Chapter IV — On the gravity of blasphemy, and on blasphemies arising from habit and from anger

I. Question I. Is blasphemy, by its very kind, a mortal sin? Response: The common opinion affirms this. Since blasphemy is opposed to the divine goodness, and to charity toward God. "Whatever," says the Angelic Doctor (II-II, q. 13, art. 2), "is repugnant to charity is, by its very kind, a mortal sin." But blasphemy, by its very kind, is repugnant to divine charity, since it derogates the divine goodness. St. Thomas confirms his view by the authority of Sacred Scripture: "Whoever shall blaspheme the name of the Lord, dying let him die" (Lev. 24). Now the penalty of death is not inflicted except for a mortal crime. Blasphemy, then, will never, on the side of its matter, be a venial sin — since this matter admits of no degree of smallness — though one blasphemy, within the genus of mortal crime, may be graver than another. St. Augustine (Bk. Against Lying, ch. 19) writes this of blasphemy: "It is worse to blaspheme than to perjure oneself; for in perjury, God is called falsely as witness to a matter; but in blaspheming, false things are said of God himself. And the more inexcusable is anyone, whether perjurer or blasphemer, the more they knew, or believe, that what they assert, in perjuring or blaspheming, is false."

II. St. John Chrysostom (Homily 95 on the Psalms): "Nothing is more impious than blasphemy against God" — and on the Apostle's words, "Use a little wine" (1 Tim. 5): "Nothing is worse than blasphemy; no good is equal to the act of thanksgiving." St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 8, ch. 7): "Blasphemy," he says, "is a most grave sin." And the reason, following St. Thomas, is that blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith, and therefore carries the gravity of unbelief — a gravity increased still further if the detestation of the will is added, and increased yet further if it breaks out into words — just as the merit of faith is increased through confession and love. Whence, since unbelief is, by its very kind, the greatest of sins, so too is blasphemy. Hence the Gloss on Isaiah 18 says that every sin, compared to blasphemy, is lighter; and indeed, as regards the object of the sin, it is graver than homicide, since blasphemy is directly against God, while homicide is against one's neighbor.

III. Question II. Is blasphemy the greatest of all sins? Response: The theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 13, punct. 10, n. 121) deny that blasphemy is, by its very kind, the gravest of sins, and teach that it is lighter than heresy, hatred of God, and despair; and they contend that this is the common opinion of St. Thomas and of theologians. What ought, in my judgment, to be said on this, I will briefly explain.

IV. Perfect blasphemy, which involves an error of the intellect together with hatred, or detestation, of the divine goodness, is the greatest of all crimes — since, under this consideration, it is opposed both to faith and to charity, and is the proper sin of the damned. Blasphemy that arises from hatred of God, even without including the error of heresy, is opposed to charity, and is worse than heresy — since charity is a more perfect virtue than unformed faith. Finally, blasphemy, by its very kind, is graver than heresy itself. For although it does not involve a false assent of the intellect, it nonetheless involves a wicked will toward God, and includes unbelief, and increases it, as St. Thomas teaches (art. 3): "Blasphemy... has in it the gravity of unbelief; and the sin is aggravated if the will's detestation is added; and still more, if it breaks out into words — just as the merit of faith is increased through love and confession. Whence, since unbelief is, by its very kind, the greatest sin, it follows that blasphemy too is the greatest sin, belonging to that same genus, and aggravating it." St. Thomas is speaking here of blasphemy according to its kind. This opinion is defended by St. Antoninus (loc. cit.), Navarrus (in his Summa, ch. 12, n. 51), Trovamala (s.v. Blasphemia, n. 4), Armilla (s.v. Blasphemia, n. 2), Comitoli (Bk. 4, q. 9, ch. 5).

V. Question III. Does one who blasphemes out of an inveterate custom and wicked habit sin? Response: The laxity of certain casuists on this question inspires horror. Fr. Tommaso Tamburini writes as follows (Bk. II, On the Decalogue, ch. 7, §4, n. 17): "Words against God uttered in drunkenness, or in madness, or through inadvertence arising from an inveterate custom, are not blasphemous in the least." He teaches the same in Bk. III, Method of Confession, ch. 3, §3, q. 22.

VI. Leander a Santissimo Sacramento (tract. 1, on oaths, disp. 5, q. 17) copies out this exceedingly lax opinion of Tamburini's, and teaches it in these words: "When one blasphemes out of habit, without full and sufficient awareness of committing a mortal sin, he does not then commit a new mortal sin, but has sinned only in the cause, insofar as he did not remove the habit, to which he did pay attention." He cites, in support of this opinion, Bonacina, Filliucci, Toledo, Sánchez, Tamburini, and others.

VII. Question IV. Does one who blasphemes inadvertently, and who is so habitually disposed that even were he to notice, he would still blaspheme, sin mortally? Response: Hear Leander, declaring this probable with the utmost and most horrifying laxity: "New words must be found to express this unheard-of kind of doctrine. I answer that it is probable — indeed more than probable — that he does not sin mortally by an actual sin in this proposed case. For in order for someone to sin actually, and to commit a new sin, it does not suffice that he be habitually disposed, and prone, to sin; it is necessarily required that he be actually, and in a 'second act,' [conscious of it]; for God, as St. Augustine says against the Semipelagians, does not impute to us what we would do, if this or that occasion arose, but what we actually do. Otherwise, men given to lust or avarice, who, given the opportunity, would give their consent to these sins, would always be actually sinning — which is altogether false." He cites, for this lax opinion of his, Valentia, Sánchez, Filliucci, Layman, Trullench, and others. See our second Theological-Moral Letter, and the Decree of the Holy Office against the book of a certain young author, containing false and scandalous propositions — among which, in my own judgment, are those defending unchaste touches, and blasphemies uttered out of inveterate habit, as though lawful.

VIII. Who could read, or transcribe, such things without feeling a certain indignation rise within him? Are we at fault, if, to arouse a similar hatred against such teachings, we ourselves have been somewhat harsh and bitter in tone? Such things, indeed, deserve rejection more by detestation than by mere refutation. This author, to shield his own laxities, calls upon Augustine himself as his patron, and does not blush to foist upon so great a Doctor so monstrous an error. What has the Semipelagian heresy concerning conditional sins to do with this matter? Is this good faith, in citing the Fathers — neither the word, nor the place, indicated? Is the present discussion not about future conditional matters? Is not the question proposed rather about one who actually blasphemes inadvertently, out of habit? Does one who fornicates out of inadvertent lust go free of the guilt of fornication? What, then, does he mean by claiming it follows from this that a man given to lust is always actually sinning, because, given the opportunity, he would give his consent? Do we say that one animated by a spirit of blasphemy does not actually break out into blasphemy?

IX. We answer this little question briefly: one who, from habit not removed or renounced through penance, utters blasphemous words — however inconsiderately and inadvertently — is guilty of blasphemy. For the inconsiderate utterance of blasphemy is voluntary in that habitual disposition toward blaspheming, even if the person would notice it were he to attend to it. The sin, then, is not conditional, but absolute; and an indirect and interpretive voluntariness is present, as theologians of the schools put it. Now for sinning, an indirect voluntariness suffices. Therefore, whoever is accustomed to blasphemy, and does not strive to root out the custom, sins — even though he does not realize that he is blaspheming. For one bound by a wicked habit, who does not detest it, has an implicit deliberation. He sins, then, a mortal sin, as often as he blasphemes — even if he does not advert his mind to the blasphemy, whether through a fit of anger, or through the inclination of that same habit. But one who is not accustomed to blaspheme, and who, through a slip of the tongue, utters a blasphemous word without attending to its sense — such that, had he attended to it, he certainly would not have uttered such words — does not sin, at least not gravely, since the blasphemy will then be merely material. One who repents of the habit of blaspheming, and who labors to root out the custom, if, with no prior thought at all, he should fall into blasphemy, will sin only lightly.

X. Question V. Does jest remove from blasphemy the character of a mortal sin? Response: The common opinion draws a distinction. If the jest does not remove from the blasphemy the character of an insult, or of irreverence toward God, it will always be a mortal sin. If the jest is such that, all things considered, it removes from the blasphemy the character of an insult and a reviling of God, then it will not be a mortal sin. So teaches Leander (q. 14), citing in support of this opinion Castropalao, Tamburini, Bassaeus, Sánchez, and others.

XI. This distinction seems to me empty and worthless. Is it permissible to jest and trifle with God, and against God, and to utter blasphemous words for the sake of amusement? Can jest strip blasphemy of every character of insult and reviling against the divine majesty? On the contrary, jest does not diminish, but increases, the wickedness of blasphemy: for, in my own opinion, one who deliberately, for the sake of a jest, breaks out into blasphemous... words sins worse than one who blasphemes out of anger, or some other passion. For what could be more wicked than to tear apart the majesty of God with blasphemous and insulting words purely for the sake of a jest? What, indeed, is more contrary to reason than to say that blasphemies and insults against God, because uttered in jest, diminish the guilt of the offense? This holds true, in my view, when someone with deliberate mind twists real blasphemy against God. It is otherwise when someone utters words which, taken strictly, smack of blasphemy, but which, according to common understanding, are not blasphemous — as when men call some woman a "goddess," their own "divine one." For although it would be an enormous blasphemy to attribute to a creature what belongs to God alone, such expressions are nonetheless universally regarded as mere hyperbole, and are in no way considered blasphemy. Men ought nonetheless to abstain from them, and should be ashamed to dignify the lowest of all rational animals with such a title.

XII. It is worth exposing another of Leander's laxities, especially since he falsely attributes it to St. Thomas himself. This author writes as follows (q. 16): "But if someone blasphemes somewhat, following the judgment of reason, yet not fully and altogether deliberately, he will then sin, but only venially — even in the case where the lack of full deliberation arose from an unjust and unlawful cause. So Navarrus, following St. Thomas, II-II, q. 13, art. 2." Leander here misrepresents both Navarrus and St. Thomas. For Navarrus is speaking of one who blasphemes out of an anger that forestalls all use of reason — and it is for this opinion that he cites St. Thomas — not of one who, in some way aware that he is blaspheming, neglects to restrain his tongue; for in that case, on account of his negligence in restraining his tongue and attending to so grave a matter, and on account of his failure to remove the unlawful cause of his inconsideration, he sins gravely, as has been said above.