Morals of the Church
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Section — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

§ V. On Placing a Cause Excusing from Obligation

171.

Excusing causes are distinguished into causes proximately and causes remotely impeding the observation of the law, according as the time for fulfilling the law is at hand or still remote. Furthermore:

I. It is licit to place or not to remove causes remotely impeding. The reason is that the legislator is not considered to bind subjects to such a burden that each one would have to avoid already, while the time of obligation is still remote, all things which will stand in the way of observing the law. Indeed the aforesaid inconvenience will easily be so great that a human legislator of himself cannot even bind to such a burden. Hence he is excused who, for example, on Thursday, even without a special reason, undertakes a journey, even if he foresees that on Sunday he cannot assist at Mass (St. Alphonsus, III, 301). Indeed, considering today's customs of traveling, he does not seem to sin who, with a just cause, even if not grave, begins a journey on Friday or even Saturday.

II. It is not licit to place causes proximately impeding, unless a proportionate cause for acting thus is present. The reason is that the legislator is considered to bind to that burden lest laws be able to be eluded more easily than is right. As regards a proportionate cause, it can generally be said that a graver one is required according as the matter of the law and the end of the legislator are graver, according as the time for fulfilling the law is more urgent, and according as the obligation recurs less frequently. Of itself, a graver cause is also required if there is question of divine law than if of human law. Therefore he sins who without just cause undertakes a journey on Saturday, foreseeing that on the following day he cannot hear Mass (St. Alphonsus, III, 301).

Nevertheless, one who illicitly placed an impeding cause is excused here and now, although by acting in this way he sinned (St. Alphonsus, III, 1045).

Finally, if there is present a sufficient cause for placing the impeding cause, it does not appear why it would be illicit to place it directly, as they say, that is, also with this intention, that you be excused from the law; nevertheless most authors are opposed to this opinion.

LawWhat excuses from observing a lawThe Causes of Sin