Hatred of God

II. Sins against charity toward God - besides omission of the act prescribed by reason of the precept of charity - are: hatred of God and sloth.

1. Hatred of God. Hatred taken generally is an act by which someone is badly affected toward someone.

Hatred is distinguished as twofold: hatred of abomination and hatred of enmity or malevolence, according as someone turns away from someone as an evil to himself, or wills evil to someone. Hatred of abomination is opposed to love of concupiscence; hatred of enmity to love of benevolence. Sadness over another's good belongs to hatred of enmity; likewise joy over his evil.

Hatred of abomination, to which every evil deliberate movement against someone is referred, is again twofold, namely of the person himself and of a quality, according as someone turns away from the person himself according to himself, or from an adhering quality of the person. These things noted, I say:

a) Hatred of abomination toward God is grave from its whole genus; for it is clear that he sins gravely who in whatever way whatsoever turns away from God.

b) Hatred of enmity toward God is grave from its whole genus, indeed even the gravest of all sins, because he who wishes evil to God most greatly injures the charity due to God.

2. Sloth; concerning this, see n. 327.

I. What hatred is and into how many kinds it is distinguished, see n. 520. But the morality of hatred toward one's neighbor is outlined in these points:

1. Hatred of abomination of the person is a grave sin, since it excludes one's neighbor from common charity. Hatred of abomination of a quality is good, evil, or (at least from the object) indifferent, according as the quality which someone turns away from is good or evil or indifferent (St. Alphonsus, II, 30; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 34, a. 3).

2. Hatred of enmity is a sin grave from its genus, that is, grave or light according as it regards a grave or light evil, or deprivation of a grave or light good (St. Alphonsus, II, 30).

From hatred of enmity must be distinguished the act by which someone in an ordered way wishes evil to his neighbor; namely insofar as it yields to the good of the one wishing, or of the neighbor, or of a third party, or of the community. Hence it is lawful, for example, to desire temporal evil for one's neighbor, so that he may be amended from sins; likewise the penalty of a delict, insofar as it restores the violated order and turns the delinquent and others away from transgressions; likewise "to wish death for a heresiarch or a disturber of public peace, on account of the common good, and of many; according to that saying in Galatians 5:12: Would that... they be cut off. Likewise, to be saddened over the fact that dignities are conferred on the unworthy; or over the health of him who from it takes an occasion of sinning" (St. Alphonsus, II, 30; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 108, a. 1). Yet it is required that the evil of one's neighbor deservedly be postponed to the good that will follow. Hence there were condemned by Innocent XI, proposition 13: "If you do it with due moderation, you can, without mortal sin, be saddened over the life of someone, and rejoice over his natural death, and seek and desire it by an inefficacious affection: not indeed from displeasure with the person, but on account of some temporal advantage";¹ likewise proposition 14: "It is lawful by an absolute desire to wish the death of one's father; not indeed as the evil of the father, but as the good of the one wishing, because, namely, a rich inheritance will come to him";² likewise proposition 15: "It is lawful for a son to rejoice over the parricide of a parent, perpetrated by himself in drunkenness, on account of the immense riches obtained from the inheritance."³

Note 1. It is probable that "in confession it is enough if you say that you wished grave evil for your neighbor; nor is there need to explain the species of evil, for example death, infamy, etc., because all are comprehended under one aspect of evil" (St. Alphonsus, II, 30). The opposite must be said of a purpose of inflicting diverse evils (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., n. 297).

Note 2. Penitents rather often confuse illicit hatred with hatred of abomination of a quality, or even hatred with a certain natural and involuntary antipathy.

¹ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1163.

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1164.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1165.

Hatred of God.-A thing cannot be hated unless it is looked upon as evil, and hence God cannot be hated except by those who regard Him as evil to themselves.

(a) Thus, those who see the Divine Essence (i.e., the blessed), cannot hate God, for His Essence is goodness itself, and, therefore, the blessed can see in God only reasons for love. (b) Those who see God obscurely through the things made by Him (i.e., wayfarers on earth), cannot hate God considered as the author of effects that are in no way displeasing to the will, such as existence, life, intelligence; but they can hate God as the author of effects displeasing to their will, such as law and punishment. Thus, no one can hate God because God has given him being, for existence of itself is something good and desirable; but a depraved will can hate God for having forbidden sin, or for inflicting chastisements, or for permitting some evils to accompany the blessings of life. That hatred of God is not a mere possibility, the scriptures in many places attest: “The pride of them that hate Thee ascendeth forever” (Ps, lxiii. 23), “Now they have seen and hated both Me and My Father” (John, xv. 24).

It should not be inferred from what has just been said that it is not God in Himself that is hated, but only His works; nor that it is a sin against God to dislike evils or even divine punishments.

(a) Thus, God Himself is not the principle or motive cause of the hatred directed against Him, for in God there is no evil that can produce dislike; but God is the term or object of the hatred aroused in the sinner by the divine effects that displease him, as the texts given above from scripture indicate. For example, a man hates his neighbor on account of certain defects he perceives or thinks he perceives; the defects are the principle, but the neighbor is the term of the hatred.

(b) Dislike of the evils that are in the world, or of chastisements sent by God, is not dislike of God Himself, since God does not ask us to love evil, but only to endure such evils as cannot be cured. Even murmurs against Providence are usually manifestations of impatience, not of hatred of Providence. It is only the sinner that dislikes God Himself for permitting or inflicting evils, who is guilty of hatred of God.

Hatred of God of various kinds. (a) As regards the intention, it is either interpretative or formal. Interpretative hatred is aversion that is not intended directly or for its own sake, but only indirectly and by reason of something else whose love is preferred. Formal hatred is an aversion that is intended directly and expressly in itself. Every mortal sin is an act of interpretative hatred of God, since mortal sin consists in placing one’s own pleasure or interest above the friendship of God; but it is only the special sin which attacks God directly that constitutes formal hate. Thus, he who murders his enemy does not directly intend dislike of God, but revenge; whereas the condemned murderer who blasphemes God, because he is to be executed, directly dislikes God. (b) As regards the degree of malice it contains, formal hatred of God is either dislike or enmity. Dislike of God is the sin of those who do not like some attribute of God; enmity towards God is the sin of those who wish some evil to God. Thus, one who deliberately wishes that God would sanction injustice dislikes the divine attribute of justice, while an unjust man who wishes he might be rid of God and His judgment is guilty of enmity to God.

Hatred of God as a Special Sin.—(a) Interpretative hatred of God is not a special sin but a general circumstance of every mortal sin; but formal hatred is a special sin, and indeed one that is comparatively rare, and that must be specially mentioned in confession. This is a sin which is distinct, not only from the sins against the other theological virtues (e.g., unbelief, despair), but also from the sins against the other objects of charity (e.g., hatred of the neighbor).

(b) Formal hatred of God is not a special sin against the Holy Ghost (see 899); but its malice pervades every such sin, and it is thus a general sin against the Holy Ghost. For example, presumption is a dislike of God’s law which requires that one must attain salvation through the observance of the commandments; rejection of the known truth is a dislike of God’s revelation.

The Gravity of Hatred of God.-(a) It is a mortal sin from its nature, and can never be venial on account of the smallness of the injury, but only on account of lack of deliberation or consent. Dislike of even one attribute of God is a grave injury, for everything pertaining to God is perfect and infinitely lovable. (b) Hatred of God is the worst of all mortal sins; for it is directly opposed to God (the supreme good) and to charity (the most excellent virtue in a creature), whereas other mortal sins offend against these goods only indirectly.

The comparison just made between hatred of God and other sins supposes that the other sins do not include hatred of God, for it is clear that simple hatred of God existing in the will is less serious than a composite sin, such as external blasphemy uttered to manifest internal hatred of God. (a) Thus, hatred of God without unbelief is worse than unbelief without hatred of God; (b) hatred of God without hatred of the neighbor is worse than hatred of the neighbor without hatred of God.

Degrees of Malice in Hatred of God.—(a) A new species of sin is added to hatred of God, when out of hatred one proceeds to sin against creatures, or to commit other offenses against God Himself. Example: Titus hates God, and therefore persecutes those who believe in God, and also blasphemes God. (b) A new degree of malice is added to hatred of God when one proceeds from dislike to enmity, or when the circumstances of person, place, manner, etc., aggravate the malice. Example: Hatred of God outwardly manifested adds the evil of scandal; not so hatred of God that is concealed.

What are the acts of the will which consist in the pursuit of good and in flight from evil? - These acts of the will can be distinguished according as the passions of the sensitive appetite, to which they correspond, are distinguished. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 22. Now the passions are: love, to which hatred is opposed; desire or concupiscence, to which flight or abomination is opposed; delight, to which sadness is opposed; hope, to which despair is opposed; daring, to which fear is opposed; finally anger, which has no opposite.

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. The first three are passions of the concupiscible; the four latter are passions of the irascible. Love is the simple complacency of good, which proceeds from the connaturality and coaptation of the one appetizing with regard to the thing suitable to him. Dilection adds to love a preceding election; charity adds to love a certain perfection, insofar as that which is loved is esteemed of great price. One love is of friendship, another of concupiscence. For to love is to will good to someone. Toward that good which someone wills to someone there is love of concupiscence. Toward that to which someone wills good there is love of friendship. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 26.

Hatred is the simple displeasure and detestation of evil, which arises from a certain dissonance of the appetite toward that which is apprehended as repugnant and harmful. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 29. One hatred is of abomination, another of enmity. The former is the detestation of some evil of a person; the latter is also the detestation of the person himself, to whom one wills evil. Concupiscence or desire is the movement of the appetite into an absent good. Flight or abomination is the detestation of an absent evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 30.

Delight is a certain repose of the appetite from the presence of a delighting good. Sadness is a certain pain from the presence of evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 31, 35. Hope is the movement of the appetite into a future good, arduous, possible to obtain, and according to this possibility or impossibility hope differs from despair. Hence it is that hope imports a certain approach to an arduous good; despair, on the contrary, imports withdrawal from it. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 40. a. 1, 4. "Fear flees future harm because of its victory over the one fearing; but daring attacks imminent danger because of its victory over the danger itself." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1. For fear "does not regard evil absolutely, but with a certain difficulty or arduousness, so that it can scarcely be resisted." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 41. a. 2 ad 3. "According to the opposition of good and evil, fear is contrary to hope; according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, daring is contrary to fear, but despair to hope." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1 ad 3.

Anger is the appetite of vengeance, as possible to itself. It seeks evil itself under the notion of vindictive justice. Hence it regards one object according to the notion of good, namely the vengeance which it seeks, and another according to the notion of evil, namely the harmful man, against whom it wills to be avenged through the infliction of punishment. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 46. a. 2, 6. It has no contrary either according to approach and withdrawal, or according to the opposition of good and evil. For it is a movement toward attacking the injurious evil already lying upon one. Hence neither can there be a movement toward fleeing evil; nor can there be a movement toward good: for when this has been obtained, there is repose and joy of the appetite. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. a. 3.

What is envy? Envy is sadness concerning the good of another, insofar as it is diminutive of one's own glory. - Moreover, in five ways can someone be saddened concerning the good of another: 1. When someone is saddened concerning the good of another absolutely, because it is the good of the neighbor; and properly this is hatred of enmity, or simply hatred or aversion of the person to whom we will evil, insofar as it is his evil; and this indeed from its genus is mortal. 2. When someone is saddened concerning the good of neighbor relatively, because he fears some evil from him; and properly this is fear, which will be licit unless it is inordinate, e.g., if he fears evil is to be inflicted on himself or on others unjustly. 3. When someone is saddened concerning the good of another because he thinks the same person unworthy of such good; and this is indignation or abomination, which is not a sin; nevertheless it will be a sin, and indeed mortal, if it either accuses God's providence, and is blasphemy, or if it so affects that it leads men to imitate evil. 4. When someone is saddened concerning the good of neighbor, not because the neighbor has it, but because he himself lacks the same, and this is not envy, but emulation or zeal, which, if it concerns honorable good, is praiseworthy; but if it concerns temporal goods, sometimes it is venial, as if the good is disproportionate to the one grieving, such as it would be if a peasant grieved that he is not a king. 5. If someone grieves that another equal to himself, or not greatly unequal, grows in glory and excellence, so that thereby he becomes superior to him, and he apprehends the very increase of glory and excellence as an impediment to his own good and as an evil to himself, insofar as it is diminutive of his own glory and excellence; and this is envy properly so called. For he is called envious because he is not seeing, since he cannot see the goods of another without sadness. Equal or not greatly unequal, because the good of those who greatly excel us is not usually apprehended as diminishing our excellence and glory. The goods of another, especially those in which there is glory, and in which men love to be honored and to be in good opinion.

Envy is mortal from its genus, Gal. 5:21. For it is directly against charity, which rejoices concerning the good of neighbor, which envy desires destroyed or grieves is not destroyed. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 36; L. 72. "Pride alone and envy are purely spiritual sins, which can belong to demons." S. Th. 1 p., q. 63, a. 2 ad 2.

What are the daughters of envy? - They are hatred of neighbor, whispering, detraction, exultation in the adversities of neighbor, and affliction in his prosperities. These are mortal from their genus, since directly against charity. Whispering is speech by which, without cause, something is reported to one person concerning another, which indeed of itself is apt to break the friendship of both; and the detractor is therefore bound to restore and reconcile that friendship. It is mortal from its genus both against charity and against justice. Detraction also is both against charity and against justice. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 36, a. 4 ad 3; q. 34, a. 6; q. 74; L. 72.

What are the sins opposed to hope? - By reason of love, the first act of hope, there is opposed to it the hatred of abomination of God, by which someone abominates God as hostile to himself because of vengeance for sins, or by which someone is turned away from God, eternal blessedness, and wishes to place his happiness in some other thing than in God. Hence it is also a mortal sin opposed to hope, to love earthly things more with a love of concupiscence than heavenly things; e.g., if someone is so disposed that he desires to remain perpetually in this life, and to leave heaven to God, if God leaves earth to him.

By reason of hope, the other act of the virtue of hope, there is opposed to it flight from God because of the labor and difficulty of attaining him, and despair and presumption. The former is voluntary diffidence of obtaining blessedness and the means necessary for attaining it. But the latter is an inordinate confidence of obtaining blessedness without the means ordained by God. Presumption is chiefly committed if you presume to obtain eternal life by the proper powers of nature without the help of grace; if you expect it without penance, without labor, from the mercy of God alone; if you expect it above your proper disposition, according to the order of divine providence, e.g., if you should wish to surpass the Blessed Virgin Mary in holiness and glory. Struggl, q. 3, nn. 11, 14-16; Suarez, d. 1, ss. 2, 3; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 20; q. 21; L. 20, 21.

Is there smallness of matter in sins against hope? - R. Negatively as to hatred of God and love of creatures, if the act is perfect, as is clear of itself. R. Negatively as to despair, if it is perfect and properly such; for it is most greatly injurious to the divine Mercy. Eph. 4:19. Otherwise, however, if it is imperfect and improperly such, as often happens in sadness and impatience. But here it must be noted that even devout souls are sometimes troubled by almost continuous temptations of despair. It is certainly not easily to be believed that they have sinned gravely, although they think they have given consent to them; just as excessive fear about the danger of salvation must not be confused with despair properly so called. - R. Affirmatively as to presumption, although it is grave from its genus. Bonacina, cited by La-Croix 128, teaches that he sins only venially who from presumption concerning the goodness of God would sin venially, or would defer doing penance concerning a mortal sin until the following day. - Suarez, d. 2, s. 3; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 20, aa. 1, 3; L. 20.

Resolves: It is a mortal and most grave sin, and admits no smallness of matter, since it is opposed to the infinite goodness of God, if someone formally hates God with the hatred of malevolence and enmity, e.g., if someone wishes God not to exist, and himself to be held in hatred by God. - Likewise he sins mortally if someone loves God with a love appreciatively less than creatures. Therefore "any act of mortal sin is contrary to charity." S. Th., 2. 2. q. 24, a. 12. Likewise he sins against the charity of God if someone does not love God on account of himself as the last end of all things, but only on account of something else, e.g., eternal life, or to avoid hell. This is mortal, because namely God would not be loved appreciatively above all things if something other than him were loved by actual intention as the principal end. Principal, because God can be loved on account of the recompense of eternal life, but less principally. By actual intention, because otherwise, by loving eternal life and other gifts of God, by the very fact that such an act is in itself right, eternal life or other gifts of God are always at least implicitly and in actu exercito ordered to God as to the supreme end. L. 23, 24; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 34, aa. 1, 2; Struggl, q. 5, n. 2; Sanch., l. 2, c. 35, n. 3.

What does charity toward neighbor import; is there given a precept of charity toward neighbor? - R. To the first. Charity toward neighbor commands love of oneself and of neighbor, but in an ordered way; for not every neighbor is neighbor to us in the same mode. Love of oneself embraces the due care to be had of soul and body. Sins committed against it are implicitly contained and accused in other sins committed and accused in confession. But since even an enemy is neighbor, it also commands love of enemies. Love, namely so that we will good to him. The chief good of man is God. Therefore by charity we will that man possess God, by association in full participation of blessedness. And this is to love neighbor as oneself. Besides interior love, since charity by its nature is not sterile, but active, it also commands exterior works. Therefore besides interior benevolence, charity also commands beneficence, which is the execution of benevolence. The matter concerns the precept of theological charity, which is evidently established from the very words of Christ. "But the second commandment is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Matt. 22:39; 1 John 4:21.

Among exterior works alms and fraternal correction hold a special place; these are works of mercy, the former corporal, the latter spiritual. For mercy is the virtue which inclines us to compassionating another's misery, and from compassion to assisting. The same charity, on the contrary, prohibits hatred of malevolence and enmity toward neighbor, which from its genus is mortal. For by it we will evil to the neighbor insofar as it is evil for him, which is always inordinate and repugnant to charity. Yet smallness of matter is given, since the evil which we will to neighbor can be great or small. Besides this internal act, it consequently prohibits that by our exterior actions we inflict spiritual harm upon his salvation through scandal, or do other harm to him either as to other goods of soul, or as to goods of body. Concerning this last there will be discussion in the precepts of the Decalogue; here we will speak only of the remaining things.

Benevolence, therefore, and beneficence are acts of charity; to the former belongs willing good, to the latter doing good, according to the common account of good. If the good which someone does to another is taken under a special account of good, beneficence will receive a special account and will pertain to some special virtue. If the good, for example, is owed, it will pertain to justice; if it is for relieving misery, it will pertain to mercy, etc. Therefore the conferring of a benefit in general pertains to charity. In order that the conferring of benefit and beneficence properly be had, it is necessary that there be had a liberal conferring of a gift. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 31, a. 1.

Charity, about which the speech is properly here, is theological charity, by which neighbor is loved on account of God. But there is also given another charity, a moral virtue, by which neighbor is loved on account of the very honorableness of this love, which per se is a natural virtue. The natural motive of this love does not impede this love also from being supernatural, if it is done from grace and informed by faith. And it is commanded by God: "All things whatsoever you wish that men should do to you, do you also to them." Matt. 7:12; Job 4:16. Nevertheless the precept of theological charity is not fulfilled by this love. It is indeed praiseworthy and very meritorious that the acts to be exercised toward neighbor be exercised from the motive of the charity of God; nevertheless per se it is not obligatory.

For as the charity of God commands that we observe his commands, but does not also command that we execute them from the motive of the charity of God, so also charity toward neighbor indeed commands that we exercise various acts of beneficence and mercy, but by no means that we effect them only from the motive of the charity of God.

R. To the second. There is given a precept of loving neighbor with a true and internal affection, as is established from John 15:12, 17, and from propositions 10 and 11 condemned by Innocent XI; and also with external love, 1 John 3:15 seqq.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 31, a. 2. But someone sufficiently satisfies this precept through a certain general love which excludes no one, and accordingly by reciting the Lord's Prayer, in which you have both an internal and external act. A precept of this sort obliges per se when the precept of charity toward God obliges per se. For it is like to this. Matt. 22:39. Hence he who fulfills the precept of charity toward God, by willing every good to God, at least implicitly fulfills the precept of charity toward neighbor, by desiring salvation for him. But it obliges per accidens: 1. If hatred toward neighbor cannot be repelled unless an act of love is elicited; for he who is bound to the end is obliged to the means. 2. When the neighbor is in necessity; otherwise the precept would be vain; if that necessity becomes known, for no one is bound to inquire whether someone is in need. - L. 8; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 25; q. 27, a. 8; q. 30; q. 31; q. 32, aa. 1, 2; q. 34, aa. 3, 4; q. 44; Struggl, q. 6, n. 4; Salm. 17; D'Annib., ed. 4, p. 2, n. 81; E. M. 282. Through a certain general love which excludes no one; for care concerning the salvation of neighbor is not incumbent on anyone, unless perhaps in a case of necessity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 5 ad 3. Nor indeed by reason of common charity is there an obligation of inquiring into the necessity of neighbor. For it regards only cases occurring to anyone. "That which is owed to some determinate and certain person... we must expend upon him, not waiting until he occurs to us, but having due solicitude that we seek him out.... But those benefits which are owed not to a certain person, but commonly to all neighbors... we need not seek those upon whom we may expend them, but it suffices that we expend them on those who occur to us." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 33, a. 2 ad 4.

What are the sins opposed to charity? - From the Angelic Doctor, 2. 2, they are: 1. Hatred of God and of neighbor, which is opposed to the very love of charity; hatred of God is virtually present in any lethal sin, q. 34. But charity toward neighbor is gravely injured by any grave displeasure caused to neighbor without just reason, which constitutes a grave offense against him. 2. Acedia, which is opposed to the joy of charity concerning divine good, q. 35. Cf. n. 343 seq. 3. Envy, which is opposed to joy concerning the good of neighbor, q. 36. Cf. n. 327 seq. 3. Discord, which is in the heart, and is opposed to the peace of charity, q. 37. Cf. n. 322. - 4. Contention, which is in the mouth, and is also opposed to peace, q. 38.

Cf. n. 322. 5. Schism, quarrel, war, sedition, which pertain to deed, and likewise are opposed to peace, qq. 39-42. Cf. n. 342, 380, 751. 6. Scandal, which is opposed to the beneficence of charity, q. 43. Omission of help, whether spiritual or temporal, when it is owed, attention being paid to the necessity of neighbor and the ability of the one helping, is properly against mercy, and consequently against charity. Injury of neighbor in his temporal goods is properly opposed to justice. But in all sins against justice toward neighbor, charity and justice are injured at the same time, although in sins against charity toward neighbor justice is not always injured.

What order generally is to be observed in charity toward neighbor?

In the order of charity each one is bound after God to love: 1. himself according to spiritual goods, insofar as he wills God, his end, i.e., the supreme and uniquely necessary good, more to himself than to another; then neighbor as to the same spiritual goods; 2. himself as to intrinsic bodily goods, such as life, health, etc.; then neighbor as to the same bodily goods; 3. himself, and then neighbor, as to external goods, such as reputation, honor, riches. The reason is that love of self is the rule of love of neighbor. But the rule is prior and preferable to what is ruled. Therefore love of self always precedes and is preferred to love of neighbor, where the matter concerns goods of the same order and equal necessity.

Of the same order: Supernatural goods are to be preferred to natural goods. Likewise the common good is to be preferred to private good, because the common good of many is more divine than the private good of one. Intrinsic natural goods, life, health, integrity of members, are to be preferred to extrinsic goods, reputation, honor, riches. But reputation and honor with respect to riches are of a higher order, because they are something spiritual and moral.

Necessity, whether temporal or spiritual, is distinguished as threefold: 1. Extreme, when danger of life, that is, of eternal damnation or death, or of another evil almost equal to death, so presses upon the neighbor that he, morally speaking, cannot escape it without another's help. And it is quasi-extreme if he can free himself, but only with the greatest difficulty; or if there is only probable danger of the aforesaid evil: of life, of integrity of principal members, of liberty, of a most grave disease, of infamy. 2. Grave, when someone suffers great danger to the salvation of the soul, or to the life of the body, or of another grave evil, which he cannot escape without great difficulty. Such is the necessity in which those things necessary for conserving one's state are lacking. 3. Common or middling, in which someone can provide for himself without great difficulty. In this, in the spiritual order, are vulgar sinners who, if they wished to apply some effort, would rise again from a depraved state; but in the temporal order poor beggars are generally in it, for whom life, according to their condition, is not too burdensome and miserable. Tambur., Expl. Dec., l. 5, c. 1, § 1, n. 4 seqq.; § 2, n. 5 seqq.; Suarez, de Carit., d. 9, s. 2, n. 4; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, aa. 4-6; q. 31, a. 3; q. 32, a. 3; q. 44, aa. 7, 8; L. 25, 27, 31; H. A. 18.

Although hatred of enmity, whether of the person according to himself and of the goods which he has in himself, namely by willing evil to him as such, or insofar as it is evil to him, from its genus is mortal, nevertheless hatred of abomination, or of quality, by which we are averse not to the man but to his malice, is licit. - This is clear of itself, and theologians commonly teach it. Hence a private person who, averse from another, flees him, if he does this so that he may deprive him of his conversation and consolation, and thus sadden him and that it may be ill with him, this is hatred of enmity and sin. But if, wishing no evil, he only flees because the person is discordant with his nature, or is accustomed to be troublesome to him, this is hatred of abomination and aversion, and sin if it is irrational; such it will not be if the person is in reality very harsh, provided contempt, scandal, and desire of vengeance are absent. - Struggl, q. 4, nn. 26, 28, 37; q. 5, n. 6; L. 30; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 24, a. 3.

How many are the sacraments of the New Testament? - There are seven: Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, Order, Matrimony. Namely, as in bodily life we are born, grow, are nourished, are healed when sick, are fortified against enemies, are governed, and are multiplied, so also in spiritual life. For through baptism we are spiritually reborn; through confirmation we are increased in grace and strengthened in faith; through the Eucharist we are nourished with divine food; through penance we are spiritually healed from the sickness of sin; through extreme unction we are strengthened in agony against the devil; through order the Church is governed; through matrimony it is multiplied. Florence, Decree for the Armenians; Trent s. 7, c. 1; St. Thomas 3 p., q. 65, a. 1-3.

Notions. Hatred in general is an act by which we turn away from some evil. But that evil can be a thing or a person. Now we are speaking about hatred of another person. But someone can be ill-disposed toward another person either because that person is evil or abominable, or because some evil is wished to him. In the first case there is the so-called hatred of abomination, which consists in an aversion of soul by which we flee from and repel some person as harmful to us or ours (i.e. to persons joined to us, e.g. blood-relations or friends). But in the other case there is hatred of enmity or malevolence, which precisely intends evil so that it may harm another. Thus, e.g., a wife can have hatred of abomination against the drunkenness of her husband, whom nevertheless she herself loves; likewise against those who lead her husband into drunkenness. But if she wishes evil to these seducers, she has hatred of enmity.

Hatred of abomination is opposed to the love of concupiscence; because, just as by the love of concupiscence we will good to ourselves, so by hatred of abomination we turn away evil from ourselves. Such hatred is licit if it does not exceed due measure and touches rather the defects than the person himself, as is clear from the example just given of the wife who hates the drunkenness of her husband. Hence the pious Psalmist also says: "I have hated the iniquitous."⁸²

Hatred of enmity is opposed to the love of benevolence and friendship; for just as by the love of benevolence we will good to another, so that it may be well with him, so by hatred of enmity we will evil to another, so that it may be ill with him. But just as love of concupiscence often leads to love of benevolence, so conversely hatred of abomination is accustomed to beget hatred of enmity; for from the fact that we turn away from someone as very troublesome to us, we are easily induced to will evil to him and to regard this evil as our good. Hatred of enmity is sometimes almost diabolical. For just as the devil wishes evil to God and men precisely in order to harm, although he knows that he can obtain no advantage for himself from it, so certain perverse men, stirred by hatred, wish and procure destruction for enemies with their own evident danger and without hope of any other advantage.

Hatred of abomination toward God is to turn away from some perfection of His, e.g. justice, omnipotence, as harmful to us. Thus perhaps an obstinate lustful sinner hates punishing divine justice. Hatred of enmity is to wish evil to God.

Malice. Every hatred of God is a mortal sin from its whole genus; indeed if it is hatred of enmity, it is, from its genus, the gravest of all sins.

The reason is: a) because it is a direct turning away from God, the highest good; b) because it is directly opposed to the most excellent virtue, namely, charity. Yet on account of special circumstances sometimes some other sin can be graver than hatred of God, e.g. the betrayal of Judas Iscariot done on account of avarice seems to be a greater sin than the hatred of God of some Freemason. - It has been said advisedly that every hatred of God is a mortal sin, because hatred of God, if it is a fully deliberate act, does not admit smallness of matter, since it always includes a grave offense against God and a grave disordering against right reason.

Hatred of God is so opposed to right reason that the Angelic Doctor⁸³ proposes a special question to himself: "Whether someone can have hatred toward God." But he answers that God, seen according to His essence, which is supremely lovable, cannot be held in hatred; but that according to the effects of justice, which are repugnant to a disordered created will, sinners and the damned can hate God, who justly and severely punishes crimes, and who commands the moral order and requires the highest reverence to be shown to Himself.

Note. 1. Not every hatred of punishments inflicted or to be inflicted by God is hatred of God; for many hate punishments, who nevertheless bear them patiently on account of reverence for divine justice. Indeed murmuring against divine providence is not always hatred of God, unless nevertheless blasphemy against God is added.

2. Although charity toward God, toward self, and toward neighbor is the same virtue, nevertheless hatred of God, hatred of self, and hatred of neighbor are not the same sin; for diverse sins can be opposed to one virtue. Hence the sin of hatred of God is distinguished in species from the sin of hatred of self and of neighbor. Indeed not all hatreds of neighbor are of the same species; thus to have hatred toward one's father is a different sin from hating some foreign person.

⁸² Ps. 118, 113.

⁸³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 34, a. 1.

S. Th. I-II, q. 29; II-II, q. 34.

944. Hatred is a motion of the appetite by which we are ill-affected toward something. For just as love is a consonance of the appetite with that which is fitting to it, so hatred is a dissonance toward that which is repugnant, or evil. Now hatred is twofold:

1. hatred of abomination or aversion, by which we turn away from something (a thing or a person) as evil or harmful to us; when there is question of a person it is called hatred of a quality;

2. hatred of enmity or malevolence, or hatred of the person himself according to himself, by which, from displeasure at some person, we will evil to him, because it is evil to him, that is, stopping in his evil, so that, namely, it may go ill with him.

Hatred of abomination is opposed to love of concupiscence; hatred of enmity is opposed to love of benevolence. But as love of concupiscence disposes to love of benevolence, so the former hatred disposes to this latter hatred: for from the fact that we turn away from someone as displeasing and troublesome to us, it often happens that we will evil to him, and regard his evil as our good.

945. Hatred of God. - According to his essence, God cannot be had in hatred, because by essence he is goodness itself; and therefore he who sees this essence does not have God in hatred. But insofar as from him there comes to us an effect which we regard as evil, he can be had in hatred by us (cf. Num. X, 35; Deut. XXXII, 41; Ps. LXXIII, 23; Jn. XV, 24), for example, insofar as he prohibits sins or punishes sinners.

This is a sin, and always mortal, unless it is done from indeliberation: for it is always a grave disorder to turn away from the highest Good, in whom there is nothing to be turned away from; or to will evil to him who is supremely lovable. Indeed it is the greatest of all sins: 1. because it is directly opposed to the dilection of God, which is the principal act of the more worthy virtue, charity, and therefore it is also directly opposed to the infinite goodness of God; 2. because precisely that by which something is mortal sin is the aversion of the will from God; but this is had in itself, essentially, and explicitly in hatred of God, while in other sins it is found only implicitly, participatively, and according to another; therefore hatred of God is the gravest sin of all. - But hatred of enmity toward God is graver than hatred of abomination: the former is opposed to the infinite intrinsic goodness of God, the latter to his external manifestation and glory.

He sins by hatred of enmity a) who wills God not to be, or not to be omnipotent, omniscient, just, etc.; - b) who is saddened concerning his perfections or rejoices concerning offense against him, concerning the violation of God's precepts; - c) who persecutes the works of God and intends to lessen his external glory, because it is displeasing to God. Thus the devil desires and procures evil to God because it is God's evil.

946. Hatred of neighbor. - Hatred of abomination of neighbor is good, if he is had in hatred according to that which is evil in him (Wis. XIV, 9; Ps. CXVIII, 113; CXXXVIII, 21), for example, insofar as he is a sinner, enemy, persecutor, harmful to us, etc., unless the hatred is greater than the cause deserves. On the contrary, it is a sin if he is had in hatred according to something which is good in him, for example, insofar as he is pious, just, prudent, etc.¹ - Hatred of enmity toward neighbor, by which we will evil to him as evil, so that it may go ill with him, is always a sin. Thus he sins who 1. desires the inconvenience of neighbor as such and taken absolutely; 2. rejoices concerning his evil as it is evil to him; or 3. is saddened concerning good as it is good to him.

¹ Some say that hatred of abomination, not of a quality but of a person, insofar as this person is held as unworthy of all dilection, is always a sin and most grave, because it is to exclude from beatitude. But this is already hatred of enmity, as being hatred of the person according to himself: already to will that he have no good.

The sin of hatred toward neighbor is mortal from its genus because it is against charity (I Jn. II, 9; III, 14-15; IV, 20). Nevertheless it can be venial, not only from indeliberation, as if it is done from a sudden motion of anger, but also from lightness of matter, for example, if we wish a slight evil to neighbor, or if the aversion is slight, as ordinarily simple displeasure is without imprecation of evil. Nevertheless this is dangerous, especially if it lasts long, because it will easily happen that the evils which here and there befall neighbor are pleasing.

Hatred of neighbor, if it is considered on the part of the disorder of the one sinning, is the gravest of sins against neighbor, because thus our will is most greatly disordered toward him.² Nevertheless it is not the greatest on the part of the effect, namely, of the harm inflicted on neighbor: thus theft, homicide, detraction, etc., are greater.

² Namely, other sins against neighbor participate in the character of hatred, Cajetan notes.

947. Hatred of neighbor is multiple in species. - Hatreds of a quality of neighbor differ in species according to specifically diverse motives, for example, to hate neighbor because he is pious or because he has brought about a just damage.

Hatreds of neighbor by which we wish (with inefficacious desire) that diverse evils befall him are probably of the same species, because these evils are sought for him only under the general character of evil; whence the evils are not to be specified in confession. On the contrary, hatreds by which we desire (with true efficacious desire) to inflict diverse evils on neighbor are certainly of diverse species, because the desire of committing a sin has the malice of the work with all the circumstances; whence the evils desired are to be declared in confession. Thus the will of taking away reputation and the will of killing differ.

948. Observations. - 1. Formal hatred of oneself is not given, as being repugnant to nature.

2. To will evil to someone insofar as it is a good for him or for others is not hatred; indeed, it is licit, if the order of charity is preserved (cf. n. 889). Nevertheless it would be a sin to will the evil of another against the order of charity, that is, on account of a good which does not equal it: thus a son cannot will the death of his father on account of the inheritance (cf. props. 13, 14, 15 condemned by Innocent XI).

3. Hatred of abomination concerning only the evil of neighbor is not simply hatred, but hatred in a certain respect and mixed with love: "This very thing, that in a brother we hate fault and defect of good, pertains to love of the brother: for it is of the same character that we will the good of someone and that we hate his evil. Whence, taking hatred of a brother simply (by not willing good), it is always with sin" (a. 3).

4. True hatred is cured with difficulty; nevertheless penitents often confess as hatreds things which are not such, or at least are not grave. Thus when they affirm that they cannot forget an injury, or cannot look at, speak to, or salute someone, or cannot do so without vehement emotion, it must be investigated whether these things are not mere natural aversion from a true or apparent offense, - or a pure affection of the sensitive appetite from diversity of disposition without sufficient deliberation, - or a desire of evil from an honorable end. But if they do not wish a grave evil to neighbor, nor refuse the ordinary signs of dilection, nor is another grave inconvenience feared from that affection (for example, contempt, scandal, and desire for revenge), they are to be absolved.

5. St. Alphonsus observes, Th. M., l. II, n. 30, ad 3: "A private person who, being averse from another, flees him, if he does this so that he may deprive him of his conversation and consolation, and thus sadden him, and it may go ill with him, it is hatred of enmity and a sin. - But if, wishing no evil, you only flee because he is contrary to your nature, or is accustomed to be troublesome to you, it is hatred of aversion and a sin, if it is without reason: such it will not be if he is a very harsh person, provided contempt, scandal, and desire for revenge are absent."

6. Hatred of neighbor formally, according to the character of the object, and therefore more directly, arises from envy, through which the very good of neighbor is rendered saddening and consequently hateful. But dispositively it arises from anger: for first, through anger, man apprehends the evil of neighbor according to a certain measure, as it has the character of revenge; but, anger persevering, man comes to considering and seeking the evil of neighbor absolutely and according to itself, which pertains to the character of hatred (a. 6, ad 3).

I. Hatred of God. — Hatred in common is an act or movement of the will whereby one is borne with malevolence toward something. It is twofold, hatred of abomination and hatred of enmity. Hatred of abomination is that whereby we avert ourselves from something as evil to us and unbecoming. Hatred of enmity is that whereby we will evil to someone so that it be ill with him; whence this hatred is not so much aversion as pursuit of something which we apprehend as good to ourselves and evil to another.

Hatred of God is the gravest of all sins²⁰⁷ ; because the reason of fault consists in voluntary aversion from God. But this aversion is stronger and greater in hatred of God than in other sins; because in hatred of God it is intended directly and per se, but in other sins indirectly only and through another thing : thus, e.g., one who fornicates does not intend directly and per se to turn away from God, but intends disordered delight, to which aversion from God is annexed. ²⁰⁷ Here q. 34, a. 2, c.

II. Hatred of neighbor. — Hatred of neighbor, whether of abomination or of enmity, is ex genere suo mortal sin²⁰⁸ ; because it is directly contrary to charity, which is the life of the soul. But out of charity we are bound to love our neighbor according to what he has from God, that is, according to nature and grace. Ergo to turn away from the neighbor according to nature and grace, and to will him evil, is ex genere suo mortal sin. See more in what was said on the love of enemies. ²⁰⁸ Ibid., a. 3, c.

Both however can become venial, not only from indeliberation of act, but also from lightness of matter : hatred of enmity, if some light evil be wished the neighbor. Hatred of abomination is rarely mortal; because simple displeasure at a created person subject to many defects and without imprecation of evil on account of them does not seem so great a disorder : unless such as that someone refuse pardon to one asking it, or the common offices of charity, or unless there be grave cause of scandal, or unless it endure while the precept of loving the neighbor urges.

[From these things you gather 1° that it is never licit to wish evil upon the neighbor under the notion of evil, but otherwise under the notion of good, that is, that from the evil wished some good outweighing the evil come to him. Care must be taken nevertheless lest beneath the cloak of a better good the poison of hatred or vengeance lie hidden. And because the life of an innocent man outweighs the goods of fortune of any private person, the following propositions were rightly condemned by Innocent XI, under numbers 13, 14 and 15 : «If you act with due moderation, you can without mortal sin grieve over the life of anyone and rejoice naturally over his death, ask and desire it ineffectually with affection, not indeed from displeasure at the person, but on account of some temporal emolument.» — «It is licit with absolute desire to covet the death of a father, not indeed as an evil of the father, but as a good of the one coveting, since plainly the rich inheritance will accrue to him.» — «It is licit for a son to rejoice over the parricide of a parent committed by himself in drunkenness, on account of the immense riches thence obtained by inheritance.»

You gather 2° that someone can wish death for himself that he may enjoy God and offend him no more, as did the Apostle, saying, Rom., VII, 24 : Unhappy man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? But what of him who wished death for himself that he might be delivered from the miseries of this life? I answer that this is per se illicit, because death is more terrible than all evils of this life : unless it be wished under the condition that it please God thus, and with the desire at least implicit of a better life, namely eternal.]

III. Sloth (Acedia). — Sloth theologically taken is weariness or sadness about spiritual good²⁰⁹ . If it be about spiritual good in common, it is not a special vice, but a circumstance of every vice; for every vice shuns the spiritual good of the opposite virtue. But it is special sin, insofar as it is weariness about divine good pertaining to us, apprehended as proper evil; as if anyone were saddened by friendship with God, by beatitude set before him, or by means necessary to friendship with God and beatitude, as the sacraments, the divine precepts, good works, insofar as they are necessary to friendship with God and beatitude. ²⁰⁹ Here q. 35, a. 1 et 2, c.

For this reason sloth is mortal sin from its genus²¹⁰ , because it is contrary to charity, through which spiritual life is had; for the proper effect of charity is joy in God, but sloth is sadness about divine good pertaining to us, as was said. ²¹⁰ Ibid., a. 3, c.

IV. Envy. — It is sadness about another's good estimated as proper evil, insofar as it is diminutive of one's own glory and excellence.

It is sin, because he grieves over what he ought to rejoice over, namely the neighbor's good. It is sin ex genere suo mortal, because it is contrary to charity. Yet it can be venial, both from indeliberation of act, and from lightness of matter, as if it be about some slight good of the neighbor.

V. Discord. — Discord of which we treat here and as it is opposed to charity, is dissension of wills concerning divine good or the neighbor's good, to which we are bound to consent out of charity; because, if we be bound to consent not out of charity, but out of another virtue, it will not be against charity, but against that other virtue. It is ex genere mortal sin, on account of contrariety to charity.

VI. Contention. — Contention generally taken is a battle of words; specially however, as taken here, it is defined by Ambrose : «Assault upon truth with confidence of clamor.» Understand truth which one knows, or can and ought to know, as in heretics. Understand also assault upon truth from the heart, not for exercise or examination's sake.

It is ex genere suo mortal sin²¹¹ , because it is contrary to charity, insofar as it is contrary to peace, which is the effect of charity. ²¹¹ Here q. 38, a. 1, c.

VII. Schism. — Schism, in Greek, in Latin scission, according to usage received among ecclesiastical writers, is taken for a special sin, which is defined : «Voluntary separation of oneself from the unity of the Church²¹² .» The unity of the Church moreover is chiefly regarded in two things, namely in the connection or communion of the members of the Church with each other, and in the order of all members toward one head, which is Christ himself, whose place the supreme Pontiff holds in the Church. ²¹² Here q. 39, a. 1, c.

Whence one can become schismatic three ways : 1° separating himself from the head; 2° from the members; 3° from head and members at once.

[Schism is one thing pure, opposed only to charity and peace, as in those who believe one holy Church, under visible head the Roman Pontiff, and whatever the Roman Church teaches, yet out of pride refuse to submit and obey the Pope, or to be united with the other members of the Church. Another is joined with heresy, in those who separate themselves from obedience to the Pope because they acknowledge not his power. Hence, although all heretics are schismatics, but not conversely, and schism can be severed absolutely from heresy, nevertheless scarcely or hardly ever is true schism found re ipsa without some heresy, or at least without breaking forth into heresy. Schismatics, whether they depart from the unity of the Church, or withdraw themselves from due obedience to the Pope, are punished with excommunication latae sententiae specially reserved in the Roman manner to the Roman Pontiff in the constitutio Apostolicae Sedis, in these words : «Schismatics and those who pertinaciously withdraw themselves or recede from the obedience of the Roman Pontiff existing for the time being.» This censure was renewed by the bull Coenae. From it follows privation of jurisdiction, when schism is manifest²¹³ .] ²¹³ Ibid., a. 3, o.

I. Hatred of God is twofold: one which is included in every sin; the other peculiar, which is described as an aversion from God, by which the will detests God insofar as he prohibits sins and inflicts punishments. This hatred of God is the gravest of all crimes, since it is opposed to the most excellent virtue of charity according to its primary act, namely the divine love. It is by its kind mortal, nor does it admit the excuse of parvity of matter; but it can turn out venial only from imperfect deliberation.

II. Hatred of the neighbor is an expressed malevolence, by which we wish him evil. It is by its kind deadly; yet it can become venial, both by parvity of matter and by imperfect deliberation — as if you wish a light evil to your neighbor, or if with imperfect deliberation you desire it for him.

III. It is licit to abominate the sinner, as sinner, according to Proverbs 29: The just abominate a wicked man. For then the sin is hated, not the man. For it is never licit to wish evil to a man, insofar as it is his evil, even with an inefficacious affection; nor is it licit to be saddened over his good, or to rejoice over his evil, as is plain from the proscribed thesis of Innocent XI recounted in the preceding chapter.

IV. Although it is never licit either to desire or to rejoice over the neighbor's evil, it is nevertheless licit, with an inefficacious affection, to wish some temporal evil to another, and to rejoice over it, insofar as this temporal evil conduces to his spiritual good — for instance, that he desist from sin, that he be called back to a better way — as St. Thomas teaches, on the third book, distinction 30, article 1, ad 4. For charity has an order, and each one ought to love himself more than another, and his kin more than strangers, and friends more than enemies, and the common good of many more than the good of one.

One can, without violating charity, wish some temporal evil to another, or rejoice if it should happen — not insofar as it is his evil, but insofar as it is an impediment of evils to another whom one is more bound to love, or to the Community, or to the Church. Similarly of his temporal evil, according as by the evil of punishment the evil of fault is frequently prevented. Hence it is licit to wish for victory in a just war, for the destruction of the Turks, for the common good of the Church or of the Principality; it is licit to wish that a punishment be inflicted by the judge on a malefactor, that he desist from inflicting harm on the Community or on a neighbor. Yet the utmost vigilance is needed in desires of this kind, however inefficacious, lest under the appearance of the common good the cupidity of private vengeance lie hidden. Similarly it is never licit to wish a lesser evil to oneself or to others in order to avoid a greater. Wherefore they gravely sin who deliberately desire death for themselves in order to avoid other troubles.

V. Question I. Is it a sin to speak ill of one's neighbor? Answer. He who with deliberate mind imprecates a grave evil upon his neighbor sins mortally. Weak women, and base men, frequently burst forth into these imprecations, and, to excuse themselves, allege the impulse of anger, as though anger were not a sin. That anger can at times forestall reason is true; but frequently, from a depraved habit and from grave negligence in restraining anger, women and men break forth into such curses. They often say, when their anger has cooled, that they are displeased at having hurled such curses; but this is not a sign that they did not sin: for when the anger has been poured out, the mind perceives the evil it has committed, and therefore is then displeased. Parish priests and Confessors, then, should instruct such persons, and show them the necessity of curbing the savage beast of anger: since their frequent curses flow from a depraved habit of becoming angry. But this wicked habituation does not excuse them, but accuses them. That Confessors may be able to discern whether they have offended gravely or lightly, let them weigh all the circumstances, the deliberation of mind, the scandal, the gravity of the evil wished, and the rest of that kind.

VI. Question II. What is discord? Answer. It is a dissension of wills from the divine good and the good of the neighbor, in which they ought to agree. It is opposed to concord, which unites hearts and wills. By its kind it is a mortal sin. For God, Proverbs 6, detests him who sows discord among brethren. It is required, however, that someone knowingly dissent from the good of God or of the Neighbor, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 37, art. 1. Wherefore there is no discord when one, in good faith, judges that this pertains to the honor of God and the utility of the Neighbor, and another judges otherwise. For this frequently happens even among the holier men themselves.

VII. Question III. What is contention? Answer. It is an altercation of words for impugning the truth; or it is an impugning of the truth with a confidence of clamor, as the Angelic Doctor says, II-II, q. 38, art. 1, where he opportunely adds: But if contention is called an impugning of falsity with a due measure of acrimony, then contention is praiseworthy. Acrimony must never be poured out upon persons, but only, with due sparingness, upon errors. This acrimony is like a seasoning, which must be used with great prudence and moderation, especially in vocal disputations. For when men dispute with mutual words, if they clamor with an immoderate outcry of voices, if they rub each other with mutual wit, the disputation easily ends in criminal contention, because the persons are present. But when errors are refuted in writing, often the authors of the errors are either dead or absent; therefore there is no danger of culpable contention. Hence it is that the mildest Fathers — Augustine, Bernard, and others — often used a style sprinkled with wit. For the reader is wearied by a cold reading; but, on the contrary, writing seasoned with a moderate pepper of acrimony sharpens his palate.

VIII. Question IV. What is Schism? Answer. It is a deliberate separation from the unity of the Church. Now he is separated from the Church who refuses either to communicate with her members, or to render due obedience to the Roman Pontiff, her visible head. Not every disobedient man is a schismatic, because pertinacity can be lacking. But every schismatic is disobedient; just as every heretic is a schismatic, but not conversely. Yet in practice these two crimes, schism and heresy, are scarcely separated, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 39, art. 1, ad 3.

IX. Question V. What is sedition? Answer. It is an aggressive war of one part of the Commonwealth against another part, or against its own Prince. It is by its kind a mortal sin, because it is gravely adverse to peace, to unity, and to the common good. Of war and duel I shall treat in explaining the fifth precept.