§ 1. On Hatred of Neighbor

498. NOTIONS. Hatred is an act of the will by which someone is borne toward something with malevolence. It is twofold: 1. hatred of enmity (or of the person), by which we are averse to someone, and will evil to him insofar as it is evil to him; 2. hatred of abomination (or of the quality), by which we are averse to neighbor not according to himself, but according to some quality of his disagreeing with us. Cf. n. 475, note 2.

Hatred ordinarily arises from an offense, and manifests itself externally by denial of signs of love.

But some SIGNS of love are common, others special. Those are called common which are usually shown to others of the same state; for example, by a Christian to a Christian, by a fellow citizen to a fellow citizen, by a kinsman to a kinsman. Special signs are those which are shown on account of a special title, for example of friendship, which is not the same toward all of the same condition (II, 28). See what is to be said below, n. 501.

499. PRINCIPLES. I. There is a precept of loving enemies, by which hatred of enmity is prohibited as a sin grave of its kind. It is established from the words of the Lord (Matt. 5:44): Love your enemies..., and in the same place (6:15): But if you will not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive you your sins. Whence (1 John 3:15): Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer.

We said, 1. Enemies, by which name are signified those who persecute us with hatred, or have affected us with offense or injury.

2. Hatred of enmity, for hatred of abomination, or of aversion, is of itself indifferent, and takes its moral species from the nature of the quality which we abhor. Thus, for example, if in neighbor you pursue with hatred his bad qualities, pride, etc., the hatred is good and can pertain to charity, according to that saying (Ps. 138:22): I hated them with perfect hatred (sinners). But one must watch lest hatred of the quality pass into hatred of the person. If you hate in him qualities simply good and honorable, justice, piety, etc., the hatred is so evil that by its nature it is a mortal sin, as we said concerning envy (n. 368).

3. As a sin grave of its kind; for hatred admits smallness of matter: in an internal act, for example if you wish a light evil to an enemy, or rejoice concerning it after it has happened; in an external act, if it betrays a hatred lightly offensive, or induces light scandal; as often happens among those who live together (Kon., n. 282).

500. II. The precept of loving enemies does not impose a special obligation, that is, one diverse from that by which we are held toward all men. It requires only this, "that one loving God and neighbor not exclude his enemies from that generality of love of neighbor." Thus all with St. Thomas (2.2, q. 25, a. 8; cf. St. Alph., II, 28, 1). Therefore special love is not of the necessity of charity, except according to the preparation of soul, by which, namely, a man is prepared for this, that in particular he would love his enemies and, when necessity requires it, would furnish special benefits to them.

Hence: 1. Those sin who wish evil to neighbor insofar as it is evil to him, whether this is done from vengeance or from aversion toward his person. But sometimes it is licit to wish a temporal evil to neighbor, insofar as it is good for him, as we said n. 349.

2. Those sin, of themselves gravely, who refuse pardon to an enemy; or do not accept suitable satisfaction, or demand greater than is fair; who bring the guilty person into judgment from hatred and vengeance, or rejoice concerning an enemy's evil. But you are not bound to forgive the satisfaction which is owed to you for injury and harm: for this you can demand, not indeed as an evil of the enemy, but as a good owed to you, all hatred being removed and charity preserved. Nor ought a feeling of indignation or the memory of injury be confused with hatred (II, 29).

3. "A private person, who, being averse to another, flees from him, if he does this in order to deprive him of his conversation and solace, and thus to sadden him and make it be ill with him, is hatred of enmity and a sin. But if, wishing no evil, you only flee because he is unlike your nature, or is accustomed to be troublesome to you, it is hatred of aversion, and a sin if it is without reason: such it will not be if the person is very harsh, provided contempt, scandal, and the desire of vengeance are absent" (II, 30, 3).

501. III. Common signs of love and benefits are owed, of themselves, to enemies; but not special ones. The reason for the first is that to deny to an enemy those things which are owed to all would be a manifest sign of hatred and vengeance. Such denial will be a grave or light sin, according as, from the circumstances, contempt is present or is reputed grave or light. The reason for the second is that special signs, which are indications of restored former friendship or of perfect reconciliation, proceed not from debt, but from liberality (Ami du Cl., 1913, p. 203).

From these things you will deduce: 1. We are bound, speaking of itself, to return the greeting of an enemy greeting us,¹ to respond to one asking or writing, to sell exposed merchandise to one wishing to buy, not to exclude him from common prayers and alms, to furnish common services to him, to avert his harm if we easily can, etc. - For all these things are numbered among common signs.

2. Per accidens we are not bound to these things when charity or justice demands something else, or a reasonable cause excuses. And indeed a) Charity, as if, from signs or benefits denied, the enemy is hoped to be amended; if he is believed to become worse from the same signs being granted, or to interpret them badly; if, from speaking with him, it is feared that quarrels, contempt, etc., may be repeated. b) Justice, as if parents or Superiors, for the just punishment and correction of a son or subject (for example, on account of an infamous delict, an unworthy marriage), deny him sight, speech, entrance into the house, even after petition of pardon; yet provided that such a punishment does not exceed the gravity of the delict, and lasts only for a time, namely as long as it will seem expedient for amendment. c) A reasonable cause, for instance, if they are omitted for a short time, not from hatred, but as a signification of just pain or sadness on account of a recently received injury; if the enemy does not respond to signs of charity. Yet one must always beware both the danger of hatred and the scandal of others (II, 28, 2).

3. We are not bound of ourselves to receive an enemy with hospitality or at a banquet, to console him when sad, to visit him when sick, to admit him to familiar conversation, to greet him when met on the way, not to exact from him reparation of the harm inflicted, to leave him immune from the public vindication of the delict by not citing him before a judge on account of the common good.² For these are special signs, which fall under counsel alone.

4. Per accidens those special signs are sometimes owed: namely, when either by reason of circumstances they become common, as if someone must, as physician, visit the sick, or as innkeeper receive travelers at table and lodging, etc.; or when from elsewhere an obliging reason is added, for example, for avoiding scandal. Wherefore it is wicked to omit special signs of this kind: a) If the omission would be scandalous to others, or would confirm the hatred of the enemy. b) If by some sign of love you could, without grave inconvenience to yourself, reconcile the enemy to you and to God. c) If the enemy's grave necessity, bodily or spiritual, demands a special benefit, etc. d) If the enemy asks pardon, or offers suitable satisfaction; for then remission of the offense must be externally signified, for which, ordinarily, common signs do not suffice, but some special sign is required. e) If previously you had been accustomed to show peculiar signs to an enemy: then total omission of any special sign whatsoever seems to carry before itself an appearance of contempt or hatred, and therefore is not licit, unless you signify that it is not done from hatred, and thus remove scandal.

502. IT IS ASKED. What are the RULES to be observed in the reconciliation of enemies?

Resp. 1. If injuries intervened on one side only, the offender is bound, as far as can be done by him, to seek pardon and reconciliation by himself or by another, and to repair the harms following from the injury; for in whatever way charity was destroyed, in the same way it must also be restored.

Except, unless a legitimate reason excuses, for example if the offense was not grave, or the offended person is absent, or does not care for a petition of pardon, does not accept it, or on account of another reason is judged already to have been satisfied. Likewise, if between two offenders one offended the other more gravely or first, that one is first bound to show signs of reconciliation.

2. If the injuries on each side were morally equal and simultaneous, each enemy is bound, when the occasion is given, to begin reconciliation by greeting, conversation, invitation, benefit, etc. Moreover, generally speaking, among equals he ought first to greet and address who passes while the other is standing or sitting before him, or who unexpectedly arrives.

3. A suitable time is to be sought; for although the offended person is bound from the beginning to forgive the offense, nevertheless he is not bound (at least under grave sin) so to forget it or to bear it with an even mind that he is immediately ready for reconciliation. For this seems violent and above human frailty, as they commonly teach. - "Ordinarily," Gousset observes (Theol. mor., I, 365), "the matter does not succeed except through the mediation of friends and prudent men." But if it is a question of restitution of a temporal good, the real right must rightly be distinguished from the injury to the person; otherwise reconciliation will be able to succeed but little prosperously.

503. Note. 1. For judging hatred itself, the confessor should believe the deeds rather than the words of the penitent; and, as regards the gravity of hatred, let him attend to three things: whether grave contempt was present, great sadness was inflicted, notable harm followed.

2. Ordinarily those cast suspicion of hatred who, although they say that they forgive, nevertheless refuse to address an enemy or to respond to him; a fortiori, those who assert that they will never speak even a word to him: unless this can be forgiven to the disturbance and horror of a recent injury. Wherefore let the confessor proceed cautiously, lest he absolve penitents of this kind too hastily.

3. Penitents who accuse themselves of hatred are not immediately to be accused of sin, especially grave sin: for often they confuse hatred properly so called, or of enmity, with hatred of abomination, or of quality or defect, or even with some natural and invincible aversion of soul. Here the question will help: Why do you have hatred for your neighbor? and what have you done from it?

504. Seven sins kindred to hatred are numbered: envy, malediction, schism, discord, contention, brawl, and sedition.

1. ENVY is a capital vice, concerning which we treated n. 368 seqq.

2. MALEDICTION is the imprecation of evil, insofar as it is evil. It proceeds from anger or hatred. Three things are required for malediction to be mortal, namely: a) that the evil uttered is truly desired; b) that it is desired with perfect deliberation; c) that the evil desired is grave (V, 83). Cf. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 76, a. 3.

3. SCHISM is the voluntary separation of a baptized person from the unity of the Catholic Church. The Angelic says (2.2, q. 39, a. 1): "Those are called schismatics who refuse to be subject to the Supreme Pontiff, and who refuse to communicate with the members of the Church subject to him (in doctrine, worship, sacraments, etc.)": from which it is clear that schism is a most grave sin, whether it is pure, or joined with heresy. - See n. 1317.

4. DISCORD is a disagreement of wills concerning the good of God and neighbor, in which we are bound from charity to consent. It is mortal or venial, according to the measure of the matter (V, 66). It differs much from disagreement of intellect; which is not a sin, if it obtains concerning opinions whose use is licit: as was the disagreement between Paul and Barnabas (Acts 15:36-40).

5. CONTENTION is an inordinate fight of words, which obtains when truth is either attacked, or defended in an undue mode. "It is mortal when, with the spirit of contradicting, you altercate concerning truth pertaining to faith, or to the salvation of soul or body" (ibid., at the end).

6. BRAWL is a fight of hands and words, among private persons; namely, when from anger one unjustly attacks another. "Brawls, if they do not exceed measure, as also slight fights, are venial; otherwise if they progress to seditions, wounds, slaughters. And these are commonly sins on the part of the one beginning the brawl; for the other can defend himself with the moderation of blameless defense" (V, 83, end). Cf. n. 734.

7. SEDITION is an aggressive war by which one part of the republic unjustly rises up against another. If it is against the legitimate prince, it is called rebellion. Concerning these, recall the things said n. 148 and n. 150, q. 2.