Clemency

I. Notion of Clemency. Clemency is a moral virtue inclining a superior to mitigation, insofar as justice permits, in exacting punishments from his subject according to the prescription of reason illumined by faith.

II. Object of Clemency. 1. The remote material object is constituted by external punishments which can be imposed on a subject for transgression of law; but the proximate object is movements of the appetite for showing vindicative power.

2. The remote formal object is the reason of debt of mitigating, from sweetness of affection, the punishments which can be imposed on a guilty subject; but the proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in this mitigation from sweetness of affection (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 157, aa. 1-3).

III. Opposed Vices. To clemency by excess is opposed cruelty, by which, from atrocity of soul, a greater punishment is exacted than right reason prescribes (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 159, a. 1); but by defect, excessive leniency, by which punishment is mitigated beyond the prescription of right reason.

II. Causes of temporary separation. 1. Causes of this kind are comprehended by canon 1131, § 1: If one spouse has given his name to a non-Catholic sect; if he has educated the offspring non-Catholically; if he leads a criminal and ignominious life; if he causes grave danger, whether of soul or of body, to the other; if by cruelties he renders common life too difficult: these and other things of this kind are for the other spouse so many legitimate causes of departing. It is said:

a) If he has given his name to a non-Catholic sect. Therefore it is required that he be formally joined to a sect, whether of infidels, or heretical, or schismatic, and that after the marriage has been entered.

b) If he has educated the offspring non-Catholically.

c) If he leads a criminal and ignominious life, as if he joins himself to a band of robbers.

d) If he causes grave danger, whether of soul or of body, to the other. Danger of soul, for example if he solicits to heresy, poisoning, etc. Add if the husband introduces others into the house with danger that they may tempt to adultery. Or if he wishes to exercise sodomy with the wife, even if she refused to consent (St. Alphonsus VI, 973). Danger of body, to which belongs, for example, a contagious disease of the spouse, unless, which today more easily has place, the danger can be removed in another way (St. Alphonsus VI, 973).

e) If by cruelties he renders common life too difficult, for example by treating the consort cruelly. Mere beating, however, unless it is grave and happens several times, is ordinarily not judged among common people to be a just cause for withdrawing. Besides, it suffices that a grave evil be prudently feared (St. Alphonsus VI, 970, 971, question 3°). To this can also be referred insanity from which danger is imminent to the spouse; likewise very troublesome cohabitation, namely on account of grave and frequent insults or quarrels, especially if they bring in a just fear of a greater evil. Here, however, as was likewise said concerning cruelty, the condition of the persons is considered (St. Alphonsus VI, 971, question 3°).

f) And other things of this kind, for example malicious desertion by the spouse.

2. All these causes of themselves furnish only the right of temporary separation. Wherefore canon 1131, § 2 says: In all these cases, when the cause of separation ceases, the custom of life must be restored; but if the separation was pronounced by the Ordinary for a definite or indefinite time, the innocent spouse is not bound to this except by decree of the Ordinary or when the time has been completed.

Clemency.—Clemency is a virtue that inclines one, from a spirit of kindness and moderation, to be as easy in inflicting punishments as the claims of justice will allow.

(a) Clemency is a virtue, because it is reasonable, does good to others, and makes the doer good. It is beneficial to public as well as private interest: “Mercy and truth preserve the king, and his throne is strengthened by clemency” (Prov., xx. 28).

(b) It inclines one to be easy, that is, to temper or relax the severity of the law. Thus, it differs from the virtues of legal justice and of charitable forgiveness, the former of which, when necessary, insists on the full rigor of the law (see 2381 sqq.), whereas the latter, when permissible, grants an enemy a full pardon (see 1198).

(c) Its matter is punishment, that is, the external evil of chastisement visited on wrongdoers. Hence, it differs from meekness, which deals with the internal emotion of anger, and from mercy, which deals with external goods bestowed upon the suffering.

(d) It is easy only in so far as the claims of justice will allow; that is, it acts from a sense of responsibility to the rights and claims of the common good and of all the interests involved, and decides according to an impartial and enlightened judgment that circumstances of person, deed, cause, etc., call for a departure from the strict requirements of law or custom. Clemency is not the same thing, then, as arbitrary laxity or sentimentalism.

(e) It is moved in the first place by kindness to the offender, and thus it differs both from the virtue of equity (which acts from the sense of higher justice) and from the vices of favoritism, extortion, and cowardice (which extend forbearance only to friends or to those who offer bribes or who bring pressure to bear).

(f) It is moved secondly by a spirit of moderation. Many persons are spoiled by authority: feeling their own importance, they desire to exercise their powers to the limit and to keep others down as much as possible. The clement man, on the contrary, keeps his poise and uses his authority with moderation. Meekness should be practised by all, but clemency is the proper virtue of superiors.

The Vices Opposed to Clemency.—(a) The extreme of defect is cruelty, which is a hardness of heart, not moved by the sufferings of others, that disposes one to inflict excessive punishments. The worst form of cruelty is savagery, which takes inhuman delight in the sufferings of others and inflicts pain without regard for guilt or innocence.

(b) The extreme of excess is undue leniency, which spares the rod when it should be used. There are times when severity is necessary, as when a crime was malicious and cold-blooded, when an offender is stubborn and irreformable, and when mildness will harm the public welfare or invite the sinner to repeat his offense. In such cases it would be unwise and harmful to mitigate the sentence which wise statutes or customs provide for the offense.

What is temperance, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? - R. To the first. Temperance is the virtue which moderates concupiscence and delight of sensible goods, especially in the delights of taste and touch, of which some regard conserving the individual, others conserving the species. Insensibility and intemperance are opposed to temperance. The former consists in this, that someone flees delight so much that he therefore omits even those things which are necessary for the conservation of nature. But the latter is the sin of excessive concupiscence. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 141 seqq.; Quodl. 12, a. 22.

R. To the second and third. The integral parts of temperance are shamefacedness and honorableness. Through shamefacedness someone flees shamefulness contrary to temperance. Through honorableness someone loves the beauty of temperance. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143; q. 144; q. 145.

The subjective parts of temperance are: Abstinence, which moderates delight in the use of foods and non-intoxicating drink; and gluttony is opposed to it, cf. 329. - Sobriety, which moderates delight in the use of drink able to intoxicate; and drunkenness is opposed to it, cf. 332. - Chastity, which moderates according to right reason the principal delight of coitus itself; and lust is opposed to it, cf. 325. Modesty, which moderates surrounding delights, for instance in kisses, touches, embraces, looks. Sometimes, however, one is put for the other. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 146 seqq.

The potential parts of temperance are: Continence, which contains man in the good of reason against the pleasures of touch, especially venereal pleasures; and incontinence is opposed to it, which impels toward those delights and yields to them. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 155, 156. Meekness, which moderates the passion of anger according to right reason; and anger is opposed to it by excess, cf. n. 341 seq.; by defect, lack of anger, which does not stir up anger when it is required by charity or justice, by correcting and punishing. It does not have malice diverse from that of the omitted office to be fulfilled from charity or justice. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 158. Clemency, which is proper to Superiors, inclines one to impose lesser punishments than by right he could, because of kindness toward neighbor and the decorum of a Superior. Cruelty is opposed to it by excess, which from harshness of soul exacts punishments beyond measure; but by defect, excessive lenity, which mitigates punishments beyond measure or remits them altogether. Cruelty is distinguished from savagery, according to which someone in inflicting punishments does not consider any fault of the one who is punished, but only this, that he delights in the torment of men. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 159.

Modesty, by which someone moderates his internal and external motions and the arrangement of his things, by a measure fitting to him. Hence under modesty the following four virtues are numbered. Humility, which moderates the motions of the soul toward lofty things, and inclines us to profess our lowliness by internal and external signs. To humility is opposed by excess pride, cf. n. 321 seq.; and by defect excessive abjection of self, which inclines to immoderate self-abjection. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 160 seqq. Studiousness, which moderates the zeal of knowing according to the dictate of right reason. To it by excess is opposed curiosity, by which someone is impelled to applying superfluous diligence of knowing, from affection for knowledge alone. But by defect negligence is opposed to it, by which someone omits to acquire owed knowledge. Curiosity and negligence per se are light, per accidens grave, for instance if the former impels you to extort a secret from another, the latter incites a confessor to omit the study of Moral Theology. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 166 seqq.

Modesty of manners, which moderates the external gestures and motions of the body according to the norm of reason, so that namely they agree with the person, both in himself and considered with all circumstances of things. To modesty of manners is opposed by excess petulance, by which a foreign mode is assumed, not agreeing with one's own condition, or an overly common mode is shown; but by defect rusticity of manners, which does not preserve a fitting mode. Each is per se light. A species of modesty of manners is eutrapelia, which imposes due mode on games and places. By excess and by defect one can also sin in play, by scurrility and excessive austerity. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 168. Modesty of dress moderates the arrangement of external things according to the prescription of reason. For it is fitting that in human society each one wear clothing convenient to his own condition. Likewise by excess and by defect one can sin in this matter, which per se is only light. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 169.

The end of the precept is charity, through which we are induced to loving God and neighbor. Among the vices opposed to temperance, adultery seems especially to be opposed to love of neighbor, and therefore it is chiefly prohibited by the precepts of the Decalogue not only in deed, but also in heart, the sixth and ninth. - But virtues annexed to the virtue of temperance, as to their effects, can likewise rightly regard charity toward God and neighbor; as, for example, from anger, which is opposed to meekness, someone proceeds to blaspheming God, or to killing a man. And thus a precept is also present concerning these virtues, implicitly in the Decalogue, explicitly in other places of Scripture. As to the integral parts of temperance, shamefacedness and honorableness, cf. 1 Cor. 14:40; 1 Tim. 2:9. As to the subjective parts, abstinence, sobriety, chastity, cf. Num. 6:3; 1 Pet. 5:8; Col. 3:5. As to the potential parts, continence, clemency, meekness, modesty, humility, cf. Ecclus. 10:31; 30:24; Col. 3:12; 2 Tim. 2:24. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 170. Therefore the various precepts of the Decalogue contain precepts of moral virtues. But in the first precept, I am the Lord thy God, the precepts of the theological virtues, faith, hope, charity, are also presuppositively and implicitly contained.

What order especially is to be observed among neighbors? The order to be observed in charity regards both the love itself, and the goods, and the persons. - As to love, one must attend whether it is a love merely appreciative and of simple complacency and joy concerning goods possessed, which is followed by worship, honor, reverence; or a love of efficacious benevolence and mercy by exterior work, by which we will and procure for another goods not yet possessed. - As to persons, there must be attended both the comparison to God, according to which some are more excellent and better than others, and the comparison to us, according to which some are more joined to us than others; but with ourselves we do not have conjunction, but unity and identity. As to goods, some are more excellent than others and more necessary, as was already declared in n. 389. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, aa. 7, 9, 11, 12.

First, by the love of simple complacency, the better are to be loved more. - "Among neighbors, we ought to love more the better and those more closely related." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 44, a. 8 ad 2. For since "the principle of love is God and the one loving himself, it is necessary that according to greater nearness to either of these principles, the affection of love be greater." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 6. - Hence by appreciative love of simple complacency and joy, parents are to be loved more than children or wife, benefactors more than those benefited; for the former have a greater likeness with God, the common parent and benefactor of all, and are more closely joined with God, the chief object of charity. By the other love of beneficence and mercy, those more closely joined are to be loved more. "It must be said that from this very fact that it is said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, it is consequently given to be understood that those who are more near are to be loved more." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 44, a. 8 ad 3. If the intensity of love is considered, "those who are more near to himself a man loves with more intense affection toward that good to which he loves them, than better persons toward a greater good." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7. For every movement has intensity of speed from the disposition of the movable thing and the power of the mover. S. Th. ibid.

If conjunction with God and conjunction with us are considered at the same time, "some neighbors are near to us according to natural origin, from which they cannot depart, because according to it they are what they are. But the goodness of virtue, according to which some approach God, can come and recede, increase and diminish; and therefore from charity I can will that this person, who is joined to me, be better than another, and thus be able to arrive at a greater degree of blessedness." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7. "But there is also another mode by which we love more from charity those more joined to us, because we love them in more ways. For toward those who are not joined to us we have only the friendship of charity; but toward those who are joined to us we have certain other friendships, according to the mode of their conjunction to us. But since the good upon which any other honorable friendship is founded is ordered as to an end to the good upon which charity is founded, it follows that charity commands the act of any other friendship." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7.

For there are various friendships of men: the supernatural friendship of charity is founded upon communication of supernatural goods; other friendships are founded upon communication of particular goods. All these friendships can be subordinated to the first. Hence the same Angelic Doctor, 2. 2. q. 103, a. 3 ad 2, says: "The reason of loving neighbor is God. And therefore the charity by which God and neighbor are loved is the same. Nevertheless there are other friendships different from charity, according to other accounts by which men are loved." Therefore, other things being equal, by love of benevolence and desire, by which we will and wish for another a good not yet possessed, which beneficence follows by doing good, those who are more joined to us are to be loved more as to those goods which are owed to such conjunction. The reason is that communication of goods is the foundation of friendship and charity. And thus in those things which pertain to nature we ought to love blood relatives more; in matters pertaining to civil communication, our fellow citizens; in military matters, fellow soldiers ought to be preferred to others. But in spiritual helps greater account is to be had of those who are judged our sons, fathers, or brothers according to the spirit. Nevertheless not improbably carnal parents, even in spiritual matters, are to be preferred, partly because their conjunction with us is founded also in these things; partly because carnal conjunction, the foundation and basis of other conjunctions, is by its own nature prior and more stable, while other conjunctions supervene upon it and can be removed, as S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 8, warns. But the grace of charity does not destroy the inclination of nature, but perfects it and directs it to a supernatural end. S. Th. l. c., a. 7. And what has been said of parents ought by the same reason to be said of children and carnal brothers, in comparison with spiritual sons or brothers.

Finally in goods pertaining to nature and to conserving bodily life, help must be given, other things being equal: 1. to one's wife, because she is one flesh with the husband; 2. to children, for whom by natural right parents are more obliged to provide than conversely; for children ought not lay up treasure for parents, but parents for children, says the Apostle, 2 Cor. 12:14, and teaches S. Th., a. 9; 3. to parents, but more to the father than the mother, because he obtains the more excellent account of principle, S. Th., a. 10; indeed, in a case of extreme necessity, S. Th., a. 9, 11 ad 3; q. 31, a. 3 ad 4, thinks that parents must be helped before all others, even wife and one's own children, since they were the cause and principle of our existing; therefore equity demands that in extreme necessity, by freeing them from destruction, we repay as much; 4. to brothers, sisters; 5. to other blood relatives; 6. to benefactors, friends. Other things being equal; for to a distinguished benefactor or friend, for example, help must be given by the law of charity rather than to a blood relative not very near or not well deserving of us. Similarly it seems that spiritual brothers must be helped more, even in temporal goods, than relatives not very near, since spiritual conjunction excels carnal conjunction.

There is indeed no order on the part of the good which we wish for the neighbor through supernatural charity, if generally such good is considered according to itself. "As to this we love all men equally from charity, because we wish for all the same good in genus, namely eternal blessedness." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 6 ad 1. Yet if the aforesaid good is considered according to the diverse participations of blessedness, we ought from charity to will a greater good to those who are nearer to God. "And this pertains to charity, that it wills the justice of God to be preserved, according to which the better participate more perfectly in blessedness." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 7.

But if necessary good is attended to, other things being equal, those are to be loved more, and indeed with efficacious love, who are in greater necessity. For since the obligation of this efficacious charity is not except by reason of necessity, it is clear that generally the greater necessity obliges more. But since a greater or lesser obligation also depends on greater or lesser conjunction, and there are diverse degrees both of need and of nearness, no universal rule can be determined for all cases as to whom help should be given more. Therefore this requires the judgment of a prudent person. And thus, generally, a stranger in grave spiritual necessity must be helped rather than a blood relative in grave temporal necessity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26; q. 31, a. 3; q. 32, a. 9; q. 44, aa. 7, 8; q. 64, a. 6 ad 2; L. 27.

710. Clemency is a moral virtue inclining a superior to mitigate or remit a due punishment, insofar as right reason permits.¹³⁹³

Although total remission of punishment is rather pardon, nevertheless it is not undeservedly reduced to clemency. But mitigation of due punishment ought not to proceed from illicit motives (for example, from gifts received), but from an affection of mildness, yet without injury to justice. Clemency is indeed very closely related to meekness, but it is not altogether the same.¹³⁹⁴ For meekness moderates punishment insofar as it is to be inflicted from anger, because it diminishes the passion of anger; but clemency moderates it insofar as it is to be inflicted from legitimate power, because it is moderative of external punishment. Hence clemency and meekness agree in this, that each abhors the misery of another; but they differ in this, that meekness comes to the aid of another by the conferral of a benefit, while clemency does so by the subtraction of punishment.

Opposed to clemency by defect is cruelty, which is atrociousness of mind in exacting punishments and exceeds the measure in punishing.¹³⁹⁵ Cruelty is related to savagery or ferocity, which, however, rather delights in the torment of men.¹³⁹⁶ Savagery or ferocity is deservedly called a bestial and not a human vice. Cruelty and ferocity are exercised principally against men, but secondarily also against animals. Cf. what was said above, n. 14, concerning the cruel tormenting of animals. Opposed to clemency by excess is excessive mildness, by which someone, contrary to the right dictate of reason, mitigates or remits due punishments. This vice is very harmful to the commonwealth, since it enervates discipline, leaves vices unpunished, and disturbs the peace of good citizens.

¹³⁹³ Milde, clémence, clemency [mildness, clemency].

¹³⁹⁴ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 157, a. 1.

¹³⁹⁵ Ibid., q. 159, a. 1.

¹³⁹⁶ Ibid., a. 2.

S. Th. II-II, q. 157.

1033. To moderate vengeance, two virtues annexed to temperance concur: meekness (douceur; zachtmoedigheid), which is the virtue moderating anger, or the very appetite of vengeance, according to right reason; and clemency (goedertierenheid), which is the virtue moderating punishments from mildness of affection insofar as the account of justice permits. For from mildness toward neighbor one is well affected and abhors his evil, and inclines the soul to imposing lesser punishments than can be imposed by right, with attention to the circumstances of the fact, person, cause, mode, etc.

These two virtues are distinguished: meekness directly moderates the very appetite or affection of vengeance and diminishes the passion itself of anger, and is in the irascible appetite; clemency directly moderates and diminishes the effect, namely exterior punishment, and therefore also the affection (of a superior) of using his whole power, and is in the will. Yet this does not prevent them from being able to concur in the same effect, when anger rises up in a superior who has the office of punishing: for then meekness, by moderating anger, brings it about that a graver punishment is not inflicted, which properly belongs to clemency, just as abstinence from theft, which belongs to justice, can be from liberality, which restrains the inordinate love of money. Nevertheless, even then they tend to the effect under a diverse formal motive: meekness inclines to it because of the honorableness which shines forth in moderating anger; clemency because of the honorableness which is in not using one's whole power on account of benignity; meekness moderates punishment as to be taken away from the impulse of anger, clemency as to be inflicted from legitimate power. Therefore meekness is not about an interior act and clemency about an exterior act; but clemency is a virtue proper to superiors, meekness common to all.

But meekness, for moderating anger, has two chief offices: a) it represses anger where a just cause of being angry is lacking; b) and if a just cause is present, it prevents anger from exceeding measure; hence it is a mean between irascibility and lack of anger.

1034. These virtues are annexed parts of temperance, because they imitate it in secondary matter as to mode: for as temperance consists in the restraint of more vehement concupiscence, of foods and venereal things, so meekness and clemency consist in a certain restraint of anger and punishments, namely in the restraint of a less vehement concupiscence, namely anger, and of the affection for inflicting punishments.

They are virtues because they moderate punishments and anger according to right reason; hence:

a) Meekness is not directly opposed to severity. For "meekness is about angers, but severity is considered about the exterior infliction of punishments"; nor is clemency opposed to severity, because each is according to right reason. "For severity is inflexible concerning the infliction of punishments when right reason requires this; but clemency diminishes punishments also according to right reason, namely when it is fitting and in those in whom it is fitting. And therefore they are not opposed, because they are not about the same thing" (a. 2, ad 1).

b) They hold the mean between excess and defect, although they diminish anger and punishments: "The virtue (of meekness) is named from the diminution of anger... because virtue is nearer to diminution than to superabundance, on account of the fact that it is more natural for man to seek vengeance for injuries inflicted than to be deficient in this, because injuries brought upon oneself scarcely seem too small to anyone... But clemency is diminutive of punishments, not indeed with respect to that which is according to right reason, but with respect to that which is according to the common law, which legal justice regards; but on account of certain particulars considered, clemency diminishes punishments, as it were judging that a man is not to be punished more... From this it is clear that clemency is compared to severity as epikeia to legal justice, of which severity is a part as to the infliction of punishments according to law. Yet clemency differs from epikeia" (ad 2): "In the diminution of punishments two things are to be considered. One of these is that the diminution of punishments be made according to the intention of the legislator, although not according to the words of the law; and according to this it pertains to epikeia. The other is a certain moderation of affection, so that a man does not use his power in inflicting punishments; and this properly pertains to clemency... And this moderation of soul proceeds from a certain sweetness of affection, by which one abhors everything which can sadden another" (a. 3, ad 1).

c) They also differ from piety and mercy "as to the motive: for piety removes the evils of neighbors from the reverence which it has toward some superior, for example toward God or a parent; but mercy removes the evils of neighbors from this, that one is saddened in them, insofar as he judges them to pertain to himself..., which proceeds from friendship, which makes friends rejoice and be saddened concerning the same things; but meekness does this insofar as it removes anger inciting to vengeance; but clemency does this from mildness of soul, insofar as it judges it equitable that someone should not be punished further" (a. 4, ad 3). And therefore "mercy and clemency agree in this, that each flees and abhors another's misery, yet differently and differently: for it belongs to mercy to relieve misery by the conferring of benefit; it belongs to clemency to diminish misery by the removal of punishments" (q. 159, a. 1, ad 2).

1035. They are not virtues simply the most perfect. - For they are praiseworthy and withdraw from evil insofar as they diminish anger or punishment; but it is more perfect to attain good than to lack evil. And therefore the theological virtues, prudence, and justice are simply greater. Yet under a certain respect they have a certain excellence among the virtues which resist passions. For "anger, which meekness mitigates, because of its impulse, especially impedes the soul of man from freely judging truth, and on account of this meekness especially makes man possessed of himself... But clemency, in this that it diminishes punishments, seems especially to approach charity, which is the most excellent of the virtues, through which we work goods for neighbors and impede their evils" (q. 157, a. 4).

CLEMENTIA, or clemency, is the virtue applying a measure conformable to right reason in the very external punishment, and thus it belongs especially to superiors toward subjects, as St. Thom. teaches, quaest. 157. Wherefore mildness and clemency avail for the same effect; whence it happens that they are often named for the same thing. Thus Cicero defines it, lib. 2. de Invent., clemency to be that by which minds, rashly drawn and provoked into hatred of someone, are held back by kindness. Which definition fits both virtues.

They are, however, diverse, for one thing is the difficulty, and so also the praise, in restraining anger itself; and another in moderating external punishment; yet they are often joined: and this the Holy Doctor intended in the declarat. terminorum, Theol., defining Clemency: It is the virtue by which the mind, rashly provoked into hatred of someone, is softened by benignity, where he seems at once to join mildness with clemency, as also St. Gregory, lib. 22. moral. cap. 7.: The praise of perfect mildness and clemency is to endure adversity, and outwardly firmly, and inwardly mildly.

St. Augustine, epist. 13.: Spare the wicked, O mild man, and good: and the better you are, the milder be; and the higher you are in power, the lower you should become in piety.

Seneca, de Clementia, lib. 1. cap. 22.: Clemency itself in the ruler makes shame at sinning, and cap. 20.: I shall call him clement, not one who is facile in another's grief, but he who, though goaded by his own stings, does not leap forth: who understands that it belongs to a great soul to bear injuries with supreme power, and that nothing is more glorious than a Prince injured with impunity, and cap. 3.: Clemency befits no one of all more than the Prince, for a pestilential power is to be able to injure. The Holy Bonav. relates all these things, lib. 2. Pharetrae, c. 40.

THIS is opposed to Clemency, and is defined by St. Bonaventure from Seneca, book 2. de Clementia, cap. 4. Atrocitas animi in exigendis poenis, that is, harshness of mind in exacting punishments. From this, he says, arise those daughters, imprisonments, beatings, floggings, duels, mutilations, and killings: Whence it is clear that it is contrary to that virtue which is in Princes and Prelates, and which consists in mildness of soul. The same is taught by St. Thomas, art. 1. To this is nearly reduced that lack of mercy which nevertheless does not inflict evil, but only does not relieve misery; of which Jerem. 6. He is cruel, and will not show mercy.

CRUELTY differs from ferocity, as the holy Doctor says, because ferocity, or savagery, so called from its likeness to wild beasts, without regard to any fault of him who is punished, delights of itself in the very torture of men, for which reason wild beasts harm men, even that they may feed on their bodies, as Seneca also says loc. cit. D. Thom. art. 2. Whence it comes about that savagery is contained under bestiality, since such delight is not human but bestial.

CRUELTY, indeed, does attend to the fault in him who is punished, but exceeds the measure in punishing; and thus cruelty differs from ferocity, as human wickedness differs from bestiality, according to Aristotle 7. Eth. cap. 5. And as cruelty is opposed to clemency, so ferocity is opposed to that virtue of superexcellence, which Aristotle at the beginning of 7. Eth. calls Heroic or Divine, so that we may say it is opposed to the gift of Piety, as St. Thomas says, art. 2. and Tannet. dub. 7. who rather opposes it to humanity. But St. Bonaventure seems to approve both as probable.

ANOTHER vice is placed by the holy Doctor in Pharetra, lib. 3. cap. 24. at the other extreme of cruelty, which he says is excessive leniency in punishing crimes, concerning which he brings forward illustrious things from the holy Fathers.

ST. GREGORY, lib. 32. moral. cap. 17. Very often lax remission is esteemed as though it were meekness and piety, and while offenders are spared temporally more than is fitting, they are cruelly reserved to eternal punishments.

ST. AUGUSTINE, ep. 50. The physician seems troublesome and cruel to the raving madman, and the father to the undisciplined son: the one by binding, the other by striking, but both loving. But if they neglect them and allow them to perish, that is rather false meekness, true cruelty. The same is brought forward from St. Bernard, pref. in Psal. Qui habitat.

THE holy Doctor observes in the places cited that the excess of cruelty in exacting punishments, by imprisoning, etc., is a mortal sin. Excessive leniency, too, by which the guilty are not punished and the way is opened to crimes, is likewise mortal. Of this the holy Doctor often treats in the opusculo de Ecclesiastica hierarchia, and elsewhere.