§ 3. On Clemency

710. Clemency is a moral virtue inclining a superior to mitigate or remit a due punishment, insofar as right reason permits.¹³⁹³

Although total remission of punishment is rather pardon, nevertheless it is not undeservedly reduced to clemency. But mitigation of due punishment ought not to proceed from illicit motives (for example, from gifts received), but from an affection of mildness, yet without injury to justice. Clemency is indeed very closely related to meekness, but it is not altogether the same.¹³⁹⁴ For meekness moderates punishment insofar as it is to be inflicted from anger, because it diminishes the passion of anger; but clemency moderates it insofar as it is to be inflicted from legitimate power, because it is moderative of external punishment. Hence clemency and meekness agree in this, that each abhors the misery of another; but they differ in this, that meekness comes to the aid of another by the conferral of a benefit, while clemency does so by the subtraction of punishment.

Opposed to clemency by defect is cruelty, which is atrociousness of mind in exacting punishments and exceeds the measure in punishing.¹³⁹⁵ Cruelty is related to savagery or ferocity, which, however, rather delights in the torment of men.¹³⁹⁶ Savagery or ferocity is deservedly called a bestial and not a human vice. Cruelty and ferocity are exercised principally against men, but secondarily also against animals. Cf. what was said above, n. 14, concerning the cruel tormenting of animals. Opposed to clemency by excess is excessive mildness, by which someone, contrary to the right dictate of reason, mitigates or remits due punishments. This vice is very harmful to the commonwealth, since it enervates discipline, leaves vices unpunished, and disturbs the peace of good citizens.

¹³⁹³ Milde, clémence, clemency [mildness, clemency].

¹³⁹⁴ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 157, a. 1.

¹³⁹⁵ Ibid., q. 159, a. 1.

¹³⁹⁶ Ibid., a. 2.