What Penance forgives

Since the sacrament of penance was instituted for producing the remission of sins ex opere operato, it must be treated briefly, so that those things which below must be said concerning this sacrament may be declared more clearly. From these things at the same time the way is known by which the sinner can recover sanctifying grace lost through sin.

The effects of a fruitful reception of this sacrament are the forgiveness of all mortal sins and of all venial sins which are confessed with due sorrow, the consequent remission of the eternal punishment due to mortal sin, and a partial remission according to the dispositions of the penitent of the temporal punishment which his sins have deserved.

Sins which are confessed to a priest who has the requisite jurisdiction to absolve them are forgiven directly by virtue of the power of the keys. On the other hand, if without fault on the part of the penitent some sin is not confessed and the penitent has the requisite sorrow, the sin will be forgiven indirectly, inasmuch as the absolution will take its effect and infuse sanctifying grace into the soul, and this sanctifying grace expels all grievous sin from the soul... The absolution will also be indirect when the priest has not faculties for some sin or sins confessed, but for some special reason he is justified in giving the penitent absolution.

After we have explained that the act of doing penance is necessary for the remission of any sin whatever, or, in other words, that sins are not remitted without penance, it must be seen whether and to what extent the very act of doing penance remits sins, both mortal and venial; likewise whether and to what extent it produces other effects, for example the remission of remaining temporal punishment, etc. For the sake of completeness and clarity, we shall treat the individual effects in distinct sections, and we shall explain all the things which regard each effect.

The effects of the sacrament of Penance are:

1. Sanctifying grace, whether first grace, or, if the penitent is already in the state of grace, second grace.

2. Sacramental grace. This consists in the fact that the sanctifying grace which the sacrament of Penance confers gives a right to actual graces by which past sins are entirely taken away and future sins are guarded against.

3. Remission of eternal punishment and the reviviscence of merits.

4. Remission of temporal punishment, proportioned to the disposition of the penitent;¹ likewise by the power of sacramental satisfaction.

5. Peace and serenity of conscience, according to these words of the Council of Trent: "Indeed the reality and effect of this sacrament, so far as its force and efficacy are concerned, is reconciliation with God, which sometimes, in devout men who receive this sacrament with devotion, is wont to be followed by peace and serenity of conscience with vehement consolation of spirit."²

¹ Cf. Council of Trent, Session 14, chapter 2.

² Session 14, chapter 3.

456. QUESTION 2. Does contrition remit not only guilt, but also the punishment due to guilt?

Reply 1. It certainly remits eternal punishment, because a man justified through contrition cannot remain liable to eternal damnation.

Reply 2. According to its greater or lesser intensity, it also remits a part of the temporal punishment due to mortal or venial sins which have been blotted out. Hence very intense perfect contrition can abolish even every punishment; but by its nature it does not necessarily have this efficacy. This is gathered from Trent, sess. 6, ch. 14 and canon 30. - Likewise from sess. 14, De Poenitentia, ch. 8 and canon 12.

186. 1° From the things said above concerning the power of the keys (n. 20 sq.), it is already permitted to infer that through the sacrament of penance all sins committed after baptism are truly pardoned before God, and that no sin is irremissible. We have already proved this from many testimonies, while at the same time explaining the texts of Scripture and of the Fathers from which the adversaries propose difficulties. - That the same sins are truly blotted out and not merely scraped away, so that they do not return on account of a subsequent sin, was proved in the Treatise on Grace, where we treated of justification.

Here it is enough to solve the difficulty which Protestants and Rationalists today propose, and which in the time of Augustine was already being urged by heretics and pagans: "You," they said, "make men sin, since you promise them pardon if they do penance." Augustine eloquently refutes this, showing that by the promise of pardon souls are induced to penance, while, on the contrary, if this hope is removed, they fall into despair, and consequently into the mire of vices: "If the entrance to penance were closed, would not that sinner add sins to sins all the more, the more he despaired of being forgiven? For he would say to himself: Behold, I have sinned, behold, I have committed a crime, now there is no place of pardon for me; penance is fruitless; I must be damned; why now do I not live as I will? Since I do not find charity there, here at least I shall feed cupidity. Why then should I abstain? Every place there is closed to me: here, whatever I do not do, I lose, because the life which is to be after this will not be given to me. Why therefore do I not serve my lusts, so that I may fulfill and satiate them?... Therefore, if you take away the harbor of penance, they will increase sins by despair." But he who has hoped for pardon cannot increase sins as he wishes; for Scripture admonishes him not to defer penance and not to be hardened in sin; for suddenly he can be struck by death and fall into the hands of the living God. Thus therefore he concludes: "Behold, the providence of God has watched over us for both things. Lest by despairing we should increase sins, the harbor of penance has been proposed; again, lest by hoping we should increase them, the day of death has been given as uncertain."¹

¹ St. Augustine, sermon 352, n. 9; P. L., t. XXXIX, p. 1559-1560.

187. Corollary. From this it follows that one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another. For (a) sin is not taken away except through the infusion of habitual grace; but any mortal sin is directly contrary to habitual grace and excludes it; therefore one lethal sin cannot be remitted without another: for, if one remains in the soul, it totally excludes grace. (b) Sin cannot be remitted without true penance, to which it belongs to detest sin insofar as it is an offense against God; but the same reason applies to one as to the other lethal sins, all of which truly offend God; therefore someone cannot truly be penitent concerning one sin without repenting of all the others, if he actually thinks of them.¹

¹ St. Thomas, 3, q. 86, a. 3.

189. (A) The sacrament of penance always remits eternal punishment together with the fault. It is certain; (a) for Trent teaches¹ that a penitent, after receiving absolution, is bound to satisfy through fastings, alms, and prayers, "not indeed for eternal punishment, which is remitted either by the sacrament or by the intention of the sacrament together with the fault; but for temporal punishment, which, as the sacred letters teach, is not always wholly dismissed for them, as happens in Baptism"... (b) The reason is clear from the things said; for the remission of mortal sin occurs through the infusion of habitual grace; but habitual grace makes us sharers in the divine nature, friends of God, and His adoptive children with a right to eternal beatitude, as we demonstrated in the Treatise on Grace (n. 139 sq.); therefore it remits eternal punishment.

¹ Trent, sess. VI, ch. 14.

190. (B) The Sacrament of Penance also diminishes the temporal punishment due to sin, and indeed in a twofold way:

(a) By reason of absolution; for, as Lugo says,² since it is certainly for God, when He commutes eternal punishment into temporal punishment, to be able to change it into a graver and more lasting temporal punishment. Therefore we ought to give thanks to God, both because He has remitted eternal punishment, and because He has not commuted it into some other greater temporal punishment, as He most justly could; and in this sense eternal punishment is never remitted without some temporal punishment being remitted at the same time, into which it could have been commuted.

² Lugo, disp. VIII, n. 64.

(b) By reason of satisfaction, or of the penance imposed by the Priest; for, according to Trent (ch. 3), satisfaction is one of the three parts which pertain to the integrity of the sacrament and concur toward the full and perfect remission of sins; but satisfaction does not directly concur toward the remission of fault, since this is remitted before satisfaction is completed; therefore it concurs toward the remission of punishment. This indeed it accomplishes ex opere operato, according to the common opinion, which holds that the three acts of the penitent are the proximate matter of the sacrament.

(C) The Sacrament of Penance does not always take away the whole temporal punishment, as we have already proved, but sometimes it does accomplish this, namely if contrition is most intense. For since temporal punishment of this kind is finite, contrition can be so intense that it remits it adequately and totally.

191. State of the question. When someone is justified by the sacrament of Penance, he receives, together with habitual grace, the infused virtues which he had lost through sin: for since virtues of this kind flow from grace, as properties from essence, when grace is restored, the virtues are likewise restored, and indeed with an intensity proportioned to the perfection of the subject's disposition. But besides this, the question is whether merits mortified by sin revive.

¹ St. Thomas, 3 p. q. 89; Suarez, Opusc. V, De meritis mortificatis; Salmantic., de Merito, disp. V; Billuart, diss. III, a. 5; Palmieri, th. 19; de Augustinis, p. I, art. 10; Billot, p. 94-108.

For the understanding of this, a few things must be noted beforehand concerning various works in relation to merit. (a) Living works are called those which are done in the state of grace, with actual grace stirring and assisting, both because they are from a spiritually living principle, and because they merit eternal life. (b) Dead works are those which, although good and supernatural, are done in the state of sin, and consequently are not meritorious of eternal life. (c) Death-bearing works are those which deprive a man of the life of grace, such as mortal sins. (d) Mortified works are called those works which, done in the state of grace, are hindered from their effect by subsequent mortal sin, insofar as they are no longer able to lead a man to eternal life. Now the question is whether merits thus mortified can revive. Theologians commonly answer affirmatively, but there is controversy concerning the mode and degree in which they revive.

192. Thesis: When sin has been remitted through penance, works previously done in charity and mortified by subsequent sin revive. Thus commonly.

(a) The matter cannot be proved by Scripture alone; but the Fathers use two texts to propose their doctrine concerning reviviscence. First they allege these words of the epistle to the Hebrews: "For God is not unjust, that He should forget your work and the love which you have shown in His name, you who have ministered to the saints and do minister";¹ but, as the Fathers and theologians argue, here there is question of works done in grace and mortified; for the Apostle addresses the Hebrews, some of whom had fallen into sin; therefore God does not forget the good works of those who do penance, but remunerates them. To the point St. Epiphanius says:² "In this you see how he pronounced that that second restoration could by no means be made, and yet he did not exclude from salvation those who repented of their sin; but he also said that they were near to salvation, and that God is rightly the receiver of the things done by those who take up absolute penance for their offenses." The Fathers deduce the same from another place:³ "So great things have you suffered without cause, if nevertheless without cause"; for Jerome says on this place:⁴ "Whoever has labored on account of faith in Christ and afterward has fallen into sin, just as he is said to have suffered the former things without cause while he sins, so again he does not lose them, if he returns to his former faith."

¹ Heb. 6:10.

² St. Epiphanius, Haeres., 59, n. 2; P. L., XLI, 1019.

³ Gal. 3:4.

⁴ Comment. on Gal., l. I, ch. 3; P. L., t. XXVI, p. 350.

(b) From Trent also the thesis can be gathered: for it declares that the good works of the just "truly merit an increase of grace and the attainment of eternal life, provided, however, that he has departed in grace";⁵ but there it is not required that someone persevere without interruption from first justification until death, but only that he depart in grace; therefore, if someone has sinned mortally and afterward repents, his merits revive.

⁵ Trent, sess. VI, can. 32.

(c) It is recommended by reason. Works done in charity, if they are considered according to themselves, always remain in divine acceptance, and therefore they are said to be mortified only because through sin they are hindered from their effect, insofar as one sinning mortally is unworthy of eternal life; but such an impediment is taken away through penance; therefore works previously mortified, through penance, recover the force of leading to eternal life the one who performed them.¹ Moreover God does not will to punish a remitted sin with any eternal punishment; but if merits previously acquired were not restored, once the fault has been remitted, sin would be punished with an eternal punishment; for the privation of glory corresponding to those merits would be a true punishment, and indeed an eternal one; therefore.

¹ St. Thomas, 3, q. 89, a. 5.

193. But concerning the mode and degree in which merits revive, there is dispute among theologians, and nothing certain can be defined:

(a) The first opinion holds, with Banez (2. 2. q. 24, a. 6), that mortified works revive only in this sense, that glory will be given to a just man rising again from sin by a twofold title, namely both on account of the preceding merits and on account of the new ones acquired from the last justification, yet not a greater glory than is due to these latter merits; nevertheless there will be some accidental reward for the preceding works, insofar as the elect will rejoice concerning their reviviscence. Yet this opinion is deservedly rejected, since it seems to deny the reviviscence itself: for what does it profit to receive the same quantity of glory by a twofold title?

(b) The second opinion teaches that all mortified works are indeed restored immediately after penance, with respect to the merit of eternal life, but not with respect to the quantity of habitual grace previously had; namely the habitual grace itself previously lost will not be restored except at the instant of death, or after death, at the first instant of glorification. The reason is that grace in justification is not given except according to each one's disposition and cooperation;² but not according to merits previously acquired. Thus Scotus and the Salmanticenses.

² This principle St. Thomas explains thus, q. 89, a. 2: "Forms which can receive more and less are intensified and remitted according to the diverse disposition of the subject... And from this it is that according as the motion of free will in penance is more intense or more remiss, according to this the penitent obtains greater or lesser grace."

(c) According to the third opinion, which Dominic Soto and Ledesma defend, merits so revive according to the degree of the present disposition, that if someone elicits an act of contrition as five, he receives ten degrees of grace, five by reason of preceding merits, and five by reason of the actual disposition.

(d) But Suarez (op. cit., disput. II), with many moderns, holds that all merits acquired before are immediately restored to the penitent sinner, both with respect to the right to glory and with respect to grace. For merits of this kind, from the things said, always remain in the acceptance of God, and are hindered from their effect only by mortal sin; therefore, when sin has been remitted, the impediment is immediately removed, and nothing prevents past merits from immediately obtaining their whole effect. We freely embrace this opinion as the more benign, but at the same time we confess that the solution of this question depends on the will of God alone, which is not sufficiently known to us from Scripture and Tradition.

194. Thus far we have directly treated of the remission of mortal sin; yet it is expedient to add a few things concerning the remission of venial sins.

¹ St. Thomas, 3 p. q. 87; Suarez, disp. XI-XII; de Augustinis, p. I, a. 9.

(A) Venial sin cannot be remitted without grace; for, from the things said in the Treatise on Grace, nothing supernatural can be accomplished without grace; but the remission of venial sin is something supernatural, since it removes an impediment by which we are delayed from the supernatural end. Hence in the Second Council of Orange, can. 14 (Denzinger, n. 157), it is read: "No wretched man is freed from any wretchedness unless he is forestalled by the mercy of God."

195. (B) Venial sin joined with mortal sin cannot be remitted without the infusion of habitual grace. For the remission of any fault supposes divine friendship; for it is a favor granted gratuitously, not owed; but divine friendship is not restored to the sinner except through the infusion of habitual grace. But venial sin in one who is already in the state of grace can be remitted of itself without the infusion of habitual grace; for, as St. Thomas says (q. 87, a. 2), each thing is taken away by its opposite; but the opposite of venial sin is not habitual grace, which is not lost through it, but the fervor of charity; therefore venial sin can be taken away of itself through a fervent act without the infusion of grace. This is illustrated by a comparison: for just as a body can happen to be stained in two ways, by the privation of beauty or by the superaddition of mud or dust, so also the soul is stained in two ways, by the privation of the beauty of grace or by a disordered inclination to temporal things, or venial sin: the former stain can be taken away only by the infusion of grace, but the latter is removed by this very fact, that by an act of fervor the disordered adherence to temporal things ceases.

196. (C) Venial sins of the just can be remitted ex opere operato and ex opere operantis: (a) ex opere operantis, namely through an act of contrition or of perfect charity, according to all, indeed more probably through an act of attrition. The Angelic Doctor (q. 87, a. 1) thus proves that some contrition is required for the remission of venial sin: venial sin, although it is not aversion from God as last end, contains some disorder, insofar as it delays the affection of man, lest it be borne promptly toward God; but such disorder cannot be taken away except by a contrary disposition, namely detestation and retraction of sin: for if the will perseveres in that disordered adherence to temporal things, the sin itself will adhere to the soul, since, while the cause remains, the effect remains.

Surely the best disposition is perfect contrition, since it takes away even mortal sin; but more probably attrition also suffices; for venial sins, if they are compared with mortal ones, are light, and consequently the same disposition is not required for the remission of venial sins as for mortal sins; therefore less perfect contrition, or attrition, suffices. Moreover the one attrite concerning venial sin immediately becomes contrite through habitual charity, as was said concerning the attrite person receiving the sacrament of penance, above n. 142.

Nor is it necessary that this attrition be formal; virtual is enough, for example when someone is borne toward God in such a way that whatever would occur to him that might delay him from this motion would displease him, and he would grieve that he had committed it, even if he does not actually think of it.

(b) Ex opere operato, through the reception of the sacraments, provided that there is no obstacle, that is, virtual or actual complacency in venial sin; this indeed is certain concerning Baptism, Penance, and Extreme Unction, which have the remission of sins as their proper effect; it is also asserted more probably concerning the others, which were instituted for the sanctification of souls, and therefore for fostering the fervor of charity, to which venial sins are opposed. But sacramentals, as we said elsewhere, remit venial sins indirectly, by stirring up sentiments of contrition and charity in the soul.

197. (D) One venial sin can be remitted without the others, namely if someone truly grieves over one, but not over the rest. Whence only then is full remission of all venial sins obtained when no affection for venial sins is retained. For from the things said, venial sin is not remitted unless it is at least virtually detested, and moreover one can be retracted without the others displeasing.

Preliminary note. Since in the present order of things no true virtue of penance can exist without the sacrament of penance received at least in voto, the effects of the virtue and of the sacrament of penance in fact almost coincide, although the manner of producing them is diverse. The effects of penance are customarily called by dogmatic theologians the justification of the impious. Let the following things be stated briefly concerning it. All the effects of penance can be reduced to three, namely: 1. the remission of all sins; 2. the infusion of grace; 3. the reviviscence of merits.

335. 1. Through penance all sins, whether mortal or venial, can be remitted.

"If the wicked man do penance, ... I will not remember all his iniquities which he hath wrought."⁸⁵ "If your sins be as scarlet, they shall be made as white as snow."⁸⁶ Hence the Lord also said to the Apostles: "Whatsoever you shall loose," making no limitation. For the remission of mortal sin the sacrament of penance received at least in voto is altogether required. But the venial sin of a man who exists in the state of sanctifying grace can be remitted even ex opere operantis without the sacrament of penance. For the Council of Trent⁸⁷ teaches that "venial sins can be expiated by many other remedies." But no sin, even venial, is remitted without some penance at least virtual,⁸⁸ which consists in the detestation of sin. For it is impossible that God remit fault to that man who does not will to abandon sin. Virtual penance can be exercised in many ways, for example, if someone asks pardon of sins from God, if someone exercises the virtue contrary to the sins committed, or if someone exercises even other virtues with the intention of obtaining pardon of sins.⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Ezek. 18:21 f.

⁸⁶ Isa. 1:18.

⁸⁷ Session 14, c. 5, On Penance (Denz., n. 899).

⁸⁸ S. theol. 3, q. 87, a. 2 ad 2.

⁸⁹ S. theol. 3, q. 87, a. 3.

336. 2. Through penance sanctifying grace is infused.

For it is of faith that in justification sins are not only covered or no longer imputed, as the Protestants maintain, but on the contrary man is made pleasing to God. Now no one can be pleasing to God without sanctifying grace. Therefore sins are remitted through the infusion of sanctifying grace. But because sanctifying grace and sin cannot exist at the same time in the same man, for they are incompatible like water and fire, when one mortal sin is remitted, all are remitted; and when one is not remitted, none is remitted. From these things it follows that the penitent must elicit contrition for absolutely all mortal sins committed. It is otherwise with venial sins; for mortal sin can be remitted without venial sin, and likewise one venial sin without another, but a venial sin cannot be remitted unless the mortal sin is also remitted, since he who wishes to remain an enemy of God is unworthy of pardon. For the remission of venial sin some influx of sanctifying grace is always required.⁹⁰

From the infusion of sanctifying grace the following effects are produced:

a) When the fault is remitted, the eternal punishment, that is, of Gehenna, is also remitted, but not always the whole temporal punishment. That eternal punishment is always remitted follows manifestly from the nature of sanctifying grace, since it renders a man pleasing to God and an heir of eternal glory. Therefore it is impossible that the same man should still be worthy of eternal punishment to be discharged in Gehenna. The Council of Trent, however, defined that through penance the whole temporal punishment is not always remitted. For it admonishes penitents after absolution has been received to make satisfaction through fasts, alms, and prayers, "not indeed for the eternal punishment, which is remitted together with the fault either by the sacrament or by the desire for the sacrament, but for the temporal punishment, which, as Sacred Scripture teaches, is not always wholly remitted to them, as is done in baptism."⁹¹ That when mortal sin is remitted God does not always forgive the whole temporal punishment is clear from several examples of Sacred Scripture, for example, from the sin of David, which indeed was remitted, but the adulterine son had to die; Moses was forbidden to enter the promised land because of a sin of distrust, remitted indeed as to fault but not as to the whole punishment. The most manifest example, however, is original sin itself, which indeed is remitted as to fault, but whose penalties remain.

b) With grace all the virtues, both theological and moral, are infused,⁹² and sacramental grace is granted, that is, a right to those helps by which the penitent man thoroughly wipes away past stains and guards against future ones.

⁹⁰ Ibid., a. 4.

⁹¹ Session 6, c. 14, On Justification (Denz., n. 807).

⁹² Cf. above, in the treatise on the virtues, I, n. 472.

337. 3. Through penance the reviviscence of merits is obtained.

Theologians customarily distinguish four kinds of works: some are living works, namely, those which proceed from grace, the principle of spiritual life; others are dead works, which, although objectively good, were nevertheless performed by a man existing in the state of mortal sin, for example, an alms given by a sinner; others are death-dealing works, that is, mortal sins, which bring spiritual death upon the soul; finally, others are mortified works, which are good works performed in the state of grace but which, through the subsequent state of sin, have lost all merit. Through penance mortified works revive. Living works do not need reviviscence, as is evident. Death-dealing works, or mortal sins, do not revive through penance but are thoroughly destroyed. Nor do dead works revive, since they never had life. That mortified works, or merits which through subsequent sin have been deprived of efficacy, revive through penance is certain and admitted by all theologians; nevertheless, it is not properly of faith.

Proof 1. From Sacred Scripture. "The wickedness of the wicked shall not hurt him, in whatsoever day he shall turn."⁹³ But wickedness would hurt very greatly if through it all prior merits were irrevocably lost.

Proof 2. From the Council of Trent,⁹⁴ which requires three conditions for human works to be meritorious and to obtain eternal life, namely: a) that they be works of a justified man; b) that they be done in God, or by the grace of God; c) that the one acting depart in the state of grace. But mortified merits have the first two conditions, while they recover the third through the virtue of penance. Arguments drawn from the authority of the Holy Fathers may be seen in Billuart.⁹⁵

Proof 3. From theological reason this reviviscence of merits is commended. It is very consonant with divine mercy that those works which were once good, meritorious, and accepted by God in order to eternal life should always remain so unless a grave obstacle occurs. Such an obstacle indeed is mortal sin, but it is removed through penance. Therefore merits acquired before the state of sin are recovered if the sin is removed.⁹⁶

The manner and degree of this reviviscence. Although all theologians agree concerning the fact itself of reviviscence, nevertheless they depart into many diverse opinions when they discuss the degree and quantity of reviviscence.

The first opinion holds that all merits acquired before sin, after penance has been performed, are immediately restored to the justified man both as to grace and as to the right to glory. Thus Suarez in his opusculum on the reviviscence of merits, and several others, especially modern authors.

The second opinion holds that all merits do not always revive, but according to the quantity of present penance and charity. Thus several Thomists, for example, Dominic Soto, Ledesma, and Gonet.

The third opinion teaches that merits revive only as to the right to accidental glory, which is increased from the reviviscence, but that essential glory is not indeed increased, yet is granted under a twofold title, namely, because of grace newly acquired and merits possessed before sin. Thus Bañez, Sylvius, and Contenson.

The fourth opinion asserts that all merits indeed rise again as to the right to glory, but not as to the quantity of habitual grace previously possessed, since this is given according to the actual disposition of the penitent. But at the moment of death a justified man elicits an act of charity so perfect that he acquires anew all the grace previously possessed. Thus the Salamancans.

Billuart⁹⁷ rightly says that among so many opinions scarcely anything certain can be established. The first opinion is more benign, more consonant with divine mercy, and suffers no more difficulties than the others. He who desires more concerning this controversy should consult Billuart,⁹⁸ who defends yet another opinion.

⁹³ Ezek. 33:12.

⁹⁴ Session 6, can. 32, On Justification (Denz., n. 842).

⁹⁵ De poenit., diss. 3, a. 5.

⁹⁶ St. Thomas, S. theol. 3, q. 89, a. 5.

⁹⁷ Loc. cit.

⁹⁸ Loc. cit.

338. Scholion. On the mutual relation between the virtue and the sacrament of penance. It is useful here, the essence of penance having been explained, to set forth under one view wherein the sacrament and the virtue of penance agree and wherein they differ.

1. They agree in effect, namely, in the destruction of sin. Indeed, in the present order of things neither the sacrament without the virtue nor the virtue without the sacrament received at least in voto can destroy mortal sin. Therefore the virtue and the sacrament of penance are intimately connected, but nevertheless differ in many things, namely:

2. They differ a) as to nature. The virtue of penance is a habit whose acts are principally internal. But the sacrament of penance, as a sensible sign, contains proximate matter externally manifested, namely, the three acts of the penitent externally produced: contrition, confession made to a priest, and satisfaction. The absolution of the priest, likewise externally manifested, must be added as the form.

b) As to the manner of operating. The virtue of penance produces the effect of justification ex opere operantis, but the sacrament ex opere operato; wherefore attrition or imperfect contrition suffices in the latter, but the virtue of penance cannot justify except by means of perfect contrition.

c) As to necessity. For a man burdened with grave sin, the virtue of penance in re, and not only in voto, is necessary by a necessity of means; but the sacrament of penance actually received is necessary only by a necessity of precept; wherefore in necessity the desire for this sacrament suffices.

452. The proper effect of Penance is reparative healing from actual sin committed after Baptism.

Whence a) negatively it remits and takes away 1) every mortal sin with eternal punishment, 2) venial sins, 3) the temporal punishment due, at least partially; - b) positively: 4) it restores grace making one pleasing, with virtues and the merit of good works, and in the sacrament it gives special help against the wounds of sin, so as not to relapse.

Hence there are four questions, in which at the same time the virtue of Penance and the sacrament must be considered.

1. Thus Jerome, ep. 130 (otherwise 8), n. 6; Tertullian, On Penance, IV; Pacian, ep. I, n. 5; Ambrose, On Fallen Virgins, 8. Cf. Augustine, serm. 392.

Question 2. Whether contrition remits not only the fault, but also the punishment due to fault? Resp. It certainly remits eternal punishment, because a man justified through contrition cannot remain guilty of eternal damnation. Besides, according to the greater or lesser intensity of the same contrition, it also remits part of the temporal punishment due to mortal or venial sins that have been destroyed. Consequently very intense perfect contrition can also abolish all punishment; but it does not necessarily have this efficacy from its nature. This is drawn from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, chap. 14; and sess. 14, on Penance, chap. 8 and can. 12.