Chapter VIII. On Causes Deobliging from Law

Deobliging causes are either exempting or impeding. The former are those which totally withdraw the subject from the dominion of the law, for example, if someone betakes himself outside the place which the law affects. But the latter are those which impede or excuse from its fulfillment a subject remaining under the law. Besides, both the former and the latter can be placed directly or indirectly, according as the agent is moved either by the end of withdrawing himself from the law, or by another cause; proximately or remotely, according as the law urges either shortly, or only after a notable interval of time.

I say, 1st. Exempting causes totally free from the obligation of the law; for no one can impose a precept upon a man not subject to himself. Moreover, where some exempting cause is present, he who was subject to the law ceases to be subject to that same law, either by reason of territory from which he is absent, or by reason of privilege. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 156.

I say, 2nd. Physical impotence, although it does not exempt, always excuses from observing the law, as the very common axiom has it: No one is held to the impossible. Moral impotence likewise excuses, because the legislator is not judged to urge obligation with so great an inconvenience, according to the common interpretation of the Doctors; this is the reason why grave fear, apart from harm to society or religion, excuses from human law. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 165; and Hom. Ap. n. 44.

Question 1. Is it always licit to place exempting causes, even directly and proximately?

Response. Affirmatively, and the reason is that law of itself does not make someone subject to itself, but rather is made for him who is already subject; and therefore, at least speaking of itself, it obliges no one to be or remain subject to itself, but rather obliges him who is and remains subject to observe it. Wherefore it is licit for someone to go outside the diocese to confess reserved sins. For any reservation lacks all force outside the territory of the one reserving, even if the penitent departed from it only for obtaining absolution (Can. 900, § 3). - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid. - Baller., note (a), p. 97.

Question 2. Must the same be said concerning the placing of impeding causes?

Response. It is certain that it is never licit to place them directly; and the reason is that so long as someone lies under a law, he cannot wish to infringe it without such a will being the violation of that very law. Indeed, it will not even be licit indirectly to place proximately impeding causes, unless a proportionate necessity is otherwise present. The reason is that a law proximately urging proximately binds the will, and constrains it to employ the necessary means lest the law itself be violated, and therefore to not throwing in impediments. But more probably it is licit, even without reason, to place remotely impeding causes; because the legislator is not judged to wish to restrict liberty to such a degree. For it would be too grave a burden if each person, long before the obligation of the law, were bound to leave behind all works unassociable with that obligation, and to await the time of the obligation. - Cf. Suarez, de Peccatis, disp. 3, sect. 4, n. 10.

But when a cause must be judged as impeding proximately, and when only remotely, can hardly, or not even hardly, be established by some general norm. And that cause is usually held to be remotely impeding which precedes the time of fulfilling the precept by the space of some days; but there must always be kept before the eyes both the mind of the legislator and the gravity of the thing commanded, and also the judgment of the prudent and the practice of the upright. Cf. Sanchez, In Decal. lib. 1, cap. 15, n. 4.

Question 3. Is he who is impotent as to the whole held to the part?

Response. Affirmatively, when the matter of the law is divisible, and the reason of the precept remains in the individual parts. Wherefore, just as he who cannot fast on a day of fasting and abstinence at the same time ought to abstain if he can, so he who has vowed a pious pilgrimage, and is not able to complete the whole journey, is not held to begin it. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap. n. 45.

You Will Resolve, 1st. He sins who on a day of fasting, without a just cause, undertakes some labor by which he becomes unable to fast. The reason is that a law proximately urging demands that an obstacle not be placed without a just cause to its fulfillment. - St. Liguori, Hom. Ap. n. 20.

2nd. He does not sin against the precept of hearing Mass who begins a journey foreseeing that on the following Sunday he will not be able to hear Mass. Yet he is not excused who does this when the precept is at least morally already urging, namely either on the same feast day or one or another hour before it, unless some just cause intervenes.

3rd. Much more easily can it be permitted that a cause be placed indirectly if the question concerns one or another omission, say of Mass, than if it concerns a continual one. Therefore the force and rigor of the precept must be considered; for certain precepts more easily admit a benign interpretation and therefore need lesser causes for excusing; on the contrary others do so with more difficulty and cease to urge only on account of graver causes. "Thus, for example, since the obligation of justice is graver than that of fidelity or obedience, a graver cause is required for you to render yourself unable to pay the price of a thing bought than to fulfill a gratuitous promise; the obligation of bringing it about that you are not impeded, for example, from executing your office of schoolmaster, physician, or judge, is graver than if it concerns the omission of Mass alone or of fasting." Baller., Op. Mor. v. 1, n. 264. The necessity or utility of the impediment must be considered. The matter is evident: consider, for instance, the necessity and evident utility arising from some pleasure journey undertaken once or twice during the summer by those of our workers who for an entire week must labor many hours daily. Surely Mother Church will not rebuke them if so rarely they omit Mass. Or consider some poor little old woman who in some corner sells goods on Sunday to other poor persons who cannot make their small purchases quite conveniently except on that day. It must also be considered whether the precept is impeded from being fulfilled proximately or remotely. And hence a graver cause is required for someone licitly to place an impediment the more proximately the law urges. Finally it must be seen whether the impediment pertains of itself and intrinsically to the matter of the precept, or only accidentally: for example, the breviary for reciting the office, or good health with respect to the same. Sanchez, Moral. lib. 1, cap. 15, n. 4. All these things must be considered, and thus in diverse laws the judgment will be diverse. - Cf. Sanchez and Baller., l. c.