Article III. On Fear

Fear is a trembling of the mind on account of some present or future danger to oneself or to those closely joined to oneself; but it is commonly divided thus:

1st. Grave or slight fear, according as the evil feared is either grave, such as death, mutilation, hard imprisonment, notable detriment to reputation, a great loss of goods, etc.; or slight or mediocre inconvenience, such as the loss of a thing of slight moment, a small detriment to reputation; or even something grave, but from a slight cause, or which can easily be averted, etc.

But grave fear is such absolutely or relatively. Fear is called absolutely grave when evils truly grave in themselves are feared; but relatively grave when evils, though slight in themselves, are nevertheless grave respectively to certain persons. Thus children, women, and old men are wont to be affected by greater fear in the same danger than men of mature age.

2nd. Fear from within or from without, according as it proceeds from an intrinsic cause, for example, from sickness, from infirmity of mind, etc.; or from an extrinsic cause, either free, namely from man, or necessary or natural, as from the elements, contagion, etc.

3rd. Fear justly or unjustly impressed, according as it is brought in either from a just cause, for example, from deserved punishments, or from an unjust cause, that is, is impressed through injury. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 20.

Reverential fear must also be added, which is had when someone fears lest he have offended his parents, or other superiors. It is referred to just or unjust fear according as its cause is just or unjust. But it can be grave, if there is a prudent fear lest those who impress the fear be offended for a long time or gravely.

An act posited from fear, however grave, is voluntary simply, although regularly it is also involuntary in a certain respect. The reason for the first is that what, being known as the lesser evil here and now, is efficaciously assumed as a means for avoiding another evil, is called voluntary simply. Hence they have always been held as apostates who, conquered by fear of torments, denied the faith. The reason for the second is that what is done from fear alone is repugnant to the will, and apart from this case would not be done. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 6, art. 6. - St. Alphonsus, n. 21.

I said, 1st, from fear or from fear alone, because acts posited with fear, or from fear but not as from a total or moving cause, are voluntary without any admixture of the involuntary.

I said, 2nd, however grave, but always excepted is the case in which the fear is so great that the use of reason is wholly removed. But if the fear should be slight under every respect, and at the same time the total cause of the action, in the external forum indeed it is not reckoned, because it is presumed not to have had influence; but in the internal forum that action will be less sinful according to the quantity of influence, or of the involuntary, which it causes.

I said, 3rd, regularly, because then an action is involuntary in a certain respect from fear when in itself it is hateful to the will, although relatively, and appears here and now desirable as a means for avoiding the evil which is feared. But this happens regularly, yet not necessarily and always. For he who, for example, flees sin in order to avoid hell, or from fear of hell, does not for that reason have flight from sin as hateful in itself; otherwise by the force of such a disposition he would always sin and become worse, which it is wicked to assert. Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 8.

You Will Resolve. 1st. Fear proceeding from within or from natural causes does not prevent an act elicited under its influence from being able to be valid: thus a vow emitted from fear of death in the midst of shipwreck, or in grave sickness, is valid. But if a vow from fear impressed by an extrinsic and free cause is not valid, the reason is not taken from the absence of the voluntary, but from the presence of injury.

2nd. Fear, even grave fear, does not of itself excuse from mortal sin whenever the violation falls into contempt of religion; but it excuses when there is question of a prohibiting human law, or even a positive divine law, not because the voluntary ceases, but because the legislator is judged not to will to press the obligation with so great an inconvenience. But natural laws which prohibit acts intrinsically bad continue to oblige, and so do laws which regard the common good of the whole republic; nor in these does fear excuse.

3rd. § 2. Acts posited from grave and unjustly impressed fear, or from deceit, are valid unless something else is provided by law; but they can be rescinded, according to the norm of can. 1684-1689, by the sentence of a judge, either at the petition of the injured party or ex officio (Can. 103).