What excuses from observing a law

175. Notions. Causes de-obliging from law are some exempting, others excusing or impeding. Those are called exempting through which someone ceases to be the subject of the law, as if someone betakes himself outside the territory which is affected by the law, or if through a privilege he is exempted from the law; therefore exempting causes render one altogether immune from the obligation of the law. Those are called excusing or impeding causes on account of which someone, although he remains the subject of the law, nevertheless is not bound to observe it, as if someone is excused from fasting because of infirmity or because of arduous labor. A twofold question must be treated here: a. concerning causes excusing from law, and b. concerning the placing of causes de-obliging from law.

176. On causes excusing from law. The causes excusing from the observance of law are ignorance and impotence, both physical and moral. That invincible ignorance and physical impotence excuse from the obligation of law is manifest: for no one is bound to the impossible. Indeed from the nature of law it is established that moral impotence also, or grave damage or inconvenience which is accidentally joined with the observance of the law, excuses from its obligation (n. 139). But since laws are of diverse species, it is now asked whether in any law grave fear or grave damage or inconvenience excuses from its observance.

1. From the negative law of nature not even danger of death excuses: for this law prohibits what is evil in itself and intrinsically; but it is not lawful, even for avoiding death, to do what is evil in itself, such as to blaspheme, to perjure oneself, to lie.

2. From an affirmative law, whether divine or human, not even danger of death excuses if its violation would fall a. to common damage; b. to the extreme spiritual damage of a particular man; c. to hatred of God or religion or to contempt of the Church.

The reason for the first is that the common good is to be preferred to the good of the life of a private man; therefore a parish priest in time of plague is bound, even with danger to life, to be present to his parishioners.

The reason for the second is that ordered charity requires that the supreme spiritual good of one's neighbor be preferred to one's own temporal good of life; therefore we are bound, with danger to life, to confer baptism on a dying child not yet baptized.

The reason for the third is that he who does what is demanded in hatred of God and religion or in contempt of the Church by that very fact consents to the intention of the one commanding and contemns God or the Church, which is evil in itself. Therefore it is not lawful to eat meat on a prohibited day if this is demanded in contempt of the Church, even under threat of death.¹

3. With these cases removed, proportionally grave damage or inconvenience excuses from a law, whether natural affirmative, positive divine, or human.

The reason for the first is that since these laws are not absolutely necessary in individual cases, God is not judged to wish to oblige with most grave inconvenience. Therefore we are not bound, with danger of life or of grave evil, to preserve a deposit, to fulfill a vow, to succor a neighbor suffering extreme bodily necessity, or to restore a thing unjustly taken away.

The reason for the second is that since the matter of these laws is not necessary for preserving order, God is not judged to require their observance with such great rigor, although He could require it. Therefore Christ Himself excuses David, who in danger of grave evil ate the loaves of proposition prohibited to laymen by divine law.² Likewise we are not bound with most grave external inconvenience to confess integrally.

The reason for the third is that a human law morally impossible does not oblige; indeed it does not even belong to a human legislator to have the power of issuing laws of this kind that are too difficult (n. 139).

But in individual precepts it must be determined how great the damage or inconvenience must be for someone to be excused from their observance, because diverse precepts are of diverse gravity and diverse rigor. In general it can be affirmed that negative laws oblige more gravely than affirmative laws, divine laws more gravely than human laws.

¹ Cf. 2 Mach. 6, 18 ss.

² Matth. 12, 3. 4. coll. with 1 Reg. 21.

177. On the placing of causes de-obliging from law. Notions. a. Causes de-obliging from law are said to be placed directly if they are placed solely or at least principally with that intention, that someone de-oblige himself from the observance of the law; and they are said to be placed indirectly if they are placed for another end, although the impossibility of fulfilling the law is foreseen.

b. Besides, a cause is called proximately impeding if the law already actually urges or will urge after a short time, and it is called remotely impeding if it urges only after a notable time. But when a cause must be judged proximately impeding and when remotely impeding must be determined not by a general rule but rather from the judgment of prudent men and from the practice of those of timorous conscience, with account taken of the gravity of the law and the frequency of the obligation.

He who on Saturday evening or on a feast day already begun places an impediment to hearing Mass places a proximately impeding cause; he who does this on Friday places a remotely impeding cause. An impediment which precedes the obligation of a law by the space of several days is ordinarily judged remotely impeding.

178. Principles. 1. It is lawful to place exempting causes even directly and proximately against a law: for the law indeed obliges to the observance of itself so long as we are its subjects, but it does not oblige that we remain subjects of the law.

Therefore anyone can transfer himself into that state or place in which the law does not oblige, except in the single case in which this is expressly prohibited, as regards the reservation of sins. Therefore each one can licitly go from a place where there is fasting into a place where there is no fasting, lest he be obliged to fast.

2. It is not lawful to place against a law directly an impeding cause, whether proximate or remote: for he who directly places an impeding cause against a law explicitly intends to violate the law; but an express will of violating the law is never licit so long as one is subject to the law.

3. It is always lawful to place against a law indirectly a remotely impeding cause, because the legislator is not judged to wish that subjects already long before the obligation of the law be bound to foresee and omit everything which would impede the observance of the law: for this would be an inconvenience too grave. Wherefore no special reason is required for someone to be able to undertake a journey, e.g. on Thursday or Friday, even if he foresees that he cannot hear Mass on the following Sunday.

4. Without a just cause it is not lawful to place against a law indirectly a proximately impeding cause: for he who is bound to the law is also bound to beware of proximately impeding impediments. But from a proportionately grave cause it is lawful to place against a law indirectly a proximately impeding cause: for he who does this does not violate the law, but permits its violation; but this is lawful from a just cause. It is said: from a proportionately grave cause; therefore:

a. The graver the law is, or the more rarely its obligation returns, the sooner the obligation begins of not rendering the future observance of the law impossible. Thus someone can on Saturday morning, but not on Saturday evening, much less in the very early morning of the feast day, undertake a journey for recreation's sake or go out hunting, if he foresees that for this reason he cannot hear Mass.

b. The graver the law is and the nearer it urges, the graver must be the cause on account of which an impediment can licitly be placed against its observance. Thus it is not lawful on the very day of fasting to hunt for recreation's sake and thus render oneself unable to fast; but it is lawful to do this from a graver cause; yet on the day before a day of fasting it is lawful even for recreation's sake to engage in hunting with the foresight that on the following day the fast will be impossible.

c. A much graver cause is required for someone frequently or continuously to render himself unable to observe the law than for this to happen only once or rarely. Hence it is certainly not lawful throughout the whole autumn season to go out hunting on Saturday morning with the foresight that on the following day the hearing of Mass will be impossible, although this may be lawful once or again.

THE natural law continues to have binding force even though its observance entails great inconvenience. We must not commit murder to save the State, nor are we allowed to tell a lie in order to preserve human life.¹ Positive law, however, does not bind with the same rigour. Our Lord taught us² that even the positive divine law does not bind men when great inconvenience would follow from its observance. It is an axiom that necessity has no law. This is all the more true of positive human law, which must be accommodated to the moral strength of the majority of the people, otherwise it will be impossible to observe it, and nobody can be bound to do what is impossible. So that not only physical impossibility excuses from the observance of the law, but also any relatively great difficulty or serious inconvenience which constitutes moral impossibility (Can. 2205).

No general rule can be given for estimating the degree of difficulty which would excuse from the duty of observing any particular law in the concrete. The importance of the law, the intention of the legislator, the results of non-observance of the law, the degree of difficulty in the special case, must all be considered, and a prudent judgement given in view of all the circumstances.

¹ Inn. III, c. Super eo, de usuris.

² Matt. xii.

A law binds those to its observance who are subject to it, but it does not oblige people to remain subject to it. If I do not like living under a particular law, the law does not prevent me from going elsewhere into territory where it does not bind, and thus freeing myself from the duty of observing it. If I do not like abstaining from flesh meat on days of abstinence, I may lawfully go and live in Spain, get my Bulla Cruciata, and enjoy my. flesh meat. Such an action will be perfectly lawful, even if I directly intend to withdraw myself from the authority of the law. I have the right to use my liberty to go and live where I choose as far as the law is concerned. And when I am outside the particular territory subject to the law, it no longer binds me.

As long as a person remains subject to a law he must have the will to fulfil its obligations as far as he can, so that he must not do anything with the intention of making it impossible for him to observe the law. Moreover, he must take reasonable means to be able to do what the law commands, for one who is bound to secure some end is bound to use the necessary means. And so a priest who is going to travel must take his breviary with him so as to be able to say his Office; and time must be made by all Catholics for hearing Mass, receiving the sacraments, and fulfilling other religious duties. The question as to what obstacles to the observance of a law I am bound to remove as far as I can, or whether and when I commit a sin by doing something which will make the observance of the law impossible, is one of great practical difficulty. We have already seen that it is not lawful to put obstacles in the way of observing a law with the intention of escaping the obligation. But suppose there is no such intention, does the precept of hearing Mass, e.g., forbid me to go to a seaside place where there is no Catholic church, and where I foresee that I shall not be able to satisfy the precept ?

This is a type of many practical questions which occur and for which it is difficult to find a general answer. The law in question, the intention of the lawgiver, the practice of good men, and other circumstances, must be weighed in each case. The answer given by theologians to the special question proposed may be taken as a guide toward a solution in other similar cases. They say that such a precept does not oblige us to foresee and make arrangements for its observance a long time ahead; such an obligation would be a great inconvenience and seriously interfere with our liberty. So that any time within the week I may go where I like without regard to the necessity of hearing Mass on the following Sunday. However, when Sunday is practically at hand, say on Saturday evening, the precept of hearing Mass begins to be urgent, and forbids me to do anything without necessity which would make it impossible for me to fulfil the precept.

In this question, as in others, we are considering what is of strict obligation under pain of sin; a good Catholic would of course try as far as possible to have the opportunity of fulfilling his religious duties on a Sunday,

A cause exempting is said to be one which withdraws someone from the domain of the law, as if someone goes out from the territory of the law, or renounces the community for which the law was made. Now it is licit to place, or not to remove, a cause exempting from the law, and this even directly, that is, with the intention that the obligation be escaped. For a law generally does not command that someone remain a subject, but only that, as long as he is a subject, he fulfill the law (St. Alphonsus, I, 152, 157).¹ I said generally,² because civil law forbids soldiers, and indeed deservedly by right, to desert the standards.

¹ c. 49, 53, X, V, 39.

² As we shall note in its own place, the ecclesiastical discipline has now been changed which formerly, in some matters, forbade one to betake himself into another region so that the obligation of the law might be escaped.

A cause excusing is one which brings it about that one who is subject to the law is not held to observe it. It differs from a cause exempting, which brings it about that someone ceases to be subject to the law (St. Alphonsus, I, 152).

The excusing causes are ignorance and inability. Ignorance brings it about that one who transgresses the law does not sin formally, but not that material sin is absent. Inability averts not only formal sin, but also material sin. Ignorance was discussed where there was speech about impediments of liberty (nn. 30-32), so that only inability must be treated.

I. Notion and division of inability. Inability is twofold, physical and moral. The former is had when someone absolutely cannot observe the law; the latter, when he cannot observe it without a grave extrinsic inconvenience, or without grave danger of such an inconvenience. I said "without a grave extrinsic inconvenience," because there is not question of the inconvenience which the law itself, or the work imposed by the law, contains in itself. It is clear that an inconvenience of this sort does not excuse. Hence, for example, shame does not excuse one who has sinned gravely from premising confession to communion; nor does it excuse someone from the precept of confessing integrally.

II. Inability which excuses. That physical inability excuses is manifest. Moral inability:

1. Does not excuse from the obligation of the natural law, since it is immutable, so that that which is opposed to it, notwithstanding moral inability, remains illicit. The examples which are brought forward against this doctrine are explained by a change of circumstances; this change brings it about that the case is no longer included in the law (cf. n. 86).

2. Generally excuses from positive law, both divine and human. For the legislator, on account of equity, is not considered to require that the subject undergo both the burden of the law itself and another grave burden, so that, if one of these, namely the burden of the law, cannot be undergone without the other burden, he is held to nothing. Moreover, the legislator is considered all the more not to require this both because the common good does not require that the law be urged in difficult cases of this sort, and because a law which were urged in this way would tend to the damage of many, considering, namely, the frailty of men. Hence rule 4 of the law in the Sixth: what is not licit in the law, necessity makes licit (cf. can. 2205, § 2). I said generally, because positive law obliges even with the gravest inconvenience: first, when common necessity or the extreme spiritual necessity of an individual requires it; second, when violation of the law would tend to contempt of God or of religion (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 96, a. 6, ad 1; St. Alphonsus, I, 175, 176; cf. can. 2205, § 3). Besides, as regards the moral inability required, note:

a) In order that someone be excused from the obligation of law, a relatively grave extrinsic inconvenience is required; in other words, the inconvenience must be graver according as the matter of the law and the end of the legislator are graver; likewise according as the legislator is more worthy and the obligation recurs less frequently. Thus, for example, of itself you are more easily excused from the observance of human law than of divine law; more easily from the law of fasting than from the law of annual communion. In addition, it suffices that relatively grave damage is probably going to follow from observance of the law; in other words, that it is prudently feared. Hence, for example, he is excused from the law of fasting who prudently fears that fasting is going to bring grave damage upon him (St. Alphonsus, IV, 154).

b) In doubt whether the cause suffices for excusing, you seem to be held to the law, because an interpretation of the legislator's mind of this sort would give occasion to illusions and undue transgressions (St. Alphonsus, I, 97). Nevertheless, one is excused even from partial observance of the law who is certainly excused from entire observance, but doubts whether the inconvenience attached to some part is sufficiently grave. The opposite opinion would open the way to anxieties (St. Alphonsus, IV, 154, 4°). Hence "if someone, because of his weakness, is certain that he cannot recite the whole office, and doubts whether he can recite a part, he is probably held to nothing" (St. Alphonsus, IV, loc. cit.).

c) One who cannot observe the whole law, but can fulfill a part, is held to this part as follows:

alpha) He is held to the possible part if the matter is morally divisible and the possible part is notable. I said "if the matter is morally divisible," that is, if it can be divided into parts in which, taken separately, the reason or end of the law is preserved. Hence proposition 54 was condemned by Innocent XI: "He who cannot recite Matins and Lauds, but can recite the remaining Hours, is held to nothing." Therefore one excused from fasting is not of himself excused from the law of abstinence; one who lacks a breviary is held to recite a notable coherent part, if he retains any in memory, suppose a little hour, Vespers, or Compline.

beta) He is not held to the possible part if the matter is morally indivisible, or the possible part is not notable. Thus one who vowed a pilgrimage to a sacred place and cannot arrive there is not held to a part of the journey, because the reason or end of the law is not preserved; one who lacks a breviary and retains only a few things in memory, or only non-coherent things, suppose separate Psalms, is obligated to nothing¹ (St. Alphonsus, I, 176, 177).

¹ Cf. Theol. Mechl., p. 149.

Excusing causes are distinguished into causes proximately and causes remotely impeding the observation of the law, according as the time for fulfilling the law is at hand or still remote. Furthermore:

I. It is licit to place or not to remove causes remotely impeding. The reason is that the legislator is not considered to bind subjects to such a burden that each one would have to avoid already, while the time of obligation is still remote, all things which will stand in the way of observing the law. Indeed the aforesaid inconvenience will easily be so great that a human legislator of himself cannot even bind to such a burden. Hence he is excused who, for example, on Thursday, even without a special reason, undertakes a journey, even if he foresees that on Sunday he cannot assist at Mass (St. Alphonsus, III, 301). Indeed, considering today's customs of traveling, he does not seem to sin who, with a just cause, even if not grave, begins a journey on Friday or even Saturday.

II. It is not licit to place causes proximately impeding, unless a proportionate cause for acting thus is present. The reason is that the legislator is considered to bind to that burden lest laws be able to be eluded more easily than is right. As regards a proportionate cause, it can generally be said that a graver one is required according as the matter of the law and the end of the legislator are graver, according as the time for fulfilling the law is more urgent, and according as the obligation recurs less frequently. Of itself, a graver cause is also required if there is question of divine law than if of human law. Therefore he sins who without just cause undertakes a journey on Saturday, foreseeing that on the following day he cannot hear Mass (St. Alphonsus, III, 301).

Nevertheless, one who illicitly placed an impeding cause is excused here and now, although by acting in this way he sinned (St. Alphonsus, III, 1045).

Finally, if there is present a sufficient cause for placing the impeding cause, it does not appear why it would be illicit to place it directly, as they say, that is, also with this intention, that you be excused from the law; nevertheless most authors are opposed to this opinion.

309. Sometimes a law, even if it remains in itself, ceases to oblige certain subjects, on account of a special reason. Now there are three principal causes exempting from the obligation of law: ignorance, concerning which we have already spoken (above, n. 89-97), moral impotence, and dispensation, concerning which we must discuss separately.

310. Impotence is nothing other than the incapacity of the subject for fulfilling the law; it is called absolute when the work prescribed by the law can in no way be effected, because, for example, powers, instruments, or the required conditions are lacking; moral impotence is present when the work cannot be accomplished except with extraordinary labor, or with the imminent danger of grave evil or deprivation of a notable good. - It is involuntary when it exists without the free consent of the agent; voluntary, when it has been freely contracted.

(A) Involuntary impotence generally exempts from the obligation of law, not only absolute impotence, but also moral impotence. For from what was said, n. 263, the legislator cannot command something too burdensome; otherwise he would command unto destruction, not unto edification; therefore, if in a particular case observance of the law becomes too difficult, or impossible, the legislator does not intend to urge it.

Sometimes that impossibility arises from the concurrence of a superior law; then the natural law is to be preferred to the positive law, divine law to human law, ecclesiastical law to civil law, negative law to affirmative law, at least commonly. - But sometimes it proceeds from grave inconvenience, and in the course of the work it will be explained how great a difficulty excuses from the law; for this depends on the character of the law itself and many other adjuncts.

It was said that moral impotence generally excuses; for it can happen that the law is of such importance that it must be observed, notwithstanding any inconvenience whatever.

311. (B) Even impotence voluntarily contracted generally exempts from the obligation of the law, provided that it is not contracted directly so that the law cannot be fulfilled, and moreover that there is a proportionately grave reason. For here recurs the principle explained above concerning an indirectly willed effect (n. 170-182).

Thus someone can make a journey, even if he foresees that he cannot hear Mass on a feast day, provided that he has a sufficient reason for traveling; but it is not licit on a fast day to go hunting, for the sole cause of recreation, with foresight that in this way impotence for fasting is induced. - But for judging what reason suffices, these things must be kept before the mind: the graver the law is, and the rarer the return of its obligation, and the more proximately it urges, the greater the reason required; likewise a much graver cause is required if someone frequently or continually renders himself impotent for fulfilling the law than if he does so once or rarely.

On account of various impediments which stand in the way of the execution of law, the bond of obligation is not rarely relaxed for the subjects themselves. For law must be possible and human. But we distinguish three kinds of impediments: ignorance, impotence, inconvenience or difficulty.

— I. Invincible ignorance takes away every sin of violated law; vincible ignorance does not do likewise. Yet the legislator can temper his law in such a way that those themselves who are vincibly ignorant are excused; and he can also, on account of the common good, extend certain effects of the law to the ignorant: for example, declare null acts done in the best faith against an unknown invalidating law.

— II. Impotence, even that to which you have given cause with sin, certainly excuses from observing the law: No one can be obliged to the impossible ¹. Suppose someone who has dissipated goods without which he cannot satisfy his creditors. He will indeed have to destroy the sin, so that he may obtain pardon; but, while the impotence lasts, he will be excused from paying the debt.

¹ Reg. 6 of Law in VI.

— III. What concerning inconvenience? A negative law of natural right being set aside, a certain moral impotence is generally judged to be present if, in order to satisfy the law, a grave inconvenience would have to be sustained which is joined accidentally with its observance. The reason is divine benignity, if there is question of divine law; but if there is question of human law, this of itself cannot command things too difficult, for that would be adverse to the common good.

But the grave inconvenience which excuses must appear even when attention is given to the reason of the common good which founds the law. Therefore in individual laws this comparison must prudently be made between the gravity of the inconvenience and the public utility or necessity of the observed law. Generally a graver excuse is required for infringing a negative law than a positive one.

But an inconvenience is required which is accidentally joined with the observance of the law; for an inconvenience joined of itself with the law, from the clear will of the legislator, must be borne. Think of the inconvenience of making an integral confession.

Moreover, an inconvenience must be excluded which was tacitly accepted together with an office. Thus a parish priest or parochial vicar cannot allege the inconveniences of celebrating Mass later or of mixing it with sermons for not observing, before Mass, the law of the eucharistic fast.

— You ask whether or not law obliges with danger to life?

The response must be drawn from the necessity of the common good or of a connected negative precept of natural right.

If the observance even of a human law is of interest for preserving the common good or for averting a common evil which is of more worth than one's own life, then that law obliges with danger to life: as if, in war, a leader commands a soldier not to depart from his station, or if souls would perish unless a pastor helped the sick laboring under plague.

A law, even human, will also oblige with danger to life when its violation is demanded in hatred of the faith or contempt of religion. Cf. c. 2205 § 3.

These cases being excluded, no human law of itself obliges with danger to life or a similar inconvenience. As to divine positive laws, this can prudently be transferred, attention being given to the gravity and intimation of the obligation. Thus the integrity of confession could on that account be neglected, but not every profession of Christian faith.

— On fear. Fear itself is reduced to inconvenience. Fear always diminishes malice; it often removes it, when the observance of the law thereby becomes too inconvenient. Hence we have the above-mentioned cc. 2205, 2218. Cf. n. 82.

Yet if the common good requires that a penalty be urged notwithstanding grave fear, the penalty will not be avoided because of fear. Thus before the Code they judged that even he was liable to censure who from grave fear had accepted a duel. And since that censure is confirmed by the new law, it must now be interpreted in the same way, from c. 6, 2°.

— Voluntary placing of an impediment. You ask whether or not it is lawful voluntarily to place an impeding cause?

A general answer cannot be given. Of itself, indeed, the law requires that the subject procure its observance and therefore make himself capable of observing the law, much less create an impediment. But that care is not to be urged in such a way that the law becomes more difficult; and the impeding cause can be so good that the legislator is judged reasonably to prefer this good to the observance of his law. Wherefore the various cases must be prudently estimated.

But these things seem to have to be weighed:

1. The force and rigor of the precept, from the matter and common interpretation. Thus the law of fasting is urged more benignly today than the law of the breviary; the obligation of justice is graver than that of fidelity, obedience, and religion itself, when there is question not of a natural precept but of positive right; hence you must do more lest you be prohibited from reasonably executing your office of teacher or servant than from hearing Mass or observing a fast.

2. The extension of the impediment itself. A cause of charity on account of which it is lawful once or twice to omit the breviary, or Mass, will not permit you never to recite the hours or hear Mass.

3. The necessity or utility of the impediment. Labor undertaken for honest recreation will not excuse from fasting as labor by which you support a family, or cultivate science, will.

4. The distance of the precept itself. The nearer is the hour at which the precept urges, the greater cause is required for placing an impediment; while you are dispensed from attention to remote precepts, lest too grave an obligation fall upon you. Wherefore, if the time of obligation is not yet near, no special cause is required that you place an impediment.

Hence: "Precepts or laws whose obligation frequently recurs, such as fasting, abstinence, assistance at the sacrifice of the Mass, then only prohibit an impediment from being placed indirectly without a just cause, when the day of obligation is already almost at hand, at most on the preceding day in the afternoon. Wherefore one who on Friday, indeed even on Saturday morning, undertakes a journey, foreseeing that on Sunday he cannot be present at Mass, indeed is not to be praised if he does not have a special cause for the journey; nevertheless he is not guilty of violation of the law of hearing Mass. But if Sunday is near, especially toward Saturday night, or if Sunday has already begun, it is lawful for no one without a just cause, and the nearer the time is at hand, the graver also the cause must be, to cast himself into such impossibility ... Almost the same is said of him to whom intemperance is a cause why afterwards he cannot fast or hear Mass" (Lehmkuhl, 1, 252).

On the contrary, for the precept of paschal communion it will not be lawful to place an impediment even some days before the time of obligation urges, unless a sufficiently grave cause has been present; and graver indeed if you foresee the omission not only of paschal communion but also of annual communion.

5. The relation between the impediment and the matter commanded. The more intimate this relation has been, the more the care of avoiding impediments seems to pertain to the inconveniences connected of themselves with the law.

Thus possession of the breviary is connected with recitation of the hours; but not flight from untimely air lest you suffer toothache and be impeded thereby. Thus also, although the relation is already nearer, someone ought not to seek absolution from a censure so that he can be present at Mass, unless perhaps for a long time, for example for several months or a year, he is thereby forced to abstain from Mass.

But what if directly, in order to flee the law, you have placed the impediment? The authors who pose this question rather deny that this is lawful, for example Lehmkuhl I, 251; Bucceroni, Institutiones, I, 221. "For a law," thus Lehmkuhl, "which requires its fulfillment, also requires that the necessary means be employed. But if necessary means must be employed, or impediments removed, a fortiori it is not lawful with that will, lest the law be fulfilled, to place impediments." Others, as Genicot, I, 116, omit the question.

Wherefore, although for another cause you can choose the day which precedes a fast for hunting, even if you foresee such fatigue of body as will impede the fast, it is not lawful for you to choose the same day for this reason, that you may be excused from the obligation of fasting by that impediment.

Lehmkuhl, however, l. c., admits that an action can be undertaken industriously "which is of far greater moment and into which I justly suppose that I can transmute the lighter law: as if someone, both from other causes and from this cause also, lest he have to fast, devotes himself to the laborious service of the sick to be cared for in a time of contagion."

373. Does ignorance excuse from fault? - Ignorance on the part of the subject does not effect that the law does not touch him in first act, but it can effect that it does not obligate in second act and that the transgressor is excused from fault. For invincible ignorance (antecedent or concomitant), whether of right or law, or of a fact determining the application of law, excuses from fault because it takes away the voluntary: for nothing is willed unless foreknown. On the contrary, vincible ignorance does not take away the voluntary; nevertheless it diminishes fault, unless it is affected for sinning more freely or for having an excuse from sin (n. 82).

374. Does ignorance of law excuse from penalty? - Invincible ignorance, whether of right or of fact, in the internal forum excuses from penalty because it excuses from fault; on the contrary, vincible ignorance does not excuse from a proportionate penalty, yet it excuses from a disproportionate penalty; whence if the fault is light, a grave penalty is not incurred (can. 2199-2203). But in the external forum, "ignorance or error concerning the law or penalty or concerning one's own fact or concerning another's notorious fact is generally not presumed; concerning another's non-notorious fact it is presumed until the contrary is proved" (can. 16, § 2); and "once an external violation of the law is posited, malice (that is, a deliberate will of violating the law) is presumed in the external forum until the contrary is proved" (can. 2200, § 2). This often does not happen, and therefore (if sufficient proof is lacking) someone is sometimes bound to undergo a penalty on account of a just cause, the common good demanding it, at least when the sentence of a judge is added; but then it is not a penalty properly so called, but rather a burden to be undergone on account of the common good.

1. Indeed, according to present-day right, none is incurred if there is question of laws properly so called (not of mere precepts) and of penalties of latae or ferendae sententiae to be inflicted by a judge (not by a superior), even in the external forum, if the excuse is established for the external forum (can. 2218, § 2).

375. Does ignorance of the penalty excuse from the penalty? - Ignorance (even invincible) of the penalty alone does not excuse from a proportionate penalty, because reason dictates to each person that evil according to its nature is to be punished, e.g., homicide by death, theft by prison. Whence canon 2202, § 2: "Ignorance of the penalty alone does not take away the imputability of the delict, but diminishes it somewhat." Similarly it does not excuse from invalidation, for canon 16, § 1: "No ignorance of invalidating or inhabilitating laws excuses from them, unless something else is expressly said." Indeed, neither does ignorance of the law exempt from any vindicative penalty of latae sententiae in the external forum (can. 2229, § 3, 1); whence canon 988: "Ignorance of irregularities, whether from delict or from defect, and of impediments, does not excuse from them."

Nevertheless, ignorance of law or penalty excuses: a) if the penalty supposes contumacy and therefore knowledge of the threat, as for medicinal penalties and censures, unless the ignorance is crass or supine (can. 2229, § 3, 1); b) if the legislator requires knowledge or rashness, because he does not will to punish except him who has acted knowingly, rashly, deliberately, studiously, with presumption, or has dared (can. 2229, § 2), unless the ignorance is affected, because this in law is equated with knowledge and excuses from no penalty of latae sententiae (can. 2229, § 1).

376. Inability is the incapacity of a subject for fulfilling the law: one kind is absolute, when the prescribed work cannot be placed, whether it is bodily or physical, when physical power for placing it is lacking, e.g., by defect of strength, means, liberty from violence, external coercion, as in one sick fixed in bed or imprisoned; or spiritual, when the work cannot be placed without sin on account of a higher law; another kind is moral, when the law cannot be fulfilled without great fear or danger of grave damage or inconvenience, bodily or spiritual, which per accidens is conjoined with fulfillment, e.g., if it requires extraordinary labor, or notably harms health or fortune, or furnishes an occasion of scandal or grave scruples, or is impeditious of a great good, e.g., of an eminent work of charity not prescribed.

377. Rules concerning excusal on account of inability.

III. Moral inability, on account of epikeia, regularly excuses from the observance of positive law, because law must prescribe acts morally possible; hence the axiom: positive law does not obligate with grave damage or inconvenience extrinsic to itself. How great a difficulty is required in order that it excuse must be morally estimated from the moment of the law, the quality of persons, the circumstances of places, times, etc.

1. Inconvenience joined per se with the law must be borne by the will of the legislator. Likewise that which has been tacitly accepted with an office.

Exceptionally, however, it does not excuse:

1. per se, by force of the positive law itself, when observance is necessary to the common good, which always excels private good; thus, e.g., even with danger of life the sacraments are to be administered to the dying by a pastor, war is to be waged by soldiers;

2. per accidens, by force of natural law, when violation would yield to contempt of God, religion, legislative power, or to grave scandal, e.g., the law of not celebrating without sacred vestments, the law concerning diriment impediments of marriage, or the law of not eating meats if this were demanded in hatred of religion.

378. He who cannot fulfill the whole law, is he bound to fulfill a part? - Response: 1) he is bound to the possible part if the law is morally divisible, the part is somewhat notable, and it conduces to the end of the law; e.g., he who cannot fast is bound to abstain from meats; lacking a breviary, he is bound to the parts which he knows by memory or which are preserved in a diurnal (prop. 34 condemned by Innocent XI);

2. he is not bound: a) if the law is at least morally indivisible, because it is impossible to observe even partially, e.g., fasting: thus he who cannot make a pilgrimage is not bound to begin the journey;

b) if the part is altogether slight, so that it is reputed as nothing, e.g., to supply the psalm Iudica at Mass: thus one who would know little of the office while lacking a breviary;

c) if the reason of the precept is not preserved in the possible part, because this contributes nothing to the end; e.g., he who cannot be present for the consecration is not bound to the remaining parts of the Mass, which are not prescribed except on account of the consecration.

One who seriously doubts whether he can observe the possible part is not bound, on account of the great inconvenience of scruple.

379. Is it licit to place an impediment to the observance of law? - Every precept in some way obligates both to avoiding impediments and to removing those which stand in the way of its fulfillment. Hence:

1. to place or not remove impediments, whether proximate or remote, is not licit if it is done directly, that is, for the end that the precept cannot be satisfied; e.g., to undertake a journey so that one cannot hear Mass: for this would be to will to violate the law;

2. indirectly, that is, for another end, with the foresight nevertheless that the law cannot be fulfilled, it is illicit to place or not remove proximate impediments, that is, at the very time of obligation or a little before, when morally and proximately it is already urgent; e.g., to begin a journey on the evening before a day of precept; unless, however, a proportionately grave cause is present, e.g., a grave inconvenience, or extraordinary means would have to be applied, e.g., for going to church: for then the principle concerning a cause with a double effect has force, one good, the other evil;

3. to place or not remove remote impediments is not prohibited, e.g., on Monday to begin a journey or to place the cause of sickness, on account of which someone cannot hear Mass on Sunday or fast on Friday: for it would be a great and grave inconvenience also to be obligated to avoid remote impediments. For these are not causes to be avoided so that the precept can be fulfilled, in other words, remote and per accidens causes, and even if they are prohibited, they are not prohibited precisely lest this effect follow.

380. Observation [the original misprints 389].

Just as inability to fulfill the law can excuse from fault, so it can also excuse from a penalty, or diminish it (cf. can. 2199, 2203, § 2, 2205).

Deobliging causes are either exempting or impeding. The former are those which totally withdraw the subject from the dominion of the law, for example, if someone betakes himself outside the place which the law affects. But the latter are those which impede or excuse from its fulfillment a subject remaining under the law. Besides, both the former and the latter can be placed directly or indirectly, according as the agent is moved either by the end of withdrawing himself from the law, or by another cause; proximately or remotely, according as the law urges either shortly, or only after a notable interval of time.

I say, 1st. Exempting causes totally free from the obligation of the law; for no one can impose a precept upon a man not subject to himself. Moreover, where some exempting cause is present, he who was subject to the law ceases to be subject to that same law, either by reason of territory from which he is absent, or by reason of privilege. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 156.

I say, 2nd. Physical impotence, although it does not exempt, always excuses from observing the law, as the very common axiom has it: No one is held to the impossible. Moral impotence likewise excuses, because the legislator is not judged to urge obligation with so great an inconvenience, according to the common interpretation of the Doctors; this is the reason why grave fear, apart from harm to society or religion, excuses from human law. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 165; and Hom. Ap. n. 44.

Question 1. Is it always licit to place exempting causes, even directly and proximately?

Response. Affirmatively, and the reason is that law of itself does not make someone subject to itself, but rather is made for him who is already subject; and therefore, at least speaking of itself, it obliges no one to be or remain subject to itself, but rather obliges him who is and remains subject to observe it. Wherefore it is licit for someone to go outside the diocese to confess reserved sins. For any reservation lacks all force outside the territory of the one reserving, even if the penitent departed from it only for obtaining absolution (Can. 900, § 3). - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid. - Baller., note (a), p. 97.

Question 2. Must the same be said concerning the placing of impeding causes?

Response. It is certain that it is never licit to place them directly; and the reason is that so long as someone lies under a law, he cannot wish to infringe it without such a will being the violation of that very law. Indeed, it will not even be licit indirectly to place proximately impeding causes, unless a proportionate necessity is otherwise present. The reason is that a law proximately urging proximately binds the will, and constrains it to employ the necessary means lest the law itself be violated, and therefore to not throwing in impediments. But more probably it is licit, even without reason, to place remotely impeding causes; because the legislator is not judged to wish to restrict liberty to such a degree. For it would be too grave a burden if each person, long before the obligation of the law, were bound to leave behind all works unassociable with that obligation, and to await the time of the obligation. - Cf. Suarez, de Peccatis, disp. 3, sect. 4, n. 10.

But when a cause must be judged as impeding proximately, and when only remotely, can hardly, or not even hardly, be established by some general norm. And that cause is usually held to be remotely impeding which precedes the time of fulfilling the precept by the space of some days; but there must always be kept before the eyes both the mind of the legislator and the gravity of the thing commanded, and also the judgment of the prudent and the practice of the upright. Cf. Sanchez, In Decal. lib. 1, cap. 15, n. 4.

Question 3. Is he who is impotent as to the whole held to the part?

Response. Affirmatively, when the matter of the law is divisible, and the reason of the precept remains in the individual parts. Wherefore, just as he who cannot fast on a day of fasting and abstinence at the same time ought to abstain if he can, so he who has vowed a pious pilgrimage, and is not able to complete the whole journey, is not held to begin it. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap. n. 45.

You Will Resolve, 1st. He sins who on a day of fasting, without a just cause, undertakes some labor by which he becomes unable to fast. The reason is that a law proximately urging demands that an obstacle not be placed without a just cause to its fulfillment. - St. Liguori, Hom. Ap. n. 20.

2nd. He does not sin against the precept of hearing Mass who begins a journey foreseeing that on the following Sunday he will not be able to hear Mass. Yet he is not excused who does this when the precept is at least morally already urging, namely either on the same feast day or one or another hour before it, unless some just cause intervenes.

3rd. Much more easily can it be permitted that a cause be placed indirectly if the question concerns one or another omission, say of Mass, than if it concerns a continual one. Therefore the force and rigor of the precept must be considered; for certain precepts more easily admit a benign interpretation and therefore need lesser causes for excusing; on the contrary others do so with more difficulty and cease to urge only on account of graver causes. "Thus, for example, since the obligation of justice is graver than that of fidelity or obedience, a graver cause is required for you to render yourself unable to pay the price of a thing bought than to fulfill a gratuitous promise; the obligation of bringing it about that you are not impeded, for example, from executing your office of schoolmaster, physician, or judge, is graver than if it concerns the omission of Mass alone or of fasting." Baller., Op. Mor. v. 1, n. 264. The necessity or utility of the impediment must be considered. The matter is evident: consider, for instance, the necessity and evident utility arising from some pleasure journey undertaken once or twice during the summer by those of our workers who for an entire week must labor many hours daily. Surely Mother Church will not rebuke them if so rarely they omit Mass. Or consider some poor little old woman who in some corner sells goods on Sunday to other poor persons who cannot make their small purchases quite conveniently except on that day. It must also be considered whether the precept is impeded from being fulfilled proximately or remotely. And hence a graver cause is required for someone licitly to place an impediment the more proximately the law urges. Finally it must be seen whether the impediment pertains of itself and intrinsically to the matter of the precept, or only accidentally: for example, the breviary for reciting the office, or good health with respect to the same. Sanchez, Moral. lib. 1, cap. 15, n. 4. All these things must be considered, and thus in diverse laws the judgment will be diverse. - Cf. Sanchez and Baller., l. c.

1. What are causes exempting from a law and causes excusing from a law?

Causes exempting remove a subject from the jurisdiction, as does departure from the territory within which the law binds. Causes excusing relieve him of the obligation of obeying the law though he remains subject to it.¹

1 Bucceroni, vol. i, no. 216.

2. Is it lawful to put both causes exempting and causes excusing voluntarily?

A subject may put causes exempting voluntarily, for a law does not compel a man to remain subject to it; it only obliges him to act in conformity with it as long as he remains subject. By special law, however, one who has incurred a reserved case in one diocese can not be absolved from it if he go to another diocese with the intention of getting absolution there.

While remaining under the jurisdiction of the law, a subject may not do anything with the intention of avoiding the obligation of complying with it. But for a sufficiently grave reason he may do something, although he foresees that the doing of it will make it impossible for him to comply with a positive law.

3. Is one bound to remove an excusing cause if he can, so as to be able to comply with a law?

Much depends on the nature of the law in question, for some laws bind more strictly than do others. Thus Lehmkuhl says: “Nor do they judge that anyone is bound by force of the law of hearing Mass to procure release from a censure, liberation from prison, etc., if, being imprisoned, he cannot assist at Mass, unless perhaps for a long time, or through design lest he be present at the sacred rite, he neglects these things. Nevertheless, they hold that someone is bound to remove those bonds or impediments by reason of the precept of Easter Communion; for which precept, even several days before the time of the law becomes urgent, it is not lawful to place an impediment, unless a sufficiently grave cause is present.”²

2 Theol. Mor., vol. i, n. 158.