Section — McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology

Continence

2544.

Continence

Continence.—(a) Its Nature.—This quality, as here taken, is the state of one who has not gained mastery over the passions sufficient to keep down strong, frequent and persistent rebellions, but whose will is firmly disposed to resist their attacks. It is less than a moral virtue, then, since it does not tranquillize the lower appetites. The temperate man has already subdued his passions, and hence he is less disturbed by them, or at least he has less trouble in rejecting their onsets.

(b) Its Relation to Temperance.—Greater difficulty increases merit, if it is due to the presence of a corporal or external impediment (e.g., a man of sickly constitution or one who suffers great opposition deserves more credit for his work than a man of vigorous constitution or one who enjoys great favors and opportunities); not, however, if it is due to the absence of a spiritual excellence (e.g., a man who finds work hard because he is lazy does not deserve more credit than another who finds it easy because he is industrious). Hence, temperance is more deserving than continence, for it controls passion with greater ease simply because it has subjected not only the higher but also the lower appetite to the dictates of reason.

(c) Its Opposite.—The vice opposed to continence is incontinence, which does not follow the dictate of reason to resist the onslaughts of passion; it sees and approves the higher things, but it follows the lower. This sin is less grievous than intemperance, just as a passing indisposition is less harmful than a settled malady. For passion comes and goes, and the incontinent man quickly regrets his weakness; but a sinful habit of gluttony or impurity is permanent, and is so like a second nature that its votaries rejoice when they have satisfied their desires (Prov., ii. 14). Incontinence in pleasure is more disgraceful than incontinence in anger, for anger is less distant from reason; but on the other hand the irascible man usually sins more grievously by the greater harm he does to others. It is more difficult to contain oneself from wrath than from intemperance in the sense that wrath storms the soul by a more vehement and compelling attack; yet, it is harder to be unconquered by pleasure, because it lays persistent siege to the soul and demands a more unwearied vigilance.