Morals of the Church
Library › Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology › Volume II. On the Precepts of God and of the Church › Part First. On the Precepts of the Theological Virtues › Book Third. On the Precepts of Charity › Question Third. On Charity of Neighbor › Article Sixth. On Sins Against Charity of Neighbor

paragraph — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology

§ 1. On Hatred

100.

100. How great a sin it is. 1. Hatred of abomination, which is referred to a quality of the neighbor: a. is licit if the quality is absolutely evil; b. is licit if the action is relatively evil, insofar as it harms me or others, unless the abomination is greater than the evil action deserves; c. is a sin, and indeed of itself mortal, if the quality is simply good (piety, zeal).

  1. Hatred of abomination, which is referred to the very person of the neighbor, is from its genus a mortal sin, as contrary to the precept of charity by which we are bound to love the neighbor; nevertheless from lightness of matter it can be venial.

Simple displeasure with or aversion from a person, if evil is not wished to him, is for the most part a venial sin; yet it grows into grave sin if someone utterly turns away from the person of the neighbor as wholly unworthy of love, who deserves no love.

  1. Hatred of enmity, which properly is the sin of hatred, is from its genus mortal, both because it is opposed to the precept of charity, which obliges under grave obligation, and because hatred toward the neighbor is expressly condemned as a grave sin: everyone who hates his brother is a murderer.1

One who from slight displeasure with a person wishes a small evil to the neighbor commits a light sin because of the smallness of the matter. One who deliberately wishes another a grave evil from displeasure with the person or because it is evil for him sins gravely against charity by hatred of enmity. Likewise one who deliberately rejoices concerning the great evil of another because it is his evil sins gravely against charity by hatred of enmity. Likewise one who deliberately grieves concerning the good of the neighbor because it is his good sins gravely by hatred of enmity. But to wish evil to another and to rejoice concerning it, not insofar as it is evil for him, but insofar as it is good for oneself or for others, the order of charity being preserved, is licit.2

Note. Those who accuse themselves of hatred are not immediately to be accused of sin, especially of mortal sin. For often what they call hatred is nothing other than a certain natural antipathy or aversion of soul arising from diversity of character, which aversion, as involuntary, is not a sin; or it is abomination of an evil quality or action, which rightly and deservedly displeases; or finally it is a desire of evil from an honorable end, which likewise is not a sin. But these are dangerous, because they can easily pass into abomination and ill will against the person. For if motions of aversion and natural antipathy are not restrained, they are easily approved by the will and thus degenerate into acts of hatred.

1 1 John 3:15.

2 Cf. De principiis, n. 329.

Hate

101.

101. On malediction. Malediction is a vocal imprecation of evil; therefore malediction is an external sin which proceeds from hatred or anger.

  1. Malediction is a sin grave from its genus, because it is opposed to the precept of charity, which obliges under grave obligation; therefore he who seriously and deliberately imprecates upon the neighbor a grave evil from hatred of enmity commits a grave sin.

  2. Nevertheless in the concrete maledictions are often excused from mortal sin by defect of the threefold condition which is required for malediction to be mortal: a. because of inadvertence to the gravity of the thing, as often happens in vehement anger; b. because of defect of consent, because they are not uttered seriously and with the will that they happen, but only either to signify indignation or to strike terror into others (children, subjects); c. because of the lightness of the evil which someone imprecates upon another.

  3. Malediction which is made to one present often also has the character of contumely, because it injures not only charity but also the honor owed to another. Hence it can happen that grave maledictions which are only venial because they are not said seriously become grave by reason of contumely, as if a subject should curse a superior or a son his father to his face.

Hate