What blasphemy is and its gravity

BLASPHEMY is an imprecatory or a contumelious speech against God. Not only words, but actions also, which express contempt, insult, derision, or imprecation against God are blasphemies.

Blasphemy is direct when the dishonour of God is intended; if the dishonour of God is not intended in itself but it is foreseen that it will be the consequence of one’s word or actions, it is indirect.

Blasphemy which is against God in his own person is immediate; if it immediately affects some creature which has a special relation toward God it is mediate.

Blasphemy is a grave insult to almighty God, and is always a serious mortal sin if it is committed with full advertence and consent. To deny the existence of God, to complain against his Providence and assert that he is unjust, to deny the perpetual virginity of the Blessed Mother of God, are so many heretical blasphemies and grievous sins.

It is a disputed question among theologians whether blasphemy against the saints which is only mediately against God is of the same species of sin as blasphemy which is immediately against him. Many assert that the species is different inasmuch as the honour due to the saints is outraged as well as that which is due to God. Ordinarily, however, it is God who is chiefly dishonoured by insults offered to his saints, and so practically we may follow the opinion of other theologians and hold that there is no specific difference between the two sins.

What is blasphemy? - Blasphemy is defined: speech of malediction against God. By speech are comprehended not only words, but also thoughts and deeds which inflict insult upon God; as if someone tramples a Crucifix underfoot, or emits spittle toward heaven as toward the seat of God. Hence blasphemy is opposed to the virtue of religion, since it is directly contrary to God's honor and worship. Malediction here is not restricted to the imprecation of some evil, but is extended generally to speech of any evil whatever, so that there are comprehended insult, railing, reproach, opprobrium, mockery, derision, jeering, illusion, irony, imprecation, any derogation from the excellent divine goodness and divine honor, whether by denying something of God which belongs to him, or by asserting of him what does not belong to him. Against God, namely considered either in himself or in his Saints and creatures in order to God himself, insofar as in them some divine perfection shines forth, for example sanctity, goodness, wisdom. L. 121, 122, 125; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 13, a. 1; q. 14, a. 1.

Note: If the discussion is of reservation or of other penalties inflicted upon blasphemy, only oral blasphemy is properly understood. For the word blasphemy then is to be used strictly. Moreover, in the common usage of men, blasphemy signifies a vice of the tongue, and it is opposed to the praise of God, which is exhibited by words alone. Therefore blasphemy of deed, by which rather the honor of God is injured, is not properly blasphemy, but is reduced to blasphemy as to the character of the injury against God. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 13, a. 2 ad 2; q. 103, a. 3; Struggl 34; Ithur., Cas. 30; Suarez, de Relig., tr. 3, l. 1, c. 4, n. 1.

You will resolve: If someone from anger against a man, or by exclaiming to exaggerate the truth, names the Saints, the Blessed Virgin, the death of God, the Body of Christ, the Blood of Christ, the Head of Christ, and other honorable members of Christ, per se he does not commit blasphemy, but only an unworthy usurpation of the divine name. Per se; for otherwise it is if these are uttered from anger or indignation against God by way of contempt, or if among the hearers God and his sacred things are judged to be dishonored. Nor is it blasphemy to say: I deny God, if I do not strike you; for he who speaks thus wishes only to signify that he certainly will strike. Nor to say: this is true as God; for created truth is not equated with uncreated truth, but only a certain hyperbolic likeness is implied. But it would be blasphemy if it were in fact intended to signify that the truth is as great according to equality as it is in the truth of faith.

On the contrary, it is blasphemy to say: may the death of Christ or the blood of God destroy you; may the sacraments destroy you; because injury is inflicted upon the death, blood, and sacraments of Christ, which are ordered not to the ruin but to the salvation of men. Consequently it is blasphemy to say: may God damn you. Likewise it is blasphemy to say that one wishes to act with God unwilling, and similar things. It is blasphemy to say: God has entirely forgotten me; why did God create me? Except, however, if these are uttered in a human manner of speaking, from lightness, or to show the gravity of grief or weariness, as is often accustomed to happen. But those are never to be excused from sin who advertently and seriously say: God is unjust; God unjustly burdens me with tribulations; he unjustly permits the evil to be happy in the world. Voit 519; L. 123-126, 128; Aertnys, ed. 2, n. 67, q. 6; Lehmkuhl, Cas., ed. 3, n. 218, 336, note.

Of how many kinds is blasphemy? - Blasphemy is first distinguished: 1. into direct or indirect, according as the dishonoring of God is intended directly and formally by the blasphemer, or, although it is not intended in itself, is nevertheless contained in deeds or sayings injurious to God, which are uttered by him with the intention, for example, of joking, of manifesting anger, with advertence to the sense which the words contain. 2. Into immediate or mediate, according as it immediately affects God himself, or only mediately, namely by dishonoring the Saints or sacred things by words. 3. Into heretical, which is also against faith; imprecative or execrative, which is also against the charity of God; and merely reproachful, according as it contains heresy, or imprecation, or mere contempt of God, although it pronounces true things, but from anger and an evil mind against God. L. 122, 123, 126; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 13, a. 1 ad 2.

What kind of sin is blasphemy? - Any formal and deliberate blasphemy, whether direct or indirect, whether immediate or mediate, is a mortal sin from its whole genus. The reason is that any derogation from divine goodness is a grave injury inflicted upon the divine Majesty. Hence Lev. 24:16: The man who has cursed his God shall bear his sin; and he who has blasphemed the name of the Lord shall die the death. Insofar as it derogates from divine goodness by denying something of God which belongs to him, or by asserting of him what does not belong to him, it is opposed to confession of faith, and pertains to infidelity, or to sin against faith. Insofar as it again derogates from divine goodness by wishing evil to God, it is against charity toward God. Insofar as it is opposed to divine praise and divine honor, it is against religion and is a sin of irreligiosity. St. Pius V, Const. Cum primum, 6 Kal. Apr. 1566, sec. 10; Struggl 36; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 13, aa. 2-4; E. M.

Note: Blasphemy, as any other sin, can become venial from imperfection of the act, namely from defect of advertence or of perfect consent. To the point is S. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 13, a. 2 ad 3: "Blasphemy can proceed without deliberation from surreption in two ways: in one way because someone does not advert that what he says is blasphemy, which can happen when someone suddenly from some passion breaks out into imagined words, whose meaning he does not consider; and then it is a venial sin, and does not properly have the notion of blasphemy." Direct blasphemy brings a merely aggravating circumstance over indirect blasphemy, and therefore it is not necessarily to be expressed in confession. For that circumstance of direct voluntary, as merely subjective, indeed makes the act more voluntary with respect to the evil object, but does not tend toward a new objective malice.

You will resolve: He does not sin gravely who pronounces words which are indeed blasphemous in themselves, but so halved or corrupted that he does not attend to their true sense; for example, he who says: I deny Di! I deny Diana! For these no longer have the character of blasphemy. L. 123.

Is the intention of dishonoring God altogether necessary for blasphemy? - For perfect blasphemy, by reason of the act, an express and explicit intention of dishonoring God is not necessary, but an implicit intention suffices, which is present in indirect blasphemy. The reason is that the indirectly voluntary suffices for sin. Therefore he who advertently pronounces blasphemous words, whence in reality there is dishonoring of God, for whatever cause he does this, voluntarily admits the sin of blasphemy and becomes guilty of it. Therefore he who knowingly and willingly pronounces blasphemous words is not excused by the fact that he did not have the intention of contemning God, but did it moved by anger or despair, for the sake of frightening, or for the sake of empty solace. Reuter 442; L. 124, 127.

Do blasphemies uttered against God and against the Saints differ in species? - Busembaum with others probably affirms, because the persons are distinct to whom their own honor is owed. Bonacina, Sanchez, and others probably deny, because the Saints are intimately connected with God, whence injury inflicted upon them is referred to God himself. Finally the Salmanticenses and others hold that besides proper malice against latria, it contains another malice distinct in species against dulia.

But since those who blaspheme the Saints, more truly, commonly speaking, intend to affect them with injury not precisely on account of their own excellence, but insofar as they are referred to God; therefore they sin not against dulia but against latria, and therefore they are not bound to explain whether they blasphemed God or the Saints. But if something is uttered against the Saints, but only as men once dwelling on earth, it will be only against dulia. Indeed it will even be only venial if it is done from jest, for example, if someone calls Saints Crispin and Crispinian cobblers; but, on the contrary, it will be mortal if it is done from contempt, from hatred, or from indignation against the Saints. Struggl 37; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 277 seqq.; L. 124, 125, 132; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 13, a. 1 ad 2.

Is blasphemy uttered in jest grave? - These words are from Reuter, n. 442: "Blasphemy is grave... if someone in jest says blasphemous words, where among the hearers dishonoring of God is joined to them." Therefore grave fault will be absent where among the hearers that dishonoring is absent. L. 124.

2. Hypparchus accuses himself in sacramental confession that he is often accustomed to blaspheme, uttering true blasphemies. But to excuse himself he adds that he does this by no means from the intention of reproaching God, but only of spurring horses, or sometimes of scolding his wife or children.

Q. 1. What is blasphemy? - 2. What as to the case?

To the first, cf. I. M. 531 seqq. - To the second: Hypparchus is guilty of blasphemy. Nor indeed is he excused from the fact that he did not intend to reproach God. For from this very fact that someone knowingly pronounces blasphemous words, if not directly and explicitly, at least indirectly and implicitly he wills to reproach God. "Nevertheless it must be confessed that in practice those who use blasphemous words are often excused from mortal sin, whether on account of inadvertence, or on account of good faith, etc." G. 295; I. M. 535, 536, 538.

300. Resolves. - 1. According to some it is blasphemy to say: May death destroy you, or the blood of God; may the Sacraments destroy you. But more truly these seem to be merely imprecatory words. It is blasphemy, however, to spit toward heaven, to gnash the teeth at it, to say that one wishes to do something against God's will, and the like.

2. It is blasphemy to say: God has entirely forgotten me: Why did God create me? - Except, however, if these things are uttered in a human manner of speaking from levity, or to show the gravity of grief or weariness, as very often happens. But those are never to be excused from grave sin who advertently and seriously say: - God is unjust. - God unjustly burdens me with tribulations. - Unjustly He permits the wicked to be happy in the world. - Voit, n. 519.

3. Those do not sin gravely who, carried away by anger or some passion, utter words of blasphemy not adverting to their meaning ⁶.

⁶ So St. Thomas (2. 2. q. 13. art. 2. ad 3): Blasphemy can proceed without deliberation, by surprise, in two ways. In one way, that someone does not advert that what he says is blasphemy: which can happen when someone suddenly, from some passion, bursts into imagined words whose meaning he does not consider; and then it is a venial sin, and does not properly have the nature of blasphemy. These things can bring it about that the opinion be set aside which St. Alphonsus (Lib. 3, n. 127) attributes to Giordanini (Istruzione per li novelli Confessori), namely that there is always present some advertence to the malice of the blasphemy.

** It could hardly have seemed credible; yet this too has happened, that the VV. (Pag. 256-260) found matter for writing through eight columns against this very brief Note, in which, besides, the opinion is attributed to another rather than to St. Alphonsus, who, the VV. advise (and this matters nothing), is Giuseppe Iorio, not Giordanini.

Accordingly (Pag. 257) they complain, 1. that the passage of St. Thomas is brought forward not entire, but torn from its context. - Resp. St. Thomas had objected to himself: Sins which are committed without deliberation are not mortal.... But blasphemy sometimes proceeds without deliberation. Therefore it is not always a mortal sin. And he answers by distinguishing whether advertence to the blasphemy is lacking or present. The first case, which was to the point, is faithfully set out in the Note. Of the other case St. Thomas adds: In another way, when he adverts that it is blasphemy, considering the meaning of the words: and then he is not excused from mortal sin. And these things were omitted because, as is plain, they were not to the point, nor was it the Author's aim to heap up useless things to increase the bulk of the book. What is there in this that can rightly be found fault with?

2. The VV. add (Pag. 257) that in the text of St. Alphonsus the word ALWAYS is to be understood of things which happen ordinarily and commonly. - Resp. If they themselves contend that the word ALWAYS cannot be understood there as ALWAYS, then ALWAYS is less aptly said there. For the rest, why then do they attack the Note, which merely notes that that ALWAYS does not agree with the doctrine of St. Thomas?

3. The VV. (Pag. 257-258) wish to reconcile St. Alphonsus with St. Thomas, because St. Thomas does not discuss the habituated, but those who by surprise burst into imagined words without consideration. St. Alphonsus, however, agrees with St. Thomas that someone from anger may not advert to the malice of blasphemy; but he deals chiefly with the habituated, of whom he writes (Prax. Conf. Cap. 2, n. 31): Finally I add with a certain learned Author (Giordanini) that blasphemers are not excused from grave sin on the ground that, because of the force of the bad habit or a vehement commotion of mind from anger, they did not advert to what they were saying; for these badly habituated persons, although they have a knowledge less vivid than others who have not contracted the use of blaspheming, nevertheless ALWAYS have that ACTUAL knowledge sufficient for this, that the act be deliberate and gravely sinful. - Resp. 1. St. Thomas discusses generally those who from some passion burst into imagined words whose meaning they do not consider. But this happens also to the habituated; indeed, as is plain of itself, much more easily and frequently to the habituated than to others. Therefore some reconciliation is sought here in vain. - 2. The passage of St. Alphonsus of which the Note speaks (Lib. 3, n. 127) embraces both the habituated and the non-habituated. Behold the words of the holy Doctor: Some DD. say that these (blasphemers) SOMETIMES, on account of the impulse of anger or of the habit contracted, can blaspheme without advertence. But I think with the Author cited (Iorio) that in blaspheming there is ALWAYS some at least confused advertence to the malice of that utterance. Therefore, 1. since St. Alphonsus opposes his ALWAYS to the SOMETIMES of the other DD., it cannot be so understood, as the VV. contend, that it means ordinarily; for ordinarily admits an exception sometimes. Therefore, 2. it is false that St. Alphonsus admits exceptions as regards the non-habituated. - Resp. 3. But then a further task remains for the VV., namely that, if they cannot reconcile St. Alphonsus with St. Thomas, they at least reconcile St. Alphonsus with St. Alphonsus. For the VV. themselves (Pag. 258) bring forward these words of the holy Doctor (De Act. Hum. n. 24): Nor should the Confessor easily believe a penitent who excuses himself... for having blasphemed... without advertence... as from habit: for if he has not striven to root out that habit by applying some remedies, then he is voluntary in cause when he blasphemes..., and therefore is not excused from fault: but otherwise if, diligence having been applied, he blasphemes inadvertently. Hence thus: 1. this last one he excuses from fault, if he blasphemes from habit, because he blasphemes inadvertently; 2. the first he does not excuse from fault, because the blasphemy is voluntary in cause, and this supposes that actual knowledge was lacking, because otherwise it would be voluntary in act. Therefore the holy Doctor too teaches that the habituated blaspheme inadvertently.

But what may seem more astonishing, the VV. themselves, as if to strengthen that opinion of St. Alphonsus about advertence, which is to be thought always present in the habituated, bring forward (Pag. 259) the opinion of many, as they say, grave Doctors, who teach that the habituated person who does not care about amendment... sins mortally as often as he utters blasphemous words, although without any advertence. Do they thus prove or confirm the aforesaid opinion of St. Alphonsus (from the Praxis Confess. Cap. 2, n. 31), that they ALWAYS have that ACTUAL knowledge sufficient for this, that the act be deliberate and gravely sinful?

Nor those who, from an inveterate habit of blaspheming now retracted, break out indeliberately into such words ⁷.

⁷ That the Confessor may judge rightly of blasphemies (and say the same of the other vices of the tongue) uttered inadvertently and by force of habit, he must apply the principles which are commonly handed down (in the Treatise on Human Acts) concerning sins in cause. Namely, although these words uttered inadvertently are held and called sins, nevertheless one does not then sin when he pours them forth from his mouth materially and without advertence; for no act without deliberation can of itself have the nature of fault; but since they are sins in cause, the guilt is incurred then, when the cause is placed. It is useless, therefore, to inquire of the penitent the number of these sins, or material acts; for the whole guilt of these is in the cause; and this guilt is neither increased nor diminished by the greater or smaller number of the acts following afterward, but is to be estimated from the foresight of the effects which was present when the cause was placed. (See Laymann, Lib. 1, Tr. 2, Cap. 3, n. 6.)

But what is this cause, in which the guilt resides? Some take refuge in the origin of the habit, and find a twofold or aggravated malice in the preceding frequentation of acts from which the habit grew. So Laymann (l. c.); who, however, aptly warns that for this it is needed that, while one blasphemes, he advert that by this he is engendering that habit in himself. - But in practice you will scarcely find that men adverted to this, especially if they contracted the habit from boyhood; moreover, even if someone adverts to the danger, yet since he has no purpose of frequenting the acts, indeed promises himself that otherwise he will not blaspheme, you will hardly find this guilt.

Yet although guilt should be lacking on this side, it is certainly had in this, that one neglects to amend the habit, which he is bound under grave obligation to remove; and this negligence indeed suffices for the acts to be indirectly voluntary, as all the effects of an omission are voluntary to us, namely when we do not remove a cause which we are bound to remove. And thus it is plain how the guilt of the habit is voluntary, although advertence and guilt were lacking in contracting the habit itself.

From these things, however, it is easy to pass judgment on these matters. For either the blasphemies are not uttered indeliberately (for the habit does not bring it about that all the acts are indeliberate), and then they have guilt in themselves, as being voluntary in themselves.

But when they are plainly indeliberate, it will happen that they are wholly excused from sin, if one seriously strives to take away the habit. The reason is, because they have no guilt in themselves, as we have said, but can have it only in cause. Now the cause is understood either as the former frequentation of acts whence the habit was induced, and this guilt has already been taken away by retractation or penance; or the cause is understood as an indirect one, namely the negligence of removing the habit, and this likewise is absent, since we suppose the man to be seriously intent on removing the habit. And these things indeed are to be inculcated on the penitent; for they are wont to add great courage for undertaking the extirpation of the vice.

But if the penitent either altogether refuses amendment of the habit, or does not indeed refuse, but meanwhile neglects to apply sufficient care or effort to it: in the first case he is incapable of absolution, as one who voluntarily remains in the state of sin, just as one who will not either restore another's goods or leave an occasion; but in the other case the DD. advise that it is expedient that absolution be discreetly deferred, so that the penitent may shake off his sloth and be in some way moved to apply effort and care effectively. Discreetly, I say; for if absolution cannot conveniently be deferred, and otherwise sufficient signs appear of a serious will to amend the bad habit, he can be absolved, as also when the delay does not seem likely to profit for taking away the bad habit. But of these things more fully where we treat of the Sacrament of Penance.

Meanwhile note that it can be decided only with difficulty when the guilt of negligence is grave in those who indeed retract the cause and apply some effort, which, however, is not always intense.

4. He does not sin gravely who pronounces words in themselves indeed blasphemous, but halved or corrupted, so that he does not attend to their true sense; for example, he who says in French: Jarnidié! mortdié! ventredié! morbleu! For these no longer have the nature of blasphemy ⁸. - St. Lig., n. 125. - Bouvier, On the 2nd precept, art. 1.

⁸ Indeed, the effort to twist, mutilate, and in any way corrupt the pronunciation of words which otherwise would sound like blasphemy shows a detestation of blasphemy. And since the common people, when struck by a vehement feeling, especially of anger, with the greatest difficulty refrain from some emphatic expression, it is certainly more advisable to suggest to them some harmless way of signifying that heat than to demand silence.

531. Malice. Blasphemy is a mortal sin in its whole genus, and therefore cannot become venial from slightness of matter, but only from imperfection of the act.

The enormous malice of blasphemy can already be suspected from the most grave penalty of death inflicted upon it in the Old Testament: "The man that curseth his God shall bear his sin; and he that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, dying let him die."⁸¹³ Even in law, both canon and civil, grave penalties are inflicted upon blasphemers.⁸¹⁴ Indeed, St. Pius V decreed that the tongue of blasphemers could be pierced.⁸¹⁵ The intrinsic reason, however, why blasphemy is so grave a sin is its hostile opposition both to the charity of God, to the virtue of religion, and often to theological faith. Hence whenever truly voluntary and deliberate blasphemy is present, it is always a mortal sin.⁸¹⁶

Because of imperfection of the act, blasphemous words often are not grave sins. For sufficient advertence and intention are not rarely lacking in blasphemers. From anger, from sudden affections, or from a habit not altogether voluntary, men, especially the uneducated, break forth into blasphemous words without in any way intending to insult God or sacred things. If someone has a bad habit of uttering blasphemous words, he must lay it aside according to his powers; otherwise, acts produced from the habit are imputed to him, although he does not attend to the malice of each. Cf. the things said above in I, n. 90 concerning the influence of habit upon the morality of human acts.

⁸¹³ Lev. 24:15ff.

⁸¹⁴ Code of Canon Law, c. 2323. Cf. German Penal Code § 166 and Staatslexikon, s.v. "Religious offenses" (Religionsverbrechen).

⁸¹⁵ Constitution Cum pridem, issued in 1566.

⁸¹⁶ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 13, aa. 2 and 3, where the Angelic Doctor says: "Since the blasphemer intends to inflict injury upon the divine honor, simply speaking, he sins more gravely than a murderer"; and with St. Augustine he says: "It is worse to blaspheme than to perjure oneself."

532. Practical rules for discerning whether gravely sinful blasphemy is present in a particular case.

It is necessary to attend especially to three things:

1. the intention of the speaker or agent;

2. the natural sense of the words;

3. the common estimation in the place.

When it is established that the speaker or agent truly willed to blaspheme, the matter is clear, since a depraved intention deforms every human act. But if it is not clearly established that the speaker or agent willed to inflict contumely upon God, and indeed it appears rather that he intended something else, then it is necessary to attend to the natural sense of the words and especially to the common estimation prevailing in the place. According to the natural sense of words, it is blasphemy if a) something true is denied of God or something false is imputed to Him; for example, the following expressions are blasphemies: God is not just; God is cruel; God does not care for me; b) some divine attribute is attributed to a creature; for example, if someone says: I can do this as well as God; or if a lover seriously calls his beloved a Goddess. Commonly, however, expressions of this kind are rather exaggerations and are not seriously intended; nevertheless, they are always diligently to be avoided, as is evident of itself; c) if someone utters things contumelious against the Church founded by Christ, against the sacraments, against the worship of God, etc.

But especially to be attended to is the common estimation prevailing in the place; for blasphemous words are often truncated: in one place they are held as blasphemous, but in another they are not. Thus, for example, the Dutch words "God dom" were held in former times as blasphemous, but now this acceptance is already ceasing. Whether the same is to be said of the similar English expression "God damn," I do not dare to affirm; for it seems to be blasphemy. The German expressions "Tausend Sakrament" [a thousand sacraments] and "Tausend Herrgott" [a thousand Lord Gods], as also the French expression "Mille noms de Dieu" [a thousand names of God], according to common estimation are not blasphemies, but vain uses of a sacred thing. For those who employ such expressions by no means intend or understand that there are a thousand sacraments, a thousand Gods, or a thousand names of God.

S. Th. II-II, q. 13.

781. Blasphemy (blapto, I injure; pheme, fame), etymologically signifies malediction and insult against someone (I Cor. IV, 13), and therefore is used to signify derogation from some excellent goodness; but in the sense of the holy Fathers and Theologians, only speech insulting to God is so called. It is said:

1. Speech or signification, and thus it is distinguished from infidelity, which is a judgment, and from sacrilege (and simony), which is an unworthy treatment of a sacred thing. Moreover, utterance happens in various modes, and therefore on the part of the act, blasphemy is internal, of the heart (by a nod, as among demons), and external, which is either of the mouth, when it is done by spoken or written words, or of work, when it is done by sign, deed, or gesture, as if someone gnashes his teeth against God, spits toward heaven, tramples Christ, sacred images, crucifixes, casts blood toward heaven, etc. Hence sacrilege is also blasphemy, if in the deed of violation of the sacred thing there is at the same time signification, or a certain real speech against God.

2. Against God, and thus it is distinguished from insult and malediction against one's neighbor and against other creatures. Blasphemy, namely, is an act against faith, religion, and God, either in himself, or through creatures, insofar as they express an order to God: "for just as God is praised in his saints insofar as the works which God effects in the saints are praised, so also blasphemy which is done against the saints consequently redounds against God" (a. 1, ad 2). Hence on the part of the object or term, blasphemy is immediate or mediate.

3. Insulting, by which, namely, something is detracted from the excellence or honor of the divine majesty, and thus it is distinguished from perjury, which is speech invocative of divine testimony. But since God is present everywhere, every speech against him is an insult; hence blasphemy can also be diverse according to the diverse mode by which insult is inflicted, as we are now to explain.

782. Diverse modes of blaspheming. - Therefore, on the part of the mode by which insult is inflicted, blasphemy can be enunciative, dishonoring, or imprecative.

1. Enunciative blasphemy happens:

a) by affirming of God what does not belong to him, for example, that he is unjust, the author of evils, cruel, that he punishes unjustly, has forgotten me, is a tyrant, etc.;

b) by denying to God what belongs to him, such as omnipotence, providence, justice, knowledge, for example, by saying that not all things are well ordered but could have been done better in creation, that God does not will or cannot help us, does not care for our affairs, that one will do something against God's will ("whether God wills or does not will, I will do this"), by denying God or the sacraments, etc.;

c) by ascribing to creatures what is proper to God alone: for since everything proper to God is God, by this very fact God is said to be a creature and that which is proper to him is denied, for example, by saying: I can do this as well as God; by seriously calling a mistress a goddess, one's whole and only good, one's beatitude; by swearing by false gods; by calling the devil holy, omnipotent, more faithful, more powerful (a. 1, ad 3).

But if something contrary to faith is affirmed, or something pertaining to faith is denied, the blasphemy is heretical.

2. Dishonoring blasphemy happens:

a) by affirming or denying something of God with truth, but in an insulting mode through contempt or mockery, for example, by reproaching Christ because he suffered and died, by naming his shameful members, "Thou hast conquered, O Galilean," "Hail, king of the Jews," "Vah, thou who destroyest the temple of God"; or by cursing through all these things, for example, "may the blood, wounds, death, head, passion, sacraments, chrism of Christ destroy thee"; or by bringing Scripture to foul things: for all those things were instituted not for destroying but for saving;

b) not by affirming, but by naming holy things shamefully and contemptuously, that is, from anger, not indeed against creatures, but against God or religion, after the mode of one being indignant at them or contemning them, for example, "God!"; the name of God, the members, blood of Christ; the sacraments, the saints; "vah! the power of God"; to swear mockingly by the members of Christ; "I despise God with my whole heart," etc.

3. Imprecative blasphemy is when evil is wished or cursed upon God, or even commanded, for example, that he perish, not exist, die, be damned, not punish sins, not be omnipotent; "to the contempt of God!"; "may it displease God!" If such a thing is done from the soul, it proceeds from hatred of God and is the blasphemy of the damned and of the worst men.

All the aforesaid modes are reduced to the two former: falsely to affirm or deny concerning God. For dishonoring blasphemy implicitly says that there is in God something blameworthy which is not blameworthy, or denies that something is worthy which is worthy. Imprecative blasphemy implicitly affirms of God that something is possible which cannot be, or that something is fitting which is not fitting.

783. The diverse intention of the blasphemer. - On the part of intention, blasphemy is direct or perfect, which is done with affective detestation or the express intention of dishonoring God, and proceeds from hatred of God, from anger and indignation against God (and religion), from contempt, etc.; and indirect, which is done without an express but with an implicit intention of dishonoring God, when someone voluntarily utters words which, according to the judgment of his intellect, he knows, either from their proper signification, or from the mode of uttering them or other circumstances, to imply dishonor of God (a. 1). Hence if someone from custom, from anger against creatures, from jest, after the manner of an interjection, pronounces blasphemous words, he commits the sin of blasphemy; except if it happens from jest that the words are not held by others as blasphemous, or if they are uttered merely narratively.

784. Blasphemy is a sin at the same time against faith and religion. - For:

a) It is opposed to the confession of faith: for either it is heretical and explicitly says something against faith; or at least it says implicitly that God or a sacred thing is blameworthy, or that in God there is something worthy of insult. Namely, someone can sin against confession of faith even by stating nothing against faith, namely, by signifying by his mode of speaking that he does not believe, or by speaking as if he did not believe.¹

¹ Cf. Lumbreras, in Angelicum, 1937.

b) It is also directly opposed to the honor and praise which are owed to God, and thus contains dishonor and irreverence against the virtue of religion.

Hence all blasphemies, even heretical ones, do not differ in species under the aspect of blasphemy; but sometimes other species are added, such as heresy, hatred of God, despair, which then must be declared in confession.

But if the speech is insulting against creatures, if they are considered formally with relation to God, insofar as they are his creatures, as easily happens for wind, rain, thunder, heaven, the whole world (for example, "cursed be the rain of God"...), and almost always for those things which per se express relation to God, such as Christian faith, the sacraments, the saints, our soul, etc., the insult necessarily redounds against God, their author. Indeed, since blasphemers generally do not intend to affect those things with injury on account of their own excellence, but only mediately insofar as they are referred to God, there is not a sin against dulia, but against religion and faith alone. - But if the saints were considered not as saints, but in themselves, formally abstracting from relation to God, insofar as they are men, it would be a sin against dulia alone owed to the saints, light if it is done from jest (for example, by calling St. Crispin a vile shoemaker, St. Peter bald, Saints John and Paul eunuchs), grave if it proceeded from anger, indignation, contempt, or hatred against them.

To curse other creatures considered in themselves, if they are rational, is injurious to them; if irrational, it is vain and idle. To curse the devil is not evil, except sometimes per accidens by reason of scandal.

785. Blasphemy is a mortal sin from its whole genus: for no insult against God can be small (Lev. XXIV, 15-16; Is. XXXVI; IV Kings XVIII, XIX; Tob. I, 21; II Mach. XV; I Tim. I, 20; Col. III, 8).

Indeed it is called most grave, in an absolute sense, that is, very grave; taken abstractly insofar as it is opposed to religion alone and implies only the dishonor of God, it is less grave than hatred of God, infidelity, despair, and idolatry; but graver than perjury (which affirms nothing false against God, but only makes him a witness of falsity) and than homicide (which is only against one's neighbor). But if it is considered in the concrete, it supposes and includes the malice of infidelity or hatred of God and adds something to them, and thus it is graver than they, so that the greatest blasphemy is graver than the greatest infidelity or the greatest hatred of God.

Therefore, on the part of the object, only idolatry surpasses it, which otherwise contains great blasphemy.

On the part of the sinner, however, it is often graver than idolatry.

On the part of the effect, it is less than homicide: for homicide harms man more than blasphemy harms God.

786. A voluntary custom or habit of blaspheming is evil because it proximately inclines to sin; hence there is an obligation of removing it, and he sins gravely who voluntarily acquires such a habit or neglects to eliminate it. He sins internally and as to affection as often as, noticing the obligation of retracting the habit, he does not retract it; externally and as to effect as often as, from habit, he utters sufficiently foreseen blasphemies by morally distinct acts.

He who blasphemes from custom:

a) either utters blasphemous words advertently, and then the blasphemy is voluntary and culpable in itself;

b) or he does not attend to the words uttered, and then the speech which externally sounds like blasphemy is voluntary and culpable in its cause, namely, the custom, as was said;

c) but if he has efficaciously retracted the custom, it is neither voluntary in the cause, nor a sin.

The custom is retracted by a will by which someone grieves over it and proposes to himself to employ means for removing it (which, on account of usefulness, should be renewed several times); but if after the resolution he has not employed the means, the custom again becomes indirectly voluntary for him, because he shows that he does not will to remove it.

787. Practical rules. - 1. Formulas are not blasphemous which by their proper signification can be insulting against God, but are either greatly changed or corrupted, or halved or defective, or at least are not held by men as blasphemous. Such are the expressions: merdie, mordie, lardie, jarnidie, sernidie, ventredie, sacredjen, non de domme, verdomd, podverdomme, sacre non, sakristi, sapristi, sangbleu, morbleu, non di hu, non de djouw, godvernondedomme, godvernondedju, saterment.

2. On the contrary, formulas are blasphemous which of themselves, by proper signification, do not contain insult against God, but either from the mode of uttering the name of God ironically or with contempt or in anger against God; or even from common acceptance are held as such. Such formerly was the Flemish expression G. v. D., which signifies according to some: "God damn," according to others: "God damn me" (which is a mortal imprecation if said seriously, venial if said with levity, as ordinarily happens), whose true signification it is necessary to teach the non-blaspheming people by mandate of the Bishops of Belgium (October 1903).

3. Equivocal formulas which can have a blasphemous and a non-blasphemous sense are blasphemous or not according to the intention of the speaker or at least of the hearers, for example, mort-Dieu, ventre-Dieu, hoc est a fato destinatum, c'est fatalite, het is alzoo dat het moest zijn. Hence they are not blasphemous if they are generally not held as such by men, for example, in Belgium: tausend sakrament, tausend Herr Gott, mille Dieu, mille nom de Dieu, milliard de nom de Dieu, sacre mille Dieu.

4. In doubt whether a formula is blasphemous, one must attend to the intention and conscience of the one uttering it, and to the circumstances.

5. The French formula S. N. de D. (S. D.) of itself is equivocal, because the word sacre has a double sense: in its primary and obvious sense it indeed signifies "blessed"; but in a secondary signification by antiphrasis it can signify "cursed" or "execrable," as happens in interjections and formulas: sacree bete, sacre coquin, menteur, bougre, matin, sacre cure, sacre fils, sacree pluie. Hence the formula S. N. de D. can have a pious sense, and a blasphemous sense, which sense it in fact has if it is pronounced from anger or indignation, not indeed against creatures, but against God. Originally it seems to have been promissory: "I swear by the sacred name of God." But that sense is no longer perceived by all; indeed by some the formula is taken in a blasphemous sense, whether they hold it as signifying: "execrable be the name of God," or themselves attribute to it no determined sense but in a confused way conceive it as a great blasphemy; which also often happens concerning the formula S. D., although for this one the persuasion is less firm. Yet this estimation does not exist by right and is not correct, since these formulas can have a good sense.

Wherefore in practice preachers and confessors should teach: a) that the blasphemous sense is not the only and sole necessary sense, and especially that it is not: "God is cursed"; b) that the formula is not blasphemous if it is not uttered from an evil intention, or from anger and indignation against God, but only after the manner of a simple interjection or from anger against creatures; c) that nevertheless one must abstain from it, both because it includes venial irreverence toward God, and lest there be scandal to others.

Question 1. Is it necessarily to be opened in confession whether the blasphemy was direct or indirect, immediate or mediate?

Response. Negatively, probably, for just as for blasphemy to be direct is only an aggravating circumstance, so to be mediate is only a diminishing one, but the specific malice is the same in either case. But if the blasphemy was heretical, that must certainly be opened, because then besides the virtue of religion, faith is injured. - Cf. Baller., note (c), p. 291, and note (a), p. 293.

Question 2. Is it blasphemy to curse creatures?

Response. It is certainly blasphemy to curse creatures with relation to God, for example, rain or winds, as commanded by God, or with the word God added; likewise to curse a creature which of itself has a special relation to God, for example, our soul, the Catholic faith, heaven, and similar things. But one must speak otherwise if indignation is directed toward creatures without relation to God. Wherefore that formula accustomed to be employed by our people, "God damn your soul," whether "to hell" is added or not, of itself is blasphemous. Indeed, besides the malice of blasphemy it also contains another specific malice against charity. I said of itself, for often each malice is lacking, because the soul is not usurped as a creature in which divine goodness shines forth in a special way, and because there is not an affection or desire of harming one's neighbor. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 128. - Kenrick, n. 44.

You Will Resolve. It is greatly to be commended to the faithful that they associate themselves with those Sodalities which in a special way turn members away from blasphemy and other sinful modes of speaking of this kind, such as, for example, is the Society named from the Most Holy Name.

Blasphemy is a Greek word signifying the same as in Latin malediction. It is taken by theologians for a malediction detracting from the excellency of goodness, especially divine goodness. Hence I say 1°: Blasphemy can be defined⁴⁷: « A speaking of the heart or of the mouth by which, in the manner of an insult, something is said derogating from the excellency of the divine goodness. » Or more briefly: « A contumelious utterance against God. » ⁴⁷ This q. 13, a. 1, o.

It is explained. It is said 1° « of the heart or of the mouth; » because we speak with both, and the demons, who speak only in mind, blaspheme.

It is said 2° « in the manner of an insult. » By this it is distinguished from simple infidelity, which consists in assent against the faith. For blasphemy does not require assent against the faith, but it suffices that something be said of God in the manner of an insult.

Nor is there required for this, mark well, an explicit and express intention of insulting and dishonoring God, but virtual and implicit suffices, insofar as by words, or by the manner of pronouncing them, according to the common apprehension, God is dishonored and contemned. Hence I do not assent to those who say that it is not blasphemy but only a vain use of the divine name, when someone, out of indignation against man, not against God, utters his head, his death, his blood, and the like. For those words so pronounced are contumelious to God, though uttered on occasion of another. Consequently there is there a virtual and implicit intention of dishonoring God. And otherwise blasphemies would be exceedingly rare, whereas they are reckoned most frequent. Hence St. Thomas, this a. 2, ad 3, says that he who suddenly breaks out into blasphemous words from some passion, adverting to their signification, commits mortal blasphemy; but he who utters these and the like words not only contumeliously, but either recitatively, or historically, is not a blasphemer: whence special attention must be given to the manner of pronouncing.

It is said « derogating from the excellency of the divine goodness. » And this is done not only when something contumelious is said directly against God, but also against the saints and sacred things; not indeed per se (for thus it would not be properly blasphemy, but the vice of irreligion, opposed to dulia), but with some relation at least virtual to God. For just as, says the Author, God is praised in his saints, insofar as the works which God works in the saints are praised, so also blasphemy committed against the saints redounds consequently to God. Therefore he who would say that St. Peter was impious and damned, that the Blessed Virgin was a harlot, would be a blasphemer. But he who spoke of them, not as saints, but as they were men on earth, e. g., if he called St. Peter bald, St. Crispin a shoemaker, would not be properly a blasphemer, since here there is no respect to God. But if he uttered these things out of hatred and indignation, he would sin mortally against dulia and the observance due to the saints; if however out of jest or levity, it would be venial sin.

Therefore blasphemy is committed: 1° by denying to God what befits him, or asserting of him what does not befit him: and this whether it be done enuntiatively, optatively, imperatively, or in imperfect speech; 2° by attributing to him what befits him, but mockingly and as something blameworthy, as by naming contemptuously the members of Christ and of the saints; 3° by attributing to a creature what is proper to God, as omnipotence; 4° by deeds equivalent to contumelious words, as spitting upon a crucifix.

I say 2°: Blasphemy is divided into heretical and non-heretical⁴⁸. Heretical is that which asserts something contrary to the faith, or denies something pertaining to the faith. Non-heretical is that by which, although nothing openly contrary to the faith is contained, nevertheless the things that are of faith are uttered contemptuously and contumeliously, as if they were blameworthy. ⁴⁸ Ibid., o.

I say 3°: Blasphemy is of its genus the gravest mortal sin⁴⁹, nor can it become venial from smallness of matter, but only from involuntary indeliberateness of the act. ⁴⁹ Ibid., a. 2, c. et ad 3.

The first part is clear, 1° from the gravest punishments by which it is punished⁵⁰. In the old law, Lev., XXIV, 16, the blasphemer was stoned. In canon law several punishments are established against blasphemers; and if they despise these, they are to be deprived of ecclesiastical burial, cap. Statutum, tit. de maledicis, lib. V Decretal., and elsewhere. 2° Because it gravely repugns charity, since it is against the excellency of the divine goodness; likewise it is opposed to faith and religion, as I shall say presently. ⁵⁰ Ibid., in arg. Sed contra.

The second part is also clear; because, however slight anything may be per se, that God should be dishonored and held in contempt is always the gravest evil.

The third part is clear in like manner; because in every species of sin involuntary indeliberateness excuses from the whole or grave sin, because from it it comes about that the act is not perfectly human.

I said « involuntary indeliberateness; » because, if it arise from a habit which the blasphemer does not care to eradicate as far as he can, it does not excuse from mortal sin, because it is voluntary in its cause, namely in that voluntary habit. Let confessors attend to this.

You will ask against what virtue blasphemy is opposed.

I answer. Insofar as it contains implicitly or explicitly something false concerning God, it is opposed to the confession of faith; insofar as it is a dishonoring of God, it is opposed to religion, whose formal object is worship, honor rendered to God.

I. Various definitions of blasphemy are given by the Doctors, all of which nonetheless amount to the same thing, and convey the same sense. St. Augustine (Bk. II, Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets, ch. 11) gives an extended discourse on blasphemy, and describes it in these words: "What, then, is blasphemy, but when evil things are said of things good? Now blasphemy is commonly understood as nothing other than to speak evil of God." St. Thomas (II-II, q. 13, art. 1) defines it more precisely: Blasphemy is a derogation of the divine goodness. This can occur in two ways. First, by attributing to God what he neither has, nor could have. Second, by removing from him what he cannot lack. This can occur either by the intellect alone, or accompanied also by a depraved affection of the will. If it remains in the heart alone, it will be blasphemy of the heart; if it breaks out into words, it will be blasphemy of the mouth. When this wickedness is conceived only in the mind, by attributing to, or removing from, God something in the manner described, it is opposed to unformed confession of faith; if a wicked affection of the heart is added, it is opposed to faith formed by charity.

II. It should be noted, following Cajetan's commentary on this article, that derogation of the divine goodness can occur in three ways. First, by the intellect alone, holding a false opinion about God. Second, by adding to this false opinion the will's detestation. Third, finally, without a false opinion, exercising the will's detestation alone — as most often happens among Christians, whether the blasphemy remains internal, or breaks out into external words. For someone, believing God to be omnipotent, can nonetheless wish to say, in order to insult God, that God cannot do this or that. Finally, the sin of unbelief is opposed to faith; but blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith, not to faith by its very nature. Blasphemy, properly speaking, consists in words. As for what St. Paul says (Titus 1): "They confess that they know God, but in their works they deny him," and St. Peter (2 Peter 2): "By whom the way of truth shall be evil spoken of," these do not express blasphemy properly so called.

III. The common division of blasphemy is into heretical and simple. Heretical blasphemy is that whereby, with the mind's assent, something is attributed to God, or something proper to him is removed from him — as, for instance, if someone blurts out that God is unjust, or that he is not omnipotent. Simple blasphemy is that whereby, without the mind's assent, but only through the perversity of the will, something is attributed to, or imprecated against, God — as if someone says, "Cursed be God." Theologians commonly teach that heretical blasphemy is committed when such propositions are asserted, and simple blasphemy when they are merely imprecated. But note that blasphemy would by no means be heretical unless the propositions "God is unjust," "God is a fool," and the like are asserted with pertinacity, and with the mind's actual assent. It scarcely happens, however, except through slip of the tongue, that such propositions are asserted without the mind's assent; the external forum, then, would condemn such a person as guilty of heresy — since judgment on internal matters is reserved to God alone.

IV. Blasphemy is further divided into that which is against God, and that which is against the Saints. The former is opposed immediately to God; the latter concerns the Saints. Moreover, blasphemy can be enunciative — as when someone says, "I wish to do this to injure God"; detestative — as if someone says, "May God perish"; derisive — as, "Ha, may the temple of God be destroyed"; and finally, injurious — as when someone blasphemes while swearing, "May God perish, if..."

V. Question I. Does blasphemy against God differ in species from that against the Saints? Response: The theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 13, punct. 10, n. 124) deny this, along with Sánchez, Azor, Bonacina, and others — citing in support Cajetan, Bañez, Diana, and others. Their reason is that blasphemy is a sin opposed to religion; and religion is one virtue. Therefore there is but one species of blasphemy. They confirm this by the parallel of an oath, which is of one species, whether one swears by God or by the Saints.

VI. The opposite opinion seems to me more probable. For although several vices may be opposed to a single virtue, they can nonetheless differ in species among themselves. Moreover, that the aforesaid two forms of blasphemy differ in species is proven from the very definition of blasphemy itself. For blasphemy is a derogation of the divine goodness. But divine goodness is not univocal to God and to the Saints; rather, the goodness that is in God differs by more than mere kind from the goodness that is in the Saints. The former is infinite, the latter finite; the latter created, the former uncreated. Moreover, blasphemy is opposed to the honor and worship owed to the person against whom it is hurled. But the worship owed to God differs by more than species from the worship owed to any creature. The worship due to God is latria; the worship due to the Saints is dulia, and to the Blessed Virgin, hyperdulia. Now these forms of worship differ by more than mere species. Therefore so do the corresponding forms of blasphemy. Finally, the definition of blasphemy applies, per se and primarily, to the injury done to God, and only secondarily to that done to the other Saints. This is defended by Sánchez (Bk. IV, q. 9), Fr. Paolo Comitoli, Leander (tract. 1, q. 19), where he cites in support Aragón, Hurtado, and others.

VII. Fr. Suárez (Vol. I, On Religion, tract. 4, Bk. 1, ch. 6, n. 19) most excellently adds that, whatever the case may be, this much is certainly true: that it must be explained in confession whether one's blasphemies were against God, against the Virgin, or against the Saints. This is likewise admitted by the aforesaid theologians of Salamanca, together with Sánchez, Bonacina, and others. Wherefore the excessive laxity of Fr. Tommaso Tamburini, who writes as follows (Bk. II, Method of Confession, ch. 3), cannot be tolerated: "Although it is more probable, with Suárez and Sánchez, that blasphemies against God, against the Blessed Virgin, and against the Saints differ in species, it being probable nonetheless, following Azor as cited in Diana, that they do not differ, it will suffice if the number of blasphemies is disclosed in confession; nor will it be necessary to explain... whether they were against God, or the Blessed Virgin, or the Saints."

I. Question I. Is blasphemy, by its very kind, a mortal sin? Response: The common opinion affirms this. Since blasphemy is opposed to the divine goodness, and to charity toward God. "Whatever," says the Angelic Doctor (II-II, q. 13, art. 2), "is repugnant to charity is, by its very kind, a mortal sin." But blasphemy, by its very kind, is repugnant to divine charity, since it derogates the divine goodness. St. Thomas confirms his view by the authority of Sacred Scripture: "Whoever shall blaspheme the name of the Lord, dying let him die" (Lev. 24). Now the penalty of death is not inflicted except for a mortal crime. Blasphemy, then, will never, on the side of its matter, be a venial sin — since this matter admits of no degree of smallness — though one blasphemy, within the genus of mortal crime, may be graver than another. St. Augustine (Bk. Against Lying, ch. 19) writes this of blasphemy: "It is worse to blaspheme than to perjure oneself; for in perjury, God is called falsely as witness to a matter; but in blaspheming, false things are said of God himself. And the more inexcusable is anyone, whether perjurer or blasphemer, the more they knew, or believe, that what they assert, in perjuring or blaspheming, is false."

II. St. John Chrysostom (Homily 95 on the Psalms): "Nothing is more impious than blasphemy against God" — and on the Apostle's words, "Use a little wine" (1 Tim. 5): "Nothing is worse than blasphemy; no good is equal to the act of thanksgiving." St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 8, ch. 7): "Blasphemy," he says, "is a most grave sin." And the reason, following St. Thomas, is that blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith, and therefore carries the gravity of unbelief — a gravity increased still further if the detestation of the will is added, and increased yet further if it breaks out into words — just as the merit of faith is increased through confession and love. Whence, since unbelief is, by its very kind, the greatest of sins, so too is blasphemy. Hence the Gloss on Isaiah 18 says that every sin, compared to blasphemy, is lighter; and indeed, as regards the object of the sin, it is graver than homicide, since blasphemy is directly against God, while homicide is against one's neighbor.

III. Question II. Is blasphemy the greatest of all sins? Response: The theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 13, punct. 10, n. 121) deny that blasphemy is, by its very kind, the gravest of sins, and teach that it is lighter than heresy, hatred of God, and despair; and they contend that this is the common opinion of St. Thomas and of theologians. What ought, in my judgment, to be said on this, I will briefly explain.

IV. Perfect blasphemy, which involves an error of the intellect together with hatred, or detestation, of the divine goodness, is the greatest of all crimes — since, under this consideration, it is opposed both to faith and to charity, and is the proper sin of the damned. Blasphemy that arises from hatred of God, even without including the error of heresy, is opposed to charity, and is worse than heresy — since charity is a more perfect virtue than unformed faith. Finally, blasphemy, by its very kind, is graver than heresy itself. For although it does not involve a false assent of the intellect, it nonetheless involves a wicked will toward God, and includes unbelief, and increases it, as St. Thomas teaches (art. 3): "Blasphemy... has in it the gravity of unbelief; and the sin is aggravated if the will's detestation is added; and still more, if it breaks out into words — just as the merit of faith is increased through love and confession. Whence, since unbelief is, by its very kind, the greatest sin, it follows that blasphemy too is the greatest sin, belonging to that same genus, and aggravating it." St. Thomas is speaking here of blasphemy according to its kind. This opinion is defended by St. Antoninus (loc. cit.), Navarrus (in his Summa, ch. 12, n. 51), Trovamala (s.v. Blasphemia, n. 4), Armilla (s.v. Blasphemia, n. 2), Comitoli (Bk. 4, q. 9, ch. 5).

V. Question III. Does one who blasphemes out of an inveterate custom and wicked habit sin? Response: The laxity of certain casuists on this question inspires horror. Fr. Tommaso Tamburini writes as follows (Bk. II, On the Decalogue, ch. 7, §4, n. 17): "Words against God uttered in drunkenness, or in madness, or through inadvertence arising from an inveterate custom, are not blasphemous in the least." He teaches the same in Bk. III, Method of Confession, ch. 3, §3, q. 22.

VI. Leander a Santissimo Sacramento (tract. 1, on oaths, disp. 5, q. 17) copies out this exceedingly lax opinion of Tamburini's, and teaches it in these words: "When one blasphemes out of habit, without full and sufficient awareness of committing a mortal sin, he does not then commit a new mortal sin, but has sinned only in the cause, insofar as he did not remove the habit, to which he did pay attention." He cites, in support of this opinion, Bonacina, Filliucci, Toledo, Sánchez, Tamburini, and others.

VII. Question IV. Does one who blasphemes inadvertently, and who is so habitually disposed that even were he to notice, he would still blaspheme, sin mortally? Response: Hear Leander, declaring this probable with the utmost and most horrifying laxity: "New words must be found to express this unheard-of kind of doctrine. I answer that it is probable — indeed more than probable — that he does not sin mortally by an actual sin in this proposed case. For in order for someone to sin actually, and to commit a new sin, it does not suffice that he be habitually disposed, and prone, to sin; it is necessarily required that he be actually, and in a 'second act,' [conscious of it]; for God, as St. Augustine says against the Semipelagians, does not impute to us what we would do, if this or that occasion arose, but what we actually do. Otherwise, men given to lust or avarice, who, given the opportunity, would give their consent to these sins, would always be actually sinning — which is altogether false." He cites, for this lax opinion of his, Valentia, Sánchez, Filliucci, Layman, Trullench, and others. See our second Theological-Moral Letter, and the Decree of the Holy Office against the book of a certain young author, containing false and scandalous propositions — among which, in my own judgment, are those defending unchaste touches, and blasphemies uttered out of inveterate habit, as though lawful.

VIII. Who could read, or transcribe, such things without feeling a certain indignation rise within him? Are we at fault, if, to arouse a similar hatred against such teachings, we ourselves have been somewhat harsh and bitter in tone? Such things, indeed, deserve rejection more by detestation than by mere refutation. This author, to shield his own laxities, calls upon Augustine himself as his patron, and does not blush to foist upon so great a Doctor so monstrous an error. What has the Semipelagian heresy concerning conditional sins to do with this matter? Is this good faith, in citing the Fathers — neither the word, nor the place, indicated? Is the present discussion not about future conditional matters? Is not the question proposed rather about one who actually blasphemes inadvertently, out of habit? Does one who fornicates out of inadvertent lust go free of the guilt of fornication? What, then, does he mean by claiming it follows from this that a man given to lust is always actually sinning, because, given the opportunity, he would give his consent? Do we say that one animated by a spirit of blasphemy does not actually break out into blasphemy?

IX. We answer this little question briefly: one who, from habit not removed or renounced through penance, utters blasphemous words — however inconsiderately and inadvertently — is guilty of blasphemy. For the inconsiderate utterance of blasphemy is voluntary in that habitual disposition toward blaspheming, even if the person would notice it were he to attend to it. The sin, then, is not conditional, but absolute; and an indirect and interpretive voluntariness is present, as theologians of the schools put it. Now for sinning, an indirect voluntariness suffices. Therefore, whoever is accustomed to blasphemy, and does not strive to root out the custom, sins — even though he does not realize that he is blaspheming. For one bound by a wicked habit, who does not detest it, has an implicit deliberation. He sins, then, a mortal sin, as often as he blasphemes — even if he does not advert his mind to the blasphemy, whether through a fit of anger, or through the inclination of that same habit. But one who is not accustomed to blaspheme, and who, through a slip of the tongue, utters a blasphemous word without attending to its sense — such that, had he attended to it, he certainly would not have uttered such words — does not sin, at least not gravely, since the blasphemy will then be merely material. One who repents of the habit of blaspheming, and who labors to root out the custom, if, with no prior thought at all, he should fall into blasphemy, will sin only lightly.

X. Question V. Does jest remove from blasphemy the character of a mortal sin? Response: The common opinion draws a distinction. If the jest does not remove from the blasphemy the character of an insult, or of irreverence toward God, it will always be a mortal sin. If the jest is such that, all things considered, it removes from the blasphemy the character of an insult and a reviling of God, then it will not be a mortal sin. So teaches Leander (q. 14), citing in support of this opinion Castropalao, Tamburini, Bassaeus, Sánchez, and others.

XI. This distinction seems to me empty and worthless. Is it permissible to jest and trifle with God, and against God, and to utter blasphemous words for the sake of amusement? Can jest strip blasphemy of every character of insult and reviling against the divine majesty? On the contrary, jest does not diminish, but increases, the wickedness of blasphemy: for, in my own opinion, one who deliberately, for the sake of a jest, breaks out into blasphemous... words sins worse than one who blasphemes out of anger, or some other passion. For what could be more wicked than to tear apart the majesty of God with blasphemous and insulting words purely for the sake of a jest? What, indeed, is more contrary to reason than to say that blasphemies and insults against God, because uttered in jest, diminish the guilt of the offense? This holds true, in my view, when someone with deliberate mind twists real blasphemy against God. It is otherwise when someone utters words which, taken strictly, smack of blasphemy, but which, according to common understanding, are not blasphemous — as when men call some woman a "goddess," their own "divine one." For although it would be an enormous blasphemy to attribute to a creature what belongs to God alone, such expressions are nonetheless universally regarded as mere hyperbole, and are in no way considered blasphemy. Men ought nonetheless to abstain from them, and should be ashamed to dignify the lowest of all rational animals with such a title.

XII. It is worth exposing another of Leander's laxities, especially since he falsely attributes it to St. Thomas himself. This author writes as follows (q. 16): "But if someone blasphemes somewhat, following the judgment of reason, yet not fully and altogether deliberately, he will then sin, but only venially — even in the case where the lack of full deliberation arose from an unjust and unlawful cause. So Navarrus, following St. Thomas, II-II, q. 13, art. 2." Leander here misrepresents both Navarrus and St. Thomas. For Navarrus is speaking of one who blasphemes out of an anger that forestalls all use of reason — and it is for this opinion that he cites St. Thomas — not of one who, in some way aware that he is blaspheming, neglects to restrain his tongue; for in that case, on account of his negligence in restraining his tongue and attending to so grave a matter, and on account of his failure to remove the unlawful cause of his inconsideration, he sins gravely, as has been said above.

II. It is likewise blasphemy to declare the devil omnipotent, or holy. To call a beloved girl a "goddess," as we have already said, is not commonly blasphemy, since no real divinity is attributed to her; such expressions are nonetheless unworthy. Free of the guilt of blasphemy, likewise, are these words: "I was born under this fate," or "It was fated to be so" — since this manner of speaking by no means denies contingent events, nor implies absolute necessity, but the common sense is that it was so ordained by God to happen, human freedom remaining unharmed. Not blasphemous, either, are such expressions as "May it please God," "By the power of God," "God's will be done" — since those who utter these words do not mock, but admire, God's power. Many also deny that this is blasphemy: "In spite of that goat who feeds and sustains me in this world" — meaning, in Latin, "In defiance of that billy-goat who feeds and sustains me, I shall act thus in this world." This locution, however, seems to me to carry, though indefinitely, a strong presumption of blasphemy — for he alone who nourishes and sustains men in the world is God.