Article II: On Inability

376. Inability is the incapacity of a subject for fulfilling the law: one kind is absolute, when the prescribed work cannot be placed, whether it is bodily or physical, when physical power for placing it is lacking, e.g., by defect of strength, means, liberty from violence, external coercion, as in one sick fixed in bed or imprisoned; or spiritual, when the work cannot be placed without sin on account of a higher law; another kind is moral, when the law cannot be fulfilled without great fear or danger of grave damage or inconvenience, bodily or spiritual, which per accidens is conjoined with fulfillment, e.g., if it requires extraordinary labor, or notably harms health or fortune, or furnishes an occasion of scandal or grave scruples, or is impeditious of a great good, e.g., of an eminent work of charity not prescribed.

377. Rules concerning excusal on account of inability.

III. Moral inability, on account of epikeia, regularly excuses from the observance of positive law, because law must prescribe acts morally possible; hence the axiom: positive law does not obligate with grave damage or inconvenience extrinsic to itself. How great a difficulty is required in order that it excuse must be morally estimated from the moment of the law, the quality of persons, the circumstances of places, times, etc.

1. Inconvenience joined per se with the law must be borne by the will of the legislator. Likewise that which has been tacitly accepted with an office.

Exceptionally, however, it does not excuse:

1. per se, by force of the positive law itself, when observance is necessary to the common good, which always excels private good; thus, e.g., even with danger of life the sacraments are to be administered to the dying by a pastor, war is to be waged by soldiers;

2. per accidens, by force of natural law, when violation would yield to contempt of God, religion, legislative power, or to grave scandal, e.g., the law of not celebrating without sacred vestments, the law concerning diriment impediments of marriage, or the law of not eating meats if this were demanded in hatred of religion.

378. He who cannot fulfill the whole law, is he bound to fulfill a part? - Response: 1) he is bound to the possible part if the law is morally divisible, the part is somewhat notable, and it conduces to the end of the law; e.g., he who cannot fast is bound to abstain from meats; lacking a breviary, he is bound to the parts which he knows by memory or which are preserved in a diurnal (prop. 34 condemned by Innocent XI);

2. he is not bound: a) if the law is at least morally indivisible, because it is impossible to observe even partially, e.g., fasting: thus he who cannot make a pilgrimage is not bound to begin the journey;

b) if the part is altogether slight, so that it is reputed as nothing, e.g., to supply the psalm Iudica at Mass: thus one who would know little of the office while lacking a breviary;

c) if the reason of the precept is not preserved in the possible part, because this contributes nothing to the end; e.g., he who cannot be present for the consecration is not bound to the remaining parts of the Mass, which are not prescribed except on account of the consecration.

One who seriously doubts whether he can observe the possible part is not bound, on account of the great inconvenience of scruple.

379. Is it licit to place an impediment to the observance of law? - Every precept in some way obligates both to avoiding impediments and to removing those which stand in the way of its fulfillment. Hence:

1. to place or not remove impediments, whether proximate or remote, is not licit if it is done directly, that is, for the end that the precept cannot be satisfied; e.g., to undertake a journey so that one cannot hear Mass: for this would be to will to violate the law;

2. indirectly, that is, for another end, with the foresight nevertheless that the law cannot be fulfilled, it is illicit to place or not remove proximate impediments, that is, at the very time of obligation or a little before, when morally and proximately it is already urgent; e.g., to begin a journey on the evening before a day of precept; unless, however, a proportionately grave cause is present, e.g., a grave inconvenience, or extraordinary means would have to be applied, e.g., for going to church: for then the principle concerning a cause with a double effect has force, one good, the other evil;

3. to place or not remove remote impediments is not prohibited, e.g., on Monday to begin a journey or to place the cause of sickness, on account of which someone cannot hear Mass on Sunday or fast on Friday: for it would be a great and grave inconvenience also to be obligated to avoid remote impediments. For these are not causes to be avoided so that the precept can be fulfilled, in other words, remote and per accidens causes, and even if they are prohibited, they are not prohibited precisely lest this effect follow.

380. Observation [the original misprints 389].

Just as inability to fulfill the law can excuse from fault, so it can also excuse from a penalty, or diminish it (cf. can. 2199, 2203, § 2, 2205).