Hate

100. How great a sin it is. 1. Hatred of abomination, which is referred to a quality of the neighbor: a. is licit if the quality is absolutely evil; b. is licit if the action is relatively evil, insofar as it harms me or others, unless the abomination is greater than the evil action deserves; c. is a sin, and indeed of itself mortal, if the quality is simply good (piety, zeal).

2. Hatred of abomination, which is referred to the very person of the neighbor, is from its genus a mortal sin, as contrary to the precept of charity by which we are bound to love the neighbor; nevertheless from lightness of matter it can be venial.

Simple displeasure with or aversion from a person, if evil is not wished to him, is for the most part a venial sin; yet it grows into grave sin if someone utterly turns away from the person of the neighbor as wholly unworthy of love, who deserves no love.

3. Hatred of enmity, which properly is the sin of hatred, is from its genus mortal, both because it is opposed to the precept of charity, which obliges under grave obligation, and because hatred toward the neighbor is expressly condemned as a grave sin: everyone who hates his brother is a murderer.¹

One who from slight displeasure with a person wishes a small evil to the neighbor commits a light sin because of the smallness of the matter. One who deliberately wishes another a grave evil from displeasure with the person or because it is evil for him sins gravely against charity by hatred of enmity. Likewise one who deliberately rejoices concerning the great evil of another because it is his evil sins gravely against charity by hatred of enmity. Likewise one who deliberately grieves concerning the good of the neighbor because it is his good sins gravely by hatred of enmity. But to wish evil to another and to rejoice concerning it, not insofar as it is evil for him, but insofar as it is good for oneself or for others, the order of charity being preserved, is licit.²

Note. Those who accuse themselves of hatred are not immediately to be accused of sin, especially of mortal sin. For often what they call hatred is nothing other than a certain natural antipathy or aversion of soul arising from diversity of character, which aversion, as involuntary, is not a sin; or it is abomination of an evil quality or action, which rightly and deservedly displeases; or finally it is a desire of evil from an honorable end, which likewise is not a sin. But these are dangerous, because they can easily pass into abomination and ill will against the person. For if motions of aversion and natural antipathy are not restrained, they are easily approved by the will and thus degenerate into acts of hatred.

¹ 1 John 3:15.

² Cf. De principiis, n. 329.

101. On malediction. Malediction is a vocal imprecation of evil; therefore malediction is an external sin which proceeds from hatred or anger.

1. Malediction is a sin grave from its genus, because it is opposed to the precept of charity, which obliges under grave obligation; therefore he who seriously and deliberately imprecates upon the neighbor a grave evil from hatred of enmity commits a grave sin.

2. Nevertheless in the concrete maledictions are often excused from mortal sin by defect of the threefold condition which is required for malediction to be mortal: a. because of inadvertence to the gravity of the thing, as often happens in vehement anger; b. because of defect of consent, because they are not uttered seriously and with the will that they happen, but only either to signify indignation or to strike terror into others (children, subjects); c. because of the lightness of the evil which someone imprecates upon another.

3. Malediction which is made to one present often also has the character of contumely, because it injures not only charity but also the honor owed to another. Hence it can happen that grave maledictions which are only venial because they are not said seriously become grave by reason of contumely, as if a subject should curse a superior or a son his father to his face.

The concupiscible passions are defined as follows: (a) love, the first of the passions and the cause of all the others, tends to sensible good considered as desirable, abstracting from its presence or absence; while hatred is the aversion from sensible evil considered precisely as unsuitable and abstracting from its presence or absence; (b) desire tends to sensible good that is absent, and flight turns away from sensible evil apprehended as future; (c) delight is the affection produced in the sensitive appetite by the presence and possession of the object desired; (d) sadness is the passion which dejects the soul on account of the presence of an evil.

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 34-36.)

The sins against charity and its subordinate virtues can be reduced to the following: (a) hatred, which is opposed to love; (b) sloth and envy, which are contrary to the joy of charity; (c) discord and schism, which are opposed to the peace of charity; (d) scandal, which is the opposite of beneficence and fraternal correction.

Hate.—Hate is an aversion of the will to something which the intellect judges evil, that is, contrary to self. As there are two kinds of love, so there are also two kinds of hate. (a) Hatred of dislike (odium abominationis) is the opposite of love of desire, for, as this love inclines to something as suitable and advantageous for self, so hatred of dislike turns away from something, as being considered unsuitable and harmful to self. (b) Hatred of enmity (odium inimicitiae) is the opposite of love of benevolence, for, as this love wishes good to the object of its affection, so hatred of enmity wishes evil to the object of its dislike.

Hatred of God.-A thing cannot be hated unless it is looked upon as evil, and hence God cannot be hated except by those who regard Him as evil to themselves.

(a) Thus, those who see the Divine Essence (i.e., the blessed), cannot hate God, for His Essence is goodness itself, and, therefore, the blessed can see in God only reasons for love. (b) Those who see God obscurely through the things made by Him (i.e., wayfarers on earth), cannot hate God considered as the author of effects that are in no way displeasing to the will, such as existence, life, intelligence; but they can hate God as the author of effects displeasing to their will, such as law and punishment. Thus, no one can hate God because God has given him being, for existence of itself is something good and desirable; but a depraved will can hate God for having forbidden sin, or for inflicting chastisements, or for permitting some evils to accompany the blessings of life. That hatred of God is not a mere possibility, the scriptures in many places attest: “The pride of them that hate Thee ascendeth forever” (Ps, lxiii. 23), “Now they have seen and hated both Me and My Father” (John, xv. 24).

Hatred of God of various kinds. (a) As regards the intention, it is either interpretative or formal. Interpretative hatred is aversion that is not intended directly or for its own sake, but only indirectly and by reason of something else whose love is preferred. Formal hatred is an aversion that is intended directly and expressly in itself. Every mortal sin is an act of interpretative hatred of God, since mortal sin consists in placing one’s own pleasure or interest above the friendship of God; but it is only the special sin which attacks God directly that constitutes formal hate. Thus, he who murders his enemy does not directly intend dislike of God, but revenge; whereas the condemned murderer who blasphemes God, because he is to be executed, directly dislikes God. (b) As regards the degree of malice it contains, formal hatred of God is either dislike or enmity. Dislike of God is the sin of those who do not like some attribute of God; enmity towards God is the sin of those who wish some evil to God. Thus, one who deliberately wishes that God would sanction injustice dislikes the divine attribute of justice, while an unjust man who wishes he might be rid of God and His judgment is guilty of enmity to God.

Hatred of God as a Special Sin.—(a) Interpretative hatred of God is not a special sin but a general circumstance of every mortal sin; but formal hatred is a special sin, and indeed one that is comparatively rare, and that must be specially mentioned in confession. This is a sin which is distinct, not only from the sins against the other theological virtues (e.g., unbelief, despair), but also from the sins against the other objects of charity (e.g., hatred of the neighbor).

(b) Formal hatred of God is not a special sin against the Holy Ghost (see 899); but its malice pervades every such sin, and it is thus a general sin against the Holy Ghost. For example, presumption is a dislike of God’s law which requires that one must attain salvation through the observance of the commandments; rejection of the known truth is a dislike of God’s revelation.

The Gravity of Hatred of God.-(a) It is a mortal sin from its nature, and can never be venial on account of the smallness of the injury, but only on account of lack of deliberation or consent. Dislike of even one attribute of God is a grave injury, for everything pertaining to God is perfect and infinitely lovable. (b) Hatred of God is the worst of all mortal sins; for it is directly opposed to God (the supreme good) and to charity (the most excellent virtue in a creature), whereas other mortal sins offend against these goods only indirectly.

Degrees of Malice in Hatred of God.—(a) A new species of sin is added to hatred of God, when out of hatred one proceeds to sin against creatures, or to commit other offenses against God Himself. Example: Titus hates God, and therefore persecutes those who believe in God, and also blasphemes God. (b) A new degree of malice is added to hatred of God when one proceeds from dislike to enmity, or when the circumstances of person, place, manner, etc., aggravate the malice. Example: Hatred of God outwardly manifested adds the evil of scandal; not so hatred of God that is concealed.

Hatred of Creatures.—All dislike of God is sinful, because there is nothing in God that merits dislike. But in creatures imperfections are found as well as perfections.

(a) Hence, dislike of the imperfections of our neighbor (i.e., of all that is the work of the devil or of his own sinfulness), is not against charity, but according to charity; for it is the same thing to dislike another’s evil as to wish his good. Thus, God Himself is said to hate detractors, that is, detraction (Rom., i. 30), and Christ bids His followers hate their parents who would be an impediment to their progress in holiness, that is, the sinful opposition of those parents (Luke, xiv. 26). Only when dislike is carried beyond reason is it sinful. Thus, a wife who dislikes her husband’s habit of drunkenness so much that she will not give him a necessary medicine on account of the alcohol it contains, carries her dislike to extremes.

(b) Dislike of the perfections of nature or of grace in our neighbor (i.e., of anything that is the work of God in him), is contrary to charity. Thus, God does not hate the detractor himself, nor should children ever hate the person of a parent, or the natural relationship he holds to themselves, no matter how bad the parent may be. As St. Augustine says: “One should love the sinner, but hate his vices.”

The same principles apply to dislike of self. (a) Thus, one should dislike one’s own imperfections, for they are the enemies of one’s soul. So, contrition is defined as a hatred and detestation of one’s vices, and it is a virtue and an act of charity to self. (b) One should not dislike the good one has, except in so far as it is associated with evil. Thus, one should not regret one’s honesty, even if by reason of it one loses an opportunity to make a large sum of money; but one may regret having married, if one’s choice has been unfortunate and has made one’s life miserable.

Direct enmity to self is not possible, for nature inclines each one so strongly to love of self that it is impossible for anyone to wish evil to himself as evil: “No one hateth his own flesh” (Ephes., v. 29). But indirectly a person may be at enmity with himself, inasmuch as he wishes evil under the guise of good; and hence St. Augustine, commenting on the words, “He that loveth his life shall lose it” (John, xii, 25), says: “If you love self wrongly, you hate it; if you hate self rightly, you love it.” This indirect enmity to self happens in two ways. (a) A person sometimes wishes himself what is not a true, but only an apparent good, as when he chooses the satisfaction of revenge rather than that of pardon of injuries. (b) A person sometimes chooses what is good, not for his true, but for his lower self, as when he decides to gratify the body at the expense of the soul.

Is it ever lawful to wish evil to self or to others? (a) It is not lawful to wish anyone evil as evil, for even God in punishing the lost does not will their punishment as it is evil to them, but as it contains the good of justice. Hence, it is contrary to charity to wish that a criminal be put to death, if one’s wish does not go beyond the sufferings and loss of life the criminal will endure. (b) It is lawful to wish evil as good, or, in other words, to wish misfortunes that are blessings in disguise. Thus, one may wish that a neighbor lose his arm, if this is necessary to save his life.

Is it lawful to wish the death of self or of a neighbor for some private good of the one whose death is wished? (a) If the good is a spiritual one and more important than the spiritual good contained in the desire to live, it is lawful to desire death. Thus, it is lawful to wish to die in order to enter into a better life, or to be freed from the temptations and sinfulness of life on earth. But it is not lawful to wish to die in order to spare a few individuals the scandal they take from one’s life, if that life is needed by others as a source of edification (Philip., i. 21 sqq.). (b) If the good is a temporal one but sufficiently important, it does not seem unlawful to desire death. Thus, we should not blame a person suffering from a painful and incurable disease, which makes him a burden to himself and to others, if, with resignation to the divine will, he prays for the release of death; for “death is better than a bitter life” (Ecclus., xxx, 17). But lack of perfect health or a feeling of weariness is not a good reason for wishing to die, especially if one has dependents, or is useful to others.

Is it ever lawful to wish spiritual evil to anyone? (a) Spiritual evil of iniquity may never be desired, for the desire of sin, mortal or venial, is a sin itself (see 242), and it cannot be charitable, for charity rejoiceth not with iniquity (I Cor., xiii. 6). It is wrong, therefore, to wish that our neighbor fall into sin, offend God, diminish or forfeit his grace, or lose his soul. On the contrary, we are commanded to pray that he be delivered from such evils. (b) The good that God draws out of spiritual evil may be desired. Some are permitted to fall into sin, or be tempted, that they may become more humble, more charitable, more vigilant, more fervent. It seems that the permission of sin in the case of the elect is one of the benefits of God’s predestination, inasmuch as God intends it to be an occasion of greater virtue and stronger perseverance. It is not lawful to wish that God permit anyone to fall into sin, but it is lawful to wish that, if God has permitted sin, good will follow after it.

Gravity of the Sin of Hatred of Neighbor.—(a) Hatred, whether of dislike or of enmity, is from its nature a mortal sin, since it is directly opposed to the virtue of charity, which is the life of the soul.

(b) Dislike, if enmity is not joined to it, is rarely in fact a mortal sin. Aversions and antipathies for others usually are either indeliberate, or have to do with what are real or fancied defects in others. Dislike is a mortal sin only when one despises another so much that one deliberately loathes even that which is of divine provenance in the other, or dislikes a real imperfection so immoderately as to inflict serious injury (e.g., by refusing pardon or the common signs of charity, by giving grave scandal, etc.)

(c) Enmity in fact is often only a venial sin, either because one wishes only a small harm (e.g., the loss of a small sum of money), or because one wishes harm, even a great harm (e.g., the commission of mortal sin), without full deliberation. Enmity is a mortal sin, however, when one deliberately wishes a grave evil (e.g., mortal sin or the loss of reputation) to one’s neighbor.

Hatred Compared with Other Sins Against the Neighbor.—(a) Hatred is a graver sin than other internal sins against the neighbor, such as envy, anger; for, while each of these latter attacks some particular kind of good of the neighbor or only to a limited degree, hatred may be directed against any good and knows no measure. Thus, covetousness is directed against the external goods or possessions of a neighbor, while hate may extend to either internal or external goods. Envy is opposed to the neighbor’s good relatively, in so far as it is considered an obstacle to one’s own glory, but hate detests another’s good absolutely. The hater finds his satisfaction, not in any profit derived for self, but in his aversion for another’s good, and the harm that is wished his neighbor. This comparison here made should be understood, other things being equal, so that hatred of another’s life is contrasted with envy of his life, etc.; for, if the goods are not the same, hatred may be a lesser sin, as when hatred of a neighbor’s temporal good is compared with envy of his spiritual good. (b) Hatred of a neighbor is a more serious sin than external offenses done against him, for hatred sets the will wrong, and it is in the will that sin takes root: “He who hates his brother is a murderer” (I John, iii. 15). The external act, on the contrary (e.g., killing an innocent man), is not a formal sin when the will is guiltless. (c) Hatred is a less harmful sin to the neighbor than external offenses; for example, internal dislike and malevolence will not break any bones, as may happen from a severe blow.

Why is hatred not numbered among the capital vices? As was said above (see 269), a capital vice is one from which naturally and usually other species of sin take their origin. Now, hatred of God or the neighbor, in the natural and usual course of sin, does not precede, but rather follows other sins. Hence, hatred is not a capital sin. This will appear more clearly if we distinguish two kinds of hatred:

(a) Hate of that which is truly evil and opposed to the true good of man (e.g., hate of vice), is naturally prior to other disinclinations, since rational nature first inclines one to love its good and hate its evil (see 1106).

(b) Hate of that which is not evil (as hate of God or of the neighbor), is naturally subsequent to other sins, for it is only a nature already corrupt that detests true goodness. This does not mean, however, that the whole catalogue of lesser sins must have been committed before hatred is arrived at, nor that in individual cases a sinner has not the freedom to hate before he has committed less grave sins.

In a certain wide sense, however, it may be said that hatred of the neighbor goes before all other sins against the neighbor, just as was remarked above (1299) concerning sins against God.

(a) Hence, interpretative hate—i.e., a feeling against another that makes one act in effect as if there were hatred—does precede the other sins. Thus, if Titus, who bore no ill-will to Balbus, becomes enraged against him and inflicts death, the murder is traced back to anger, but this anger may be called hate, inasmuch as dislike of the life of Balbus is included in the desire of revenge.

(b) Formal hate—i.e., dislike of another that is absolute, and not modified by such considerations as desire of revenge or sorrow over one’s own inferiority—does not precede, but rather follows the other sins, as was explained in the previous paragraph. It is only this sin of formal hate that is a special sin. Titus in the example murdered Balbus, not because he had an absolute dislike for him, but because the thirst for revenge made Balbus displeasing to him.

Various Species of the Sin of Hatred.—(a) Hatred of God and hatred of the neighbor are sins specifically distinct, and hence to be declared specifically in confession. They are opposed to the same virtue of charity, but, on account of the generical difference of sin against God and sin against the creature, they must be classed as different species of sin.

(b) Hatred of the neighbor in itself is but one species of sin, since all its acts have this one essential character in common, that evil is wished to a neighbor as evil—that is, one wishes another evil in general or every kind of evil, but does not specify particular evils, such as damnation or death.

(c) Hatred of the neighbor on account of its circumstances or results may be connected with sins of other species. Thus, he who hates his neighbor because the latter is pious, adds irreligion to his hatred; he who out of hatred wishes the death of his neighbor, adds the guilt of murder to hatred; he who out of hatred wishes to destroy his neighbor’s property, adds the guilt of injustice to his hatred: he who hates his parents, adds impiety to uncharitableness; he who calls down a curse on another, adds malediction to hate.

Penitents who accuse themselves of hatred often have in mind a sin specifically distinct from the sin of hatred, or an act not sinful at all.

(a) Thus, “hatred of God” is sometimes used to signify a want of resignation to the divine will.

(b) “Dislike of the neighbor” is sometimes used to signify uncongeniality on account of difference of character, etc., or positive disapproval of qualities or acts that deserve dislike or censure. Thus, a penitent who always feels ill at ease in the company of a neighbor on account of some natural incompatibility or of some fear which he himself does not understand, or who dreads meeting an individual whose manners are boorish or whose conversation is distasteful, may accuse himself of sinful dislike.

(c) “Wishing evil to the neighbor” is sometimes used to signify one’s desire that justice take its course or that the order of charity be observed. Thus, a penitent who wished for the common good that a criminal be punished, or according to charity that his friend would defeat others in competition for a prize, may accuse himself that he wished harm to the criminal or had luck to the competitors against his friend.

Circumstances of hatred should be mentioned in confession as follows: (a) when they add a new species—thus, the person hated (e.g., one’s father) or the evil wished (e.g., a fall into mortal sin, loss of reputation, death, etc.) may add a new sin to that of hate; (b) when they multiply the number of sins within the species of hate, as when one hates a large number of persons (see 219).

Hatred and Fighting.—(a) Hatred is not necessarily a cause of fighting. The hater wishes evil to his neighbor, not as punishment, but absolutely; his passion is calmer, more lasting, and more insatiable than that of the angry man. If it suits him, he will bide his time patiently, pretending friendship, but all the while plotting ruin to the one he hates. (b) Hatred at times does bring on fighting, for, if the hater sees that he can safely attack openly, he will use quarreling and fighting as a means to his purpose.

The prohibitions of uncharitableness are as follows: (a) against hatred: “Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart” (Lev, xix. IT); (b) against sloth: “Bow down thy shoulder and hear her (wisdom), and be not grieved with her bands” (Ecclus., vi. 26); (c) against envy: “Let us not be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another” (Gal., v. 26), (d) against discord: “Speak the same things and let there be no schisms among you” (I Cor., i. 10); and (e) against scandal: “Put not a stumbling-block or a scandal in your brother’s way” (Rom., xiv. 13).

498. NOTIONS. Hatred is an act of the will by which someone is borne toward something with malevolence. It is twofold: 1. hatred of enmity (or of the person), by which we are averse to someone, and will evil to him insofar as it is evil to him; 2. hatred of abomination (or of the quality), by which we are averse to neighbor not according to himself, but according to some quality of his disagreeing with us. Cf. n. 475, note 2.

Hatred ordinarily arises from an offense, and manifests itself externally by denial of signs of love.

But some SIGNS of love are common, others special. Those are called common which are usually shown to others of the same state; for example, by a Christian to a Christian, by a fellow citizen to a fellow citizen, by a kinsman to a kinsman. Special signs are those which are shown on account of a special title, for example of friendship, which is not the same toward all of the same condition (II, 28). See what is to be said below, n. 501.

499. PRINCIPLES. I. There is a precept of loving enemies, by which hatred of enmity is prohibited as a sin grave of its kind. It is established from the words of the Lord (Matt. 5:44): Love your enemies..., and in the same place (6:15): But if you will not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive you your sins. Whence (1 John 3:15): Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer.

We said, 1. Enemies, by which name are signified those who persecute us with hatred, or have affected us with offense or injury.

2. Hatred of enmity, for hatred of abomination, or of aversion, is of itself indifferent, and takes its moral species from the nature of the quality which we abhor. Thus, for example, if in neighbor you pursue with hatred his bad qualities, pride, etc., the hatred is good and can pertain to charity, according to that saying (Ps. 138:22): I hated them with perfect hatred (sinners). But one must watch lest hatred of the quality pass into hatred of the person. If you hate in him qualities simply good and honorable, justice, piety, etc., the hatred is so evil that by its nature it is a mortal sin, as we said concerning envy (n. 368).

3. As a sin grave of its kind; for hatred admits smallness of matter: in an internal act, for example if you wish a light evil to an enemy, or rejoice concerning it after it has happened; in an external act, if it betrays a hatred lightly offensive, or induces light scandal; as often happens among those who live together (Kon., n. 282).

500. II. The precept of loving enemies does not impose a special obligation, that is, one diverse from that by which we are held toward all men. It requires only this, "that one loving God and neighbor not exclude his enemies from that generality of love of neighbor." Thus all with St. Thomas (2.2, q. 25, a. 8; cf. St. Alph., II, 28, 1). Therefore special love is not of the necessity of charity, except according to the preparation of soul, by which, namely, a man is prepared for this, that in particular he would love his enemies and, when necessity requires it, would furnish special benefits to them.

Hence: 1. Those sin who wish evil to neighbor insofar as it is evil to him, whether this is done from vengeance or from aversion toward his person. But sometimes it is licit to wish a temporal evil to neighbor, insofar as it is good for him, as we said n. 349.

2. Those sin, of themselves gravely, who refuse pardon to an enemy; or do not accept suitable satisfaction, or demand greater than is fair; who bring the guilty person into judgment from hatred and vengeance, or rejoice concerning an enemy's evil. But you are not bound to forgive the satisfaction which is owed to you for injury and harm: for this you can demand, not indeed as an evil of the enemy, but as a good owed to you, all hatred being removed and charity preserved. Nor ought a feeling of indignation or the memory of injury be confused with hatred (II, 29).

3. "A private person, who, being averse to another, flees from him, if he does this in order to deprive him of his conversation and solace, and thus to sadden him and make it be ill with him, is hatred of enmity and a sin. But if, wishing no evil, you only flee because he is unlike your nature, or is accustomed to be troublesome to you, it is hatred of aversion, and a sin if it is without reason: such it will not be if the person is very harsh, provided contempt, scandal, and the desire of vengeance are absent" (II, 30, 3).

501. III. Common signs of love and benefits are owed, of themselves, to enemies; but not special ones. The reason for the first is that to deny to an enemy those things which are owed to all would be a manifest sign of hatred and vengeance. Such denial will be a grave or light sin, according as, from the circumstances, contempt is present or is reputed grave or light. The reason for the second is that special signs, which are indications of restored former friendship or of perfect reconciliation, proceed not from debt, but from liberality (Ami du Cl., 1913, p. 203).

From these things you will deduce: 1. We are bound, speaking of itself, to return the greeting of an enemy greeting us,¹ to respond to one asking or writing, to sell exposed merchandise to one wishing to buy, not to exclude him from common prayers and alms, to furnish common services to him, to avert his harm if we easily can, etc. - For all these things are numbered among common signs.

2. Per accidens we are not bound to these things when charity or justice demands something else, or a reasonable cause excuses. And indeed a) Charity, as if, from signs or benefits denied, the enemy is hoped to be amended; if he is believed to become worse from the same signs being granted, or to interpret them badly; if, from speaking with him, it is feared that quarrels, contempt, etc., may be repeated. b) Justice, as if parents or Superiors, for the just punishment and correction of a son or subject (for example, on account of an infamous delict, an unworthy marriage), deny him sight, speech, entrance into the house, even after petition of pardon; yet provided that such a punishment does not exceed the gravity of the delict, and lasts only for a time, namely as long as it will seem expedient for amendment. c) A reasonable cause, for instance, if they are omitted for a short time, not from hatred, but as a signification of just pain or sadness on account of a recently received injury; if the enemy does not respond to signs of charity. Yet one must always beware both the danger of hatred and the scandal of others (II, 28, 2).

3. We are not bound of ourselves to receive an enemy with hospitality or at a banquet, to console him when sad, to visit him when sick, to admit him to familiar conversation, to greet him when met on the way, not to exact from him reparation of the harm inflicted, to leave him immune from the public vindication of the delict by not citing him before a judge on account of the common good.² For these are special signs, which fall under counsel alone.

4. Per accidens those special signs are sometimes owed: namely, when either by reason of circumstances they become common, as if someone must, as physician, visit the sick, or as innkeeper receive travelers at table and lodging, etc.; or when from elsewhere an obliging reason is added, for example, for avoiding scandal. Wherefore it is wicked to omit special signs of this kind: a) If the omission would be scandalous to others, or would confirm the hatred of the enemy. b) If by some sign of love you could, without grave inconvenience to yourself, reconcile the enemy to you and to God. c) If the enemy's grave necessity, bodily or spiritual, demands a special benefit, etc. d) If the enemy asks pardon, or offers suitable satisfaction; for then remission of the offense must be externally signified, for which, ordinarily, common signs do not suffice, but some special sign is required. e) If previously you had been accustomed to show peculiar signs to an enemy: then total omission of any special sign whatsoever seems to carry before itself an appearance of contempt or hatred, and therefore is not licit, unless you signify that it is not done from hatred, and thus remove scandal.

502. IT IS ASKED. What are the RULES to be observed in the reconciliation of enemies?

Resp. 1. If injuries intervened on one side only, the offender is bound, as far as can be done by him, to seek pardon and reconciliation by himself or by another, and to repair the harms following from the injury; for in whatever way charity was destroyed, in the same way it must also be restored.

Except, unless a legitimate reason excuses, for example if the offense was not grave, or the offended person is absent, or does not care for a petition of pardon, does not accept it, or on account of another reason is judged already to have been satisfied. Likewise, if between two offenders one offended the other more gravely or first, that one is first bound to show signs of reconciliation.

2. If the injuries on each side were morally equal and simultaneous, each enemy is bound, when the occasion is given, to begin reconciliation by greeting, conversation, invitation, benefit, etc. Moreover, generally speaking, among equals he ought first to greet and address who passes while the other is standing or sitting before him, or who unexpectedly arrives.

3. A suitable time is to be sought; for although the offended person is bound from the beginning to forgive the offense, nevertheless he is not bound (at least under grave sin) so to forget it or to bear it with an even mind that he is immediately ready for reconciliation. For this seems violent and above human frailty, as they commonly teach. - "Ordinarily," Gousset observes (Theol. mor., I, 365), "the matter does not succeed except through the mediation of friends and prudent men." But if it is a question of restitution of a temporal good, the real right must rightly be distinguished from the injury to the person; otherwise reconciliation will be able to succeed but little prosperously.

503. Note. 1. For judging hatred itself, the confessor should believe the deeds rather than the words of the penitent; and, as regards the gravity of hatred, let him attend to three things: whether grave contempt was present, great sadness was inflicted, notable harm followed.

2. Ordinarily those cast suspicion of hatred who, although they say that they forgive, nevertheless refuse to address an enemy or to respond to him; a fortiori, those who assert that they will never speak even a word to him: unless this can be forgiven to the disturbance and horror of a recent injury. Wherefore let the confessor proceed cautiously, lest he absolve penitents of this kind too hastily.

3. Penitents who accuse themselves of hatred are not immediately to be accused of sin, especially grave sin: for often they confuse hatred properly so called, or of enmity, with hatred of abomination, or of quality or defect, or even with some natural and invincible aversion of soul. Here the question will help: Why do you have hatred for your neighbor? and what have you done from it?

504. Seven sins kindred to hatred are numbered: envy, malediction, schism, discord, contention, brawl, and sedition.

1. ENVY is a capital vice, concerning which we treated n. 368 seqq.

2. MALEDICTION is the imprecation of evil, insofar as it is evil. It proceeds from anger or hatred. Three things are required for malediction to be mortal, namely: a) that the evil uttered is truly desired; b) that it is desired with perfect deliberation; c) that the evil desired is grave (V, 83). Cf. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 76, a. 3.

3. SCHISM is the voluntary separation of a baptized person from the unity of the Catholic Church. The Angelic says (2.2, q. 39, a. 1): "Those are called schismatics who refuse to be subject to the Supreme Pontiff, and who refuse to communicate with the members of the Church subject to him (in doctrine, worship, sacraments, etc.)": from which it is clear that schism is a most grave sin, whether it is pure, or joined with heresy. - See n. 1317.

4. DISCORD is a disagreement of wills concerning the good of God and neighbor, in which we are bound from charity to consent. It is mortal or venial, according to the measure of the matter (V, 66). It differs much from disagreement of intellect; which is not a sin, if it obtains concerning opinions whose use is licit: as was the disagreement between Paul and Barnabas (Acts 15:36-40).

5. CONTENTION is an inordinate fight of words, which obtains when truth is either attacked, or defended in an undue mode. "It is mortal when, with the spirit of contradicting, you altercate concerning truth pertaining to faith, or to the salvation of soul or body" (ibid., at the end).

6. BRAWL is a fight of hands and words, among private persons; namely, when from anger one unjustly attacks another. "Brawls, if they do not exceed measure, as also slight fights, are venial; otherwise if they progress to seditions, wounds, slaughters. And these are commonly sins on the part of the one beginning the brawl; for the other can defend himself with the moderation of blameless defense" (V, 83, end). Cf. n. 734.

7. SEDITION is an aggressive war by which one part of the republic unjustly rises up against another. If it is against the legitimate prince, it is called rebellion. Concerning these, recall the things said n. 148 and n. 150, q. 2.

S. Th. I-II, q. 29; II-II, q. 34.

944. Hatred is a motion of the appetite by which we are ill-affected toward something. For just as love is a consonance of the appetite with that which is fitting to it, so hatred is a dissonance toward that which is repugnant, or evil. Now hatred is twofold:

1. hatred of abomination or aversion, by which we turn away from something (a thing or a person) as evil or harmful to us; when there is question of a person it is called hatred of a quality;

2. hatred of enmity or malevolence, or hatred of the person himself according to himself, by which, from displeasure at some person, we will evil to him, because it is evil to him, that is, stopping in his evil, so that, namely, it may go ill with him.

Hatred of abomination is opposed to love of concupiscence; hatred of enmity is opposed to love of benevolence. But as love of concupiscence disposes to love of benevolence, so the former hatred disposes to this latter hatred: for from the fact that we turn away from someone as displeasing and troublesome to us, it often happens that we will evil to him, and regard his evil as our good.

945. Hatred of God. - According to his essence, God cannot be had in hatred, because by essence he is goodness itself; and therefore he who sees this essence does not have God in hatred. But insofar as from him there comes to us an effect which we regard as evil, he can be had in hatred by us (cf. Num. X, 35; Deut. XXXII, 41; Ps. LXXIII, 23; Jn. XV, 24), for example, insofar as he prohibits sins or punishes sinners.

This is a sin, and always mortal, unless it is done from indeliberation: for it is always a grave disorder to turn away from the highest Good, in whom there is nothing to be turned away from; or to will evil to him who is supremely lovable. Indeed it is the greatest of all sins: 1. because it is directly opposed to the dilection of God, which is the principal act of the more worthy virtue, charity, and therefore it is also directly opposed to the infinite goodness of God; 2. because precisely that by which something is mortal sin is the aversion of the will from God; but this is had in itself, essentially, and explicitly in hatred of God, while in other sins it is found only implicitly, participatively, and according to another; therefore hatred of God is the gravest sin of all. - But hatred of enmity toward God is graver than hatred of abomination: the former is opposed to the infinite intrinsic goodness of God, the latter to his external manifestation and glory.

He sins by hatred of enmity a) who wills God not to be, or not to be omnipotent, omniscient, just, etc.; - b) who is saddened concerning his perfections or rejoices concerning offense against him, concerning the violation of God's precepts; - c) who persecutes the works of God and intends to lessen his external glory, because it is displeasing to God. Thus the devil desires and procures evil to God because it is God's evil.

946. Hatred of neighbor. - Hatred of abomination of neighbor is good, if he is had in hatred according to that which is evil in him (Wis. XIV, 9; Ps. CXVIII, 113; CXXXVIII, 21), for example, insofar as he is a sinner, enemy, persecutor, harmful to us, etc., unless the hatred is greater than the cause deserves. On the contrary, it is a sin if he is had in hatred according to something which is good in him, for example, insofar as he is pious, just, prudent, etc.¹ - Hatred of enmity toward neighbor, by which we will evil to him as evil, so that it may go ill with him, is always a sin. Thus he sins who 1. desires the inconvenience of neighbor as such and taken absolutely; 2. rejoices concerning his evil as it is evil to him; or 3. is saddened concerning good as it is good to him.

¹ Some say that hatred of abomination, not of a quality but of a person, insofar as this person is held as unworthy of all dilection, is always a sin and most grave, because it is to exclude from beatitude. But this is already hatred of enmity, as being hatred of the person according to himself: already to will that he have no good.

The sin of hatred toward neighbor is mortal from its genus because it is against charity (I Jn. II, 9; III, 14-15; IV, 20). Nevertheless it can be venial, not only from indeliberation, as if it is done from a sudden motion of anger, but also from lightness of matter, for example, if we wish a slight evil to neighbor, or if the aversion is slight, as ordinarily simple displeasure is without imprecation of evil. Nevertheless this is dangerous, especially if it lasts long, because it will easily happen that the evils which here and there befall neighbor are pleasing.

Hatred of neighbor, if it is considered on the part of the disorder of the one sinning, is the gravest of sins against neighbor, because thus our will is most greatly disordered toward him.² Nevertheless it is not the greatest on the part of the effect, namely, of the harm inflicted on neighbor: thus theft, homicide, detraction, etc., are greater.

² Namely, other sins against neighbor participate in the character of hatred, Cajetan notes.

947. Hatred of neighbor is multiple in species. - Hatreds of a quality of neighbor differ in species according to specifically diverse motives, for example, to hate neighbor because he is pious or because he has brought about a just damage.

Hatreds of neighbor by which we wish (with inefficacious desire) that diverse evils befall him are probably of the same species, because these evils are sought for him only under the general character of evil; whence the evils are not to be specified in confession. On the contrary, hatreds by which we desire (with true efficacious desire) to inflict diverse evils on neighbor are certainly of diverse species, because the desire of committing a sin has the malice of the work with all the circumstances; whence the evils desired are to be declared in confession. Thus the will of taking away reputation and the will of killing differ.

948. Observations. - 1. Formal hatred of oneself is not given, as being repugnant to nature.

2. To will evil to someone insofar as it is a good for him or for others is not hatred; indeed, it is licit, if the order of charity is preserved (cf. n. 889). Nevertheless it would be a sin to will the evil of another against the order of charity, that is, on account of a good which does not equal it: thus a son cannot will the death of his father on account of the inheritance (cf. props. 13, 14, 15 condemned by Innocent XI).

3. Hatred of abomination concerning only the evil of neighbor is not simply hatred, but hatred in a certain respect and mixed with love: "This very thing, that in a brother we hate fault and defect of good, pertains to love of the brother: for it is of the same character that we will the good of someone and that we hate his evil. Whence, taking hatred of a brother simply (by not willing good), it is always with sin" (a. 3).

4. True hatred is cured with difficulty; nevertheless penitents often confess as hatreds things which are not such, or at least are not grave. Thus when they affirm that they cannot forget an injury, or cannot look at, speak to, or salute someone, or cannot do so without vehement emotion, it must be investigated whether these things are not mere natural aversion from a true or apparent offense, - or a pure affection of the sensitive appetite from diversity of disposition without sufficient deliberation, - or a desire of evil from an honorable end. But if they do not wish a grave evil to neighbor, nor refuse the ordinary signs of dilection, nor is another grave inconvenience feared from that affection (for example, contempt, scandal, and desire for revenge), they are to be absolved.

5. St. Alphonsus observes, Th. M., l. II, n. 30, ad 3: "A private person who, being averse from another, flees him, if he does this so that he may deprive him of his conversation and consolation, and thus sadden him, and it may go ill with him, it is hatred of enmity and a sin. - But if, wishing no evil, you only flee because he is contrary to your nature, or is accustomed to be troublesome to you, it is hatred of aversion and a sin, if it is without reason: such it will not be if he is a very harsh person, provided contempt, scandal, and desire for revenge are absent."

6. Hatred of neighbor formally, according to the character of the object, and therefore more directly, arises from envy, through which the very good of neighbor is rendered saddening and consequently hateful. But dispositively it arises from anger: for first, through anger, man apprehends the evil of neighbor according to a certain measure, as it has the character of revenge; but, anger persevering, man comes to considering and seeking the evil of neighbor absolutely and according to itself, which pertains to the character of hatred (a. 6, ad 3).

I. Hatred of God is twofold: one which is included in every sin; the other peculiar, which is described as an aversion from God, by which the will detests God insofar as he prohibits sins and inflicts punishments. This hatred of God is the gravest of all crimes, since it is opposed to the most excellent virtue of charity according to its primary act, namely the divine love. It is by its kind mortal, nor does it admit the excuse of parvity of matter; but it can turn out venial only from imperfect deliberation.

II. Hatred of the neighbor is an expressed malevolence, by which we wish him evil. It is by its kind deadly; yet it can become venial, both by parvity of matter and by imperfect deliberation — as if you wish a light evil to your neighbor, or if with imperfect deliberation you desire it for him.

III. It is licit to abominate the sinner, as sinner, according to Proverbs 29: The just abominate a wicked man. For then the sin is hated, not the man. For it is never licit to wish evil to a man, insofar as it is his evil, even with an inefficacious affection; nor is it licit to be saddened over his good, or to rejoice over his evil, as is plain from the proscribed thesis of Innocent XI recounted in the preceding chapter.

IV. Although it is never licit either to desire or to rejoice over the neighbor's evil, it is nevertheless licit, with an inefficacious affection, to wish some temporal evil to another, and to rejoice over it, insofar as this temporal evil conduces to his spiritual good — for instance, that he desist from sin, that he be called back to a better way — as St. Thomas teaches, on the third book, distinction 30, article 1, ad 4. For charity has an order, and each one ought to love himself more than another, and his kin more than strangers, and friends more than enemies, and the common good of many more than the good of one.

One can, without violating charity, wish some temporal evil to another, or rejoice if it should happen — not insofar as it is his evil, but insofar as it is an impediment of evils to another whom one is more bound to love, or to the Community, or to the Church. Similarly of his temporal evil, according as by the evil of punishment the evil of fault is frequently prevented. Hence it is licit to wish for victory in a just war, for the destruction of the Turks, for the common good of the Church or of the Principality; it is licit to wish that a punishment be inflicted by the judge on a malefactor, that he desist from inflicting harm on the Community or on a neighbor. Yet the utmost vigilance is needed in desires of this kind, however inefficacious, lest under the appearance of the common good the cupidity of private vengeance lie hidden. Similarly it is never licit to wish a lesser evil to oneself or to others in order to avoid a greater. Wherefore they gravely sin who deliberately desire death for themselves in order to avoid other troubles.

V. Question I. Is it a sin to speak ill of one's neighbor? Answer. He who with deliberate mind imprecates a grave evil upon his neighbor sins mortally. Weak women, and base men, frequently burst forth into these imprecations, and, to excuse themselves, allege the impulse of anger, as though anger were not a sin. That anger can at times forestall reason is true; but frequently, from a depraved habit and from grave negligence in restraining anger, women and men break forth into such curses. They often say, when their anger has cooled, that they are displeased at having hurled such curses; but this is not a sign that they did not sin: for when the anger has been poured out, the mind perceives the evil it has committed, and therefore is then displeased. Parish priests and Confessors, then, should instruct such persons, and show them the necessity of curbing the savage beast of anger: since their frequent curses flow from a depraved habit of becoming angry. But this wicked habituation does not excuse them, but accuses them. That Confessors may be able to discern whether they have offended gravely or lightly, let them weigh all the circumstances, the deliberation of mind, the scandal, the gravity of the evil wished, and the rest of that kind.

VI. Question II. What is discord? Answer. It is a dissension of wills from the divine good and the good of the neighbor, in which they ought to agree. It is opposed to concord, which unites hearts and wills. By its kind it is a mortal sin. For God, Proverbs 6, detests him who sows discord among brethren. It is required, however, that someone knowingly dissent from the good of God or of the Neighbor, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 37, art. 1. Wherefore there is no discord when one, in good faith, judges that this pertains to the honor of God and the utility of the Neighbor, and another judges otherwise. For this frequently happens even among the holier men themselves.

VII. Question III. What is contention? Answer. It is an altercation of words for impugning the truth; or it is an impugning of the truth with a confidence of clamor, as the Angelic Doctor says, II-II, q. 38, art. 1, where he opportunely adds: But if contention is called an impugning of falsity with a due measure of acrimony, then contention is praiseworthy. Acrimony must never be poured out upon persons, but only, with due sparingness, upon errors. This acrimony is like a seasoning, which must be used with great prudence and moderation, especially in vocal disputations. For when men dispute with mutual words, if they clamor with an immoderate outcry of voices, if they rub each other with mutual wit, the disputation easily ends in criminal contention, because the persons are present. But when errors are refuted in writing, often the authors of the errors are either dead or absent; therefore there is no danger of culpable contention. Hence it is that the mildest Fathers — Augustine, Bernard, and others — often used a style sprinkled with wit. For the reader is wearied by a cold reading; but, on the contrary, writing seasoned with a moderate pepper of acrimony sharpens his palate.

VIII. Question IV. What is Schism? Answer. It is a deliberate separation from the unity of the Church. Now he is separated from the Church who refuses either to communicate with her members, or to render due obedience to the Roman Pontiff, her visible head. Not every disobedient man is a schismatic, because pertinacity can be lacking. But every schismatic is disobedient; just as every heretic is a schismatic, but not conversely. Yet in practice these two crimes, schism and heresy, are scarcely separated, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 39, art. 1, ad 3.

IX. Question V. What is sedition? Answer. It is an aggressive war of one part of the Commonwealth against another part, or against its own Prince. It is by its kind a mortal sin, because it is gravely adverse to peace, to unity, and to the common good. Of war and duel I shall treat in explaining the fifth precept.

HATRED, if it be counted among the passions, obtains their indifference, so that it is now called evil, now good, according to the disposition of the object; whence it is sometimes of virtue, sometimes of vice; Here, however, it is taken for a depraved affection of the soul, diametrically opposed to Charity, as it will be permitted to see below.

Hatred regards the whole, whatever has been apprehended as evil and troublesome. Hence it is plain that it can be held in hatred, not only one's neighbor; but even God, if he be apprehended as troublesome; for thus the damned hate him, and they hated him in this life. So Christ says at Ioan. 15. They have hated me, and my Father. But that the word may be fulfilled which is written in their law: Because they have hated me without cause. Psalm. 34. and 138. Where the S. Doct. observes shrewdly on 15. Ioan. from D. August. tract. 81. and the Gloss; that God is said to be hated without cause, because we have no cause for hating God, nor do we reap any advantage from it. It is divided into hatred of affection, and of effect. See D. Bonavent. in 3. dist. 30. quaest. 4. and ad Psalm. 30. where he truly divides hatred. It is defined by D. Bonaventure in the opusc. declaratorio terminorum Theologiae: Hatred is the will, affecting evil for the neighbor, that he may lack the good which saddens the one hating him. Where he defines only hatred toward the neighbor. Nyssenus indeed, homil. 8. in Eccles., defines it thus: It is an alienation, and aversion of appetite, or of the will, from that which is unpleasing, or affects with molestation, or, as D. Thom. says, prima 2. quaest. 29. art. 1. from that which is esteemed as noxious and evil.

From these definitions you have a twofold hatred, of Abomination, and of Enmity. That is, by which we abominate someone as unworthy of our friendship; this, however, is that by which we wish evil to the neighbor precisely that ill may befall him, as Tannerus notes, disput. 2. quaest. 6. dub. cit.