On Human Acts — Chapter III: On the Merit of the Human Act

196. Preliminary notes. As was said above, n. 8, the end toward which we tend is supernatural, and is attained by us by way of remuneration, n. 29. Therefore it does not suffice to act honorably, but supernatural and meritorious acts must be elicited.

¹ Dogmatic theologians treat concerning this matter in the Treatise De Gratia, namely St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 114; Suarez, lib. XII, c. 2 sq.; Salmanticenses, disp. I-II, and others whom we list in Synopsi Th. Dogmat., De Gratia, n. 184-204.

When someone, by a free and honorable action, brings to another an emolument not owed, he is said to merit with him, or he acquires a right to some retribution; but conversely, if someone freely and unjustly inflicts some detriment on another, he demerits, or incurs the obligation of undergoing some punishment. Yet in order that a reward can be demanded by strict right, it is necessary that some pact, at least implicitly, be entered into, by force of which one of the contracting parties promises some determinate work in favor of the other, and the other promises a determinate reward in retribution for the work. For although a good and free action, performed in favor of another, is of itself apt for obtaining some reward, the strict obligation of conferring it, and also the nature, quantity, and quality of this reward, are by no means determined of themselves; therefore it is necessary that a pact be entered into for determining these things.

From this it is asked whether man can merit with God. The reason for doubting is that, since he has received his whole being from God, he can do nothing which is not owed to God. Nevertheless, since man is of his own right and is endowed with liberty, he can furnish something of his own to God, namely a free act of the will (above, n. 30); and, although this free submission is essentially owed, God, nevertheless, most good, deigns to accept it as worthy of reward, and promises the unfading crown of glory to all those who freely operate good. This promise posited, we acquire a right to retribution, not indeed from an explicit pact, but from the fidelity by which God always fulfills His promises. - But because we have been elevated to the supernatural state, here we shall treat not of natural retribution, but of supernatural merit, setting forth its nature, and also the conditions required for merit on the part of the one operating, of the work, and of God.

197. 1. Notion. Meritorious acts are distinguished from supernatural acts in this, that more conditions are required for merit properly so called than for the supernatural.

All honorable acts are called supernatural which proceed from a supernatural principle (i.e. from a faculty elevated by grace, whether habitual or actual), and at the same time are elicited from a motive known through revelation;¹ hence certain acts of unbelievers, by which they prepare themselves for justification, are supernatural, although they are not properly meritorious, from what is to be said.

¹ Certain theologians, with Noldin (n. 79-80), assert that the former condition suffices, and that it is not required that the motive be supernatural; for, when the root and principle of the act is something supernatural, the fruit or effect must also be supernatural. Yet others more commonly reject that opinion; for since acts are specified by the formal object, supernatural works differ from natural works by reason of the formal object, or motive. - To compose the dispute, perhaps it could be said that an act elicited under the influence of actual grace is already supernatural inchoatively, but does not become totally supernatural unless there is added a motive known by faith.

But a meritorious act is a good and supernatural work done on account of God, from which, divine ordination being posited, there arises a right to supernatural retribution.

It is called (a) a good and supernatural work, so that thus it may be distinguished from natural merit by which someone can obtain a merely natural reward; thus an unbeliever, by acting honorably, can obtain some natural recompense. But a meritorious work ought to be supernatural both by reason of the principle, insofar as it is done under the influence of grace, and more probably by reason of the end, insofar as it is done at least implicitly on account of a supernatural end, as will be declared below. (b) On account of God; for if some work is not done on account of God, there is no reason why retribution should be expected from Him. (c) From which there arises a right...; in this consists the essence of merit, and it is distinguished from impetration; for merit gives a certain right to retribution, while impetration gives no right, but obtains favor from mere mercy. (d) Yet there is added, divine ordination being posited; for unless God had willed to give us supernatural retribution on account of our good works, we would have no right to it: all that we have or do is from God and is owed to God, and therefore we can have no strict right relative to God, unless He Himself confers such a right upon us. (e) To supernatural retribution; in this merit is distinguished from satisfaction; for satisfaction compensates for the injury brought against God, while merit is ordered to obtaining reward.¹

¹ Therefore a threefold value can be present in our works: impetratory, which arises from petition clothed with due conditions, and is founded partly on the mercy of God, partly on His promises; meritorious, which arises from the supernatural work itself done on account of God, and is founded partly on justice, partly on the divine promise; satisfactory, insofar as it is a penal work which is accepted by God as compensation for the injury brought against Him. In the prayer of the just this threefold value can be found: insofar as it fittingly asks from God, it can impetrate; insofar as it performs a supernatural work acceptable to God, it can merit grace; but insofar as it performs a difficult and laborious work, it makes satisfaction for its sins.

198. 2. Species. A twofold merit is usually distinguished:

(a) Merit de condigno is that to which a reward is owed from justice, or at least from fidelity: from justice, when the work of itself equals the reward; from fidelity, when a promise is present, by force of which the reward, although exceeding the work, is nevertheless infallibly granted. Merit de condigno is true merit, or merit simply and properly so called, and therefore theologians intend to speak of it as often as they do not expressly signify otherwise.

(b) Merit de congruo is that to which reward is owed not from justice or fidelity, but from mere fittingness. - To explain the difference between each, certain theologians use this comparison: a soldier who conducted himself very strenuously in war has a twofold merit: he merits de condigno the stipend promised to soldiers; but he merits de congruo, besides the ordinary stipend, to be promoted to some dignity.

In the Treatise De Gratia (n. 193-204), it is proved that a justified man, that is, one placed in the state of grace, can truly merit an increase of grace and eternal life; here therefore it will suffice to set forth the conditions required for merit, especially the conditions required for merit de condigno; for the conditions for merit de congruo are the same, with two exceptions, namely the state of grace and the promise of God, which are not required for merit de congruo. - Conditions of this kind are taken: 1. on the part of the one operating; 2. on the part of the work; 3. on the part of God.

199. For merit de condigno, two things are required: the state of wayfarer and the state of grace.

1. The state of wayfarer. (A) For God willed that man merit eternal life while he was dwelling on earth, or in the state of probation. (a) This is certainly proved by those texts of Scripture in which the Prophets, Christ, and the Apostles exhort the faithful that, while they live, they operate good, and thus prepare themselves for judgment, or for the coming of Christ; since, as St. Paul says,¹ "we must all be manifested before the tribunal of Christ, that each one may receive the proper things of the body," that is, those things which were done in the body, or during mortal life. For these suppose that after death there is not given a place for penance or merit. (b) This indeed is confirmed not only from the unanimous consent of the Fathers and theologians of all schools, who taught and teach this as one of the primary Christian truths; but also from the intimate persuasion of all the faithful, who therefore wish to act well in the present life or to be reconciled with God before death, because they believe that after death there is no redemption. Wherefore it can be said that this truth was implicitly defined by the ordinary and infallible magisterium of the Church.

¹ II Cor., V, 10.

(B) Reason shows that this is fitting. For it is necessary that the time of probation, through which man can merit or demerit, receive an end; but it altogether befits that this time receive its end at the point of death: for as long as the soul is joined to the corruptible body, on the one hand it is not capable of the beatific vision, and on the other it is in a state most apt for meriting, because it can use the body for acquiring perfection, and in the miseries of this life can find ampler opportunities for meriting. Therefore. Yet we admit that that argument is only an argument of fittingness, because the time of probation depends on the will of God alone.

200. Moreover, the state of sanctifying grace is required. It is certain: (a) From Scripture. For Christ says: "As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself unless it remain in the vine; so neither can you, unless you remain in Me";¹ but no one remains in Christ except through habitual grace; therefore. Likewise St. Paul:² "And if I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor... but have not charity" (and consequently habitual grace), "it profits me nothing."

¹ John, XV, 4.

² I Cor., XIII, 3.

(b) From Tradition. From the decree of Trent, in which it is declared that the works of a justified man truly merit;³ for a justified man is said to be one who is adorned with habitual grace; and from the condemnation of the proposition of Baius denying that sanctifying grace is necessary for merit.⁴

³ "If anyone shall say that the good works of a justified man... do not truly merit increase of grace, eternal life, and the attainment of eternal life itself... and also increase of glory; A. S." (Trent, sess. VI, can. 32).

⁴ Apud Denzinger, n. 895; cf. nn. 882, 892.

(c) From theological reason. It is certainly repugnant that someone merit de condigno with God, when otherwise he is an enemy of God and worthy of eternal punishment; but a sinner, not yet justified, is hateful to God and worthy of eternal punishment; therefore he cannot at the same time merit eternal life. - Moreover, there ought to be some proportion between work and reward; but the reward concerning which we are treating is within the order of supernatural filiation; therefore we can be heirs of eternal life insofar as we are adoptive sons of God: "if sons, also heirs";⁵ but only through habitual grace are we made adoptive sons of God; therefore only through this grace do we merit.⁶

⁵ Rom., VIII, 17.

⁶ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 114, a. 3.

201. There are three: namely, the work must be free, honorable, and supernatural. 1. A meritorious work must be free, both from coercion and from necessity. It is of faith against the Jansenists.

For the following proposition was condemned as heretical: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, liberty from necessity is not required in man, but liberty from coercion suffices."¹ And in reality no one is rewarded or punished unless he is master of his acts; but man is not master of his acts unless he is truly and intrinsically free. - This, however, does not prevent prescribed works from being meritorious; for God, by His goodness, has promised recompense even to prescribed works; thus, for example, love of enemies is prescribed, and yet it is a very meritorious work, according to that saying: "Love your enemies... and your reward shall be great";² indeed, a precept, other things being equal, increases merit, by adding to the work the merit of obedience.

¹ Apud Denzinger, n. 968. - The state of fallen nature is that in which man is placed after original sin; cf. De Deo Creante, n. 197-200.

² Luke, VI, 35.

202. 2. Moreover it must be honorable, or naturally good, on the part of the object, end, and circumstances; for an evil work evidently cannot be rewarded, but on the contrary is worthy of punishment; but an indifferent work, if there is any in the individual case, of itself neither merits nor demerits; therefore only a good work can be rewarded. Yet a work indifferent of itself can be made good through a supernatural intention; indeed a work materially evil can, according to the common opinion, become good and meritorious, if it is honorable in the mind of the agent: for God looks upon the heart.

203. 3. Supernatural (a) by reason of the principle, in the sense that it must be done under the influence of grace; this is admitted by all. But what grace is required? Certain theologians, ancient and modern,³ said that habitual grace suffices, without actual grace, because an act elicited under the influence of habitual grace and the infused virtues is already sufficiently supernatural by reason of the principle. - Yet the common opinion is that actual grace is required; for Christ said to the Apostles, already adorned with sanctifying grace: "Without Me you can do nothing";⁴ these words indeed are interpreted by the Fathers not only of habitual grace, but also of actual grace. Here also come all the texts brought forward in the Treatise De Gratia (n. 50-60), from which it is evident that even a just man can do nothing in the supernatural order without actual grace. Likewise Trent declares that the works of the just are not meritorious without the virtue of Christ which precedes, accompanies, and follows them; but grace preceding, accompanying, etc., is actual grace.¹ - Besides, that grace is never lacking to men of good will.

³ Thus D. Soto, De nat. et grat., l. III, c. 4; Terrien, La Grâce et la Gloire, Paris, 1897, t. II, p. 56-62.

⁴ John, XV, 5.

¹ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 16.

(b) By reason of the end or motive, according to the common opinion, in the sense that it must be done not from a human motive, but with at least implicit relation to God or to eternal life, according to that saying: "Whatever you do, do from the heart, as to the Lord and not to men, knowing that from the Lord you shall receive the retribution";² all the places where it is said that we ought to act on account of God prove the same.

² Coloss., III, 23.

Indeed, according to Thomists, it is required that that work be done under the influence of charity; yet the virtual influence suffices, which remains as long as the act of charity toward God, once elicited, has not been retracted. For they argue thus:³ in order that an act of some virtue be meritorious of eternal life, it ought to proceed from habitual grace; but from grace no act proceeds except through the mediation of charity: for every movement and influence of grace tends toward God, the supernatural ultimate end; therefore no act can be meritorious of eternal life unless it is referred to God, the supernatural ultimate end, at least virtually by charity. - Yet this is denied by not a few theologians, especially Suarez and Vasquez;⁴ for, Scripture being witness, eternal life is promised not only to acts of charity, but also to other supernatural works, namely obedience, poverty, meekness, and the rest of good works in general.⁵ Besides, any supernatural work performed in the state of grace has sufficient proportion with eternal life. And this seems to be the mind of St. Thomas, who often teaches that every honorable act performed by him who is placed in the state of grace and elicits an act of charity as often as this is prescribed, is meritorious, because it is habitually and implicitly referred to God (above, n. 191).⁶ - The controversy is more in the mode of conceiving than in the matter itself; for Thomists hold that all acts elicited by him who has charity, or is in the state of grace, are done virtually under the influence of charity and are meritorious, unless this is impeded by some disordering of the act. Besides, according to all, it is better often to offer our actions to God from the motive of charity: for thus merit is greatly increased.

³ Salmanticenses, disp. IV, n. 7.

⁴ Suarez, lib. XII, c. 9-10; Vasquez, Ia IIae, disp. 127.

⁵ Mark, III, 35; Matt., V, 3-6; Rom., II, 6; I Tim., VI, 17.

⁶ St. Thomas, De Malo, q. 2, a. 5; De Carit., q. un., a. 11, ad 2.

204. In order that our works be truly meritorious, a positive ordination of God is required. For through merit de condigno we acquire a true right to reward; but a creature cannot acquire any strict right toward God unless some positive ordination of God is supposed: for all our acts are already owed to God by the manifold title of dependence, gratitude, etc.; hence, according to Trent, eternal life is "as a reward, from the promise of God Himself, to be rendered to the good works of the just."¹ Besides, our works, even supernatural ones, do not of themselves equal the reward granted to us, namely the beatific vision; and therefore our merit is not from mere justice, but partly from justice and partly from fidelity.

¹ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 16.

This can indeed be illustrated by a comparison: if some worker should labor of his own accord in the field of another person, without having been hired by him, he will not have a strict right to payment; but if he has done this from a pact, he will have a strict right to reward. Thus also we, while we labor in the vineyard of the Lord, cannot have a right to supernatural reward, unless God first has sent us into His vineyard and has declared a recompense to be annexed to such labor. Nevertheless it befits God so to act, because the worker is worthy of his pay, and it is fitting that happiness follow virtue.

205. Corollary. From this it is given to understand what circumstances can increase merit: 1. the greater excellence of the act itself, which is taken both from the object formally taken; for example, an act of charity is objectively better than an act of humility; and from the quantity of the work, for example in the case of alms; and from its difficulty: thus it is more meritorious to resist a grave temptation than a light one; 2. the end, or intention of the one operating; thus he merits more who acts from the motive of charity than he who acts from the motive of hope or fear; 3. greater intensity, or fervor, consisting in this, that we act with all our powers, with a great heart and a willing soul; likewise constancy in operating, which supposes a greater and more assiduous effort; 4. more intimate conjunction with Christ; for he who keeps himself more intimately united with Him derives from Him a greater power of meriting; for He Himself is the fountain and origin of all merits; and those who are joined to Him bring forth much fruit, according to the words of Christ Himself:¹ "He who remains in Me, and I in him, he bears much fruit."

¹ John, XV, 5.

Therefore let us act freely, honorably, and meritoriously, through Christ, and with Christ, and in Christ; and our works will truly be seeds of eternal life.