paris, 1895; Paulhan, Les Caractères, 2nd ed., Paris, 1902; Malapert, Les éléments du caractère et leurs lois de combinaison, Paris, 1897; E. Ledos, Traité de la Physionomie humaine, 2nd ed., Paris, 1904, t. I, p. 85-161.

² Not rarely also temperament designates something physiological, and character something psychological.

Physiologists and moralists by no means agree concerning the species of temperaments. Formerly four were distinguished, according to the four principal elements of the human body, namely: the sanguine, in which the sanguine system prevailed; the nervous, where the nerves dominated; the bilious, in which bile had more force; the lymphatic, or phlegmatic, where the watery part of the blood principally existed. But modern physiology has rejected this division, as lacking a foundation; hitherto, however, no other scientific foundation could be found.

117. Yet commonly enough four principal temperaments are distinguished, which, as regards psychological marks, very nearly approach the division given above. For among men, some are more sensitive, because they feel more vividly, and others more active, because they react more vehemently to sensations. Again, among the former, some excel by abundance of blood, others by organization of the nerves; among the latter, some act more promptly and intensely, as the choleric, others only slowly and weakly, as the phlegmatic. Therefore four temperaments are distinguished:¹

¹ Thus Fouillée, op. cit., p. 3-80; Paulhan proposes another division, op. cit.

(a) Those who are sensitive and sanguine feel promptly and vividly, but not intensely and perseveringly; wherefore they are very unstable; they easily sin and conceive contrition, but, forgetful of promises, soon fall into sin. Among these are numbered Mark Antony, Louis XIV, Mirabeau, etc.

(b) Those who are sensitive and nervous feel much more intensely and lastingly; therefore in them the passions, whether they are ordered to good or to evil, are much more vehement; and thus their moral character depends especially upon the object toward which they turn themselves; they likewise have some instability, arising from the various emotions to which they are given: such were Voltaire and Frederick, king of Prussia. Sometimes they become melancholic, when they cannot attain the ideal perfection which they pursue: thus Pascal.

(c) The choleric act not only intensely but perseveringly and with the greatest force; they are ambitious, they wish to dominate others and to obtain glory in whatever way: such were Caesar, Cromwell, Napoleon.

(d) The phlegmatic act more coldly and slowly, but with great strength and unconquered constancy; thus many Dutchmen, but especially, among them, William, duke of Holland, who became king of England.

These four kinds, however, are often found mixed in one and the same individual, and indeed in various degrees.

118. (B) The influence of temperament on liberty. Concerning this Aquinas had already said:² "The soul rules the body and resists the passions which follow temperament; for from temperament some are more apt than others for concupiscences or angers; yet they abstain from them more, on account of something restraining them, as is clear in the continent." - In reality it is historically evident that there were not a few who, by temperament prone to anger, became most gentle, as St. Francis de Sales; others, inclined to ambition, became humble and full of zeal for souls, as is clear in the example of St. Francis Xavier. - This is proved no less evidently by experience; for one and the same man often acts according to his character, but sometimes against the same;³ moreover, temperament is not rarely changed by education, so that some of those who at first excelled in sensibility afterward rejoice in the greatest activity.

² Sum. Cont. Gentil., lib. II, cap. 63.

³ Whence not rarely it is said concerning some action: "it is contrary to his character."

Therefore, if by temperament the exercise of free will is often diminished, it is not wholly removed. But educators and confessors should strive with all their strength to help the younger, so that whatever is good in their character they may assiduously cultivate, and whatever is evil they may correct by contrary acts, as was said where we treated concerning the passions.¹ - Moreover, some psychological notion of the various kinds of character is especially useful to confessors, so that they may more safely direct their penitents to the practice of virtues: the sanguine are to be persuaded to accomplish all things more deliberately and constantly, lest, moved by a passing ardor, they undertake something above their strength, and afterward, cast down in spirit, fall into despair; the nervous and the choleric are to be moderated, lest, through excessive ardor, they indulge excesses, but especially are to be admonished to turn their passions to a good end; the melancholic need consolation, lest they be oppressed by sadness and despair; the phlegmatic are to be stirred up, lest, made sleepy, they become sluggish and lax.

¹ Concerning this see also A. Martin, L'Education du caractère, Paris, 1889.

119. Hereditary propensions and natural inclinations, which arise from temperament and are strengthened from character, are greatly increased or diminished by education. For the soul of the young is like soft wax, which easily receives external impressions and retains them in itself.

² Dupanloup, De l'Education, 7th ed., Paris, 1866, t. I, p. 89-402; t. II, p. 108-484 and p. 547-599; Martin, Educ. du caractère, p. 126-365; cf. Marion, Leçons de Psychologie appliquée à l'éducation, 8th ed., Paris, 1895; H. Spencer, Education, New York, 1885; in French, De l'Education, 7th ed., Paris, 1888.

Now the young are instructed not only by parents and teachers, but also by all with whom they converse, and by society itself: for civil laws bend minds toward that which they prescribe; if they favor drunkenness, divorce, and other vices, by that very fact they induce many to those sins; but conversely, if vices are punished by proportionate penalties, not a few are deterred from them through fear of just chastisement.

120. Education influences free will especially in a threefold way: by inculcating principles, by presenting example, and by exciting passions.

1. By inculcating principles. For since, from what has been said, the will does not act unless illuminated and moved by the intellect, he who can inspire ideas and emotions by that very fact bends the will. It is evident by experience how much prejudices vividly impressed on the minds of the young avail, especially in religious and moral matters; thus certain persons, among Protestants and socialists, have been so imbued from childhood with prejudices against Catholics that they judge them guilty of any crime whatsoever, and therefore pursue them with contempt and hatred; likewise not a few, among anarchists, are persuaded that nothing is more useful to social order than to plunder the goods of the rich. But others, on account of a defect of moral education, labor under ignorance even concerning certain precepts of the natural law, and acts evil in themselves are perpetrated in good faith.

Now, in these or similar cases, in order to judge whether acts evil in themselves can be called free and imputable or not, the principles set forth above concerning ignorance and error, n. 94-98, must be applied. In other respects one must deal more mildly with these persons, so that, by a kind and sincere exposition of the truth, prejudices may be dispelled and the will turned toward better things.

121. 2. By presenting example. Examples influence liberty in a twofold way: indirectly, by gradually inducing the intellect to approve that which is done by many, especially by those who shine with some authority; directly, by drawing the consent of the will, because, as the adage has it, words move, examples draw: for men, especially the young, by a certain natural propension desire to imitate what they see done by others. Thus not a few boys, otherwise of a good disposition, are often induced by the examples of older persons to blaspheme, steal, or act immodestly; likewise, in prisons where young men and adults are enclosed promiscuously, most come out worse than they were before, because by the words and examples of others they have been enticed to many vices.

By all these things, certainly, the power of maturely deliberating or of freely acting is diminished, but it is not extinguished. Wherefore those who, deceived and seduced by depraved examples, have indulged in vice are partly to be excused; and one must strive with all one's strength that, having left evil companions, they frequent others stable in good, by whose conversation and example they may return to better things.

122. 3. By exciting or moderating the passions. For just as by the best education the passions are moderated and directed toward good, so likewise by evil education they are excited and carried toward evil. Thus, for example, those who receive and read books in which whatever is true, beautiful, and good is extolled much more easily turn their passions to the practice of virtue; on the contrary, if books of love-affairs are given them to read, in which vices are vividly described, their curiosity is excited, desires are inflamed, and the way is prepared for lust.

Here, therefore, the principles given above concerning the passions, n. 103-104, must be applied; these for the most part do not remove liberty, but diminish it.

123. 1. Notion. Besides temperament and education, natural habits influence liberty; for since they are acquired by repeated acts, they increase the inclination to performing similar acts. - Here we treat only of natural habits, which are acquired by repeated acts, and not of supernatural habits, which are divinely infused; and indeed insofar as they affect a free act.

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 49-54; Suarez, Disput. metaphysicae, disp. XLIV; Meyer, t. I, n. 130-139; Bouquillon, n. 338; Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clergé, XXI, 1899, p. 529-593, 673 sq.; Rabier, Psychologie, p. 571-587; F. Ravaisson, De l'habitude (thesis), Paris, 1838.

In this sense, habit is defined as a constant inclination acquired by repeated acts for producing similar acts. Already by the first act a certain initial facility is acquired for repeating the same; but when the same acts are often repeated, at a short interval, with attention and with a propension of the will, especially if it is a question of a delightful thing, soon a vehement inclination is formed and rooted; and this not rarely is acquired and strengthened much more easily by the law of ancestral heredity, concerning which above. This inclination is added to various faculties, and therefore can affect not only the sensitive appetite, but also the intellect and the will.

In moral matters one must carefully distinguish between voluntary and involuntary habit. (a) When a habit has been knowingly and freely acquired and has not been efficaciously retracted,¹ it can be called actually voluntary; indeed, if it had been acquired inadvertently, it becomes actually voluntary when it has not been retracted after the agent became conscious of this habit. (b) When an inclination was acquired inadvertently and retracted as soon as the operator was conscious of it, it must be called altogether involuntary. (c) If it was acquired or retained advertently, but afterward efficaciously retracted, it is called antecedently voluntary and actually involuntary, nor is it morally imputed to the agent.

¹ It is efficaciously retracted when means apt for overcoming the custom are applied, even if it is not immediately conquered.

124. 2. Concerning the influence of habits on liberty. (A) What is done from a voluntary habit, not yet retracted, is free and imputable: in itself indeed, if the habit is actually voluntary; in the cause, if it is antecedently voluntary.

(a) For he who actually wills to retain a habit of which he is conscious by that very fact freely wills frequently to elicit the acts which he foresees will naturally follow from that habit; otherwise he would retract the habit.

(b) But if he does not actually will positively to retain the habit, but formerly freely acquired it, without ever having retracted it, the acts which proceed from the habit can be called voluntary in the cause, insofar as the agent, by freely acquiring the inclination, by that very fact freely willed the effects which he foresaw would follow from it. But, as we noted above, n. 97, the free in the cause is less imputable than the free in act.

(c) Indeed, a habit actually willed increases the voluntary, and consequently merit or demerit; for he who is conscious of some habit, good or evil, and positively wills to retain it, by that very fact shows how vehemently he intends the acts proceeding from the habit; for knowing that they arise from the habit frequently and intensively, he nevertheless wills to retain the habit, and therefore intends this frequency and intensity.

125. (B) What is done from an involuntary or efficaciously retracted habit is less free and imputable.

For, on the one hand, the habit itself is not voluntary, and on the other hand, it so impedes the deliberation of reason and allures the will that it weakens its powers and greatly diminishes liberty. - Indeed, sometimes the habit is so vehement that, when it bursts forth into act, it anticipates the judgment of reason and free consent, especially if it affects the executive powers, as is evident in the example of those who utter blasphemous formulas without any deliberation. Not rarely also custom has sent down the deepest roots, so that, even if it does not wholly remove the use of reason, nevertheless it takes away that degree of liberty which is required for grave sin, as can be seen among certain drunkards who, even after the habit has been retracted, are impelled to drinking by a propension almost invincible.

Wherefore, where habit prevails, it must be morally judged from all the adjuncts how great a degree of liberty remains in the agent.

126. 3. Concerning the manner of acting with regard to habits. From this it is given to understand of how great importance it is to acquire good habits and to eradicate evil ones. For by custom the powers of the will are increased a hundredfold, and acts are performed more promptly, more easily, more perfectly, and more delightfully, and thus the way is prepared for true and constant progress: for with less effort a greater effect is produced.¹ Those, therefore, who have obtained the custom of piety and virtue walk expeditiously in the ways of the Lord and ascend the arduous paths of perfection with a great heart; but those who have formed depraved habits fall easily into sins, undergo the tyranny of the passions, and can return to the practice of virtue only with difficulty and by heroic efforts.

¹ Concerning the utility of habit A. Lemoine says, apud Rabier, Psychol., p. 587: "If it were necessary for the will always to make the same efforts to direct the movements of the members, if no trace remained today of yesterday's exercise, man would not walk; he would scarcely drag himself along like a child of tender age. He would not speak, he would stammer. He would see without looking, he would learn without ever knowing. If it were necessary for him always to conquer the same resistance of instincts and passions without passion losing its force, without that of the will increasing, the most valiant man would soon be at the end of moral energy; he would succumb in this struggle ceaselessly renewed, and virtue would be only a word. It is thanks to habit that man can run instead of crawl, that the sciences are constituted and enriched; that virtue is acquired, that in all things progress is accomplished. In proportion as the act no longer requires, in order to be repeated, anything but a simple effort, the surplus of power, which the cause does not expend in order to reproduce it, becomes in some way available for new and superior efforts."

Happy, therefore, are those who, already from childhood, learn to cultivate, by repeated acts, honesty, piety, abnegation of oneself, charity toward others, and the other virtues!

But if depraved habits have already sent down deep roots, nevertheless one must not despair: custom is conquered by custom. In order that a depraved custom may be conquered more efficaciously, (a) there ought to go before it attentive consideration or meditation on all the motives which ought to move us to eradicate it completely; (b) when the evil inclination urges, we ought to divert the mind to other things, and, if an external occasion is present, immediately flee it and direct our whole attention to something honorable; (c) we ought to apply the means described above, n. 107, for overcoming the passions.¹

¹ Payot, op. cit., p. 200-222, after ascetics, explains how especially sensuality and pleasure can be conquered by the young.

127. On account of the intimate connection between body and soul, there are certain pathological states in which liberty is diminished or removed. All states of this kind directly affect the nervous system, and indirectly the will. Among these we shall treat: 1. concerning abulia and invincible propension, which in the state of wakefulness especially harm liberty; 2. concerning neurasthenia, hysteria, and epilepsy, which in the same state harm liberty less; 3. concerning hypnotic sleep and suggestion.

² Ribot, Les maladies de la volonté, 18th ed., Paris, 1904; translated into English by Fitzgerald, The diseases of the will; more briefly Rauh and Revault, Psychologie appliquée à la Morale, Paris, 1900, p. 282-286.

128. (A) Abulia (lack of will) consists in a certain incapacity of efficaciously willing what is desired. Positivists infer that this is a disease of the will itself from the fact that it is found in men otherwise apparently sound and robust, who by their own initiative cannot or will not will what otherwise they desire and are able to accomplish. But from these facts this conclusion cannot be drawn; for even in those who seem sound, a disease of the nerves or brain can lie hidden. Wherefore all those who admit the spirituality of the soul teach that abulia arises from a certain pathological state of the body, by force of which the organs are not in that condition in which the will can expeditiously exercise its operations.

Sometimes this impotence is universal; sometimes it is limited to certain acts or certain times.¹

¹ Ribot reports many examples of abulia, op. cit., p. 38-59.

Nothing certain is known concerning the cause of this disease;² but those incur the danger of falling into it who more promptly and easily, without sufficient reason, abdicate their own will and show themselves sluggish; or who abuse soporific medicines, for example opium.³

² Ribot gives a physiological explanation, p. 50-56.

³ In this way the very well-known T. de Quincey had fallen into abulia; cf. Ribot, p. 40-43; T. Quincey, Confessions of an opium-eater.

Whatever the case, when the disease has prevailed, liberty is much diminished, and sometimes it seems to be removed at least as regards certain acts; and therefore the omission of acts which are prescribed is, in itself, either little free or in no way free; but it is free in the cause when someone knowingly and freely has induced this state by his own fault. - Nor is such a disposition altogether incurable; for, with relatives and friends helping, those who labor under abulia begin to will and execute easier things, and step by step more difficult things also, provided they are persuaded that this is not arduous.⁴

⁴ Ollé-Laprune, Le prix de la vie, Paris, 1896, ch. 24, p. 304-317.

129. (B) Vehement and invincible propension.⁵ Here there is question of those propensions which, by an almost unavoidable motion, impel someone to doing that which otherwise he abhors. Sometimes certain persons are so suddenly and vehemently pressed by these impulses that they are not conscious of the things which are perpetrated; but others are conscious of this violent propension and flee to friends so that, being imprisoned or bound by them, they may be able to avoid the evil action to which they are impelled.⁶ Thus certain persons are carried unwillingly to suicide, homicide, theft, drunkenness, during the whole time in which the crisis endures, and afterward, when the crisis has been overcome, they detest all these things and become masters of themselves.

⁵ Ribot, op. cit., p. 73-95.

⁶ "These irresistible impulses are, some unconscious, sudden, followed by immediate execution, without the subject having even had time to take knowledge of them, without his being informed of his action either before or after; the others are fully conscious: the sick person feels that he is no longer master of himself, that he is dominated by an interior force, invincibly pushed to commit acts which he reproves and of which he has horror. A young man adores his mother and is haunted by the idea of killing her; to prevent himself from executing his atrocious desire, he is obliged to beg that he be tied in the barn like a wolf." (Rauh and Revault, op. cit., p. 283).

Whence from all the adjuncts it must be judged whether, in these cases, liberty is only diminished or is removed. In practice, however, as soon as someone is conscious that a crisis is occurring, he ought to ask friends to take care that the invincible propension not pass into act. - Moreover all those things by which propensions of this kind can be induced ought carefully to be avoided.

130. (A) Neurasthenia is a certain pathological state in which the nerves appear weakened and exhausted, so that the agent, although master of himself, labors under the greatest inconstancy and is much depressed physically and mentally. Generally a state of this kind is caused by various excesses, whether by working too much, or by indulging pleasures, or by abusing certain narcotic medicines;¹ sometimes, however, it is transmitted by heredity. It affects the whole body, and therefore can be called not so much a disease as a cohort of diseases.

¹ "All the passions, or even excessive sentiments, are capable of bringing on neurasthenia; whether it is love or ambition or filial affection, or again cupidity, which comes into play, it will suffice that their development be hindered for a consequent neurasthenic state to declare itself. In the intellectual sphere, all excesses of work can be incriminated, and, if moral preoccupations are joined to it, which is not rare, the combination of the two orders of causes will bring on neurasthenia still more easily." (Dr. Block, cited by H. Vigouroux, Traité de Médecine, t. III, p. 125.)

From this weakness of the nerves the will becomes very infirm and unstable, unfit for strongly resisting evil propensions; wherefore liberty is diminished, though not removed. - Besides physical medicines, which physicians prescribe, spiritual remedies are of much profit, such as confidence in God,¹ a firm will and hope of repelling this disease, moderation in acting, a quiet life far from the tumult of cities, the society of friends who are able gently to console the sick person and often strongly to exhort him to acting well and quietly.

¹ This is candidly acknowledged by a man otherwise unbelieving, who wrote concerning nervous diseases: "Religious faith could be the best preservative against these maladies of the soul and the most powerful means for curing it, if it were living enough to create in its adherents a true Christian stoicism. In this state of soul, alas! so rare in right-thinking circles, man becomes invulnerable. Feeling himself supported by his God, he fears neither sickness nor death. He can succumb under the blows of a physical disease, but morally he remains standing in the midst of suffering; he is inaccessible to the pusillanimous emotions of neuroses." Dubois, Les Psychonévroses et leur traitement moral, Paris (Masson), 1904, p. 245-246; in the same place various therapeutic and moral means for curing those diseases are described; cf. Feuchtersleben, Hygiène de l'âme, Paris (Baillière), 1904, p. 147.

131. (B) Hysteria (from the Greek word hystera, uterus, because formerly this was thought to be a disease of the uterus) is also a disordering of the nervous system, but much graver than neurasthenia; it consists especially in this, that the sensibility of the nerves is diminished or for a time extinguished in certain parts of the body (anesthesia), while in others it is rendered much more intense (hyperesthesia). This irritability of the nerves changes the whole nature of hysterical persons, disturbs the mind, weakens the will, and opens the way to hallucinations: they vividly represent to themselves phantasms, which induce a state akin to ecstasy or somnambulism. Prone to diverse and contrary affections, and laboring under the greatest inconstancy, they pass immediately from laughter to tears, from love to hatred. Often they have recourse to lying: they simulate sentiments of soul which they do not have, piety, and imaginary visions; sometimes they falsely affirm that force has been brought upon them by a person whose name they reveal, describing the minute circumstances of the crime, and on that account they excite discords and scandals. Not rarely they are prone to theft, and they easily steal whatever pleases them. - Therefore let priests beware lest they be deceived by these persons.

Not only women, but also men can incur hysteria: a soft life, abstinence from physical exercises, the reading of romantic books which excite the imagination and disturb the heart, premature and excessive study, lustful excesses, in one word whatever induces physical debilitation and agitates the nervous system, disposes one toward it. - There are various degrees of hysteria and various stages, which are described by physiologists; sometimes the disease grows stronger and reaches a paroxysm,¹ which by physicians is commonly called great hysteria (la grande hystérie).

¹ P. Richer, Etudes cliniques sur l'hystéro-épilepsie; Axenfeld and Huchard, Traité des névroses, p. 967-1012; Ribot, op. cit., p. 115-125; Surbled, op. cit., t. IV, p. 72-78; Antonelli, Medicina Pastoralis, Rome, 1905, t. I, n. 436-449. - Physiologically hysteria is described thus: "Hysteria is a neurosis with numerous and varied manifestations. The three principal ones are: the sensation of a ball which starts from the belly and rises back to the throat, where it determines a feeling of constriction; nervous attacks accompanied by cries, by loss of consciousness; anesthesias or partial paralyses." (Vigouroux, op. cit., p. 95). - Psychologically it is described thus by Huchard, apud Ribot, p. 117: "Their character changes like the views of a kaleidoscope, which could make Sydenham say with reason that what is most constant among them is their inconstancy. Yesterday they were playful, amiable, and gracious; today they are in a bad humor, susceptible and irascible, growing angry at anything and nothing, gloomy and sulky by caprice, discontented with their lot; nothing interests them, they are bored with everything. They experience a very great antipathy against a person whom yesterday they loved and esteemed, or on the contrary manifest an incomprehensible sympathy for another... Sometimes their sensibility is exalted by the most futile motives, while it is scarcely touched by the greatest emotions... By turns gentle and violent, beneficent and cruel, impressionable to excess, rarely mistresses of their first movement, incapable of resisting impulses of the most opposed nature, presenting a defect of equilibrium between the superior moral faculties, the will, the conscience, and the inferior faculties, instincts, passions, and desires."

It is very difficult to define whether and in what degree hysterical persons remain free. Whence, in practice, only from all the circumstances, and from the declaration of the hysterical persons themselves (to which, however, one must not entirely give trust), can it probably be known what liberty remains in them. - Remedies are of two kinds: physical, which a wise² physician will prescribe, for example physical exercises, assiduous labor, although moderate; and spiritual, especially a sufficiently constant effort for at once restraining vain phantasms and bridling the passions, while hysterical persons are masters of themselves.

² I say wise; for, since hysterical persons fall into hypnotic sleep more easily than others, certain physicians, for the sake of experiment, hypnotize them and often render their condition worse.

132. (C) The epileptic disease is likewise a certain disordering of the nerves which, with longer intervals interposed, induces a crisis of greater or lesser duration, in which the sick person is not master of himself. Now, among epileptics, there are some who do nothing morally evil; but there are others who are vehemently impelled toward something dishonorable, for example toward inflicting injuries on others, toward stealing, toward blaspheming, or toward speaking or acting basely, without retaining any memory of all these things. In which case they are not free;¹ nor can the offenses thus perpetrated be imputed to them, provided they are not voluntary in the cause.

¹ "Some sick persons suddenly begin to utter incoherent words, coarse words, insults against the persons who surround them. Others commit acts of brutality, strike persons, break objects. Under the influence of the impulse, the epileptic is capable of wounding, of killing the persons who approach him; and he is all the more terrible because his vigor, in those moments, is prodigious, and because he strikes with remarkable sureness... After a few moments the sick person comes back to himself, retaining no memory of what happened." (Féré, L'épilepsie, p. 51-52). Cf. Surbled, op. cit., p. 78-82.

133. To these pathological states must be added hypnotic sleep, while which endures commands are suggested to be fulfilled either at once or after some interval.

² Charcot, Leçons sur les maladies du système nerveux, Paris, 1887; and Oeuvres complètes, t. V; P. Richer, Etudes cliniques sur la grande hystérie, Paris, 1885; Bernheim, De la suggestion et de ses applications à la thérapeutique, Paris, 1886; A. Moll, Der hypnotismus, a work rendered into English as Hypnotism, 1893; E. Morselli, Il magnetismo animale, la fascinazione e gli stati ipnotici; Coconnier, L'hypnotisme franc, Paris, 1897; Grasset, L'hypnotisme et la suggestion, Paris (Doin), 1903. - You will find a brief synopsis in Lelong, La vérité sur l'hypnotisme, and Guibert, Etude sur l'hypnotisme, Paris, Retaux, s. d.; Tanquerey, Synop. Theol. Dogmat., De Deo Creante, n. 108-115.

(A) The facts are described. Hypnotic sleep is induced by various means, by command of the voice, by the gaze of the eyes, by the handling of the hands, especially by pressing zones which are called hypnogenic, or even by simple mental suggestion. Generally it is asserted that no one, in the state of wakefulness, can be hypnotized unless he has first given consent at least implicitly; but natural sleep can be changed into hypnotic sleep without the consent of the sleeper. Not all can be hypnotized, but many can, and not only women but also men, especially those who are weak in will or labor under a nervous disease.

The phenomena of hypnotism are distinguished into three kinds: somatic, intellectual, or mixed. (a) The first are so called because they especially affect the body (soma): catalepsy, lethargy, and somnambulism. In the cataleptic state, the body remains immobile, like a statue, and preserves that manner of bearing itself which is impressed upon it; it appears altogether inert and insensible. In the lethargic state, the eyes previously closed are opened and turn themselves almost necessarily toward the hypnotizer; the members acquire, as it were, waxen flexibility. If some motion is impressed upon the members, the hypnotized person performs or completes the same; thus if the hands are joined, as generally happens at the time of prayer, the whole body behaves just as if the mind were vacant for contemplation. Finally, in the state of somnambulism, the hypnotized person seems to be, as it were, awakened from sleep: he hears, sees, speaks, and acts; but he is not master of himself, for he obeys almost absolutely the command of the hypnotizer.

(b) In the intellectual order, the principal phenomenon is mental suggestion, which can happen especially in the state of somnambulism. Namely, the hypnotized person hears and executes all those things which are suggested and commanded by the hypnotizer; for example, he sees or does not see an object truly present in the room, at the nod of the hypnotizer; if the latter has ordered that a theft be committed, at first indeed he resists, but for the most part, conquered by the stronger will, the theft is perpetrated. Indeed, suggestions to be executed after a week or a month he faithfully fulfills at the appointed time.

(c) Mixed phenomena are called those which are produced in the body through the mediation of the imagination; for example, a bloody sweat, which someone suffers at the suggestion of the hypnotizer.

134. The cause of these facts is assigned diversely by diverse authors.¹ Many explain them through a certain analogy with natural sleep. For very often it happens to those sleeping that they take imaginary likenesses of things, which are represented in their phantasy, as real, and perform various acts under their influence; and this indeed proceeds from the fact that reason, in order to judge rightly concerning the truth of things, lacks the perception of the senses which is necessary to it. Now he who permits himself to be hypnotized by another submits himself to his command; in his phantasy he vividly perceives likenesses of things which are suggested by him, and, judging them to be real, acts in the same way as if he truly perceived the things themselves.²

¹ Cf. Wundt, Hypnotisme et suggestion, translated from the German by Keller, Paris, 1902.

² Coconnier explains this happily, op. cit., p. 347-380.

135. (B) Concerning the liberty of the hypnotized person.¹ (a) It is certain and admitted by all that the exercise of liberty is much diminished by hypnotic sleep and suggestion; indeed, according to all, it is almost entirely removed as long as the sleep endures; for if an honorable person first resists the suggestion of stealing something, this happens by force of a habit previously acquired; but if the hypnotizer orders the same thing again and again, soon the theft is carried out; therefore that liberty which suffices for moral imputability does not remain.

¹ Concerning this see J. Liégeois, De la suggestion et du somnambulisme, Paris (Doin), 1889, n. 507-575; Gilles de la Tourette, L'Hypnotisme, Paris (Plon), 1889; Mercier, Psychologie, 1904, n. 203.

(b) But if it is a question of a suggestion to be fulfilled afterward, in the state of wakefulness, the Parisian school contends that liberty is not wholly removed but only diminished; while, according to the school of Nancy, even in this case the hypnotized person cannot morally resist the suggestion. Wherefore, in practice, he must be interrogated carefully and cautiously, so that, from his own testimony, it can be discerned whether and to what extent he was free in performing the action.

(c) From this it is clear that the evil actions which the hypnotized person perpetrates are sometimes free in the cause, namely when he freely abdicated his own will and gave consent to hypnotic sleep, foreseeing that actions of this kind were to be suggested. - For this reason the use of hypnotism cannot be permitted indiscriminately, but only for most grave reasons, and with precautions applied lest anything morally evil be able to occur, as will be explained below, n. 916.

136. Since liberty is a necessary condition for acting morally and meritoriously, and otherwise one of the noblest faculties, it is of the greatest importance to fortify and strengthen it against various impediments. The principal means for attaining this are these:

(a) To cultivate reason rightly; for since this especially influences the free act, whatever perfects the intellect by that very fact strengthens the will. For ideas have the greatest force for exciting desires; and these tend toward action.² Wherefore, if we conceive honorable, noble, and Christian ideas, and do not dwell upon them perfunctorily, but assiduously and attentively, by that very fact we vehemently desire and strenuously strive to accomplish good. But conversely error and ignorance, together with prejudices imbibed from whatever source, are to be carefully dispelled by the study and meditation of truths which greatly help toward rightly informing morals. Inadvertence and lightness of soul are to be corrected by the custom of doing nothing except on account of an honorable, indeed also supernatural, motive seriously considered: therefore one must think before acting, so that all things may be done not from blind impulse, but deliberately.

² Cf. Dr. P. E. Lévy, L'éducation rationnelle de la volonté, 4th ed., Paris, Alcan, 1904, p. 22-57; Payot, Education de la volonté, p. 35-45 and 66-127.

(b) To moderate the passions and direct them toward good; for since they add powers to the will, they are indeed not to be extinguished, but, with reason going before, ought to obey the will as handmaids. - But if depraved habits have already been formed, let them be conquered by contrary custom, and by repeated acts let the habit of doing good promptly and expeditiously gradually be acquired.

(c) But because bodily weakness, and especially disturbance of the nervous system, can induce pathological states which greatly retard or impede the free exercise of the will, excesses of every kind are to be avoided, so that there may truly be a sound mind in a sound body.

(d) Finally, since the will is diminished unless you exercise it, it is expedient to choose more often deliberate and free acts of the will; and therefore, in order to act strenuously, the greatest opportunities, which rarely occur, are not to be awaited, but in the smallest matters, which occur daily, the power of the will is to be exercised; for thus hesitation and fluctuation of soul are avoided, from which abulia can be induced; besides, as Christ Himself observed: "He who is faithful in that which is least is faithful also in that which is greater; and he who is unjust in that which is little is unjust also in that which is greater."¹

¹ Luke XVI, 10. - Cf. Guibert, La formation de la volonté, Paris, 1903.

(e) Nor are supernatural means to be passed over, especially prayer and frequent reception of the sacraments, by which grace is obtained and the will is strengthened, according to that saying: "I can do all things in Him who strengthens me."²

² Philip., IV, 13.