Part I — Chapter II: On Injury, or the Violation of Right

264. Notion and species. Although right cannot be violated licitly, in fact it is often injured, and the act by which another's right is violated is deservedly called injury (in-jus, that is, a negation of right). Among jurists, and many others, injury is frequently taken in a restrictive sense for an unjust lesion of honor; but here we use the word in a broader sense, to signify any lesion whatever of strict right.

Injury is properly distinguished from injustice as act from habit: the former, namely, is the act by which the strict right of another is violated; but the latter is the habit of eliciting such acts. Sometimes, however, in a broad sense these two words are taken indiscriminately.

By reason of morality, injury is formal, or imputable, when someone knowingly and willingly injures the right of another; material, when another's right is violated involuntarily, e.g., from ignorance or a fortuitous case.

265. Division of the chapter. There are as many kinds of injuries as there are diverse goods which can be violated. Now the goods possessed by men are of three kinds: goods of the body, goods of the soul, and goods of fortune; therefore a threefold kind of injuries can be distinguished; but before we discuss the individual kinds, a few things concerning injury and crime in general must be premised.

Since the Catholic priest ought to judge not only of the licit and illicit, but also to know the causes and remedies of crimes, so that he may restrain injustice more efficaciously, we shall speak: 1. of the causes and remedies of crimes; 2. of the general principles concerning injury.

266. The Lombrosian School, so named from its leader Cesare Lombroso,¹ contends that the internal causes of crimes are certain natural anatomical, physiological, and mental defects, - to which are added external sociological causes, or causes arising from the very state of society; from which it is inferred that crimes are not imputable to man, since he lacks liberty; nor therefore are they properly to be punished, but only to be prevented in the best way possible, for protecting social order. A theory of this kind is deduced from the system of evolution; for since, they say, man descends from the brute, it is no wonder that there are certain men who, on account of the law of atavism, approach more nearly to brutes and imitate their depraved instincts; in fact those guilty of grave crimes display anatomical, physiological, and psychological characteristics by which they seem to be similar to brutes and to primitive barbarian men, and form a special type which they call the criminal type;¹ they are also impelled to crime by the law of heredity and by many social causes.

¹ Lombroso, born at Venice, 1836: Le Genie et la Folie, 1864; L'Homme criminel, 1875; La femme criminelle, 1896; L'Homme delinquant, 1897; L'Anthropologie criminelle, 1890; Nouvelles recherches de Psychiatrie, 1892; Les Applications de l'Anthropologie criminelle, 1892, etc. - Among his disciples are numbered in Italy: E. Ferri, Nuovi orizzonti; L'omicidio, Turin, 1890; Criminal Sociology, New York, 1896; Les Criminels dans l'Art et la Litterature, 1897; Garofalo, La Criminologie, 2nd ed., Paris, 1890; in France: Dr. Letourneau, Preface to L'Homme Criminel; Dr. Fere, Degenerescence et Criminalite, Paris, 1888; in England: Thompson; Maudsley, Physiology and Pathology of the Mind, 1867; Responsibility in mental disease, 1874; in Austria: Benedikt; and in a general way positivists and materialists; nevertheless not all explain these theories in the same way.

¹ Let us bring forward certain examples, which Tarde gathers from Lombrosian works, La Criminalite comparee, 5th ed., Paris, 1902, p. 11 sq.: "Anatomically, the criminal is in general tall and heavy. I do not say strong, for on the contrary he is weak in muscles. By his average stature and weight, he surpasses the average of honorable people; and this superiority is more remarked in the assassin than in the thief... Malefactors have a receding, narrow, and wrinkled forehead, prominent eyebrow arches, very large ocular cavities, like those of birds of prey, advanced and very strong jaws, ears standing out and large, like a handle: these are very clear traits of savagery. Add to these diverse anomalies which it would take too long to enumerate, and in particular the defect of cranial or facial symmetry..."

It is not our purpose here to prove man's free will, concerning which there is treatment in the Philosophical Institutions; but by saying a few things concerning the causes of crimes, we shall briefly set forth what of truth and what of falsity is found in the theories of today's Criminalists.²

² For understanding this better, see Treatise on Human Acts, n. 87-136.

267. 1. What concerning anatomical causes? Among the various anatomical defects with which, according to Lombroso, criminal men are endowed, there can be certain ones which so deform the brain that they diminish or impede the exercise of the intellectual faculties, and therefore of conscience, and so lessen or entirely remove free will; those who labor under such a defect are called semi-fools or insane, and when they commit crimes under the influence of innate propensities, they are guilty either little or in no way, according to the degree of liberty which remains in them. - We likewise confess that from certain lineaments of the face or body, or from other external signs, there can sometimes be conjectured the existence of depraved proclivities, which, whether innate or acquired, incline the will more or less to vicious acts; and therefore a wise judge, not only in the forum of conscience, but also in the external forum, can use all these things for judging concerning the gravity of crimes. - But from this it by no means follows that always and everywhere all crimes are to be excused from every moral fault, because they were committed by those who, on account of anatomical deformities, are judged to lack moral sense.

268. In fact: (a) The anthropological Congress held at Paris in the year 1889 declared that from the anatomical investigations thus far carried out it is by no means established that there is even one character which belongs exclusively to criminal men, and therefore that jurists and judges can deduce nothing certain from anatomical deformities with regard to the imputability of crimes.¹ (b) Judges who for many years have carried out accurate investigations concerning crimes do not hesitate to assert that there is no physical sign by which guilty men can be distinguished from honorable men; for the various signs alleged by Lombroso and his disciples are for the most part common to guilty and innocent persons;² indeed the supporters of this school plainly admit that these signs, although they are more frequently found in guilty persons, are not rarely also found in good persons.³

¹ Thus Benedikt, who previously had favored the Lombrosian theories more than was fair, declared in the Paris Congress: "All these craniometric methods indicate more dilettantism than scientific rigor... the jurists are quite right to distrust the gifts which the anthropologists make to them." (Archives d'anthrop. criminelle, 1889, p. 555.) Manouvrier, Topinard, Brouardel said the same openly, in L. Proal, Le crime et la peine, 3rd ed., Paris, 1899, p. 82-83; cf. Tarde, La Philosophie penale, 3rd ed., Paris, 1892, p. 218-236.

² Thus, among others, L. Proal, op. cit., p. 82: "There are no physical characteristics distinguishing the malefactor from the honorable man. Brought into contact by my profession with criminals, I believe that assassins are just as much dolichocephalic as brachycephalic... The face of the accused does not appear to me more asymmetrical than that of honorable people; the nose of thieves resembles that of swindlers; the teeth, ears, and hands of the accused present no exceptional peculiarities. My judicial experience no more permits me to admit the existence of a criminal type effacing the national type."

³ Lombroso, L'Anthropologie criminelle, Preface and passim, e.g., p. 40-56. Thus also Garofalo, op. cit., p. 71, after reporting signs of this kind, writes: "None of these characters is constant, but according to comparison with non-delinquents, their frequency is much greater in the criminal world."

269. 2. What concerning psychological causes, and especially insanity? Since merely anatomical causes are unequal to explaining crime, the Lombrosian school, adhering to the footsteps of Dr. Despine, contends that criminal men labor under a certain congenital weakness of mind, which is akin to insanity, and imports the lack of moral sense; a sign of this thing is that many of them are troubled by the epileptic disease, which often remains hidden, or, as they say, masked. This it tries to prove from the fact that guilty persons generally (a) show no signs of shame, blushing, contrition for past crimes, or firm purpose with regard to future things; (b) easily commit the same crimes again; (c) neither do they hesitate in doubt, but they commit crime at once, and indeed without any mercy toward the innocent whom they kill; (d) moreover they act imprudently and improvidently, and therefore are easily captured.

270. We indeed confess that there are certain persons who labor under insanity, and therefore are immune from moral fault while they commit crimes. But from public documents it is established that very few are impelled to crime by insanity or by the epileptic disease.¹

¹ "Out of 5,432 prisoners, Bruce Thompson (disciple of Lombroso in England) found only 57 epileptics. According to the penitentiary statistics published by the Ministry of the Interior in 1882, out of 8,071 young detainees of both sexes, 10 cases of epilepsy were established among boys and 6 among girls; out of 13,392 detained men and 2,290 detained women on December 31, 1881, at the end of that year there were reported 27 men and 1 woman, not insane, but having had attacks of epilepsy. During the year 1882, this affection is noted in 16 men and 7 women. M. Lombroso himself acknowledges that out of 100 Italian prisoners there are only 5 epileptics." (L. Proal, op. cit., p. 85.)

271. Moreover the arguments brought forward above prove nothing; for (a) if certain persons among the guilty show no signs of contrition, there are not a few who sincerely grieve for crimes committed, and not only live honorably, but even splendidly, sometimes performing heroic acts directly contrary to the vicious acts which they had previously committed, as is established from the testimony of those who care for the amendment of the guilty.²

² See their testimonies in Proal, op. cit., p. 110.

(b) Nor is it any wonder that those who have often committed some crimes relapse more easily into the same ones, since by repeated acts a habit is formed and propensity toward evil is increased; but from this it by no means follows that acts of this kind are not free or imputable; it is indeed more difficult in this case to resist depraved propensities, but not impossible: habit is conquered by habit.

272. (c) It sometimes happens that crimes are committed at once, with violent passion impelling to this: and under this head liberty and imputability can be diminished. But generally more grave offenses are committed only gradually, after lesser ones have already been admitted several times, as is established from both public and private documents;¹ from this it happens that greater penalties are inflicted on repeat offenders, and judges who inquire into crimes generally discover that not a few offenses of the same kind were committed by the guilty. - It is likewise true that by most guilty persons no pity is shown at the very time when the crime is carried out; but often, after the crime has been committed, the most criminal men are so moved by mercy that they shed tears,² if however cases are excepted in which homicide was deliberately committed from hatred or revenge: for passions of this kind greatly darken the mind and moral sense, unless from the beginning they are strenuously attacked and conquered.

¹ Proal, op. cit., p. 117-118.

² Ibid., p. 120.

(d) Nor do guilty persons generally act imprudently; for from public documents it is established that many of them remain unknown, because they skillfully hide themselves from magistrates.³ Hence if a few show themselves improvident in certain circumstances, it is not logically inferred from this that all and permanently labor under infirmity of mind.

³ "For greater precision, I am going to borrow some examples from the criminal statistics of 1880. From 1875 to 1880, there were on average per year 34,501 individuals judged for thefts; but the authors of 38,682 thefts remained unknown and the presumed authors of 2,720 other thefts were dismissed from prosecution for insufficient charges. More than six tenths of thieves remained unpunished. In the same period, there were 197 individuals judged for assassination, but the authors of 72 assassinations remained unknown, and 77 were dismissed from prosecution for insufficient charges." (Proal, op. cit., p. 115-116.)

273. 3. What concerning the law of heredity? That certain physical diseases and defects are transmitted by heredity from parents to children is known to all; in the same way, although neither so universally nor so efficaciously, it is commonly held that certain aptitudes of mind pass into descendants, on account of the connection which is acknowledged to exist between dispositions of the body and faculties of the mind. With regard to moral propensities, we also confess that these are sometimes poured from parents into children, especially those which are more intimately connected with the constitution of the body and blood, such as inclinations to drunkenness, vices of the flesh, anger, etc. Hence in most regions examples are alleged of families in which certain vices seem to have been transmitted through many generations.¹ Besides, congenital propensities of this kind are greatly increased by education, as long as children remain under the power and influence of parents. Therefore, whenever judgment is made concerning the gravity of crimes which have been committed by children whose parents had been addicted to vices, they are surely to be dealt with more mildly.

¹ You will find not a few examples of this kind in P. Aubry, La Contagion du meurtre, 2nd ed., Paris, 1894, p. 17-51; R. L. Dugdale, The Jukes, New York, where, through five generations, the history of a certain American family is described, nearly all of whose members publicly indulged in vice.

274. Yet from this it is by no means established that they are immune from every moral fault. For by heredity and education depraved inclinations are much increased, but they are not irresistible, nor do they utterly extinguish liberty. For experience establishes that not a few, born from vicious parents, cultivated distinguished virtues, and on the contrary that many, born from honorable parents, fell into the mire of vices. Even in these families which seem to be as if immersed in vice, not a few members are found who cultivated virtue.²

² Cf. Aubry, op. cit., pp. 42, 48, 50.

275. 4. What concerning social causes? It cannot be doubted that crimes are promoted or on the contrary restrained by the laws and institutes of society. Let us bring forward certain examples:

(A) Whenever religion is fostered, by that very fact crimes are diminished and prevented, since many are deterred from vice by fear of eternal punishments, and are drawn to virtue by hope of eternal beatitude; on the contrary, when religion is altogether omitted in the education of boys or in public institutes, many more offenses are committed, according to experience as witness, and as the adversaries themselves confess.³

³ Thus in France, from the year 1880, the offenses and crimes of youths and adolescents were greatly multiplied. For these things are read in the report to the President of the Republic for the year 1894: "Number of minors accused of offenses of common law: males from 16 to 21 years: 1880: 22,267; 1890: 25,416; 1894: 28,701." (Annuaire d'Economie Politique, by M. Block, 1897, p. 212.) That this must be attributed to the neutral school is confessed by men by no means religious, such as J. Bonzon, Le Crime et l'Ecole, Paris, 1896; Fouillee, Les Jeunes Criminels, in Revue des Deux-Mondes, Jan. 15, 1897, p. 417-449.

(B) Likewise laws or customs favoring drunkenness more or less by that very fact promote crimes; for, as experience testifies, many things are committed under the influence of alcoholism.¹

¹ E. Masoin, L'alcool et le crime, in Revue neo-scolastique, Nov. 1901, p. 362-369, where these things, among others, are gathered from public documents, p. 363: "Of the whole number of criminals, 11 percent were in a state of drunkenness at the moment of the deed; for those condemned to death, it rises to 43 percent. - Of the whole number of criminals, 44 percent were notorious drunkards; for those condemned to forced labor the figure of 44 percent rises to 54 percent and for those condemned to death it reaches 60 percent." - Cf. Treatise on Sins, n. 550-555.

276. (C) No less dangerous is the immoderate license of writing all things or of exhibiting in theaters even obscene things and those things which incite readers or hearers to crimes of diverse kinds; for many guilty persons openly declared that they had been impelled by all these things to commit crimes about which they had not previously thought.²

² Fouillee, Les Jeunes Criminels, l.c., p. 436-443; Proal, op. cit., p. 187 sq.

(D) Finally the manner of acting with guilty persons who are thrust into prisons often contributes most greatly to the propagation of crime; for those who committed an offense only accidentally, when an occasion was given, indeed also those who are accused of crime, generally cohabit with those who have frequently committed crimes; from which it happens that they hear many things by which they are impelled to vice and crimes, so that not a few leave prison worse than before; hence the number of repeat offenders grows day by day.³

³ Aubry, La Contagion du Meurtre, p. 55-67; H. Joly, Le Combat contre le Crime, Paris, 2nd ed., s.d., p. 182-261.

277. Conclusion. Therefore the causes impelling to crime are multiple; nor surely are the primary ones to be omitted, namely depraved propensities and passions,⁴ which are in all more or less, and are rooted more deeply in the soul through vicious habits, education, and other external causes. Among these are eminent: -

⁴ Concerning these there is fuller treatment in the Treatise on Sins and Vices, n. 510-567.

(A) Cupidity, or the sacred hunger for gold, that is, the inordinate propensity for acquiring riches by all means, even illegitimate ones, as quickly as possible; for this directly incites to theft, but indirectly to homicide, whenever this is apprehended as a useful means for becoming rich. Hence deservedly the Apostle:¹ "For they who wish to become rich fall into temptation, and into the snare of the devil, and into many useless and harmful desires, which plunge men into destruction and perdition. For cupidity is the root of all evils."

¹ I Tim., VI, 9-10.

278. (B) Pleasure, or the inordinate love of carnal delights, intemperance and lust, to which men cannot indulge unless they have money; hence, when their own resources have now been dissipated, nothing remains except to steal; besides, those who indulge in wine and women not rarely fall into quarrels and contentions, and so are impelled to greater crimes, as mournful experience establishes.² The Wise Man had already said this:³ "A drunken workman will not become rich... Wine and women make wise men apostatize, and they will rebuke the sensible: and he who joins himself to fornicators will be wicked: rottenness and worms will inherit him... and he will be taken away from the number of his soul."

² You have examples in Proal, op. cit., p. 254-263; H. Joly, La Criminalite de la Jeunesse; M. De Morrison, Juvenile offenders, New York, 1897, p. 69 sq.; Proal, Le Crime et le Suicide passionnels, Paris, 1900.

³ Eccli., XIX, 1.

279. Pride, or the inordinate love of one's own excellence, which is accompanied by an excessive appetite for honors and vainglory, and which is followed by envy, hatred, and the desire of revenge. For from these often arise thefts, by which riches desired for vain display may be more easily acquired; contentions, quarrels, homicides, by which those who are hated or excite envy may be more efficaciously removed.⁴ - This indeed can be illustrated from many texts of Scripture: "Pride is hateful before God and men: and all iniquity of nations is execrable... since the beginning of all sin is pride."⁵ - "Not as Cain, who was of the evil one, and slew his brother. And why did he kill him? Because his works were evil, but those of his brother were just... Everyone who hates his brother is a murderer."¹ - "Whence are wars and contentions among you? Is it not from this? From your concupiscences, which war in your members... You kill and envy."²

⁴ Proal, op. cit., p. 245-251; 257-258; 260-262.

⁵ Eccli., X, 7, 15.

¹ I John III, 12, 15.

² James IV, 1-2.

Hence criminal men, if you except the insane who are impelled to crime by a certain blind instinct, are not born such, but become such by their own weakness or malice, yet often under the influence of external causes.

280. Means of this kind cannot be efficacious unless they meet the causes of crimes. Now concerning anatomical defects, insanity, or weakness of mind, nothing special occurs to be said, since these concern physicians rather than priests. The laws of heredity likewise cannot be changed; but depraved propensities transmitted by heredity, or strengthened by habits, can in some way be corrected by Christian education and manly effort. But social causes can be changed for the better by new laws and by private associations of citizens.

281. 1. First of all Christian education is required, by which depraved inclinations can be moderated and tamed. And indeed, when a family is endowed with honesty and religion, nowhere can a better education be found than in the paternal home. But where parents are vicious and irreligious, an effort must be made so that, with license obtained from the parents or from civil authority, the children may be handed over to another family, in which they can be instructed in a Christian manner. If both are lacking, let them be committed to one of the Catholic orphanages which today have been erected in almost every place.³

³ Concerning various institutes of this kind see Paris charitable et prevoyant, Paris, 1897, p. 28-260; La France charitable et prevoyante; Maxime du Camp, Paris bienfaisant, Paris, 1888, p. 161-201 and 392-425; P. Delay, Les OEuvres de preservation et de rehabilitation, in Correspondant, Nov. 25, 1903, p. 723-753.

This education ought to tend to this, that depraved inclinations, as soon as they are manifested, may be restrained and rooted out, e.g., propensity to small thefts, cruelty even toward brutes, etc. Likewise the notion of the duty to be fulfilled should often be inculcated, by which the innate tendency toward pleasure may be lessened; the faculties of the soul, especially reason and will, should be directed perpetually to the good; but chiefly the love of God and neighbor on account of God should frequently be presented as the supreme duty.¹

¹ Among others, Dupanloup discusses education excellently, De l'Education, 7th ed., Paris, 1886, especially t. I, p. 1-176; t. II, p. 108-484; t. III, p. 367-498; Lettres sur l'Education des Filles, Paris, 1879.

282. 2. Yet education profits little unless youths are gradually taught to fly with their own wings, or to act by their own powers. For since the life of man upon earth is warfare, and our wrestling is especially against the passions inclining the will to evil, it is necessary that each one, relying on the help of God, be able by his own effort to fight strenuously and constantly against depraved inclinations; for this two things especially are desired: a firm persuasion of mind concerning duty to be placed before all things, - and an unconquered strength of will for overcoming obstacles. But the passions are not to be utterly rooted out, since they add strength to the soul, but are to be directed to the good and honorable; thus the covetous should desire the treasures of heavenly grace and glory; the ambitious should turn their powers to promoting the kingdom of God; and so concerning the others, as is set forth more fully in the Treatise on Virtues.

283. 3. Social causes which impel to crime must be removed with all strength, insofar as this can be done.

(A) Impiety and irreligion must be restrained by providing more efficaciously for the Christian education of youths, by instituting Catholic schools, by setting forth the doctrine of Christ more frequently, by creating associations and confraternities, by using laymen as auxiliary apostles for propagating religion, etc.

(B) Intemperance, which casts so many men into vices, must be attacked by the various means which are proposed by societies favoring temperance,² by vividly describing the depraved consequences of drunkenness, and by procuring honorable recreations for youths, by which they may be kept away from taverns and drinking houses; and by favoring laws which restrict the number of taverns.

² For several years now societies of this kind have been instituted in Ireland, England, and the United States of America, and they have served not a little for restraining drunkenness. Recently in France certain ones have likewise been founded, and in these days (Oct. 1903) a Congress was held at Paris for promoting temperance in various ways; concerning which see the periodical La Temperance, Nov.-Dec. 1903. - Cf. Mgr. Turinaz, Le clerge catholique et la lutte contre l'alcoolisme, Paris, 1901; Riemain, Plan de campagne contre l'alcoolisme, Paris, 1901; La Science Sociale, Oct. and Nov. 1903, p. 334-335; Oudaille, Le Foyer familial et la femme contre l'alcoolisme, Paris, 1904; Cheysson and Riemain, Premier Congres national contre l'alcoolisme, Paris, 1904; Bertillon, L'alcoolisme et les moyens de le combattre, Paris, 1904.

284. (C) With regard to books, newspapers, spectacles, and other things of this kind which corrupt morals and prepare the way for many crimes, nothing is more efficacious for warding off these dangers than to spread good books and newspapers, - to offer honorable recreations especially to the younger, - to institute Catholic associations, in which all those who sincerely wish to cultivate religion and virtue will be able to be gathered together. Nor nevertheless should legal means be omitted by which scandalous exhibitions can be impeded.

(D) Nor must one altogether despair of those who are thrust into prisons: (a) all those who strive to reform their morals must be aided with all strength, whether by proposing wiser laws concerning the manner of acting with the guilty, or by visiting those detained in prison and instructing and educating them;¹ (b) when the guilty are freed from prison and are prepared to begin a new life, work should be procured for them, insofar as this can be done, so that they may be able to live honorably; for experience establishes that not a few relapse because they have not found the means of living honorably.²

¹ Concerning this see H. Joly, A la recherche de l'Education correctionnelle, Paris, 1902; Le Combat contre le crime, ch. V-VIII.

² Joly, Le Combat contre le crime, ch. IX-X.

By these and other means, which, when opportunity is given, will occur to the mind, the number of crimes will be able to be diminished, and not a few of those who have committed crime from human frailty will return themselves to better fruit.

Before we discuss the individual species of injuries, it will not be beside the matter to set forth certain principles which are common to all: 1. concerning the gravity of injury; 2. concerning the axiom: injury is not done to one knowing and willing; 3. concerning the other axiom: injury is not done when the owner is irrationally unwilling; 4. concerning the influence of intention on the injustice of an external act.

285. 1. On the gravity of injury. Injury is a grave sin from its kind, insofar as it violates a right which of itself is of grave moment; but it can be venial both from imperfection of the voluntary act and from smallness of matter.

But in order to judge whether an injury is grave or not, attention must be paid to two things: (a) to individual men whose rights are injured, namely whether a grave hurt or damage is inflicted upon them, whether material or spiritual, by disturbing their liberty, security, or peace; for, as St. Thomas rightly says,¹ "sins which are committed against one's neighbor are to be weighed in themselves according to the harms which are inflicted upon the neighbor, because from this they have the character of fault"; (b) to society itself, namely to the damage which is inflicted upon the public good, or which would be inflicted if such an injury were committed with impunity; for since the common good, other things being equal, prevails over the private good, he sins mortally who, although he has inflicted only slight damage upon some private person, gravely harms the commonwealth, or would harm it on the supposition that his action were not prohibited under grave sin. Thus he who steals one hundred coins from a rich man perhaps brings him only slight harm; nevertheless he sins mortally, because, on the supposition that such theft were not prohibited under grave sin, the order of society would soon be overthrown.

¹ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 73, a. 3.

286. 2. On the meaning of the axiom: To one knowing and consenting, injury and deceit are not done.² The meaning is that no injury is committed against him who knowingly and freely can and wills to renounce his right; for then he cannot complain of a violated right.

² Reg. 27 de Reg. juris in 6°, p. 1122, ed. Richter-Friedberg.

But, in order that the axiom may be true, it is necessary that the consent be:

(a) Fully free, that is, extorted neither by error nor by deceit or fear; thus the traveler who, through fear of death, hands money to a robber lacks due liberty, - as does the laborer who, compelled by necessity, accepts a wage less than what is owed from strict justice, - and the one who gives money to someone falsely asserting that he is his relative, when the only motive of the donation is the alleged kinship, etc.

(b) Valid, or truly given by him who can lawfully renounce his own right. Now he who patiently tolerates or condones an injury is not by that very fact judged to yield his right; nor even he who, for the sake of humility, desires reproaches; but an act is required by which one properly abdicates his rights; and, although consent can sometimes be presumed, if it rests upon valid reasons, it ought not easily to be presumed.

On the other hand, the consent of one who consents to be killed in a duel is not valid, - nor that of a husband who permits another to use his wife, - nor that of a cleric who renounces the privilege of the canon; for the rights in question can be renounced neither licitly nor validly.

Moreover, in order that the one injuring may be immune from the sin of injustice, it is required that he know that this abdication of right has in fact been made validly; otherwise subjectively he will be guilty of injustice.

287. 3. On the meaning of the axiom: Injury is not done when the owner is irrationally unwilling. When from strict justice the owner is bound not to be unwilling to the occupation of his thing, no injury is done to him, even if he opposes this occupation; e.g., a poor man placed in extreme necessity can take bread necessary for sustenance, even against the owner's will; for in this case the owner from strict justice is bound to permit the hungry man to take what is necessary for saving his life, unless he himself is in the same necessity; hence he does not have a right to retain his thing; nor consequently is injury done to him.

288. 4. On the influence of intention in the injustice of an external act. Since two things are required for injury, namely an action or omission injurious to another's right and the mind or intention of harming, the question arises whether the agent's intention influences the injustice of the act, so that from the internal act the external act can become unjust.

Now especially a threefold hypothesis can be conceived:

(A) When the external act is of itself indifferent, the agent's intention can render it unjust, because it can bring it about that this act is harmful to another or not; thus he who buys a stolen thing with the intention of returning it to its owner does nothing unjust; but if with the mind of retaining the same thing, he commits an injury.

(B) But when the external act is of itself just and licit, a depraved intention of harming does not render it unjust; such is the case of a judge who justly, from proofs, condemns the guilty man to death, even if he does this from hatred; for then he does not violate the neighbor's right, since the latter has juridically been recognized as guilty; nevertheless he injures charity by the sin of hatred.

(C) When the external act is indeed illicit, but not unjust, the intention of harming does not render it unjust; e.g., he does not act unjustly who refuses to aid another who is in grave danger, since otherwise he is bound to this only from charity; for although he does this from the mind of harming, he does not injure the other's strict right.

Injuries of this kind are prohibited by the fifth precept of the Decalogue: "You shall not kill"; by which words, primarily indeed, the unjust killing of oneself or of one's neighbor is forbidden; but secondarily wounding, or mutilation, in one word, whatever unjustly injures either one's own body or another's body.¹ Therefore we shall speak:

¹ Concerning injury in the matter of chastity, namely concerning defloration and adultery, this is treated in the Treatise on Chastity.

1. of the killing of oneself, or suicide;

2. of the killing of one's neighbor, or homicide;

3. of the duel, which partakes of the nature of both;

4. of war, in which many homicides are perpetrated.

289. Historical survey. (A) Among the Jews very few examples of suicide are found, both because that crime was prohibited by God, and because the Israelites desired to be long-lived upon the earth. The cases indeed are alleged of Samson,³ Saul,⁴ Achitophel,⁵ Eleazar,⁶ Razias;⁷ but Samson and Eleazar did not properly commit suicide, but gave their life for their country, in order to rout enemies.

² St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 64, a. 5; Lugo, disp. X, n. 1-55; Lessius, lib. I, cap. 9, dub. 6; Billuart, diss. X, art. 3; St. Alphonsus, n. 366-375; Carriere, n. 833-856; Ball. P., tr. VI, n. 855-875; Tissot, De la manie du suicide, Paris, 1841; Lisle, Du suicide, Paris, 1856; Morselli, Il suicidio, Milan, 1879; Legoyt, Le suicide ancien et moderne, Paris, 1881; Masaryk, Der Selbstmord als sociale Massenerscheinung, Vienna, 1881; Westcott, Suicide, its history, litterature, etc., London, 1885; Bonomelli, Il suicidio, Milan, 1892; E. Durkheim, Le Suicide, etude de sociologie, Paris, 1897; P. Hauviller, Du suicide, unite de son etiologie, son traitement, Paris, 1899; L. Proal, Le Crime et le suicide passionnels, Paris, 1900; Gurnhill, The Morals of suicide, London, 1900.

³ Jud., XVI, 22-30.

⁴ I Reg., XXXI, 2-6.

⁵ II Reg., XVII, 23.

⁶ I Mach., VI, 43-46.

⁷ II Mach., XIV, 37-46.

(B) Among the Greeks,¹ the chief philosophers, such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, regarded self-killing as something cowardly; yet some killed themselves, whether on account of the public good, or to avoid disgrace or other private evils; such were Codrus the Athenian, Menoeceus the Theban, Cleomenes, king of Sparta, Themistocles, Isocrates. The Stoics advocated suicide as an act of virtue, by which they could at their pleasure be snatched from the bonds of life; and also the Epicureans, as a means of fleeing the bitternesses of life.

¹ Concerning the history of suicide among the Greeks and other Nations see Legoyt, op. cit., p. 7 sq.

(C) At Rome, as long as the citizens cultivated virtues and honorable and simple morals, suicide was almost unknown; especially the examples of Lucretia, Scipio of Utica, Cassius, and Brutus are cited. But as soon as wealth, luxury, and love of pleasures flourished, namely in the last times of the Republic and under the reign of the Emperors, many citizens, in order to avoid pains or a more cruel death, took away their own life.

290. (D) These morals the Christian religion corrected, by often inculcating human dignity, the value of life, patience in adversities, and trust in God. Hence, among Christians, suicides became exceedingly rare. There were indeed some who went to meet martyrdom, and also Christian virgins who, lest they lose virginity, did not hesitate to bring death upon themselves;² but the Fathers, especially St. Augustine,³ while they praised their virtue and right intention, reproved the deed itself. Likewise certain heretics, akin to the Donatists and called Circumcellions, approved suicide; these "were accustomed to kill themselves by various deaths, especially by precipices and waters and fires, and to seduce into that madness others of either sex whom they could."⁴ But for this reason they are severely censured by the Fathers.

² Thus St. Pelagia (in St. Ambrose, de Virginibus, III, 7), Domnica with her two daughters (Eusebius, Eccles. Hist., VIII, 12, in Migne, P. G. XX, 770-771), Sophronia (Eusebius, op. cit., VIII, 14, Migne, l. c. 786-787).

³ De civit. Dei, l. I, c. 26-27, in Migne, P. L. XLI, 39-40.

⁴ St. Augustine, De Haeresibus, n. 69, in Migne, XLII, 43.

291. (E) But in more recent times, as faith decreased and pagan morals gradually were reborn, not a few writers again advocated suicide, among whom were Montaigne, Montesquieu, Rousseau, who, otherwise little consistent with himself, elsewhere reproved that crime, - d'Holbach, Barbieri, J. Robeck,⁵ and generally the positivists and materialists. Therefore suicides became more frequent, especially in France and Germany.⁶ Besides, in various regions many more are committed among Protestants than among Catholics, even according to non-Catholic writers as witnesses.¹

⁵ Concerning these see Legoyt, op. cit., p. 85-99.

⁶ In France suicides are multiplied daily; - namely, in the year 1826 there were counted 1739; in 1851: 3639; in 1888: 8451; in 1897: 9156. If a comparison is made with other regions, already in the year 1888 France held the first place; for this was the proportion of suicides per 1,000,000 inhabitants: - in France: 212; in Prussia: 198; among the Belgians: 116; in Austria: 114; in England: 80; in Italy: 53. - In cities suicides are more frequent than among country people; thus per 1,000,000 inhabitants there are had at Leipzig: 450; at Paris: 400; at Berlin: 300; at Vienna: 290. Cf. M. Block, L'Europe politique et sociale, Paris, 1892, p. 459, 460, 462. - As to the causes of suicide, these things are read in M. Block, op. cit., p. 461: "Relatively to the presumed motives of suicides, the General Account gives the following averages for the period 1876-80: poverty and reverses of fortune, 698; family sorrows, 842; love, jealousy, etc., 254; drunkenness, 799; desire to withdraw oneself from judicial proceedings, 236; physical sufferings, 202; cerebral maladies, 1901; others and unknown, 627."

¹ Durkheim, op. cit., p. 149-173; Hauviller, op. cit., p. 62-65.

292. Division of the matter. Suicide is sometimes directly intended as an end or a means: then it is called direct; but sometimes it is not intended in itself, but is foreseen as probably going to follow from the action which is placed; thus a soldier about to fight for his country foresees that death will probably follow from the battle; then suicide, if it really occurs, is indirect. Hence we shall speak: 1. of direct suicide; 2. of indirect suicide; 3. by way of corollary, of mutilation of oneself, surgical operations, and care of one's own body.

293. 1. Principle: Suicide, directly and by one's own authority intended, is of itself a grave sin, injurious to God and harmful no less to the individual than to society.

It is said: by one's own authority... so that the case of one who would kill himself by divine inspiration may be excluded; - of itself, grave, because there can be some who in good faith, on account of various motives, take away their own life; but of itself the sin is mortal, on account of the motives which we now explain.

294. (A) It is a sin injurious to God;² for, from what has been said above (n. 34), perfect dominion over his own life does not belong to man, but only dependently upon God, its founder, supreme lord, and last end. Now, by taking away life from himself by his own hand, he violates God's rights: (a) since God, and indeed He alone, as supreme lord of all, has the right of disposing of human life, which He handed over to us after the manner of a deposit, and which we ought to use according to His will: for creatures essentially and according to their whole being depend upon the Creator; this indeed the Apostle intimates: "For none of us lives to himself, and no one dies to himself. For whether we live, we live to the Lord; or whether we die, we die to the Lord. Therefore whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord's."¹ (b) Moreover God, insofar as He is the last end, has a strict right that we tend toward Him by the means which He has determined; now He has established according to His wisdom the term of our life and probation, and therefore we usurp His rights if by premature death of our own will we put an end to this probation.²

² This is the chief argument; the two others only confirm it.

¹ Rom., XIV, 7-8.

² Some pagans had already understood this; for Socrates (in Plato, Phaed., c. 6) says: "This seems to me, O Cebes, to be said rightly, that God indeed has care of us; but we men are one certain thing among the possessions of the gods. Would you not therefore also be angry if one of your slaves killed himself, and, if you had power, would you not affect him with some punishment?"

Therefore deservedly St. Augustine writes that self-killing is prohibited by these words, You shall not kill: "It remains that we understand of man what was said, You shall not kill: neither another, therefore, nor yourself; for he who kills himself kills nothing other than a man."³

³ De Civ. Dei, lib. I, c. 20, in Migne, P. L., XLI, 35; a little above, c. 17, p. 30-31, he had said: "For surely, if it is not licit by private power to kill a man, even a guilty one, whose killing no law permits, certainly also he who kills himself is a homicide; and he becomes so much the more guilty when he kills himself, the more innocent he was in that cause for which he thought he ought to be killed."

295. (B) Harmful to the individual himself; for he who spontaneously casts away life by that very fact takes from himself not only a present good, but every further abundance of good. (a) For life is the greatest good which we can enjoy in the present life;⁴ for it is the condition without which we cannot enjoy other goods; as long as we live, we can acquire not only external goods, but also internal goods, namely knowledge, virtue, merits; but by voluntarily deserting life, we are deprived of all these things. (b) Moreover, as long as we preserve life unharmed, even if we are oppressed by various miseries and immersed in vices, hope remains that, circumstances having changed and morals having been reformed, things may proceed prosperously for us, and that we may redeem the faults of our past life by due satisfaction and by the practice of virtues; but if suicide is perpetrated, every hope vanishes, and nothing remains except that we pay the penalty proportioned to our faults. (c) It is a law implanted in our nature that we cultivate by manly effort the faculties received from God, physical, mental, and moral; the more perfect this development is, the greater is our happiness, since by the legitimate and progressive exercise of the faculties we approach more closely our last end; but, on the other hand, if life is cut off immaturely, man withers like a dried flower, before he has attained the degree of perfection destined for him.

⁴ On the moment and value of life Olle-Laprune discusses excellently, Le prix de la vie, 3rd ed., Paris, 1896.

296. (C) Harmful to society. Every man is inserted into society as a useful member, and remains bound to it by certain bonds and duties, because he unceasingly receives many benefits from it: for he enjoys the protection of society, and by its aid he is able so to cultivate his faculties that their force is increased a hundredfold. Therefore he ought to pay the debts of charity and justice to the State; this indeed he can furnish by working, teaching, giving good example, and by other means by which the public good is promoted. Now, by departing from life by his own motion, the citizen despises all these duties, and gives scandal to those to whom he ought to have been of utility and edification. Deservedly, therefore, he is compared to a soldier who deserts the post where he ought to fight strenuously; deservedly he is held guilty of cowardice.

297. (A) First of all there are alleged the infirmities and miseries of human life, such as poverty, disease, especially incurable disease, old age, bitter pains, weariness, griefs, and other things of this kind; and from this it is inferred that death is more desirable than a life overwhelmed by so many and so great miseries.

But in this a false concept of life is presented; for we are not here upon earth in order to enjoy pleasures, but in order to cultivate virtues by the legitimate exercise of the faculties, to increase moral perfection, and to obtain a better life. Now nothing is more efficacious than tribulation for the practice of virtues; for virtue is perfected in infirmity, fortitude is strengthened in adversities,¹ patience is exercised by bearing pains bravely, merits are greatly increased; moreover, if we have sinned, an occasion offers itself for expiating faults by salutary penance. Thus the distresses of this life are rendered more tolerable; indeed they bring a certain joy, according to that word of the Apostle:² "And not only this, but we glory also in tribulations, knowing that tribulation works patience; and patience probation; and probation hope. And hope does not confound."

¹ Already Martial the poet had said: "In adverse things it is easy to despise life; he acts bravely who is able to be miserable."

² Rom., V, 3-5; cf. VIII, 18-39, where the same thing is set forth more fully.

298. (B) Others kill themselves because they cannot tolerate disgrace, since honor is life itself, and more precious.

A foolish excuse indeed! From the fact that others unjustly attack our reputation, must we punish ourselves by taking away life with a cruel hand? Nor indeed do we thus recover the good estimation of our neighbor; but, on the contrary, by living honestly and acting nobly we overcome false accusations. But if we have been guilty of some fault, reputation is recovered not by suicide, by which disgrace is increased, but by a praiseworthy life.

299. (C) Some, in order to preserve chastity, have gone to meet death, since virtue is much more precious than life.

And these indeed are subjectively worthy of excuse, on account of the right intention which they had, as St. Augustine notes; but, according to the same, this is not in itself a sufficient reason for committing suicide; for since purity is a virtue of the soul, it is not lost even when the body is oppressed, as the holy Doctor says:³ "Wherefore a woman violently oppressed without any consent, and forced by another's sin, has nothing which she may punish in herself by voluntary death: much less before this happens; lest certain homicide be admitted, while the very crime, although another's, still remains uncertain." - In reality, material integrity of the flesh is not more precious than life, since sometimes it is licitly lost, in surgical operations, in order to save life. - But what if there is present a danger of inwardly consenting? Not even in this case is it licit to kill oneself; for in so great a danger grace will not be lacking for resisting lust, provided it is earnestly sought: "But God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able, but will make also with temptation an outcome, that you may be able to bear it."⁴ Therefore nothing remains except that one must fight strenuously; and what is said of this temptation must be said of others: it is licit for no one, in order to overcome any temptations whatever, to kill himself; for evils are not to be done that goods may come.

³ De Civit. Dei, l. I, c. 18, in Migne, XLI, 31-32.

⁴ I Cor., X, 13.

300. (D) Not a few contend that they lead a useless life, indeed one burdensome to others, or even harmful, insofar as they give scandal, so that by killing themselves they promote the good of their neighbor or of society.

But that these motives are not sufficient is already clear from what has been said. (a) If someone leads a useless life, nothing prevents him by praying, working, and helping others by works of charity from bringing many benefits both to himself and to others;¹ for this is the law of Providence: that, while we do good to others, we contribute most greatly to our own happiness. (b) But if we impose burdens upon others, because of disease, old age, etc., by that very fact we offer them an occasion of exercising patience and acquiring merits; on the other hand, by bravely tolerating our infirmities, we are unto edification for them: "Bear one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfill the law of Christ."² (c) But if we have harmed society or our neighbor, the duty lies upon us of repairing scandal by honesty and sanctity of life; by no means, however, do we have the right of taking away our life, since this rather gives new scandal.

¹ This J. J. Rousseau, who elsewhere favors suicide, explains eloquently: "Suicide is a furtive and shameful death; it is a theft committed against the human race. Before leaving it, give back to it what it has done for you. - But I am attached to nothing, I am useless to the world. - Philosopher of a day! do you not know that you could not take a step upon the earth without finding some duty to fulfill, and that every man is useful to humanity by the sole fact that he exists? Senseless youth! if there remains at the bottom of your heart the least sentiment of virtue, come, that I may teach you to love life. Each time that you are tempted to go out of it, say to yourself: 'let me do one more good action before dying,' then go seek some indigent person to aid, some unfortunate person to console, some oppressed person to defend." (Nouvelle Heloise, III, letter 22.)

² Galat. VI, 2.

301. A point to be noted for practice. Since some are led to suicide by a certain auto-suggestion, by the force of which, by frequently thinking about their own miseries, they gradually persuade themselves that there is no other means of extricating themselves from these difficulties except to perpetrate suicide, it is of the greatest moment to turn their mind away from this continual thought, by suggesting to them some work of charity, or another occupation by which they may more easily overcome weariness of life.

302. 1. Principle: It is not licit to kill oneself indirectly, or to do or omit something from which death is foreseen as going to follow, unless from a proportionately grave cause.

This is clear from what was said in the Treatise on Human Acts, where voluntary indirect action was treated. For indirect suicide is nothing other than an act good of itself, or at least indifferent, from which death follows per accidens and beyond the intention; now an act of this kind is indeed not licit when there is no sufficient reason, because to posit the cause of some grave evil, without a sufficient motive, is something gravely sinful; but if a proportionate cause is present, it becomes licit; for the evil effect is not intended, but only permitted, and otherwise is compensated for by the good effect directly intended.

303. 2. What cause is proportionately grave? The general principle is that a greater cause is required the nearer and more certain the danger of death is. Let us run through the principal causes:

(A) The public good is a sufficient cause for someone to expose himself to a danger even proximate and certain of death; thus it is licit for soldiers to set fire to a ship, or to explode a fortress, in order to submerge or destroy enemies, although their own death would certainly follow from this; but this of itself is not licit merely in order to avoid captivity, unless some hope shines forth of avoiding death. - The fulfillment of the duties of one's state can be referred to the public good; thus priests, physicians, and other men to whom by office the care of others belongs can, and sometimes ought, to expose themselves even to proximate danger of death, in order to procure the salvation, life, or security of others.

304. (B) A good of a superior order, even individual, such as the exercise of charity, faith, chastity, justice, and other Christian virtues, is a sufficient reason for going to meet even certain danger of death.

Thus, for the sake of charity, someone can expose himself to danger of death in order to save the life of parents, a spouse, a friend, a neighbor; e.g., in shipwreck it is licit to yield to another a plank already seized, although it is foreseen that death will follow from this. For the sake of faith, it is licit not only to bear death bravely, but also not to flee, even if an opportunity offers itself, - indeed to present oneself to judges, if this is judged necessary for strengthening others in the faith. For protecting chastity, a virgin upon whom violence is inflicted can flee, and in fleeing can cast herself headlong from a high cliff or from a window, even if death can follow from this, yet not altogether certainly, because not death itself, but the keeping of virginity, is intended.

From love of justice, evildoers can offer themselves to judges to be condemned and killed; indeed, when someone has been found guilty of death, more probably he can, at the judge's command, take poison with his own hands (as is narrated of Socrates), because then he does nothing other than execute a just sentence; yet not a few contradict this, because it is repugnant to equity that the guilty man be compelled to kill himself.

305. (C) In order to avoid a more certain danger of death, or a more cruel kind of death, it is licit to expose oneself to a morally certain danger to life; thus it is licit to leap from a window, with very probable loss of life, in order to flee flames; to cast oneself headlong from a tower, even with certain danger of death, in order to flee a more atrocious death which evildoers are actually about to inflict.

306. (D) When there is question of a danger to life not certain, but more or less probable, a lesser cause suffices. Thus it is licit to serve those laboring under a contagious disease, even if there is a great danger of contracting the plague; craftsmen can exercise a dangerous art, e.g., ascend the roofs of buildings, even with probable danger of death, when this is useful for the support of themselves and their family. - But if there is question of arts less necessary and more dangerous, e.g., of taming wild beasts, penitents indeed should be kept away from these, insofar as this can be done; but if they have exercised these arts for a long time, and, because of the special skill with which they are endowed, the danger is not so proximate, and on the other hand they can scarcely otherwise provide for themselves and their own, they are not to be compelled to abandon their art.

307. When something is done or omitted from which life is shortened by several years, a less grave reason suffices; for the danger of death is not so proximate.

(a) Hence it is licit for workers to blow glass, gild metals, and exercise other arts by which life is rendered shorter; for the good, both private and public, demands that sometimes human life be shortened, whether for one's own support, or for the progress of industrial or mechanical affairs. Nevertheless an effort must be made that, in the best way possible, works entrusted to craftsmen be rendered less dangerous.

(b) Regularly no one is bound to use extraordinary means in order to live longer; for the law of prolonging life for a long time does not oblige with so great an inconvenience. Thus those who inhabit a region not very healthy are not bound to seek a healthier one by going to a distant region; those who could live longer by abstaining from a certain drink or food are not bound under grave sin to abstain from these, provided they observe the laws of temperance; nor is it necessary to undergo a dangerous operation in order to prolong life, unless per accidens this is necessary for the good of the family or of the State.

308. 1. On mutilation of oneself. It is not licit to mutilate oneself by one's own authority, unless this is necessary for preserving life or health. For man does not have full dominion over his person and members, but only dependently upon God (above, n. 34); consequently he cannot cut off his members, except from a permission of God reasonably presumed; now, since the parts exist for the sake of the whole, if the cutting off of some member is necessary or very useful for saving the whole body, the divine permission can deservedly be presumed.¹

¹ To the point St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 65, a. 1: "Since some member is part of the whole human body, it exists for the sake of the whole, as the imperfect for the sake of the perfect. Hence disposition must be made of a member of the human body according as it is expedient for the whole. Now a member of the human body is of itself indeed useful for the good of the whole body; yet per accidens it can happen that it is harmful; for example, when a putrid member is corruptive of the whole body... then it is licit, by the will of him whose member it is, to cut off the putrid member for the sake of the health of the whole body. And the same reason holds if it is done by the will of him to whom it belongs to care for the health of him who has the corruptive member."

309. (a) Therefore it is licit to submit oneself to surgical operations when they are judged by experts to be truly useful for preserving health, even when they are not free from danger, provided they are very useful; nevertheless it is expedient that the counsel not of one only, but of two or more, be taken, since today some favor these operations more than is fair, for the sake of experiment or gain.²

² Surbled, La Morale dans ses rapports avec la Medecine, Paris, t. II, pp. 188-193, 216-224.

(b) But it is not licit to mutilate oneself in order to acquire some gain or other advantage, e.g., to flee the burden of military service or to obtain more abundant alms; for this is not a sufficient reason, but smells of cowardice.

310. 2. On care of one's own body. Since the body is the instrument of the soul, and its health serves not a little for rightly accomplishing the operations of the soul, the duty lies upon each one of caring for his own body, by applying at least ordinary means for preserving health. Therefore those excesses in food and drink, labors and vigils, by which life is notably shortened or the body quickly becomes unequal to serving the soul, are to be avoided;¹ therefore in danger of death a physician should be called.

¹ Surbled, La Morale dans ses rapports avec la Medecine, Paris, 1900, t. I, p. 78-83.

Nevertheless moderate austerities are by no means prohibited, by which sensual inclinations can be more efficaciously tamed; for the body is the servant of the soul and ought to be reduced to servitude, so that it may serve the higher aspirations of the mind, according to that word of the Apostle:² "I chastise my body and bring it into servitude, lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become reprobate."

² I Cor., IX, 27. - Cf. On the Virtue of Charity, n. 767.

311. Homicide means the same thing as the killing of a man. But those who are killed can be innocent, or evildoers condemned by public authority, or unjust aggressors. Hence we shall speak: 1. of the killing of the innocent; 2. of the killing of an evildoer; 3. of the killing of an unjust aggressor. - But the things which we say concerning homicide can, with due proportion, be predicated of wounding and mutilation.

³ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 64; Lugo, disp. X, n. 56-223; Lessius, lib. II, c. 9, n. 36-111; Billuart, diss. X, art. 4-9; Carriere, II, n. 744-805; Ball. P., Tr. VI, n. 876-922; Lehmkuhl, n. 832-849.

This can be direct or indirect, as was said above concerning suicide.

312. Principle: The direct killing of an innocent person is a most grave sin, injurious to God, to the neighbor, and to society. - I say most grave, because by taking away life it inflicts a most grave injury.

(a) It is a sin injurious to God; for, since He is the supreme lord of life and death, His rights are violated by such homicide; hence He severely reproves this crime both by the words related above: You shall not kill; and by these, which declare the former: "The innocent and just you shall not kill, because I abhor the impious."⁴

⁴ Exod., XXIII, 7.

(b) Injurious to the neighbor; for since, from what was said above (n. 295), life is a very excellent good, and a means of enjoying many other goods, both natural and supernatural, he who voluntarily takes away the life of an innocent person does him the greatest injury; and this indeed is greater when he leaves him no time to be reconciled to God, if he is in the state of mortal sin.

(c) Injurious to society; for since the innocent person is a useful member of society, injury is done to the community by prematurely cutting off this member; whence the more useful the citizen was, the graver the crime is.

313. Corollaries. (a) It is not licit to kill the lethally wounded, the old, the sick, the dying, lest they suffer longer; nor the insane, lest they harm others, provided they can be restrained otherwise; nor a mother placed in extremis, so that the infant can be baptized; all these retain the right to life, and must be committed to God, who alone can dispose of their life.

(b) Nor can hostages (otages) be killed, even if the enemies who sent them have not kept the faith given, indeed even if they have killed other hostages.

(c) They sin gravely who, from whatever motive, kill infants, or directly accelerate their death: for these are innocent. Parents are guilty of a horrible crime who hand over their own children to others to be killed, so that they may make the insurance price their own.¹

¹ "Parents without entrails insure at a high rate the head of very young children, and, coldly, slowly, let them die of starvation and misery. The death which carries off these little beings, revealing no manifest violence, is most often reputed natural, and secures good annuities to its skillful and sinister authors." (Dr. Surbled, op. cit., t. III, p. 238). - Concerning the killing of an infant in the mother's womb we speak in the Supplement to the Treatise on Matrimony, n. 72-78.

(d) Sometimes relatives or kin of someone deceased ask from the physician that the heart of the dead man be pierced or an artery opened, lest perhaps he be buried alive. Now if the physician seriously doubts concerning death, he cannot perform this, since he would expose himself to the danger of killing a man who perhaps survives; but if certain signs of death are present, puncture of the heart is not illicit, since this is done only to free relatives from vain anxieties.

314. Principle: It is not licit to place an action from which certainly or probably the death of an innocent person will follow indirectly, unless from a proportionately grave cause and with a right intention. This is clear from what was said where indirect suicide was treated, above, n. 302.

Hence (a) in a just war it is licit to direct artillery (canons) against a besieged city, even if it is foreseen that many innocents will perish from this, provided this is held as a necessary and efficacious means for attacking the city; nevertheless it is equitable that the head of the city first be warned, so that women and infants can flee to a safe place.¹

¹ Bonfils, Manuel de Droit international, 3rd edition, Paris, 1901, n. 1083-1086.

(b) If someone, while an enemy pursues, cannot avoid death except by passing through a narrow way, with the danger of trampling an innocent person, he can do this.

(c) It is not licit for a physician, for the sake of experiment, to use a new remedy, or to perform a dangerous operation, when a more efficacious and less rash remedy is at hand.²

² Guermonprez, L'assassinat medical et le respect de la vie humaine, Paris, 1904.

315. (d) Likewise, in industrial matters, those sin who use dangerous materials or machines, from which the life of workers is placed in great danger, especially where the law prohibits this.³

³ P. Pic recounts the principal laws recently promulgated concerning this matter in various regions, Traite elementaire de legislation industrielle, Paris, 1903, n. 609-648.

(e) But he who places an action of itself not dangerous, or rarely and therefore not probably dangerous, from which nevertheless death follows by chance, is not morally guilty of homicide, provided he has applied ordinary diligence; thus a hunter who, while he gives himself to hunting with due diligence, by chance kills a man; for then he neither could nor ought to have foreseen death; otherwise it would have to be said if he is guilty of negligence, e.g., by imprudently playing with a gun; then he is gravely or lightly guilty, according as the negligence was grave or light.⁴

⁴ Concerning accidental homicide, with respect to French law, see Cod. pen., a. 319-320.

316. State of the question.⁵ It is indeed unjust to kill the innocent, but when there is question of evildoers who have been guilty of a most grave crime, the matter stands otherwise. For among almost all peoples, both ancient and recent, the punishment of death has been received by common usage.

⁵ Meyer, op. cit., II, n. 594.

Yet the Waldenses denied that even evildoers could be punished with the death penalty: this opinion was then commonly reproved. Nevertheless, already from the eighteenth century, not a few philosophers and jurists went over to the same opinion. Thus Cesare Beccaria (1716-1793) taught that the right of inflicting the penalty of death is to be restricted to the crime of dangerous sedition, or to the case in which the death of the delinquent is the only means for restraining the crimes of others;⁶ Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), who acknowledges as the principle of morality utility alone, denied that capital punishment is useful and consequently just.¹ Ch. Lucas² (1803-1889) proceeded further, directly asserting that the penalty of death is neither just nor useful: for neither in the individual nor in society is there an inherent direct right over the life of the neighbor, but only the right of repelling an unjust aggressor by force; now the penalty of death established by laws is not inflicted in self-defense, since the evildoer, having been captured by authority, is no longer able to harm, but only in vengeance; and this is manifestly unjust. - Others, with Spedalieri (1741-1795), defend the same in another way; namely they say that the State obtains its rights from a social pact, and therefore does not have the right of death, since citizens could not validly renounce the right and duty of preserving life.

⁶ Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, § 16.

¹ Theorie des peines et des recompenses, Paris, 1812.

² Many others wish the penalty of death to be abolished; among whom are Mittermaier, De la peine de mort, transl. Leven, 1865; C. J. Paton, Death Penalty, New York, 1891, with the authorities alleged, p. 140-160; Hello recounts others, Revue critique, 1867, t. 31, p. 322.

Hence in certain regions capital punishment in fact was abrogated: in Italy, in some parts of Switzerland, and in certain of the United States of America;³ but, after a few years, already in several of these States it was restored anew.

³ Garraud, Precis du Droit Criminel, 8th ed., 1904, n. 164; Tarde, La Philosophie penale, 3rd ed., Paris, 1892, p. 534-536.

317. Principle: The supreme civil authority can punish with capital punishment evildoers fully convicted of a most grave crime, as often as the public good requires this.

(A) To supreme authority there certainly belongs the right of protecting society against evildoers, who disturb the public order, by efficaciously deterring them from crimes especially harmful to the security of the commonwealth and of citizens; for upon it lies the right and duty of protecting the common good against any invaders of rights whatever. Now both historically and psychologically it is clear that the boldness and propensity of some toward committing crimes are not broken except by fear of capital punishment. (a) Historically: for among almost all peoples capital punishment flourished down to these last times. Thus, already in the time of the Patriarchs, it had been said to Noah and his sons: "Whoever shall shed human blood, his blood shall be shed";⁴ likewise to the Jews: "You shall not suffer sorcerers to live⁵... He who strikes and kills a man shall die the death."⁶ Among the Greeks and Romans, and also other Nations, the same penalty was inflicted not only on slaves, but also on free men, whose life was greatly esteemed. The Apostle acknowledges it as legitimate, writing concerning supreme civil authority:¹ "But if you do evil, fear; for he does not bear the sword without cause. For he is the minister of God, an avenger unto wrath to him who does evil." In reality, among Christian nations, otherwise protectors of human life, the penalty of death was by no means abolished, but on the contrary was always held as a necessary means for protecting the life of peaceful citizens. But in more recent times capital punishment, removed from the midst in a few regions, after the experience of a few years, has already been restored in certain places, so that public security might be provided for more efficaciously;² since indeed the boldness of evildoers and the number of crimes were increasing each year. But, on the other hand, in regions in which the penalty of death was preserved rather firmly, as in England, the number of crimes is accustomed to decrease. Historically, therefore, it is clear that a penalty of this kind is an efficacious and morally necessary means for providing for the public good.

⁴ Gen., IX, 6.

⁵ Exod., XXII, 18.

⁶ Levit., XXIV, 17.

¹ Rom., XIII, 4.

² Thus especially in certain parts of Switzerland and of the United States of America. As regards Switzerland, Garraud has these things, op. cit., p. 234, note 1: "Following a very active campaign of petitioning for the restoration of the death penalty, the National Council (of Switzerland) decided that a new constitutional provision would be submitted to the popular vote; it was adopted on May 18, 1879, and revises art. 65 in this sense, that each canton is permitted to reestablish the death penalty for crimes of common law. Some cantons have profited from this faculty, among others those of Zurich, Lucerne, and Zug." Likewise, of the four American States which had abolished the penalty of death, two established the same anew.

318. (b) The same is proved psychologically. For man by a certain natural instinct dreads death more than other evils; this feeling even the most abandoned of evildoers experience, though impervious to other motives; hence those condemned to death earnestly beg that the sentence be changed, and, when the punishment is imminent, not a few strive with all their strength to escape; on the other hand, from various testimonies it is clear that many are deterred from crime by terror of the final punishment;³ but if some are not deterred from crime even by fear of death, this generally arises from the fact that, entangled by depraved passions, by an inveterate habit of evil, or by occasions, they do not think of capital punishment, or hope to elude the ministers of justice; but many others in reality abstain from crimes through terror of the extreme punishment. - But, on the other hand, no other penalty sufficiently deters certain evildoers from homicide; not long and laborious detention, because today it is usually tempered, at least after some time, so that some value it more highly than a life indeed free, but subject to many miseries; on the other hand hope remains, because of the instability of political affairs, of recovering liberty after a short time, - nor that solitary detention which in Italy holds the place of a capital sentence: for this does not sufficiently terrify abandoned men, who retain hope of escaping.¹ Therefore both historically and psychologically it is clear that the penalty of death is a most efficacious means for deterring evildoers from crimes, and therefore can be inflicted by supreme authority, on account of the public good.

³ Thus, in the Italian Chamber, March 10, 1865, the deputy Conforti narrated that a conspiracy for perpetrating theft and homicide had been abandoned because on that day on which it had been agreed to carry the crime into execution, two other evildoers underwent the penalty of death. Cf. Garofalo, La Criminologie, 1890, p. 225.

¹ On the other hand this penalty is more cruel than death itself, since it is accustomed to bring on weariness, desperation, and a certain form of insanity.

319. (B) This is confirmed by another argument from the ethical order. Justice demands that the wounded moral order be healed and repaired by suitable satisfaction; and therefore the duty lies upon the rulers of the commonwealth of taking care that grave offenses be punished by a proportionate penalty; for otherwise the moral order is disturbed and endangered. Now there are offenses so grave that, according to common estimation, they can be expiated only by the penalty of death; such are especially homicides cruelly perpetrated after mature deliberation; for offenses which include the highest injury of the moral order and the highest injury demand a penalty highest from its kind, or the penalty of death. This indeed is so true that, as the adversaries admit, the rule set forth above is approved by common sense: "Whoever shall shed human blood, his blood shall be shed."

320. The principal difficulties are solved. (a) Some indeed object that evildoers, as long as they live, can be amended for the better; therefore they are to be spared so that they may do penance and thus repair the injured order.¹ - St. Thomas had already solved this difficulty:² "But the fact that the evil, as long as they live, can be amended, does not prevent their being justly able to be killed; because the danger which threatens from their life is greater and more certain than the good which is expected from their amendment. They also have in the very article of death the faculty that through penance they be converted to God. But if they are so obstinate that even in the article of death their heart does not recede from malice, it can be estimated with sufficient probability that they will never recover sense from malice."

¹ Thus C. Lucas, op. cit., p. 129: "From the Christian point of view, society commits a crime greater than that of the assassin whom it immolates; it kills the soul; it is the life of the soul, it is the penitential life that it tears away."

² Contra Gentiles, lib. III, c. 147.

321. (b) Others say that in no one, except God, is there an inherent right of life and death, and therefore society usurps divine rights while it kills evildoers. - We indeed confess that in God alone there is the full and direct right over the life of man; but He can delegate to Princes, and in fact has delegated, an indirect power; for to them has been entrusted the charge of promoting the common good of society; now the common good sometimes requires that certain evildoers be punished with the penalty of death, so that these and others may be deterred from similar crimes;³ then they act not indeed by their own authority, but insofar as they take the place of God: "For there is no power except from God... For he is the minister of God, an avenger unto wrath to him who does evil."⁴

³ "The common good is better than the particular good of one. Therefore the particular good must be taken away, so that the common good may be preserved. But the life of certain pestiferous men impedes the common good, which is the concord of human society. Therefore men of this kind are to be taken away from the society of men through death." (St. Thomas, l. cit.)

⁴ Rom., XIII, 1, 4.

322. (c) They insist: Capital punishment, as inflicting irreparable damage, can be decreed only by an infallible authority; now what judge can claim infallibility for himself? - We willingly concede that only those are to be punished with death who, not from indications more or less probable, but from morally certain proofs, have been juridically found guilty, as we said in the thesis; but for this an infallible judgment is by no means required, but that certainty suffices which can be found in human affairs after diligent examination; in reality, does not moral certainty, which does not exclude every danger of death, suffice for performing surgical operations? Do men not also daily expose life for pursuing a private good? If the matter stands thus, why could supreme authority not punish with extreme punishment him who with moral certainty has been judged harmful to society?

323. Moreover it is equitable that death be decreed only for the gravest crimes, namely fully deliberate homicides, as in reality is done today among cultivated nations. Indeed it is to be wished that morals be so tempered that the penalty of death is no longer necessary. Meanwhile, however, it is unjust, by sparing the guilty, to expose the life of the innocent to danger.

324. Corollary: In well-ordered societies, it is not licit for a private man by his own authority to kill evildoers outside the case of legitimate defense.

For from what has been said, the right of life and death is proper to God, and therefore cannot be exercised except by those to whom it has been delegated divinely, for the good of the whole community; now, in societies already rightly constituted, the right of punishing evildoers has been granted by God not to individual citizens, but to legitimate superiors; and deservedly; for, since the killing of evildoers is ordered to the public good, it belongs only to those to whom the care of the community is committed, namely to legitimate superiors having public authority.¹ - On the other hand, no one ought to be punished with capital punishment except after a mature judgment in which, all things having been carefully weighed, the guilty man has been juridically convicted of the crime; for how many evils would spring forth if it were licit for each person, without judicial sentence, to punish evildoers? Now for a prudent and mature judgment that order is required which magistrates follow when sitting before the tribunal.

¹ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 64, a. 3.

Therefore the practice is to be reproved which still flourishes in certain regions, of killing certain evildoers immediately after the crime has been committed, without judicial form.²

² This practice in the United States of America is called lynching; concerning which see The Catholic World, August 1887, p. 593; Bryce, The American Commonwealth, 3rd ed., New York, 1897, t. II, p. 567. - In certain cases, when there is question of very odious crimes, and otherwise public authority is little solicitous about punishing them quickly, there can be, and in fact are, men who in good faith judge the killing of evildoers done by private persons to be licit; therefore, while this is objectively reproved, attention must especially be paid to subjective dispositions.

Although it is not licit for individual citizens directly to kill evildoers, they have the right of defending their own life or the life of their neighbor against unjust aggressors, even with the danger of killing the same.

325. Principle: It is licit for each one to defend his own life or that of others, or even the integrity of members, even with the killing of an unjust aggressor, provided nevertheless that the moderation of blameless defense is observed.

It is proved. (A) For he who defends himself, by wounding or killing the aggressor, does not directly intend the killing, but his own defense or that of others, repelling force by force; and therefore he performs an act good of itself, foreseeing the evil effect that will follow from it, namely the wounding or death of the aggressor. Now in the case he has a proportionately grave reason for permitting that effect, namely the legitimate defense of himself or others, and in addition the public good, which demands that the boldness of the wicked be broken. Nor can it be said that the invader is thus exposed to the danger of eternal damnation: for he ought to impute this evil to himself, and otherwise before he dies he is able to elicit an act of contrition. Therefore he acts licitly who defends himself, even with the killing of an unjust aggressor.

326. (B) Positive laws, ecclesiastical or civil, confirm this indeed. Thus Innocent III says: "Although all laws and all rights permit force to be repelled by force, yet because this must be done with the moderation of blameless defense, not for taking vengeance, but for repelling injury...."¹

¹ Decret. Greg. IX, l. V, t. 12 de Homicidio, c. 18, p. 801, ed. Richter-Friedberg. - Thus also in the French Penal Code, a. 328: "There is neither crime nor offense when homicide, wounds, and blows were commanded by the actual necessity of legitimate defense of oneself or of another." Cf. for Germany, Cod. p. a. 53; for England and the United States, Bouvier, Dict. of Law, word Self defence.

327. The principle is explained. (a) It was said: it is licit; because generally no one is bound to defend himself in this way; for someone can, from charity, permit his own killing, lest the aggressor be deprived of temporal and eternal life, unless, however, the life of the one attacked is very useful to the common good or to the family.²

² Others add with St. Alphonsus (n. 380): unless the one attacked were himself in mortal sin, because then he would be entirely bound to defend himself. - Yet this argument does not seem to be valid; for he who acts thus performs a heroic act of charity, by which he is cleansed from his sins and justified.

(b) Of an unjust aggressor; for if there is question of a guard or minister of justice who tries to capture a guilty man or to kill one juridically condemned, the latter certainly cannot be repelled by force and killed, because he uses his own right, indeed he performs an office; now the public good demands that violence not be inflicted upon ministers of justice legitimately exercising their office. But it suffices that the aggressor be materially unjust; hence a madman or a drunkard can be killed, if otherwise we cannot defend life.

It is moreover required that the aggressor actually bring force to bear, or at least exhibit signs of imminent aggression, e.g., by drawing a sword, seizing a gun, etc.; hence it is not licit to kill an aggressor before he has in some way begun the act of invasion; otherwise homicides would frequently be perpetrated under the pretext of legitimate defense, not without great detriment to the commonwealth. Deservedly, therefore, this eighteenth proposition was condemned, at least as scandalous, by Alexander VII, September 24, 1665: "It is licit to kill a false accuser, false witnesses, and also the judge from whom an unjust sentence certainly threatens, if by another way the innocent person cannot avoid the damage."¹ - Nor is it licit to kill an invader who has already ceased from aggression and flees, because he is no longer an aggressor, and it belongs to public authority alone to punish the guilty who are not actually attacking others.

¹ In Denzinger, n. 989.

328. (c) With the moderation of blameless defense, that is, by doing only that which is required for one's own defense; and therefore if another way of escaping the danger is at hand, e.g., by fleeing, crying out, it is not licit to kill or wound the invader; likewise if it suffices to inflict a wound, it is not licit to kill him. - Nevertheless, if someone, disturbed by a sudden attack, has not observed moderation, because time was lacking for maturely weighing all the circumstances, as often happens, he is not to be reproved for grave sin; for in practice it cannot easily be discerned what is necessary for defending oneself. Likewise if the one attacked cannot flee without great detriment, without, e.g., being regarded by others as cowardly, he can resist the aggressor even with the danger of killing him. Therefore, in a particular case, attention must be paid to the psychological dispositions of him who defends himself.

329. 2. Corollaries. It is licit to defend not only life and bodily integrity, but other goods, with the killing of an unjust aggressor: namely goods of the greatest moment, whose loss is morally irreparable.

(A) It is licit for a woman to repel by force an invader of chastity, even with the killing of the aggressor, if another means of efficaciously defending chastity is not at hand. Thus commonly. For here there is question of a good of the greatest moment, which, once lost, cannot be repaired; for a woman, by permitting herself to be oppressed, exposes herself to the danger of inwardly consenting to lust, of conceiving illegitimate offspring, and of losing reputation; if she is a virgin, she will with difficulty be married; if already married, she will introduce adulterine offspring into the family of the husband, with disgrace and detriment to the whole family; and these evils indeed are a proportionately grave reason. - But if she has already been oppressed, it is not licit to kill the aggressor, from what has been said above.

Hence it is not licit for a husband by his own authority to kill a wife detected in adultery; for the contradictory proposition was reproved by Alexander VII at least as scandalous.¹ - But whether a husband or father can kill him who attacks the chastity of his wife or daughter, when otherwise the aggressor cannot be repelled, is controverted. In practice, however, those who, moved by indignation, kill the invader are for the most part excused: for they do not think they act badly; and generally they are not condemned by a civil tribunal.

¹ In Denzinger, n. 990: "The husband does not sin who by his own authority kills his wife detected in adultery."

330. (B) As regards goods of fortune, let us separate certain things from uncertain:

(a) It is not licit to kill him who impedes us from the attainment of goods which we do not yet possess, but to which we have a right. This is clear from the condemnation of this proposition (32) by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679: "It is licit not only to defend by deadly defense the things which we actually possess, but also those to which we have an inchoate right and which we hope to possess."² - And deservedly, for here there is question of an evil which can be repaired by having recourse to judges.

² Ibid., n. 1049; it was condemned as at least scandalous and pernicious in practice.

(b) If there is question of goods actually possessed, but of lesser moment, the same must be said, from the condemnation of proposition (31) by Innocent XI: "Regularly I can kill a thief for the preservation of one gold coin."³ For the reason is not proportionately grave.

³ Ibid., n. 1048; this proposition was condemned at least as scandalous and pernicious in practice.

331. (c) When there is question of goods of great moment already possessed, more probably it is licit to defend them, even with the killing of an unjust aggressor, if otherwise they cannot be preserved or recovered. - For here there is question of the irreparable loss of goods which are very useful and sometimes morally necessary for the support of life; now the public good demands that thieves who seize goods of this kind and do not wish to abandon them be intercepted in flight, even by a lethal wound, if there is need; otherwise not a few would be incited to theft. - On the other hand, charity does not oblige someone to prefer the neighbor's good, even of a higher order, to his own good, unless the neighbor is in extreme necessity; now the unjust aggressor in the case is not in extreme necessity, since, by leaving the goods which he has invaded, he can escape unharmed. Thus St. Alphonsus, n. 383, with many others.¹

¹ Some attack this doctrine of theologians as contrary to natural equity. Nevertheless it is approved by most jurists, not only in France, but in other regions. Let Garraud be heard, op. cit., p. 213: "Suppose a thief, stealing from the safe of a merchant the titles which constitute the greater part of his fortune, fleeing with these titles, without the darkness permitting him to be recognized: the evil will be irreparable if the owner does not succeed in wounding or killing the thief: he fires and kills him; if Art. 328 (of the Penal Code) does not give him the right to do this, no tribunal will hesitate to declare that this act is not imputable to its author, whether one considers it as justified by legitimate defense, or rather as imposed by a force which the agent could not resist." - He alleges, as regards the laws of other nations: Berge, Revue generale du droit, 1879, t. III, p. 277; Alimena, I limiti e i modificatori dell' imputabilita, t. III, p. 97 seq.

This indeed is admitted by almost all when there is question of a nocturnal aggressor; for, besides the reasons already brought forward, it can be feared that the invader also wishes to take the life of the owner.

In either case, according to all, the owner can rescue his own things from the robber; and if the latter resists and threatens death, it is licit for the owner to defend himself, even by killing the invader.²

² Cod. paen. gall., a. 329.

332. (C) If honor or reputation is attacked, regularly it is not licit to kill the unjust aggressor. - The reason is that loss of honor and reputation generally is not irreparable, since it can be preserved or recovered by other means; on the other hand the common good demands that reputation not be repaired by the killing of the aggressor; for an approach would lie widely open to innumerable slaughters, if it were licit for each person to vindicate his own reputation by violent means, especially because each person would be judge in his own cause, concerning a matter of whose gravity it is difficult to judge. - Deservedly, therefore, this proposition (30) was condemned by Innocent XI as at least scandalous and pernicious in practice: "It is lawful for an honorable man to kill an invader who strives to bring calumny upon him, if otherwise this disgrace cannot be avoided: the same also must be said if someone strikes a slap or strikes with a club, and after the inflicted slap or blow of the club flees."³

³ Denzinger, n. 1047.

333. I said regularly; for if someone is attacked not only by words, but by deeds, e.g., by a slap or club, he can repel injury with the moderation of blameless defense; and if the aggressor continues to inflict injury, and brings force to bear and threatens death, the one attacked can repel force by force, even with the killing of the aggressor.

Likewise he who is struck by a slap, and, inflamed with anger, immediately strikes the aggressor and wounds and kills him, is often excused from grave sin, because he did this without mature deliberation. - But when injury has already been inflicted, whether by words or by deeds, it is not licit to take vengeance for it, but recourse must be had to judges.

334. 1. Origin of the duel. Among the ancients there were no duels properly so called, for the sake of vindicating honor, but singular combats between leaders or soldiers of two armies for the purpose of putting an end to battle; thus David with Goliath, Menelaus with Paris, Hector with Ajax, Achilles with Hector, Turnus with Aeneas, the three Horatii with the Curiatii engaged. Besides, at Rome there flourished bloody fights of gladiators between captives or slaves, indeed sometimes between free men, for the sake of displaying strength. - In the Middle Ages judicial duels were in use, for the sake of ending a lawsuit, which seem to have been borrowed from the Germans and Lombards: namely, when full proof could not be brought before a judge, a duel between the litigants was often in use, with the magistrates approving that the matter be left to the judgment of God, according to this: if laws do not suffice, let us come to arms. - But tournaments held among knights differed from duels, since they were not undertaken with a hostile mind, but for the sake of exercise and for the display of fortitude.

¹ J. P. Pigna, Il duello, 1554; Boyssat, Recherches sur les duels, Lyon, 1610; J. Savaron, Traite contre les duels, Paris, 1610; F. Bacon, Charge concerning duels, 1614; Cockburn, History of duels, London, 1720; Basnage, Dissert. historique sur les duels, Basel, 1740; Stadler, S.J., Tr. de duello, Ingolstadt, 1751; F. Gorguereau, Le duel considere dans tous les rapports historiques, moraux et constitutionnels, Paris, 1791; Pinet, Du duel en jurisprudence, Paris, 1829; Cauchy, Du duel considere dans ses origines et dans l'etat actuel des moeurs, Paris, 1846; Mendez, Essai sur le duel, 1854; Millingen, History of duelling, London, 1841; Sabine, Notes on duel, Boston, 1859; Tavernier, Le duel, Paris, 1884; Letainturier-Fradin, Le duel a travers les ages, Paris, 1892.

But already from the sixteenth century duels properly so called, for the sake of vindicating honor, began to prevail; namely, if anything harmful to reputation or honor had been inflicted, nobles and military leaders judged that this could be vindicated only by arms and washed away by blood; for they thought that they did not carry swords in vain. This cruel custom indeed first began to flourish among nobles and soldiers, afterward also among men of the robe; holy men and some Princes indeed resisted it; but today among many Nations it still flourishes, especially among leaders, soldiers, or political men.²

² Since duels are not recounted in public documents, it is difficult to know how many there are in various regions. In France, besides duels held among soldiers, from the year 1878 to the year 1890 about 647 are counted, of which not a few (1/77) were lethal (in Garraud, Traite du Droit Penal, Paris, 1891, t. IV, p. 310; cf. Questions Actuelles, t. XIV, 1892, p. 162-163).

335. 2. Notion and species. (A) A duel, as it is understood today, is a singular combat between two or more, entered into by agreement, with arms apt for killing or gravely wounding. - Therefore three things are required for a duel: (a) a singular combat, which is entered upon between two, or between several, but one against another; it matters little with what intention it is done, for the sake of exercise, or of vengeance, or of repairing honor, or of showing fortitude; (b) entered into by agreement, in which the adversaries agree concerning time, place, and arms; hence if two immediately fight from an impulse of anger, or if one provokes and attacks another and the latter defends himself, it is not properly a duel; (c) arms apt for killing or gravely wounding; therefore it is not necessary that in fact death or a grave wound follow, but it suffices that of itself a grave wound can be inflicted; hence fights which are done with the fist, rods, staffs, or with a sword of blunted edge, under the condition that neither be lethally wounded, are not duels.

(B) A duel is public when it is entered into from public authority and on account of the public good, e.g., for ending a dispute between two nations; or private when it is undertaken in a private name. The former is licit, if it is done on account of the common good, for ending war, lest the blood of many be poured out: for if in war army can fight against army, leaders can agree that one fight against one, or a few against a few; today, however, singular combats of this kind have gone into disuse. But if it were entered into on account of a particular good, even with the authority of a judge, for vindicating injury or manifesting truth, it would be illicit, since other means are at hand for obtaining these ends. But the latter is a grave sin, as will be clear from the following proposition.

336. 3. Principle: A duel, entered into by private authority, is always of itself gravely illicit. It is certain.

It is proved: (A) By authority. For the Church has more than once reproved the duel as a grave crime; thus the Council of Trent imposed penalties against duelists, declared them excommunicated, and, if they died in the combat, judged them unworthy of the honor of ecclesiastical burial; it exposed its mind concerning the gravity of this sin by these words: "Let the detestable use of duels, introduced by the fabrication of the devil, so that by the bloody death of bodies it may gain also the destruction of souls, be utterly exterminated from the Christian world."¹ Benedict XIV enlarged and explained the Tridentine sanctions, exploding various reasons alleged by duelists.² The Code renewed the excommunication to be incurred by the very fact and simply reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, already issued by the Roman Pontiffs, against "those perpetrating a duel, or simply provoking to it or accepting it, or giving any assistance or favor whatever, and also those deliberately watching it, and those permitting it, or, as much as is in them, not prohibiting it, of whatever dignity they may be."³ Already Leo XIII, confirming the decrees of his Predecessors, had lucidly set forth how empty are the things which are customarily brought forward for defending or excusing the savage custom of the duel.¹

¹ Sess. XXV, cap. 19 de Reformatione.

² Constit. Detestabilem, Nov. 10, 1752, where he condemns the following propositions as false, scandalous, and pernicious:

1. "A military man who, unless he offers or accepts a duel, would be held as fearful, timid, abject, and unfit for military offices, and thence would be deprived of the office by which he sustains himself and his own, or would be bound perpetually to lack the hope of promotion otherwise due and deserved for him, would be free from fault and penalty, whether he offers or accepts a duel."

2. "Those accepting a duel, or provoking to it, can be excused, even for the sake of protecting honor or avoiding human contempt, when they know certainly that the fight is not going to follow, as being about to be impeded by others."

3. "A military leader or officer accepting a duel from grave fear of loss of reputation or office does not incur the ecclesiastical penalties issued against duelists."

4. "It is licit in the state of natural man to accept and offer a duel for preserving fortunes with honor, when by another remedy their loss cannot be repelled."

5. "The asserted license for the state of nature can also be applied to the state of a badly ordered city, in which, namely, either by negligence or by malice of the magistrate, justice is openly denied."

This manner of speaking indeed seems harsh; but it is therefore employed so that vain evasions may be forestalled; if the duel were permitted in these cases, empty reasons would soon be devised for excusing every duel.

³ Code, can. 2351. - With this excommunication are punished:

A) The duelists themselves, that is, those who perpetrate a duel; indeed, also he who provokes another to a duel, or who accepts, even if in reality the duel does not follow;

B) Those giving any assistance or favor whatever, that is, a) all and each who cooperate in any way with a duel. Thus: seconds, unless they accept this office with the intention and hope of altogether impeding the duel; - those ordering that a duel be done; - those persuading or advising, if the advice or reason was efficacious of itself, and the duel follows; - the physician who, asked by the duelists, assists at the duel; - the physician and confessor who, by agreement with the duelists, stand in a neighboring house or in a nearby place.

b) Those deliberately watching, even from mere curiosity, but not those who watch while passing by by chance, or in secret, nor those who go to the place of combat in order altogether to impede the duel;

c) Those positively permitting the duel, and indeed also those who, being endowed with authority, do not prohibit it, as much as is in them, when they ought and are able to prohibit it.

Cf. Treatise on Censures, n. 1182; J. Sole, De delictis et poenis, Rome, 1920, p. 320-325.

¹ Apostolic Letter Pastoralis officii, Sept. 12, 1891, to the bishops of the German and Austro-Hungarian empire.

337. (B) By reason. (a) For the duel by its nature directly tends to the killing or wounding of the adversary; certainly, as Leo XIII says (l. c.), "those who provoke to a private combat or accept one offered do this, and direct their mind and powers to this, bound by no necessity: to take away life or at least to inflict a wound upon the adversary"; now directly to intend this is a grave sin, from what has been said above, n. 312. - Nor can it validly be said that here there is question of the case of legitimate defense; for there is no urgent necessity, since the aggression, if there was any, is not actually existing but already past; on the other hand, recourse can be had either to judges or to upright men who can compose the matter peacefully; indeed recourse to arms cannot vindicate honor or reputation: "for although," Leo XIII continues, "he who, after receiving injury, has challenged to the combat, departs victor from the combat, this will be the judgment of all sensible men: by such an outcome of the combat, the challenger is proved indeed better in strength for wrestling, or in handling arms, but not for that reason better in honesty; but if the same man falls, to whom again would this manner of protecting honor not seem imprudent, not plainly absurd?" Therefore the duel can by no means be excused under the pretext of legitimate defense, especially because it often arises from a passion for revenge, which is especially opposed to Christian charity.

338. (b) Besides, he who undertakes a duel rashly casts his own life into grave and manifest danger; but the natural and divine law prohibits this, when otherwise there is no reason of office or charity which may persuade this rashness. And this manner of acting is to be reproved all the more because duelists bring damage not only upon themselves, but upon their own family, or that of the adversary: for if either one or both are wounded or killed, how many dissensions, envies, and miseries arise from this?

339. (c) Moreover, by duels the social order is disturbed; for if it is licit for each person to vindicate his own rights by private force and hand, and to avenge the honor which he thinks violated, it is finished with the legitimate authority of judges, and with the peace of families and society; force will be repelled by force, even outside the case of actual and unjust aggression, and thus the morals of Barbarians will begin to reign everywhere.

340. 4. The difficulties are solved. (a) Many indeed object that they cannot refuse an offered combat without being held as sluggish and cowardly.

Leo XIII, l. c., responds: "If the duties of men were to be measured from the false opinions of the crowd, not from the eternal norm of the right and just, there would be no natural and true distinction between honorable actions and shameful deeds. The wise men of the gentiles themselves both knew and taught that the fallacious judgments of the crowd are to be spurned by a brave and constant man." Certainly he exhibits greater fortitude who, obeying the voice of conscience, despises the empty judgments of the crowd, than he who, against the dictate of conscience, undertakes the offered combat lest he be despised by others.¹

¹ So that sensible men may more easily and efficaciously refuse the duel, it is altogether expedient that they be associated and bind themselves by pact to avoid all combats of this kind. This was already done in past centuries; cf. Faillon, Vie de M. Olier, 4th ed., Paris, 1873, t. II, p. 258.

341. (b) At least, not a few continue, duels must be permitted to soldiers, so that by such exercise military virtue may be sharpened, and at the same time an end may be imposed upon quarrels which otherwise would arise frequently among soldiers.

To this Leo XIII says: "The incentives of military virtue look to this, that the city be better prepared against enemies. But can this be effected by the help of that custom which by its own nature looks to this, that, when a disagreement has arisen among soldiers, of which the causes are not rare, from the individual parts of the defenders of the fatherland one or the other be killed?" - And indeed there are other means for composing disagreements,² namely the judgment of leaders or arbiters (jury d'honneur).

² Among some nations, e.g., the English, duels are strictly prohibited, and the mark of infamy is by no means branded upon those avoiding singular combat. Cf. Science Sociale, t. XXIV, 1897, p. 77-92.

342. (c) They insist: most duels are by no means dangerous, since the adversaries stop as soon as a light wound has been inflicted and the first drops of blood are shed.

It happens not rarely that, notwithstanding an agreement of this kind, a grave wound or death itself is inflicted in the heat of the fight. Besides, is it not ridiculous to agree upon such a condition? What special virtue is inherent in the first drops of blood, that they may vindicate the honor of the offended man? Is this not an ignoble vestige of a ruder age and foreign barbarity?

343. 5. On academic duels. In certain regions, especially in Germany, duels flourish which are called academic, in which, namely, students of the academies, using a certain small knife, try to inflict upon themselves an incision or wound in the face, the other parts of the body being well covered; in these, death or mutilation is not intended, nor always vengeance or reparation of honor, but often the display of fortitude and strength; very rarely does death or a grave wound follow from this. - Nevertheless the S. C. of the Council, having been questioned concerning this matter, on August 9, 1890, responded that irregularity is incurred in this case by the duelists and their seconds, from infamy of law.¹ From this it follows that contests of this kind truly are duels, since infamy of law is a penalty imposed by Trent upon duelists; in reality the conditions set forth above are found there: singular combat, entered into by agreement, with arms apt for gravely wounding; although death or mutilation rarely follows, nevertheless the danger of both is present.

¹ In Acta S. Sedis, XXIII, p. 242.

344. 6. Points to be noted for practice. Since duels in certain armies are sufficiently frequent, and are often imposed by commanders, there can be soldiers who unwillingly in good faith undertake a singular combat, whether they are ignorant of the censures attached to the same, or falsely persuade themselves that they cannot avoid such a fight; therefore it can happen that, on account of good faith, they are excused from censures or grave sin, from what was said in the Treatise on Human Acts, n. 94. Likewise, when they approach the sacred tribunal and otherwise are found well disposed, it is not always expedient that they be questioned specifically concerning the purpose of never refusing an offered combat; it suffices that in a general way they will to observe the divine and ecclesiastical laws. Cf. Treatise on Penance, n. 105. - On the other hand, account must be taken of the scandal which would be given if a Catholic soldier or commander accepted a duel.

345. Preliminary notes. War differs from the duel, since it is not done between two private persons, but between two or more nations; and also from sedition, which has place between parts of one Nation dissenting from one another. It can be described: a contest of two or more nations fighting among themselves by force, for vindicating true or pretended rights.

¹ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 40; F. de Vitoria, Relectiones Morales, Cologne, 1696, p. 410-467, De jure belli; Suarez, De Caritate, disp. XIII, De bello; Grotius, de Jure belli ac pacis, The Hague, 1680; S. Pufendorf, De Jure naturae et gentium, Amsterdam, 1688, lib. VIII, c. 6-8, p. 879-903; Meyer, t. II, n. 732-765; F. de Martens, La Paix et la Guerre, translated from Russian by the Count de Sance, Paris, 1901; H. Bonfils, Manuel de Droit international, 3rd ed., 1901, p. 563-871, where many modern writers are alleged.

Defensive war is often distinguished from offensive war: the former is undertaken in order to repel by force force inflicted by another nation; the latter brings force upon another nation and disturbs an existing peace. But sometimes apparent aggression is nothing other than defense, e.g., if provinces already unjustly occupied by enemies are invaded.

346. Principle: In order that war may be undertaken legitimately, a threefold condition is required and suffices: the authority of the supreme civil power, a just cause, and a right intention.²

² Thus St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 40, a. 1.

1. There is required: (A) Supreme authority; for it does not belong to a private person to move war, since he can pursue his right before tribunals, even when injury has been inflicted by a foreigner; but only to him to whom the care of the commonwealth has been committed: for there is question of a matter pertaining to the good of the whole society; and therefore, just as it belongs to supreme authority to use the sword against evildoers who disturb the social order from within, so it belongs to it to protect the commonwealth from exterior enemies by the military sword. But this supreme authority sometimes resides in princes, sometimes in presidents of the commonwealth, with the assent of the Legislative Assembly;³ in whatever hypothesis, it is licit to declare war only after mature deliberation, and after upright men and experts in international law have been consulted: for there is question of a matter of most grave moment.

³ Thus in France: "The President of the Republic cannot declare war without the prior assent of the two Chambers." (Loi constit. of July 16, 1875, a. 9.)

347. (B) A just cause; and this must be proportionately grave; now since in wars, especially modern wars, many men are killed and innumerable resources are destroyed, war can be declared only from a most grave cause; indeed it is required that it be necessary, namely one for which no peaceful means can provide a remedy. Therefore, before recourse is had to arms, a way must solicitously be sought by which the dispute that has arisen can be settled peacefully, whether by sending ambassadors, or by having recourse to mediators or arbiters,¹ as often as this can be done without dishonor.

¹ At The Hague (La Haye) an international tribunal was instituted in the year 1899, for peacefully settling disputes which arise between various Nations: it is certainly to be wished that recourse be had to this tribunal for the most part, rather than to arms; cf. De Martens, La Conference de la Paix a la Haye, Paris, 1901; H. Bonfils, op. cit., p. 527. - The same author shows that arbitration was already in use, and indeed with a happy outcome, p. 533-542.

348. Among just causes are numbered: the unjust invasion or detention of some province by enemies; grave injuries inflicted either upon the nation itself, or upon ambassadors, or upon citizens, which a foreign nation obstinately refuses to repair; violation of a treaty or pact, with great detriment to the commonwealth; violation of neutrality, as they say; the necessity of bringing aid to another people unjustly oppressed. - But diversity of religion or the desire of converting infidels to the faith by no means suffices: for true religion is propagated not by arms, but by prayers and preaching.² - Nor the sole enlargement of empire: otherwise there would be an equally just cause on each side of those waging war, and the right of the stronger, not the stronger right, would prevail everywhere. - Nor the singular progress of some nation, which so increases in power that it now surpasses neighboring nations formerly equal. - Nor one's own glory or the private good of the Prince or of his family: for private good ought to yield to public good.

² Vitoria proves this at length, op. cit., De Indis, p. 305-409.

349. Yet here it can be asked whether a cultivated nation can invade the territory of a barbarous nation, in order to impart to it the benefit of modern civilization. And here indeed a distinction is needed: (a) if a certain nation has more citizens than it can nourish, and on the other hand there are regions by no means or little cultivated, because of the scarcity of inhabitants or their ignorance or sloth, it is not unjust by peaceful means to occupy almost empty territories, while giving fair compensation to the natives; but if they do not wish to accept this and wish to repel the occupiers by force, those who use moderate force to retain the territory which they need for procuring the necessities of life for themselves cannot be reproved for injustice; for the earth was entrusted primarily to our first parents for assisting human necessities. (b) But if, under the pretext of imparting a higher civilization, regions already sufficiently cultivated by their inhabitants are invaded by force and arms, the aggression seems to be unjust: for civilization ought to be propagated not by arms, but by persuasion, industry, and commerce; otherwise nations which consider themselves more cultivated will soon invade and oppress others.

350. (C) Right intention, by which, namely, it is intended that the good of society be promoted or evil warded off; therefore intentions which are opposed to Christian charity or justice must carefully be removed, such as desire of harming, cruelty of taking revenge, lust for dominating, an implacable mind. Therefore occasions of war are not to be sought on account of the great profit hoped for from it: "For it is of the utmost savagery," says Vitoria, op. cit., p. 466, "to seek causes, and to rejoice that there are causes for killing and destroying men whom God created, and for whom Christ died; but one ought to come to the necessity of war compelled and unwilling." Indeed equity counsels that Rulers desist from that which they foresee will be an occasion of war; for the occasion of such grave evils must carefully be removed.

351. 2. It suffices, or, with all the conditions set forth above having been posited, war is licit. For often war is the only means by which some nation can efficaciously protect its own existence or rights of great moment; for there is no tribunal on earth, even today, which can compel nations dissenting among themselves to settle a dispute peacefully. Now a nation can defend itself and its rights, when they are of most grave moment, against unjust aggressors; for if private persons can do this, in the case of actual aggression, a fortiori a nation can, which has the same and more powerful rights, insofar as it enjoys public authority; but if an enemy is not actually attacking, but does not wish to repair a grave injury inflicted, rights can be vindicated by force, since there is no tribunal before which they can peacefully be sought again; otherwise the unjust and violent would soon oppress the honest and meek. Therefore war can be licit.

Nevertheless it is to be wished that soon an international tribunal be instituted before which nations dissenting about a matter of grave moment are bound to present themselves; and indeed it is equitable that the president of this tribunal be the Roman Pontiff, vicar of Him who is deservedly called the Prince of peace.

352. Corollaries. (a) For declaring offensive war a probable motive does not suffice, but a morally certain cause is required; thus commonly. For since here there is question not only of one's own rights, but of the rights of others, and on the other hand so many and so great evils follow from war, it is not licit to use probable opinions in a matter of such moment. Hence it is necessary to weigh the causes of war with the greatest prudence, to hear the reasons of the adversaries, if they wish to discuss from fairness and goodness, and to seek the counsel of upright and wise men, who may speak with liberty, without anger and hatred. When this has been done, if doubt remains, recourse must be had to arbiters; if the other party rejects this recourse, a legitimate cause for declaring war is now had.

(b) Even when a just cause certainly exists, justice demands that, before war is begun, reparation be sought from the adverse party; and if suitable reparation is offered, one must abstain from war. This is clear from what was said above; for war must be warded off by all legitimate and honorable means.

353. What is licit or illicit in time of war can be defined only with difficulty; some things are determined by natural law, some by the law of nations; and since customs are diverse according to times and places, certain things today among cultivated nations are held as illicit which formerly were esteemed as legitimate. Hence in practice the modern expositors of international law must be approached, who declare at length what is licit, with attention paid to the customs, conventions, and laws of various nations.¹ We hand down only certain more general things briefly.

¹ Cf. H. Bonfils, op. cit., p. 571-877. - Hence not a few of the things which are set forth by older theologians on this matter, with circumstances changed, must be reformed today.

354. (A) Today, among cultivated nations, the declaration of war ought to be preceded by what they call an ultimatum, that is, an intimation concerning war soon to be undertaken, unless such or such a condition be fulfilled; for thus a last opportunity is given to the enemy of repairing the injury inflicted. - Moreover at the time when war is declared, humanity demands that to foreigners living within the borders of the territory some space of time be granted, within which they can provide for themselves and their goods.

355. (B) Once military operations have begun, it must be kept before the mind that war is not waged against private citizens, but against the nation as a public person. (a) Hence, although all things are licit which are necessary for breaking the forces of the enemies, it is held today as illicit to usurp the goods of private persons without compensation,¹ and a fortiori directly to kill noncombatants or reduce them into captivity.² But since the expenses of war can be exacted from the enemy, the victor, when cities and villages have been captured, can impose taxes, provided they are proportionate to the resources of the inhabitants;³ but to give a captured city to the army for plunder is not licit today.⁴

¹ H. Bonfils, op. cit., p. 664-682.

² Ibid., p. 638-643.

³ Ibid., p. 674-677.

⁴ Ibid., p. 678-680.

356. (b) It is licit to besiege fortified citadels, and to deprive them of water and food, so that they may submit themselves more quickly; likewise to discharge artillery (canons) against them, even with the danger of killing innocents; to demolish houses, even monasteries and churches, when the enemies use them to protect themselves; likewise to destroy the walls of a city, etc.; because all these things are necessary for conquering the enemies. - But it is illicit to infect springs or wells with poison, or to use poisoned weapons, because these things, as cruel, are prohibited by the modern law of nations.

357. (c) Whether reprisals are licit, that is, actions otherwise prohibited by international law, when the enemies first have violated the law of nations, is not so certain. If they are employed only for this end, that the enemies may thus be compelled to avoid injuries of this kind, strictly speaking they are not unjust, because they are one of the means of averting similar injuries in the future. But since in this matter it is easy to exceed, and on the other hand this mode of acting can induce the enemy to inflict new and worse injuries, generally it is expedient to abstain from this, while nevertheless protesting against an open violation of international law.⁵

⁵ Ibid., p. 575-579.

(d) To prepare ambushes for enemies, and to use various stratagems for overcoming them, is part of military prudence, and is prohibited by no law; likewise it is licit to search out the secrets of the enemies and, when these are known, to use them for conquering the same more easily; for all these things are very useful for pursuing the end of war.

358. (C) When war has been ended and the enemy asks for peace, the victor ought to use the victory obtained moderately. For he can:

(a) Exact that for which war had been declared, e.g., recovery of a province, satisfaction for grave injury inflicted, etc.; for since the war is supposed just, it certainly gives the power of vindicating rights which he already possessed beforehand; (b) demand an equitable indemnity for the expenses of war and other damages inflicted on the occasion of the war; for all these things are deservedly imputed to the enemy who unjustly undertook war; (c) exact securities for future safety; for the victor ought wisely to provide for his own security; e.g., the conquered nation can be bound to hand over fortified places situated on the borders into the hands of the victor, at least for a time, or to demolish them and not build new ones, - but not to cede to the victor all provinces and cities captured during the war; yet certain parts of the occupied region could be retained by way of indemnity, if the conquered could not pay money.¹

¹ H. Bonfils, op. cit., p. 874-877.

359. 1. Duties common to both. (a) In time of a just war commanders and soldiers are bound to serve the fatherland, even with danger to life, because the public good demands this. Hence they cannot desert military service, and deserters ought to return to camp; but those who would flee to the enemies and render them any help whatever would be traitors and guilty of a grave crime.

(b) If the war is certainly and evidently unjust, it is not licit to serve as a soldier, nor to kill enemies in battle; for unjust aggression and the killing of an innocent person are something intrinsically evil. But in practice this rarely happens; for even when war is unjust in itself, for the most part it does not seem to be such to soldiers, who otherwise neither are accustomed nor generally are able to inquire concerning the legitimacy of war: for this is left to the supreme authority and to the Legislative Assembly.

(c) In doubt whether war is just, soldiers already hired, or otherwise called under the banners by supreme authority, are not bound to inquire concerning the legitimacy of the war, but can presume that it is just. Otherwise it must be said of foreigners who voluntarily wish to enter the army; they cannot serve as soldiers unless first the justice of the war is clear; for there is question of inflicting most grave damage upon another, and they cannot freely expose themselves to the danger of killing innocents.

360. 2. Duties of commanders. (a) Upon them lies the duty of using all legitimate means for bringing back victory, and therefore of following the rules of military art in the best way they can, - of watching over discipline, - of taking care that, insofar as this can be done, nothing be lacking to soldiers either as regards the health of the body or as regards the salvation of the soul.

(b) They ought to follow the international laws of war, to restrain useless plunderings, devastations, and the killing of innocents by suitable penalties.

(c) They can indeed exact from inhabitants those things which are necessary for the support of the army, but they ought to pay the price of these, either immediately or after the war.²

² "Prestations in kind shall, as far as possible, be paid for in cash; if not, they shall be recorded by receipts" (Acte de la Haye, art. 52).

361. 3. Duties of soldiers. (a) Soldiers ought to obey commanders, and not begin a hostile action unless the same command them.

(b) Since today the right of plunder is not acknowledged, they cannot make the spoils of enemies their own, nor a fortiori take away the goods of private persons.

362. (A) Active sedition against legitimate civil authority has always been reproved in the Church. The ancient Christians, even while persecutions raged, served the emperors in all things which pertained to civil affairs, and did not resist them except in the cause of faith, because it is better to obey God than men. Deservedly, therefore, St. Thomas teaches that sedition is a mortal sin, and so much the graver as the common good is greater than private good.¹ (B) If there is question of tyrannical power usurped, it was commonly taught that a tyrant can be killed by any private person, with certain conditions posited: (a) that it be certain the tyrant has no right to the kingdom; (b) that there likewise be no superior to whom recourse can be had; (c) that the commonwealth does not contradict the killing of the tyrant; (d) that from his killing more and greater goods than evils can be expected.² These conditions indeed rarely occurred together. (C) As regards legitimate power, but acting tyrannically, passive resistance is of itself licit and sometimes obligatory.

¹ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 42, a. 2. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, Tr. VIII, c. 2, n. 13; Meyer, II, n. 522-537.

² Billuart, diss. X, art. 2.

363. But today, since the exercise of supreme authority is especially in the hands of the Legislative Assembly, whose members are chosen by the votes of citizens, the most efficacious means for shaking off tyranny is not sedition, nor rebellion or tyrannicide; but the provident and perpetual association of upright citizens, which should strive with all its strength to elect honest and upright men, who in the Legislative Assembly may be able to restore and protect true liberty. For in our days the votes of citizens have greater force than arms of any kind; but the votes of individuals are of little value, unless by common counsel the upright are united among themselves.

364. After the things said concerning injuries concerning the goods of the body, we must now treat of injuries concerning the goods of the soul. Now the principal goods of the soul are: (a) reputation, or the good estimation which we enjoy among others, which is injured in two ways: internally by rash judgment, but externally by detraction or defamation; (b) honor, which consists in the acknowledgment of our excellence, and is offended by contumely; (c) truth, to which are opposed lying, when what is false is said, and violation of a secret, when truth is revealed which ought to have been kept silent.

365. 1. Notion. (A) The good estimation to which the neighbor has a right, as long as his malice is not clear, is injured as often as by slight and insufficient indications we think evil about him and give consent to this thought.

¹ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 60, a. 2-4; Sotus, lib. III, quaest. IV, a. 3-4; Lugo, disp. XIV, n. 10-33; Sayrus, Clavis regia sacerdotum, Venice, 1618, lib. XII, c. 3; St. Alphonsus, n. 962-967; Carriere, n. 860-868; Ball. P., Tr. VI, n. 1056-1066; Lehmkuhl, n. 1185-1187; Haine, De Decalogo, q. 167-169; Noldin, n. 647-650.

(B) There are various grades toward rash judgment: (a) doubt concerning the neighbor's honesty, when we deliberately suspend judgment concerning his probity, and indeed from insufficient motives; (b) suspicion, by which, from slight indications, not indeed firmly, but with great fear of erring, we judge that the neighbor has done something evil; (c) opinion, by which not certainly, but probably, from insufficient motives, we pronounce that the neighbor has done something evil. - Rash judgment properly so called is a firm assent of the mind concerning the sin or fault of the neighbor conceived without sufficient reason. - Psychologically, the transition from doubt and suspicion into firm judgment is easily made.

In all these grades, rashness arises from this, that someone judges evil of the neighbor without sufficient reason; but if he were judging according to proofs and things alleged, doubting when a sufficient reason for doubting is present, or pronouncing certainly when moral certainty is present, the judgment would be prudent, not rash, and therefore not sinful under this head.

366. (C) The causes from which rash judgment proceeds are assigned as three by St. Thomas:² "In one way indeed from this, that someone is evil in himself; and from this very thing, as if conscious of his own malice, he easily thinks evil of others... In another way it comes from this, that someone is badly affected toward another; for when someone despises or hates someone, or is angry with him or envies him, from slight signs he thinks evil about him, because each one easily believes what he desires. In a third way it comes from long experience; whence the Philosopher says that 'old men are especially suspicious, because many times they have experienced the defects of others.'" - Therefore there are three causes: the depravity of the one judging himself; hatred and envy; experience of human frailty. The first two show perversity of affection and increase the malice of the act; the third diminishes the same.

² St. Thomas, q. 60, a. 3.

367. 2. Principle: Rash judgment properly so called in a grave matter is a mortal sin against justice.

It is explained; here there is question of rash judgment properly so called, that is: (a) certain, not indeed metaphysically but morally, insofar as it is firmly judged that the neighbor has done something evil; for if the judgment is only doubtful, generally the injury inflicted upon the neighbor is not grave.

(b) Deliberately brought forth, that is, after sufficient advertence of the mind, by which the one judging rashly attends to the gravity of the matter and the slightness of the motives, and nevertheless wills to give assent; therefore, if the judgment is sudden, conceived from levity rather than from malice, the sin will be only light; and under this head many rash judgments, grave of themselves, do not exceed venial sin.

368. (c) From insufficient motives; for he who from a grave or even probable motive judges sinisterly about another does not sin gravely; yet he sins lightly if, with all the circumstances considered, the judgment exceeds the limits of prudent assent. Hence in practice attention must be paid to the various circumstances of person, time, place, etc. - Thus if a man of depraved morals speaks lingerlingly with a suspect woman, it is not rash to judge that something evil is being transacted there; otherwise, if an upright man has conversation with the same woman; - if someone unknown secretly and at night enters another's dwelling, it is not rashly judged that a depraved intention is present in him; otherwise if by day a known person enters openly; - likewise if seditious men gather in a dark place and converse there in a low voice, they are deservedly judged to be conspiring toward something evil; otherwise, if there is question of upright men who are gathered in an open place.

(d) In a grave matter, for if the matter is light, the sin will be only venial. But matter is held grave which, with attention paid to the quality of the person and other circumstances, notably injures his reputation; e.g., if someone rashly judges that some soldier, who has several times fought a singular combat, provoked an enemy to a duel, the sin is not grave, since the soldier in question would by no means judge himself injured by this judgment; otherwise if the same judgment were made concerning a priest.

369. It is proved. (A) Each one has a strict right to preserving a good reputation and good estimation among others, as long as it is not morally certain that he is wicked; now that right is gravely violated by rash judgment clothed with those conditions which we have set forth above; since, in a grave matter, without sufficient motive, deliberately and certainly, we judge that the neighbor is guilty of some sin or vice, and unjustly deprive him of the good estimation to which he had a right among us.

This indeed will be better understood if we attend to the three things required for a judgment to be brought equitably: authority in the judge, accurate knowledge of the cause, and perfect integrity, or immunity from prejudices and passions; now these three things are lacking in rash judgment: (a) authority is lacking, since private men, superiors excepted, have received no mandate for judging others; (b) accurate knowledge of the matter is lacking, since by hypothesis the judgment is rash; on the other hand, often judgment is brought from fallacious appearances or from false testimonies of others, and not only concerning external acts, but also concerning intentions which are known to God alone; (c) integrity is lacking, since judgments of this kind for the most part arise from envy, hatred, or prejudices.¹

¹ Bourdaloue solidly develops this, Careme, Sermon for the Friday of the Fifth Week, on Rash Judgment.

370. Hence Scripture prohibits us from judging and condemning the morals of others: "Judge not, that you may not be judged: for with what judgment you shall judge, you shall be judged... Condemn not, and you shall not be condemned";² and especially lest, while we ourselves are bound by the same or greater sins, we judge severely concerning the lesser sins of others: "Wherefore you are inexcusable, O every man who judges; for in that in which you judge another, you condemn yourself: for you do the same things which you judge";³ hence he who judges his brother offends the law: "He who detracts from a brother, or who judges his brother, detracts from the law, and judges the law."⁴

² Matt., VII, 1-2; Luke, VI, 37.

³ Rom., II, 1.

⁴ James, IV, 11.

371. 3. Corollaries. (A) Rash doubt, suspicion, and opinion concerning the probity of the neighbor generally are only venial sins, because they do not utterly take away the good estimation of the neighbor, but only diminish it, and therefore do not inflict a grave injury.

Yet in a twofold case they can be mortal: (a) if they are deliberately brought forth concerning most grave sins, without any probable foundation, e.g., if someone rashly suspects that a pious priest is a heretic, or that an upright man and one above every exception is guilty of theft; for simple suspicion in the case inflicts grave injury;⁵ (b) if someone from envy or hatred, without sufficient motive, voluntarily fosters suspicions concerning a grave matter; for then the sin is grave, on account of the evil affection from which it arises.

⁵ A few theologians indeed deny this (in St. Alphonsus, n. 964), relying on the authority of St. Thomas, l. c., a. 3; but the holy Doctor there hands down a general rule, saying nothing about the exception; therefore his authority is alleged in vain.

372. (B) In relation to the mode of conducting oneself with respect to the neighbor: (a) we are not indeed bound, when there is reason for doubting whether the neighbor's actions are to be taken in a good or in an evil part, always to bring a judgment favoring the neighbor; but it is licit to abstain from judging.¹ (b) In the external mode of acting, we are by no means prohibited from applying precautions for guarding against our own or another's damage, just as if the neighbor were wicked; thus it is licit to lock money in a chest, lest it be stolen by servants or unknown guests; for since among men who are judged upright there are some who are in reality wicked, he acts prudently who uses precautions of this kind, without nevertheless doubting without reason concerning the probity of this or that individual.

¹ Yet charity counsels that, insofar as this can be done, we understand the actions of the neighbor in the better part; charity is kind, and does not think evil. I Cor., XIII, 4. - Faber discusses Christian kindness at length, Spiritual Conferences, on kindness, in French Confer. spirituelles, Bonte.

373. (C) All rash judgments, whatever the object concerning which they turn, are of the same moral species, because they violate the same right; therefore it is not necessary in confession to set forth the object of the rash judgment, but it suffices to declare whether the matter is grave or not.

Notion and species.

² St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 73; Sotus, lib. V, quaest. 10; Lugo, disp. XIV, n. 34-134; Sayrus, lib. XI, cap. 3 and lib. XII, cap. 6; Billuart, diss. XV, art. 2; St. Alphonsus, n. 966-982; Carriere, n. 898-922 and 961-963; Martinet, lib. IV, art. 14, § 3-6; Lehmkuhl, n. 1175-1184; Ball. P., n. 1067-1102; Noldin, n. 633-642.

Malice and gravity.

On the licit manifestation of hidden vices.

On the sin of those hearing detraction.

Scholion on whispering.

374. (A) Reputation is injured not only internally by rash judgment, but also externally, by words or by other equivalent signs, through detraction, which is also called defamation. This indeed in a general way is the unjust blackening of the neighbor's reputation.³ - But this can be done in two ways: through simple detraction (in French medisance), which is the unjust injury of another's reputation by manifesting without cause a true but hidden vice; - through calumny (calomnie), which is the unjust injury of another's reputation by imputing to another a false crime or defect. - Therefore calumny adds to simple detraction a lie, and indeed a pernicious one.

³ Some in the definition of detraction add the word hidden, so that it may thus be distinguished from contumely, which is done in the presence of the one defamed; nevertheless we abstain from this word, because detraction brought forth in the presence of the defamed person and of others does not cease to be defamation, but is detraction joined with contumely. - But the essential distinction between defamation and contumely is situated in this, that the former injures reputation, the latter honor.

375. (B) Defamation can be done in various ways, which are expressed in these verses:

Imputing, increasing, manifesting, turning into evil,

He who denies or diminishes, is silent, or praises remissly.

That we may explain the matter psychologically, these are the various grades of detraction: (a) The detractor praises remissly and coldly, declaring that praises brought forward by others are either wholly or partly undeserved; (b) he is silent, that is, he says nothing, or positively says "let there be speech of something else," when there is question of the endowments of the neighbor, and the silence imports a certain denial; (c) he diminishes, namely he somewhat attenuates the qualities of the neighbor, saying, e.g., that he is not as pious, honest, or distinguished as many think; (d) he denies the endowments of the neighbor acknowledged by others; (e) he turns into evil, that is, he attributes harmless or even good deeds to ambition, vanity, avarice, and other vices; (f) manifesting, or uncovering hidden offenses or vices; (g) increasing, that is, amplifying offenses; e.g., if someone has once been drunk, he is declared a drunkard; (h) imputing, falsely attributing to someone a vice from which he is free. - These last two pertain to calumny, and often also turning into evil; the rest are referred to simple detraction. But the transition from one grade to another is easily made.

The worst kind is reticence expressed by these or similar words: "There are other deeds of his, concerning which it is better to be silent! - These things certainly are excellent; would that he had always shown himself such! But what good is there in recalling past things? - There are indeed many other things which I could report; but charity prohibits this, etc." These indeed, if they lack foundation, are referred to calumny properly; but if they rest upon true but hidden facts, they pertain to detraction, yet by their generality they approach calumny, because they suggest worse things.

376. (C) On the part of malice, there is a great difference between defamation which is done directly from the intention of injuring reputation, and that which is done from levity and talkativeness, without the intention of harming the neighbor. - Yet those who, from an itch for speaking, often defame the neighbor (and among these there are not a few pious persons!), must be carefully warned to place a guard of circumstance upon their lips.

377. 1. Principle: Simple detraction and calumny, which are done from the intention of injuring the reputation of the neighbor, are from their kind mortal sins against justice.

It is proved. (A) For from what has been said each one has a strict right to his own reputation; now that right is injured by defamation; this is clear when there is question of calumny, which, by imputing a false crime or defect, deprives the innocent man of the reputation owed to him; it is also clear as regards detraction, for as long as an offense remains hidden, the offender retains the right to reputation among others (unless a grave reason stands in the way, as will be explained below), and therefore he is deprived of his right when his hidden vices are manifested without reason. - Nor may it be said that truth has its rights, and demands that hidden offenses be uncovered; for it belongs to God, as supreme judge, to illuminate the hidden things of darkness and to manifest the secrets of hearts at the opportune time; but he who by private authority, without sufficient reason, uncovers the hidden vices of others usurps the rights of God, who is the sole judge of the living and the dead; and also harms the good of society; for if it were licit for all to bring the hidden basenesses of the neighbor into the light, contentions, quarrels, envies, and jealousies would arise on every side; the peace and tranquility of families would be gravely disturbed. Therefore defamation is unjust, and indeed of itself gravely, since it injures reputation, which of itself is more precious than gold.

378. (B) Scripture not rarely reproves detractors as hateful to God and men, and assimilates them to sinners who are excluded from the kingdom of heaven; thus it is said: "The detractor is an abomination of men";¹ - Paul, describing the pagans, depicts them as "filled with all iniquity... whisperers, detractors, hateful to God,"² as if by all these vices they had been made hateful to God; elsewhere he teaches that revilers are excluded from the kingdom of God.³

¹ Prov., XXIV, 9.

² Rom., I, 29-30.

³ I Cor., VI, 10.

379. (C) Likewise the Fathers many times condemn that vice as truly diabolical;⁴ St. Augustine, in order to keep his guests away from this vice, had written on his table:⁵

⁴ For their testimonies see in Buseus, Panarium, word Detractio.

⁵ In Possidius, Vita S. Augustini, in Migne, P. L., XXXII, 52.

"Whoever loves by words to gnaw at the life of the absent

Let him know that this table is forbidden to him."

Especially let these words of St. Bernard be noted, which set forth the threefold malice of detraction: "Is not the tongue of the detractor a viper? Very fierce indeed: namely, one which so lethally infects three with one breath"; namely, as he explains below, the detractor kills himself, - the hearer - and him against whom he detracts.¹

¹ Serm. XVII, De Diversis, n. 4-5.

380. 2. Rules for judging the gravity of detraction. The sin of defamation, which is grave from its kind, can be venial under a twofold head: from inadvertence of mind, which attends little to the damage of the neighbor, and from lightness of matter, concerning which especially we must treat. Now the general principle is that the gravity of the sin is to be taken from the gravity of the damage which the injured person suffers in reputation. But the gravity of the damage ought to be considered not only in itself, but also in relation to the person injured, to the condition of the one detracting, to the number and quality of the hearers. Therefore attention must be paid:

381. (A) To the defect which is manifested; thus detraction in those things which pertain to honesty of life is much graver than that which turns upon natural defects of soul and body, both because these do not notably diminish reputation, and because they more easily become or can become public knowledge; whence generally the former defamation is grave, but the latter light. Yet if the natural defect is very disgraceful, and brings great sadness to the one injured (e.g., if it is said of a distinguished man that he is illegitimate), the sin can be mortal. - Likewise to call someone in general proud, irascible, lazy, etc., is not as grave as to narrate particular facts from which these defects are actually manifested; for general propensities denote natural inclination more than personal fault. - Thus also it is not mortal to report concerning him who has already been defamed by some sin something connected with that offense, e.g., to say of a husband who is known as a drunkard that he quarreled with his wife; otherwise, if the fact is altogether dissimilar, e.g., if it is said that a priest who has already lost reputation in doctrine is depraved in morals; for he who has lost reputation in one matter has not for that reason lost the same in a matter wholly dissimilar.

382. (B) To the person injured, and to his condition and dignity; for he who enjoys an intact reputation necessary to him for exercising an office or business suffers graver damage than another who neither enjoys nor needs an intact reputation.² Likewise the gravity of the defect which is manifested depends much on the condition of the person; thus an accusation against chastity harms a priest more than a layman, a girl more than a soldier; on the contrary, an insinuation of cowardice brings greater detriment to a soldier than to a girl; to say that a merchant is dishonest, that a physician is ignorant, harms these especially, not only as regards reputation itself, but also as regards the profit which they can make. - To detract concerning the dead, whether by words or writings, although less damaging than concerning the living, nevertheless is unjust, because they have not lost the right to reputation, and on the other hand something of disgrace redounds from this upon the family; hence historians who, shortly after the death of some man, narrate his life, ought to take care not to injure the reputation of the deceased or of his family.¹ - It is not licit to detract concerning some family or community, because the disgrace redounds upon the whole community, e.g., if someone were to say that in such a monastery certain religious indulge in such or such a vice; otherwise, if it were said in a general way that in monasteries there are not lacking those who sin gravely, although this mode of speaking is to be avoided before those who can suffer scandal from it.

² It is not licit to reveal the hidden sin of the neighbor, while adding at the same time that penance for it was performed, because, even with this correction, his reputation is injured.

¹ But if they write long after his death, they can reveal even hidden vices, by reason of the public good, so that men may be deterred from vices; hence even a little after his death they can collect documents in which these offenses are narrated, so that memory of them may exist. - Cf. Baller. P., n. 1097; Noldin, n. 642.

383. (C) To the person of the detractor; since a man who is regarded as grave, prudent, and truthful harms more than one who is light, talkative, and lying; likewise if someone affirms something as certain from sight, he inflicts greater damage than if he reports the same as heard from persons of uncertain authority. Yet if someone narrates a grave matter as heard from a person worthy of faith, or if he foresees from the circumstances that the hearers will believe it, he can commit a grave sin.

He who narrates a hidden crime, without naming the person guilty of this sin, indeed does not sin against justice, if he knows that the hearers cannot know this person; otherwise, if he foresees that the same can easily be known.

384. (D) To the number and quality of the hearers; for, other things being equal, detraction brought forth before many is worse than in the ear of one, - before talkative persons who will preach the matter over the roofs than before men tenacious of secrecy.

On this occasion theologians ask whether he sins gravely who, without malice, manifests a grave defect of the neighbor to one prudent man, who is not going to divulge the matter. Now if this is done from a reasonable cause, for seeking counsel or consolation, it certainly is not a grave sin. But if it is done without cause, it is controverted: some say, with Cajetan,² that the damage is not notable, because reputation is lost before one only; others assert, with Lugo,³ that the damage is notable, precisely because reputation is lost before a grave man, concerning whose good estimation men especially care; and indeed this reason is not lacking in solidity. - In practice, those who act thus are not to be disturbed, but they are to be exhorted to abstain from manifesting the defects of the neighbor when no reason is present.¹

² Commentary on q. 73, art. 2.

³ Lugo, l. c., n. 51-52.

¹ You will find the French laws concerning calumny and defamation in the Supplement, n. 72.

385. A point to be noted for practice. Detraction and calumny are sins specifically diverse, insofar as calumny, besides detraction, contains a lie. Some say that this malice, as against truthfulness, is not mortal, and therefore does not have to be declared necessarily in confession.² - Yet this does not seem consonant with right reason; for the lie in question is pernicious, and therefore grave, if the matter itself is grave.

² Thus Noldin, n. 637, who nevertheless adds: "Yet for the most part the confessor ought to know this, both so that the gravity of the sin and so that the mode of restitution can be determined."

But detractions in diverse matters, e.g., to say that someone is a robber, a liar, or a drunkard, are more probably not sins diverse in species, since they injure reputation in the same mode, if not in the same degree; therefore the confessor is not bound to inquire concerning the very matter of detraction, except insofar as this is necessary for judging whether the defamation is grave or not.

386. 1. Principle. From what has been said, it is never licit to calumniate; indeed generally it is illicit to uncover the hidden defects of the neighbor; but, when a proportionately grave reason is added, this can be licit; for the obligation of keeping silent about the defects of others ceases when their revelation is demanded by the public or private good, proportionate to the damage which follows from the manifestation itself, provided the intention is held not of harming, but of obtaining a good effect; for the manifestation of a vice which really exists is not of itself something intrinsically evil, and therefore can be permitted from a proportionately grave reason.

Now a sufficient motive can be:

387. (A) The public good, namely when the revelation of the offense is necessary for impeding an evil which threatens society or the community; for it is better to avert such damage than to preserve the reputation of a harmful person. Thus, if there is question of conferring an office upon someone unworthy or incapable, it is licit to uncover his hidden vices to the superior, when these are going to harm the whole community; newspaper writers can uncover the vices of candidates who seek public dignities or offices, as often as this knowledge contributes to the public good; if any secretly teach a very bad doctrine, from which faith or morals are corrupted, they must be denounced to superiors.

388. (B) Private good: (a) of the offender himself, as often as it cannot be procured without injury to his reputation, e.g., when children or subjects cannot be corrected unless their secret vices are manifested to parents or superiors; when someone cannot be kept away from an invalid marriage without manifestation of a hidden impediment. - Many also teach that this is licit for obtaining the prayers of the pious for the amendment of the offender; yet this must be done only prudently and with a right intention; for there are some who, under this pretext, but in reality from an itch for manifesting the vices of others, say to many: "pray for such a person, who greatly needs prayers, because..."; and this often is nothing other than open detraction or calumny veiled by hypocrisy.

(b) The good of the one revealing, when someone, for the sake of consolation or counsel, narrates to a friend injuries inflicted upon himself, even if thus another's hidden vice is uncovered; or uncovers to a judge the hidden crime of an accuser, in order to destroy the force of his testimony; for we can prefer our own good to the good of the neighbor.

389. (c) Also the private good of the neighbor; namely, when innocents can easily be deceived and seduced by the wicked, it is often expedient to manifest the secret offenses of these, so that the temporal or spiritual ruin of the unwary may more easily and efficaciously be averted; for the good of the innocent must be preferred to the reputation of the guilty. - Therefore if inquiry is made concerning the honesty of some servant, concerning the skill of a certain physician, etc., it is licit to disclose the truth, yet prudently and while observing the laws of charity.

In all these cases, revelation ought to be made with the least damage to the guilty person, - namely by manifesting only that which is truly useful for averting the evil, and only to those for whom the matter can be useful. - But it is never licit to impute what is false to someone in order to avoid one's own damage or that of others: for this would be a pernicious lie; therefore deservedly the following propositions (43-44) were condemned by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679, as scandalous and pernicious in practice: "Why should it be anything but venial to destroy the great authority of one detracting from oneself by a false crime? - It is probable that he does not sin mortally who imputes a false crime to someone, in order to defend his own justice and honor."¹

¹ In Denzinger, n. 1060-1061.

Hence more probably it is not licit to manifest a hidden crime when knowledge of it has been acquired unjustly (e.g., by unjustly reading another's letters), even for defending oneself.¹ For the public good demands that fraud and injustice be able to patronize no one; therefore if someone has known another's secret by truly unjust means, the common good demands that he cannot use it. But otherwise it would have to be said if someone had the right of examining private letters, according to the rules to be set forth below.

¹ Thus Lugo, disp. XIV, n. 100-108.

390. 2. Corollary: on the manifestation of a public crime. When a crime is public, generally it is licit to manifest it without injustice even to those who are ignorant of it, because the right to reputation has been lost. Yet, so that the matter may be determined more accurately, certain distinctions are necessary.

(A) When an offense is public by notoriety of law, that is, by force of "a judicial sentence publicly promulgated,"² it can be manifested, even without cause, in the region where it has been denounced, unless it has been amended and already destroyed by oblivion; for the judge by a legitimate sentence deprived the offender of the right to reputation, at least in this matter; and, by promulgating this sentence, gave to others license to divulge the offense, so that citizens may more easily beware of criminal men. - Yet I said in the region where the sentence has been promulgated; for if the offender has gone away into a distant region, and there harms no one, charity at least can demand that his crime not be revealed, lest otherwise he come into despair. I likewise said unless it has been amended and already destroyed by oblivion; for if, even in the region where the sentence was made public knowledge, the offender has amended himself and enjoys a good reputation, it would be against charity, and perhaps against justice, to recall the memory of the past and expiated crime, and to deprive the guilty man, now amended, of his restored reputation.

² There is question of a sentence which passed into a judged matter, or of the confession of the offender made in judgment, according to the norm of the Code, c. 1750 and 2197, 2.

391. (B) But if the fact is public only by notoriety of fact, insofar, namely, as it is publicly known and cannot be concealed by any evasion,³ it can be manifested unless it has been amended and destroyed by oblivion. - For, even if no judicial sentence has intervened, the public good demands that criminal men, who have offended not once but several times and can inflict damage upon others, become known to all. - But if the offender is truly amended, and therefore by no means harmful to society, and otherwise his offense has been destroyed by oblivion, he who recalls the memory of this offense certainly sins against charity, and more probably against justice; for the offender, who had lost the right to reputation by a public offense, recovered it by amendment of life.

³ Code, can. 2197, 3.

392. (C) If the crime is public by notoriety of fact in one place, more probably it is not licit, whether from charity or from justice, to divulge it in another distant place, unless it is foreseen that the same will shortly be public in that place, or it is feared lest the offender harm others in that place. The reason of the general rule is that the offender has not lost the right to reputation in that remote region; but if reputation is going to be lost within a short time, it can morally be held as already lost; on the other hand, if the guilty man is harmful to others, on account of the public good it is expedient that he be denounced. - Even when the neighbor has lost the right to reputation, to narrate his offenses from an itch for speaking wittily is often a venial sin against charity, as being very unpleasant to the neighbor.

Among those hearing detraction, some induce the detractor to blacken the neighbor, others voluntarily rejoice concerning it, others merely do not impede the detraction.

393. 1. Those who induce others to detract, by inquiring concerning the defects of the neighbor, or by praising him in such a way that they move others to detraction, or by approving their narration, sin in the same way as those detracting themselves, not only against charity, but also against justice; for formally they cooperate with an unjust action; besides, they give scandal, by provoking others to sin.

2. Those who voluntarily rejoice concerning detraction, without nevertheless formally cooperating with it, sin against charity, because they rejoice concerning the evil of the neighbor; gravely, if they do this from hatred, envy, or revenge, or another motive of this kind, and otherwise the matter is grave; venially, if from curiosity, or from the mode of narrating, or from another lightly sinful motive.

394. 3. He who neither approves detraction, nor rejoices concerning it, but only does not impede it, sins against charity, unless he is excused by some reason, - both because he does not avert evil from the defamed person, and because he does not impede the sin of the detractor; but he does not injure justice, because he is not bound from justice to avert that twofold evil.

That obligation of impeding detraction chiefly lies upon superiors; since the superior of the one defaming ought to correct the detractor, and the superior of the one defamed ought to avert the evil of his subject; whence, other things being equal, superiors sin more gravely in this case than subjects or equals; yet not against justice, because by force of their office they ought to watch over the spiritual, not the temporal, good of subjects, and therefore they are not bound from strict justice to impede their defamation.

It was said unless he is excused by some reason; for there are those who do not sin even venially by not impeding detraction: (a) because they prudently foresee that every correction will be useless or even harmful, e.g., because the detractor is thereby stirred up to increase the detraction; (b) because a grave inconvenience is feared, e.g., quarrels, insults; (c) or because he does not dare to say anything, on account of reasonable shame.

In practice, nevertheless, one ought or at least it is expedient to manifest a certain displeasure, if possible, whether by departing, or especially by diverting the conversation to other things, as soon as the opportunity presents itself.

395. Whispering (in French rapport, delation) is the manifestation of some saying or deed of another for disturbing peace and friendship among families or friends. Therefore it differs from detraction by reason of the end, because properly it intends not the blackening of the neighbor, but the sowing of discord; nevertheless it generally involves detraction or calumny, and therefore contains a twofold malice. - Whisperers in Scripture are called double-tongued, because they often use a double mode of speaking, conversing in one way before one person, in another way before another, so that they may more efficaciously sow the causes of quarrels.

396. Whispering is a grave sin from its kind, directly indeed against charity, but indirectly also, at least for the most part, against justice, insofar as it involves detraction or calumny. It is a grave sin from its kind, because of itself it tends to destroy friendship, which is the greatest good, according to Scripture as witness: "A faithful friend is a strong protection: and he who has found him has found a treasure; there is no comparison to a faithful friend... a faithful friend is a medicine of life and immortality."¹ - Hence in the same place whispering is often reproved as a sin hateful to men and God, and worthy of death: "A whisperer shall defile his own soul, and in all things he shall be hated... The whisperer and the double-tongued are accursed: for he will disturb many having peace."² And elsewhere:¹ "Six things there are which the Lord hates, and the seventh His soul detests... him who sows discord among brothers"; wherefore, according to St. Paul,² whisperers are worthy of death. Therefore whispering is of itself a grave sin: "And therefore whispering is a greater sin than detraction, and also than contumely; because a friend is better than honor, and to be loved than to be honored."³

¹ Eccli., VI, 14-16.

² Eccli., XXI, 31; XXVIII, 15.

¹ Prov., VI, 16, 19.

² Rom., I, 29, 32.

³ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 74, a. 2.

But the sin is the graver the more intimate and more necessary the friendship is which is dissolved, and the worse the effects are which can be foreseen from this; therefore if friendship is dissolved between parents and children, or between spouses, or between defenders of the Catholic faith, and from this dissensions, quarrels, and other things of this kind can be foreseen, the sin is greater.

But he does not commit whispering who dissolves by counsels or fraternal correction a harmful or dangerous friendship.

397. 1. Notion and species. Just as reputation is injured by rash judgment and defamation, so honor is injured by contumely. For honor is the external manifestation of reverence owed to the neighbor on account of his excellence; it is owed to all those who, although otherwise imperfect, are endowed with certain distinguished gifts. - To this is opposed contumely, which is the unjust injury of honor inflicted upon one present and knowing it; or at least with the intention that it become known to the one injured, whether through a messenger or through letters. Therefore it differs from detraction by reason of the object, because it directly injures honor, not reputation; by reason of the mode, because it is done to one present, while for the most part detraction is done concerning one absent. - Yet sometimes contumely is done before others, to whom a hidden offense of the offended person is manifested, and in this case it is joined with detraction.

⁴ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 72; Soto, lib. V, quaest. 9, art. 1; Lugo, disp. XIV, n. 189-196; Sayrus, lib. XI, cap. 8; St. Alphonsus, n. 984-990; Carriere, n. 977-980; Martinet, lib. IV, art. 14, § 2; Noldin, n. 651-654.

Contumely can be inflicted positively by words or deeds which express contempt; and negatively, by omitting due honor, e.g., a greeting in circumstances in which this is owed. To contumely is referred mockery or derision, by which the defects of the neighbor are turned into laughter, to his shame and confusion; and also insult, or reproach, by which a vice is disgracefully cast before him. For the most part contumely, mockery, and insult arise from anger, or from hatred.

398. 2. Principle: Contumely is a sin mortal from its kind against justice.

For every man has a right to honor on account of the natural or supernatural gifts with which he is endowed, - for example, on account of the grace and virtues with which he is adorned, doctrine or prudence or other qualities by which he shines forth, or by reason of the duty or office committed to him; and this indeed is true even if he labors under certain defects or vices, since by these the excellent gifts with which he is furnished are not taken away. Now contumely violates that right, by despising the neighbor through words, deeds, or omission of due reverence; but this injury is of itself grave, because honor, by the common estimation of men, is placed before the goods of fortune, and therefore is held as a good of great moment; yet it can be venial from lightness of matter or imperfection of the voluntary act. Hence Scripture strictly prohibits injuries of this kind, under most grave penalties: "But he who shall say to his brother, raca, shall be guilty before the council; but he who shall say, fool, shall be guilty of the hell of fire";¹ on the contrary, it wills that Christians be "anticipating one another with honor,"² and "in humility esteeming one another superior to themselves";³ wherefore he who despises his brother is wholly opposed to the evangelical spirit.

¹ Matt., V, 22.

² Rom., XII, 10.

³ Philip., II, 3.

399. 3. On the gravity of contumely. In order that judgment may be made rightly concerning the gravity of contumely or mockery, attention must especially be paid to these things:

(A) To the dignity of the person offended and the gravity of the injury; generally the more honorable the offended person is, the graver the contumely is, other things being equal; but the gravity of the injury is not taken only in itself, but in relation to the person; thus insults with which common people affect one another injure honor less than similar words held among persons of a nobler condition.

(B) To the person offending, and his dispositions; if he is endowed with authority, the offense is greater, because more care is taken of it; if he is of a more lowly condition, it is more easily held as nothing; likewise, if it arises from anger or levity, it is certainly less grave than if from hatred, envy, or contempt.

(C) To the effects going to follow from it; namely, the sin is greater if it is done before many persons, who take scandal from this; likewise if it is foreseen that quarrels, enmities, and contentions are going to arise from it.

400. Corollaries. (A) Mockery is a sin of the same species as contumely; therefore the same must be said concerning its gravity. Yet an urbane kind of joking is more easily excused from sin, if it is done by way of honorable recreation, among friends who plainly understand the matter. Nevertheless, even in these circumstances, let it be used soberly and prudently, and not for too long, lest perhaps he concerning whom there is question be made too sad or be provoked to anger.

(B) Sometimes insult and reproach are not only excused from sin, but are praiseworthy, namely when they are done cautiously and moderately by superiors or friends from the intention of correcting a subject or brother. But then let them be done with right intention, when a grave reason is present, and indeed in such a way that it can be understood that they are brought forward not from anger or passion, but from the mind of correcting and amending the offender.

Truthfulness is a virtue annexed to justice, inclining the mind to saying what is true when, where, and how it is fitting. Social life requires this, since it supposes the sincerity and honesty of citizens; and sometimes justice requires it, as will be clear from what is to be said. To truthfulness are opposed chiefly false testimony and lying.

401. 1. Principle: False testimony is of itself a grave sin against justice.

(A) For it is directly prohibited by the eighth precept of the Decalogue: "You shall not speak false testimony against your neighbor";¹ hence false testimony is numbered among the six sins which the Lord hates;² and a false witness is exhibited as very harmful to the neighbor:³ "A dart and a sword, and a sharp arrow, is the man who speaks false testimony against his neighbor."

¹ Exod., XX, 16.

² Prov., VI, 16, 19.

³ Prov., XXV, 18.

402. (B) In reality false testimony, according to St. Thomas,⁴ has a threefold deformity: (a) from perjury, because witnesses are not admitted unless sworn, and therefore they offend religion by violating the oath, and under this head they always sin gravely;⁵ (b) from violation of justice; for he who is legitimately questioned before magistrates is bound to speaking the truth not only from legal obedience, but also from commutative justice, since otherwise he can be an unjust cause why an innocent person is condemned; and under this head the sin is grave from its kind, against justice, and obliges to restitution as often as it was an efficacious cause of damage, from the principles to be set forth below concerning the unjust damager; (c) from the lie itself; for denial of owed truth is a sin against truthfulness, and indeed a pernicious one, which therefore will be mortal if the matter is grave. - Deservedly, therefore, canon law reproves an offense of this kind in these words: "A lying witness is harmful to three persons: first to God, whose presence he despises; then to the judge, whom he deceives by lying; lastly to the innocent person, whom he injures by false testimony."¹

⁴ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 70, a. 4.

⁵ Today nevertheless in certain regions an oath is no longer exacted.

¹ Decretal., lib. V, tit. XX, c. 1, p. 816-817, ed. Friedberg. - Cf. Cod. p. gal., a. 316-366; Supplement, p. 71*.

403. 2. Corollaries. (A) Per accidens false testimony can be a venial sin: (a) from lightness of matter, if only light harm is inflicted upon the neighbor, and otherwise an oath is not exacted; yet this rarely occurs in a judicial matter; (b) from defect of sufficient advertence; the witness indeed ought to be cautious, and to think seriously before he renders testimony, since there is question of a matter altogether grave; nor ought he to assert as certain that concerning which he is not certain, but he ought to bring forth doubt under doubt. "But because it happens from the instability of human memory that a man sometimes thinks himself to be certain about that which is false, if someone, reconsidering with due solicitude, judges himself to be certain about that which is false, he does not sin mortally by asserting this: because he does not say false testimony in itself and from intention, but per accidens against that which he intends."²

² St. Thomas, l. c., ad 1.

(B) He who knowingly and willingly brought forth false testimony, by cooperating efficaciously toward the condemnation of an innocent person, is bound from justice to repair the damage inflicted, with equal or greater³ inconvenience to himself, even with retraction of the testimony brought forth, if this is necessary and efficacious. - But concerning him who erred inculpably, or at least did not cooperate efficaciously toward inflicting damage, - because, e.g., with the testimony of others already given, the matter could have been held as finished, judgment must be made according to the principles to be set forth below where Restitution is treated.

³ If his own damage were much greater, in certain circumstances he could be excused from restitution or retraction, as will be explained below.

404. Preliminary note. A lie is speech against the mind, expressed by words or by other exterior signs.

¹ St. Augustine, De Mendacio, one book; Contra Mendacium, one book; Migne, P. L., XL, 487-548; St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 110-111; Lessius, lib. II, cap. 47, dub. 6; J. Barnes, O. S. B., Dissertatio contra aequivocationes, Paris, 1625; Th. Raynaudus, S. J., De aequivocatione et mentali restrictione, among his works, Lyons, 1565, t. XIV, p. 71, 232; L. Thomassin, Traite de la Verite et du Mensonge, Paris, 1691; St. Alphonsus, n. 151-171; Carriere, n. 923-960; Bolgeni, in Melanges theologiques de Liege, 4th series, 1850-1851, p. 406-413; Examen de l'opinion de Bolgeni, in Melanges, 6th series, 1852-53, p. 410-462; Waffelaert, Dissertation morale sur la malice du mensonge, Tournai, 1884; F. Bouillier, Questions de Morale pratique, Paris, 1889, p. 249-359; Ami du Clerge, XVIII, 1896, p. 561-572; Dubois, Une Theorie du mensonge, in Science catholique, Sept. 1897; Etude sur la malice intrinseque du mensonge, by a professor of Theology, Paris, 1899; Du mensonge proprement dit, by a Professor of Theology, Paris, 1903.

If it is done solely for the sake of joking, it is called jocose; if for one's own or another's utility, it is called officious; but when it is brought forth in order to inflict damage unjustly upon someone, it is named pernicious. - To lying are recalled simulation, by which by deed or external sign the neighbor is induced into error; and also hypocrisy, which covers internal wickedness with the external appearance of virtue; boasting, by which someone by praising himself or his own passes beyond the limits of truth; flattery, which extols another beyond the limits of truth, with the mind of blandishment.

Since there have been various opinions concerning the essence and intrinsic malice of lying, we shall set forth the matter historically, in order to deduce practical conclusions from it.

405. (A) Doctrine of St. Augustine. Before Augustine, the Fathers in a general way reproved lying as contrary to Christian truthfulness;² yet a few, such as Clement of Alexandria, Origen, St. Chrysostom, and St. Hilary, had taught that in a case of necessity, for averting the greatest damage, it is licit to use a lie just as a medicine; and in this sense they understood certain deeds related in each Testament.¹ Being questioned concerning this matter, St. Augustine set forth his doctrine in two works, De Mendacio (around the year 365), and Contra Mendacium (around the year 420); in both he openly teaches, - not indeed as Catholic doctrine, but as an opinion to which he firmly adheres, - that every lie is a sin, and that one must never lie: (a) not for the temporal salvation of anyone whatever, since the life of the soul is more powerful than bodily life;² (b) nor for preserving purity or avoiding defilement, since purity of the soul excels the integrity of the body;³ (c) nor for the eternal salvation of another: for just as, in danger of eternal salvation, it is not licit to aid a man through defilement, so neither through a lie, which truly is a sin;⁴ therefore it is not licit to deceive the guards of a prison in order to baptize a man; nor can Catholics falsely say that they are Priscillianists, in order that they may know the secrets of these.⁵

² Thomassin, op. cit., p. 75-107; 129-189, sets forth their doctrine excellently.

¹ See the testimonies in Thomassin, l. c., and T. Raynaudus, op. cit., p. 143-149.

² In Migne, XL, 494, 541-545.

³ Ibid., 496-497.

⁴ Ibid., 546-547.

⁵ The book Contra Mendacium was directly written so that Catholics might be deterred from using a lie to uncover hidden Priscillianists. - Migne, l. c., p. 517.

406. But since not a few texts of the Scriptures were opposed by adversaries for defending lying, he handed down that these are to be explained in a threefold way: (a) let it be shown that the deeds alleged, if rightly understood, are not lies: thus the manner of acting of Jacob, who seems to deceive his father, is not a lie, but a mystery;⁶ (b) but if they are lies, they are not to be imitated; (c) or at least concerning those matters which pertain to the doctrine of religion, one must in no way lie.⁷

⁶ Ibid., 533.

⁷ Ibid., 535.

Concerning equivocation and mental restriction he is entirely silent, and he seems by the whole mode of arguing to exclude them.

But the reasons why, according to Augustine, lies are utterly and always illicit are: (a) the authority of the Scriptures, especially of the Apostle saying:⁸ "Putting away lying, speak truth each one with his neighbor, because we are members one of another"; where the word neighbor designates all, even heretics;⁹ (b) the intrinsic malice of lying, which is no less an evil than adultery;¹⁰ (c) the depraved consequences to follow from this; since indeed faith is not had in other matters toward one who lies in one.¹¹

⁸ Ephes., IV, 25.

⁹ In Migne, l. c., p. 527.

¹⁰ Ibid., 527-528 and passim.

¹¹ Ibid., 523.

Yet since he knows that there are some defenders of lying, he says: "At least in the worship of God let them concede that one must not lie... concerning the other kinds of lies, let him who is pleased that lying is to be done choose for himself what he thinks to be the mildest and most innocent kind of lying."¹

¹ Ibid., 544.

407. (B) Doctrine of St. Thomas. Most Fathers embraced the opinion of St. Augustine, with a few nevertheless excepted, who, with Cassian,² held that lying can be applied as it were as hellebore, in a case of necessity, for averting an imminent evil. St. Thomas polished the Augustinian doctrine, (a) by defining the conditions required for a lie properly so called: "Therefore if these three concur, namely that what is enunciated is false, and that the will to enunciate the false is present, and again the intention of deceiving, then there is falsity materially, because what is false is said, - and formally because of the will of saying what is false, - and effectively because of the will of imprinting falsity."³ (b) Afterward he establishes that every lie is a sin, because it is evil according to itself: for it is against nature that someone by voice signify that which he does not have in mind.⁴ (c) The sin is grave when the lie turns upon divine matters, that is, faith or religion, or inflicts grave damage upon the neighbor; - but it is venial if light harm is inflicted, or if the lie is officious or jocose.⁵

² "And so one must think of a lie, and use it so, as if the nature of hellebore were in it; if it is taken when a deadly disease is imminent, it becomes healthful; otherwise, when taken without necessity of the greatest danger, it belongs to present destruction... Therefore when some grave danger threatens from the confession of truth, then the refuges of lies are to be received, yet in such a way that we are healthfully bitten by the guilt of a humble conscience." (Collat. XVII, cap. 17, in Migne, XLIX, 1062-1063.)

³ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 110, a. 1. Yet he adds that the intention of deceiving does not pertain to the essence of a lie, but to a certain perfection of it.

⁴ Ibid., a. 4.

⁵ Ibid., a. 3.

408. (C) The theory of moralists concerning equivocation and mental restriction. Up to this point nothing had been said concerning equivocation or mental restriction; yet soon theologians understood that in certain circumstances, in order to avoid a greater evil, truth can be hidden under the appearance of equivocation. This, already before implicitly proposed, Lessius and Parsons more directly set forth and defended;⁶ but J. Barnes and Thomassin (op. cit.) attacked their opinion; Th. Raynaudus, op. cit., strove with all strength to vindicate the doctrine of Lessius; and, although some theologians, such as Caramuel,¹ held the same as very dangerous, nevertheless this became common in the schools.

⁶ Lessius, in the book de Antichristo, § 31; de Justitia, lib. II, cap. 11, dub. 20, and cap. 42, dub. 9, and also cap. 47, dub. 6; Parsons, Tr. de Aequivocatione.

¹ Theologia Fundamentalis, Frankfurt, 1652, Fundam. LXII, p. 639.

Yet certain theologians proceeded further in this matter, whose propositions Innocent XI condemned as scandalous and pernicious in practice on March 2, 1679 (n. 24-28):

24. "To call God as witness of a light lie is not such irreverence on account of which He would will or could damn a man.

25. "With cause it is licit to swear without the mind of swearing, whether the matter is light or grave.

26. "If someone, either alone or before others, whether questioned, or of his own accord, or for the sake of recreation, or for any other end whatever, swears that he did not do something which in reality he did, by understanding within himself something which he did not do, or another way from that in which he did it, or any other true addition, in reality he does not lie, nor is he perjured.²

² From this it is clear that this and the following propositions are condemned because in these there is question of purely mental restriction, which cannot be understood even by a prudent man, and indeed confirmed by oath.

27. "A just cause of using these amphibologies is as often as this is necessary or useful for protecting the health of the body, honor, family affairs, or for any other act of virtue, so that the concealment of truth is then judged expedient and studious.

28. "He who by means of recommendation or gift has been promoted to a magistracy or public office will be able with mental restriction to render the oath which by mandate of the king is customarily exacted from similar persons, without respect being had to the intention of the one exacting: because he is not bound to confess a hidden crime."

409. With these excesses set aside, the theory concerning equivocation and mental restriction is proposed today in this way. Equivocation is a word or other sign which, from its nature and the common use of men, is not determined to signify one thing, but can signify several.³ Mental restriction is an act of the mind, by which the words of the speaker, through something which is retained in the mind, are determined to another sense than the natural and obvious one; if the sense of the speaker can in no way be perceived, the restriction is purely or strictly mental;⁴ but if it can be understood from the context or from the circumstances, the restriction is called broadly mental.¹

³ Thus when Christ said: "Lazarus our friend sleeps" (John XI, 11), these words could be understood of sleep or of death.

⁴ Thus if to one asking "whether you have seen Rome," you answer affirmatively, understanding in a picture.

¹ If someone, questioned about a secret which he ought to conceal, responds, I do not know.

Now, for the legitimate use of equivocation or mental restriction, two conditions are required together: (a) that the true sense can be discovered by a prudent man from the context or from the circumstances; (b) that a proportionately grave cause be present; for since deception is a certain evil, it is not licit without reason to give another an occasion of deception; on the other hand, the nearer this occasion is, and the graver the error to which another is exposed, the greater cause is required.

410. Yet this theory concerning mental restriction by no means pleased many recent philosophers, who contended that, with it admitted, no one is now certain in what part the words of another ought to be taken; since, on the other hand, there are not lacking cases in which it is necessary to say what is false in order to avoid a greater evil, they tried to mitigate the rigor of the Augustinian theory and to accommodate it to human weakness. Namely, they say that a lie properly so called is illicit, which is repugnant to the right or good of others; but in a case of necessity a false-saying (faussete) is licit, by which what is false is indeed enunciated, but only when truth is not owed to others, and on the other hand these suffer no damage from the assertion of what is false. Thus especially Grotius and Pufendorf.² Most Protestant theologians,³ not a few Rationalists, and certain Catholics⁴ assented to these. - A lie properly so called indeed is always illicit, they say, because it violates the right which someone has to knowing the truth; but false-saying does not injure the neighbor's right, since by hypothesis truth is not owed to him; nevertheless it cannot be applied without reason, since speech of itself was instituted for saying what is true.

² Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, lib. III, c. 1, § 10-21; Pufendorf, De jure nat., l. IV, c. 1.

³ Thus among others Taylor, Milton, Paley, Johnson, whom Newman cites, Apologia pro vita sua, 5th ed., Appendix, p. 378-384; de Wette, Christl. Sittenlehre, III, 126; Martensen, Die christl. Ethik, 1879, t. II, p. 245 sq.; Dorner, Christian Ethics, New York, 1887, p. 489-492; N. Smyth, New York, 1892, p. 392-400.

⁴ Bolgeni, Il possesso, c. 48; author of the article in Melanges theol., l. c.; Piat, in Appendix IV to Theologia Moralis by Van der Velden, Tournai, 1875, t. I, p. 524-533; Dubois, l. c.; author of the little work Etude sur la malice intrinseque du Mensonge; Fonsegrive, Elements de Philosophie, t. II, p. 475.

411. (A) A lie properly so called, or the denial of owed truth, is intrinsically evil and a sin grave of itself.

(a) For as often as truth is owed to someone, whether from justice, or from obedience, charity, or another virtue, the neighbor through a lie is deprived of truth to which he has a right, and therefore incurs damage grave from its nature; for truth is the essential good of the intellect, just as virtue is the good of the will; and if someone is deceived in a grave matter, by that very fact he suffers grave harm. - Moreover, once the liceity of lying is admitted, the security of social life is now overthrown; for this consists in mutual confidence; now if, when truth is owed to the neighbor, it is licit to say what is false, confidence vanishes and suspicions disturb security on every side.

(b) Deservedly, therefore, Scripture prohibits and rebukes lying: "You shall not lie, nor shall each deceive his neighbor";¹ - "You will destroy all who speak a lie";² - "The just man will detest a lying word";³ - "Do not plow a lie against your brother, nor do likewise against a friend; do not will to lie every lie: for its assiduity is not good";⁴ - "Putting away lying, speak truth each one with his neighbor, because we are members one of another."⁵

¹ Levit., XIX, 11.

² Ps., V, 7.

³ Prov., XIII, 5.

⁴ Eccli., VII, 13-14.

⁵ Ephes., IV, 25.

412. Hence when someone is bound from office to announce the truth, as a preacher of the Gospel; or is legitimately questioned by superiors or judges;⁶ or if there is question of entering into pacts or contracts, - it is never licit to use equivocations or false-saying by which the neighbor can be induced into error.

⁶ In certain regions, one who is accused of a crime can legally declare himself guilty or not (to plead guilty or not guilty); in this case he is not bound to confess the crime committed by himself, but can wait until he is judicially proved guilty; but if as a witness he wishes to appear in his own cause (in the witness-box, as they say) he is bound to manifest the truth.

413. (B) Even when truth is not owed to the neighbor, lying is illicit outside the case of necessity, but only under light sin.

For since error is an evil of the intellect, it is not licit to induce the neighbor into error, unless grave necessity excuses this. - Besides, since speech by its nature is the expression of the mind, he who deliberately and without grave reason asserts something false acts voluntarily against the natural order of things and against his own dignity. - Under light sin, from the common sense of the faithful.

414. (C) But in a case of necessity, when grave damage, whether temporal or spiritual, is foreseen as going to arise from open declaration of the truth, it is licit to use these words or signs which induce the neighbor into error, if the damage cannot otherwise be averted. But this mode of speaking is commonly called mental restriction by theologians, false-saying (faussete) by moderns, or a psychological lie.¹

¹ Therefore those are little consistent with themselves who on the one hand reprove the moderate use of mental restriction, and on the other approve false-saying in many cases; let them deservedly blame the abuse of equivocations, but not condemn the use, unless, with Augustine and Kant, they altogether exclude every assertion of what is false. Nor likewise are theologians consistent with themselves who do not hesitate to assert that, even in a case of necessity, any false-saying whatever is intrinsically illicit, and on the other hand permit the use of certain restrictions which by all upright persons ignorant of theological distinctions are held as lies or false-sayings. Wherefore Genicot says (n. 416): "For it is not an inconvenience if the unlearned call those things licit lies which are more commonly called broadly mental restrictions by Theologians." - Now today not only the unlearned, but many of those who otherwise are learned, do not understand mental restrictions, but abhor them, as is clear both from their writings and from their public speeches; therefore if the word false-saying pleases them more, one must not dispute about the name itself.

(a) For in this case the deception of the neighbor is not directly intended, but the good effect which follows from the deception, namely the legitimate defense of oneself or of others; on the other hand the neighbor in the case does not have a right to knowing the truth, and the accidental error which is caused in his mind is a lesser evil than that which would follow from the manifestation of the truth; besides, the neighbor is deceived for this reason, because he does not attend to all the circumstances. Therefore here there is question of an act good in itself, namely of the temporal or spiritual safety of the neighbor, from which nevertheless an evil effect is foreseen, namely error caused in the mind of another.

415. (b) It is certainly necessary that a practical means be at hand for all, by which secrets, otherwise necessary or very useful, may licitly be protected from an importunate and unjust investigator; now unless in a case of necessity it is licit to use equivocations or false-saying, there will be no means of this kind; for silence will betray the truth, and will bring great damage; for the manifestation of a secret is as pernicious to human intercourse as lying itself, as St. Alphonsus says, n. 152. Now no one ought to be in that condition that, whatever he chooses, he sins; therefore there ought to be a legitimate means for warding off the importunate, by inducing them into error.

Let us explain the matter by examples: if some innocent person is sought by unjust aggressors, who wish to kill him, and cannot be saved in any other way than by deceiving the unjust persecutors, is it not licit to deceive them? In this case, if they were actually attacking the innocent person, it would be licit to repel them by force, even by inflicting death; is it not a lesser evil to induce them into accidental error? - Likewise a physician foresees that some sick person is going to die unless he is deceived; an advocate, judge, confessor, and others bound from office to preserve a secret foresee that the secret committed to them cannot be preserved by silence alone, and therefore they say, "I do not know," or "he about whom you ask by no means committed such a crime"; in this case do they not deserve better of society itself than if by keeping silent they had manifested the secret?

416. And indeed, when the use of equivocation or false-saying is circumscribed by these limits, social security is by no means endangered; for the neighbor is not deceived except when he unjustly inquires into the truth, and he ought to attribute to himself the error into which he falls.¹

¹ We have said nothing of those modes of speaking by which the truth is politely covered, e.g., the master is not at home, so that it may be signified that he, although present, does not wish or is not able to receive anyone; these and other similar things are easily understood and cannot be held as lies.

Most theologians indeed admit this as regards mental restriction, but they commonly assert that false-saying is opposed to divine truthfulness, and therefore is intrinsically illicit, even in a case of necessity.

It is answered that false-saying is no more opposed to the truthfulness of God than homicide is to His supreme dominion; now, in a case of necessity, for the defense of oneself or of others, indirectly willed homicide is permitted, without the right of God being violated by such an action; why would the denial of truth (whether it be called mental restriction or false-saying) not likewise be permitted in a case of necessity, in defense of oneself or others? For then divine truthfulness is by no means injured, which remains intact, but only a particular truth is kept silent or denied, knowledge of which would be truly harmful.

417. Points to be noted for practice. (a) Whatever opinion is chosen, love of truth should be carefully and unceasingly inculcated upon all, especially the younger; when it is said that light lies are venial sins, at the same time it should be clearly and explicitly taught that it is shameful to lie and unworthy of an honorable man, and that those are worthy of every praise who speak candidly and openly according to the mind, even if they suffer not a few inconveniences from this. Therefore teachers should receive kindly boys who ingenuously confess their faults, and for the most part grant them pardon, or at least mercifully mitigate the penalty inflicted upon them; on the contrary they should strictly punish those who deliberately use lying and hypocrisy to cover their faults.

(b) If someone, in a case of necessity, is forced to have recourse to equivocations or false-sayings, let him use them only from a proportionately grave cause, and when by no other way can his own or another's damage be averted.¹

¹ Nor should someone easily persuade himself that the threatening evil cannot be averted in another way. To the point is Bentzon, Causeries de Morale pratique, Paris, 1899, p. 134: "There are in life those distressing situations where one asks oneself whether concealing the truth is not a duty of mercy. There again, let us take good care. No doubt pain wants to be spared, weakness also. But with tact, kindness, a lively sympathy, there are scarcely any things that one cannot gradually say as they are." - Cf. Montaigne, Essais, liv. II, XVII.

We shall treat: 1. of the notion of a secret; 2. of its obligation; 3. of the causes excusing from revelation of a secret; 4. of the consequences to be deduced from this.

² Lugo, disp. XIV, n. 135-151; Lessius, lib. II, cap. 2, n. 51-62; Sporer-Bierbaum, Tr. V, n. 673-674; Elbel-Bierbaum, P. IV, n. 387-392; St. Alphonsus, n. 970-971; Carriere, n. 964-976; Lehmkuhl, n. 1196-1199; Haine, q. 170-175; Noldin, n. 655-661.

418. I. Notion of a secret. A secret is a matter, not yet made public knowledge, which ought to be preserved hidden. - It can be threefold: (a) natural, which from the very nature of the matter ought to be guarded, because the matter cannot be manifested without damage to the neighbor; e.g., if you know where another's money is hidden which robbers intend to steal, by the natural law, without any promise, you are prohibited from manifesting this; (b) promised, when someone explicitly promises to keep silence concerning a hidden matter which he already knew beforehand; e.g., if someone, after hearing a secret, spontaneously or at the petition of a friend, says: I promise you to press the matter with deep silence; (c) committed, when the matter is not revealed to someone except under an express or tacit promise of preserving secrecy; express, if it is said: I shall not manifest this matter to you except under the condition that you be silent concerning it; tacit, when a hidden matter is committed to someone who from office, by force of the duty which he bears, or by special title of kinship or friendship, is bound to preserve the secret matter; thus physicians, advocates, priests, parents and friends and others, to whom a hidden matter is not manifested except because it is supposed that it is to be guarded faithfully. - When a sin is declared under the seal of confession, it is called sacramental.

419. II. On the obligation of a secret. First principle: Those who violate a natural or committed secret without cause commit a sin against justice, and indeed grave from its kind.

(A) As regards a natural secret, this is clear; for, from the definition given above, it cannot be violated without damage being inflicted upon the neighbor in the goods of body, soul, or fortune; and therefore to manifest such a secret without cause is the same as cooperating unjustly with the damage of the neighbor. - But the gravity of the sin depends on the gravity of the damage which is foreseen or can be foreseen.

(B) A committed secret obliges even more strictly from justice; for in this case there is a true contract, explicit or implicit, by force of which the one hearing the secret obliges himself to preserve it inviolably; if therefore he manifests it without reason, he harms the neighbor and society: (a) the neighbor, because he violates the strict right which the latter has that the secret be preserved, which was not revealed except under the condition of guarding it faithfully;¹ (b) society; for the common good demands that all may safely seek counsel or aid from those who, from office or by title of special friendship, are able to offer it; but men would be deprived of this utility if a committed secret could be manifested without grave cause; for who would confidently approach a physician, advocate, priest, and disclose to him secrets whose manifestation can harm him, unless he were certain that the same would be guarded inviolably?

¹ Hence civil laws affect violators of professional secrecy with severe penalties; cf. Cod. pen. gal., art. 378; Supplement, p. 72*.

420. Second principle: Those who violate a merely promised secret without cause sin against justice or fidelity, according to the intention of the one promising.

For he who promises something can bind himself in two ways: from justice indeed, if by explicit declaration, or implicitly from various circumstances, he manifests his intention of obliging himself thus; from fidelity, if he does not wish to undertake such an obligation, but only intends to confirm words by deeds. In the former case, the promise of itself obliges under grave sin, provided the matter is grave; in the latter, it binds only under light sin. Yet it must be noted that it is unworthy of an honorable man to violate these promises without reason.²

² "There could not exist a society, in fact, which does not rest on this firmly established principle: that every word given is sacred... What should one think of a man who has several words, or who has no word, for it is all one? In vain he lavishes his word of honor; it has no value in the eyes of anyone. Can one imagine a more certain sign of moral decline?" (Marion, Lecons de Morale, 11th ed., Paris, 1901, p. 269-270.)

I said merely promised, because it happens not rarely that a promised secret is at the same time natural, because it cannot be revealed without damage; then it obliges from justice, according to what was said above.

421. III. On the causes excusing from revelation of a secret. These ought to be greater the stricter the obligation is of preserving it; but this obligation depends on two things: (a) on the nature of the secret; for from what has been said, a committed secret obliges more strictly than a merely promised secret; and that which is at the same time natural and committed binds more strictly than a merely natural one; (b) on the damage inflicted: the graver and more irreparable the damage inflicted by the manifestation of the secret is, the greater cause is required for revealing it. - With these things posited, there are four causes from which a secret can legitimately be manifested:¹

¹ Some thought that a secret can never be revealed, even for saving the life of a friend; Fenelon excellently refutes these, in a letter, hitherto unknown, to L. de Sacy, which E. Levesque, S.S., made public in the periodical Revue des Facultes Cathol. de l'Ouest, April 1902, p. 511-526; from which we excerpt these things: "The silence which you would keep and which would cause your innocent friend to perish is contrary to humanity, to Christian charity, to good faith, and to the security of men in society... It is true that the secret which was told to you is a kind of deposit... It is not at all a deposit of sincere confidence, but a trap which is laid for you to force you to be an accomplice in a crime. Now society, which has so much interest in the preservation of other deposits, and in inviolable fidelity concerning other secrets, has a capital interest that the fraudulent deposit of so criminal a secret not be guarded, and that this deceiving depositor be confounded in his own deception... It is true that fidelity concerning a secret is a virtue, but this virtue is inferior to humanity, to charity, to the general order of human society... I would not wish, however, that you turn the secret against that unjust man from whom you hold it. To avoid this inconvenience, say to your friend only what is absolutely necessary for saving his life. Say it only to him alone. Say it to him only by using all the power which friendship gives you and all that which is acquired for you by the singular service which you actually render him, in order to prevent him from avenging himself."

422. 1. The public good of civil or ecclesiastical society; for since the obligation of a secret was chiefly introduced on account of the public good, its obligation ceases when the public good demands the revelation of the secret, according to this: the safety of the commonwealth is the supreme law. But here there is question of a proportionately grave public good: therefore the damage threatening the commonwealth must be compared with the damage going to follow from the violation itself of the secret, and the lesser evil, with all things carefully weighed, must be chosen. Thus if someone under secrecy, even committed secrecy, knows another's plan of betraying a city, and cannot otherwise impede its execution, he can and ought to manifest it to authority; but light damage does not suffice, arising namely from the fact that some guilty person will remain unpunished.

423. 2. The good of him who handed down the secret; for he is not judged unwilling, since there is question of promoting his own good; thus if someone knows that another wishes to marry, although bound by a diriment impediment, and that this evil cannot otherwise be averted than by manifesting the impediment to his own priest. Yet the case of a secret which was committed by reason of public office is excepted (De Matrim., n. 200): for then the public good demands that such a secret be guarded.

424. 3. The good of an innocent third party, namely when grave damage to him cannot be averted in another way; e.g., if you know, even under secrecy, that snares are being unjustly prepared for Titius, and that his death cannot otherwise be impeded than by revealing the secret, it is licit to do this; for charity demands that we impede grave damage to an innocent person even with damage to the guilty. - But if there is question of a committed secret, it is not licit to manifest it, unless the damage to be inflicted is from him who committed the secret; for, if it were revealed in other circumstances, the public good could be injured, as was explained above; but on the supposition that the one committing the secret himself wishes to kill or wound an innocent person, he now becomes an unjust aggressor, and the innocent person can be warned to beware for himself.¹

¹ Yet in many regions this is prohibited to those who have received the secret from office; thus physicians are forbidden to reveal a hidden contagious disease even to relatives.

425. 4. One's own good, namely when he who heard the secret cannot flee grave damage except by manifesting the secret; for he is not judged to have obliged himself with so great an inconvenience.

Yet the matter becomes more difficult if there is question of a committed secret; e.g., Caius is falsely accused of homicide, whose author he knows from a committed secret: can he manifest him, in order to spare his own life? - It is answered affirmatively if the author of the crime falsely accused him to whom he committed the secret: for then he is an unjust aggressor. But if the calumny proceeds from another source, it is controverted; each opinion seems probable; in practice the name of the guilty man can be manifested, if he is first warned that he should provide for himself by flight: for then he cannot complain.

But when the common good demands that a hidden matter be altogether preserved, even with the greatest private damage, - e.g., if the guarding of the secret is necessary for the security of the State or army, - it is necessary to die for the fatherland rather than betray the secret.

426. IV. Corollaries. 1. He who without legitimate authority and just cause maliciously investigates or extorts the secrets of another, of itself sins gravely against justice.

For each one has a right to his own secret: for nothing is more proper to man than the hidden things of the heart; now that right is injured as often as another maliciously, that is, through force, deceit, or fraud, tries to fish out these secrets. - But the gravity of the sin depends on the very gravity of the hidden matter which is thus extorted.

It was said (a) without legitimate authority; for superiors, whether ecclesiastical or civil, can and ought sometimes to investigate secrets on account of the common good; thus Bishops inquire concerning those to be ordained whether something is known against them; likewise magistrates from office can and ought to uncover crimes even hidden ones.

(b) Without just cause: for if it is licit to manifest a secret for averting grave damage, from what has been said above, by that very fact it is licit to investigate it; e.g., if someone were very probably to suspect that snares were being unjustly prepared for him, he would have the right of investigating the matter, and of exploring the secret counsels of adversaries: for this is the case of legitimate defense.

427. 2. He who justly or unjustly uncovers the secrets of another cannot use them to the damage of the neighbor; e.g., if someone by chance hears others conversing about a new invention, still hidden, he cannot use this knowledge for his own advantage; for otherwise he inflicts injury upon them, because they will no longer be able to obtain the exclusive privilege to which they had a right. A fortiori if, by unjustly opening another's letters, you know that some office is vacant, you cannot seek it with the damage of another: for thus you would deprive another of the legitimate hope of obtaining the same.

428. 3. From this it can be understood what must be said concerning the violation of a secret contained in letters.

(A) Of itself it is a grave sin to open and read another's letters, without the consent of him to whom they were written. For often secrets, some of which can be of great moment, are contained in these letters, e.g., matters pertaining to family, to business, or to conscience; and therefore by reading these letters without license, one exposes himself to the danger of unjustly knowing a secret of great moment.

429. (B) Yet the sin will be light: (a) if it is reasonably presumed that in these letters nothing is to be found except what is of lesser moment, e.g., if someone already knows the nature of the matters which are usually treated between two friends; (b) if the letters are opened or read from levity of mind, or without full advertence, and the reading is interrupted as soon as it is noticed that the matter is grave.

(C) But there will be no sin: (a) if express or tacit consent is present, - which nevertheless ought not easily to be presumed, - e.g., if spouses or friends are accustomed to hand over to one another to be read the letters which they receive from a common friend; (b) if in certain communities or colleges it is licit for the superior, from received custom or rule, to read the letters of subjects; for then the inferiors, by accepting the custom or rule, give tacit consent; yet letters sent to major superiors or received from them are excepted, and also those in which secrets of conscience are opened, from the reading of which the superior ought to abstain; (c) if the reading of some letter is necessary for averting damage threatening the commonwealth or private persons, according to what was said above.

430. (D) If letters have been thrown away by the owner, or knowingly left in a public place, they can be read without injustice, because he is deservedly judged to have renounced his right; but otherwise, if this happened against his intention.

But what if the owner tore up the letter and threw away its fragments? Not a few theologians hold that it can be read without injustice, because by so acting the owner renounced his right.¹ But much more probably others teach that this is not licit; for by tearing up the letters, he sufficiently signified that he did not wish them to be read by others, and therefore did not renounce his right.²

¹ Layman, lib. III, tr. III, p. 1, c. 4, n. 4; Lugo, d. XIV, n. 150; Vogler, n. 388.

² St. Alphonsus, lib. II, De peccatis, n. 70, with the authors alleged there.

431. The right which is inherent in man of possessing goods of fortune can be injured in two ways: by damage unjustly inflicted, by which the thing of the neighbor is destroyed or made worse; and by theft, by which another's thing is unjustly taken away. We shall treat of the former where Restitution is treated, by defining the conditions required for a damaging action so that place may be given to reparation; now we must treat of theft, especially by setting forth two things: 1. its nature and gravity; 2. causes excusing from the occupation of another's thing.

³ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 66; Soto, lib. V, q. 3; Lugo, disp. XVI; Sayrus, lib. IX, cap. 15; Lessius, lib. II, cap. 12; Sporer-Bierbaum, Tr. V, n. 779-882; Billuart, diss. XI; St. Alphonsus, n. 518-546; Carriere, t. III, n. 981-1020; Marres, lib. II, cap. II, n. 158-190; Ball. P., Tr. VIII, n. 274-331; Lehmkuhl, n. 928-943; Noldin, n. 403-419.

1. Notion and various species.

2. General principle concerning the gravity of theft.

3. What matter is grave?

4. Specifically concerning small thefts.

432. I. Notion and various species of theft. 1. Notion. Theft, if it is considered generically, is the taking of another's thing, with the owner reasonably unwilling.⁴ - It is said: (a) Taking, that is, either the carrying away, or even the detention, of another's good; for, as St. Thomas says,⁵ "to detain that which is owed to another has the same character of harm as an unjust taking"; and this taking indeed is done with the mind of retaining the thing for oneself; for if it were done with the mind of soon returning it to the owner or preserving it safely, it would not be theft; and with the intention of using and enjoying the thing; thus it is distinguished from damaging, by which the goods of another are destroyed without any profit.

⁴ Some add the word unjust; but this is involved in the words "with the owner reasonably unwilling"; others add hidden, but undeservedly, because then robbery could not be called a species of theft.

⁵ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 66, a. 3.

(b) With the owner reasonably unwilling, and under this head theft is truly unjust; for if the owner were not reasonably unwilling, e.g., if a wife took some money from her husband lest it be dissipated in games or feasts, there would be no injustice nor theft.

433. 2. Species. Three species of theft can be distinguished morally: (a) theft simply, namely the hidden usurpation of another's thing, insofar as it is done while the owner is absent or at least ignorant; (b) robbery, that is, the open and violent taking of another's thing, while the owner is present and unwilling; for then a new malice is added to theft, namely an offense inflicted upon the person possessing, which must be declared in confession; (c) sacrilege, if the thing taken away is sacred, or dedicated to God, because a new malice is found here, namely a sin against the virtue of religion; - some indeed think every theft committed in a sacred place to be sacrilegious, although the thing taken away is not sacred; but more probably, with Lugo,¹ it is denied, unless that thing in some way pertains to the church, or at least is under its custody as a deposit, loan, etc. - Other species indeed are distinguished by jurists, but they do not change the moral species of the act.²

¹ Lugo, De Justitia, disp. XVI, n. 19; de Poenit., XVI, n. 470.

² For France, Cod. pen., art. 379-409. - As regards various modes of stealing (chantage, vol a l'americaine, au poivrier, a la roulotte, au bonjour, a la carre, a l'amitie, a l'esbrouffe, etc.), see E. Nicolay, Histoire des Croyances, superstitions, moeurs, usages et coutumes, Paris, 3rd ed., t. III, p. 355-389.

434. II. General principle concerning the gravity of theft: Theft is a sin against justice mortal from its kind.

(A) For primarily it is opposed to justice; above (n. 74), it was proved that the right of dominion over external goods flows from the natural law, and is morally necessary both to the individual and to society; now such a right is openly violated when another's thing is taken away with the owner reasonably unwilling; therefore...

(B) But secondarily and consequently it is opposed to charity, insofar as it brings sadness to the neighbor, disturbs peace, introduces quarrels, contentions, and hatreds; - and also to the good of the community, since it tends to destroy concord among citizens, necessary for the good of society, and to shake the security of rights.

Deservedly, therefore, it is numbered by the sacred authors among sins which exclude from the kingdom of heaven: "Neither thieves... nor the rapacious shall possess the kingdom of God."¹

¹ I Cor., VI, 10.

435. Yet that sin admits smallness of matter; for he who steals one or two asses does not gravely offend private right, nor greatly disturb public peace.² - But even small thefts must altogether be reproved as something unworthy of an upright man, both because they lead to greater ones, and because they reveal a depraved inclination of mind.

² It is certainly astonishing that there are men who vehemently reprehend small thefts committed by servants, and at the same time do not hesitate to steal thousands of coins by frauds! Each is evil, but the second is worse: "For in that in which you judge another, you condemn yourself" (Rom. II, 1).

436. Matter can be grave in a twofold way: (a) in itself and absolutely, with respect to all, even the rich; (b) relatively to the condition or disposition of the owner, from whom the thing is taken away.

1. In itself and absolutely a grave quantity must be admitted which suffices for mortal sin; for, as was said above (n. 285), injury is to be held as grave, not only when it gravely harms individuals, but also when it inflicts grave harm upon society; now, unless matter absolutely grave were present, the public good would often be gravely injured, even when the good of some private person would suffer only light damage; for, as Lugo rightly says (n. 29), even if the theft of one gold coin would not bring great detriment to a very rich man, nevertheless it would cause great damage to society, because, if such a theft were not prohibited under grave sin, thefts of this kind would be multiplied, from whose frequency the greatest detriment would be brought upon the rich in general and upon the whole of society; and this danger cannot be avoided unless individual thefts of some moment are gravely prohibited.

But what that absolutely grave matter may be cannot be determined except by the moral estimation of the prudent, according to the various circumstances of times and places: for the value of money is diversified according to various regions and various times. Now today in most regions of Europe, a sum of about sixty francs is commonly reputed absolutely grave matter; in the United States of America, seven or eight dollars. - And this indeed is established for confessors; but in sermons to the people it is not expedient to define the matter thus, lest perhaps this be twisted into a depraved sense.

437. 2. There is also relatively grave matter, namely that which brings grave harm given the condition of the owner; for in order to constitute theft, it is required that the owner be reasonably unwilling; now the owner, given the same sum of money, will be more or less reasonably unwilling, according as he more or less needs the money taken away, or is more or less poor. - But the commonly received principle is that in theft that matter is judged relatively grave which corresponds to the daily wage, or to the money which suffices for one day for a father of a family for the support of himself and his family, indeed for a worker for his own daily support. And deservedly; for he suffers grave harm who is unjustly deprived of the sum required for daily food.

Hence with respect to a worker, in Europe, ten, fifteen, or twenty francs constitute relatively grave matter, according to diverse places; in America three or four dollars; - with respect to the poor, in Europe, two francs, or, if they are very poor, twenty asses can be grave matter.

Likewise he who steals from a worker an instrument without which he cannot work inflicts grave damage and sins gravely, even if the instrument in itself is of modest price, at least when another instrument cannot be procured in useful time: for then he is deprived of a means necessary for earning support.

438. 3. In order to judge concerning the gravity of theft, attention must also be paid to the disposition of the injured person; for since one of the conditions necessary for theft is that the owner be unwilling, theft will be graver or lighter according as the owner is more or less unwilling.

(a) Now generally a spouse in relation to a spouse is judged less unwilling than in relation to others, on account of the mutual love by which they accompany one another, and especially on account of a certain community of goods which exists between them; and therefore the matter required for mortal sin is greater for spouses than for strangers; according to St. Alphonsus,¹ a doubly greater amount is required. Indeed it can happen that the takings of wives are not thefts, if the license of the husband can deservedly be presumed.

¹ Homo Apostolicus, Tr. X, n. 32.

(b) The same is said of children of the family in relation to parents, on account of a similar reason. Yet for practice it must be noted that sometimes younger children sin gravely, even in small thefts, on account of erroneous conscience, because they falsely judge these to be grave sins.

439. (c) In relation to servants, a distinction must be made: if they appropriate for themselves common foods, which are not carefully guarded, the sin is not mortal, provided these are eaten by the servants themselves, and therefore are neither sold nor carried out of the house; the reason is that the masters are not judged gravely unwilling. - But if they steal things carefully guarded, money, garments, generous wine, etc., the quantity which suffices for mortal sin for strangers will be grave matter also for servants, because in relation to all these things the master is not less unwilling for these than for strangers; indeed, according to common estimation and civil laws, theft of this kind is reputed graver, as an abuse of confidence (abus de confiance).

Therefore servants should be seriously warned about this matter, especially if they are Catholics employed by non-Catholics, lest by such a manner of acting they bring disgrace upon the Catholic religion.

440. Small thefts, which of themselves do not exceed venial sin, if they are morally united, can coalesce into grave matter,¹ in a fourfold way: - 1. By reason of intention: he who commits small thefts, whether against the same person or against diverse persons, with the intention of arriving at a notable sum, sins gravely, because by that very fact he intends to inflict grave damage either upon a determinate person or upon society. - Therefore he sins gravely who, when he intends to steal one hundred coins from Titius, so that he may execute the plan more safely, steals two or three coins again and again; likewise he who uses false weights, although each time he defrauds in small matter; or he who, under a feigned pretext, successively extracts a great sum of money from various persons: for then grave matter is in fact intentionally taken away.

¹ This indeed can be deduced from the fact that Innocent XI, March 2, 1679, condemned as scandalous and dangerous in practice this proposition (n. 38): "One is not bound under the penalty of mortal sin to restore what has been taken away by a few thefts, however great the total sum may be." (Denzing., n. 1055.)

Yet he who intends to steal a notable sum several times from the same person more probably does not sin mortally as often as he steals something small, but commits only one mortal sin, namely at that instant at which he enters upon the plan of stealing, - unless he revokes the intention previously conceived and afterward renews the same.

441. 2. By reason of accumulation: he who has already committed light thefts several times, even without the intention of arriving at a notable sum, sins mortally at the time when he notices that he is then at last completing grave matter, provided there is moral union between the various thefts, and a serious will of repairing the preceding thefts is absent: for knowingly and willingly he inflicts notable damage. But moral union exists when little thefts are committed within a short interval of time, e.g., within two months. But if there is a great interval between the various thefts, e.g., six months, the little thefts, from the common estimation of men, are not judged morally united, and therefore under this head they do not constitute grave theft.

442. 3. By reason of retention: he who knowingly and willingly retains a great quantity of another's good, unjustly obtained either from one or from several, sins mortally, even if no moral union is present between the various small thefts, because the retention of another's thing in great quantity, no less than the taking itself, inflicts great damage upon individuals or society.

443. 4. By reason of cooperation: those who by common counsel or concurrence, together or successively, steal a notable sum, sin mortally, although individuals steal only light matter; for individuals consent and cooperate in the whole damage. But otherwise it must be said if there was not mutual conspiracy or mutual help, but individuals stole independently from one another, although they noticed that notable damage was being inflicted upon the same owner. - Likewise if several, moved not by mutual conspiracy but by mutual example, have committed light thefts, they do not sin gravely against justice, although individuals sin, perhaps gravely, against charity, by reason of scandal.

444. Corollary: What matter is required in small thefts, that it may become grave? All concede that a greater quantity is required than if a thing of great price were stolen together and at once; for the owner in this case does not so much feel the damage, and therefore is less unwilling. But what that greater quantity may be can be determined only from the common estimation of the prudent; according to the more common opinion, if small thefts are committed against the same person, the matter is grave if it exceeds by half the sum commonly required for grave theft (e.g., if 30 fr. is held as grave matter, 45 fr. are required in this case); but if they are committed against diverse persons, matter is judged grave if it is twice as great (therefore 60 fr. in this hypothesis).

N. B. Even when small thefts do not attain mortal sin, some restitution is to be advised, lest otherwise penitents make a step from small things to greater ones.

445. Since theft is defined as the unjust taking of another's thing, no cause properly excuses from it; but there can be causes excusing from the occupation of another's thing. There are two: necessity and hidden compensation.

446. First principle: He who is in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity can take from the goods of another as much as is necessary for him to escape this necessity, unless however the owner is in the same necessity.

It is explained. Extreme necessity is that in which the necessities of life are lacking, or a certain danger threatens of losing a good of an order superior to the goods of fortune, e.g., integrity of members, health, liberty, chastity. Quasi-extreme necessity is verified when someone is in very probable danger of losing a superior good, namely life, a principal member, etc.

447. It is proved. According to the order of divine Providence, temporal things were primarily instituted for assisting human necessity, and therefore by the division and appropriation of things it is not impeded that man's necessity should be assisted from things of this kind; now if a man, constituted in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity, could not appropriate to himself from the things of another as much as is required to escape this necessity, the order of divine Providence would be frustrated and human law would prevail over natural and divine right; therefore. - Or, in other words, the right of life, members, and liberty is superior to the right of property; moreover in a conflict of rights, the lesser ought to yield to the greater, from what was said above, n. 29.

Yet it is said "unless the owner is in the same necessity," because then the condition of the possessor is better.

448. Corollaries. 1. In extreme or quasi-extreme necessity, it is not licit to take away more than what is necessary; whence, if the sole use of the thing suffices, e.g., of a horse for fleeing, of a gun for the defense of life, etc., the obligation remains of restoring these things when the necessity ceases.

449. 2. If someone, in a case of necessity, takes another's thing, and possesses goods or the hope of possessing them, he is bound to restitution when the necessity ceases, even if the thing was consumed or destroyed; for he could take away nothing in this case except under the burden of restitution, since nothing else is required that he may go out from present necessity. - But if, at the time when the thing was taken away, the one taking away had neither actually nor in hope the means from which he might restore, probably he is bound to nothing afterward, even if he becomes rich, because he made the thing his own without any burden of restitution; yet it is very fitting, according to all, that he return an equivalent sum. But we hold as more probable the opinion which asserts that he is bound to restitution even in this case; for, by force of the general principle, he cannot take away more than what is necessary; moreover, even in this case, he needed only the use of the thing, and therefore he could not take the thing away except on the condition that he return it as soon as he is able.

3. When a poor man is in extreme necessity, another can take away another's thing for relieving the necessity of this poor man, provided he himself cannot assist him from his own goods: for what someone can do by himself, he can also do through another.

450. 4. It is controverted whether, in the case of extreme or quasi-extreme necessity, it is licit to steal a thing of great value. Some affirm, because then all things become common;¹ others deny, because, even in a case of necessity, no one is bound to aid another with so great an inconvenience. - We think that a thing of great price (e.g., a horse for fleeing) can then indeed be taken away, but under this law, that it be returned as soon as this can morally be done: for, on the one hand, life or integrity of members is much more precious than a horse or another thing of this kind, and on the other, the use alone of this thing by hypothesis is necessary.

¹ That principle, which is found among some theologians, can only be accepted with a sufficient grain of salt; for, as we have said, in this case not all things become common, but only that which is required for preserving life or health.

451. 5. A poor man who in these cases needs some thing regularly ought to seek it from the owner, if this can be done, so that contentions may thus be avoided; yet if he takes it away, without any petition, he does not injure justice, since he has a right in the thing, but he sins venially, unless he is excused by some reason, by not preserving the legitimate mode.

452. 6. It is controverted whether a rich man who neglects to assist one in extreme need sins only against charity, or also against justice. But if by force or threats he impedes the poor man from taking that thing, he certainly injures justice, since he obstructs the right which is inherent in one in extreme need of occupying something necessary for himself; and under this head he is bound to repair the damages which followed from this.

453. Second principle: In necessity simply grave or common, it is not licit to take away another's thing.

Grave necessity is that in which the neighbor is very probably going to suffer a notable loss of goods or loss of status, unless he is helped by another's aid. But common necessity is that in which ordinary poor persons are placed, who, unless they are helped, live a troublesome life, although they are able to provide necessities for themselves.

Now if any cause excused from the occupation of another's thing in the aforesaid cases, this would be the good of society; but the common good demands, on the contrary, that it not be licit to take away another's thing for assisting necessity of this kind; for since cases of this kind are altogether frequent, and men easily persuade themselves that they are constituted in such necessity, the security of possessions would be disturbed; and idleness and the squandering of goods would be favored, if it were licit for each person by his own authority to invade another's things in so common a necessity. - Deservedly, therefore, Innocent XI reproved this proposition (36) as scandalous and pernicious: "It is permitted to steal, not only in extreme necessity, but also in grave necessity."¹

¹ In Denzing., n. 1053.

Here there is no question of legal compensation, by which the mutual obligation of two debts is juridically extinguished, but of an extralegal act by which a creditor secretly takes, from the goods of the debtor, what is owed to him; this compensation is called hidden, because it is done without recourse to the judge, and for the most part at least while the debtor is unaware.

454. Principle: In general hidden compensation is illicit; but in certain cases it can be tolerated, if the due conditions are present.

1. In general it is illicit, as being full of dangers; for if it were permitted to each one to vindicate his own rights, which he thinks have been injured by another, without recourse to magistrates, a broad way would be opened to thefts, since for the most part men enlarge their own rights and lessen those of others. Therefore in general those who think themselves injured ought to have recourse to judges.

455. 2. Yet when this recourse is hardly morally possible, hidden compensation, clothed with the due conditions, can be tolerated. For justice is not injured when from another's goods only that is taken away which is owed from strict justice; moreover public order is not disturbed if this is done very rarely, from a grave cause, when another way of recovering one's own goods is lacking.

456. The required conditions are numbered as five:

(a) That the debt be from strict justice, and not from charity or from a certain fittingness; thus a servant does not have a right to compensation to whom the master had promised, from gratitude, a certain sum of money which in fact he did not give; nor also a non-necessary heir, who has no part in the testament.

(b) That it be morally certain; for in doubt the condition of the possessor is better; otherwise, since men are prone to exaggerating their own rights, a way would be opened to injustice.

(c) That the debt cannot be recovered otherwise without grave inconvenience, e.g., without many expenses or danger of exciting enmities.

(d) That the damage of the debtor or of a third party be guarded against: of the debtor indeed, by employing means lest he pay twice or remain in bad faith, thinking that the debt was not paid; which can be done by a fictitious condonation; - of a third party, by avoiding lest another, e.g., a servant, be accused of theft.

(e) That the thing which is taken be of the same value as the thing owed, and, if it can conveniently be done, of the same nature and species.

457. Corollaries. (A) Servants or workers who have freely agreed about some wage cannot use compensation on the pretext that the work furnished is greater than the promised salary; for the pact is to be stood by, unless it is evidently unjust. Hence Innocent XI condemned this proposition (37) as scandalous and pernicious: "Male and female domestic servants can secretly take from their masters to compensate their service, which they judge greater than the salary which they receive."¹ - But otherwise it must be said if, compelled by force, fear, or necessity, they agreed about a salary which, according to the estimation of prudent men, is less than just, as will be explained below where the hiring of services is treated.

¹ Denzing., n. 1054.

(B) If a servant of his own accord increases the services owed, he does not acquire a strict right to a greater wage, nor therefore to compensation, because he is judged to do this gratuitously in order to conciliate to himself the favor of the master. But if he furnishes this from the express or tacit will of the master, he is worthy of a greater wage; therefore, if this has not been paid, and the servant has used compensation, he is not to be compelled to restitution.²

² According to Sabetti (n. 411, q. 2), those who are in charge of cars drawn along railway routes (conducteurs d'omnibus de tramways, car-conductor) can use hidden compensation, if, in the judgment of God-fearing men, the payment which they receive is truly unjust. - This indeed can be tolerated when it is certain that the matter is so; but it is much more expedient that these and other workers form associations (syndicats professionnels, labor-unions) and, by united strength, obtain a just salary; otherwise, little by little, a way is opened to frauds and thefts.

458. (C) Merchants who freely sell below the legitimate price cannot use hidden compensation, namely by unjust weight or measure; otherwise, if by error, force, or fear they delivered a thing at too cheap a price.

NOTE. In practice, confessors should not advise hidden compensation, since it is full of dangers; but, if penitents have used it under the conditions explained above, they should not be compelled to restitution.

And let these things suffice concerning the injury of right: now we must treat of the reparation of the same.