Article — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Article First. On Causes De-obliging from Law.
175. Notions. Causes de-obliging from law are some exempting, others excusing or impeding. Those are called exempting through which someone ceases to be the subject of the law, as if someone betakes himself outside the territory which is affected by the law, or if through a privilege he is exempted from the law; therefore exempting causes render one altogether immune from the obligation of the law. Those are called excusing or impeding causes on account of which someone, although he remains the subject of the law, nevertheless is not bound to observe it, as if someone is excused from fasting because of infirmity or because of arduous labor. A twofold question must be treated here: a. concerning causes excusing from law, and b. concerning the placing of causes de-obliging from law.
176. On causes excusing from law. The causes excusing from the observance of law are ignorance and impotence, both physical and moral. That invincible ignorance and physical impotence excuse from the obligation of law is manifest: for no one is bound to the impossible. Indeed from the nature of law it is established that moral impotence also, or grave damage or inconvenience which is accidentally joined with the observance of the law, excuses from its obligation (n. 139). But since laws are of diverse species, it is now asked whether in any law grave fear or grave damage or inconvenience excuses from its observance.
From the negative law of nature not even danger of death excuses: for this law prohibits what is evil in itself and intrinsically; but it is not lawful, even for avoiding death, to do what is evil in itself, such as to blaspheme, to perjure oneself, to lie.
From an affirmative law, whether divine or human, not even danger of death excuses if its violation would fall a. to common damage; b. to the extreme spiritual damage of a particular man; c. to hatred of God or religion or to contempt of the Church.
The reason for the first is that the common good is to be preferred to the good of the life of a private man; therefore a parish priest in time of plague is bound, even with danger to life, to be present to his parishioners.
The reason for the second is that ordered charity requires that the supreme spiritual good of one's neighbor be preferred to one's own temporal good of life; therefore we are bound, with danger to life, to confer baptism on a dying child not yet baptized.
The reason for the third is that he who does what is demanded in hatred of God and religion or in contempt of the Church by that very fact consents to the intention of the one commanding and contemns God or the Church, which is evil in itself. Therefore it is not lawful to eat meat on a prohibited day if this is demanded in contempt of the Church, even under threat of death.1
- With these cases removed, proportionally grave damage or inconvenience excuses from a law, whether natural affirmative, positive divine, or human.
The reason for the first is that since these laws are not absolutely necessary in individual cases, God is not judged to wish to oblige with most grave inconvenience. Therefore we are not bound, with danger of life or of grave evil, to preserve a deposit, to fulfill a vow, to succor a neighbor suffering extreme bodily necessity, or to restore a thing unjustly taken away.
The reason for the second is that since the matter of these laws is not necessary for preserving order, God is not judged to require their observance with such great rigor, although He could require it. Therefore Christ Himself excuses David, who in danger of grave evil ate the loaves of proposition prohibited to laymen by divine law.2 Likewise we are not bound with most grave external inconvenience to confess integrally.
The reason for the third is that a human law morally impossible does not oblige; indeed it does not even belong to a human legislator to have the power of issuing laws of this kind that are too difficult (n. 139).
But in individual precepts it must be determined how great the damage or inconvenience must be for someone to be excused from their observance, because diverse precepts are of diverse gravity and diverse rigor. In general it can be affirmed that negative laws oblige more gravely than affirmative laws, divine laws more gravely than human laws.
1 Cf. 2 Mach. 6, 18 ss.
2 Matth. 12, 3. 4. coll. with 1 Reg. 21.
177. On the placing of causes de-obliging from law. Notions. a. Causes de-obliging from law are said to be placed directly if they are placed solely or at least principally with that intention, that someone de-oblige himself from the observance of the law; and they are said to be placed indirectly if they are placed for another end, although the impossibility of fulfilling the law is foreseen.
b. Besides, a cause is called proximately impeding if the law already actually urges or will urge after a short time, and it is called remotely impeding if it urges only after a notable time. But when a cause must be judged proximately impeding and when remotely impeding must be determined not by a general rule but rather from the judgment of prudent men and from the practice of those of timorous conscience, with account taken of the gravity of the law and the frequency of the obligation.
He who on Saturday evening or on a feast day already begun places an impediment to hearing Mass places a proximately impeding cause; he who does this on Friday places a remotely impeding cause. An impediment which precedes the obligation of a law by the space of several days is ordinarily judged remotely impeding.
178. Principles. 1. It is lawful to place exempting causes even directly and proximately against a law: for the law indeed obliges to the observance of itself so long as we are its subjects, but it does not oblige that we remain subjects of the law.
Therefore anyone can transfer himself into that state or place in which the law does not oblige, except in the single case in which this is expressly prohibited, as regards the reservation of sins. Therefore each one can licitly go from a place where there is fasting into a place where there is no fasting, lest he be obliged to fast.
It is not lawful to place against a law directly an impeding cause, whether proximate or remote: for he who directly places an impeding cause against a law explicitly intends to violate the law; but an express will of violating the law is never licit so long as one is subject to the law.
It is always lawful to place against a law indirectly a remotely impeding cause, because the legislator is not judged to wish that subjects already long before the obligation of the law be bound to foresee and omit everything which would impede the observance of the law: for this would be an inconvenience too grave. Wherefore no special reason is required for someone to be able to undertake a journey, e.g. on Thursday or Friday, even if he foresees that he cannot hear Mass on the following Sunday.
Without a just cause it is not lawful to place against a law indirectly a proximately impeding cause: for he who is bound to the law is also bound to beware of proximately impeding impediments. But from a proportionately grave cause it is lawful to place against a law indirectly a proximately impeding cause: for he who does this does not violate the law, but permits its violation; but this is lawful from a just cause. It is said: from a proportionately grave cause; therefore:
a. The graver the law is, or the more rarely its obligation returns, the sooner the obligation begins of not rendering the future observance of the law impossible. Thus someone can on Saturday morning, but not on Saturday evening, much less in the very early morning of the feast day, undertake a journey for recreation's sake or go out hunting, if he foresees that for this reason he cannot hear Mass.
b. The graver the law is and the nearer it urges, the graver must be the cause on account of which an impediment can licitly be placed against its observance. Thus it is not lawful on the very day of fasting to hunt for recreation's sake and thus render oneself unable to fast; but it is lawful to do this from a graver cause; yet on the day before a day of fasting it is lawful even for recreation's sake to engage in hunting with the foresight that on the following day the fast will be impossible.
c. A much graver cause is required for someone frequently or continuously to render himself unable to observe the law than for this to happen only once or rarely. Hence it is certainly not lawful throughout the whole autumn season to go out hunting on Saturday morning with the foresight that on the following day the hearing of Mass will be impossible, although this may be lawful once or again.