Chapter — Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology
I. On the Necessity of Charity
What is charity? Charity is an act of the will by which, with a love of benevolence and friendship, we love God as the highest good on account of himself, and neighbor on account of God. Of benevolence, because we will good to God; of friendship, because love is with reciprocal love. Neighbor, namely all with whom we can be sharers of eternal blessedness, ourselves, other men, angels. For charity is friendship with God, and every friendship is founded upon some communication of life. Communication of life; for it belongs to charity and friendship to love, and to love is life. Communication of life; for to love is to will good; if therefore the love is mutual, there must be mutual willing of good, and accordingly a common life and a common good. Moreover there is no other communication of life and good with God than eternal blessedness, whose beginning in this life is had through grace. On account of God, i.e., on account of the glory of God. The highest good, on account of himself; and accordingly we love God in all things and above all things, so that we may obtain his promises, not because this is our good, but because it redounds to the good of God, i.e., to the glory of God. Therefore the primary material object of charity is God, the secondary neighbor. But the formal object is the absolute goodness of God. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 23, 25, 27; L. 22; E. M. 377.
Good is that which is fitting. This account being presupposed, the will loves it because it is fitting to it. Moreover, this very thing is most fitting to the will, that God exist; and this good is more fitting to it than its own proper good. And thus the will can rightly be borne toward God by its own act on account of himself, and will that God exist and be endowed with infinite goods and perfections.
Is there given a special precept of charity toward God? R. Affirmatively. Proof: Matt. 22:37, 38: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart... this is the greatest and first commandment. The same is evinced from proposition 1 condemned by Alexander VIII. The precept of charity, as is clear from the cited sacred text, obliges us to love God above all things, not indeed intensively, by a greater effort of the will and a more fervent love which surpasses any other affection of the will, and which also ordinarily redounds into the senses, although this is most becoming; but appreciatively, by reason and rational will preferring God to all things, with a perfect and efficacious will, not only an imperfect and inefficacious velleity and complacency, so that we esteem no creature more than God, and wish rather to lose all things than gravely to offend God. But since love and friendship is the union and agreement of two wills, the nature and precept of charity consist in this, that someone wills those things which God wills, and does not will those things which God does not will, in any grave matter gravely, in any light matter lightly; this finally is true and perfect charity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26; q. 44; L. 22; E. M. 378.
Hence it is clear that it would be altogether falsely thought almost impossible or exceedingly difficult to elicit an act of charity. For, if it is commanded, God helps us toward it. And if the goodness of men moves us to a love of benevolence and friendship, much more does the infinite goodness of God. If that goodness which is also manifested by benefits moves us most greatly, how much ought the goodness of God the Creator, Redeemer, Rewarder, not to move us? If besides we are in the state of grace, the habit itself of charity persuades us that its act ought not to be difficult, since that habit is infused in a certain connatural mode for eliciting the act. Therefore, if the divine excellence, the infinite perfection of God, the infinite goodness of God having been proposed to him, someone tries with sincere soul to elicit pure charity, he will rightly be able to think that he has elicited that act of charity, and consequently that from charity he has also conceived perfect contrition for sins. Cf. Deut. 6:1-9.
Resolves: It is a mortal and most grave sin, and admits no smallness of matter, since it is opposed to the infinite goodness of God, if someone formally hates God with the hatred of malevolence and enmity, e.g., if someone wishes God not to exist, and himself to be held in hatred by God. - Likewise he sins mortally if someone loves God with a love appreciatively less than creatures. Therefore "any act of mortal sin is contrary to charity." S. Th., 2. 2. q. 24, a. 12. Likewise he sins against the charity of God if someone does not love God on account of himself as the last end of all things, but only on account of something else, e.g., eternal life, or to avoid hell. This is mortal, because namely God would not be loved appreciatively above all things if something other than him were loved by actual intention as the principal end. Principal, because God can be loved on account of the recompense of eternal life, but less principally. By actual intention, because otherwise, by loving eternal life and other gifts of God, by the very fact that such an act is in itself right, eternal life or other gifts of God are always at least implicitly and in actu exercito ordered to God as to the supreme end. L. 23, 24; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 34, aa. 1, 2; Struggl, q. 5, n. 2; Sanch., l. 2, c. 35, n. 3.
Is schism a special sin against charity? - "The sin of schism properly is a special sin, from this, that it intends to separate itself from the unity which charity makes; which not only unites one person to another by the spiritual bond of love, but also the whole Church in unity of spirit. And therefore properly those are called schismatics who by their own will and intention separate themselves from the unity of the Church.... And therefore those are called schismatics who refuse to be subject to the Supreme Pontiff, and who refuse to communicate with the members of the Church subject to him.... But schism per se is opposed to the ecclesiastical unity of charity.... It must be said that not to obey precepts with a certain rebellion constitutes the account of schism. But I say with rebellion, when someone both pertinaciously contemns the precepts of the Church, and refuses to undergo its judgment. But not every sinner does this; whence not every sin is schism." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 39, a. 1; q. 42, a. 1 ad 2.
When does the precept of charity toward God urge? No precept is given of always acting from the motive of charity. Proof from proposition 8 condemned by Alexander VIII, E. M. 313, and because besides charity there are acts of other virtues, good and meritorious. - But the precept of charity urges more frequently than once in life, or every five years. Proof from propositions 5, 6, 7 condemned by Innocent XI. - When and how the precept of charity urges must be determined by the same rules which we established above concerning faith. Cf. 354. St. Alphonsus judges that one is not excused from mortal sin who defers an act of charity for a month. But this opinion rests on no demonstrative argument, and does not exceed the limits of probability. Besides, the same Holy Doctor thinks it most probable that the precept of charity urges in the article of death. If the speech is about those for whom no other means of justification is available, this is most truly affirmed. But if such necessity is absent, this opinion too does not exceed the limits of probability. But if no other means of justification is available, an act of charity is necessary not only by necessity of precept, but also of means. But the habit of charity is necessary to all by necessity of means; it is inseparable from sanctifying grace, which nevertheless we can obtain also by simple attrition and the sacrament, especially of baptism and penance. Benedict XIV exhorts Bishops to establish that in all parishes, on Sundays and feast days, the acts of faith, hope, and charity be read to the people. C. Etsi minime, 7 Feb. 1742, n. 18.
The precept of charity is satisfied by working toward this end, namely of pleasing God, by avoiding sin because it displeases God, by praying that the name of God be sanctified, that his kingdom come, that his will be done, by rejoicing in the divine perfections, by wishing that no one offend God, by eliciting an act of contrition, because contrition includes the motive of charity, but by no means by attrition, because it is not based on the motive of charity, etc. Therefore no one who lives piously ought to be anxious about this precept. Likewise, because of the various opinions of doctors and because of defect of advertence, as in the precept of faith and hope, sin is rarely committed here. John 14:21; L. 8, 23; H. A. 13; Struggl, q. 4, nn. 7-10; E. M. 381.
What does charity toward neighbor import; is there given a precept of charity toward neighbor? - R. To the first. Charity toward neighbor commands love of oneself and of neighbor, but in an ordered way; for not every neighbor is neighbor to us in the same mode. Love of oneself embraces the due care to be had of soul and body. Sins committed against it are implicitly contained and accused in other sins committed and accused in confession. But since even an enemy is neighbor, it also commands love of enemies. Love, namely so that we will good to him. The chief good of man is God. Therefore by charity we will that man possess God, by association in full participation of blessedness. And this is to love neighbor as oneself. Besides interior love, since charity by its nature is not sterile, but active, it also commands exterior works. Therefore besides interior benevolence, charity also commands beneficence, which is the execution of benevolence. The matter concerns the precept of theological charity, which is evidently established from the very words of Christ. "But the second commandment is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Matt. 22:39; 1 John 4:21.
Among exterior works alms and fraternal correction hold a special place; these are works of mercy, the former corporal, the latter spiritual. For mercy is the virtue which inclines us to compassionating another's misery, and from compassion to assisting. The same charity, on the contrary, prohibits hatred of malevolence and enmity toward neighbor, which from its genus is mortal. For by it we will evil to the neighbor insofar as it is evil for him, which is always inordinate and repugnant to charity. Yet smallness of matter is given, since the evil which we will to neighbor can be great or small. Besides this internal act, it consequently prohibits that by our exterior actions we inflict spiritual harm upon his salvation through scandal, or do other harm to him either as to other goods of soul, or as to goods of body. Concerning this last there will be discussion in the precepts of the Decalogue; here we will speak only of the remaining things.
Benevolence, therefore, and beneficence are acts of charity; to the former belongs willing good, to the latter doing good, according to the common account of good. If the good which someone does to another is taken under a special account of good, beneficence will receive a special account and will pertain to some special virtue. If the good, for example, is owed, it will pertain to justice; if it is for relieving misery, it will pertain to mercy, etc. Therefore the conferring of a benefit in general pertains to charity. In order that the conferring of benefit and beneficence properly be had, it is necessary that there be had a liberal conferring of a gift. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 31, a. 1.
Charity, about which the speech is properly here, is theological charity, by which neighbor is loved on account of God. But there is also given another charity, a moral virtue, by which neighbor is loved on account of the very honorableness of this love, which per se is a natural virtue. The natural motive of this love does not impede this love also from being supernatural, if it is done from grace and informed by faith. And it is commanded by God: "All things whatsoever you wish that men should do to you, do you also to them." Matt. 7:12; Job 4:16. Nevertheless the precept of theological charity is not fulfilled by this love. It is indeed praiseworthy and very meritorious that the acts to be exercised toward neighbor be exercised from the motive of the charity of God; nevertheless per se it is not obligatory.
For as the charity of God commands that we observe his commands, but does not also command that we execute them from the motive of the charity of God, so also charity toward neighbor indeed commands that we exercise various acts of beneficence and mercy, but by no means that we effect them only from the motive of the charity of God.
R. To the second. There is given a precept of loving neighbor with a true and internal affection, as is established from John 15:12, 17, and from propositions 10 and 11 condemned by Innocent XI; and also with external love, 1 John 3:15 seqq.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 31, a. 2. But someone sufficiently satisfies this precept through a certain general love which excludes no one, and accordingly by reciting the Lord's Prayer, in which you have both an internal and external act. A precept of this sort obliges per se when the precept of charity toward God obliges per se. For it is like to this. Matt. 22:39. Hence he who fulfills the precept of charity toward God, by willing every good to God, at least implicitly fulfills the precept of charity toward neighbor, by desiring salvation for him. But it obliges per accidens: 1. If hatred toward neighbor cannot be repelled unless an act of love is elicited; for he who is bound to the end is obliged to the means. 2. When the neighbor is in necessity; otherwise the precept would be vain; if that necessity becomes known, for no one is bound to inquire whether someone is in need. - L. 8; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 25; q. 27, a. 8; q. 30; q. 31; q. 32, aa. 1, 2; q. 34, aa. 3, 4; q. 44; Struggl, q. 6, n. 4; Salm. 17; D'Annib., ed. 4, p. 2, n. 81; E. M. 282. Through a certain general love which excludes no one; for care concerning the salvation of neighbor is not incumbent on anyone, unless perhaps in a case of necessity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 5 ad 3. Nor indeed by reason of common charity is there an obligation of inquiring into the necessity of neighbor. For it regards only cases occurring to anyone. "That which is owed to some determinate and certain person... we must expend upon him, not waiting until he occurs to us, but having due solicitude that we seek him out.... But those benefits which are owed not to a certain person, but commonly to all neighbors... we need not seek those upon whom we may expend them, but it suffices that we expend them on those who occur to us." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 33, a. 2 ad 4.
What are the sins opposed to charity? - From the Angelic Doctor, 2. 2, they are: 1. Hatred of God and of neighbor, which is opposed to the very love of charity; hatred of God is virtually present in any lethal sin, q. 34. But charity toward neighbor is gravely injured by any grave displeasure caused to neighbor without just reason, which constitutes a grave offense against him. 2. Acedia, which is opposed to the joy of charity concerning divine good, q. 35. Cf. n. 343 seq. 3. Envy, which is opposed to joy concerning the good of neighbor, q. 36. Cf. n. 327 seq. 3. Discord, which is in the heart, and is opposed to the peace of charity, q. 37. Cf. n. 322. - 4. Contention, which is in the mouth, and is also opposed to peace, q. 38.
Cf. n. 322. 5. Schism, quarrel, war, sedition, which pertain to deed, and likewise are opposed to peace, qq. 39-42. Cf. n. 342, 380, 751. 6. Scandal, which is opposed to the beneficence of charity, q. 43. Omission of help, whether spiritual or temporal, when it is owed, attention being paid to the necessity of neighbor and the ability of the one helping, is properly against mercy, and consequently against charity. Injury of neighbor in his temporal goods is properly opposed to justice. But in all sins against justice toward neighbor, charity and justice are injured at the same time, although in sins against charity toward neighbor justice is not always injured.