Envy

Envy is sadness on account of another’s good, inasmuch as it is regarded as lessening one’s own. It is directly opposed to charity, which inclines us to rejoice in the good of our neighbour, and is mortally sinful if the matter is serious. We must carefully distinguish envy from various other dispositions which bear some resemblance to it. Thus, if one is sorry because another has obtained something desirable, thereby making it impossible for himself to obtain it, it is not envy but emulation, which in itself is praiseworthy. Sadness because another has obtained a post of influence of which he is unworthy, is not envy nor sinful. In the same way, if one is sad because his enemy has obtained the means of doing him harm, there is no sin in such a disposition. Envy comes in where an equal, or one who is not much more than an equal, rises in position, power, or influence, and his rise is regarded with ill will because it seems to lower one’s self.

The ambitious are usually also envious, inasmuch as they see others enjoying what they wish to have for themselves. The mean-spirited, too, are commonly envious, since they look upon trivialities as matters of great importance, and the promotion of others, especially of the young, as a lowering of themselves.

I. Notion. Envy is sadness concerning the good of one's neighbor, estimated as one's own evil, i.e., as something diminishing one's own excellence (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36, a. 1). Now:

1. Envy differs: 1. from sadness concerning another's good insofar as from it you fear harm to yourself or to others, for example, concerning the eminent knowledge of a wicked deputy; 2. from sadness concerning the good of one's neighbor, not because the neighbor has it, but because it is lacking to you; "and this properly is zeal... and if this zeal is concerning honorable goods, it is praiseworthy, according to that saying in 1 Corinthians 14: Seek earnestly spiritual things" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36, a. 2); 3. from sadness concerning another's good because he is unworthy of that good, as if someone grieves over an office conferred on an unworthy person; "and this sadness... is called nemesis (or indignation) and belongs to good morals" (St. Thomas, cited place). So also St. Alphonsus, V, 72.

2. Envy is found especially among those who are equal, or nearly equal, in something (St. Alphonsus, V, 72). "No one," says St. Thomas, "strives for those things in which he is greatly deficient; and therefore when someone surpasses him in this, he does not envy him. But if he is deficient only slightly, it seems that he could attain to this; and thus he strives for it; hence if his striving is frustrated on account of the excess of another's glory, he is saddened. And from this it is that lovers of honor are more envious; and likewise the faint-hearted are envious, because they reckon all things great; and whatever good happens to anyone, they reckon themselves to have been surpassed in something great; hence also in Job 5 it is said: Envy slays the little one. And Gregory says in the fifth book of the Moralia (cap. 31) that we cannot envy any except those whom we think better than ourselves in some respect" (II-II, q. 36, a. 1, ad 3). Moreover, those who are accustomed to sin by the vice of envy are:

a) "The ambitious, and those who seek glory from some thing; since, when they place glory in this, that in that matter they be alone and singular, they grieve and are saddened if others approach it" (St. Alphonsus, V, 72; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36, a. 1, ad 3).

b) "The faint-hearted, to whom, since all things seem great, any good whatever of another seems to diminish their own. Thus women, for example, easily apprehend and grieve that they are surpassed by another's good, for example, by beauty" (St. Alphonsus, cited place; St. Thomas, cited place).

c) "Old men with respect to young men; and whoever have with difficulty obtained something which others easily attain" (St. Alphonsus, cited place; St. Thomas, cited place).

II. Morality. Envy is a mortal sin from its genus, which is clear both from Sacred Scripture, which excludes the envious from the kingdom of heaven,¹ and from the fact that it is opposed to charity (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36, a. 3; St. Alphonsus, V, 72). But more often it is venial, either on account of smallness of matter, or because a great good is envied only slightly (cf. St. Thomas, cited place).

¹ Gal. 5:21.

III. The daughters of envy are: 1. hatred; 2. whispering; 3. detraction; 4. exultation in the adversities of one's neighbor; 5. affliction at his prosperity (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36, a. 4, ad 3; St. Alphonsus, V, 72).

IV. Remedies of envy. 1. Be humble and weigh the vanity of honor.¹ 2. Consider that one's neighbor is a son of God and your brother in Christ. 3. Exercise charity, by pursuing one's neighbor with honor and by praying for him.

¹ Gal. 5:26.

The predominant individual motives for sin are as numerous as the different characters of those addicted to sin, and hence it is impossible to classify them. The predominant general motives for sin, on the contrary, can be assigned according to the principal goods that most often move or repel with wills of all who commit sin, as follows: (a) goods of the soul, such as praise and honor, inordinately pursued (the vice of pride); (b) goods of the body, inordinately desired (the views of lust and gluttony); (c) goods that are external, unduly loved (the vice of avarice); (d) one’s own good, not sufficiently wished (the vice of sloth); (e) the neighbor’s good, not suffiviently desired (the vices of envy and anger).

The Sin of Envy.—Envy is a sadness at the good of a neighbor, which one considers as a detriment to one’s own excellence or glory, and therefore as an evil to self.

(a) Envy is a species of sadness, that is, it is a displeasure of the will at the presence of what one regards as an evil. In this way envy differs from the sin of rejoicing at the evils of others, which, as will be said below (see 1342), is one of the consequences of envy, although both are of the same species. Thus also, envy differs from pride and vainglory (which are not aversions but inclinations), and from covetousness (which is the desire of what belongs to another).

(b) Envy is about some good, especially about those goods from which men obtain the esteem and honor of others, such as virtue, ability, rank, success, prosperity. Thus, envy differs from sorrow about evil or the evil effects of good, such as repentance for one’s sins, regret that one is not as good as others, displeasure at the bad use that men make of health or wealth.

(c) Envy is about the good of a neighbor, for only an insane person would feel chagrin at the superiority of God, and self-envy is a contradiction in terms. Thus, envy differs from sorrow at the good of God (hatred of God), and from sorrow at the good of self (sloth). A person may be said, however, to envy God in the sense that he is mortified at the external glory of God, if he feels himself an antagonist of that glory. In this way the devil is said to envy the attributes of God, because they overcome his efforts to promote impiety, and man is said to envy the Holy Ghost, when he is discontented at the progress of holiness in the souls of men.

(d) The envious man considers his neighbor’s good as a detriment to his own good. This is the distinctive trait of envy which sets it apart from other forms of repining at another’s good fortune. Thus, displeasure at the excellence or glory of another without reference to detriment to self is not envy, but hatred; with reference to the unworthiness of another, it is not envy, but indignation.

(e) Hence, envy looks on the neighbor’s prosperity as a calamity to self, as a sort of punishment and the contradiction of one’s own desires. Here envy stands in contrast with mercy, for, while the merciful regard the misfortunes of neighbors as the misfortunes of themselves, the envious regard the prosperity of others as their own misfortune.

The Objects of Envy.—(a) The material objects are many, but they are reduced to excellence and glory. Excellence includes every kind of desirable quality. Glory is the honor, fame and praise that follow on public knowledge of one’s excellence. As a rule, envy is concerned with the excellence of glory, but it may also be about internal or objective excellence. Thus, if two disputants are alone, the less able will perhaps envy the greater knowledge of the more able; but, if there is an audience, the more able will perhaps envy the greater applause received by his less able opponent.

(b) The formal object of envy is one, namely, the detriment to the excellence or glory of self which the envious person sees in the excellence or glory of another. Detriment must not be understood absolutely here, as if the envious person lost something or failed to obtain something on account of the other person. It must be understood relatively, in the sense that the envious person feels that the situation between himself and the other person is no longer the same, that the latter has gained on him or passed him, and has thus lessened his excellence.

The Subjects of Envy.—(a) The persons most inclined to envy are of two quite different types, namely, the ambitious and the pusillanimous. The ambitious man ardently covets honors, and he is correspondingly saddened when others surpass him, especially if he already enjoys repute or is not far removed from the object of his desires. The pusillanimous man, being petty, holds every small advancement of others as great and as a blow to his own prestige. He is, therefore, filled with intense envy, where a different person would see little or no cause for such a feeling. On the contrary, those who recognize their own unsuitability for what is above them, and those who are great of soul, are not so much inclined to envy. There are few, however, even among the most perfect, who are not tempted to envy in some form.

(b) The persons who are most likely to be envied are those who in some way or other are one’s likes or equals, for one does not feel that one is thrown into the shade by a person who is always far above one, or by those who are far removed in time, place, age, etc. Thus, a beggar will envy a fellow-beggar who becomes a millionaire, but not those acquaintances who were always rich, and still less the fortunate persons whom he knows only from hearsay. The elder son envied his brother, not his father (Luke, xv. 28). Many exceptions to this are only apparent. Thus, persons sometimes are envious of those far above them, but it is because these have advanced at their expense, as when a poor person envies those who have the property he once owned. Persons are sometimes envious of their equals who have not surpassed them, but it is because these latter have obtained with little or no effort what they themselves have gained only by hard work. Persons are sometimes envious of their inferiors, but this is because they make a comparison from some viewpoint in which there is equality, as when an old man envies a youth the advantages that were not enjoyed in his own youth, or the present promotion that surpasses his own.

It was said above (see 1313) that hatred differs from other sins against charity, inasmuch as it dislikes another’s good unqualifiedly, whereas these other sins dislike his good with some qualification. Hence, envy differs from hate, because envy is a qualified displeasure. It differs from other kinds of displeasure over the prosperity of others, because the qualification in each case is different.

(a) Thus, emulation is displeased at the thought of a neighbor’s prosperity, not because it does not like his success, but because it dislikes the unsuccess of self. Example: Titus is grieved when he thinks of the virtue of Balbus, because he himself lacks virtue.

(b) Fear dislikes the prosperity or superiority of another, not on account of the prosperity or superiority in itself, but on account of the evil results it apprehends from that prosperity. Example: Caius is displeased at the elevation of Claudius, because he knows the latter is his enemy and will persecute him. He is also displeased that, in spite of his own greater learning and soundness, he has not the influence possessed by Balbus, who misleads many by long-winded sophistry.

(c) Indignation (nemesis) is displeased that a neighbor has a certain good, of which he is unworthy. Example: Sempronius is angry because Titus, who is dishonest, succeeds in business.

(d) Envy grieves over a neighbor’s prosperity, not because it thinks this prosperity will actually bring about a lessening of the honor of self, but because it regards the very fact of that prosperity, in itself and apart from any consequences, as a change in one’s relationship to the neighbor, and to that extent an obscuration of the glory of self. Example: Balbus is grieved at the prosperity of Claudius, because he knows Claudius will use his resources to defame him. Caius is grieved at Claudius’ prosperity, because he regards it as a reflection on his own fame, since he is less prosperous. Balbus fears, Caius envies.

Is emulation a sin? (a) If emulation is about spiritual things, it is not sinful, but praiseworthy. St. Paul encourages a holy rivalry among the Corinthians for the higher gifts of God (I Cor., xii. 31). St. Jerome writes to Laeta that her daughter should be associated with other girls as fellow-pupils, that the progress of the latter and the praises they receive may act as a spur to the daughter not to be outdone. One who equals or surpasses the virtue or knowledge of another does not take away or lessen the other’s good, but improves his own good; and thus emulation is not harmful, but beneficial in spiritual matters. (b) If emulation is about temporal things, it is also lawful to be sorry at their absence. But, if the desire is inordinate, then emulation is sinful. Example: Sempronius is not inferior in ability to Titus, and hence, while not desiring monopoly or disliking competition, he is sorry that he has not attained an equal success in business. Balbus is very deficient in education, in initiative and in character, while Caius excels in all these qualities; and yet Balbus is discontented that he does not hold the responsible position of Caius, or one of equal importance. The emulation of Sempronius is reasonable, that of Balbus is unreasonable.

Rivalry is called jealousy, when it proceeds from a love so ardent that it wishes to have exclusive possession of the object loved. This jealousy is lawful or unlawful, according as the person who loves has or has not exclusive rights.

(a) Jealousy is unlawful in a mother who is vexed because her child loves his father as well as herself. The child ought to love both parents, and it is an evil jealousy that makes the mother grieve when the child does this.

(b) Jealousy is lawful in a wife who grieves because her husband gives to others the affection he promised would be hers alone. Scripture speaks of God Himself as jealous of the fidelity of His creatures, and declares that He will suffer no rival, but must have sole dominion over the heart (Josue, xxiv. 19 sqq.); and St. Paul tells the Corinthians that he is jealous of them, with the jealousy of God, because they have not been faithful to his preaching, but have been friendly to false teachers (II Cor., xi).

Is grief at the prosperity of another a sin, when it is caused by fear of the harm he will do?

(a) If it is clear that the other will use his prosperity to act against justice or charity or the like, it is not a sin to grieve over the prosperity. For, since it is right to deprive a neighbor of the means of sinning when one has the power to do so, it is not wrong to wish that he lacked those means. Thus, it is not a sin to grieve over the election of an official who will promote lawbreakers and persecute the law-abiding: “When just men increase, the people shall rejoice; when the wicked shall bear rule, the people shall mourn” (Prov., xxix. 2). St. Gregory the Great declares that, as it is not uncharitable to rejoice at the downfall of an enemy, neither is it envious to be saddened at his success; since his downfall is a blessing to the oppressed, while his success means injustice to many.

(b) If it is clear that the other will use his power, wealth, or other goods to inflict evils that are deserved or not unjust, it is wrong to be sorry that he has the power, wealth, etc., just as it would be wrong to deprive him of them. Thus, it is wrong to grieve over the election of an honest official who will correct abuses and punish lawbreakers. It is not unlawful, however, for a lawbreaker to be sorry for himself at the prospect of the penalty he will receive.

(c) If it is uncertain whether the other will use his prosperity to do injury to oneself or to others, it is lawful to fear and to be on one’s guard, but it is not lawful to grieve unconditionally at the prosperity, just as it is not lawful in the circumstances to deprive the other of his prosperity.

Sorrow at being surpassed by another on account of the relative loss of glory to self, with the wish that the other had not the good that makes him superior, is envy, as explained above. This sorrow is a sin. (a) Thus, it is condemned in scripture: “Let us not be made desirous of vainglory, envying one another” (Gal, v. 26); “The patriarchs through envy sold Joseph into Egypt” (Acts, vii. 9), “Charity envieth not” (I Cor., xiii. 4). (b) It is not reasonable to be grieved at the prosperity of others, since prosperity is something good and an object of joy rather than of sorrow.

From its nature envy is a mortal sin. (a) Thus, it is directly opposed to the principal acts of charity, which are love of the neighbor, desire of his good, and joy over his prosperity; and charity is the life of the soul (I John, iii. 14). Secondary acts of charity, such as kissing the sores of a leper, may be omitted without loss of love, but envy destroys love itself. (b) Envy is directly contrary to mercy; for, while mercy grieves at the evil of others, envy grieves at their good. The envious are not merciful, neither are the merciful envious.

Degrees of Gravity in Sins of Envy.—(a) There are no different species of envy of the neighbor, for all acts of envy have the one essential trait that they are sorrow over the excellence of another, viewed, not absolutely in itself, but relatively as a lessening of one’s own excellence. We should distinguish, however, the envy which is a sin against God (viz., envy at another’s spiritual good, or sorrow at the diffusion of grace) from the envy which is a sin against the neighbor.

(b) There are different degrees of envy within the species, according to the greater or less excellence of the good which is envied. Thus, it is a greater sin to be envious about spiritual things (e.g., another’s influence for good) than about temporal things (e.g., another’s ability to get money); it is a greater sin to be envious about the wellbeing of the body than about dress, style, etc.

Envy is one of the capital vices, that is, it is an evil tree which from its very nature yields the evil fruits of other sins. The fruits of envy are progressive in evil.

(a) Thus, in the beginning of envy, one tries to diminish the glory of the person one envies, either secretly (sin of whispering) or openly (sin of detraction).

(b) In its progress, envy rejoices at the adversity of the neighbor, if its attempt to injure succeeds; or it sorrows over his continued prosperity, if its effort at blackening has failed. Rejoicing at a neighbor’s adversity is not different specifically from envy; but the affliction over the neighbor’s prosperity now spoken of is of the same species as the vice which sought to undermine the neighbor. Thus, if the envious person resorted in vain to detraction, his grief at the failure of his efforts is in guilt a sin of detraction.

(c) In its consummation, envy becomes hatred, as was said above on the causes of hate (see 1316).

In what way is envy preeminent among sins? (a) Envy is not the most enormous vice, for, as said above (see 1301), hatred of God is from its nature the worst of all sins. But there is one kind of envy—namely, envy of a brother’s spiritual good—which has a place among those gravest offenses called “sins against the Holy Ghost” (see 899).

(b) Envy is most like to the sin that brought all woe into the world, for “by the envy of the devil death entered the world” (Wis., ii. 24). It was sorrow at the gifts bestowed upon our first parents that moved the demon to tempt them, and accordingly his envy led to their fall and to the loss of original justice by the Whole race.

Useful Considerations against Envy.—(a) Envy is useless, since it does not obtain that on which one’s heart is set, or obtains it only by the sacrifice of charity, which is something better. (b) Envy is harmful, since it carries its own torment with it (Gen., iv. 5; Wis., vi. 25; Prov., xiv. 30), and brings on many sins against the neighbor. Through envy the first murder was committed (Gen., iv. 8), and it was envy that brought about the crucifixion of Christ (Matt, xxvii. 18).

Useful practices against envy are: (a) the uprooting of its causes, pride and vainglory; (b) the cultivation of an unselfish charity and of emulation of what is best in others: “So that by all means, whether by occasion, or by truth, Christ be preached, in this I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice” (Philip., i. 18); “Let us consider one another, to provoke unto charity and to good works” (Heb., x. 24).

The Origin of Discord.—(a) The disagreement with the will of a neighbor arises from envy. For he who considers the excellence of his neighbor as a lessening of his own excellence, is inclined to contradict the wishes of the neighbor, even if he recognizes them as good. (b) The preference of one’s own will and persistence in it are due to pride and vainglory. For he who unduly desires his own excellence or fame does not wish to yield to others or change his purposes. He feels that, even though he is in the wrong, he must not take what he regards as a position of inferiority.

The Causes of Sinful Contention.—(a) The cause of that which is principal in contention—namely, the departure from the truth held by another and the stand made for error—is envy, pride and vainglory, as said above (see 1854) concerning discord. (b) The cause of that which is secondary in contention—namely, the wrangling or bawling manner and the shouts or screams of the contenders—is anger.

The prohibitions of uncharitableness are as follows: (a) against hatred: “Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart” (Lev, xix. IT); (b) against sloth: “Bow down thy shoulder and hear her (wisdom), and be not grieved with her bands” (Ecclus., vi. 26); (c) against envy: “Let us not be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another” (Gal., v. 26), (d) against discord: “Speak the same things and let there be no schisms among you” (I Cor., i. 10); and (e) against scandal: “Put not a stumbling-block or a scandal in your brother’s way” (Rom., xiv. 13).

What is envy? Envy is sadness concerning the good of another, insofar as it is diminutive of one's own glory. - Moreover, in five ways can someone be saddened concerning the good of another: 1. When someone is saddened concerning the good of another absolutely, because it is the good of the neighbor; and properly this is hatred of enmity, or simply hatred or aversion of the person to whom we will evil, insofar as it is his evil; and this indeed from its genus is mortal. 2. When someone is saddened concerning the good of neighbor relatively, because he fears some evil from him; and properly this is fear, which will be licit unless it is inordinate, e.g., if he fears evil is to be inflicted on himself or on others unjustly. 3. When someone is saddened concerning the good of another because he thinks the same person unworthy of such good; and this is indignation or abomination, which is not a sin; nevertheless it will be a sin, and indeed mortal, if it either accuses God's providence, and is blasphemy, or if it so affects that it leads men to imitate evil. 4. When someone is saddened concerning the good of neighbor, not because the neighbor has it, but because he himself lacks the same, and this is not envy, but emulation or zeal, which, if it concerns honorable good, is praiseworthy; but if it concerns temporal goods, sometimes it is venial, as if the good is disproportionate to the one grieving, such as it would be if a peasant grieved that he is not a king. 5. If someone grieves that another equal to himself, or not greatly unequal, grows in glory and excellence, so that thereby he becomes superior to him, and he apprehends the very increase of glory and excellence as an impediment to his own good and as an evil to himself, insofar as it is diminutive of his own glory and excellence; and this is envy properly so called. For he is called envious because he is not seeing, since he cannot see the goods of another without sadness. Equal or not greatly unequal, because the good of those who greatly excel us is not usually apprehended as diminishing our excellence and glory. The goods of another, especially those in which there is glory, and in which men love to be honored and to be in good opinion.

Envy is mortal from its genus, Gal. 5:21. For it is directly against charity, which rejoices concerning the good of neighbor, which envy desires destroyed or grieves is not destroyed. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 36; L. 72. "Pride alone and envy are purely spiritual sins, which can belong to demons." S. Th. 1 p., q. 63, a. 2 ad 2.

What are the daughters of envy? - They are hatred of neighbor, whispering, detraction, exultation in the adversities of neighbor, and affliction in his prosperities. These are mortal from their genus, since directly against charity. Whispering is speech by which, without cause, something is reported to one person concerning another, which indeed of itself is apt to break the friendship of both; and the detractor is therefore bound to restore and reconcile that friendship. It is mortal from its genus both against charity and against justice. Detraction also is both against charity and against justice. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 36, a. 4 ad 3; q. 34, a. 6; q. 74; L. 72.

What intention is required in adults for receiving the individual sacraments? - In baptism and order there is required at least a habitual explicit will. The reason is that sacraments of this kind impose grave obligations to be fulfilled. But no one is judged to receive a grave obligation; rather, his positive will must be altogether clear. Lugo d. 9, n. 119, 127; L. 81, 82. The sacrament of baptism and of order is indeed invalidly conferred on those having only interpretative intention. Nevertheless Coninck, Sporer, Dicastillo, etc., apud Croix l. 6, p. 1, n. 168, and others judge that for receiving baptism an implicit intention contained in contrition or attrition had by the recipient suffices, or, as Lugo d. 9, n. 130 says, in the will of giving one's name to the Christian Religion, or, if he is ignorant of this, of doing whatever things are necessary for salvation, as La Croix has it, l.c. Cf. L. 82. This indeed can have place in urgent necessity, but baptism must then be conferred conditionally, and therefore repeated conditionally if time allows, unless there is certainty concerning a true and explicit intention not retracted. Cf. S. C. de P. F., March 30, 1898.

In confirmation, extreme unction, and the Eucharist, a habitual implicit will suffices, which is less rightly called interpretative, and which consists in this, that someone has had a general intention, and has not retracted it, of applying those things which are necessary and useful for his salvation; or of living and dying in the Catholic religion, with the helps of the same religion; or, a fortiori, of receiving all the sacraments in life and at death. The reason is that these sacraments bring many advantages and no disadvantage. But all are judged to wish to receive advantages. Hence both confirmation and extreme unction can be conferred conditionally on a dying person deprived of his senses. Ritual, de Extr. unct. § 6; L. 82. But if he in reality had never thought of receiving them, they would have to be altogether repeated.

For penance there is required either actual or at least virtual intention; nor therefore does habitual intention suffice. The reason is that in this sacrament the acts of the penitent are required for the matter, and these indeed cannot be had without at least virtual will of receiving the sacrament.

L. 82. - Likewise for matrimony at least virtual intention is required. For "since each spouse is not only receiving, but also minister of the sacrament, in each of them there is certainly required that intention which is demanded in the ministers of the other sacraments." L. 82.

Fr. Lehmkuhl, ed. 11, n. 66, requires for the Eucharist, besides the case of viaticum, an expressed habitual intention. Yet ordinarily it is not only virtual, but even actual. The reason, he says, is that "in the general will of living a Christian life there is in no way contained the will of receiving the sacred Eucharist so many times and at such a time." - But if, besides the case of viaticum, it is a question of the Eucharist to be received from obligation, certainly that general will also implicitly contains this. And if that general will is conceived more determinately, namely of applying all the means constituted by God as necessary and useful for salvation, certainly this will would also implicitly include the Eucharist to be received from mere devotion. Finally, if the general will of dying in a Christian manner includes the will of receiving the sacraments of the Church at the point of death, why does the general will of living a Christian life not include the will of receiving Christ's sacraments during life? "Wherefore," the same Fr. Lehmkuhl concludes, "an adult to whom, besides the case of viaticum, the Holy Eucharist were given without his knowledge, would indeed receive it materially, but not with fruit." - But consequently to the things which have just been noted: if in the case of Viaticum the aforesaid adult would receive the sacred Eucharist sacramentally and with fruit, also outside that case he would receive it sacramentally and with fruit, if namely, as was said, he has its will at least implicitly.

177. • Envy is sadness concerning another's good, insofar as it is esteemed as one's own evil, or at least as a lesser good. Joy concerning another's evil, which is judged an increase of one's own good, is recalled to it. But it is directly against charity, and grave from its genus.

The daughters: detraction, calumny, whispering, contumely, etc.

Remedies: consideration of the evils proceeding from envy, offices of charity toward the neighbor, frequent prayer, exercise of humility. - See St. Lig., no. 72.

522. 1. Notion of envy. Envy, which is called also livor, zeal, jealousy, arises from pride: for when someone inordinately seeks his own excellence, he easily is saddened at another's good insofar as it is conceived as diminishing his own excellence, and consequently as our evil. For envy is sadness at another's good insofar as we conceive our excellence to be diminished thereby.

⁵ St. Cyprian, De zelo et livore, P. L., IV, 637-652; St. Gregory, Moral., lib. V, c. 46 (alias 31), P. L., LXXV, 727-730; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36, and De Malo, q. 10; Natal. Alexander, op. cit., 1027-1061; Alibert, op. cit., t. I, p. 331-340; Descuret, t. II, p. 241-274.

Therefore if someone grieves at another's good because he thinks the other unworthy of a good of this kind, it is not envy, but indignation. - Likewise, if we are saddened at another's elevation because some evil threatens us from it, it is not the effect of envy, but of fear. - To grieve at a neighbor's good because we lack this and wish by honest means to obtain the same or something similar is not envy, but emulation: yet one must beware lest he wish to despoil his neighbor of it.

Generally envy is wont to be found among equals or nearly equals: for when the matter concerns those who greatly excel, there is less fear lest their glory diminish our excellence. - Not rarely, even in perfect men, the seed and first movements of this vice are to be found. It generally arises from those goods which are esteemed honorable, such as dignities, magistracies, insignia of titles, riches, beauty, adornment, celebrity of name, eloquence, erudition, friendships, piety, virtues, etc.

523. 2. The daughters of envy. Five are numbered, namely whispering, detraction, exultation in the adversities of one's neighbor, affliction in his prosperity, hatred.

For since the envious man grieves at the good of his neighbor, he soon desires that this man be deprived of it. Hence he tries to diminish it or utterly destroy it, for example, by speaking ill of his neighbor, whether secretly through whispering, or more openly through detraction; if he obtains the intended end, he exults in the adversities of the other; otherwise he is afflicted in his prosperity; furthermore all these things, when they endure for a long time, generate hatred.¹

¹ Concerning whispering and detraction, the matter is treated more fully in the Treatise on the Virtue of Justice, n. 374-396; concerning the others, it is said where Charity is treated.

524. 3. The malice of envy. (A) Envy properly so called is a sin mortal from its kind, because it is directly opposed to charity, which obliges of itself under grave obligation; for it belongs to the nature of friendship that we wish goods to our neighbor, just as to ourselves; but the envious man, on the contrary, wishes evil to his neighbor, since he is saddened at the good which the other possesses.

But, in order that envy be a grave sin, two things are required: (a) that the good of the neighbor to which it is referred be, all things carefully weighed, of grave moment; whence the greater a good of this kind is, the graver the sin is. Hence St. Thomas says:² "There is nevertheless envy which is counted among the gravest sins, namely envying fraternal grace, according as someone grieves at the very increase of God's grace." Akin to this is the envy of those who are saddened at the spiritual good accomplished by other preachers, confessors, pastors. (b) That the envious man deliberately and seriously wish the neighbor to lack this good; from this head, many movements of envy do not exceed venial sin, because they are imperfectly deliberate, or do not obtain the full consent of the will.

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36, a. 4, ad 2.

525. (B) Envy is also a grave sin whenever it induces us to inflict grave harm upon our neighbor; for the malice of some act is to be measured not only from its nature, but also from its effects.

Now, with St. Cyprian as witness,¹ many evils have arisen from this vice: "It is the root of all evils, the fountain of calamities, the seedbed of delicts, the matter of faults. From it hatred rises, from it animosity proceeds. Zeal inflames avarice, while someone cannot be content with his own, seeing another richer. Zeal stirs up ambition, while someone sees another higher in honors. With zeal blinding our senses, and bringing the hidden places of the mind under its dominion, the fear of God is despised, the teaching of Christ is neglected, the day of judgment is not foreseen... Hence the bond of the Lord's peace is broken, hence fraternal charity is violated, hence truth is adulterated, unity is split, there is a leap into heresies and schisms, while priests are disparaged, while bishops are envied, while someone either complains that he himself was not rather ordained, or disdains to bear another set over him." Rarely indeed do all these things arise from envy at the same time, but often fraternal charity is wounded, - union, today so necessary among Catholics, is broken, - obedience to legitimate superiors is either disparaged or at least rendered only with difficulty: and these are more than enough!

¹ St. Cyprian, op. cit., P. L., IV, 642.

526. 4. Remedies against envy. (A) One must frequently keep before the mind that spiritual society which prevails among the faithful; for all are sons of the same heavenly Father, all brothers in Christ, citizens of the same Church, called to the same eternal inheritance; we make up one body, of which Christ is the head.² Wherefore each ought to regard the goods of another as his own, and therefore to rejoice in the neighbor's endowments, good works, and progress, as though he himself enjoyed all these: for what profits one member of the body profits the others also. Thus Paul felt when, although certain men were preaching not from charity, but on account of envy and contention, that they might stir up pressure for his chains, nevertheless he sincerely wrote:³ "For what then? So long as in every way, whether by occasion or by truth, Christ is preached; and in this I rejoice, yes and I will rejoice." - And indeed, while the envious waste away in jealousy, are troubled and inflamed in mind, and carry an enclosed wound in the breast on account of another's happiness; on the contrary, those who regard the goods of others as their own enjoy peace and joy.

² "And if one member suffers anything, all the members suffer with it; or if one member glories, all the members rejoice together. But you are the body of Christ and members of member." (1 Cor. 12:26-27). Let the whole chapter be read.

³ Phil. 1:18.

527. (B) Those who know that they are liable to movements of envy should turn that vice into noble emulation.¹ First indeed let them not value perishable things, such as wealth, honors, bodily strength and elegance, or even knowledge and eloquence, so highly as piety and virtues: for why do we envy our neighbor over fragile and perishable things? But with regard to the virtues of others, let us strive to imitate them by manly effort: "Let us consider one another unto the provocation of charity and of good works."² Augustine explains this excellently:³ "Why do you envy the just man, O unjust man? Because you wish to seem just? Quickly do what is better, and more easily you will be what you wish to seem. Be just: thus you will love him whom you envied; because what you grieve that he is, you also will be, and you will love yourself in him, and him in yourself. For if you envied a rich man, it would not be in your power to be rich; if you envied some honorable noble senator, it would not be in your power that you also be noble and distinguished; if you envied a beautiful man, you would never make yourself beautiful... if you envy the just man, the matter is in the will; be what you grieve that the other is."

¹ Concerning this Thomas excellently discusses, Educ. des sentiments, p. 203-222.

² Heb. 10:24.

³ Enarrat. in Ps. 139, P. L., XXXVII, 1807-1808.

(C) To tear out envy entirely, it will be opportune to consider the evils which arise from envy (n. 525); and also to eradicate the root from which it arises, namely pride; for, as Augustine says,⁴ "the devil fell by pride, and, because envy is the companion of pride, it cannot happen that the proud man does not envy."

⁴ St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps. 58, P. L., XXXVI, 709.

IV. ENVY. —Envy (invidia) is defined as sadness on account of another's good (tristitia de alienis bonis). To be sad because an unworthy man has obtained a post of honor or wealth, of which he is sure to make wrong use, or to which we ourselves have a better claim, or which will be employed to our disadvantage, is not envy. Such sadness generally results from shortsightedness or a mistaken idea of Providence; but it does not exclude charity; in fact there is a species of sadness which is extolled as a virtue. Cfr. Ps.

CXVIII, 136: "My eyes have sent forth springs of water, because they have not kept thy law." Matth. V, 5: "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." 2 Cor. VII, 9 sq.: "Now I am glad, not because you were made sorrowful; but because you were made sorrowful unto penance. For you were made sorrowful according to God...." ³⁰ Sadness combined with selfishness, however, is always sinful because incompatible with, nay directly opposed to, charity. The envious man seeks to injure his neighbor rather than advantage himself, whereas charity inclines us to rejoice in the wellbeing of others. Through the envy of the devil sin and death came into this world.³¹ Envy inspired the first recorded murder and the crucifixion of Christ.³² It is the lowest form of selfishness because it aims solely at destruction. This vice is mortally sinful in itself, but admits of a parvitas materiae.

³⁰ Cfr. St. Augustine, Serm., 254 (al. 151 de Temp.), n. 2; St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 36, art. 1-4.

³¹ Cfr. Gen. III, 1; IV, 5; Wisd. II, 24.

³² Cfr. Matth. XXVII, 18; 1 Cor. X, 24; XIII, 4 sqq.; Gal. V, 26.

Envy engenders hatred, revenge, malignant joy at the misfortunes of others, calumny, slander, and crimes against life and property.³³ More than any other vice envy entails its own punishment, for it destroys peace of mind and sometimes even injures the body.³⁴ Sacred Scripture graphically compares this vice to "rottenness of the bones" ³⁵ and intimates that it consumes its victim body and soul.³⁶

³³ Matth. XXVII, 18-25; cfr. Gen. IV, 8; XXVI, 14 sq.; XXVII, 41; XXXVII, 4, 11.

³⁴ Matth. XXVII, 18-25. Cfr. Gen. IV, 5-6; XXXI, 2-5.

³⁵ Prov. XIV, 30.

³⁶ Wisd. VI, 25.

— Notion. 1. Envy is sadness concerning another's good, insofar as that good is a diminishment of one's own excellence. It is directly opposed to charity, which rejoices concerning the neighbor's good; and it is accustomed to be conceived not toward those who excel us from afar, but toward equals or those a little superior. Mortal from its kind, because of imperfection of the act or the smallness of the good concerning which one is sad, it will be only venial.

Therefore it is not envy if you are sad concerning another's good, a) because from it you fear harm to yourself or to others: this is fear; b) because we lack the good which the other has, so that we do not grieve formally because it belongs to another: this is emulation, zeal; c) because the other is unworthy: this is indignation. These three can be ordered and good, or also inordinate and graver evils.

But it is envy properly so called if you apprehend the very increase of another's excellence as if it were an evil to you, and for this reason are pained that the other grows in excellence and thus becomes superior to you.

The sin of envy is easily committed by the ambitious and by women.

N.B. To curse the day on which someone was born, on which he took a wife, from pain because he was born, can be a simple manifestation of sadness concerning the evils which arose on that occasion: which is no sin or only a slight one. But it would be grave irreverence toward God to carp at the dispositions of divine Providence; and it would be gravely opposed to charity truly to wish grave evil either to oneself or to another.

2. As a capital vice, envy begets hatred, detraction, joy concerning the evil of the neighbor, whispering, that is, evil speaking concerning the neighbor, for the removal of his friendship with others. The whisperer ought to strive to restore that friendship.

The opposite virtue is charity, by which we rejoice concerning another's good as concerning our own.

421. Notion. Envy, which sometimes is also called livor, zeal, jealousy, is sadness concerning another's good, which is judged to be one's own evil, because it diminishes our excellence or glory.⁶⁴

Sadness concerning another's good can arise in several ways: 1. If someone grieves concerning the good of another, whom he judges unworthy of a good of this kind, it is not envy, but indignation or nemesis. 2. If someone is saddened concerning another's good insofar as from this there threatens him danger of some harm, as when a man is saddened concerning the exaltation of his enemy, fearing lest he be attacked by him, it is not envy, but rather an effect of fear.⁶⁵ 3. To grieve concerning the good of one's neighbor, not because he has this, but because we lack this and wish to obtain this by honorable means, is not envy, but emulation.⁶⁶ 4. To be saddened concerning the good of one's neighbor, insofar as his good is without relation to us, is not envy, but hatred of neighbor. 5. To be saddened concerning the good of another, insofar as it diminishes our excellence, is properly envy. - From these things said it appears:

a) that the envious man considers the good of his neighbor only insofar as it diminishes his own excellence and glory;

b) that envy arises from pride, which is the disordered appetite of one's own excellence. Concerning this matter the Angelic Doctor notes very well with St. Gregory:⁶⁷ "The first offspring of pride is vain glory, which, when it has corrupted the oppressed mind, soon begets envy: because while it seeks the power of an empty name, it pines away lest someone else be able to obtain this. Therefore it is not against the notion of a capital vice that it itself arises from another.... Yet perhaps on account of this, that envy is manifestly born from vain glory, it is not posited as a capital vice either by Isidore..., or by Cassian..."

c) that envy for the most part is not found except among equals. For the envious man strives to be preferred in glory to another or at least to equal him. But no one except a madman strives to equal or to be preferred in glory to those who are much greater than himself. And therefore man is not wont to envy those who are distant much either in place or in time or in state.⁶⁸ Wherefore Aristotle⁶⁹ beautifully says: "No one envies those who lived or will live ten thousand years from now; nor those who dwell at the pillars of Hercules."

⁶⁴ Cf. ib. q. 36, a. 1.

⁶⁵ Cf. Aristot., Rhet. l. 2, c. 9, n. 3.

⁶⁶ Cf. ib. c. 11.

⁶⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 36, a. 4 ad 1.

⁶⁸ Cf. ib. a. 1 ad 2.

⁶⁹ L. c. c. 10.

422. Malice. Envy from its genus is a mortal sin. The reason is that envy is directly opposed to charity, which of itself obliges under grave sin. For charity requires that we rejoice concerning the good of another. Envy, on the contrary, is saddened concerning the same good.⁷⁰

But in order that envy should truly be a mortal sin, it is required a) that there be grave matter. Hence the good of the neighbor concerning which the envious man is saddened must be of grave moment, and the greater this good is, the graver is the sin of envy. Wherefore "a certain envy is counted among the gravest sins, namely envy of fraternal grace, according as someone grieves concerning the very increase of God's grace, not only concerning the good of the neighbor. Hence it is posited as a sin against the Holy Spirit, because through this envy man in a certain way envies the Holy Spirit, who is glorified in his works."⁷¹

b) That the act be perfectly deliberate. It is clear of itself from what was said above in n. 364 concerning the requisites necessary for mortal sin that a perfectly deliberate act is necessary for this, that envy should truly be a mortal sin. - In practice envy by itself alone is rarely a mortal sin, because those two required conditions are rarely present. But I say by itself alone; for envy more often becomes a grave sin on account of the effects which are called its daughters.

⁷⁰ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 36, a. 3.

⁷¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 36, a. 4 ad 2.

423. Daughters of envy. By St. Gregory⁷² and after him by St. Thomas⁷³ five daughters of envy are enumerated, namely hatred, whispering, detraction, affliction at the prosperous things of one's neighbor, exultation at his adversities.

1. Hatred. The worst daughter, and as it were the first-born of envy, is hatred, which can become truly diabolical and infernal. From envy the devil tempted the first parents and brought death into all the sons of Adam;⁷⁴ from envy Cain killed his brother Abel;⁷⁵ from envy the sons of Jacob sold their brother Joseph;⁷⁶ from envy the Pharisees accused Christ.⁷⁷ Hence it is skillfully said: "Love is strong as death, jealousy hard as hell,"⁷⁸ and St. Cyprian⁷⁹ says concerning this vice: "It is the root of all evils, the fountain of calamities, the seedbed of offenses, the matter of faults. From it hatred arises, from it animosity proceeds."

2. Whispering, which here is taken as the hidden denigration of another's reputation, also arises from envy. For the envious man strives by all means, and especially by sinister speech, to diminish the glory of his neighbor.

3. Detraction, which here is taken as the manifest denigration of another's reputation, likewise arises from envy for the same reason.

4. and 5. "Affliction at the prosperous things of one's neighbor in one way is envy itself, insofar, namely, as someone is saddened concerning the prosperous things of someone, according as they have a certain glory; but in another way it is a daughter of envy, according as the prosperous things of the neighbor happen against the effort of the envious man, who strives to impede them. - But exultation at adversities is not directly the same as envy, but follows from it; for from sadness concerning the good of the neighbor, which is envy, there follows exultation concerning the evil of the same."⁸⁰

⁷² Moral. l. 31, c. 45 (al. 17).

⁷³ S. theol. l. c. a. 4 ad 3.

⁷⁴ Cf. Sap. 2, 24.

⁷⁵ Cf. Gen. 4, 8.

⁷⁶ Cf. Gen. 37, 8.

⁷⁷ Cf. Matth. 27, 18.

⁷⁸ Cant. 8, 6.

⁷⁹ De zelo et livore (Migne, Patr. lat. 4, 642).

⁸⁰ S. theol. l. c. a. 4 ad 3.

424. Remedies against envy are: 1. The exercise of humility. As was said above, envy arises from pride as from a root. Therefore if the root of pride is torn out by humility, the branch of envy must wither. 2. The exercise of fraternal charity. For envy is directly opposed to charity, as was said above. But opposites expel one another. Wherefore just as envy expels charity, so charity vigorously exercised expels envy. 3. Consideration of the evils which are wont to arise from envy. We have already enumerated above certain evil effects of envy. Besides those, worthy of mention is the great harm which the envious man causes to himself in the goods of body and soul. For envy is wont to harm bodily health; hence concerning envious Cain it is said: "His countenance fell."⁸¹ Envy is called "wasting away,"⁸² "rottenness of the bones."⁸³ Envy causes reproach and contumely.⁸⁴ Wherefore it has rightly been said:⁸⁵

Nothing is more just than envy, because immediately it gnaws the author himself, and tortures his own heart.

⁸¹ Gen. 4, 5.

⁸² Nagender Neid; Sap. 6, 25.

⁸³ Prov. 14, 30.

⁸⁴ Cf. Eccli. 6, 1.

⁸⁵ Cf. Tract. de interiore domo seu de conscientia aedificanda, c. 23, among the spurious works of St. Bernard (Migne, Patr. lat. 184, 542).

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36 and 158; De Malo q. 10 and 12.

507. Envy is inordinate sadness concerning another's good, esteemed as one's own evil, insofar as that good seems diminutive of one's own excellence. This of itself also can be mortal, as directly against charity, because just as charity rejoices concerning the good of neighbor, so envy is saddened concerning it (cf. treatise on Charity). It is especially concerning those goods in which there is glory and in which men love to be honored and to be in esteem, such as dignities, magistracies, insignia of titles, riches, beauty, adornment, celebrity of name, eloquence, erudition, friendships, piety, virtues, etc., especially wisdom and happiness; but that sin is especially accustomed to be found among the ambitious and women, and among those who are in some way equals, or at least approach in something, for example, in condition, knowledge, virtue, etc.: for such persons wish mutually to be equaled or preferred.

508. From envy five sins generally arise, from the fact that it attempts to do something against neighbor. For in that which it attempts to do, there is something as beginning and principle, something as means, and something as terminus. The principle is that someone intends to diminish the glory of another, which is done secretly by whispering, manifestly by detraction. The means is that one willing to diminish the glory of another either can do so, and then exultation in adversities arises, that is, joy in the evils of neighbor; or he cannot, and then there arises affliction in prosperities, which is not envy itself, but its daughter, when the prosperous things of neighbor happen against the attempt of the envious man who strives to impede them. Finally, the terminus is in hatred of neighbor itself, for just as delight causes love, so sadness causes hatred.

509. Anger is the inordinate appetite of vengeance. It is called inordinate because anger of itself is not evil but indifferent, as being a passion; hence to seek vengeance according to right reason, for example, so that another may be corrected, so that the order of justice may be preserved, so that reason may execute justice more strongly, so that others may be terrified, is good and praiseworthy (cf. treatise on Temperance).

Anger can be evil in two ways: 1. on the part of the object: a) by seeking unjust vengeance against him who has not deserved it, or beyond what he has deserved; b) by seeking vengeance not according to the legitimate order, but to be executed by one's own authority; c) by seeking it not for the due end, but, for example, from hatred, as satisfying one's own evil mind. This anger of itself is mortal, because it is contrary to charity and justice, although it admits lightness of matter, if the vengeance is slight. - 2. On the part of the mode, anger is evil if it is too ardent interiorly, or too much manifested exteriorly. This of itself is venial, because it is a mere excess of an indifferent thing; nevertheless it becomes mortal on account of an effect prohibited under grave matter, such as scandal, blasphemy, notable detriment to health, etc.

But let it be noted that anger is not necessarily inordinate because it is great, but because it is too great; hence a vehement motion is good provided it is proportioned to the quality of the fault, the condition of the sinner, and other circumstances, as is clear in Christ casting the merchants out of the temple.

510. From anger six sins more commonly arise. - Insofar as it is in the heart, from it are born 1. indignation against the man with whom one is angry, while he reckons it unworthy that such an injury has been done to him; and 2. swelling of mind, by which the angry man fills his mind, by meditating on and devising various means of vengeance; - insofar as it is in the mouth, from it arise 3. clamor, or inordinate and confused speech by which man shows anger in words; 4. blasphemy, by which he breaks forth into words injurious to God; and 5. contumely, or injurious speech against neighbor; - insofar as it proceeds even to deed, 6. quarrels arise from it, under which name are comprehended all harms, such as woundings, homicides, beatings, etc., which are brought upon neighbors in deed in anger.

S. Th. II-II, q. 36; Q. D. de Malo, q. 10.

951. Envy is inordinate sadness concerning the good of another, esteemed as one's own evil, insofar as that good seems diminutive of one's own excellence. It is said:

1. sadness: this is concerning evil considered as joined to us; and thus envy differs from hatred, which is concerning the good of neighbor, in neighbor considered as absolutely evil;

2. concerning the good of another esteemed as one's own evil: "The object of sadness is one's own evil; but it happens that what is another's good is apprehended as one's own evil, and thus there can be sadness concerning another's good";

3. insofar as it is diminutive of one's own excellence: sadness concerning the good of another which is considered as evil can happen in four ways: a) when someone grieves concerning the good of another, because from it he fears harm will come either to himself or to other goods, and such sadness is an effect of fear; b) when someone is saddened concerning the good of another, not because the other has the good, but because we lack that good which he has, and this is zeal or emulation, which, if it is concerning honorable goods, is praiseworthy; c) when someone is saddened concerning the good of another, because he to whom the good happens is unworthy of it, and this sadness is called nemesis or indignation, which is good if it is done for a right end and with due subjection to the ordering of divine Providence; d) when someone grieves concerning the good of another, insofar as the other exceeds him in goods and this is esteemed as one's own evil, because it is diminutive of one's own glory or excellence, and this properly is envy;

4. inordinate: envy is always evil because it grieves concerning that about which one should rejoice, namely, concerning the good of neighbor.

952. The gravity of envy. - Envy is a mortal sin from its genus. For the genus of sin is taken on the part of the object. But envy according to its object is opposed to charity, because as charity rejoices concerning the good of neighbor, so envy is saddened concerning it. Nevertheless it can be venial not only from indeliberation or imperfection of the act, but also from lightness of matter, if someone envies concerning a small good of neighbor, for example, because he wins in a game, perhaps by running with him, or by doing something of this kind.

953. Observation. - The sin of envy is accustomed to be found especially among those who are in some way equals, for example, of the same family, or at least approximate in something, for example, in condition, knowledge, virtue, etc.: for such persons wish mutually to be equaled or preferred. It is chiefly concerning those goods in which there is glory, and in which men love to be honored and to be held in esteem, especially concerning wisdom and happiness. Whence it arises from vainglory, although it itself is also a capital sin, as was said in the treatise on Sins, n. 508.

I. Envy is inordinate sadness concerning the good of another, estimated as one's own evil, insofar as that good seems diminutive of one's own excellence. It is called:

1. sadness: this is concerning an evil viewed as joined to us, and thus envy differs from hatred, which concerns the good of the neighbor considered in the neighbor as absolutely evil;

2. concerning the good of another estimated as one's own evil: "the object of sadness is one's own evil; but it happens that what is another's good is apprehended as one's own evil, and thus there can be sadness concerning another's good";

3. insofar as it is diminutive of one's own excellence. Sadness concerning another's good, which is considered as an evil, can happen in four ways: a) when someone grieves concerning another's good because from it he fears harm to come either to himself or to other goods, and such sadness is an effect of fear; b) when someone is sad concerning another's good, not because the other himself has the good, but because we lack that good which he has, and this is zeal or emulation, which, if it concerns honorable goods, is praiseworthy; c) when someone is sad concerning another's good because he to whom the good happens is unworthy of it, and this sadness is called nemesis or indignation, which is good if it is done for a right end and with due subjection to the ordering of divine Providence; d) when someone grieves concerning another's good, insofar as the other exceeds him in goods and this is estimated as one's own evil, because it is diminutive of one's own glory or excellence; and this properly is envy. "And therefore men especially envy concerning those goods in which there is glory, and in which men love to be honored and to be in reputation";

4. inordinate: envy is always evil, because it grieves concerning that concerning which one ought to rejoice, namely concerning the good of the neighbor.¹

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36, a. 1 and 2; cf. Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 10, a. 1 and 2.

II. The gravity of envy. - Envy is a mortal sin from its genus. For the genus of a sin is taken on the part of the object. But envy according to its object is opposed to charity, because as charity rejoices concerning the good of the neighbor, so envy is sad concerning it. Nevertheless it can be venial not only from lack of deliberation or imperfection of the act, but also from lightness of matter, if someone envies a slight good of the neighbor, for example that he wins in a game, say by running with him, or doing something of this kind.²

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36, a. 3; Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 10, a. 2.

"There is a certain envy which is counted among the gravest sins, namely envy of fraternal grace, according as someone grieves concerning the very increase of the grace of God, not only concerning the good of the neighbor. Whence it is posited as a sin against the Holy Spirit, because through this envying man in some way envies the Holy Spirit, who is glorified in His works."³

³ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36, a. 4 ad 2.

III. Envy is a capital sin. - A capital vice is a sin from which other vices are naturally apt to arise, especially according to the account of final cause. But as men are wont to do many things on account of delight, both so that they may obtain it and because from its impulse they are moved to act, so also on account of sadness they do many things, either so that they may avoid it, or because from it they are moved to do certain things. Whence, since envy is a certain sadness, it is deservedly numbered among the capital sins.

IV. Envy has five daughters. - Five, according to St. Gregory, Morals, book 31, c. 45 (or 17), are the sins which generally arise from envy.

For envy, because it is sadness concerning another's glory insofar as it is one's own evil, attempts to do something against the neighbor. But in this which it attempts to do, something is as beginning and principle, something as means, and something as terminus. The principle is that someone intends to diminish the glory of another, which happens secretly through whispering, openly through detraction. The means is that one wishing to diminish another's glory either can do so, and then there is born exultation in adversities, that is, joy in the evils of the neighbor; or he cannot do so, and then there arises affliction in prosperities, which is not envy itself, but its daughter, when the neighbor's prosperous things happen contrary to the attempt of the envying man who strives to impede them. Finally the terminus is in hatred of the neighbor, for as delight causes love, so sadness causes hatred.⁴

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 36, a. 4; Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 10, a. 3.

V. Observations. - 1. Envy is especially concerning those goods in which there is glory and in which men love to be honored and to be in reputation, such as dignities, magistracies, insignia of titles, riches, beauty, adornment, celebrity of name, eloquence, condition, friendship, piety, virtues, etc., especially wisdom and happiness. Whence it arises from vain-glory, although it itself also is a capital sin.

2. The sin of envy is wont especially to be found among the ambitious and women, and among those who in some way are equals, for example of the same family, or at least approach in some respect, for example in learning, knowledge, virtue, etc.; for such persons wish to be equaled with or preferred to one another.

3. The penitent who accuses himself of envy is to be asked concerning the affection in which he thinks his envy was; for there are penitents who cannot sufficiently distinguish various affections, such as emulation, zeal, indignation, and dread of harm, from envy itself.

VI. Remedies against envy. - Several remedies can be numbered against envy, which are reduced to four:

The first is consideration of the insanity and irrationality proper to this vice, because envy does not diminish the good of the one envied but of the envying man; for it is torture without fruit and with great damage, on account of the evils which accompany it and on account of the root from which it arises, pride. From this we shall be readier to repel every movement of envy immediately.

The second is consideration of the dogma of the communion of saints, and of the spiritual society among the faithful and the incorporation of all into Christ; whence the good of each is in some way the good of all, and the goods of others are ours, concerning which it is not fitting to grieve but necessary to rejoice.

The third is a right estimation of goods, by which it happens that we do not value so highly temporal goods which are wont to be the occasion of envy, but prefer to all things the good of Christian virtue, and thus convert envy into noble emulation and zeal for progress in the spiritual life.

The fourth is the exercise of charity toward the neighbor, by which we give thanks and rejoice concerning his good, pray for his good, and strive to procure it; to these is to be added prayer for obtaining from God greater charity for ourselves.

Capital sins are so called because they are as it were the heads or fountains of other sins. Hence they should be called vices rather than properly sins, if they are considered in general.

Seven are enumerated, namely: 1st. Pride; 2nd. Avarice; 3rd. Lust; 4th. Envy; 5th. Anger; 6th. Sloth; 7th. Gluttony. But how fittingly all sins are reduced to seven heads St. Thomas explains excellently, 1-2, q. 84, art. 4.

We shall say very few things here about the individual capital sins, but we shall carefully indicate the places of St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus to which recourse must be had for a fuller exposition of the doctrine.

Pride is the disordered love of one's own excellence, and is distinguished into perfect, or complete and consummated in its own genus, and imperfect. It is called perfect when a man so stands in himself and is pleased with himself that he is in the disposition of gravely transgressing the law rather than obeying the commands of superiors. But this, by that very fact, always includes mortal sin in itself. In other cases it is called imperfect, and then of itself it is accustomed to introduce only venial sin. From pride proceed ambition, vain glory, presumption, boasting, ostentation, and hypocrisy. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 162; and QQ. DD. De Malo, qq. 8 and 9.

Avarice is the disordered appetite of temporal goods. It is opposed to justice or to liberality. If the former, it will easily issue into mortal sin, namely as often as it impels one to grave injustice toward the neighbor. - If the latter, of itself it will produce only venial sins. For the rest, excessive affection toward earthly things can impel, and indeed is accustomed to impel, into other even grave sins. From avarice also proceed hardness of heart toward the miserable, disquiet of soul, perfidy, deceit, etc. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 118; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 13.

Lust is the disordered appetite of a venereal thing. Lust is a grave sin from its whole genus; but this is to be understood if venereal delectation is deliberate in itself and directly willed. But if it is only indirectly voluntary, it sometimes admits smallness of matter, as will be said more fully below where the sixth precept of the Decalogue is treated.

Blindness of mind, inconsideration, inconstancy, hatred of God, languor of faith, indeed even loss of faith, are effects of lust. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, qq. 153 and 154; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 15.

Envy is sadness concerning the good of another, insofar as it is judged as one's own evil, or at least as one's lesser good. To it is reduced joy concerning the evil of another, which is judged an increase of one's own good. Envy is directly against charity, and from its genus, although not from its whole genus, imports grave sin. From envy proceed detraction, calumny, whispering, contumely, etc. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 36; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 10.

Anger is the kindling of the soul, and a disordered motion against someone or something; or it is a disordered appetite of vengeance. Irascibility is the habit of anger. Anger is mortal from its genus, if it is an appetite of vengeance; but venial, if it is only a disordered motion of the soul. - Anger generates indignation, rancor, shouting, insults, blasphemies, etc. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 158; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 12. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 80 and seq.

Sloth in general sounds the same as laziness; but more strictly it is torpor of mind and weakness of will, from which distaste for spiritual things flows because of the labor and trouble attached to them. - If it is so great that grave obligations are omitted from it, it must be held grave; if otherwise, it is to be judged slight. Torpor, wandering of the mind, nausea in prayer, etc., are the fruits of sloth. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 35; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 11. - St. Alphonsus, n. 84.

Gluttony is the disordered appetite of food or drink, and from its genus it is nothing but venial sin. But it becomes grave if it gravely harms health, or if it renders someone unfit for duties. - From gluttony come drunkenness, about which more fully presently, dullness of mind, buffoonery, much speaking, and uncleanness of every kind. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 148 and 150; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 14. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 74 and seq.

Note. - It would perhaps be very fitting to consult St. Thomas concerning sobriety. Sobriety is especially concerned with drink having the power of making drunk. For sobriety preserves measure: "and therefore," says the Angelic Doctor, 2-2, q. 149, a. 1, "it especially assigns to itself that matter in which it is especially praiseworthy to preserve measure. But of this kind is drink capable of making drunk, because its measured use contributes much and a moderate excess harms much, because it impedes the use of reason more than excess of food." And ibid. ad 3: "although measure is required in all things, nevertheless sobriety is not properly said in all things, but in those things in which measure is especially necessary." Now then, "it pertains to moral virtue to preserve the good of reason against those things by which it can be impeded. And therefore," he says ibid. a. 2, "where a special impediment of reason is found, there it is necessary that there be a special virtue for removing it. But intoxicating drink has a special account of impeding the use of reason, insofar as namely it disturbs the brain by its fumes. And therefore ... a special virtue is required, which is sobriety." And although "food and drink commonly can impede the good of reason, by absorbing it through immoderation of delectation, ... drink capable of making drunk impedes according to a special account." Would that also the following words of the Angelic Doctor were noted by some: "in all drinks capable of making drunk there is one and the same account of impeding the use of reason. And thus that diversity of drinks is related accidentally to virtue." Ibid. ad 3. No food or drink, speaking according to itself, is illicit. Yet drink can be rendered illicit by accident, either "because by wine [a man] is easily harmed, or because by a special vow he is obliged not to drink wine," or "from the manner of drinking, because namely he exceeds measure in drinking," or "on the part of others who are scandalized by this." Ibid. art. 3. To the objection that the use of wine is totally illicit, because it impedes wisdom without which someone cannot be in the state of salvation, the Angelic Doctor responds: "Wisdom can be had in two ways. In one way according to the common mode, insofar as it suffices for salvation. And thus it is not required for having wisdom that someone altogether abstain from wine, but that he abstain from the immoderate use of wine. In another way according to a certain degree of perfection. And thus it is required in some persons, for perceiving wisdom perfectly, that they altogether abstain from wine, according to the conditions of certain persons and places." ad 1. But for women and young people, if we regard proneness to pursuing bodily pleasures, "for old men in whom reason ought to flourish for the instruction of others, and for Bishops or any ministers of the Church who with devout mind ought to insist upon spiritual offices, and for kings who by wisdom ought to govern the subject people, sobriety is specially enjoined." Ibid. a. 4. - Cf. the places to be cited at n. 148 from St. Thom. 1-2, q. 88, a. 5, ad 1; 2-2, q. 150, a. 2.

Drunkenness is a voluntary excess in drink unto disturbance of reason, whether this is done from or with pleasure, or without pleasure. But it is divided into perfect and imperfect. The first is had when the use of reason is altogether taken away, so that the drunk man is incapable of acting morally; but the other is that by which the mind is indeed disturbed, yet still has the power to discern between good and evil.

But many others, following St. Thomas, define the vice of drunkenness as: superfluous drink without necessity and from the pleasure of wine alone unto deprivation of the use of reason.

Perfect drunkenness is always a mortal sin, but imperfect drunkenness of itself is only venial. The reason for the first is gathered both from the consent of theologians and the estimation of God-fearing men, and because to deprive oneself of the use of reason in a violent and unnatural way, and indeed in such a way that it cannot immediately be recovered, gravely repugns rational nature; and finally because in the Scriptures, for example, I Cor. vi, 10, drunkards are excluded from the kingdom of God. But the reason for the second is both because there is no grave disordering as long as one can act morally, and because the consent of theologians so holds. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 150, art. 2. - St. Alphonsus, n. 75. But St. Thomas speaks thus, 1-2, q. 88, a. 5, ad 1: "Concerning drunkenness it must be said that according to its own account it has this, that it is a mortal sin. For that a man without necessity renders himself unable to use reason, through which man is ordered to God and avoids many sins that occur, from the pleasure of wine alone, is expressly contrary to virtue. But that it is venial sin happens on account of a certain ignorance or infirmity, for instance when a man does not know the strength of wine or his own weakness, whence he does not think that he will be made drunk: for then drunkenness is not imputed to him as sin, but only overabundance of drink. But when he is frequently made drunk, he cannot be excused through this ignorance, without his will seeming to choose rather to suffer drunkenness than to abstain from superfluous wine, whence the sin returns to its own nature." Therefore the drunk man is guilty of a twofold disordering according to St. Thomas: by drinking wine from pleasure alone; and by drinking from excess unto the loss of the use of reason without any motive which would justify even the account of excessive drink. Cf. Baller., tr. 4, n. 381, seq. - Azor., l. 7, c. 33, q. 5. - Lessius, lib. 4, c. 3, d. 3, n. 13. - Dicastillo, lib. 1, disp. 3, d. 11, n. 104.

You Will Resolve. 1st. It is lawful to use any liquors whatever, as medicine for driving away diseases, for example, typhus, even if drunkenness is foreseen as going to follow, provided nevertheless that it is not directly intended, and the salvation of the soul is not placed in danger. It is required namely 1st. that drunkenness follow only indirectly, and 2nd. that no danger be present that the sick man die without reception of the sacraments. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 150, a. 2, ad 3. - St. Alphonsus, n. 76. St. Thomas speaks thus: "When someone drinks much according to the counsel of medicine ... the drink is not reputed superfluous." l. c.

2nd. The same seems able to be said of those of our country who take a great quantity of liquor in order to expel or restrain the poison which they have drawn from the bites of serpents; for drunkenness, if any follows in such a case, would be said to have followed only indirectly. In this case it is not taken from the pleasure of wine alone nor without necessity.

3rd. It can never be lawful to assume drunkenness as a means for obtaining some effect, however good, because evils are not to be done that goods may come. But if a great quantity of liquor were taken, not indeed for violent deprivation of the use of reason, but for relaxing and thus soothing the nerves, so that from this some surgical operation may be done more easily, it does not appear why this would be illicit, since it is said to be lawful to use opium or ether for performing similar operations.

4th. Those mothers or nurses are altogether to be condemned who, for quieting the tears of children, use alcoholic or opiated drinks, and thus from the first age introduce an evil custom into them.

5th. A fortiori doctors are to be condemned who recur to the same remedy in order to provoke the sick to gladness or to lessen pains of the body; for those acting thus, although perhaps they can be excused from the sin of drunkenness, because they procure it only indirectly, nevertheless certainly introduce an evil custom into the sick if they recover; or, if they die, expose them to the danger of eternal damnation.

6th. Certainly they sin gravely who by command, counsel, or provocation induce others to drunkenness, or induce them to drink with foresight of future drunkenness: something which here and there is done under the vain pretext of friendship or civility.

7th. Likewise he who drinks to excess in order to free himself from the death which another threatens against him does not drink from the pleasure of wine alone or without cause; hence it is not sin.

Question 1. What must be said concerning the promise not to drink (the pledge) as it is accustomed to be made among us?

Response. Although a promise of this kind is good in itself, and, as daily experience establishes, offers an excellent remedy for amending the life of many, nevertheless the practice of receiving it is not without difficulties. For if it is said openly, what theologically speaking is certainly true, namely that violation of that promise is no sin or only venial sin, it will scarcely not happen that the whole efficacy of the remedy vanishes. But from the other side, if nothing is said, many and grave sins will be perpetrated from an ill-formed conscience; since there are many who judge violations of that promise to be graver sins than perfect drunkenness. Therefore much prudence and discretion is needed in receiving promises of this kind. - Wherefore, if there are those who doubt concerning the quantity of that obligation and inquire about it, or if they are not so untaught that they can easily grasp an explanation, or are not drawn to liquors by an utterly mad and ruined love, it will be useful, indeed necessary, to explain to them what the nature of that promise is; for since this is not a vow, but only a purpose manifested to a priest, it cannot of itself oblige under grave sin. But in the other hypothesis perhaps it would be better to say nothing, and to bear oneself permissively concerning those grave sins which would follow; for the lessening of drunkenness will be a sufficient reason for permitting them. - Cf. Irish Ecclesiastical Record, May 1883, pp. 338 and seq.

Question 2. What must be said concerning those sodalities recently instituted for extirpating the vice of drunkenness?

Response. That they are very good and are preferred by many apostolic laborers to the other remedy which consists in the promise not to drink. The reason is that these more recent remedies, while from one side they foster piety more, which is the beginning of every true conversion, from the other side offer no occasion of new sins. The Fathers of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore indeed alluded to these remedies in the following words: "Since monstrous scandals arise from excessive drinking, we exhort pastors, and beseech them by the bowels of Jesus Christ, that they put every zeal into eliminating the vice of drunkenness. To this end, we judge worthy of praise the zeal of those faithful who abstain from every ardent liquor in order to decline more safely the danger of excesses. But those who spontaneously enter a society among themselves, so that by mutual examples of virtues they may help and strengthen one another, ought first of all to employ those aids which Christ the Lord left in the Church, by which human vices are amended and infirmity is sustained; and by prayer, frequent reception of the sacraments, and other exercises of piety, to obtain heavenly aid for themselves, and to trust not in themselves, nor in their purposes, but in God, without whom human effort profits nothing." But the Fathers of the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore, speaking more explicitly, say: "The societies which come under the name of 'Catholic Union for promoting Total Abstinence' and 'Sacred Thirst,' we acknowledge as worthy of great praise; for they are governed by a truly Catholic spirit, and seek the necessary strength not so much in firmness of their own will as in the power of prayers and of the sacraments. Moreover it is known that the Head of the whole Church and Vicar of Christ on earth has more than once enriched them with his apostolic blessing and with the indulgences of the Church. Therefore we also exhibit to the same the signs of our benevolence, and that they may flourish the more, we commend them to the paternal care of all our priests, that they may not only add courage to them but also always show them the Catholic path." Cf. Conc. Plen. Balt. II, nn. 470 and seq.; and Conc. Plen. Balt. III, nn. 260 and seq.

Very recently special spiritual graces in favor of the faithful enrolled in societies of Temperance or Abstinence from intoxicating drink were conceded by the Supreme Pontiff Pius X on 21 May 1914 - namely: indulgences both plenary and partial, and also an altogether singular favor by virtue of which all Masses which are applied by any priest whatsoever for the soul of some deceased member can assist that soul as if they had been celebrated at a privileged altar. These graces were granted by the Supreme Pontiff wishing to show his more favorable will toward the aforesaid Societies and to find their Members more eager in advancing so salutary a purpose. - Acta Apost. Sed., v. VI, p. 309.

Question 3. Is it lawful to induce someone to drunkenness so that he may be turned away from a greater evil?

Response. Affirmatively, if drunkenness is only material to him; because a material evil can be permitted for a grave cause. Thus commonly against Collet, Concina, etc. But they more commonly deny it if drunkenness is formal; because evils are not to be done that goods may come: nevertheless St. Alphonsus, n. 77, admits the opposite opinion as probable with several others, "because it is lawful to induce another to a lesser evil so that he may be impeded from a greater." For when someone can be deterred from perpetrating a greater evil by no other means, to persuade the lesser evil has the account of good. See below n. 185. Q. 5th.

Note. - 1st. Habitual excessive drink produces enormous harms for the individual, the family, and society. It harms the health, fortune, and morals of individuals: domestic peace departs from the family, horrible crimes are committed, reason itself day by day becomes degenerate and more vicious.

Personal remedies: for all to avoid the occasions of this sin and those persons and assemblies by whom temperance is violated; to acquire strength by exercise of this virtue and of Christian mortification, and by consideration of motives both natural and supernatural by which men may become stronger against the vice of drunkenness, finally by petition of divine aid. - Dictionnaire de Theol. Cath., under the word Gourmandise.

2nd. The use of morphine, chloroform, and other medicines bringing exile of reason must be ruled by these general principles. The use of morphine, etc., for calming grave pains by soothing the senses is permitted in surgical operations, in more difficult births, and in general when there is a just cause. The use of morphine, etc., taken habitually induces an unquenchable thirst, to which follows unfitness for performing grave duties, and servitude under the medicine itself: such use is gravely prohibited; indeed doctors sin gravely who so frequently prescribe these things to the sick that there is proximate danger of inducing this habit or desire for morphine. The use of morphine which does not bring with it this danger but only a lessening of pains is not illicit of itself. The use of morphine, etc., inducing the loss of the exercise of reason for a long time without cause is certainly a grave sin.

The use of morphine, etc., employed with the dying without their consent so that they may remain in a state of semi-wakefulness is a grave sin and against natural right: such use in those circumstances, that is, with one dying, is gravely illicit when he is not prepared by the sacraments for dying, nor is it lawful for him to consent to it. If he is prepared and there is no danger of falling into grave sin, doctors are to be deterred from employing these means. But what if the pains are most bitter and extraordinary, for example, if someone is burned by slow fire in a conflagration, and cannot be removed from the flames themselves, because, say, he is held by the beams of the house? Is it lawful in this case, when there is no danger of falling into a state of sin, without the consent of the dying man so to soothe his senses that he will remain in fainting until death? It is not lawful: because he has a right to acquire enormous merits. What if he himself wishes it, or if there is danger of falling into grave sin? In those most difficult circumstances let the priest assist him with every help and exhortation so that he may suffer the pains bravely. If at last the sacred minister himself fears, let him be silent; indeed it does not seem altogether certainly prohibited so to soothe the senses, because in the case, morally speaking, he is a prepared sick man: to this indeed he is bound, but it is not clear that he is bound to acquire greater merits. It is his right: but whether a grave obligation rests upon him, this is not evident. Cf. Villada, Cas., v. 3, p. 309. Lehmkuhl speaks more severely, n. 892, ed. 11a.

3rd. Nor does artificial sleep seem illicit, by which, induced by medicinal injections, a woman giving birth does not fully perceive the pains of birth. During this state, so it is reported, she is not deprived of the use of the senses; afterward, however, she is said not to remember those things which then happened, and the sleep is called twilight. Moreover we affirm that if the woman in that state is duly protected, if the doctor is prudent, if care is applied so that nothing harmful happens either to the woman or to the fetus, the matter is done licitly. But another thing would have to be said if these conditions were not verified.

Envy is thus opposed to Charity, that as for the latter all things, even evils, cooperate unto good, so for the former all things, even goods, cooperate for evil; and as Charity covers the multitude of sins, so Envy covers all the goods of the neighbor, that they may not be seen; whence the envious one is said to be from non-seeing, as the Seraphic Doctor has, where below.

On Envy the Fathers have written many splendid things: Cyprian, serm. de Invid., Basil homil. 11. et 21., Chrysostom homil. 44. et 45., Cassian collat. 18., Prosper lib. 3. de vita contemplativa, cap. 9., and others as gathered by St. Bonaventure, Lib. 2. Pharetrae, cap. 8., where, drawing on St. Gregory (Lib. 2. moral. cap. 20. Lib. 3. cap. 17.), he lists the daughters of Envy, which are Hatred, Whispering, Detraction, Anger; and others, from other Fathers, chiefly St. Augustine (de disciplina Christiana, cap. 1.) and Jerome (epist. 99.), where they call it a diabolical vice.

Envy is defined by all as: Sadness over the neighbor's good, judged as an evil of one's own, insofar as by comparison it diminishes the excellence of one's own good. So the Socratic Doctor (opusc. explic. Terminorum Theologiae; et p. p. censil. sect. 19.). Hence Aristotle (Lib. 2. Rhet. cap. 9.) says the cause of Envy is equality, or similarity, and proximity. And the Saints have similar things: Augustine in Psalm. 104., as gathered by St. Bonaventure loc. adducto, Damascene Lib. 2. cap. 24. St. Augustine also, Lib. 11. de Genes. ad litt. cap. 14., describes Envy, saying: Since each loves his own excellence, he envies equals, that they be made equal to him; inferiors, lest they be made equal to him; superiors, because they are not made equal to him; etc. The same is taught by the Angelic Doctor (p. p. censil. sect. 19.). Hence also Lucan sang:

— Emulous virtue gave the spur, and now each can no longer bear that Caesar be before him, or Pompey his equal. —

Therefore not only the surpassing good of one's neighbor begets Envy, but anything even equal, insofar as it is apprehended as diminishing our excellence or impeding our surpassing others. In this sense St. Gregory is to be understood, Lib. 5. moral. cap. 33. We cannot envy except those whom we think better than ourselves in some respect; for he does not call them better simply, but insofar as they diminish our excellence, as Tancretus noted (disp. 2. quaest. 6. dub. 1.), Valencia (disp. 3. quaest. 14. puncto 1.). Hence St. Augustine (Lib. 11. in Genes. cap. 15.), as cited by St. Bonaventure loco cit., says the differences of envy are three: namely, envying superiors, because one is not their equal; equals, because they prosper for the better; inferiors, lest they be made equal to oneself. But one must note that Envy agrees with the other three affections in the character of sadness, but differs by the other parts of the definition, as the Angelic Doctor indicates (p. p. Censil. sect. 19. et in speculo animae, cap. 1.).

For first, there is a certain effect of fear, which is sadness over another's good insofar as it is feared to bring ruin upon us; and this is not a sin, as is clear from Aristotle loco cit. and St. Thomas (hic art. 1. et 2.) and St. Bonaventure in speculo animae. The envious man, however, is not saddened over another's good under this aspect, but as in fact judged to surpass him in his own excellence.

The second effect, similar to Envy, is when one is saddened not over another's good, so as to envy it, but over his own deficiency, insofar as he himself does not have that good; and this is not a sin, as St. Bonaventure says. This affection is called zeal and emulation, as the Philosopher teaches (Lib. 2. Rhet. cap. 11. and St. Thomas art. 1.). But Envy is saddened over another's good insofar as it diminishes one's own excellence. Hence 1 John cap. 3. says, For this reason Cain slew his brother, because his brother's works were just. Here the Angelic Doctor notes that Envy is sometimes called by the name of anger, Genes. 4. Why are you angry? where the Gloss reads: you are tormented by envy; sometimes by the name of hatred: His brothers hated him, Genes. 37.; sometimes by the name of emulation, 1 Kings 1. Her rival afflicted her. To this belongs what Nyssenus says, Lib. de vita Moysi: The envious man grieves at the happiness of others, and rejoices in their calamities. And Chrysostom, homil. 44. ad pop. Why do you grieve, O man, at your neighbor's goods? We ought to grieve at the evils we suffer, not at the goods by which we seem to be held in esteem by others. Therefore this sin is without any pardon. And Isidore, Lib. 3. sent. cap. 25. There is no virtue that has not for its contrary the evil of Envy; only misery is without envy.

The third affection, similar to Envy, is sadness over another's good insofar as we judge him unworthy of that good; and this affection is called Nemesis, or Indignation. So Aristotle loco cit. cap. 9.; and St. Bonaventure asserts that this affection, with regard to temporal goods, which more often bring ruin, is not a sin (in speculo animae, supra citato.). See him also, Lib. primo de profectu Religiosi, cap. 13. Hence St. Gregory (in Pastorali, part. 3. cap. 1. admon. 23.) says: It often happens that, without losing Charity, we are gladdened by the ruin of an enemy, and again saddened by his glory without the guilt of envy: since we believe in our mind that some are thereby well raised up; and as he advances, we fear that very many are unjustly oppressed. So reports St. Bonaventure, Lib. 3. Pharetrae, cap. 21.

From what has been said it follows that Envy does not exist among those who are not equals or similar in some state, as Aristotle teaches (cap. 10.); for among these only the excellence of one obscures the excellence of the other. Hence he infers that neither the dead, nor those most remote at the pillars of Hercules, are envied; but envy, he says, exists among neighbors and rivals, and among those who desire and strive for the same things, whence the saying: The potter envies the potter, and the smith the smith.

Hence you infer that those prone to envy are the faint-hearted, since to them all things seem great, as St. Gregory noted above; to this Job 5: Envy slays the small one. On the contrary, the magnanimous are free from envy, as Silius Italicus says. See Valencia.

From all these things the Angelic Doctor concludes in the place cited in the Summa that Envy is opposed to piety, which arises from Charity.

St. Thomas shows (2. 2. g. 36. a. 4.) not only the character of envy as capital sin, but also how the filiae invidiae: susurratio, detractio, cxultatio in adversis proximi, afflictio in prosperis proximi, odium, develop therefrom. Furthermore, he refutes the objection against classification of this sin as capital sin, as also the objection that the above-mentioned exultatio and afflictio coincide with envy; respecting the exultatio, he denies it entirely; respecting the afflictio, he admits it under one point of view, while under another he denies it. This may suffice as regards envy as capital sin.

Our task here is to ascertain whether envy is ex genere suo peccatum mortale, and if so, whether ex toto genere.

The answer to the first question is simple, if the nature of envy is precisely determined. Not infrequently penitents lack this knowledge, and they accuse themselves of envy, although they did either not sin at all, or sinned (grievously or lightly), but not through envy. There are acts which have one or two characteristics in common with envy. One characteristic, the tristitia de bono proximi has, in common with envy, the so-called aemulatio, or zelus, when someone is sad at his neighbor’s possession, because he, too, would like to possess, not in eodem individuo, but in eadem specie vel mensura. If the aemulatio has reference to natural or supernatural mental qualities, it is quite praiseworthy; if to temporal advantages, it is also of itself laudable, or at least permissible, but it becomes sinful if the desire is in any way inordinate; nevertheless, it has not even in this case the character of envy. For this there would be required the desire that the neighbor might not possess the benefit. Even this wish is not the nota specified of envy. Such desire is present also in other kinds of tristitia be bono proximi. For instance, in the tristitia, which is a result of fear, if someone, for instance, mourns over a neighbor's possession because he fears, either for himself or for others, evil consequences from it, be they deserved or undeserved. In the former case the tristitia is faulty, not so in the latter, though the fear which produces it may be inordinate, for instance, if there is no sufficient reason for suspecting that the neighbor will misuse his power in order to harm us or others. In no case has this tristitia the character of envy. Again, the desire that the neighbor might not obtain, or not possess, something of value is connected with that tristitia which someone entertains because he considers the neighbor unworthy of the benefit in question. This étristitia is called indignatio, or nemesis. In regard the bona honesta, ex quibus aliquis justus efficitur, so St. Thomas teaches (/. c. a. 2.), this tristitia can not occur at all; for the gratia justifications is not obtained except by proper preparation, if otherwise such preparation is possible (comp. Cone. Trid. sess. 6. de justif. cap. 5.). It is only possible with respect to riches and other such things, which can fall to the worthy and the unworthy (S. Thom. I. c.), and is sinful if directed against Divine Providence, which allows the unworthy to have such goods either ad eorum correctionem, in order to incite them to penance and conversion, or ad eorum damnationem, that, if they do not become converted and thus incur damnation, they will be rewarded then for the good that they have done. It is sinful also if it proceeds from a contempt of the eternal goods which God has reserved for his faithful (ps. 36. 1.). But neither in the one nor in the other case has it the character of envy.

Finally, the desire that the neighbor may not obtain, or possess, a benefit, is present in the tristitia, which is sad at the neighbor’s possession, in quantum proximo bonum est, and this tristitia is odium inimicitiae, just like the gaudium and desiderium circa malum proximi ut ipsi malum est, it results from envy (S. Thom. 1. c. 8, q: 34. a. 6.), is nearest related to it, yet not envy itself.

Although the envious does not grieve over a possession of the neighbor, because it is an advantage for the latter, still envy is directly contra caritatem (proximi), cujus est gaudere de bono proximi, because the envious only grieves over the neighbor’s possession and would like to see him deprived of it, quod sit diminutivum propriae excellentiae. The diminutio propriae excellentiae per bonum proximi is in itself never a just reason to grieve over the possession of the neighbor and to wish that he might not have the same, unless he makes use of it ad diminuendam excellentiam nostram, or if he is unworthy to possess it in common with other more worthy persons, or even in preference to them. (Compare what is said above of tristitia ex timore and the indignatio.) Then again it is quite false that the bonum proximi, except in the cases just mentioned, is a diminutio propriae excellentiae, since from your neighbor’s happiness, because of the union of charity and friendship, some excellence is rather added to you, as Laymann (l. 2. tr. 3. c. 10. n. 2) correctly remarks. For this reason we said quod sit, and not quod est, diminutivum, etc. Is envy thus directly contra caritatem proximi, it is evident that it is ex genere suo peccatum mortale (comp. S. Thom. I. c. q. 36. a. 3.).

The second question is whether it is mortale ex toto genere. St. Thomas says nothing about this, because he makes, in general, no distinction between mortale ex toto genere and non ex toto. Many other authors explicitly declare that there is not respecting this sin a parvitas materiae, but do not explain this further. Of all authors to whom we have turned for advice, we find Schwane (Special Moral Theology, I. p. 140) most explicit, in spite of his brevity: “Envy is a grievous sin if our fellow-beings are envied on account of their spiritual advantage. Envy that concerns temporal possessions of our fellow men is not always a grievous sin.”

Leaving aside this distinction between spiritual and temporal benefits, we say: Envy is always a grievous sin if the object is a possession of such nature, or such extent, that the neighbor, by its absence or deprivation, would suffer an important injury.

Dr. Anton Auer.

Mary and Anna had conceived a mortal grudge for each other. It grew out of envy and jealousy. For a long time they kept it in check, as far as any public outward manifestation of it was concerned. However, one Sunday, as they were both leaving the church, they met, and immediately began to abuse and vilify each other, before all the people, and finally came to blows. Of course it caused a scandal and everyone was greatly shocked.

How many sins did these two women commit, both as regards the kind and the number of the sins?

Answer. There can be no doubt but that these two women sinned against the love they owed each other. Envy and jealousy are sins against charity. Charity is a virtue that disposes one to love one's neighbor, to wish one's neighbor well, and to do him good. Envy is a feeling or sentiment of grief or discontent and uneasiness at the sight of another's excellence or good fortune, coupled with a certain degree of hatred or dislike (odium inimicitiae) for such a person, and a desire to possess equal advantages. Envy and jealousy are directly opposed to charity and are therefore sinful. Now since Mary and Anna both harbored, for a long time, feelings of envy and jealousy, these sins of envy and jealousy must have been multiplied many times, since they were peccata mere interna, or sins of the heart, or of the will. These internal sins, or sins of the heart, are said to be multiplied as often as the evil feeling or desire is expressly or tacitly retracted and again revived and consented to. In fact, it may be said that internal sins, or sins of the heart are multiplied as often as they are physically interrupted, no matter even if the interruption be involuntary. In this way sins of the heart are multiplied as often as they are physically interrupted, no matter from what cause, so that there will be as many sins numerically, as there are interruptions. An exception is made for the case where many acts are prompted by the same burst of passion; in that case the several actions, following quickly upon one another, are united or rather unified by the one cause from which they proceed, namely the same outburst of passion. But now, ordinarily speaking, no outburst of passion lasts more than two or three hours at most, and therefore Mary and Anna must have multiplied their internal sins of envy and jealousy, at least several times a day. In practice, however, it will suffice if these women indicate the length of time that they indulged these sinful feelings against one another. For instance, it will be sufficient if they confess to having harbored sentiments of envy or hatred or jealousy for one month, or two months, etc. For by so doing, they make it sufficiently clear to the confessor, just about what is the number of these sins that they committed. Besides, it would scarcely be possible to be more exact or explicit in matters of this kind. The Council of Trent says that mortal sins must be confessed, according to kind and number, prout sunt in conscientia, at the time of confession. It is the conscience of the sinner that eventually must number his sins or keep count of them. But, usually, the sinner is ignorant of those theological distinctions, regarding number and kind and the method of distinguishing them. These rules must be applied to the sinner according to his special circumstances. We take it for granted that these two women had no intention from the beginning of making any external demonstration or of coming to blows. Therefore as often as they desisted from these thoughts of envy and hatred, they multiplied these sins numerically. Did they intend from the beginning to come to blows, an interval of time would be required to multiply actus internos cum proposito externam actionem ponendi.

So much for the internal sins of the heart that Mary and Anna committed by envy and jealousy. Let us take up the sins of act, or the external sins that Mary and Anna committed on that Sunday morning, when with much mutual abuse and vilification and many imprecations, they engaged in a physical encounter before the whole congregation. How many different sins did they commit on this occasion? Sins, of course, of action, external sins. Were they many in number and many in kind?

They seem to have committed only one sin against charity, by anger. St. Thomas says that sins of the tongue are multiplied according to kind or species, not by reason of the things that are said, but rather by reason of the purpose for which they are said.

"Species peccati oris magis attenditur ex fine, quam ex materiali objecto." (2-2 q. 74, a. 2.)

In the case before us, the abuse and imprecations and maledic tions, all proceed from the same outburst of passion, from the same explosion of anger and hatred, and are all meant, not as so many separate and formal evils which they mutually call down upon one another's head, but rather as evil in general which they wish one another, not attending to the particular kinds of evil that their words imply, and they constitute one act along with the physical act of beating one another, which is the principal act. Whilst, therefore, physically speaking, all these different acts of abuse and contumely and physical encounter, constitute separate physical acts; nevertheless, morally taken, they form but one act, containing but one kind of moral malice. If these women belong to the rank and file of the community, there will be no question of loss of honor or defamation, because the spectators do not believe what these hurl at one another, knowing that it is said in the heat of passion, etc.

But did they not give grave scandal to the community by such conduct on Sunday, in the sight of the whole parish?

If there were non-Catholics in the community, who witnessed this scene, or who learned of it immediately, with all its disgusting details, of course there would be given serious scandal. For such conduct necessarily leads the non-Catholic to despise the Catholic religion. But if there were only Catholics present, or in the community, then we should have to consider whether they would be led into sin by such a scene. Scandal is not necessarily given because a sin is committed before others. A sin committed before others is scandalous only when it will very probably lead the others into sin also. The sinful action may shock others or outrage their feelings, but as long as it does not lead them into sin, it is not scandalous. Now a community of Catholics might witness such a scene as the above, and never be led into any sin by it. In that case no scandal is given. They might feel bad about it and shocked and humiliated, but they would not be scandalized.

To sum up therefore, Mary and Anna, by harboring ill will and envy and hatred toward one another, committed a grave sin against charity, and they multiplied their sin several times daily, all during the time that they entertained the grudge for one another.

Secondly, when they came to blows, they committed a new sin against charity, with which the abusive language and epithets, that immediately preceeded it, constitute one moral act. This they will sufficiently confess by saying that they quarreled and came to blows.

The various evils that they wished each other, did not constitue a new kind of sin, nor was there any defamation of character or grave scandal.

Case.—Aegidius, a poor man, is much inclined to sadness at the thought that the rich are favored above his class not only temporally, but even spiritually, since they are better able to give alms and may thus acquire greater merits in this life and have more suffrages offered for them after death.

Questions:

1. Are Aegidius’ dispositions sinful?

2. What should be thought of his opinions? Solution:

1. Envy is a sorrow over the good fortune of our neighbor inasmuch as we consider that it surpasses our own good. Such feeling is of course out of harmony with the law of charity, which bids us to love our neighbor as ourselves and to rejoice at his prosperity. Therefore envy is sinful and, if fully deliberate, a mortal sin. Envy of the spiritual good of another is a most grievous crime, and is numbered as one of the sins against the Holy Ghost.

Quite different from envy is emulation or zeal, which causes us to grieve at our neighbor’s good, not because he possesses it, but because we ourselves are wanting in that good. Such sadness, if its object be moral goodness or righteousness, is virtuous and praiseworthy: “Let us consider one another to provoke unto charity and good works” (Heb., x, 24; cfr. 1 Cor., xiv, 1). But if it be concerned with temporal things only, emulation is or is not sinful according to circumstances.

Temporal possessions may assist a person to love God. It is not wrong, then, to desire such advantages, provided avarice, covetousness and impatience be excluded. As Aegidius is a spiritually minded man, it is not likely that he begrudges his neighbor the favors with which God has blessed him; he merely wishes that he enjoyed certain opportunities for good that others have. Such a wish springs not from envy, but from zeal. If, however, some slight movements of envy are mingled with his anxiety about his soul’s welfare, his inadvertence and ignorance will excuse him from serious fault.

2. For it is not true that riches are usually an advantage in the supernatural order. An abundance of this world’s goods does not generally lead its possessor towards God, but it does make him more responsible before God. The rich are deserving of compassion rather than envy, if we view matters in the light of faith, Hence it is not the rich, but the poor whom our Lord calls blessed. While Aegidius is not able to give liberal alms, there is much that he can do for his neighbor. The widow’s mite was worth more in our Lord’s eyes than the great gifts of the Pharisees. Merit and reward are proportioned to internal charity rather than to the actual relief that is effected.

As to the greater number of Masses that the rich can have offered for the repose of their souls and their speedier liberation from Purgatory, Aegidius should remember: (1) God is the Supreme Master of His creatures, and if it pleases Him to grant to one an easier way to salvation than to another, the latter has no right to complain; for the graces of God are free gifts of His bounty, they are given sufficiently to all, and each one will be judged according to his opportunities and merits. (2) If the rich are enabled to obtain greater suffrages after death, the poor by patiently bearing their difficulties during life have made a satisfaction that acquits the temporal punishment due to sin more quickly than do the sufferings of Purgatory. (3) The sacrifice of the Mass is profitably offered for the dead and its fruits are applied to him for whom it was offered, if there be no obstacle. But the remission of the temporal punishment of sin depends upon the Divine mercy and liberality. Hence it may happen that a great portion of the fruit of Masses and other suffrages that are offered for the soul of one person may be applied to another whose life on earth made him more deserving of mercy. (4) The poor man has more security of salvation and the opportunity for greater merit and a higher reward. These infinitely surpass the advantages of his wealthy neighbor, even though the latter should be liberated sooner from Purgatory.