Abduction

582. Nature of the Impediment. 1. The impediment of abduction consists in this, that matrimony between a man who abducts an unwilling woman for the sake of entering matrimony, and the abducted woman, so long as she exists in the power of the abductor, is null.¹

a. Abduction, insofar as it is a diriment impediment of matrimony, is defined: the abduction of an unwilling woman for the sake of entering matrimony.

b. Although grave fear is most often joined with abduction, nevertheless the impediment of abduction does not dirimently impede matrimony by reason of fear unjustly inflicted, but is a special impediment distinct from fear.

2. This impediment exists only between the abductor and the abducted woman, but not between the abducted woman and other men who, e.g., carried out the abduction in favor of another.

If someone, thinking that by abducting a certain woman he will do something pleasing for his friend, abducts her without the friend's knowledge and brings her into his own house, the friend can validly contract with her, because he is not the abductor.

3. The impediment exists so long as the woman is under the power of the abductor, even if after the abduction she freely consents to matrimony; but as soon as she has been endowed with liberty, the impediment ceases without dispensation. Hence if, placed outside the power of the abductor, she freely consents, the abductor can have her as wife. It makes no difference whether the abductor by himself or through others detains the abducted woman in his power.

4. The impediment of abduction is of ecclesiastical law only, and it was established lest an abducted woman consent to matrimony from fear, and therefore for protecting the liberty of matrimonial consent.²

In the impediment of abduction the Church is not accustomed to dispense. Nevertheless, if the abducted woman freely consents to matrimony, it sometimes permits matrimony by dispensing, although the woman has not yet been restored to a safe place.³

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 24, c. 6, De reform. matr. Cn. 1074: 1. Between an abducting man and a woman abducted with a view to matrimony, so long as she has remained in the power of the abductor, no matrimony can exist. 2. But if the abducted woman, separated from the abductor and constituted in a safe and free place, has consented to have him as husband, the impediment ceases.

² Cf. Instruction of the Holy Office to the bishops of Albania, February 15, 1901.

³ Cf. the cited instruction to the bishops of Albania.

583. Declaration. In order that abduction dirimently impede matrimony, the following conditions are required:

1. That there be abduction of a woman, not of a man: for the law speaks only of the abduction of a woman, which is done by a man. Therefore matrimony between an abducting woman and an abducted man is not invalid. Moreover, it makes no difference whether the woman who is abducted is honorable or dishonorable, virgin or widow, betrothed or free, of greater or lesser age.

The question whether one incurs the impediment of abduction who abducts a betrothed woman or a girl of minor age is resolved by the new Code. For it uses the generic word woman (Weibsperson). Moreover, where women of minor age are to be excepted, this is expressly noted, as in Cn. 2353.

2. That there be a. either abduction, by which a woman is transferred from one place to another morally diverse place, whether by the abductor himself or in his name by another; b. or detention, by which a man violently detains a woman in the place where she is staying or to which she freely came, with a view to matrimony.¹

Therefore the question about a morally diverse place becomes superfluous, whether there is true abduction if a woman is transferred from one chamber to another contiguous chamber of the same house, or from a public road apart into a field: for the impediment of abduction is always present either by reason of abduction or by reason of violent detention.

3. That the abduction be violent, namely, one which is done while the woman is unwilling and resisting. If therefore the woman consents to the abduction and to the matrimony, it is rather flight than abduction; this does not dirimently impede matrimony, even if it is done against the will of the parents. For the law intends nothing else than to protect the liberty of matrimony, which is not injured if the woman consents to the matrimony.

Now abduction is judged violent if it is done by physical force or by grave fear unjustly inflicted; if it is done by fraud and deceitful solicitation, even with the woman's consent; but it is not violent if the woman is induced to flee by prayers, blandishments, gifts, or promises.

4. That it be done for the sake of entering matrimony: for the Church, in establishing this impediment, chiefly intends this, that the liberty of matrimonial consent be preserved. If therefore she is abducted for another reason, e.g., only for the sake of satisfying lust, no impediment of matrimony arises.

Note. Abduction (Entfuhrung) is a crime which is committed if someone with a view to matrimony or for the sake of satisfying lust carries off an unwilling woman by force or deceit, or a woman of minor age who indeed consents, but without the knowledge or against the will of her parents or guardians. The crime of abduction is always punished in the ecclesiastical forum (Cn. 2353), but a diriment impediment of matrimony does not always follow from it, as is clear from the things set forth above.

¹ Cn. 1074, 3. Since this canon establishes that violent detention of a woman is held equal to abduction, the former impediment, by which abduction alone invalidated matrimony, is extended also to violent detention of a woman, even one not carried off or abducted.

The Council of Trent¹ made the following law: ‘“‘ The Holy Synod ordains that no marriage can subsist between the abductor and her who is abducted so long as she shall remain in the power of the abductor. But if she that has been abducted, being separated from the abductor and being in a safe and free place, shall consent to have him for her husband, the abductor may have her for his wife.”” This decree made abduction a diriment impediment of marriage, and in keeping with its tenor the impediment may be defined as the violent abduction of a woman from a place of safety to another place where she is detained in the power of the abductor for the purpose of marriage. In order to constitute the impediment the abduction must be against the will of the woman, whether it be effected by open violence, or threats, or fraud; for if she freely consent both to the abduction and to marriage, we have elopement, not abduction. Consent to both abduction and marriage is required, for the Council made an abducted woman incapable of contracting a valid marriage, as long as she is in the power of the abductor. The woman, too, must be the abducted party; if a man were forcibly carried off by the orders of a woman who wished to marry him, this impediment would not arise. It is a disputed point among Doctors as to whether the impediment would arise if a man carried off his betrothed by violence in order to marry her. The better opinion is that the impediment would hinder the marriage, for although betrothal gave the man a right to marry the woman at the proper time, still it gave him no right to use violence for the purpose.

¹ Sess. xxiv, c. 6, de ref. Matr.

The words in the definition “ from a place of safety” signify a place where the woman is not.in the power of the abductor, so that to give rise to the impediment the woman must be taken from one place to another which is morally distinct, and where she is under the control of the abductor. The forcible detention of a woman in a place where she is in the man’s power but to which she came of her own accord is equivalent to abduction (Can. 1074, sec. 3). The abductor’s aim must be to contract marriage, not merely to satisfy his lust.

The impediment is of ecclesiastical law and lasts as long as the person abducted remains in the power of the abductor, for, as the Council says, if the woman be restored to her liberty and then freely chooses to have the abductor for her husband, the impediment ceases (Can. 1074, sec. 2).

The Council imposed the penalty of excommunication on the abductor and on all who aid and abet him, besides obliging him to give the woman a sufficient dower whether he marry her or not. Other penalties are assigned by Canon 2353.

With canon 1074 considered, a twofold raptus can be distinguished, properly so called and less properly so called; each diriments marriage.

I. Notion of raptus properly so called. Raptus properly so called as an impediment is: the violent abduction of a woman, with marriage in view, and her retention under the power of the abductor.

II. Existence of the impediment. Between a male abductor and a woman abducted with marriage in view, as long as she has remained in the power of the abductor, no marriage can stand (canon 1074, § 1).

III. The required conditions are evident from the notion handed down. Namely, there is required:

1. Abduction, that is, from place to place; for example, from city to city, from street into house, from one house into another (St. Alphonsus VI, 1107), or even from one room into another, if the house is very large and is the domicile of several families.

2. Violent abduction. Unjust moral force, or unjust fear inflicted upon the woman, suffices. Therefore there is required the abduction of a woman unwilling or resisting. Nevertheless the impediment seems also to be present if a woman, deceived by fraud or circumvented by deceitful solicitations, indeed follows the man, but does not know and does not will that she is being abducted for the purpose of entering marriage.¹ The impediment is not present if the woman consents to the abduction so that she may freely enter nuptials with the abductor; and this holds even if she is still subject to parents or tutors and they are unwilling (St. Alphonsus VI, 1107).

Here, however, it can be asked whether fear inflicted for the purpose that the woman be abducted for marriage is always unjust, namely even if there is question of a betrothed woman who without just cause refuses to enter marriage. Several affirm this, because the aforesaid manner of acting is unjust at least as to mode, namely insofar as no one by private authority can coerce a betrothed woman to nuptials in such a way. But this cannot be said universally; or it can happen that this is done without injustice, for example, if a betrothed man by fear of an evil which it is lawful to inflict abducts a betrothed woman unjustly refusing, so that at last he may arrive at the marriage owed to him.

3. Of a woman, whether honorable or corrupted, whether virgin or widow. But the impediment is not had if a woman abducts a man (St. Alphonsus VI, 1107).

4. For the sake of contracting marriage. Therefore the impediment of raptus is not had if a woman is abducted, for example, for the sake of acquiring money or solely for satisfying lust (canon 1074, § 1).

5. And her detention under the power of the abductor; namely, the impediment lasts as long as the woman remains in the power of the abductor, even if now she freely consents to the nuptials themselves.

IV. Cessation of the impediment. But if the abducted woman, separated from the abductor and established in a safe and free place, has consented to have him as husband, the impediment ceases (canon 1074, § 2).²

V. Notion of raptus less properly so called. Raptus less properly so called as an impediment is: the violent retention of a woman in the place where she stays or to which she has freely gone, with marriage in view.

VI. Existence of the impediment. "With regard to the nullity of marriage, violent retention of the woman is held equivalent to raptus, namely when a man violently detains a woman with marriage in view in the place where she stays or to which she has freely gone" (canon 1074, § 3).

VII. The required conditions, after what has been said, scarcely need any exposition. Namely, there is required: 1° violent retention, that is, either by physical force or by moral force, namely unjust fear; 2° of a woman, as was said concerning raptus properly so called; 3° in the place where she stays or to which she has freely gone. If she is retained in a place to which she has been led violently, the impediment of raptus properly so called subsists; 4° with marriage in view.

VIII. Cessation of the impediment takes place in the same way as cessation of the impediment of raptus properly so called.

Note 1. It makes no difference whether one violently abducts or detains the woman by himself or through another.

Note 2. The impediment of raptus, both properly and less properly so called, although directly it touches only the faithful party, nevertheless indirectly also affects the infidel party. And so it exists even between an infidel and a faithful person, and this whether the abducted woman is faithful or infidel.

IX. The penalties established are: One who, with marriage in view or for the sake of satisfying lust, has abducted by force or deceit an unwilling woman, or a consenting woman of minor age but with the parents or tutors unaware or contradicting, is by the law itself to be held excluded from legitimate ecclesiastical acts, and moreover is to be punished with other penalties according to the gravity of the fault (canon 2353). Note especially that the penalty does not touch raptus less properly so called, but it does touch several who have not contracted the impediment of raptus properly so called.

X. Dispensation. Although the impediment of raptus and quasi-raptus is of ecclesiastical law, nevertheless the Church dispenses in it only very rarely, namely by permitting the abductor or quasi-abductor to enter nuptials with the abducted or quasi-abducted woman not yet established in a safe place. Furthermore, if the impediment has ceased, according to the common opinion it is not lawful for the pastor to assist at the marriage except by license of the Ordinary, to whom it belongs to judge concerning the cessation of the impediment.

¹ Cf. Sacred Congregation of the Council, June 25 and August 27, 1864.

² Sacred Congregation of the Council, August 20, 1769; March 14, 1772; Council of Trent, session 24, de reformatione matrimonii, chapter 6.

61. Raptus can be taken in two ways. First, it can be taken insofar as it is an impediment diriment of marriage, and is: the violent abduction of any woman from a safe place into another, where she is detained under the power of the abductor, for the sake of entering marriage. In the other way it is a species of lust; and it is the abduction of any person, whether male or female, whether virgin or corrupted, whether married or unmarried, from place to place, with violence brought either upon the one abducted or upon those under whose power the person is, namely parents or guardians or husband, but not if they are brothers and the woman is of her own right, for the sake of fulfilling lust. Wherefore in the first way a person is abducted for the sake of contracting marriage; but in the other way for the sake of lust. Concerning raptus in the first way there is speech in the treatise on Marriage; here we treat of raptus in the second way. - Moreover it is clear how raptus taken thus differs from stuprum. For stuprum has place only with an unwilling virgin, but raptus with any person; stuprum involves only violence or fraud, but raptus also abduction from place to place; stuprum brings violence only upon the virgin, raptus upon the person abducted or those under whose power the abducted person is, or even both. "Whence you see that raptus of a virgin, once the base effect has followed, differs from stuprum only very accidentally." Sporer, de Matr., 603. "If, however, a woman should depart willingly with her lover, the parents not knowing, it will not properly be raptus, but flight, not adding a malice distinct in species from fornication." - L. 443. Therefore the proper malice of raptus consists in the injury which is inflicted in violent abduction for the sake of lust. Wherefore as stuprum perfectly such, so raptus, besides the sin of lust, contains a sin of injustice; but in raptus that injustice is against both the person herself, who is violently abducted, and also the parents or any others under whose power that person is placed. Here it must be noted that by raptus even of one willing the right of paternal power is violated, but not by the defloration of the same, since as regards the use of her own body she is not subject to her parents. - Schmalzgrueber, l. 5, p. 2, t. 16, de Adulteriis, etc., Sect. II, de Stupro, n. 19; St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 154, a. 7; L. 444.

62. Note. Billuart, diss. 6, art. 4, par. 1, has these things about flight: "Flight can be reduced to raptus, because although it is done without violence, nevertheless it is not done without injury to parents, insofar as especially girls are committed to their custody by nature and law for a definite time, regularly until the twenty-fifth year of age, by which they become of full age, and beyond which the abduction of a girl voluntarily consenting, even with parents resisting, must no longer be called raptus, either properly or improperly, because then injury is done to no one."

63. What ought a woman oppressed by force to do, so that she may be immune from sin?

R. 1. She must guard against inwardly assenting to pleasure; otherwise she sins mortally, although force is externally brought upon her. - 2. She must also defend herself externally as much as she usefully and reasonably ought; otherwise she is already judged to consent. But whether she is also bound to cry out, several affirm; but others very probably deny, if there would be danger of notable harm, whether of infamy or of excessive shame, because then, if she already resists otherwise as much as she can, she is not bound with so great inconvenience to herself to repel force. Except if there is present a proximate danger of consenting. L. 430.

But in the supposed case whether it is lawful to kill the invader of modesty, Bishop Bouvier denies, but others commonly affirm. The reason is that if this is lawful for protecting honor and resources, much more must it be said to be lawful for protecting modesty, when no other remedy is at hand. Lugo, Roncaglia, etc., observe that it will be lawful for a girl not only while she is actually being violently touched by another, but also immediately after, to strike him with slaps, fists, a stick, and even non-dangerous blows. The reason is that unless in such a way she shows her constancy and displeasure, he will not easily depart. Hence always, if this is not done for vengeance, it is not only to be permitted, but also to be counseled to the woman, so that the other may at least come to his senses and not solicit her another time. L. 386.

Finally, whether a woman oppressed by force is bound rather to suffer death, by repelling with force the invader of modesty, than to permit intercourse, there is a twofold opinion. "The first says that, although she can, nevertheless a woman is not bound to suffer death, but can then bear herself permissively while intercourse occurs, provided she resists positively by the will and the danger of consent is absent; because, as they say, that permission is not then moral cooperation, but only material, and therefore is sufficiently excused on account of danger of death. The second teaches that this is altogether illicit, because, since the woman can impede intercourse, if induced by fear she rests, then her cooperation becomes truly moral and voluntary; for in the woman that rest in intercourse is reckoned as action. Yet this reason does not convince, because that rest of the woman truly cannot be called action, since it is in no way positive; therefore the first opinion, speculatively speaking, does not seem to lack its probability. Nevertheless it must not be denied that the second opinion is altogether to be recommended in practice, at least on account of the danger of consent which can easily be present in that permission." L. 368, 430, 433. - Hence above in R. 2 it was said: "as much as she usefully can and reasonably ought, certainly without danger of her life or reputation; for then she is not bound to kill, mutilate, or wound the invader, even though she could by right." Sporer, 605; Elbel, de Act. hum., Conf. 2, Cas. 1.

64. Can a girl violently oppressed lawfully expel at once the semen of the man that has been injected, lest she conceive?

R. Negatively. The reason is that this expulsion of semen now existing in the womb is per se and directly against generation from the positive action itself of the woman. But if the semen had not yet been injected into the womb, "she could lawfully turn herself and interrupt coitus, although the semen of the man would have to be poured forth, because this would happen per accidens and on account of the malice of the man alone." L. 394 and l. 6, n. 954. - Nevertheless there are not lacking authors who permit that, if it is done immediately after intercourse, before conception has been made, because, they say, the semen then bears itself in the manner of an unjust aggressor, whom it is lawful to repel. But if it is lawful immediately after intercourse, before conception is made, to expel semen by washing or by another means, as St. Alphonsus excellently says in the cited n. 394, the same would be lawful afterwards, which would be altogether illicit. Is not the fetus already conceived then more the aggressor, the continuer of the aggression? Besides, how can semen be expelled after it has been received, before conception takes place? For "the womb of a woman is closed as soon as it receives the semen." L. 394. - But observe here that generation is not impeded by simple washing, if it is done at least some hours after intercourse.

65. What are the penalties against abductors?

R. The penalties are of detention, imprisonment, forced labors, according to various cases, Italian Penal Code, art. 340-344; French Penal Code, l. 3, art. 354-357. But as regards Canon Law, from Trent, sess. 24, c. 6, de Ref. Matr., the abductor is bound "whether he has married her or has not married her, decently to endow the one abducted according to the judgment of the judge," unless she is a prostitute or of evil reputation; and this is not so much a penalty as just compensation. But as regards penalties properly so called, whether he who abducts a woman for the sake of lust, or for another evil end than marriage, if he does not incur the impediment, at least incurs the other penalties established by Trent, sess. 24, c. 6, de Ref. Matr., some affirm, because the Tridentine in that special chapter speaks generally; but others more truly deny, because Trent intended only to favor the liberty of marriage. For the rest, except excommunication, the other penalties established there are ferendae sententiae. Scavini, Milan 1874, l. 3, n. 808.

What is abduction? - Abduction can be taken in two ways. First it can be taken as it is a diriment impediment of marriage, and it is the violent leading away of any woman from the home or paternal or quasi-paternal power to another place for contracting marriage, under the power of the abductor. In another way, however, it is a species of lust; and this is the carrying away of any person, whether male or female, whether virgin or corrupted, whether married or unmarried, from place to place, force being brought either against the one abducted or against those to whose power the person is subject, namely parents or guardians, or husband, but not if they are brothers and the woman is of her own right, for the sake of fulfilling lust. Inst. l. 4, t. 4, section 2. Therefore in the first way the person is carried away for the sake of contracting marriage; in the other way, for the sake of lust. Abduction in the 1st way is discussed in the treatise on Marriage; here we deal with abduction in the 2nd way.

Moreover it is clear how abduction thus taken differs from defilement. For defilement has place only with an unwilling virgin, but abduction with any person; defilement involves only violence or fraud, abduction also the leading away from place to place; defilement brings violence only to the virgin, abduction to the person abducted, or to those to whose power the abducted person is subject, or even to both. "Hence you see that abduction of a virgin, the base effect having followed, differs from defilement only very accidentally." Sporer de Matr. 603. Yet if someone departs voluntarily with a lover, the parents not knowing, there will not properly be abduction, but flight, not adding malice distinct in species to fornication. Therefore the proper malice of abduction consists in the injury which is brought in violent carrying away for the sake of lust. Therefore, just as defilement perfectly such, so abduction, besides the sin of lust, contains a sin of injustice; and that injustice is both against the person herself who is violently carried away, and also against parents or any other persons whatever in whose power that person is constituted. From Trent, s. 24, C. 6 de R. M., the abductor is bound "to dower decently, at the judgment of the judge, the woman abducted, whether he has married her or has not married her," unless the woman is a prostitute or of bad reputation. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 154, a. 7; L. 444; C. I. Poen. 349 seqq.; C. G. 354 seqq.; C. B. 826.

What is the impediment of abduction? Abduction is the violent carrying away of a woman from a safe place to another, where she is detained under the power of the abductor, for the sake of entering marriage. Abduction dirimently impedes marriage by ecclesiastical law between the abductor and the abducted woman. Trent, sess. 24, chap. 6, de R. M.

Three conditions are required for incurring this impediment, namely: 1. that the abducted woman be led away from place to place. Woman, whoever she may be. Also a betrothed woman? It must be affirmed, because the law does not distinguish. Others, however, deny it, because a betrothed woman can be compelled to nuptials, unless perhaps she has a just cause for withdrawing from the betrothals. Cf. Collectanea S.C. de Propaganda Fide, n. 1418. She can indeed be compelled to nuptials; nevertheless betrothals do not give a right to inflict force upon her. An abducted woman; the impediment is not incurred if a woman abducts a man, because Trent speaks only of a male abductor. Be led away; not if she is unwillingly retained in the place to which she had gone spontaneously, since strict interpretation is needed here. It is the same whether the abductor executes the abduction by himself or through others; likewise whether he keeps the abducted person in his power by himself and with himself, or through others and with others. Sacred Congregation of the Council, June 25, 1864, A.S.S., vol. 1, pp. 15-24. But the impediment is incurred by the one who abducts for himself, not by those who abduct for another, although these can incur other penalties decreed against abductors both by civil and by canon law. Schmalzgrueber, book 5, tit. 17, n. 26. From place to place; the impediment is not contracted if she is led from room to room in the same house, because thus she is not properly constituted under the power of the abductor.

2. That the woman be abducted only for the sake of marriage; therefore the impediment is not incurred if the woman is led away for another cause, e.g., for satisfying lust. For Trent intends nothing else except to favor the liberty of marriage. Nor is the impediment incurred if marriage is contracted between the abductor and the abducted woman after she has been freed from the power of the abductor. This appears clearly from the text of Trent. On the contrary, this impediment lasts as long as the abducted woman is in the power of the abductor, even if she consents freely.

3. That the abduction be made while the woman resists, or is altogether unwilling, force being inflicted or fear being struck. Hence the impediment is not had if the woman consents to the carrying away; for then there is not abduction but flight, although those under whose power she is are unwilling. And, on the contrary, the impediment is present if, with these persons consenting, she herself is led away unwillingly. Abduction by seduction, as it is called, by inducing a woman with flatteries or gifts to follow him, does not constitute the impediment, because no force and no fraud is employed against the one led away, nor is injury inflicted upon the parents. But if a woman, deceived by fraud, unknowingly comes into the power of the one contriving the abduction, abduction is still had and the marriage is dirimently impeded. Sacred Congregation of the Council, April 24, 1868; June 25 and August 27, 1864; A.S.S., vol. 1, p. 23; Riganti, de Cancell. Reg., 40, n. 79 ff. L. 1107 ff.; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 154, a. 7, ad 4; Schmalzgrueber, book 5, tit. 17, nn. 37-40; E.M.

Are betrothals valid when contracted while the abducted woman is under the power of the abductor? There are two probable opinions. The first opinion denies it, because betrothals require liberty, just as marriage itself does; for a penal law is extended where the same reason operates. The second opinion affirms it, and St. Alphonsus with La Croix, etc., calls this more probable. The reason for this opinion is that betrothals, since they are always rescindable, require less liberty than marriage. L. 1107.

VI. The remaining Tridentine excommunications, reserved to no one, which are retained by the present Constitution, are the following: 1. The abductor, and all those furnishing counsel, help, and favor to him, are excommunicated by the law itself. Sess. 24, chap. 6, de Ref. Matr.

The abductor, namely of a woman for contracting marriage with the abducted woman. For there is question of abduction as a diriment impediment of marriage. And all those furnishing counsel, help, and favor to him, namely for the abduction; not likewise if they furnish these after the admitted abduction, so that the abducted woman may more easily marry the abductor. Are excommunicated by the law itself. The diriment impediment ceases if the abducted woman is no longer detained under the power of the abductor; but the excommunication perseveres and has an end only by absolution. Suarez, disp. 31, sec. 5, final paragraph; Bonacina, disp. 2, q. 2, part 9, and de Susp., disp. 3, part 5, par. 1, n. 38; E.M.

"Whether those who abduct girls, betrothed by their parents to a gentile man, against their will, and bring them to the house of the bridegroom, incur the penalty of excommunication?

R. Either the betrothals were entered by the parents before the girls obtained the use of reason, and it is not established that after the use of reason they confirmed and ratified them; since these betrothals are altogether void, surely those who offer counsel, aid, or favor to the abduction of these virgins are excommunicated by the law itself, according to chapter 6, session 24, de Ref. Matr., Council of Trent. But otherwise, if the betrothals were either first entered with their consent, or afterward confirmed, and therefore are reputed firm and valid; for those who drag the bride by force to the bridegroom are not subjected to the penalties of abductors, although she is unwilling and refusing." S. C. de P. F., Apr. 17, 1784, Collect. n. 1418; I. M. 1024, 1212.

857. • Abduction is the violent carrying away of a woman from a safe place to another place where she is detained under the power of the abductor ¹, for the purpose of entering matrimony.

¹ It is the same whether the abductor carries out the abduction himself or through others, and likewise whether he retains the abducted person in his power by himself and in his own custody or through others and in their custody. This is gathered from a Declaration of the Sacred Congregation of the Council of June 25, 1864, which can be seen in the Roman Acts, volume 1, pages 15-25. But one who abducts for himself incurs the impediment, not those who abduct for another, although the latter can otherwise incur penalties decreed against abductors both by civil and Canon law. See Schmalzgrueber, book 5, title 17, no. 20.

Abduction invalidates matrimony by ecclesiastical law between the abductor and the abducted woman. This is established from the Council of Trent, session 24, chapter 6.

Three conditions are required for incurring that impediment, namely: 1. that the abducted woman be carried away from one place to another; 2. that the woman be abducted solely for the purpose of matrimony; 3. that the abduction occur while the woman resists ², or is altogether unwilling. This is gathered from the text of the Council of Trent ³. - St. Ligorius, no. 1107.

² It makes no difference whether the woman is carried away from her own home by force or, led about by deceit, unknowingly comes into the power of the one plotting the abduction; likewise, whether she is carried away from her own dwelling or, having been led from it through fraud, is thereafter prevented from being able to return to it freely. For free consent is equally absent both if through open force and if through fraud she is no longer permitted to be in her own power. See the Declaration of the Sacred Congregation cited in the preceding note.

³ The text of the Council of Trent cited by the Author does not in fact add this condition, that the woman be carried away altogether resisting and unwilling. The Doctors, however, are commonly accustomed to infer it from the fact that the Council speaks of that abduction by which the liberty of matrimony is injured. See Schmalzgrueber, book 5, title 17, no. 35. But liberty of consent appears sufficiently present when the woman consents to her abduction.

Nevertheless, this doctrine can easily be reconciled with the opposite opinion if a suitable distinction is employed. For the abduction of a woman consenting to her own carrying away can occur in two ways: first, when negotiations concerning nuptials with the abductor preceded and the woman consents to her own carrying away so that the marriage which otherwise was impeded can be entered. Then no impediment arises, since it ought rather to be called flight with the man for freely contracting matrimony than abduction. Second, when no negotiation concerning nuptials had preceded; and then the woman's consent to her own carrying away is presumed to have been extorted through deceit. Since consent to matrimony cannot be inferred from consent to the abduction, the abduction of the woman, although willing, is included in the decree of the Council. See Riganti on Rule 49 of the Chancery, no. 79 and following.

These things are brilliantly confirmed from Declarations of the Sacred Congregation which you have collected in the Appendix inserted in the first volume of the Roman Acts, beginning at page 54. From these the Author of the Appendix draws the following conclusions: I. an abduction which falls under the decree of the Council is not present when negotiations concluding the matrimony to be entered precede the abduction. For in this case the man has a right to have the woman espoused to him, and the woman is bound to consent to the matrimony. II. Nor is this abduction verified if, without deceit, the man carries away the woman by agreement because negotiations concerning the matrimony could not be concluded on account of the opposition of the parents. III. Nor is abduction verified if not the man but the woman solicited the man to carry her away. In these two cases it must rather be called the flight of the woman with the man so that they may more freely contract matrimony than abduction. IV. On the contrary, abduction is verified if the woman is carried away through snares and deceitful solicitations by one planning abduction, so that afterward under the influence of the abductor she is compelled to consent to matrimony.

And the same Author deservedly concludes that whenever the woman appears to have consented to the abduction, the resolution must be taken from the circumstances considered. For if the woman consents to the carrying away so that she may contract matrimony more freely, and uses this means of carrying away to remove obstacles, it does not appear to be abduction but mere flight, although some injury is inflicted upon the dissenting parents. But if the man cannot obtain the woman's consent to matrimony by a direct way and, therefore meditating the seizure or theft of the girl, begins to circumvent the inexperienced woman by snares, deceitful solicitations, etc., so that by these arts he may extort some compliance from the fickle girl, and, having obtained it, carry her away in contempt of her parents, everyone sees that the man indeed intends to compel the girl into matrimony, while the girl, through the man's snares, in some manner adheres to the circumvention without herself seriously perceiving that she is being driven to enter a marriage which perhaps she would never have entered willingly and against the will of her parents.

And in these things there is contained that by which the following question of the Author concerning abduction by seduction may also be resolved.

819. Notion. Abduction, insofar as it is an impediment of matrimony, is distinguished from abduction insofar as it is a sin of lust, which is wont to be defined: the violent abduction of a woman from a safe place to an unsafe place for the purpose of satisfying lust. But abduction as an impediment of matrimony is defined: the violent abduction or detention of a woman for the purpose of entering matrimony.

Origin of this impediment. The abduction of women for the purpose of entering matrimony occurred many times among the ancient pagans and Jews. Examples are the abduction of the Sabine women and the abduction of Helen. Even in our days, among barbarous peoples, women are sometimes abducted for matrimony.¹⁴⁹ In ancient Roman law the abduction of women was punished most gravely, namely, by the penalty of death.¹⁵⁰ In the law of the Decretals, abduction is not yet found, at least as an impediment distinct from the impediment of fear.¹⁵¹ But the Council of Trent¹⁵² established abduction as a special impediment in these words: "The holy Synod decrees that between the abductor and the abducted woman, so long as she remains in the power of the abductor, no matrimony can subsist. But if the abducted woman, separated from the abductor and constituted in a safe and free place, consents to have him as husband, the abductor may have her as wife; and nevertheless, the abductor himself and all those furnishing counsel, aid, and favor are by the law itself excommunicated and perpetually infamous, and incapable of all dignities, and, if they were clerics, they are to fall from their proper rank. Furthermore, the abductor is bound to endow the abducted woman decently, according to the judgment of the judge, whether he has taken her as wife or has not taken her." The Code of Canon Law, can. 1074, establishes similar things.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, c. 17.

¹⁵⁰ L. 5, § 2, Dig., Ad leg. Iul. de vi publica, 48, 6.

¹⁵¹ c. 7, X, 5, 17.

¹⁵² Sess. 24, c. 6, De reform. matrim.

820. Required conditions. In order that abduction constitute a diriment impediment of matrimony, and one distinct from the impediment of force and fear, the following are required according to the discipline now in force:

a) Violent abduction from a safe place to an unsafe place, that is, the woman must be abducted from a place in which she was safe to a place physically and morally diverse in which she is no longer safe.

Hence the abduction of a woman from one house to another in the same city suffices, because the place is diverse; but the abduction of a woman from one room to another in the same house does not suffice, since the rooms of the same house are not held to be morally diverse places. Nevertheless, even in this case the matrimony could be invalid a) because of the impediment of force and fear, b) because of the violent detention of the woman in such a place. - It makes no difference whether the abductor himself, who desires to enter matrimony, abducted the woman, or another did so at the command of the abductor. For what someone does through another, he is held to do himself.¹⁵³

The abduction must be violent, that is, against the will of the woman. This violence can be either physical (raptus violentiae) or moral, that is, accomplished by grave fear, fraud, deceit, hypnotic suggestion, etc. Therefore the impediment of abduction is not present if a woman freely flees with a man to a distant place for the purpose of contracting matrimony there against the will of her parents. But in the external forum, the free consent both to the flight and to the matrimony must then be proved; otherwise abduction is presumed.¹⁵⁴

Violent detention is equivalent to abduction. If a woman indeed freely flees with a man but afterward is violently detained in an unsafe place and induced by fear or deceit to contract matrimony, the impediment of abduction is also present in this case.¹⁵⁵

b) The abduction of a woman, whether honorable or dishonorable, whether espoused or not yet espoused.

The impediment of abduction does not arise if a man is forcibly abducted from a safe place to an unsafe place for the purpose of entering matrimony. Thus the most common and today certain opinion, with a few contradicting.¹⁵⁶ The reason is that the Code of Canon Law speaks of a male abductor and a female abducted, but not of a female abductor and a male abducted; nor is there a sufficient cause for extending the impediment to the abduction of a man.

c) For the purpose of entering matrimony.

It is required that the end of the abduction or detention was entering matrimony, and not lust, vengeance, the extortion of money, or something else.¹⁵⁷ If there is doubt what the end of the abduction was, the end of matrimony is presumed.

d) That the abductor retain the abducted woman in an unsafe place and contract matrimony there.

For the Code of Canon Law, can. 1074, § 2, expressly establishes after the Council of Trent:¹⁵⁸ "But if the abducted woman, separated from the abductor and constituted in a safe and free place, consents to have him as husband, the impediment ceases."

¹⁵³ Cf. Rule of Law 68 in VI°.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. Leitner, Lehrb. d. kirchl. Eherechtes, § 25, p. 142.

¹⁵⁵ Code of Canon Law, can. 1074, § 3.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor., bk. 6, n. 1107.

¹⁵⁷ Sacred Congregation of the Council, January 23, 1586.

¹⁵⁸ Loc. cit.

821. Cessation of the impediment. Although the impediment of abduction (insofar as it is not joined with the impediment of force and fear) is constituted by ecclesiastical law alone and therefore does not bind unbelievers among themselves,¹⁵⁹ nor did it exist before the Council of Trent, nevertheless the Supreme Pontiff most rarely dispenses from it, because a) it is so intimately connected with the impediment of force and fear, b) there is a great danger that the woman, existing under the power of the abductor, may furnish matrimonial consent that is not altogether free but merely feigned.

For this reason, the Holy Office, in an Instruction directed to the bishops of Albania on February 15, 1901, was unwilling to delegate the faculty of dispensing to the bishops. These are the words: "Nothing prevents assistance from being given to the abducted woman by a dispensation if, in whatever manner, it is certainly established that her consent is truly free and sufficient motives for dispensing are present. But in a matter of such moment, especially lest the most holy Tridentine law become cheapened through excessive facility in obtaining a dispensation of this kind, it is fitting that judgment be altogether reserved to the Holy See."¹⁶⁰

Indeed, in every concession of a matrimonial dispensation the clause is wont to be added: "provided that the woman was not abducted, and if she was abducted, that she does not exist under the power of the abductor." This clause imports a true condition without which the dispensation is not valid. - But in the most ample faculty of dispensing from impediments, however public, conceded by the Code of Canon Law, cann. 1043-1045, for imminent danger of death and for a case in which matrimony cannot be deferred without grave danger, there is also included the faculty of dispensing from the impediment of abduction. But care must then be taken that the abducted woman furnishes true and free consent.

The impediment of abduction ceases by that very fact when the abducted woman has been separated from the abductor and restored to a safe place. This is evident from the words of the Code cited. But it belongs not to the parish priest but to the bishop to judge whether the abduction has truly been purged, that is, has ceased;¹⁶¹ nevertheless, even after the abduction has been purged, there remain not only the penalties imposed against abductors of women (concerning which below), but also, if some other impediment obstructed the matrimony, mention of the abduction previously committed would have to be made in the petition for a dispensation. When it is necessary to convalidate a matrimony invalid because of the impediment of abduction, the spouses must first be separated, and both must express marital consent before the parish priest and two witnesses according to the legal norms. For this impediment is held to be of public law. Only a dispensation conceded in danger of death is excepted.

¹⁵⁹ If the abductor is a member of the faithful but the abducted woman an unbeliever, and likewise conversely, if the abductor is an unbeliever but the abducted woman a member of the faithful, the impediment of abduction seems to bind each: the member of the faithful directly, but the unbeliever indirectly. Cf. Cappello, De sacr. III, n. 472; Wernz-Vidal, Ius can. V, n. 310.

¹⁶⁰ Collect. de Prop. Fide, n. 2101.

¹⁶¹ Cf. Gasparri, De matrim., n. 559; Feije, De imped. et dispens. matrim., 4th ed., n. 186; Van de Burgt-Schaepman, Tract. de matrim., n. 115. - Wernz-Vidal, Ius can. V, n. 313, and Vogt, loc. cit., § 43, teach that the judgment of the bishop is not required, at least by common law.

822. The penalties against abductors of women imposed by the Council of Trent¹⁶² or by ancient law have been abolished. But the Code of Canon Law, can. 2353, establishes: "One who, with a view to matrimony or for the purpose of satisfying lust, has abducted an unwilling woman by force or deceit, or a woman who is a minor (below twenty-one years of age) indeed consenting but without the knowledge or against the will of her parents or guardians, is by the law itself to be held excluded from legitimate ecclesiastical acts and furthermore is to be punished with other penalties according to the gravity of the fault."

The abduction of women (especially that perpetrated for the purpose of lust, which today rages so widely in what are commonly called Mädchenhandel, "traffic in girls," and la traite des blanches, "white-slave traffic") is also wont to be punished most gravely by civil laws.¹⁶³

¹⁶² Sess. 24, c. 6, De reform. matrim.

¹⁶³ Cf. Austrian Civil Code, §§ 56, 94; French Penal Code, art. 354 ff.; German Penal Code, § 236 ff.; Spanish Civil Code, art. 135; and Penal Code, art. 460 ff.

895. Abduction (enlevement; gewelddadige ontvoering, schaking), as it is an impediment of matrimony, is defined: The violent abduction of an unwilling woman under the power of another, for the sake of entering matrimony. It is said:

1° Abduction under the power of another, under which name comes not only a transfer from place to place morally different, but also detention under the power of another, which is morally equivalent to abduction.

What formerly could be disputed is now certain from can. 1074, § 3: "As regards the nullity of matrimony, violent retention of a woman is held equal to abduction, namely when a man violently detains a woman, with a view to matrimony, in the place where she stays or to which she has freely gone."

2° Of an unwilling woman, not of a man, because the law regards that which happens commonly, not that which happens rarely and exceptionally, and because the liberty of a woman, as of the weaker one, is more to be protected.

Moreover, woman is understood as any woman whatever, whether virgin or corrupted, whether of minor or major age, whether betrothed or widow, whether honorable or dishonorable or infamous.

3° Violent, namely by physical force, or moral force as by threats and grave fear, the woman, namely, being unwilling and resisting.

It is necessary that violence be inflicted on the woman herself in order to matrimony; hence a) force inflicted on parents does not suffice; b) nor does it suffice that the woman, induced by flatteries, importunate prayers, gifts, or false promises, voluntarily follows, which is called abduction of seduction, because it is more flight than abduction; c) nevertheless it does not matter whether the abductor by himself or through another violently abducts the woman, or whether with himself or with another he retains her in his power: in which case the one commanding contracts the impediment, but not the mandatory; on the contrary, if someone without mandate acts for another, there is no impediment; d) it is not required that the woman be unwilling as regards the abduction itself or detention; it suffices that she is so as regards only the matrimony to be entered.

4° For the sake of entering matrimony, but not some other end, even the worst, as revenge, or even satisfying lust: thus abduction, as it is an impediment of matrimony, differs from abduction which is a species of lust.

Nevertheless, the impediment is present if a woman who first was abducted on account of the cause of lust is afterward detained unwillingly by force with a view to matrimony.

896. Principle I. Between a male abductor and a woman abducted with a view to matrimony, as long as she remains in the power of the abductor, no matrimony can stand. - Thus can. 1074, § 1, confirming the Council of Trent, l. c.

A threefold condition is required for contracting the impediment: violence, abduction or detention in a place under the power of the abductor, and the intention of entering matrimony. Once these have been fulfilled, the impediment exists only between the abductor and the abducted woman, and indeed as long as she is in the abductor's power; for by the very fact that the woman is endowed with liberty the impediment ceases, whence can. 1074, § 2: "But if the abducted woman, separated from the abductor and constituted in a safe and free place, has consented to have him as husband, the impediment ceases."

The impediment is of ecclesiastical law: for although grave fear is for the most part joined with abduction, nevertheless the impediment of abduction does not diriment matrimony by reason of fear, but is a distinct impediment, which exists as long as the woman is constituted under the power of the abductor, although she consents to the union spontaneously and freely.

136. • I. Notion.

Raptus, as it is an impediment of matrimony, is defined: "the abduction or detention of an unwilling woman, for the sake of entering matrimony with her."

137. • II. Existence of the impediment.

That impediment is of ecclesiastical law, established for protecting the liberty of matrimony.

"§ 1. Between a man who abducts and a woman abducted with a view to matrimony, so long as she remains in the power of the abductor, no matrimony can stand.

§ 3. As regards the nullity of matrimony, violent retention of the woman is held equal to raptus, namely when a man violently detains a woman with a view to matrimony in the place where she is staying or to which she freely came." (Can. 1074.)

138. • III. What conditions are necessary that the impediment be present.

a) Abduction is required, i.e., removal from a place in which the woman is free from the power of the abductor to a morally diverse place in which she is under his power; or detention, i.e., custody of the person in some place from which she is impeded from departing and where she is under the power of the one detaining her.

b) Force done to the woman is required. But it matters little whether the woman is unwilling as to the abduction or detention, or only as to entering matrimony.

c) It is necessary that a woman be abducted or detained. The law does not concern itself with the unusual case of the raptus of a man by a woman.

d) It is necessary that raptus have matrimony as its end. If it is done for another end, even a most wicked one, the impediment is not present.

139. • IV. Cessation of the impediment.

a) It ceases by the fact itself, once the woman has been separated from the abductor and placed in a safe and free place, and consents to have the abductor as husband. (Can. 1074, § 2.)

Nevertheless let the pastor not assist at the matrimony without consulting the Ordinary, whose part it will be to judge whether the raptus has truly ceased and the woman freely consents to matrimony.

b) The Church dispenses very rarely in this impediment, on account of the danger of consent that is not free.

But it is not excluded from the faculty granted by cc. 1043-1045. Then, however, care must be taken that the woman give free consent.

Canon XI. Girls betrothed to some men and afterwards carried off by others, it seemed good that they be restored to those to whom they had been betrothed, even if they suffered force.

Canon XXII. Those who have women by abduction, if indeed they have carried off women already betrothed to others, are not to be admitted before they have been taken away from them and restored to the power of those to whom they had been betrothed from the beginning, whether they wish to receive them or desist. But if someone has taken one who is free, it is necessary indeed to take her away and restore her to her own people and permit it to their will ... and if they wish to hand her over to him (that is, to the abductor), it is necessary to establish the marriage; but if they hold her back, by no means to inflict force.

Canon CIV. If any widows, however much still placed in lesser years and left by a husband at mature age, have devoted themselves to the Lord and, having cast off lay clothing, have appeared in religious habit under the testimony of the bishop and the Church, but afterwards have passed over to secular nuptials, according to the Apostle they will have condemnation, because they have dared to make void the faith of chastity which they vowed to the Lord. Therefore let such persons remain without the communion of Christians, and let them not even communicate in banquets with Christians. For if adulterous wives are bound by guilt to their husbands, how much more will widows who have changed religious life be marked with the crime of adultery if by lustful pleasure they have corrupted the devotion which, of their own accord and not compelled, they offered to God, and have made a passage to second nuptials? And if they have been seized beforehand by someone with violence rushing in and afterwards by delight of the flesh and of lust have consented to remain in marriage with the abductor or violent man, they will be held liable to the condemnation comprehended above.

Canon XXVII. Concerning those who carry off women, even under the name of living together, or those cooperating with or conniving at abductors, the holy synod decreed that, if indeed they are clerics, they fall from their own grade, but if they are laymen, they be excommunicated.

Canon XLVI. Professed widows, if they have furnished connivance, are to be condemned with the abductors.

Decree I. Since through the calamity of war ... men were carried off into captivity, and their women ... who thought their own husbands either killed or believed they would never be freed from domination, and, solitude compelling them, passed over to marriage with others, and since now ... some of those who were thought to have perished have returned, your charity deservedly seems to be uncertain what ought to be ordained by us concerning the women who have been joined to other men. But because we know it written that "a woman is joined to a man by God" (Prov. XIX, 14), and again we have recognized the precept, that "what God has joined, let not man separate," it is necessary that we believe the covenants of legitimate nuptials are to be restored, and, the evils which hostility brought in being removed, that to each one that which he legitimately had be reformed; and it must be procured with every zeal that each one receive what is his own.

Canon II. If an abductor with the abducted woman has fled to the Church, and it has been established that the woman herself suffered violence, let her immediately be freed from the hand of the abductor, and let the abductor, immunity from death or penalties having been conceded, either be subjected to the condition of serving or have the free faculty of redeeming himself. But if it has been established that she who is abducted has a father, and the girl, either about to be abducted or abducted, consented to the abductor, let her be returned excused to the power of the father, and let the abductor be held liable by the father to the satisfaction of the preceding condition.

Decree IV. We detest abductors of widows or virgins because of the savagery of so great a crime, pursuing more vehemently those who have attempted to associate virgins consecrated to God, whether willing or unwilling, to their own marriage. We prescribe that these, because of the atrocity of so nefarious a crime, be suspended from communion.

Canon XVI. Concerning the abductors of consecrated virgins or of those living in the purpose under devotion, we establish that if anyone has presumed to inflict force upon a consecrated or devoted woman, that is, one who has professed religion, let him be repelled from ecclesiastical communion even to his departure, the viaticum alone being reserved to him in the peril of infirmity. But if she who is said to have been abducted has consented to live with her abductor, let her herself also be struck with a similar excommunication. This form also is to be preserved under ecclesiastical discipline concerning penitents and widows remaining in the purpose.

Canon V. Let no one obtain the marriages even of sacred virgins either by abduction or by any competitions (competition signifies a certain force, but rather moral, under the appearance of right or by abuse of authority). Similarly, one must abstain from unions with those women who, by change of garment, whether widows or girls, have professed religion, penance, or virginity by public declaration. But if anyone has come against the interdiction and has neglected to hear his priest, let him in the present be held a stranger from the communion of the Catholic Church and be struck with anathema forever.

Canon VI. Let no one presume to abduct a widow or the daughter of another outside the will of the parents, or judge that she is to be sought by the king's favor. But if he has done this, similarly removed from the communion of the Church, let him be punished with the condemnation of anathema.

Canon XX. We, following this, which either the Apostle Paul or Pope Innocent (to Victricius) established, bringing it into our canons, decree that it is to be observed that no one shall presume to abduct or claim or associate to himself as wife a sacred virgin of God, who has changed her garment in honor of Christ; because even the Roman law established that whoever perhaps has abducted a sacred virgin of God or a widow, if afterward it comes to agreement with them about the union, they shall be struck by capital sentence (Law 1, Cod. Theod., concerning abduction or marriage).

Cf. Decree XII of Innocent, above; Canon XVI of the Council of Orleans, A.D. 538. The law to which the Fathers appeal is the law of Constantius, which Iovinianus renewed, increased with capital punishment. In Cod. Theod. L. IX, Tit. XXV, De Raptu, l. 1: If anyone, I do not say shall abduct, but shall even attempt, for the sake of joining marriage, sacred virgins or unwilling women (or widows?), he shall be struck by capital sentence.

Thus Sirmondus edited the canon just now recited. But Baluzius (in the Capitularies of the Franks), referring from the same Council an edict of King Chlothar on this matter, thus presents it under n. XVIII: Religious girls and widows or nuns, who have vowed themselves to God, both those who reside in their own houses and those who have been placed in monasteries: let no one either claim them by our precept, or drag them away, or presume in any way to associate them to himself in marriage. And if anyone has elicited a precept concerning this (that is, has obtained it from the king), let it obtain no effect. And if anyone, either by force (that is, violence) or by any order, has presumed to draw them away or to associate them to himself in marriage, let him be struck by capital sentence. And if they have made marriage in the Church and that abducted woman, or she who is to be abducted, seems to consent to this, let them be deported into exile, sequestered from each other, and let their properties be joined to their nearest heirs.

Canon XXIII. Widows who have sought to be consecrated to the Lord, or girls consecrated to the Lord, let no one, sustained either by royal authority or by power of whatever kind, or by his own rashness, dare to abduct or drag away. But if both have consented, let them be deprived of communion.

Canon XI. If anyone has abducted or stolen as wife a virgin whom he has not betrothed to himself (other reading: unless he has betrothed her), or consenting to him, let him be anathema.

Marriage with the abducted woman is permitted to the abductor if betrothal preceded, which Justinian had denied. Cf. what was said at the canons of the Council of Meaux, A.D. 845.

Gelasius the Roman Pontiff indeed (in the Fragment apud Andreas Thiel after his epistles) said: "That law of former princes said that abduction was committed there where a girl, concerning whose nuptials nothing had been done, seems to have been led away." Gregory follows him.

Canon VI. But a girl betrothed by one man and abducted by another, according to the statutes of the Council of Ancyra, is to be returned to him by whom she had been betrothed, even if she has suffered violence from the abductor. But concerning abductors, this seems best to us: that, since they make little of ecclesiastical excommunication, they be terrified by the authority of secular laws.

Canon LXIV. Abductors of virgins and widows, who afterward also, with the will of the parents, as if betrothing them under the name of dowry, have led them into marriage, are to be subjected to public penance; and after public penance has been completed, as the Bishop shall have foreseen, lest they fall into worse things, coming together again, let them take care henceforth to be devoted to alms and to whatever other works of religious and salvific conversation, until by consent they are able to abstain from the conjugal work. But sons from a blameworthy conjunction of this sort, procreated even less laudably before marriage, shall in no way be promoted to ecclesiastical dignity; nor shall those generated from such a marriage be applied to ecclesiastical orders, unless perhaps either the greatest utility or necessity of the Church demands them, or an evident prerogative of merits commends them.

Canon LXV. But those who have not yet taken into marriage, with the will of the parents, under the aforesaid name of betrothal or dowry, those whom they had abducted, when this constitution has been promulgated into the ears of all (those, namely, who did that before this constitution was known; see the following canon), are to be separated from their conjunction and subjected to public penance; but the abducted women are to be restored legally to their parents. But after public penance has been completed, if age and incontinence have demanded it, let them be associated in a legitimate marriage pleasing to both parties. For in these things we do not constitute a rule, but, to use the words of great Leo, we judge what is more tolerable. But if one of the married persons has died, the one who did public penance and has survived shall not presume to repeat marriage, unless perhaps the bishop shall have foreseen that some indulgence should be conceded, so that he can remove a graver offense.

Canon LXVI. But whoever hereafter (from notice of this constitution) has presumed to abduct virgins or widows, according to the synodal definition of blessed Gregory, let they themselves and their accomplices be anathematized, and let the abductors remain perpetually without hope of marriage.

Justinian, Code, Book IX, Title XII, prohibited that a marriage should ever stand between the abductor and the abducted woman, whether she had been betrothed before the abduction or otherwise, with the faculty denied to the abducted virgin or widow of demanding her own abductor as husband for herself. The Church did not approve this law under this universality. Cf. Canon XI of Gregory II in the Roman Council, above, which is not well cited by these Fathers; and the canon of Lucius III, Cum causam, De raptoribus, which agrees with Gregory; and Innocent III, canon Accedens, in the same place; then the decree of the Synod of Trent, Session XXIV, chapter VI. These Fathers seem to have wished to walk in a certain middle way.

Canon LXVIII. Concerning those who abduct the betrothed women of others, or accept them with the consent of the parents, let the ancient and synodal sentence be observed (cf. Canon XI of the Council of Ancyra). And even if perhaps such an outcome is known to be found in the Church, that, for the competence of salvation and religion, the Pontiffs ought to treat some matter more humanely ... by no means, so that we may descend to the greatest indulgence, shall the acceptor of another's betrothed woman pass without public penance, and let him legally pay a fine to the betrothed man.

Canon X. But concerning abductors, following the statutes of the ancient Fathers, we judge that this is to be held: that if they abducted those who, together with the betrothed man, have been initiated by the priestly blessing, even though they have corrupted the same women, nevertheless they are to be drawn away from these men and restored to their proper betrothed men. But those who either are widows or have not yet been betrothed and are abducted without their own will and that of their parents, nevertheless are to be restored to their parents or relatives, and, if they wish, they may marry others; for they can by no means thereafter be legitimate wives to those by whom they were abducted. But although the ancient canons command that the abductors themselves and those furnishing help to them be anathematized, nevertheless we do not deny that, when they are placed at the last moment, if they devoutly ask, the viaticum of sacred communion is to be given for mercy.

Cf., as to the first part, Canon XI of the Council of Ancyra, above. As to the second, the canons of the Council of Meaux cited a little before and the things noted there. The Church did not approve the rigor of the Fathers of Pavia, since it permits marriage if the abducted woman, restored to liberty, consents spontaneously.

Canon IX. Whoever has accepted in marriage his own blood-relative, or her whom his blood-relative had previously known, or one whose blood-relative he has carnally accepted in marriage, or hereafter has accepted, or, after he knew, did not immediately dismiss, or, knowing, has not dismissed; or he who abducted the wife of another, or shall have abducted her; or he who, dismissing his own wife without episcopal judgment, has led another, or shall have led her: until he hands himself over to fruitful penance, let him know himself excluded and alienated from the Body and Blood of Our Lord Jesus Christ and from the thresholds of the Church ...

§ 1. Between a male abductor and a woman abducted with a view to marriage, as long as she has remained in the power of the abductor, no marriage can stand.

§ 2. But if the abducted woman, separated from the abductor and placed in a safe and free place, has consented to have him as husband, the impediment ceases.

§ 3. As regards the nullity of marriage, violent retention of a woman is held equal to abduction, namely when a man violently detains a woman with a view to marriage in a place where she is staying or to which she freely came (Can. 1074).

From the third paragraph, violent retention of a woman in the place in which she is staying, or to which she freely came, is held equal to abduction.

Question 1. Does abduction of seduction induce the impediment, or when a woman is induced by gifts, flatteries, etc., to follow the abductor?

Resp. Negatively, because through the impediment of abduction the Church intends only to consult for the liberty of Marriage, which is not injured when a consenting woman is carried away, even when the parents are unwilling. Except nevertheless, unless deceit and fraud intervene in bestowing and promising gifts, as perhaps some Declarations of the Sacred Congregation of the Council suppose, on which the patrons of the affirmative opinion rely. - Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 1107. - Analecta Juris Pontificii, vol. 4, pp. 1848 and following.

Question 2. Is the impediment incurred if Marriage takes place after the woman has been liberated from the power of the abductor?

Resp. Negatively, and the reason is that, the woman having become of her own right and violence having ceased, actual abduction is no longer had, as is required by the Council of Trent. It must be noted, however, that this impediment exists if the woman contracted Marriage while she remains under the power of the abductor, even if she consents altogether freely. Cf. S. Alphonsus, n. 1032. - Acta S. Sedis, vol. 1, pp. 15 and following.

Question 3. Do those who carry out abduction for another incur this impediment?

Resp. Negatively, because they are not properly abductors, although they can incur the penalties laid against abductors. - Cf. Varceno, vol. 2, p. 362. - Ballerini, note (a), p. 832. - Acta S. Sedis, vol. 9, p. 519.¹

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1117, n. 70.

XXXIII. QUESTION XIII. What is the impediment of clandestinity and of abduction? ANSWER. The impediment of clandestinity arises from an occult matrimony without the presence of the parish priest and of witnesses, and dissolves matrimony by ecclesiastical right, of which it has been said above. Abduction is an impedient impediment, when a man leads away a wife from the house of her own husband. This abduction hinders matrimony not only with the woman abducted, but with any other whatsoever, when she is truly a wife under the power of a husband, and he resists. And even if the woman abducted consent, both she and the abductor are bound by the impediment, if the husband resist.

XXXIV. Abduction which is a diriment impediment is the violent leading away of a woman from place to place for the cause of matrimony. Violence is twofold. One physical, by which by force a woman is dragged from her own house. The other moral, which stirs up threats and fear falling upon a constant man. Either is required for abduction. For if a woman be led away from her parents' house with her own consent, even if she be deceived by guile and fraud, it is not abduction inducing an impediment, because then it is flight, not abduction, since all violence, whether physical or moral, is lacking as often as the woman consents. Nor does it matter that the woman abducted be a virgin or corrupt. It is said from place to place, that is, she ought to be led from the place in which she is to a place in which she is under the power of the abductor, although no copulation follow. Wherefore if he lead her from chamber to chamber that he may know her, it is not abduction. There is added for the cause of matrimony, because if this intention be lacking, and for another end — for instance for the fulfilling of lust — the woman be led away, it is not properly abduction inducing an impediment. Read the penalties constituted against abductors in Trent, session 24, chapter 6.