Continence

The Parts of Temperance.—(a) The subjective parts or species of temperance are two, since there are two distinct objects of the virtue. These objects are the two delights of touch that are ruled by the virtue, namely, those associated with the nutritive and those associated with the generative function. The first subjective part of temperance includes abstemiousness as to food and sobriety as to drink; the second part includes chastity, as regards the principal sexual act (copulation), and decency or pudicity, as regards the secondary acts (kisses, touches, embraces, etc).

(b) The integral parts are also two, since there are two conditions for the perfect exercise of temperance. These conditions are the fear and avoidance of what is disgraceful (shamefacedness, reserve, or delicacy) and the love of what is honorable (virtue of propriety or refinement). Shamefacedness is a passion, but, as physical fearlessness is a disposition for moral courage, so is the fear of incurring reproach a preparation for virtue. Hence, this delicacy is a laudable passion, and is ascribed chiefly to temperance, whose opposite is chief among things disgraceful. Propriety is also assigned to temperance, because it is an attraction towards that which is spiritually good and beautiful, a habit most useful for temperance, which must subordinate the delightful to the good, the carnal to the spiritual.

(c) The potential parts of temperance are its minor or servant virtues. They resemble temperance inasmuch as their chief praise is in moderation, but they are inferior to it inasmuch as that which is moderated by them is less recalcitrant than the sexual or gustatory appetites. First among these potential parts are those whose task of moderating, while not of the greatest difficulty, is yet more than ordinarily difficult; and here we have continence, which calms a will agitated by immoderate passion, and meekness, which governs the passion of anger. Next among the potential parts are those whose task of moderating offers less or ordinary difficulty, because they keep in order matters less removed from reason. All the virtues of this second group are given the common name of modesty. They are reduced to four: humility and studiosity, which moderate the internal appetites of excellence and of learning respectively; modesty of bearing and modesty of living, which regulate respectively the external acts of the body and the external goods of food, drink, clothing, furnishings, etc.

Continence.—(a) Its Nature.—This quality, as here taken, is the state of one who has not gained mastery over the passions sufficient to keep down strong, frequent and persistent rebellions, but whose will is firmly disposed to resist their attacks. It is less than a moral virtue, then, since it does not tranquillize the lower appetites. The temperate man has already subdued his passions, and hence he is less disturbed by them, or at least he has less trouble in rejecting their onsets.

(b) Its Relation to Temperance.—Greater difficulty increases merit, if it is due to the presence of a corporal or external impediment (e.g., a man of sickly constitution or one who suffers great opposition deserves more credit for his work than a man of vigorous constitution or one who enjoys great favors and opportunities); not, however, if it is due to the absence of a spiritual excellence (e.g., a man who finds work hard because he is lazy does not deserve more credit than another who finds it easy because he is industrious). Hence, temperance is more deserving than continence, for it controls passion with greater ease simply because it has subjected not only the higher but also the lower appetite to the dictates of reason.

(c) Its Opposite.—The vice opposed to continence is incontinence, which does not follow the dictate of reason to resist the onslaughts of passion; it sees and approves the higher things, but it follows the lower. This sin is less grievous than intemperance, just as a passing indisposition is less harmful than a settled malady. For passion comes and goes, and the incontinent man quickly regrets his weakness; but a sinful habit of gluttony or impurity is permanent, and is so like a second nature that its votaries rejoice when they have satisfied their desires (Prov., ii. 14). Incontinence in pleasure is more disgraceful than incontinence in anger, for anger is less distant from reason; but on the other hand the irascible man usually sins more grievously by the greater harm he does to others. It is more difficult to contain oneself from wrath than from intemperance in the sense that wrath storms the soul by a more vehement and compelling attack; yet, it is harder to be unconquered by pleasure, because it lays persistent siege to the soul and demands a more unwearied vigilance.

What is temperance, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? - R. To the first. Temperance is the virtue which moderates concupiscence and delight of sensible goods, especially in the delights of taste and touch, of which some regard conserving the individual, others conserving the species. Insensibility and intemperance are opposed to temperance. The former consists in this, that someone flees delight so much that he therefore omits even those things which are necessary for the conservation of nature. But the latter is the sin of excessive concupiscence. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 141 seqq.; Quodl. 12, a. 22.

R. To the second and third. The integral parts of temperance are shamefacedness and honorableness. Through shamefacedness someone flees shamefulness contrary to temperance. Through honorableness someone loves the beauty of temperance. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143; q. 144; q. 145.

The subjective parts of temperance are: Abstinence, which moderates delight in the use of foods and non-intoxicating drink; and gluttony is opposed to it, cf. 329. - Sobriety, which moderates delight in the use of drink able to intoxicate; and drunkenness is opposed to it, cf. 332. - Chastity, which moderates according to right reason the principal delight of coitus itself; and lust is opposed to it, cf. 325. Modesty, which moderates surrounding delights, for instance in kisses, touches, embraces, looks. Sometimes, however, one is put for the other. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 146 seqq.

The potential parts of temperance are: Continence, which contains man in the good of reason against the pleasures of touch, especially venereal pleasures; and incontinence is opposed to it, which impels toward those delights and yields to them. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 155, 156. Meekness, which moderates the passion of anger according to right reason; and anger is opposed to it by excess, cf. n. 341 seq.; by defect, lack of anger, which does not stir up anger when it is required by charity or justice, by correcting and punishing. It does not have malice diverse from that of the omitted office to be fulfilled from charity or justice. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 158. Clemency, which is proper to Superiors, inclines one to impose lesser punishments than by right he could, because of kindness toward neighbor and the decorum of a Superior. Cruelty is opposed to it by excess, which from harshness of soul exacts punishments beyond measure; but by defect, excessive lenity, which mitigates punishments beyond measure or remits them altogether. Cruelty is distinguished from savagery, according to which someone in inflicting punishments does not consider any fault of the one who is punished, but only this, that he delights in the torment of men. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 159.

Modesty, by which someone moderates his internal and external motions and the arrangement of his things, by a measure fitting to him. Hence under modesty the following four virtues are numbered. Humility, which moderates the motions of the soul toward lofty things, and inclines us to profess our lowliness by internal and external signs. To humility is opposed by excess pride, cf. n. 321 seq.; and by defect excessive abjection of self, which inclines to immoderate self-abjection. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 160 seqq. Studiousness, which moderates the zeal of knowing according to the dictate of right reason. To it by excess is opposed curiosity, by which someone is impelled to applying superfluous diligence of knowing, from affection for knowledge alone. But by defect negligence is opposed to it, by which someone omits to acquire owed knowledge. Curiosity and negligence per se are light, per accidens grave, for instance if the former impels you to extort a secret from another, the latter incites a confessor to omit the study of Moral Theology. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 166 seqq.

Modesty of manners, which moderates the external gestures and motions of the body according to the norm of reason, so that namely they agree with the person, both in himself and considered with all circumstances of things. To modesty of manners is opposed by excess petulance, by which a foreign mode is assumed, not agreeing with one's own condition, or an overly common mode is shown; but by defect rusticity of manners, which does not preserve a fitting mode. Each is per se light. A species of modesty of manners is eutrapelia, which imposes due mode on games and places. By excess and by defect one can also sin in play, by scurrility and excessive austerity. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 168. Modesty of dress moderates the arrangement of external things according to the prescription of reason. For it is fitting that in human society each one wear clothing convenient to his own condition. Likewise by excess and by defect one can sin in this matter, which per se is only light. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 169.

The end of the precept is charity, through which we are induced to loving God and neighbor. Among the vices opposed to temperance, adultery seems especially to be opposed to love of neighbor, and therefore it is chiefly prohibited by the precepts of the Decalogue not only in deed, but also in heart, the sixth and ninth. - But virtues annexed to the virtue of temperance, as to their effects, can likewise rightly regard charity toward God and neighbor; as, for example, from anger, which is opposed to meekness, someone proceeds to blaspheming God, or to killing a man. And thus a precept is also present concerning these virtues, implicitly in the Decalogue, explicitly in other places of Scripture. As to the integral parts of temperance, shamefacedness and honorableness, cf. 1 Cor. 14:40; 1 Tim. 2:9. As to the subjective parts, abstinence, sobriety, chastity, cf. Num. 6:3; 1 Pet. 5:8; Col. 3:5. As to the potential parts, continence, clemency, meekness, modesty, humility, cf. Ecclus. 10:31; 30:24; Col. 3:12; 2 Tim. 2:24. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 170. Therefore the various precepts of the Decalogue contain precepts of moral virtues. But in the first precept, I am the Lord thy God, the precepts of the theological virtues, faith, hope, charity, are also presuppositively and implicitly contained.

Continence, leaving aside its various acceptations, is taken here insofar as it implies firmness of will, lest it decline toward illicit things.¹³⁷⁸ It can be defined: a disposition of the will by which evil and vehement concupiscences concerning touch are resisted, that is, concerning food and venereal things.¹³⁷⁹ Therefore, he who resists passions in the matter of temperance is called simply continent; but he who resists other passions is called continent in a qualified respect, for example, continent as to anger, continent as to avarice, etc. Continence differs from temperance as the imperfect from the perfect.¹³⁸⁰ For temperance is subjectively seated in the concupiscible appetite, which it holds as though tamed under the right will; but continence resides in the will, which strongly resists the rebellious motions of the appetite and restrains concupiscences of touch not yet tamed.¹³⁸¹ Hence the continent man is not badly compared by some to one who receives wild beasts to be tamed, but the temperate man to one who has already tamed them. These things, however, are not to be understood as though the temperate man no longer felt any rebellious motions of concupiscence within himself - St. Paul himself experienced the contrary in himself - but a man endowed with the virtue of temperance more easily represses all rising motions.

Continence is not a perfect virtue; wherefore the Angelic Doctor notes:¹³⁸² "Continence has something of the nature of virtue, insofar, namely, as reason is made firm against the passions, lest it be led away by them; nevertheless it does not attain to the perfect nature of moral virtue, according to which even the sensitive appetite is subjected to reason, so that vehement passions contrary to reason do not rise up in it."

¹³⁷⁸ Selbstbeherrschung in sinnlichen Genüssen, maîtrise de soi-même, self-control [self-mastery in sensual enjoyments, mastery of oneself, self-control].

¹³⁷⁹ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 155, a. 2.

¹³⁸⁰ Ibid., a. 4.

¹³⁸¹ Ibid., a. 3.

¹³⁸² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 155, a. 1.

VI. Admonition concerning the limitation of offspring to be generated. - Since the matter is of great importance and in our days much agitated, let it be pleasing to make some observations concerning it. Now the limitation of offspring to be generated can be obtained in a threefold way:

1. By observing continence. This mode is lawful, provided that it is done by the common counsel of both spouses and without proximate danger of incontinence. Indeed, to observe continence from a motive of virtue is of itself better than to generate offspring, as is clear from the example of the Blessed Virgin and St. Joseph. But in practice it will rarely be opportune to counsel this mode, on account of the frequent danger of incontinence. The Apostle wrote, I Cor. VII, 5: "Defraud not one another, unless perhaps by consent for a time, that you may give yourselves to prayer; and return again together, lest Satan tempt you because of your incontinence."

2. By using means contrary to nature, such as onanism. This is always gravely illicit, so that it can never be legitimized for any reason. Concerning this we have spoken sufficiently in the little work Concerning Chastity and Lust, q. 8, a. 4.

3. By exercising the conjugal act exclusively in the time of agenesia, so that every conception of offspring may thus be avoided. This is not contrary to nature, and therefore not gravely or always illicit.

The time of agenesia is called that in which conception happens more rarely, indeed not at all; whence by this practice generation becomes little probable or even impossible.

Formerly this time was determined by the physician Capellmann and others in this way: from ten or fourteen days after the beginning up to three or four days before the new menstruation of the woman. For they thought that ovulation in the woman, and therefore fertility, coincided with menstruation, so that during the month the woman was fertile from day 1 to day 14, sterile from day 15 to day 25, and again fertile from day 26 to day 28.

But afterward it was discovered that menstruation does not coincide with ovulation, although it is a connected phenomenon; but that it takes place between two ovulations. Concerning this matter diverse computations made by physicians are found. According to the most recent experiments of Doctor Knaus, the woman would be fertile from day 11 to day 17 after menstruation has occurred, sterile from day 1 to day 10, and from day 18 to day 28. According to Doctor Ogino she would be fertile from day 12 to day 19 before the following menstruation (exceptionally to day 24), but sterile for 11 days before the following menstruation, and for 9 days (exceptionally only for 4) after menstruation has occurred. Hence certain persons would wish that the theory, as they say, of Ogino-Knaus be widely spread, so that human generation could be subjected to certain rules, and an effective remedy be provided against the horrible practice of onanism so widely diffused.

Concerning this it must be noted:

A. As to the very dissemination of the matter, general diffusion and broad propagation among the people, especially if to be done by priests, does not seem praiseworthy:

a) because it is apt to harm the common good;

b) because it easily provokes scandal, and leads to onanism: for since the effect of each practice is the same, is there not a danger that they may not sufficiently perceive the difference between the two, and finally make use of the unnatural mode, as easier and more certain?

B. As to the matter itself:

1. Although day by day the said theory approaches more to certainty, nevertheless the computation seems only approximate; whence, in order certainly to avoid conception, even in the said theory, spouses would have to abstain from union for a rather long time, namely from day 4 to day 19 or 20 after menstruation: certainly longer than is sometimes proclaimed by those promoting the theory.

2. The experiments do not seem sufficiently certain, because a) the time during which the ovum and semen remain apt for fertilization is not yet certain; b) the experiments are not numerous enough to produce every kind of certainty; and c) several were made not in the human species but in animals, whence from them one can conclude only by analogy.

3. Early, later, or supplementary ovulation is always possible, whence in fact fertilizations have occurred at other times.

4. Hence others say that there is no general law, but that the matter depends on the diverse condition of the woman; but others say that there is no time in which conception is not strictly possible.

From these things it is clear how cautiously the confessor ought to proceed in affirming or counseling in this matter; in particular, let him avoid proposing the time of agenesia as if through it generation were altogether certainly avoided.

C. As to morality:

1. From the fact that an act is not contrary to nature, it does not yet follow that it is plainly lawful and, a fortiori, honorable; in the case, voluntarily exercising conjugal union only at that time when conception cannot occur is indeed not an act contrary to nature, since in that mode it is instituted as nature indicates, but it is an act indifferent of itself, yet ill-sounding, which, in order to be lawful and honorable in the concrete, requires a co-honestating reason.

2. In particular, that act, indifferent of itself, is not lawful and honorable unless it be done from a good end: such an end is not to seek pleasure without a burden, to wish to avoid offspring without a just reason, or from egoism more easily to enjoy all the conveniences and pleasures of modern life. In these cases there is venial sin, since according to the common doctrine of theologians to exercise the conjugal act for pleasure alone is venial.

3. Even if a right end is present, the act will not be good unless it is done with due circumstances, and therefore by mutual consent, without danger of incontinence and without detriment to conjugal love and fidelity; otherwise mortal sin would be present.

4. In a particular case, in which a sufficient reason is present for avoiding procreation, the aforesaid practice can cautiously be suggested, rather by a physician than by a priest, only to those who cannot observe continence: let it be said to them that in this case it is lawful.

5. Finally, to inveterate onanists, whose amendment cannot be hoped for, the same practice can cautiously, as the Sacred Penitentiary said, 16 June 1880, be suggested: as a lesser evil in those who are determined to commit a greater one.

The doctrine proposed in this way is sufficiently common among moralists.

S. Th. II-II, q. 155 and 156.

1029. Continence (zelfbeheersching, inhouding) is taken in various ways:

1. Generally, it imports the firmness of reason and will which contains itself within itself, that is, in that which befits reason, lest it flow forth to illicit things; and this is the entirely general sense: abstinence from every illicit thing.

2. But specially it is firmness of reason and will by which someone resists any evil concupiscences whatever which vehemently exist in him.

3. But because the chief concupiscences according to touch, namely of foods and venereal things, are more vehement and more difficult to overcome, because they more follow the inclinations of nature in the conservation of the individual and of the species, therefore continence properly is a disposition of the will by which resistance is made to the chief depraved concupiscences according to the pleasures of touch. Hence he who resists passions in the matter of temperance, especially in venereal pleasures which are more vehement, is called simply continent; he who resists passions in other matters is not called continent simply but in a certain respect, as continent of anger, of avarice, of gain, of honor, etc.

4. Sometimes continence is taken in a perfect sense for abstinence from every voluntary venereal pleasure, so that one may be wholly intent upon more perfect goods, and thus perfect continence is principally virginity, secondarily widowhood.

Hence continence is defined: A habitual disposition of the will for resisting the impulses of depraved concupiscence, especially of the pleasures of touch, most of all venereal pleasures; or, a disposition of the will by which resistance is made to depraved concupiscences concerning touch.

1030. Continence is a good habit and has something of the account of virtue, because it denotes firmness of soul, insofar as by it reason is strengthened against passions lest it be led away by them; yet it is not a virtue in the strict and full sense, because it does not render man perfect: a) for it is an imperfection to resist the motions of concupiscence and not to consent; perfection is to have mastery over them; but continence does not attain moral perfection, according to which the sensitive appetite also is subjected to reason, so that passions contrary to reason do not rise up in it so vehemently and so frequently;1 b) it is also a habit easily movable. Hence:

1. Continence is not in the sensitive appetite, namely in the concupiscible power, but in the will.2 Every habit existing in some subject makes that subject differ from the disposition which it has while subjected to the opposite vice. But the sensitive appetite has itself in the same way in him who is continent and in him who is incontinent, because in both it bursts forth toward vehement depraved concupiscences. Therefore continence is not in the sensitive appetite as in its subject. But it is in the will, which through continence is disposed to choose to resist depraved concupiscences, by which the incontinent man permits himself to be overcome (q. 155, a. 3).

2. "Continence has as its matter the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch, not as moderating them (which belongs to temperance, which is in the concupiscible power), but it is about them as resisting them. Hence it must be in another power, because resistance is toward another" (ad 1). For "although passions are not in the will as in their subject, nevertheless it is in the power of the will to resist them; and in this way the will of the continent man resists concupiscences" (ad 3).

3. Continence differs from temperance as the imperfect and begun differs from the perfect and completed. Temperance represses the sensitive appetite concerning concupiscences of touch, subjects it to reason, and renders it obedient; continence resists it as it rises up and still struggles against reason. Hence temperance is better. For a) "the good of reason is stronger in him who is temperate, in whom even the sensitive appetite itself is subjected to reason and as it were tamed by reason, than in him who is continent, in whom the sensitive appetite vehemently resists reason through depraved concupiscences" (a. 4);

b) "the will is nearer to reason than the concupiscible power. Hence the good of reason, from which virtue is praised, is shown to exist more from the fact that it reaches not only to the will, but also even to the concupiscible power, which happens in him who is temperate, than if it reaches only to the will, as happens in him who is continent" (ad 3).

1031. Incontinence is opposed to continence and therefore pertains more to the soul than to the body. For each thing is attributed more to that which is the cause per se than to that which only furnishes the occasion. But vehement passions, which from the disposition of the body rise up in the sensitive appetite, which is a power of an organic body, are only the occasion of incontinence, because, while the use of reason remains, man can resist them and not consent. Therefore the cause per se of incontinence is on the part of the soul, which by reason does not resist the passions; and indeed in a twofold way: a) when the soul yields to the passions before reason takes counsel, and then there is unbridled concupiscence or flying ahead, either from swiftness, as in the choleric, or from vehemence, as in the melancholic; b) when man is inconstant in those things concerning which he has taken counsel by reason and has judged, and then there is weakness, from softness of temperament as in women, and in the phlegmatic.

Hence incontinence:

1. Properly and simply is about pleasures of touch, and in this way it is sin for a twofold reason: in one way from the fact that the incontinent man withdraws from that which is according to reason; in another way from the fact that someone immerses himself in certain shameful pleasures;

2. Properly and in a certain respect is about pleasures from cognition of exterior things good in themselves (honor, riches, vengeance), namely when man in these does not observe the mode of reason: thus it is sin, not from the fact that someone plunges himself into depraved concupiscences, but from the fact that he does not observe the due mode of reason in the concupiscence of things to be sought in themselves;

3. Improperly and according to likeness, it is about concupiscences of those things which someone cannot use badly (for example, virtues), when someone is wholly led by good concupiscence as the incontinent man is led by evil concupiscence. And such incontinence is not sin but pertains to the perfection of virtue.

1032. Remarks. - 1. Incontinence is a lesser sin than intemperance, because the intemperate man sins from a permanent evil habit, the incontinent man from a passing passion.

For a) "where there is a greater inclination of the will to sin, there the sin is graver. But in him who is intemperate, the will is inclined to sin from its own choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired by custom; but in him who is incontinent, the will is inclined to sin from some passion. And because passion quickly passes, but habit is a quality difficult to move, hence it is that the incontinent man at once repents when the passion has passed, which does not happen concerning the intemperate man; indeed he rejoices that he has sinned, because the operation of sin has become connatural to him according to habit... Hence it is clear that the intemperate man is much worse than the incontinent man" (q. 156, a. 3);

b) voluntary ignorance also is greater in the intemperate man; "for the ignorance of the incontinent man is considered with respect to some particular eligible thing, insofar as namely he judges that this is now to be chosen; but the intemperate man has ignorance concerning the end itself, insofar as namely he judges this to be good, that he should follow concupiscences unbridledly" (ad 1);

c) hence "his healing is more difficult for two reasons. The first of these is on the part of reason, which has been corrupted concerning the estimation of the ultimate end; which is as a principle in demonstrative matters. But he who errs concerning a principle is more difficultly reduced to truth, and similarly in operative matters he who errs concerning the end. The other is on the part of the inclination of the appetite, which in the intemperate man is from habit, which is difficultly removed; but the inclination of the incontinent man is from passion, which can more easily be repressed" (ad 2).

2. He who has efficaciously retracted a vicious habit, for example of intemperance, but has not yet extirpated it, is not simply intemperate, since that habit is no longer voluntary to him; hence if from the inclination of the remaining habit he happens to sin, he seems rather to be assimilated to the incontinent man who falls from passion than to the intemperate man who sins from a voluntary habit.

3. On the part of the passion by which reason is overcome, incontinence of concupiscence is more shameful than incontinence of anger, for four reasons: a) "because the motion of anger participates somewhat in reason, insofar as namely the angry man tends to avenge an injury done to him, which reason in some way dictates, but not perfectly, because it does not intend the due mode of vengeance; but the motion of concupiscence is totally according to sense, and in no way according to reason; b) because the motion of anger more follows the temperament of the body, because of the swiftness of the motion of choler, which tends to anger; hence it is more ready at hand that he who according to the temperament of the body is disposed to being angry becomes angry, than that he who is disposed to concupiscence concupisces...; but that which proceeds from a natural disposition of the body is reckoned more worthy of pardon; c) because anger seeks to work openly; but concupiscence seeks hiding-places and steals in deceitfully; d) because the concupiscent man works pleasurably; but the angry man as if compelled by a certain preceding sadness." But incontinence of anger for the most part is graver by reason of the evil effects to which it leads, as to those things which pertain to harm of neighbor (q. 156, a. 4).

1. This is not to be understood as if the temperate man feels no further rebellious motions of concupiscence in himself; but a man endowed with the virtue of temperance suffers less frequent and vehement motions and more easily represses the motions.

2. It belongs to reason as first mover, to the will as subject.

CONTINENCE is the virtue restraining the exorbitant movements of the will, which usually arise from the movement of the passions of the sensitive appetite moving the will toward things contrary to right reason. On this Aristotle 7. Eth. The Holy Doctor defines it in Opusc. declarat. termin. Theol.: Continence is the regimen of concupiscence by the governance of counsel. It is gathered from Cicero 2. de Invent., as the Holy Doctor notes in Compend. Theol. lib. 5. cap. 35.

On Continence you have many things from the Holy Fathers in St. Bonavent. lib. 3. Pharetrae, cap. 45., where it is also taken by them for Chastity, but we now treat of Continence, by which the will is strengthened against the assaults of the passions. Now this, since it does not also bring it about that such perturbed movements of the passions are checked, but only that the will, while they arise, is not conquered and drawn away from what is consonant with reason, is not a wholly perfect virtue; as Valentia notes, disp. 9. quaest. 1. puncto 2., although, inasmuch as it obtains victory against the arising passions, it can be in some manner called a virtue, as St. Thom. teaches, art. 1., from Aristotle 4. Eth. cap. 5.

Incontinence, indeed, in its universality extends to all vices; nevertheless it is a special vice opposed to Temperance — namely to that potential part of it which is continence, and which is opposed to the passions by bridling them, lest they rush in.

Hence incontinence in this sense consists in a lapse into unbridled passion, and therefore the intemperate man sins more gravely than the incontinent, as Aristotle says, 7 Eth. cap. 8; D. Thomas, art. 3: for the intemperate man sins from habit, but the incontinent from passion.

But the incontinence of concupiscence is more typical than that of anger. First, because the movement of concupiscence is wholly according to sense; but the movement of anger participates somewhat in reason. Second, because the movement of anger follows more the complexion of the body on account of the swiftness of the motion of the choler, which tends to anger; whence from the irascible the irascible are more frequently born, than from the concupiscent the concupiscent. Third, because anger seeks to act manifestly; but concupiscence seeks hiding places. Fourth, because concupiscence acts with delight; but the angry man as if from a certain sadness. So S. Thomas, art. 4, from Aristotle, 7 Eth. cap. 6. D. Bonaventure, p. p. Centil. sect. 18, makes incontinence a daughter of vainglory, and describes it thus: Incontinence is the will, by conforming itself, desiring to be praised by those who are evil.