Question One: On Continence

S. Th. II-II, q. 155 and 156.

1029. Continence (zelfbeheersching, inhouding) is taken in various ways:

1. Generally, it imports the firmness of reason and will which contains itself within itself, that is, in that which befits reason, lest it flow forth to illicit things; and this is the entirely general sense: abstinence from every illicit thing.

2. But specially it is firmness of reason and will by which someone resists any evil concupiscences whatever which vehemently exist in him.

3. But because the chief concupiscences according to touch, namely of foods and venereal things, are more vehement and more difficult to overcome, because they more follow the inclinations of nature in the conservation of the individual and of the species, therefore continence properly is a disposition of the will by which resistance is made to the chief depraved concupiscences according to the pleasures of touch. Hence he who resists passions in the matter of temperance, especially in venereal pleasures which are more vehement, is called simply continent; he who resists passions in other matters is not called continent simply but in a certain respect, as continent of anger, of avarice, of gain, of honor, etc.

4. Sometimes continence is taken in a perfect sense for abstinence from every voluntary venereal pleasure, so that one may be wholly intent upon more perfect goods, and thus perfect continence is principally virginity, secondarily widowhood.

Hence continence is defined: A habitual disposition of the will for resisting the impulses of depraved concupiscence, especially of the pleasures of touch, most of all venereal pleasures; or, a disposition of the will by which resistance is made to depraved concupiscences concerning touch.

1030. Continence is a good habit and has something of the account of virtue, because it denotes firmness of soul, insofar as by it reason is strengthened against passions lest it be led away by them; yet it is not a virtue in the strict and full sense, because it does not render man perfect: a) for it is an imperfection to resist the motions of concupiscence and not to consent; perfection is to have mastery over them; but continence does not attain moral perfection, according to which the sensitive appetite also is subjected to reason, so that passions contrary to reason do not rise up in it so vehemently and so frequently;1 b) it is also a habit easily movable. Hence:

1. Continence is not in the sensitive appetite, namely in the concupiscible power, but in the will.2 Every habit existing in some subject makes that subject differ from the disposition which it has while subjected to the opposite vice. But the sensitive appetite has itself in the same way in him who is continent and in him who is incontinent, because in both it bursts forth toward vehement depraved concupiscences. Therefore continence is not in the sensitive appetite as in its subject. But it is in the will, which through continence is disposed to choose to resist depraved concupiscences, by which the incontinent man permits himself to be overcome (q. 155, a. 3).

2. "Continence has as its matter the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch, not as moderating them (which belongs to temperance, which is in the concupiscible power), but it is about them as resisting them. Hence it must be in another power, because resistance is toward another" (ad 1). For "although passions are not in the will as in their subject, nevertheless it is in the power of the will to resist them; and in this way the will of the continent man resists concupiscences" (ad 3).

3. Continence differs from temperance as the imperfect and begun differs from the perfect and completed. Temperance represses the sensitive appetite concerning concupiscences of touch, subjects it to reason, and renders it obedient; continence resists it as it rises up and still struggles against reason. Hence temperance is better. For a) "the good of reason is stronger in him who is temperate, in whom even the sensitive appetite itself is subjected to reason and as it were tamed by reason, than in him who is continent, in whom the sensitive appetite vehemently resists reason through depraved concupiscences" (a. 4);

b) "the will is nearer to reason than the concupiscible power. Hence the good of reason, from which virtue is praised, is shown to exist more from the fact that it reaches not only to the will, but also even to the concupiscible power, which happens in him who is temperate, than if it reaches only to the will, as happens in him who is continent" (ad 3).

1031. Incontinence is opposed to continence and therefore pertains more to the soul than to the body. For each thing is attributed more to that which is the cause per se than to that which only furnishes the occasion. But vehement passions, which from the disposition of the body rise up in the sensitive appetite, which is a power of an organic body, are only the occasion of incontinence, because, while the use of reason remains, man can resist them and not consent. Therefore the cause per se of incontinence is on the part of the soul, which by reason does not resist the passions; and indeed in a twofold way: a) when the soul yields to the passions before reason takes counsel, and then there is unbridled concupiscence or flying ahead, either from swiftness, as in the choleric, or from vehemence, as in the melancholic; b) when man is inconstant in those things concerning which he has taken counsel by reason and has judged, and then there is weakness, from softness of temperament as in women, and in the phlegmatic.

Hence incontinence:

1. Properly and simply is about pleasures of touch, and in this way it is sin for a twofold reason: in one way from the fact that the incontinent man withdraws from that which is according to reason; in another way from the fact that someone immerses himself in certain shameful pleasures;

2. Properly and in a certain respect is about pleasures from cognition of exterior things good in themselves (honor, riches, vengeance), namely when man in these does not observe the mode of reason: thus it is sin, not from the fact that someone plunges himself into depraved concupiscences, but from the fact that he does not observe the due mode of reason in the concupiscence of things to be sought in themselves;

3. Improperly and according to likeness, it is about concupiscences of those things which someone cannot use badly (for example, virtues), when someone is wholly led by good concupiscence as the incontinent man is led by evil concupiscence. And such incontinence is not sin but pertains to the perfection of virtue.

1032. Remarks. - 1. Incontinence is a lesser sin than intemperance, because the intemperate man sins from a permanent evil habit, the incontinent man from a passing passion.

For a) "where there is a greater inclination of the will to sin, there the sin is graver. But in him who is intemperate, the will is inclined to sin from its own choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired by custom; but in him who is incontinent, the will is inclined to sin from some passion. And because passion quickly passes, but habit is a quality difficult to move, hence it is that the incontinent man at once repents when the passion has passed, which does not happen concerning the intemperate man; indeed he rejoices that he has sinned, because the operation of sin has become connatural to him according to habit... Hence it is clear that the intemperate man is much worse than the incontinent man" (q. 156, a. 3);

b) voluntary ignorance also is greater in the intemperate man; "for the ignorance of the incontinent man is considered with respect to some particular eligible thing, insofar as namely he judges that this is now to be chosen; but the intemperate man has ignorance concerning the end itself, insofar as namely he judges this to be good, that he should follow concupiscences unbridledly" (ad 1);

c) hence "his healing is more difficult for two reasons. The first of these is on the part of reason, which has been corrupted concerning the estimation of the ultimate end; which is as a principle in demonstrative matters. But he who errs concerning a principle is more difficultly reduced to truth, and similarly in operative matters he who errs concerning the end. The other is on the part of the inclination of the appetite, which in the intemperate man is from habit, which is difficultly removed; but the inclination of the incontinent man is from passion, which can more easily be repressed" (ad 2).

2. He who has efficaciously retracted a vicious habit, for example of intemperance, but has not yet extirpated it, is not simply intemperate, since that habit is no longer voluntary to him; hence if from the inclination of the remaining habit he happens to sin, he seems rather to be assimilated to the incontinent man who falls from passion than to the intemperate man who sins from a voluntary habit.

3. On the part of the passion by which reason is overcome, incontinence of concupiscence is more shameful than incontinence of anger, for four reasons: a) "because the motion of anger participates somewhat in reason, insofar as namely the angry man tends to avenge an injury done to him, which reason in some way dictates, but not perfectly, because it does not intend the due mode of vengeance; but the motion of concupiscence is totally according to sense, and in no way according to reason; b) because the motion of anger more follows the temperament of the body, because of the swiftness of the motion of choler, which tends to anger; hence it is more ready at hand that he who according to the temperament of the body is disposed to being angry becomes angry, than that he who is disposed to concupiscence concupisces...; but that which proceeds from a natural disposition of the body is reckoned more worthy of pardon; c) because anger seeks to work openly; but concupiscence seeks hiding-places and steals in deceitfully; d) because the concupiscent man works pleasurably; but the angry man as if compelled by a certain preceding sadness." But incontinence of anger for the most part is graver by reason of the evil effects to which it leads, as to those things which pertain to harm of neighbor (q. 156, a. 4).

1. This is not to be understood as if the temperate man feels no further rebellious motions of concupiscence in himself; but a man endowed with the virtue of temperance suffers less frequent and vehement motions and more easily represses the motions.

2. It belongs to reason as first mover, to the will as subject.