Grave and slight fear

Fear is defined to be a perturbation of the mind on account of some present or future danger.

It is grave or slight in proportion as the danger is serious or not serious. Absolutely grave fear is such as will seriously affect an ordinarily constant man, as the fear of death, of perpetual imprisonment, or of loss of goods; relatively grave is such as will seriously affect anyone of timid disposition.

Reverential fear is that which a subject feels lest he should offend his superior. Ordinarily, divines rank it as slight fear, but it may become grave if, for example, a very austere father threaten his daughter with loss of home or with his perpetual displeasure.

Fear from without is the result of some external danger, which may arise either from a necessary cause, as, e.g., from the danger of shipwreck; or it may be threatening from a free agent. Fear from within is from an internal cause, as the fear of death from a disease which has been contracted.

II. Division. Fear is divided:

1. By reason of intensity, into grave and light, according as the motion is grave or light.

2. By reason of influence on the act, into antecedent and concomitant, according as the act is placed from it or only with it. A traveler from fear hands over money to one lying in ambush; with fear he passes through unsafe places.

Does fear cause the involuntary? - Fear is the trepidation of the mind because of present or future danger. L. 1. Quod metus, etc., Dig.

It is divided first into light and grave. The first is had either when the present or future evil is light, or when, although it is grave, nevertheless it is only little probable. The second is had when the evil is grave, very probable or certain. But an evil is grave either absolutely or relatively. Absolutely grave is that which strikes fear of itself even into a constant man, and it has place when the evil which is feared is grave in itself and is commonly reputed such, as death, mutilation, etc. Relatively grave is had when the evil which is feared is not grave according to itself, but is such with respect to this or that person.

Fear is furthermore divided into intrinsic and extrinsic by reason of the cause from which it proceeds. Intrinsic fear is that which arises from the intrinsic disposition of the subject himself, namely from each one's own weakness of body or soul. Fear of death excited by a grave illness is intrinsic fear, since it arises, as from a cause, from an infirmity which is in the very subject of the fear. Extrinsic fear is that which is excited by an extrinsic cause, whether this cause is natural or necessary, or whether it is a moral or free cause; as likewise fear of death from shipwreck, or from a robber encountered on the road. Extrinsic fear inflicted by a moral or free cause is subdivided into just and unjust, according as that cause has or does not have the right of inducing fear; as fear induced by a judge or by a highway robber. And whether fear has been inflicted justly or unjustly, such fear can be inflicted simply to obtain something, or to bring in some evil, as in robbers threatening death unless someone gives what he has, or in an enemy likewise threatening death in vengeance; and it can be inflicted in order to extort consent to some certain thing, for example, to betrothals, to marriage, to a contract, etc.

Fear by a special name is called reverential when there is fear lest a superior be offended, or by which someone fears to resist him to whom he is subject, namely father, mother, grandfather, father-in-law, husband, king, master, prelate, tutor, and curator; and likewise an uncle, or cousin, or older brother, if the one suffering the fear dwells with them and receives support from them. "Pontius deservedly says that reverential fear of itself is grave, because it is one thing to operate from reverence owed to a superior, another from reverential fear, which necessarily includes fear of some grave damage imminent from obedience not rendered, for example, long-lasting indignation, etc." L. 1. 3. n. 717. Certainly the indignation of a father, master, etc., is an evil; and if it is long-lasting, it is a grave evil. Therefore, even with other evils excluded, for example beatings, threats, etc., reverential fear of itself is grave. L. 1. 5. n. 20; l. 6. n. 1056; C. H. 1267; C. G. 111, 11112; C. I. 1111 ff.; C. L. 666. "It is one thing to do something with fear, another truly from fear; for the first states concomitance. Hence what is done in that way, although it is absolutely voluntary, nevertheless that voluntary does not arise from fear, but rather is opposed to and conquers the fear itself, which is a sign of a great will: as when Christ the Lord was advancing toward death, fearing it, He embraced it with the highest will, which did not arise from fear of the Father and of men, and therefore conquered natural fear. But to be done from fear signifies that the fear itself induces one to willing or doing something; and then fear is the cause of such voluntary, in the way in which among acts of the will intention is the cause of election, and love of good is the cause of hatred of the opposed evil. For in this way in the present case, when someone fears death, he determines and intends to flee it; and by force of this decree he chooses this means, for example, to throw goods into the sea, and use or execution follows upon this election. Therefore from first to last fear was the cause exciting and applying the will to that efficacious act by which it commanded that exterior action." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 3, s. 1, n. 6.

Now those things which are done from fear are more voluntary than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply, but involuntary according to a certain respect. For each thing is simply such according as it is in act. But here the act, insofar as it is exercised here and now, is simply willed, because, although such an action considered in itself is not lovable simply, nevertheless here and now it is proposed as absolutely to be chosen, as a suitable means for avoiding a greater evil. Therefore under that notion it is here and now simply voluntary. For judgment concerning the voluntary must be made with the thing considered in particular with all circumstances, and not by abstraction or precision of the intellect. "But that what is done through fear is taken as existing outside this case, insofar as it is repugnant to the will, this is only according to reason, and therefore it is involuntary according to a certain respect, i.e., insofar as it is considered as existing outside this case." "Therefore that which is done through fear is voluntary without qualification, i.e., according as it is actually done; but it is involuntary under a condition, i.e., if such fear were not imminent." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6. "And because acts are in particulars, therefore it is voluntary simply, involuntary according to a certain respect." S. Th. Suppl. q. 47. a. 1; Quodl. 5. a. 10; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 3, s. 1, 2.

Note: Light fear is not regularly judged a cause of acting, because it can easily be repelled and contemned. Nevertheless sometimes it can well be a cause of acting. And thus a subject, not daring out of reverence to contradict a superior, is determined by him, unwillingly, to acting.

Those things which are done from fear are involuntary according to a certain respect when the thing is evil in itself, but good only in the present circumstances, as is clear in the example given of throwing goods overboard for the merchant, which is evil for him in itself, and good for him in the present circumstance of shipwreck. But if the thing is good in itself, so that it is such even abstracting from the present circumstances, then he who operates from fear can be borne into that thing with a perfect inclination of the will, so that the voluntary simply is had, without at the same time having the involuntary according to a certain respect. And thus one who from supernatural fear of Gehenna wills to abstain from sin has the voluntary simply without an involuntary mixed in, because the observance of the divine law is simply good in itself, even abstracting from that circumstance of fear of divine judgments.

Moreover, "he who wills to keep the precept from fear of hell, if he understands the force of that motive, cannot have a simple contrary affection: I would transgress the precept if there were no punishment; for by this very affection he would sin and incur the guilt of punishment, and consequently would act against his own motive. If therefore he is truly and efficaciously moved by that motive, and understands its force and the quality of his acts, it cannot happen that such an affection be present with that motive." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 3, s. 2, n. 6; L. 1. 6. n. 442, objection II.

5. Fear is divided into light and grave, by reason of the evil which is feared. The first is had either when the imminent or future evil is light, or when, although it is grave, nevertheless it is little probable and likely. But the other is had when the impending evil is grave, and is very probable or certain.

6. But evil is grave either absolutely or relatively. Hence grave fear is subdivided into absolutely grave and relatively grave. Absolutely grave harm is that which strikes fear of itself into a constant man, and is grave in itself and is commonly reputed such. Each point is explained by the Holy Doctor, 4. Dist. 29. q. 1. a. 2. And first concerning fear falling upon a constant man: “That fear falls upon someone means that someone is coerced by fear. But someone is coerced by fear when he does something which otherwise he would not will, in order to avoid something which he fears. But in this the constant man is distinguished from the inconstant man as to two things. First as to the quality of the danger which is feared, because the constant man follows right reason, through which he knows something for which one must fight or which must be done. But always the lesser evil, or the greater good, must be chosen. And therefore the constant man is coerced to sustaining a lesser evil by fear of a greater evil; but he is not coerced to a greater evil so that he may avoid a lesser evil. But the inconstant man is coerced to a greater evil on account of fear of a lesser evil, as to sin on account of fear of bodily punishment. But the pertinacious man, on the contrary, cannot be coerced even to sustaining or doing a lesser evil so that he may avoid a greater evil; whence the constant man is in the middle between the inconstant and the pertinacious. Secondly they differ as to the estimation of the imminent danger, because the constant man is coerced only from a strong and probable estimation; but the inconstant man from a slight one.... The constant man is intrepid, not because he does not fear at all, but because he does not fear the things which ought not to be feared, or where, or when, they ought not to be feared.” But concerning evil grave in itself and commonly reputed such, he adds these things: “Sins are the greatest of evils, and therefore to this in no way can a constant man be coerced; indeed man ought rather to die than to sustain such things.... But certain bodily harms are lesser than certain others, which are among the principal things which pertain to the person, such as death, blows, dishonoring through rape, and servitude; and therefore from these one is coerced to sustaining other bodily harms.... Nor does it differ whether these pertain to one’s own person, or that of wife, or children, or others of this kind.” And among other things infamy is to be reckoned with these, if it cannot easily be met, ibid. ad 3.; loss of all goods by theft, robbery, fire; dismissal from office; frustration of contracting matrimony; exclusion from an expected inheritance, etc. But relatively grave evil is that which according to itself, and according to the common estimation of men, is not grave, yet is grave with respect to this or that person, for instance, a boy, a girl, a woman, an old man, an infirm person.

17. • DEFINITION. Fear is a trepidation of the mind on account of some present or future danger to oneself or to those closely connected.

DIVISION. Fear is commonly divided thus, namely:

1. Grave, or light fear, according as the evil feared is either grave, such as death, mutilation, hard imprisonment, notable detriment to reputation, great loss of goods, etc.; or, on the contrary, light, or a moderate inconvenience, such as the loss of a thing of slight moment, a small detriment to reputation, or even a grave one, but from a slight cause, or one which can easily be averted, etc.

But grave fear is absolutely or relatively so. Fear is called absolutely grave when evils truly grave in themselves are feared; but relatively grave when, although light in itself, it is nevertheless grave with respect to certain persons: thus children, women, the aged, are accustomed to be affected by a greater fear in the same danger than men of mature age.

2. Fear from within, or from without, according as it comes from an intrinsic cause, for example from disease, from infirmity of mind, etc., or from an extrinsic cause, whether free, namely from man, or necessary or natural, as from the elements, contagion, etc.

3. Fear justly or unjustly struck, according as the cause is just, for example that of deserved punishments, which is brought on; or unjust, that is, it is struck by injury.

Reverential fear also must be added, which is had when someone fears lest he have offended his parents or other Superiors. It is referred to just or unjust fear according as its cause is just or unjust. But it can be grave, if there is a prudent fear lest those who strike fear be held offended for a long time or gravely.

68. Divisions. Among the many divisions of fear or dread, the following are the more principal:

1. Fear struck from within or from without. The former is caused by a cause intrinsic to man or by a natural cause, for example, from illness, a storm, contagion, etc. The latter is caused by a free extrinsic cause, for example, by a man, a demon, etc.⁵⁸

2. Grave and light fear. Grave fear arises from the imminent danger of a grave evil, for example, of death, mutilation, grave beating, grave infamy, the loss of a notable quantity of goods, etc., and is said "to fall upon a constant man," that is, it moves not only women and timid men, but also a constant man. - Grave fear is either absolutely grave or only relatively grave. That fear is considered absolutely grave which is accustomed to move every man and whose object is truly grave. That fear is considered relatively grave whose object is indeed in itself light, which nevertheless vehemently moves a determined person because of his special qualities; for example, a timid daughter vehemently fears her father's punishment, which nevertheless, taken objectively, is not so grave an evil. - Light fear is that by which either a light evil is feared, or there is present a light danger of a grave evil; for example, if some robust person because of fear of rain, dust, or mud were to omit Mass on a feast day.

Note. Reverential fear, by which a subject fears the offense or indignation of a superior, for example, a son fears the offense of his father,⁵⁹ is customarily reduced to light fear (at least in the external forum). But in the internal forum reverential fear sometimes becomes grave, namely, if the offense of the superior is held as a grave evil; for example, if the offense of the superior is lasting, if threats and very troublesome quarrels are deservedly feared. But in order that reverential fear be held grave, even in the external forum, strict proof is required, namely, that the reverential fear is qualified, that is, that the offense and indignation of the superior cause grave evils. This case indeed can occur if the validity of marriage is impugned because of a defect of consent caused by reverential fear.⁶⁰

3. Fear justly and unjustly struck. Fear is justly struck when it is caused by a legitimate person and in due manner. Thus, for example, the father of a deflowered daughter strikes just fear into her deflowerer if he threatens to hand him over to the judge. Fear is unjustly struck when someone threatens another with evil without sufficient cause or even altogether injuriously. Thus, for example, there would be unjust fear if the same father threatened the deflowerer of his daughter with death unless he were willing to take the deflowered daughter as wife; still more unjust is the fear which a robber casts upon a traveler, saying: Your life or your purse!

4. Antecedent and concomitant fear. The former precedes the action and causes it; for it moves the will to acting. Whence he who suffers such fear acts from fear; for example, a traveler from antecedent fear is moved to giving money to a robber. - The other fear accompanies the action which it not only does not cause, but rather would impede, if this were possible. Thus in the example brought forward the robber receives the money from the traveler with dread or fear; for he fears lest he be seized and punished by the judge. Concerning concomitant fear we shall no longer speak in what follows.

⁵⁸ Thus Laymann (Theol. mor. l. 1, tract. 2, c. 6, n. 3), D'Annibale (Summula Theol. mor. I, 138), Aertnys-Damen (Theol. mor. I, n. 19), and others explain this division. Other authors understand the same division otherwise, calling fear struck from without that which is struck by any extrinsic cause whatever. Thus, for example, Noldin (De principiis n. 55) calls fear of death from shipwreck fear from without. There is indeed no need to dispute about words, but confusions must be carefully avoided. Besides, all agree that fear caused by an external natural or necessary cause is assimilated to fear struck from within.

⁵⁹ Cf. Act. Ap. Sed. IV (1912), 647, in the Lyons case.

⁶⁰ Cf. below, in the treatise on marriage, the impediment of defect of consent. On the diverse acceptations of reverential fear see D'Annibale, l. c. In practice these controversies are of small utility.

Fear is a trembling of the mind on account of some present or future danger to oneself or to those closely joined to oneself; but it is commonly divided thus:

1st. Grave or slight fear, according as the evil feared is either grave, such as death, mutilation, hard imprisonment, notable detriment to reputation, a great loss of goods, etc.; or slight or mediocre inconvenience, such as the loss of a thing of slight moment, a small detriment to reputation; or even something grave, but from a slight cause, or which can easily be averted, etc.

But grave fear is such absolutely or relatively. Fear is called absolutely grave when evils truly grave in themselves are feared; but relatively grave when evils, though slight in themselves, are nevertheless grave respectively to certain persons. Thus children, women, and old men are wont to be affected by greater fear in the same danger than men of mature age.

2nd. Fear from within or from without, according as it proceeds from an intrinsic cause, for example, from sickness, from infirmity of mind, etc.; or from an extrinsic cause, either free, namely from man, or necessary or natural, as from the elements, contagion, etc.

3rd. Fear justly or unjustly impressed, according as it is brought in either from a just cause, for example, from deserved punishments, or from an unjust cause, that is, is impressed through injury. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 20.

Reverential fear must also be added, which is had when someone fears lest he have offended his parents, or other superiors. It is referred to just or unjust fear according as its cause is just or unjust. But it can be grave, if there is a prudent fear lest those who impress the fear be offended for a long time or gravely.

VIII. Question III. Is a vow extorted by fear valid? Response. The distinction of fear has already often been explained. For one fear is grave, falling upon a steadfast man; another is light. Grave fear can arise from within: say, from illness, from a storm, from death feared from a wild beast, from an imminent shipwreck. This fear is called intrinsic, because, although the danger that excites the fear is external, it in no way compels the making of the vow; the one vowing is moved by himself to make the vow. Another fear is called extrinsic, which arises from an external cause that compels; and this again is twofold, one justly, the other unjustly instilled in order to extort the vow. Wherefore the one vowing, struck by such fear, chooses the vow as the only means of turning aside the danger that threatens him. These things being laid down, authors by common consent assert that the vow is valid, both by the law of nature and by positive law, when it arises from a grave fear that is intrinsic: because then the one vowing is compelled by no one but himself, and of his own accord and freely chooses the vow as a fit means of escaping the danger. All vows, therefore, made to avoid shipwreck, illness, or death threatening either from a wild beast or from an enemy, are valid. Indeed, even vows elicited on account of a fear instilled from without, but not in order to extort the vow, are valid. For example: you have offended your neighbour; he threatens you with death in revenge; you make a vow to escape death. The vow is valid, because you made the vow with no one compelling you to it. Likewise valid is the vow you elicit in order to avoid the death, or the danger of harm, with which the brother of the girl whom you deflowered threatens you. For although such fear is unjustly instilled from without, it does not tend to extort a vow, but to take revenge; and you, to withdraw yourself from the danger, make the vow of your own accord and freely. The same must be said when the fear comes from without, but is justly brought to bear in order to extort the vow. Because, when the fear is just, the one vowing is unwilling unreasonably; and consequently the consent is justly extorted, and the one vowing is justly compelled to the vow: the whole of the coercion and necessity comes from the one vowing himself, who unjustly refuses to make the vow. Finally, neither does light fear make a vow void, as all commonly admit, because it impairs free consent but little and lightly. And this is certain among all authors.

This QUESTION is exceedingly weighty, and presupposes much, and hands down things necessary also for other Tracts, even that on marriage.

I ASSUME first, from the first part 2. Tract. 1. disp. 3. quaest. 5., that the Will, as regards elicited acts, cannot be coerced.

I ASSUME secondly, from the same disput. quaest. 8., that things done through fear are not involuntary. So holds also the Jurisconsult l. si mulier 21. §. si metu coactus, ff. de eo, quod metus causa. and l. cum proponas C. de hered. instit. and C. si privatus, ff. qui et a quibus. The reason is clear, because he can elicit, and not elicit, the act.

Fear IS a trepidation of mind from danger present or to come. So defines Ulpian the Jurisconsult, l. 1. ff. de eo quod metus causa. It is defined likewise by D. Bonav. 3. p. Centil. sect. 55. and in 4. at the place cited.

Fear is DIVIDED into Concussive, such as that which is inflicted by threats, and Impressive, which is called fear of Fact, as when deeds intervene, say blows, etc. So D. Bonav. loc. cit., on which Zasius Instit. de actione, §. quadrupli, num. 10. Bursatt. consil. 72. num. 11. vol. 1., where he reports others; Sanchez l. 3. de matrim. disput. 12 num. 8. Another fear they add, Compulsive from a powerful man, which is also called Violent; because the force that strikes fear is a man of great power: another fear, they say, is tacit, or of reverence, such as a daughter's toward her Father. The last they call fear of treachery, such as that of a sick man fearing to be treated treacherously by his physician.

Fear, then, is said of someone coerced conditionally, because setting fear aside the will would not will it; yet not absolutely, because he can still be unwilling, and therefore it is called conditional force.

BUT violent force, or absolute force, is that which is from without, not conferring force upon the sufferer ex 3. Eth. cap. 2., as if a Christian were dragged to a Mosque, and compelled by blows to offer incense to an Idol; which force D. Bonav. defines thus, loc. cit. Centil. and in 4. at the place cited, following the Jurisconsult, l. 2. ff. de eo quod metus causa: Vis est maioris rei impetus, qui repelli non potest, which assuredly lacks the voluntary altogether:

A CELEBRATED division of fear is that of D. Bonav. in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. in corpore, and loc. cit. Centil., and found in c. Considerationi, c. veniens, el. 2. de sponsal. cap. cum dilectus de his quae vi, et from the Jurisconsult, l. metu, l. 2. ff. de eo quod metus causa. Decio cap. final. de appell. c. causam matrimonii, num. 4. de off. deleg. Menochio de arbitrariis l. 2. Centur. 2. casu 135. n. 1. Flaminio de resignatione benef. l. 13. q. 1. n. 54. Abb. c. cum dilectus n. 3. D. Thoma in 4. dist. 29. quaest. un. art. 2. and elsewhere everywhere with the other Theologians and Summists.

Another is called fear falling upon a constant man, which is also called just fear, c. Finali de appell.; it is called probable by D. Bonav. loc. cit. and Goffredo de his, quae vi, num. 2. Angelo, at the word metus. Sylvest. quaest. 1. Sanchez loco cit. num. 19. It is called also grave fear by D. Bonav. and others, with the Jurisconsult, lege metum, l. 2 ff. de eo quod metus causa, where he says, it is not of a man of no account, since even the strong are shaken by it.

Another is called the fear of an inconstant man, and it is called light fear, in contrast to the preceding, because it marks out as inconstant, light, and vain the one who is shaken by it and led to act against his appetite.

Five conditions, however, S. Bonav., in the places adduced, whom the rest follow, assigns to fear, that it be of the first kind. The first is that the evil feared be grave, l. Metum, l. 1. de eo quod metus causa, there, Labeo says fear is to be taken, not any fear whatever, but of a greater evil.

From the last words they take occasion to say that this fear need not be great absolutely, but comparatively, so that it be greater than another, though light in itself. So Sylvest. v. metus, quaest. 1. Veracruz p. 1. speculi, art. 8. concl. 3. Carbon. de restit. quaest. 46. fundamento 3.

But D. Bonav. in 4. loc. cit. in corpore, and loc. cit. Censil. wills it to be grave in itself, say of death, infamy, or mutilation; whom follow Sotus 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 2. Sanchez num. 12. The reason is, D. Bonav. loc. cit., because contracts are rescinded by such fear, seeing it impedes consent, cap. Cum locum de sponsal.; but when the evil is light, though preferred before a graver evil, the liberty of consent in a strong man is not held to be impeded.

To those words I say that the comparative is there abusive, and signifies only what is positively great, as the Gloss explains there.

The second condition of fear falling upon a constant man is that the estimation of the grave evil be of one probably imminent, and not a light suspicion. So D. Bonav. in 4. loc. cit., and found l. Metum la 2. ff. de eo quod metus causa. For a constant man is not so lightly terrified; so also D. Thom. in 4. dist. 29. quaest. unica, art. 2. in corpore. Scotus there quaest. unica, §. de primo contradictio. Durandus there quaest. 2. Richard. art. 1. quaest. 1. Gabriel in 3. dist. 39. quaest. 1. art. 1. Sotus 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 2. Palacios there, disp 1. Ledesm. dub. 23. de matrimonio. And from the Jurisperiti, Torcremata 31. quaest. 2. in summa, num. 6. Sylvest. v. metus, quaest. 1. Tabiena v. impedimentum, impedimento 9. quaest. 1. Burlat. consil. 72. num. 30. vol. 1. Alphaeus in his collectaries, collect. 877. Sanchez num. 15. Hence Aristotle, 3. Eth. cap. 9., says, the brave man is fearless, because he does not fear lightly, but where right reason dictates that he must fear.

Hence I infer with D. Bonav. loc. cit. in resol. that there is not required a true and real infliction of the punishments, for then it would be called not fear but harm; but it is enough that there be a probable fear of a future or imminent infliction, Leg. nec timorem 7. ff. de eo quod metus causa and l. 15. tit. 2. p. 4., and the Gloss teaches, c. el. primo vero metuebant de electione. Bartolomaeus l. metum autem, at the beginning, num. 1. ff. de eo quod metus causa. Sylvest. v. metus, quaest. 1. Lopez on that l. 15. Cucus l. 5. instit. Maiorum, tit. 12. num. 157.

Some add that the fear ought to be present, not awaited, though the evil be only future. They gather this from l. metum autem 9. ff. de eo, quod metus causa. So expound many, as Sanchez num. 16. reports.

Others, however, think that a probable suspicion of fear suffices, and that this is enough for rescinding the act, Leg. novissime, ff. de falso tutore, there, that he was thus compelled by fear, or fearing, lest he be compelled. So Bartol. l. 2. lectura 2. C. quod metus causa. Baldus leg. interpositas at the end C. de Transact. Alex. cons. 99. n. 6. vol. 3. Parisius consil. 60. num. 15. vol. 3. Romanus l. 5. ob turpem, num. 10. C. de condonatione ob turpem causam. Hostiens. c. Cum dilectus de his, quae vi, on the words nec metum mortis, and there Anchar. num. 7. Rebuff. Tom. 2. consil. Gallicarum, tit. de rescissione contractuum, art. unico Glossa 2. 2. num. 6. Alex. Tartagnus among the matrimonial consilia of Tileti cons. 21. num. 5. Sylvest. v. metus Villalobos in communi opinione, litt. N. at the word metus, num. 70. Anton. Gabr. tom. 2. commun. l. 11. v. metus, fol. 107. Burgos de Paz cons. 25. num. 73. Padella l. cum proponas, la 1. num. 3. C. de transact. Decisio Pedemontana 170. num. 3. Ioan. Garzia de nobilitate, gloss. 17. num. 14. Mascard. de probat. concl. 1055. num. 26.

Yet that Law sounds differently to me: that the contract be rescinded of one who, compelled by fear, or fearing, would not be compelled, that is, by force against the thing, say if he were compelled to subscribe, l. nam timor violentiae inferendae vitiat electionem. So the Gloss C. bone, CL. 1., at the word metuebant de electione, which all follow there, Alex. cons. 98. vol. 3. Rebuff. Mascad. loc. cit.

Therefore I note that the Law does not say, or thinking probably, lest fear be struck into him, but fearing (it says) lest he be compelled, that is, by force.

The third condition required for grave fear is assigned by D. Bonav. loc. cit. in corpore; and it is that the one striking fear be able to command his threats to execution; for it is not for a brave general to be terrified by the threats of little rustics, as D. Bonav. notes, l. Famosi, ff. ad legem Iul. maiest., there, for the person also is to be considered: whether he could do it, Gloss. l. metum, v. iactationibus, C. de his, quae vi. Anchar. c. ad Audientiam, num. 2. de his, quae vi. Baldus l. metum q. C. de his quae vi, and there Alex. Salicetus num. 2. Sebastianus de medicis, de casibus fortuitis, quaest. 1. num. 67. Flaminius de resign. benef. l. 13. quaest. 1. n. 116. Cucus l. 1. Instit. Mai. tit. 12. num. 165. Rolandus consil. 83. num. 28. vol. 2. Angelus v. metus, Sotus l. 7. de Iustitia, quaest. 2. art. 1. ad 2. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 3. §. Pro explicatione, fol. 988. Carbo de restit. quaest. 46. fundamento 4., and all whom Sanchez num. 19. follows.

Note, however, that it is not to be taken as though he could in very fact fulfill the threats, but that the one fearing reasonably judge that he can fulfill them, even though in fact he truly cannot, for some reason unknown to the one fearing. Which D. Bonav. signified excellently, loc. cit., whom Richardus follows, there art. 1. quaest. 1., as Sanchez num. 19. reports. Wherefore the quality and power of the one striking fear and of the sufferer must be weighed, as if the former were a powerful man and the latter weaker, as Beroius cap. 1. n. 30. de off. deleg. Sotus, Arag. Carbo, and Sanchez loc. cit., and Henriquez l. 11. de matrim. cap. 9., after D. Bonav. loc. cit. Censil., teach well.

The fourth condition is D. Bonav. loc. cit. Censil., which he indicates in 4., that it be likely that the threatener will execute his threats; because he is wont to do so, and is not of those Worthies who fling out threats but do not execute them. It is established ex l. unica, C. Si quis Imperatori, there, let us weigh the sayings from the characters of men. And leg. Famosi, ff. ad Leg. Iul. maiest. and Leg. metum, C. de his, quae vi, there: Fear ought to be proved not by boasts or contentions alone, but by the atrocity of the deed. And so teaches Bartolus, Paulus, Alex. Baldus, Salicet. and Aretinus: Abbas indeed cap. 1. num. 3. de offic. deleg., and cap. causam matrimon. numer. 5. on the same title, and cap. Cum dilectus, numer. 8. Anchard. in the chapter ad Audientiam, num. 2. de his quae vi. Navo cap. consultatione, num. 12. de sponsal., and cap. finali, num. 17. de appel. Felinus cap. 1. de offic. deleg., there Decius, and cap. causam matrim. on the same title num. 21. Crottus leg. stipulatio hoc modo concepta, num. 67. ff. de verb. oblig. Vitalis de Cambaris tract. de clausulis; clausula non vi, tit. de metu uxoris, found in Tom. 18. tract. noviorum, Iacobinus leg. interpositas, num. 10. Cod. de transact. Couar. 4. decret. 2. part. cap. 3. §. 6. Tiberius Decianus consil. 18. num. 128. vol. 1. Bursatus consil. 72. num. 35. and 42. vol. 3. Flaminius lib. de resignatione, benef. lib. 15. quaest. 1. num. 174. Mascardus de probat. consil. 1055. num. 18. Antonius Gabriel. Tom. 2. com. lib. 11. v. metus, fol. 106.

From the Theologians, Henriquez lib. 11. de matrim. cap. 9., Lopez 2. part. Instruct. de matrim. cap. 40. fo. 1071., and Sanchez num. 20., who num. 21. adds that it is required that such a one be wont to execute the threatened evil in the same kind of evil as that threatened, on the doctrine of Baldus leg. finali at the end, ff. de haered. instit., where he says that conjecture is not drawn from unlike things; so Cynus, whom Alexander cites and follows, leg. metum, num. 2. Cod. de his, quae vi.

The last condition is that the one fearing be unable to meet the threatened evils otherwise than by vowing; for if he could meet them otherwise, it would not be the fear of a brave man, but of a little fellow, whose it is to dread evils he could easily escape. This condition, however, seems to me implicit in the second, whereby the evil is imminent, for then it is well-nigh irreparable.

Straightway Sanchez disputes whether one choosing a greater evil, say to deny Christ, in order to avoid a lesser, say death, can be called a constant man, and whether that fear of a lesser evil, though grave in itself, suffices to render external acts invalid, as involuntary, because it is fear falling upon a constant man, since it is grave according to the first condition of fear.

Very many assert that an evil, even if grave, does not suffice to strike fear into a constant man if it be chosen to avoid another greater evil, to say, he is not held to be a constant man if he chooses the greater evil, say fault, to avoid a lesser penalty, say death; the reason is, because such a one is moved not by rational but by irrational fear; but the constant man acts rationally.

And indeed D. Bonavent. holds this, at the place cited, toward the end, D. Thom. in 3. dist. 29. quaest. unica, art. 2. in corpore, Scotus quaest. unic. §. de prima contradictio, and §. hic dicitur, Durandus quaest. 1. Richardus art. 1. quaest. 1. ad Paludanum quaest. unica, art. 2. concl. 2. num. 13. Gabriel. in 3. dist. 39. quaest. 1. art. 1. and art. 3. concl. 8. Victoria sum. de matrim. num. 168. Sotus in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 2. Palacios in 4. dist. 29. dub. 1. fol. 655. Veracruz p. p. speculi, art. 8. and others, whom Sanchez reports, lib. 4. de matrim. disp. 2. num. 2., where he asserts that these Doctors, speaking of fear in reference to marriage and other contracts to be rescinded — namely that it be fear falling upon a constant man, sufficient to annul marriage — require that the lesser evil be chosen by the man, otherwise he was not constant but inconstant.

Others, however, explain that these Doctors will this condition of choosing the lesser evil to be required in order that fear excuse from fault, but not that it suffice for rescinding contracts; and in this sense D. Bonavent. spoke, in 3. dist. 29. art. 3. quaest. 2. ad 3., where he grants fear falling upon a constant man with regard to human contracts; yet with regard to things of universal justice he denies it, according to that of Matth. 10.: Fear not them that kill the body. Therefore such fear, on grounds urged before God, is not reckoned a sufficient cause to excuse man from the guilt of sin, or from the obligation of an oath, though it exempt him from human contracts, according to the Axiom of the Jurisperiti reported above.

In the place indeed adduced by Sanchez, in the fourth sent., at the end of the question cited, he says that fear falling upon a constant man is of those things only that are not contrary to our salvation, and thus no fear of penalty, with respect to committing sin, can fall upon a constant man; therefore he ought rationally to suffer death rather than sin; but marriage is not of things contrary to salvation, whence he infers that, with respect to it, the fear of a constant man can fall, which fear renders the act involuntary; whence it comes about that this condition, of one choosing the lesser evil in order to be a constant man, in our case does not come into play in a vow or oath, but only in things that carry fault in themselves, which, even though they carry only venial fault, are yet a greater evil than any penalty whatsoever, even of death, as D. Bonavent. teaches, in 3. dist. 38, whom others imitate after D. Augustine, reported in cap. ne quis 22. quaest. 2.

Which things being so, Sanchez does not rightly institute the second disputation lib. 4. de matrimonio: Whether the fear of a constant man necessarily requires that the lesser evil be chosen, that is, the penalty rather than the fault. He says that B. Bonaventure, D. Thomas, and others assert that such an evil ought to be preferred in reference to marriage; for since marriage is not compared, as an evil, with the fear, and consequently cannot be called a lesser evil than the evil certainly threatened by the threatener unless one enter marriage, I do not see on what ground Sanchez says that D. Bonaventure, D. Thomas, and others spoke in this sense, that by choosing marriage rather than death, or death rather than marriage, one is said to choose the greater or the lesser evil, and thence one is argued to be a constant or inconstant man. As D. Bonavent. subtly argues, at the place cited, and Sanchez himself, disp. 5. num. 16., where he says that the fear of just excommunication does not strike grave fear with regard to some contract, because one thing is not chosen as an evil before another, since both are goods.

This fear, then, is not only required for the rescission of marriage and other just contracts, as Soto asserts, in 4. dist. 29. quaest. 1. art. 4., Nauar. summa lat. cap. 22. num. 51., and others whom Sanchez follows, num. 3.; neither can it even intervene.

Sanchez defines this well indeed, disp. 3.: this grave fear, which is called falling upon a constant man, is not equally to be assessed, but proportionally, so that what is light to a man may be grave to a woman or a child, cap. indignanti, 13. quaest. 6., as Tiraquel notes, lib. 1. connub. num. 71., the Gloss cap. cum locum de sponsal. v. metu, where Anton. num. 12. Abbas num. 6. Alexand. de Nevo, num. 23. and others.

Moreover, note that it is not required for grave fear, which deters a constant man, that the evil be feared for one's own person, but it is enough that it be feared in the persons of one's children, leg. isti quidem §. fine, ff. de eo, quod metus causa.

The same of other kindred, in cap. sciam cuncti de electione, in 6., which text Jason says is notable, leg. de pupillo, ff. si quis ipsi, num. 12. ff. de operis novi nuntiat. Felinus cap. Ecclesiae sanctae Mariae, n. 99., where fear inflicted upon the kindred of an elector in order to strike fear into the elector is held to have been struck into the elector himself.

The same of a bond of friendship closely joined, Sanchez teaches, num. 9.; because a friend is another self. Attend also to other things concerning grave evil, sufficient to strike fear into a constant man.

AND indeed, as to those evils that are not declared grave by law, that is to be defined by the judgment of a Judge, leg. 3. ff. ex quibus causis. The greater reason is, because all cases cannot be expressed; but this judgment is not required for those evils that are clearly grave by law. So Baldus, cap. 2. de his, quae ad finem; his reason is, because arbitria are given with respect to those things that cannot be comprehended under a rule, on account of human variety, as is noted on leg. non possunt, ff. de legibus. Sylvester notes the same, V. metus, quaest. 4.; it will be so judged, whether the estimation of the impending evil be in accordance with right reason.

AS TO evils certainly grave, D. Bonavent., at the place cited, in corpore, enumerates death, found in cap. cum dilectus, de his quae vi, and leg. nec timorem 7. ff. de eo quod metus causa. The reason is, because of all terrible things the greatest is death, by the testimony of Aristotle, 4. Eth. So also Sanchez, disp. 5. num. 4.

S. Bonavent. asserts the same of mutilation; for it is a kind of partial death, cap. si quis absciderit disp. 55., and it is found expressly in dicta leg 7. The same, of grave bodily torment, is found expressly in the said cap. cum dilectus, and the said leg. 7., to which grave blows are reduced. The same must be said of the fear of arms, leg. 3. at the beginning, in the verse qui armati, ff. de vi, et vi armata.

S. Bonavent. asserts the same of the fear of servitude. It is found in leg. ego puto, and leg. isti quidem, ff. de eo, quod metus causa. Say the same of the fear of captivity and of grave exile. Of the fear of prison, it is found in leg. nec timorem, and leg. qui in carcerem, ff. de eo, quod metus causa.