Chapter III — On blasphemy: what it is, and how many kinds there are

I. Various definitions of blasphemy are given by the Doctors, all of which nonetheless amount to the same thing, and convey the same sense. St. Augustine (Bk. II, Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets, ch. 11) gives an extended discourse on blasphemy, and describes it in these words: "What, then, is blasphemy, but when evil things are said of things good? Now blasphemy is commonly understood as nothing other than to speak evil of God." St. Thomas (II-II, q. 13, art. 1) defines it more precisely: Blasphemy is a derogation of the divine goodness. This can occur in two ways. First, by attributing to God what he neither has, nor could have. Second, by removing from him what he cannot lack. This can occur either by the intellect alone, or accompanied also by a depraved affection of the will. If it remains in the heart alone, it will be blasphemy of the heart; if it breaks out into words, it will be blasphemy of the mouth. When this wickedness is conceived only in the mind, by attributing to, or removing from, God something in the manner described, it is opposed to unformed confession of faith; if a wicked affection of the heart is added, it is opposed to faith formed by charity.

II. It should be noted, following Cajetan's commentary on this article, that derogation of the divine goodness can occur in three ways. First, by the intellect alone, holding a false opinion about God. Second, by adding to this false opinion the will's detestation. Third, finally, without a false opinion, exercising the will's detestation alone — as most often happens among Christians, whether the blasphemy remains internal, or breaks out into external words. For someone, believing God to be omnipotent, can nonetheless wish to say, in order to insult God, that God cannot do this or that. Finally, the sin of unbelief is opposed to faith; but blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith, not to faith by its very nature. Blasphemy, properly speaking, consists in words. As for what St. Paul says (Titus 1): "They confess that they know God, but in their works they deny him," and St. Peter (2 Peter 2): "By whom the way of truth shall be evil spoken of," these do not express blasphemy properly so called.

III. The common division of blasphemy is into heretical and simple. Heretical blasphemy is that whereby, with the mind's assent, something is attributed to God, or something proper to him is removed from him — as, for instance, if someone blurts out that God is unjust, or that he is not omnipotent. Simple blasphemy is that whereby, without the mind's assent, but only through the perversity of the will, something is attributed to, or imprecated against, God — as if someone says, "Cursed be God." Theologians commonly teach that heretical blasphemy is committed when such propositions are asserted, and simple blasphemy when they are merely imprecated. But note that blasphemy would by no means be heretical unless the propositions "God is unjust," "God is a fool," and the like are asserted with pertinacity, and with the mind's actual assent. It scarcely happens, however, except through slip of the tongue, that such propositions are asserted without the mind's assent; the external forum, then, would condemn such a person as guilty of heresy — since judgment on internal matters is reserved to God alone.

IV. Blasphemy is further divided into that which is against God, and that which is against the Saints. The former is opposed immediately to God; the latter concerns the Saints. Moreover, blasphemy can be enunciative — as when someone says, "I wish to do this to injure God"; detestative — as if someone says, "May God perish"; derisive — as, "Ha, may the temple of God be destroyed"; and finally, injurious — as when someone blasphemes while swearing, "May God perish, if..."

V. Question I. Does blasphemy against God differ in species from that against the Saints? Response: The theologians of Salamanca (tract. 21, ch. 13, punct. 10, n. 124) deny this, along with Sánchez, Azor, Bonacina, and others — citing in support Cajetan, Bañez, Diana, and others. Their reason is that blasphemy is a sin opposed to religion; and religion is one virtue. Therefore there is but one species of blasphemy. They confirm this by the parallel of an oath, which is of one species, whether one swears by God or by the Saints.

VI. The opposite opinion seems to me more probable. For although several vices may be opposed to a single virtue, they can nonetheless differ in species among themselves. Moreover, that the aforesaid two forms of blasphemy differ in species is proven from the very definition of blasphemy itself. For blasphemy is a derogation of the divine goodness. But divine goodness is not univocal to God and to the Saints; rather, the goodness that is in God differs by more than mere kind from the goodness that is in the Saints. The former is infinite, the latter finite; the latter created, the former uncreated. Moreover, blasphemy is opposed to the honor and worship owed to the person against whom it is hurled. But the worship owed to God differs by more than species from the worship owed to any creature. The worship due to God is latria; the worship due to the Saints is dulia, and to the Blessed Virgin, hyperdulia. Now these forms of worship differ by more than mere species. Therefore so do the corresponding forms of blasphemy. Finally, the definition of blasphemy applies, per se and primarily, to the injury done to God, and only secondarily to that done to the other Saints. This is defended by Sánchez (Bk. IV, q. 9), Fr. Paolo Comitoli, Leander (tract. 1, q. 19), where he cites in support Aragón, Hurtado, and others.

VII. Fr. Suárez (Vol. I, On Religion, tract. 4, Bk. 1, ch. 6, n. 19) most excellently adds that, whatever the case may be, this much is certainly true: that it must be explained in confession whether one's blasphemies were against God, against the Virgin, or against the Saints. This is likewise admitted by the aforesaid theologians of Salamanca, together with Sánchez, Bonacina, and others. Wherefore the excessive laxity of Fr. Tommaso Tamburini, who writes as follows (Bk. II, Method of Confession, ch. 3), cannot be tolerated: "Although it is more probable, with Suárez and Sánchez, that blasphemies against God, against the Blessed Virgin, and against the Saints differ in species, it being probable nonetheless, following Azor as cited in Diana, that they do not differ, it will suffice if the number of blasphemies is disclosed in confession; nor will it be necessary to explain... whether they were against God, or the Blessed Virgin, or the Saints."