Ignorance and imputability

Invincible ignorance, as defined above, excuses from fault, so that, however bad an action done in invincible ignorance may be, it cannot be a formal sin. The reason is obvious; there is no knowledge in the agent of the malice of the action, and so the bad action is involuntary, and not imputable.

Vincible ignorance of the malice of the act, however, cannot excuse one who does wrong. He does not indeed will the evil in itself, but he wills its cause, and so it is voluntary in its cause and imputable. A person who sins in simply vincible ignorance, or even in crass ignorance, is indeed less blameworthy than one who sins with full knowledge of the malice of his act; the sin is only imperfectly voluntary, and less imputable than if perfectly voluntary. There is an apparent difference of opinion among theologians as to whether affected ignorance increases or lessens the malice of a wrong Prop. 2 damn. ab Alex. viii; 68 inter Baianas, can. 2202. action. With many modern authors it seems best to distinguish the motive with which in each case ignorance is fostered. If the state of ignorance is fostered through fear of being compelled by knowledge to abstain from the sinful act, such affected ignorance would seem to lessen the malice of the sin; the wrongdoer would not in this case venture to sin if he had full knowledge, and so he fosters his ignorance; his will is less malicious than if he sinned with full deliberation and consent. If, on the contrary, he merely fosters his ignorance to be able to plead it in excuse, and he is so bent on sinning that he would do the act in the same way even if he had full knowledge of its malice, then it does not seem to diminish the sin; it is rather a sign of an absolute determination to commit the sin.¹

We saw in a former chapter that the degree of malice which attaches to a sin committed in more or less culpable ignorance is measured rather by the sinfulness of the neglect to put away the ignorance, than by the sinfulness of the act in itself.

¹ Bucceroni, 1, n. 51, can. 2229.

Ignorance itself of what we are bound to know, as of the obligations of our state of life, of the truths of faith which are necessary to salvation, is sinful if consequent and vincible; antecedent and invincible ignorance is of course not sinful.

Preliminary. In order that the doctrine concerning imputability may be rightly proposed, certain things are to be noted concerning the efficient cause.

An efficient cause is called that which by its own power influences an effect. It is distinguished:

1. Into a physical and a moral cause, according as it influences an effect physically or morally, that is, by moving another free cause to act. Thus, for example, a thief is the physical cause of theft; but the one who impelled the thief to steal is the moral cause of the theft.

2. Into a cause per se and a cause per accidens. The former is that which by its nature, or by reason of its proper form, produces an effect or influences an effect, whether physically or morally. Thus, for example, immoderate drinking is the per se and physical cause of drunkenness; evil counsel is the per se and moral cause of a proximate sin. The latter is that which, by reason of a form or circumstance which happens to it, produces an effect or influences an effect. Thus, for example, immoderate drinking can be the per accidens and physical cause of pollution.

Note. An occasional cause, which properly is not a cause, is called that upon the positing of which another cause produces an effect. Thus, for example, one who gives a sum of money to someone can be for him the occasional cause of drunkenness.

3. Into a proximate and a remote cause, according as it concurs proximately or remotely in producing the effect. Thus one who arranges the type is the proximate cause, and one who prepares the paper is the remote cause, of printing a book.

4. Into a cause influencing gravely, moderately, and lightly, according as it exercises a grave, moderate, or light influence on the effect. Thus, for example, very immodest touches influence venereal commotion gravely, moderately immodest touches moderately, and lightly immodest touches lightly.

I. Notion. Imputability is the property by virtue of which an act, or the effect of an act, must be attributed to someone as to its author and master. The root of imputability is liberty, not morality, as some think. For that is the root of imputability on account of which an act must be ascribed to someone as to its master. But an act must be ascribed to a human being as to its master because and insofar as he placed it freely. To the imputability of an act, or of the effect of an act, there corresponds responsibility in the agent, by virtue of which the agent must be held as the author and master of the act or of its effect.

II. Imputability of acts. It is clear that a human act must be imputed to the human being. For a human act is an act of which a human being is master (n. 15). But from the fact that you are master of some act, that act is imputed to you. More difficult to determine is:

III. Imputability of effects. The discussion concerns evil effects; moreover, acts, although undeliberated, that are going to follow from a cause, for example in drunkenness, are also referred to effects. Therefore we ask:

1. What is required in order that an evil effect be imputed? It is required:

a) That the agent advert, at least confusedly, that the effect will certainly or probably follow. For nothing is willed unless it is at least in some way known.

b) That the agent be able not to posit the cause, or to remove it once posited, or to posit a cause which may impede the effect. Otherwise liberty is lacking, which is the foundation of imputation.

c) That the agent ought not to posit the cause, or ought to remove it once posited, or ought to posit a cause which may impede the effect; and precisely for this reason, lest the evil effect follow (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 6, a. 3; q. 20, a. 5; q. 73, a. 8, ad 1; St. Alphonsus, V, nn. X and XI). Therefore the effect is not imputed: 1. if the action, as being sinful, must indeed be omitted, yet not on account of the evil effect. If someone, for example, gets drunk on Thursday, foreseeing that he will not be present at Mass on the following Sunday, he does indeed sin by making himself drunk, but the neglect of Mass is not imputed to him, because he is not bound on Thursday to abstain from drunkenness in order to avoid the neglect of Mass; indeed, positive precepts do not carry with them the obligation of removing remote impediments. 2. The effect is not imputed if the action can be placed notwithstanding the evil effect. This has place especially, though with the things that must be posited being posited, in the case in which the action, besides an evil effect, also has a good effect. I have said "with the things that must be posited being posited"; since the assigned case is very practical, these things must be explained more fully. Therefore let there be this:

Proposition. It is permitted to place an action from which a double effect is going to follow, one good, the other evil, if the following conditions are present:

a) The action is good in itself, that is, abstraction being made from the evil effect, or at least indifferent, according to these words of St. Paul: "Let us not do evil that good may come."¹ It is said, "abstraction being made from the evil effect"; understand this of an evil effect distinct from a formally evil effect, because an action which has a formally evil effect, that is, which produces an evil effect by the very fact that it is placed, is evil in itself. In a word: here and in what follows we speak of effects which are not formal.

b) The evil effect is not intended; and moreover there is absent any grave danger of approving it, for example a pollution that will follow from the action, or of consenting to it.

c) The good effect does not follow by means of the evil effect. Otherwise evil would be done so that good might come. Nevertheless, it is not required that the good effect follow as immediately, nor that it follow as probably, as the evil effect. This required condition is present when, for example, medicine taken by a pregnant and sick mother produces the expulsion of the fetus and the health of the mother, yet does not produce the latter effect by means of the former. It must be said otherwise if a pregnant girl or wife were to procure reputation or health for herself by means of abortion (St. Alphonsus, III, 394).

d) There is present a proportionate cause for permitting the evil effect; for since this effect is evil, it must of itself be guarded against, so that of itself it cannot be permitted, much less contributed to in any way, unless a proportionate cause excuses. Besides, concerning the proportionate cause, observe:

a) The cause for permitting the evil effect of the action is situated in the good effect of the same action. Nevertheless, the effects are not only to be considered as if in particular, but the advantage and disadvantage of the whole of human society must be weighed.²

b) A graver cause is required: a) the greater, of itself, the obligation is of impeding the effect,³ or the weaker, of itself, the right is of placing the action;⁴ b) the greater the causal connection is between the action and the evil effect, so that a greater cause is required if the action influences it per se than if it influences it per accidens, and a greater cause if it influences it gravely than if lightly;⁵ c) the more closely the evil effect is joined with the action;⁶ d) the more necessary the action is for the evil effect;⁷ e) the more certainly the effect is going to follow; f) the worse the evil effect is.

Therefore, when there is question of an action whose effect is twofold, good and evil, it is certainly permitted to place it when the explained conditions have place. But it is another question whether each of the said conditions is always required. Moreover, this seems to be denied concerning the second and third conditions when the evil effect consists either: 1. in the privation of a good which is ordered to the good effect that will follow from the action; or 2. in the privation of a good which an unjust aggressor has lost the right of retaining. Hence it is permitted, for example, to amputate a member in order to save the whole; likewise, with the things to be observed having been observed, to wound or kill an unjust aggressor, although in the examples adduced the good effect is obtained by means of the evil effect, and the evil effect is intended as a means.⁸

2. To how much fault is the evil effect imputed? The solution depends on so many circumstances that it cannot be answered completely here. It will suffice to have noted these things, while more matters are referred to the diverse treatises.

a) A lightly evil effect is imputed to light fault.

b) A gravely evil effect is imputed to grave fault if the cause, both by its own nature and gravely, influences it, as pollution from gravely immodest touches. It is imputed of itself to light fault if the cause influences either lightly, as pollution from a less immodest touch, or remotely, per accidens, or occasionally, even gravely, as pollution from drunkenness, provided nevertheless that the danger of consenting is absent. I have said "of itself," because it can happen that the effect is imputed to grave fault even if the cause posited influences it only remotely, per accidens, or occasionally. This has place if the effect must be guarded against by reason of a stricter virtue, especially justice or religion, or by reason of the common good. Hence, for example, blasphemies and homicide committed in drunkenness, and foreseen, are imputed to grave fault, although drunkenness does not influence the aforesaid effects per se.

3. When is the evil effect imputed? The whole malice is contracted at the time when the cause is posited or not removed, or at least when the will of positing or not removing it is present. The reason is that every fault resides in the free will. But the malice is contracted whether or not the effect follows, because the event does not influence the depraved will, which has already preceded (St. Alphonsus, V, 10).

Question. Whether the evil effect itself, if it can no longer be impeded, for example homicide committed in perfect drunkenness, is infected with the malice of the will, or whether it is a merely material sin.

Response I. The evil effect of which we are speaking is a merely material sin if the depraved will was sincerely retracted before the event of the effect; for when it has been retracted, there is not that from which true morality could accede to the effect.

Response II. It is disputed if the will has not been sincerely retracted; but with St. Alphonsus (IV, 149; V, 10), it seems it must be said that the said effect is not a merely material sin. For what has been chosen by the will, or at least culpably permitted, and is committed while the will persists, cannot be called a merely material sin, but seems infected with the malice of the will. Finally, observe that this effect can consist both in a deed or in a positive act, and in an omission, for example of hearing Mass (St. Alphonsus, l.c.). Thus also Cajetan,⁹ the Salmanticenses,¹⁰ and Billuart.¹¹

St. Thomas has these words: "It must be said that in drunkenness two things are attended to, as was said: namely, the consequent defect and the preceding act. From the part of the consequent defect, in which the use of reason is bound, drunkenness has the effect of excusing from sin, insofar as it causes the involuntary through ignorance. But from the part of the preceding act, a distinction seems to have to be made; because if from that preceding act drunkenness has followed without sin, then the following sin is totally excused from fault, as perhaps happened to Lot. But if the preceding act was culpable, then someone is not totally excused from the following sin, which namely is rendered voluntary from the will of the preceding act, insofar as someone giving himself to an unlawful thing falls into the following sin. Yet the following sin is diminished, just as the nature of the voluntary is diminished" (II-II, q. 150, a. 4).

¹ Rom. 3:8.

² Frins, De actibus humanis ontologice et psychologice consideratis, n. 197.

³ For example, a graver cause is required for a public official than for a private person to cooperate in theft.

⁴ For example, a graver cause is required for a stranger than for a parishioner to seek the sacraments from an unworthy pastor.

⁵ For example, a graver cause is required so that, notwithstanding a pollution that will follow, a very immodest touch may be admitted, than so that a less immodest touch may become lawful.

⁶ For example, if there is question of printing an evil book, a greater cause is required if there is discussion of arranging the type than if there is discussion of preparing the paper.

⁷ For example, a graver cause is required for it to be permitted to give drink to a drunkard if other innkeepers who would give drink are lacking, than if they are present.

⁸ Concerning these things, which are denied by many, something will be said later.

⁹ In II-II, q. 150, a. 4.

¹⁰ De princ. mor., tr. 20, c. 10, n. 26.

¹¹ De pecc., diss. 1, a. 4, § 3.

"2. Although invincible ignorance of the natural law be granted, in the state of fallen nature this ignorance does not excuse one who acts from it from formal sin." Proposition condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 Dec. 1690.

"10. That they did not sin who, not knowing Christ, crucified Him, and that whatever is done through ignorance is not to be ascribed to guilt." Chapters of Abelard condemned by the Council of Sens and by Innocent II in the year 1140.

8. Whether ignorance is always a sin? — Ignorance differs from nescience and from error. Nescience is the simple negation of knowledge; whence anyone who lacks knowledge of certain things can be said not to know them. Nescience, as is clear, is not a sin. But ignorance is the privation of knowledge, namely when someone lacks knowledge of those things which he is apt by nature to know. Error is to approve false things as true. “Whence it adds a certain act over and above ignorance: for there can be ignorance without the fact that someone makes a judgment concerning things unknown, and then the one ignorant is not erring; but when he now makes a false judgment about the things which he does not know, then he is properly said to err. And because sin consists in act, error manifestly has the account of sin (namely of itself or objectively); for it is not without presumption that someone make a judgment concerning things ignored, and especially in those things in which danger exists.” S. Th., De Malo q. 3. a. 7. It is not without presumption, namely again of itself or objectively; for subjectively and as to formal sin, or fault, presumption yields to truth, if in good faith, if invincibly, someone has erred, as must presently also be said concerning ignorance.

12. Moreover forgetfulness, inconsideration, and inadvertence are equated with ignorance. Wherefore the same moral judgment must be passed concerning these as concerning simple ignorance. Cf. Suarez, D. 4, S. 3.; St. Alphonsus, l. 1, n. 169.

13. Further, invincible ignorance is not sin; but vincible ignorance is sin, if it is of those things which someone is bound to know, but not if it is of those things which someone is not bound to know. The reason of the first part is that ignorance is called invincible because it cannot be overcome by study. But it is not imputed to a man as negligence if he does not know those things which he cannot know. Therefore such ignorance, since it is not voluntary, because it is not in our power to repel it, is not sin. The reason of the second part is that whoever neglects to have or to do that which he is bound to have or do, sins by a sin of omission. Whence, on account of negligence, ignorance of those things which someone is bound to know is sin. But the sin is graver in proportion as the ignorance is more voluntary. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76. a. 2., q. 19. a. 6., Quodl. 8. a. 15.

15. Having posited that ignorance can be sin, it is asked further: whether ignorance can also be a cause of sin? — Sin can be taken in two ways: formally, for subjective fault itself; materially, for the objective act itself of sin. — If the discussion is about the objective act itself of sin, how ignorance can be a cause of sin is shown thus. Toward that which is unknown as to all things, the will cannot be borne. But if something is known according to something and unknown according to something, the will can will it. And in this way ignorance is a cause of sin, as when someone knows that this one whom he kills is a man, but does not know that he is his father; or when someone knows that some act is pleasurable, yet does not know that it is sin. Further, the moving cause is twofold, one per se and another per accidens. Per se indeed is that which moves by its proper power; but per accidens, as removing what prohibits, or as the very removal of what prohibits. And in this way ignorance can be the cause of an act of sin. For it is the privation of knowledge perfecting reason, which prohibits the act of sin insofar as it directs human acts. Whence it is clear that not every ignorance of one sinning is a cause of sin, but only that which takes away the knowledge prohibiting the act of sin, not that which simply takes away the knowledge of the act of sin. If the will of someone, for example, is so disposed that, recognizing his father, he certainly would not kill him, and this man kills a man not knowing that he is his father, ignorance is the cause of the act of parricide; if on the contrary the will of someone is so disposed that he would not be prohibited from the act of parricide even if he recognized his father, ignorance of the father is not the cause of sin for this man, but has itself concomitantly to the sin; and therefore such a one does not sin because of ignorance, but sins while ignorant. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76. a. 1. — If the discussion is about the subjective fault itself of sin, vincible ignorance can be a cause of sin or fault. The reason is that “ignorance is said to cause the act which the opposite knowledge was prohibiting.” But someone can deliberately will not to know certain things, lest he be drawn back from sin; someone can, on account of other occupations, neglect to learn those things by which he would be drawn back from sin. But invincible ignorance cannot be the formal cause of sin. For invincible ignorance can be the cause of effecting an act which would be sin if it were done voluntarily; yet simply it is never a cause of sin, because when it is present, not only is the act not sin, but it can even be virtue. Cf. n. 6. — S. Th. l. c. a. 3.; Suarez, Tr. 5, D. 4, S. 1, n. 5.

18. But sometimes it does not excuse totally from sin, sometimes it excuses totally from sin. And this the Angelic Doctor declares thus, 1. 2. q. 76. a. 3: “That it sometimes does not excuse totally from sin can happen from two things. In one way from the part of the thing itself ignored. For ignorance excuses from sin insofar as something is ignored to be sin. But it can happen that someone indeed ignores some circumstance of sin, which if he knew, he would be drawn back from sinning, whether that circumstance makes for the account of sin or not; and nevertheless there still remains in his knowledge something through which he knows that it is an act of sin; for instance, if someone striking someone knows indeed that he is a man, which suffices for the account of sin, but nevertheless does not know him to be his father, which is a circumstance constituting a new species of sin; or perhaps he does not know that the one defending himself strikes him back, which, if he knew it, he would not strike him, which does not pertain to the account of sin. Whence although such a one sins on account of ignorance, nevertheless he is not totally excused from sin, because there still remains to him cognition of sin. In another way this can happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, namely, that ignorance itself is voluntary either directly, as when someone studiously wills not to know certain things, so that he may sin more freely; or indirectly, as when someone, on account of labor or on account of other occupations, neglects to learn that by which he would be drawn back from sin. For such negligence makes the ignorance itself to be voluntary and a sin, provided that it is of those things which someone is bound and able to know. And therefore such ignorance does not totally excuse from sin. But if the ignorance is such as to be wholly involuntary, either because it is invincible, or because it is of that which someone is not bound to know, such ignorance wholly excuses from sin,” if namely ignorance of this kind, invincible, is total by reason of the bad object unknown, and not only partial; for example, if someone in the example already adduced not only invincibly were ignorant of the circumstance of father, but also of the circumstance of man, and believed that he was striking and killing a beast.

20. The question now follows: whether ignorance diminishes sin? — “Ignorance which is not the cause of sin, but has itself concomitantly to sin, neither diminishes sin nor increases it,” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4. The reason is that that ignorance influences nothing in the act of sin; whence, just as it does not excuse from sin, cf. n. 19, so also it neither increases nor diminishes sin, but leaves it wholly in that state in which it is. If a confessor, for example, is so disposed in soul that he absolves all penitents, whether prepared or indisposed for sacramental absolution, the fact that he is ignorant, whether voluntarily or non-voluntarily, of the principles of Moral Theology, this ignorance, as it is not the cause of the sin and does not excuse from that sin, so neither does it increase or lessen it. The same should be said of an ignorant physician of the healing art who is so disposed in soul that he wills to procure, as much as is in him, not the health, but the death of the sick.

25. But it seems that one must distinguish, for ignorance of this kind can proceed from various affections and motives. If someone affects ignorance merely on account of weariness or labor in learning, or not precisely lest he be drawn back from sin, but lest he be drawn back from such an action, to which he strongly clings, the sin certainly is not increased: for example, if someone were unwilling to know what the Church has defined concerning some matter, because he does not wish to depart from the Church’s definition, and otherwise wishes to think freely, as long as the Church’s definition is not certain to him. For then, if it happens in the matter that he dissents from the definition of the Church, without doubt this is with a lesser will, and without pertinacity, and with less contempt. But if someone affects ignorance for this end, lest he be drawn back from sin, the sin is increased precisely in the account of intrinsic inclination, and of the inclined will, and, in this sense, of the voluntary, since the man so loves that thing that on account of it he wills even to undergo the loss of ignorance; but it is diminished simply in the account of a human act, for ignorance, from whatever cause it may arise, per se lessens the account of a human act and the formal contempt of law. Moreover, in such a case that man wills to be ignorant for this reason, lest he be drawn back from sin. Therefore, if he knew, perhaps in reality he would be drawn back from sin. Therefore that ignorance shows that the will is not so firmly established in such a sin. Finally, if someone affects ignorance because he absolutely wills the sin itself, whether in reality it is prohibited or not, wholly contemning the law, the sin certainly is increased, because that ignorance is a sign of great affection toward sin and of greater contempt, since he pursues sin with such affection that he wills even to suffer the loss of ignorance and thus to sin, although perhaps the thing in itself is not sin; as if someone, in the example adduced, should be unwilling to know the definition of the Church, because he has decreed to think thus, whatever the Church may think. And in this sense indeed St. Thomas in the cited place seems to be understood. Cf. Suarez D. 4. S. 2.; Lugo, On Penance, D. 4. S. 4. n. 183.; Struggl, cited place, n. 36.

27. Concerning sins likewise not foreseen, which are done from ignorance of fact, culpable on account of negligence, as when one occupied with hunting kills a man instead of a stag, it must be said that they pertain to the species of sins directly willed, for instance of dangerous hunting, and of similar acts by which those sins are caused. The reason is that more is required for the account of a proper species than the simple account of the voluntary; for that from which the species of sin is taken must be intended per se. Whence, although those sins are voluntary in their causes, nevertheless, because they are not voluntary in themselves, they are not intended per se, and because of this they are not according to themselves sins, neither as elicited acts, nor as commanded acts; but they are events, or effects of sins, not intended nor foreseen, although foreseeable, and because of this aggravating circumstances, yet not themselves drawing into their own species, but they themselves are drawn away into the species of their causes. “For when something,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 76. a. 4., “is not known to be sin, it cannot be said that the will is borne directly and per se into sin, but per accidens.” The Holy Doctor is speaking of ignorance indirectly voluntary and culpable. — Concerning sins also not foreseen, which are done from ignorance of law culpable on account of negligence, the very same seems to be said on account of the same reason. And thus he who on a fasting day eats twice on account of culpable negligence in knowing the Church’s laws of fasting does not contract any malice specifically other than that of that voluntary ignorance. Cf. Cajetan in the cited place of St. Thomas, La Croix, l. 1. n. 757-760.

To be free, an action must proceed (1) from internal inclination, without constraint; (2) from a full knowledge of the end intended, and (3) from indifference of the will.¹

¹ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 5 sqq., qu. 76 sq.

An action that is performed without constraint is called spontaneous. Obstacles to spontaneity are: 1. VIOLENCE. —By violence (vis, violentia, coactio) is meant the state of being driven by some external force which the agent is unable to resist. Since the will itself cannot be subjected to violence, its interior acts (actus eliciti s. interiores) are never forced. The only acts that can be affected by force are those mediate acts known as imperati.² Acts performed under absolute compulsion, the subject resisting internally, are involuntary (actus simpliciter involuntarii). When the compulsion is not absolute, the acts performed under it are more or less voluntary, according to the degree of resistance offered.³

² Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 4: "An act of the will is twofold: one is immediately its own, as elicited by it, namely to will; the other is an act commanded by the will and exercised through another power, such as walking and speaking. These are commanded by the will but exercised through a motive power. Therefore, with respect to acts commanded by the will, the will can suffer violence insofar as the exterior members can be prevented by violence from executing its command. But with respect to the will's own proper act, violence cannot be inflicted upon it. The reason is that an act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from an interior knowing principle, just as natural appetite is a certain inclination from an interior principle but without knowledge. What is coerced or violent, however, is from an exterior principle. Hence it is contrary to the nature of an act of the will itself that it be coerced or violent, just as it is contrary to the nature of a natural inclination or of the motion of a stone that it be borne upward. For a stone can be carried upward by violence, but it cannot be that this violent motion comes from its natural inclination. Similarly, a man can be dragged by violence, but that this should be from his will is contrary to the nature of violence." —Cfr. St. Anselm, De Lib. Arbitr., c. 5: "A man cannot will unwillingly, because he cannot will while unwilling to will." (Migne, P. L., CLVIII, 496). God can ex nolente facere volentem per gratiam efficacem (St. Alphonsus, De Act. Human., n. 19), and, by His omnipotence, cause the human will to act or abstain from acting; but He cannot properly speaking compel it, because He cannot cause it to will and not to will the same thing at one and the same time. —Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 10, art. 4: "It does not belong to divine providence to corrupt the nature of things, but to preserve it." —IDEM, De Veritate qu. 22, art. 8: "God can change the will by necessity, yet He cannot coerce it."

³ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 5. —That internal compulsion (necessitas) destroys the freedom of the will has been indirectly defined by the Church. Cfr. Prop. Damnat. Baii, prop. 46: "Voluntariness does not belong to the nature and definition of sin." Prop. 67: "Man sins, even damnably, in that which he does necessarily." —Prop. Damnat. Jansenii, prop. 3: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, freedom from necessity is not required in man; freedom from coercion suffices." —Prop. Damnat. ab Alexandro VIII. (7 Dec., 1690), prop. 1: "In the state of fallen nature, for formal sin and demerit that freedom suffices by which the act was voluntary and free in its cause—original sin and the will of Adam sinning." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1046, 1067, 1094, 1291). —Cfr. Th. Müncker, Der psychische Zwang in seinen Beziehungen zu Moral und Pastoral, Düsseldorf 1922.

2. IGNORANCE. —When a man has no knowledge of the end intended, he is said to be ignorant. Moral ignorance may therefore be defined as a lack of that knowledge which a person ought to have in order to perform the duties of his office or vocation. It is impossible to will a thing that lies outside the scope of one's knowledge.⁴ If a man unknowingly directs his action towards such an object, that action is in so far forth involuntary (involuntarium).⁵

⁴ "Quod latet, ignotum est," "Ignoti nulla cupido," are Scholastic axioms.

⁵ Cfr. St. Augustine, De Lib. Arbitr., III, c. 19, n. 53: "It is not charged to you as a fault that you are unwillingly ignorant, but that you neglect to seek what you do not know." (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 1297).—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 76, art. 2-3.

Ignorance may be culpable or inculpable (culpabilis s. inculpabilis), vincible or invincible (vincibilis s. invincibilis).

Invincible ignorance is that which cannot be overcome by the use of ordinary intelligence. It involves no moral responsibility.

Vincible ignorance, on the other hand, —the kind that can be dispelled by the use of ordinary intelligence, —may, in certain circumstances, diminish moral responsibility, but never entirely abolishes it; for whatever is done in a state of vincible ignorance, is willed at least indirectly, and to that extent is voluntary.

Ignorance due to gross negligence is called crass or supine (ignorantia crassa); when means are used to foster it, it is called affected (ignorantia affectata). Both crass and affected ignorance are sinful.⁶

⁶ Cfr. Job XXI, 14; John IX, 41; XV, 22.

3. FEAR. —Fear (metus) is a disturbed condition of the mind caused by real or imaginary danger. Fear does not always destroy free-will, but generally diminishes accountability.⁷

⁷ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 6; qu. 41-44; St. Alphonsus, De Act. Human., n. 20—22.

Fear is grave or slight (metus gravis s. levis) according to the nature of the danger by which it is caused. As fear, generally speaking, does not exercise compulsion, the actions which it inspires are voluntary, though the degree of their imputability varies in proportion to the disturbance excited in the mind. Both canon and civil law regard acts inspired by grave and unjust fear as void.⁸ If serious evil or danger suddenly overwhelms a man, so as to deprive him momentarily of the use of reason, the acts he performs in that state are involuntary; in other words, a man may sometimes be so disturbed by fear that free-will is suspended.

⁸ Cfr. J. Laurentius, S.J., Instit. Iuris Eccl., Freiburg 1903, pp. 458 sqq.; E. Taunton, The Law of the Church, London 1906, p. 345.

4. CONCUPISCENCE. —Concupiscence (concupiscentia), in the general sense of the term, is any movement of the sensitive appetite towards its proper object.⁹ More particularly, it is that inordinate inclination to evil which is in human nature since the fall of Adam and Eve.¹⁰

⁹ Cfr. Catechismus Romanus, P. III, c. 10, qu. 5: "It must be known that concupiscence is a certain agitation and force of the mind by which men, impelled, seek pleasant things that they do not have."

¹⁰ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 30, art. 1-3: "Concupiscence is the appetite for a delightful good ... according to sense, ... the sensitive appetite, a passion of the sensitive appetite." Cfr. qu. 77, art. 1 and 7. —St. Alphonsus, De Act. Human., n. 23-25; Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, 2nd ed., St. Louis 1916, pp. 203, 217, 245, 261 sqq., 283 sqq.

Concupiscence may precede or follow the action of the will. In the former case it is called antecedent; in the latter, consequent.

Antecedent concupiscence (concupiscentia antecedens) is involuntary when it completely impedes the use of reason, and in that case there is no accountability. Men are often "blinded by passion." When the use of reason is not entirely suspended, the guilt of an evil act may be greatly diminished by passion.¹¹ Thus, to kill a man in a rage is less criminal than to murder him in cold blood.

¹¹ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 77, art. 7: "Sometimes passion is so great that it entirely takes away the use of reason, as is evident in those who become insane through love or anger; and then, if such passion was voluntary from the beginning, the act is imputed as sin because it is voluntary in its cause. ... But if the cause was not voluntary but natural, as when someone through illness or some similar cause falls into such a passion as entirely takes away the use of reason, the act is rendered wholly involuntary and consequently is entirely excused from sin. Sometimes, however, passion is not so great that it entirely interrupts the use of reason; and then reason can exclude the passion by turning to other thoughts, or prevent it from obtaining its effect, because the members are not applied to action except by consent of reason. Hence such passion does not entirely excuse from sin." (Cfr. qu. 10, art. 3; qu. 73, art. 6).

Consequent concupiscence (concupiscentia consequens) may to some extent obscure the light of reason, but as a rule increases the malice of evil acts ¹² because it is either deliberately excited by the will or, at any rate, willed in its cause.¹³

¹² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 7: "Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but rather makes something voluntary. For something is called voluntary because the will is borne toward it; through concupiscence the will is inclined to will what it desires, and therefore concupiscence tends more to make something voluntary than involuntary." —Qu. 77, art. 1: "A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot directly draw or move the will, but it can do so indirectly, and in two ways: first, by a certain distraction ... and secondly, on the part of the will's object, which is the good apprehended by reason."

¹³ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 77, art. 6: "Consequent passion does not diminish sin, but rather increases it, or more properly is a sign of its magnitude insofar as it shows the intensity of the will toward the sinful act. And so it is true that the greater the lust or concupiscence with which someone sins, the more he sins." —IDEM, De Veritate, qu. 26, art. 7: "Consequent passion itself in the lower appetite is a sign that the movement of the will is intense. For in a passible nature the will cannot be strongly moved toward something without some passion following in the lower part. Hence Augustine says that while we bear the infirmity of this life, if we have no passions, we do not live rightly." —The passage of St. Augustine here referred to by the Angelic Doctor is De Civitate Dei, XIV, c. 9, n. 4 (Migne, P. L., XLI, 451).

READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, qu. 76 sq. —V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. I, 4th ed., Freiburg 1904, pp. 73 sqq. —A. Huber, Die Hemmnisse der Willensfreiheit, pp. 48 sqq. —Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus Theol. Mor., Vol. I, tr. 1, c. 3-6. —Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 30 sqq.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 41 sqq. —A. Sweens, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, 2nd ed., Haaren 1910, pp. 59 sqq. —F. P. Kenrick, Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, pp. 7 sqq. —W. McDonald, The Principles of Moral Science, Dublin 1904, pp. 177 sqq., 184 sqq. —A. Vermeersch, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, Bruges 1922, pp. 69 sqq., 77 sqq., 81 sqq.

I. NOTION OF IMPUTABILITY. —There is a distinction between responsibility, imputability, and morality.

"Responsibility is the condition of a man who, having sufficient knowledge, and being free from coercion, can act or not act, as he chooses, and is therefore accountable for his determination. Imputability is the character of an act which is freely performed, so that the good or evil of it is attributable to him who performs it. The morality or immorality of an act is its conformity or non-conformity with the moral law." ¹ Imputation is the judgment by which a man is declared to be the free cause of an act and held responsible for its consequences.

¹ R. I. Holaind, S.J., Natural Law and Legal Practice, p. 84.

Before judgment on the authorship of an act can be definitely pronounced, it is necessary to inquire, (i) whether the agent to whom the act is imputed is really its author (imputatio facti), and (2) whether he was free to act and is responsible for his conduct (imputatio iuris sive legis).

The judgment by which an act is imputed to a man is pronounced either by his own conscience ² or by civil or ecclesiastical authority, and may be true or false. God alone always "judgeth justly," ³ because He is "the searcher of hearts." ⁴ Human judgments are just only in so far as they coincide with those of God.

² Cfr. 1 Cor. IV, 3 sq.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 112, art. 5; Theo. Meyer, S.J., Institutiones Iuris Naturalis, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 173 sqq.

³ Jer. XI, 20.

⁴ Ps. VII, 9 sq.; cfr. Jer. XVII, 10; XX, 12; John II, 23; Rom. XIV, 4, 10; Acts I, 24; XV, 8; 1 Cor. IV, 5; 2 Cor. V, 10; Apoc. II, 23; XX, 12.

1. A man is responsible for an act (be it of commission or omission) in exact proportion to the degree of liberty which he enjoys. Hence only free acts are imputable, i. e., attributable to the agent for reward or punishment. In other words, where there is no freedom of choice, there is no imputability, and the greater a man's power to determine his actions, the greater his merit or demerit, and vice versa.⁵

⁵ Cfr. W. Schmidt, Der Kampf um die sittliche Welt, pp. 301 sqq.

2. Of course, no human being is entirely free. It was shown in the first part of this treatise how the will is influenced by individual as well as social factors. In addition to these there are certain others which diminish responsibility, e. g., ignorance, inadvertence, habit, and various mental disturbances.

a) IGNORANCE (ignorantia) is the absence of knowledge which a person should have.⁶ The civil courts (except in the case of children) do not admit ignorance as a mitigating circumstance in cases of serious transgression, but proceed on the principle that "ignorance of the law does not excuse."

⁶ Cfr. E. Taunton, The Law of the Church, pp. 365 sq.; J. Hollweck, Die kirchlichen Strafgesetze, Mayence 1899, pp. 77 sqq.

Moral Theology, on the contrary, acknowledges the existence of culpable ignorance by which responsibility and guilt are diminished. The reason is not far to seek. A sin that springs from ignorance does not indicate a positive evil tendency of the will. That there are peccata ignorantiae the New Testament teaches in numerous passages. Christ prayed for his executioners: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do/' ⁷ In one of the discourses reported by St. John, Jesus says: "If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin." ⁸ St. Peter, after accusing the Jews of having killed the Author of life, added: "Brethren, I know that you did it through ignorance, as did also your rulers."⁹ St. Paul regrets that he persecuted Christ and His Church, but adds: "I obtained the mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in unbelief." ¹⁰ Note, however, that ignorance can never altogether excuse any one from performing the duties proper to his state of life, because every man is strictly bound to inform himself with regard to these duties.¹¹ b) INADVERTENCE (inadvertentia) signifies the omission of such care as duty requires one to take with regard to one's obligations. Civil jurisprudence imputes acts of inadvertence that involve injury to others. Not so Moral Theology. Sins committed through inadvertence (peccata inadvertent iae) are not altogether imputed because they spring from defective knowledge. There can be no guilt in the theological sense of the term where there is no dolus, i. e., a deliberate intention of violating the law, or culpa lata, i. e., criminal carelessness or neglect of that ordinary care which every sensible person is supposed to exercise in important matters.¹² An evil action may be premeditated (malice prepense or aforethought), or committed in a fit of passion (dolus repentinus). This distinction is important in cases where a man takes the life of another. If he acts with malice aforethought, he is guilty of murder; if carried away by passion, his crime is merely man-slaughter.

⁷ Luke XXIII, 34.

⁸ John XV, 22.

⁹ Acts III, 17.

¹⁰ 1 Tim. I, 13.

¹¹ Cfr. Luke XII, 47 sq.; Jas. IV, 17.

¹² Cfr. Codex Iuris Can., can. 2199 sq.; Ex. XXI, 29 sqq.; Numb. XXXV, 22 sqq.; Deut. XIX, 4-6.

Negligence means failure to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations that ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence may be slight, ordinary, or gross. These principal degrees have been shaded off in opposite directions by the Roman jurists and the Schoolmen (latissima, latior, lata; levis, levior, levissima),¹³ c) CUSTOM (consuetudo) or habit is a facility acquired in performing certain acts by frequent repetition. If a man always acts in the same manner, he gradually acquires a certain facility. As a determinant of the will, this facility may be a means either of virtue or of vice, and as the proverb says, often becomes second nature.¹⁴ Habit diminishes but does not destroy free-will. In so far as a habit is freely acquired, it increases responsibility, and in so far as it is good, it augments merit. If one has unconsciously acquired a bad habit, the sinful acts are not imputable until the wickedness of the habit and its acts is realized. As soon as it is realized, the duty arises of rigorously combatting the evil habit. By falling back into a bad habit a man incurs grave responsibility, because he almost invariably acts against his better knowledge and his conduct has in it something tending to that state of which our Saviour says that it is "worse than the first." 15 Acts which are, as it were, mere mechanical consequences of a habit, are imputable only in so far as the habit itself is voluntary (voluntarium in causa). d) There are many different kinds of MENTAL DERANGEMENT or psychic abnormality. Illusions, hallucinations, fixed ideas, hypochondria, melancholia, hysteria, morbid fear in its various forms (especially agoraphobia, i. e., the dread of crossing or being in the midst of open spaces), severe nostalgia (homesickness), and all forms of quasi-amentia impede the normal exercise of reason and must therefore be regarded as extenuating circumstances, though they do not entirely destroy free-will unless they develop into actual insanity. In all such cases medical experts should be consulted. Note, however, that theologians must sometimes assume moral guilt where physicians and lawyers deny the existence of responsibility. For while it is quite true that the genuine symptoms of insanity are rarely simulated, that many crimes (especially sexual perversities) are pathological, and that an insuperable disinclination to labor and a slanderous tongue may be symptoms of neurasthenia or hysteria, it is equally certain that not all forms of mental derangement entirely destroy the freedom of the will.

¹³ Cfr. V. Patuzzi, Ethica Christiana, Vol. V, Bassano 1790, pp. 229 sq.: "The broadest fault is equated with deceit and fraud, and in truth consists in explicit deceit, as if a soldier standing watch pretended to sleep so that the enemy might enter. A broader fault is implicit deceit, as if the keeper of a flock, who can drive away a thief or wolf by shouting, nevertheless remains silent. A broad fault is the omission, in guarding another's property or avoiding damage, of that diligence which prudent and sensible men commonly employ in caring for their own affairs, as if a servant should neglect to close the door of the house at night. A slight fault consists in the omission of that diligence which more diligent men and heads of households are especially accustomed to employ; as if someone should place a borrowed golden vessel in his own room, even with the door closed, but without drawing the bolts. Finally, the slightest fault imports the omission of that diligence which only the most cautious and circumspect customarily employ, such as that of a man who locks jewels in a chest but does not test or examine by hand whether it is firmly closed." —E. Voit, Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, 6th ed., Würzburg 1769, n. 744, p. 494: "A broader fault is called presumed deceit, or the omission of due diligence, from which, although an evil intention to harm is not altogether manifestly inferred, it can nevertheless prudently be presumed. Such a fault exists in one who does not indeed intend harm to his neighbor, but nevertheless foresees that it will result from his action or its omission."

¹⁴ Cicero, De Finibus, V, c. 25: "Consuetude quasi altera natura." — Cfr. St. Augustine, Confessions, VIII, c. 5, n. 10: "For from a perverse will lust arose; and while lust was served, custom arose; and while custom was not resisted, necessity arose." — IDEM, De Musica, VI, c. 7, n. 19: "Non frustra consuetudo quasi secunda et quasi affabricata natura dicitur." (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 753, 1173). —IDEM, Serm., 17 (a/. 28 inter Homilias, 50), n. 3 (P. L., XXXVIII, 125). —St. Bernard, De Consid., IV, c. 3, n. 8: "Nil tam durum, quod duriori non cedat." (P. L., CLXXXII, 777). —Cfr. Jer. XIII, 23. 15 Matth. XII, 43 sqq.; cfr. Prov. XXVI, 11; Luke XI, 24 sqq.; Heb. X, 26; 2 Pet. II, 20 sqq.

3. The CONSEQUENCES of an act (eventus sequentes) are imputable to the agent whenever they follow from the act in the ordinary course of events and can therefore be foreseen, either definitely or at least in confuso, or when they are organically connected with the act from which they flow and form a moral whole with it. When an act that is in itself licit entails evil consequences which the agent can foresee, these consequences are imputable to the agent, provided the act is neither physically nor morally necessary. Consequences which follow an act with purely physical necessity are not imputable in the court of morals, though they can and must be reckoned with in secular jurisprudence.¹⁶

¹⁶ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1a 2ae, qu. 20, art. 5; Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., pp. 122 sqq.

READINGS. —On imputability in general: M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 182, 543 sq. —R. I. Holaind, S.J., Natural Law and Legal Practice, pp. 84 sqq. —Theo. Meyer, S.J., Institutiones Iuris Naturalis, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 173 sqq.

On ignorance: A. Boudinhon in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. V, p. 682.—J. F. Delany, ibid., Vol. VII, pp. 648 sqq.—Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 30 sqq.—E. Taunton, The Law of the Church, pp. 365 sq. —A. Sweens, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, pp. 71 sqq. —A. Tanquerey, S.S., Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, pp. 48 sqq.

On negligence: Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 27, 409 sq., 539. —J. F. Delany in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. X, p. 737.

On mental derangement as a diminuent of responsibility: A. Huber, Die Hemmnisse der Willensfreiheit, 2nd ed., pp. 214 sqq. —Ig. Familler, Pastoral-Psychiatrie, Freiburg 1898. —S. Weber, Zwangsgedanken und Zwangszustände, Paderborn 1903. —R. v. Kraft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis, 13th ed., Stuttgart 1907. —W. Wille, Die Psychosen des Pubertätsalters, Vienna 1898.—K. Hilty, Ueber Neurasthenie, Berne 1897.—Krauss, Der Kampf gegen die Verbrechensursachen, pp. 295 sqq. —J. Bessmer, S.J., Störungen im Seelenleben, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1907. —IDEM, Die Grundlagen der Seelenstörungen, Freiburg 1906. —Th. Braun, Die religiöse Wahnbildung, Tübingen 1906, pp. 13 sqq. —Jas. J. Walsh, "Scruples, Obsessions, and Dreads," in the Ecclesiastical Review, Vol. LVI (1917), No. 4, pp. 360-375.—O'Malley-Walsh, Essays in Pastoral Medicine, New York 1906, pp. 211 sqq. —Fr. a Barbens, O. M. Cap., Introductio Pathologica ad Studium Theol. Mor., Tarracona 1917, pp. 81 sqq.

Preliminary note. To ignorance also are to be referred forgetfulness and inadvertence, which, if they are perfect, are equivalent to invincible ignorance; but if they are imperfect, they exercise the same influence upon the morality of the act as vincible ignorance. Therefore the following two principles are valid in the same way concerning ignorance and concerning inadvertence and concerning forgetfulness.

45. Principle 1. Invincible (antecedent) ignorance takes away the voluntary, and therefore also the imputability of any act which has been produced from it.¹⁸ Authors are accustomed to say briefly: Antecedent ignorance excuses from sin.

The reason is that he who acts from invincible ignorance inculpably lacks cognition of the morality of the act. But nothing is willed unless it is foreknown. Wherefore the Jansenistic proposition (2) was condemned by Alexander VIII: "Although invincible ignorance of natural law be given, this, in the state of fallen nature, does not excuse one acting from it from formal sin."¹⁹ St. Augustine expressly says: "It is not imputed to you as fault if you are unwillingly ignorant."²⁰

Resolves: a) He does not sin who eats meat on Friday while invincibly thinking it is Thursday.

b) Infants before the use of reason do not sin when perpetrating something against natural or divine law.

c) A youth invincibly ignorant that some book is on the Index of prohibited books sins if he reads it and afterward, when he perceives the prohibition, rejoices over the reading, saying that he would have read the book even if he had known the prohibition. He sins not indeed by the reading itself, since it was done with invincible ignorance, but by the joy afterward had.

¹⁸ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 76, a. 3 and q. 6, a. 8.

¹⁹ Denz. 1292; cf. also ibid. 1068.

²⁰ De lib. arb. 3, c. 19 (Migne, Patr. lat. 32, 1297).

46. Principle 2. Vincible ignorance a) does not take away the voluntary; b) nevertheless diminishes it, unless c) it is affected.

The reason for the first is that, notwithstanding vincible ignorance, the acts could and should have been foreseen and known. For since vincible ignorance itself is voluntary, the effects also following from it are voluntary. Peter Abelard seems to have taught the contrary, and therefore his proposition was condemned: "that whatever is done through ignorance is not to be ascribed to fault."²¹

The reason for the second is that here and now perfect cognition is truly lacking, which, if it were present, the action would not occur. But when perfect cognition is lacking, the perfect voluntary also is lacking, or the voluntary is diminished. Nevertheless vincible ignorance (at least if it is crass) is not accustomed to diminish the voluntary to the point that an act otherwise mortally evil becomes a venial sin.

The reason for the third is that affected ignorance is accustomed to arise either from an evil will causing it for sinning more freely,²² or from contempt of the law.

Resolves: a) A confessor, physician, advocate, etc., who from very imperfect knowledge necessary to their office err in particular cases, sin, because they could and strictly should have procured sufficient knowledge for themselves. For their ignorance is vincible and culpable.

b) The faithful who neglect to learn the truths of faith and the precepts of morals sin if from ignorance they err concerning faith or transgress moral precepts. Nevertheless their sin is less than if they knowingly transgressed the same precepts.

c) The faithful are bound to acquire sufficient cognition of the truths of faith and morals, lest from ignorance they err in matters which pertain to the salvation of the soul.

The two principles enunciated can also be briefly expressed thus:

1. Antecedent ignorance causes the simply involuntary. Consequent ignorance causes the simply voluntary and the involuntary in a certain respect.

2. Concomitant ignorance indeed causes the non-voluntary, but not the involuntary²³ (concerning the distinction between the involuntary and the non-voluntary, see below n. 56).

3. Antecedent ignorance excuses; consequent ignorance accuses; concomitant ignorance neither excuses nor accuses.

²¹ Denz. 377.

²² Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 76, a. 4: "Ignorance (affected) seems to increase the voluntary and sin: for from the intensity of the will toward sinning it comes about that someone wishes to undergo the harm of ignorance because of liberty in sinning." Cf. also De malo q. 3, a. 8.

²³ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 8.

47. Scholion 1. On the inadvertence of the customary sinner. It can happen that a man is so bound up in evil habits that he elicits evil acts without any actual advertence to the malice, and those habits become as a second nature. This indeed can occur, for example, from the habit of blaspheming, fornicating, lying. In these cases a distinction is needed: Either the evil habit has been efficaciously retracted through sincere contrition, and then the acts produced without advertence are involuntary and therefore inculpable; or the evil habit has not been retracted, and then the individual acts do not lack fault, because they should have been foreseen and guarded against; indeed such acts are graver sins, since they proceed from a deep-rooted habit freely admitted.²⁴ Nevertheless in the confessional customary sinners of this kind are not to be too much tormented so that they state the number of individual acts. For investigation of the exact number is impossible, and rude penitents are accustomed to answer the questioning confessor whatever comes into their mouth, as St. Alphonsus says. Therefore it suffices if the confessor asks through what length of time the penitent has lived in such a habit, and about how many acts he committed each day.

Scholion 2. On ignorance of ecclesiastical laws and penalties. Although ignorance of invalidating or incapacitating laws (for example, impediments of marriage, irregularities) does not excuse from the same, unless something else is expressly said (c. 16, § 1), nevertheless "The violation of an unknown law is in no way imputed, if the ignorance was inculpable; otherwise imputability is diminished more or less according to the culpability of the ignorance itself" (c. 2202, § 1). But as often as because of ignorance (or some other cause) the transgression of the law was not gravely culpable, no ecclesiastical penalty is incurred (c. 2218, § 2). Grave fault, however, is not always required if there is question of imposing penances or penal remedies.

As to ignorance of ecclesiastical penalties, these things have been established: a) Ignorance of only the penalty does not take away the imputability of the delict, but diminishes it somewhat (c. 2202, § 2); b) Affected ignorance, whether of the law or only of the penalty, excuses from no penalty; but crass and supine ignorance excuses from penalties alone, if the law has the words: shall have presumed, shall have dared, knowingly, deliberately, rashly, with purpose aforethought shall have acted, or other similar words; c) Other ignorance indeed excuses from medicinal penalties, but not from vindicative penalties (c. 2229).

²⁴ S. theol. I-II, q. 78, a. 2; cf. also below n. 90.

830. It is asked: Does ignorance excuse from this impediment? Authors disputed much whether this impediment is incurred even if one or each of the contracting parties did not know that it was imposed for the crimes recounted above. - The much more probable opinion taught that ignorance does not excuse from this impediment; today this has become certain and is admitted by all, since the Code of Canon Law, can. 16, § 1, establishes without any restriction: "No ignorance of invalidating or incapacitating laws excuses from them unless something else is expressly stated." But all diriment impediments of matrimony are invalidating laws, and the impediment of crime is not expressly exempted.

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 8; q. 19, a. 6; q. 76.

80. Ignorance properly is the lack of knowledge in a subject capable of it, for example of astronomy in a priest. It differs:

1. From nescience, which is the simple negation of knowledge in an incapable subject, for example in a child or a madman;

2. From error, which is not a mere lack but a positive act of the intellect judging a thing to be otherwise than it is; it arises from ignorance or rashness;

3. From inadvertence, which is the lack not indeed of habitual knowledge but of actual consideration;

4. From forgetfulness, which is the privation of knowledge previously had.

But since moralists treat only of due duties and undue sins, they often take ignorance more strictly, not indeed for a negation, but for the privation of knowledge which ought to be in someone, such as theology for a confessor. Hence some distinguish negative ignorance, privative ignorance, and even positive ignorance or ignorance of false disposition, if it includes error.

81. Ignorance is divided:

1. By reason of the object which is unknown, it is ignorance of law, whether natural or positive, whether divine or human, whether of the law itself or of the penalty joined to it, by which, namely, the existence or extension or sense of the law itself is unknown; and ignorance of fact, by which a fact or a concrete circumstance of fact determining the present application of the law is unknown.

Thus he who does not know that on the vigil of Pentecost one must fast, or that heretical books are prohibited, is in ignorance of law; he who does not advert that this day is the vigil of Pentecost, or that this book is heretical, is in ignorance of fact.

2. By reason of the subject or person who is ignorant, ignorance is invincible or vincible. Invincible or involuntary ignorance is that which could not be removed by moral diligence; but vincible or voluntary ignorance is that which could have been so removed.

Moral diligence is that which prudent persons are accustomed to employ, and which varies according to the various circumstances or quality of the business, person, place, etc.; for example, it will be greater in a priest for rightly executing his office than in a rustic, greater where there is question of the goods of life than of fortune, where there is question of notable harm to a third party than of a small one.

Vincible ignorance is inculpable if it ought not to have been removed; but culpable if it ought to have been. But moralists, attending only to due and undue things, use the words culpable and vincible indiscriminately, and often call culpable ignorance vincible, and call inculpable ignorance invincible.

1. Speculatively one can still distinguish absolutely invincible ignorance, if it can in no way be removed; morally invincible and absolutely vincible ignorance, if absolutely it can be removed but only with toil and difficulty (because there is not given a proximate moral power for overcoming it); and morally vincible ignorance, if it can be removed morally and by ordinary diligence. But moralists do not treat of these.

Invincible ignorance can arise from a twofold head: either because someone has not thought at all about the truth to be sought or about the danger of error (for the first idea is not in man's power), or because, if he has thought and employed diligence, nevertheless he has not arrived at the truth. Whence it is not voluntary.

On the contrary, vincible ignorance is voluntary, whether directly and in itself, as if someone wills to be ignorant; or only indirectly from negligence, as if he omits to inquire when he ought to inquire; or only in the cause, if he wills something upon which ignorance follows (for example, drunkenness). But there are many degrees in it, which are usually reduced to three: a) ignorance strictly or simply vincible, when diligence is employed to overcome it, but not sufficient diligence, or not the whole diligence which is morally possible, or not all that which the quality of the business and person demands: it is indirectly voluntary; b) crass ignorance, when no or scarcely any diligence has been employed for acquiring knowledge, and supine ignorance, if this was so for driving away ignorance: it is voluntary, either indirectly, or in the cause; c) affected, malicious, or directly willed ignorance, when someone expressly and deliberately wills to be ignorant for any end whatever: whether so that he may act at pleasure and not be drawn back from his purpose, or so that he may have an excuse in sins committed or to be committed, or because of disgust, etc., especially if he studiously wills not to know so that he may not be drawn back from sinning but may sin more freely.

2. Several modern authors regard that three-membered distinction as not correct, because it is made with respect to a twofold diverse terminus: for ignorance is antecedent or consequent relative to the will itself of being ignorant; but it is antecedent or concomitant relative to the will of the work to be known. Nevertheless it seems that it can be rightly understood and defended by saying that the three aforesaid ignorances are distinguished by reason of both termini at once, namely, by considering at once the act of the will concerning ignorance and the act of the will concerning the work.

3. By reason of the act of the will together with the work, ignorance is:

a) Antecedent, which does not follow from the will but precedes its act, and yet is the cause to it of willing and doing what it would not will nor do if knowledge were present (according to the present disposition). Hence ignorance is the cause of the work because it removes knowledge which would impede the work, for example if someone, thinking he is killing a beast, kills a friend whom he would not have killed if he had known: such a person acts from involuntary ignorance. For all antecedent ignorance is invincible, but not conversely, because invincible ignorance is not always the reason for doing that which otherwise would not be done.

b) Concomitant, which precedes the act of the will and is joined to it, yet not as the cause of willing and doing that which is done, because even if it were not present, nevertheless the thing would be done (according to the present disposition), for example if someone, thinking he is killing a beast, kills an enemy whom he would also have killed if he had known: such a person acts with involuntary ignorance. It is also invincible.

c) Consequent, which in some way follows from an act of the will directly not willing or indirectly neglecting to inquire, and is directly or indirectly voluntary and at the same time precedes the work so that it can be the cause of willing and doing it, for example if someone voluntarily neglects to inquire about the danger of killing a man, whom, if he knew, he would not kill, or about a day of abstinence, although, if he knew that abstinence was required, he would abstain; such a person acts from voluntary ignorance. Consequent ignorance is vincible, as voluntary, whether it is vincible at the moment when the work is placed, or was formerly vincible, provided that the work was foreseen and because of it ignorance ought to have been guarded against. Otherwise it would be invincible with respect to the work, although vincible in itself, and therefore antecedent or concomitant with respect to the work which is placed.

82. Principles. I. Antecedent ignorance removes the voluntary according to that which is unknown, because it is invincible; indeed it renders the work positively involuntary simply, because it makes something against the habitual inclination of the will: for the work would not be done if ignorance were absent.

Hence: that which is done from involuntary antecedent ignorance is positively and simply involuntary; therefore such ignorance excuses.

We said: according to that which is unknown, for under another respect it can be voluntary: thus he who kills a man or a friend, thinking him to be a beast or an enemy, voluntarily shoots the arrow, but does not shoot it into a man or into a friend; and he who sins with a woman, not knowing that she is joined in marriage, although he is not guilty of adultery, nevertheless is guilty of fornication.

II. Concomitant ignorance removes the voluntary because it is invincible, but does not render the work positively involuntary, because this is not against the inclination of the will but would also be done if ignorance were not present; therefore it makes the non-voluntary. Hence: that which is done with involuntary concomitant ignorance is non-voluntary; and of this ignorance it is said: it does not accuse, nor does it altogether excuse, namely, from the habitual disposition of the will.

III. Consequent ignorance does not make the simply involuntary, but renders the work simply voluntary, because it itself is vincible and voluntary. Yet it generally (even if it is affected) makes the involuntary in a certain respect, because it is against some inclination of the will, insofar as it is the cause of doing that which would not be done if knowledge were present; hence it diminishes the voluntary and the sin according to the degree of vincibility, so that sometimes it even makes a mortal sin venial.

But it must be well noted: ignorance exceptionally in no way diminishes the voluntary, namely, if it is so affected that someone precisely chooses it in order to sin more freely or so as not to be drawn back from sin. Namely, this in no way makes the involuntary, nor therefore diminishes the voluntary and sin, but rather increases it, not by reason of itself but by reason of the cause, because there is a greater affection toward evil. For then it comes from a greater intensity or more intense inclination of the will toward sinning that someone wills to undergo ignorance.

Hence: that which is done from voluntary or consequent ignorance is simply voluntary, but ordinarily involuntary in a certain respect, and then less voluntary. This ignorance does not excuse, but accuses.

83. Observations. - 1. The general doctrine concerning ignorance is briefly expressed in canon 2202, § 1: "The violation of an unknown law is in no way imputed, if the ignorance was inculpable; otherwise imputability is diminished more or less according to the culpability of the ignorance itself."

2. The things which we have said about ignorance can be applied to inadvertence and forgetfulness, and to error. Error includes ignorance; full inadvertence and perfect forgetfulness are equated with invincible ignorance; but if they are not perfect, but arise from negligence, they are equated with vincible ignorance. Whence canon 2202, § 3: "The things which are established concerning ignorance also hold for inadvertence and error."

Question 3. Does ignorance affect the imputability of a delict?

Response. § 1. The violation of an unknown law is in no way imputed if the ignorance was inculpable; otherwise imputability is diminished more or less according to the culpability of the ignorance itself.

§ 2. Ignorance only of the penalty does not remove the imputability of the delict, but diminishes it somewhat.

§ 3. Those things which are established concerning ignorance are also valid concerning inadvertence and error (Can. 2202).

This canon is an application of canon 2199 to defect of knowledge, which is opposed to imputability. For if ignorance of the violated law is inculpable, the very fact of violation is inculpable. But if, however, ignorance of the law is culpable, the violation will be culpable; and indeed the culpability of the latter follows the culpability of the former. Ignorance only of the penalty leaves the violation of the law intact; and therefore in no way removes imputability. But since such a violation does not carry with it contumacy against the punishing authority, imputability is diminished. Nevertheless a sinner of this sort has posited the cause of some punishment.

Question 5. Does ignorance excuse from penalties?

Resp. § 1. Affected ignorance, whether of the law or of the penalty alone, excuses from no penalties latae sententiae, even if the law contains the words of which in § 2.

§ 2. If the law has the words: has presumed, has dared, knowingly, studiously, rashly, has acted deliberately, or other similar words which demand full cognition and deliberation, any diminishment of imputability, whether on the part of the intellect or on the part of the will, exempts from penalties latae sententiae.

§ 3. If the law does not have those words:

1°. Ignorance of the law, or even of the penalty alone, if it was crass or supine, exempts from no penalty latae sententiae; if it was not crass or supine, it excuses from medicinal penalties, but not from vindicative penalties latae sententiae;

2°. Drunkenness, omission of due diligence, weakness of mind, impetus of passion, if, notwithstanding the diminishment of imputability, the action is still gravely culpable, do not excuse from penalties latae sententiae;

3°. Grave fear, if the delict inclines toward contempt of the faith or of ecclesiastical authority or toward public harm of souls, in no way exempts from penalties latae sententiae.

§ 4. Although the guilty person is not held by censures latae sententiae according to the norm of § 3, n. 1, this nevertheless does not impede him, if the matter bears it, from being affected by another suitable penalty or penance (Can. 2229).

Affected ignorance is ignorance directly willed and studiously acquired or not rejected; the end is that which someone regards, so conducting himself that he remains in ignorance. Such a one strives that knowledge of the law not be acquired.

Not likewise one who labors under crass ignorance, which does not arise, as such, from the fact that someone directly wishes not to acquire knowledge or to retain ignorance, but because for another cause, on account of love of leisure, weariness of study, he is excessively negligent in fulfilling the obligation of learning the law and driving away ignorance. Therefore this ignorance, excessive negligence of study, is crass, and thence the man himself is crassly ignorant, because, supine, he lies as if content in the mire of ignorance. This is indirectly voluntary ignorance.

Surely he is not worthy of immunity and liberty from a penalty conjoined with violation of the law who acts precisely so that he may not know the law. Such a one esteems the law itself little, indeed least of all. Wherefore one acting from affected ignorance is equated with a man acting knowingly when it is a question of penalties latae sententiae; from which, therefore, this ignorance does not excuse, not even when there are in the law the words knowingly, etc., as in § 2.

But when the words of the law demand a perfect voluntary, namely full cognition and deliberation, any diminishment of imputability arising from the part of the intellect or from the part of the will exempts from a penalty latae sententiae. In other words, the very extreme things required by the law must be verified.

When the law does not have the words has presumed, etc., ignorance whether of the law or of the penalty alone does not excuse, if it was crass and supine, from any penalty latae sententiae; such ignorance, so gravely and altogether culpable, is not worthy to be granted immunity; it is surely a certain great contumacy, and no cause is present for exempting a man who applied either no diligence or very slight diligence so that he might know what he is bound to know.

But it is otherwise if it was not crass, and it is a question of medicinal penalties; for to what end is a penalty or medicine for one who is ignorant? and therefore, since a penalty which he does not know does not amend him, in those ignorant persons who are not crassly, although gravely, ignorant, an excuse is present: "that dangers of souls may be met, we do not will those ignorant to be bound by sentences brought by the statutes of any Ordinaries whatever, provided nevertheless their ignorance was not crass or supine" c. 2, I, 2, in VI°. But the same gravely culpable ignorance does not excuse from vindicative penalties; for such a delict is voluntary in the cause and therefore imputable, and the man by transgressing the law placed the cause of the penalty, which can by law be brought upon the unwilling. But in general, although the guilty person is not entangled in censures latae sententiae, let him be affected by another suitable penalty or penance.

By equal reason fear does not excuse from penalties latae sententiae when the delict inclines toward contempt of the faith or of the Church or toward public harm of souls.

Question 5. Does vincible ignorance excuse from censure?

Resp. Affected ignorance excuses from none. If the law has the words: has presumed, has dared, any diminishment of imputability excuses. If the law does not have those words, crass or supine ignorance does not excuse; but that which is not crass or supine excuses. - Cf. Can. 2229.

I say : Invincible ignorance of the law of nature excuses from formal sin the one acting from it. This is against Luther, Calvin, Jansenius and the Jansenists, defined by Alexander VIII, 7 December 1690, in the condemnation of this proposition: « Even if invincible ignorance of the law of nature be granted, in the state of fallen nature it does not excuse from formal sin the one acting from it. » It is the second among 31.

It is proved 1° from Sts. Augustine and Thomas. Aug., lib. III, de lib. Arbit., cap. 18, n. 50: « Is there so great a deceit [of ignorance] that it can by no means be guarded against? If it is so, there are no sins. » St. Thomas, here q. 76, a. 3, c, speaking of invincible ignorance in general, expressly says: « But if it be such ignorance as is altogether involuntary, either because it is invincible, or because it concerns what one is not bound to know, such ignorance altogether excuses from sin. »

It is proved 2° by this fundamental reasoning of St. Thomas. That which takes away from the act the character of the voluntary, and renders it involuntary, excuses from formal sin; for sin is a moral act, consequently free and voluntary. But this is what invincible ignorance of the law of nature effects; for the voluntary is defined as « that which is from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end ». Therefore.

They answer that invincible ignorance of the law of nature, and the things done from it, are voluntary in us in Adam, since they are effects of that sin.

On the contrary : 1° For personal sin there does not suffice the voluntary of nature, or in the head, but there is required the voluntary of the person, as Alexander VIII defined in the condemnation of this proposition: « In the state of fallen nature, for mortal sin and demerit there suffices that liberty by which it was free and voluntary in its cause, original sin and the will of Adam sinning. » It is the first among the condemned propositions (7 December 1690). 2° Because otherwise it would follow that the indeliberate motions of concupiscence which we suffer unwillingly, all the defects and miseries of this life, folly, frenzy, blindness, etc., and all the things that arise from these, would be formal sins; because they too are effects of original sin and voluntary in Adam.

It is confirmed. Invincible ignorance of positive law, even divine law, excuses from formal sin the one acting from it, the adversaries themselves confessing. Therefore also invincible ignorance of the law of nature. — Proof from consequence. Invincible ignorance of positive law excuses from formal sin because it itself is involuntary, and what is done from it is involuntary. But likewise invincible ignorance of the law of nature itself is involuntary, and what is done from it is involuntary. Therefore.

For the solution of the objections from Augustine, whom the Jansenists press most of all, it must be observed that in all the things objected from him the holy Doctor never speaks of ignorance of the natural law, but either determinately of ignorance of positive law, or generally of ignorance of whatever kind of law; whence these are to be solved by them, as by us. It must therefore be said that, when St. Augustine says that ignorance of the law does not excuse from sin, he speaks either of vincible and indirectly voluntary ignorance through negligence in learning, or of sin taken in a wide sense, for that which is from sin and leads on to sin, as it is taken by the Apostle and by the council of Trid., sess. V, can. 2. « Not only that do we call sin, he says, lib. III de libero Arbit., c. 19, n. 54, which is properly called sin, for it is committed by free will and knowingly; but also that which now follows necessarily from the punishment of this. »

X. Question VIII. From what indications can it be gathered that an erring conscience is vincible, or invincible? Answer. You can prudently presume the ignorance to be invincible: 1. If the thing ignored be of human, or of positive, law. 2. If the matter be most difficult even among the Learned themselves. 3. If no scruple, doubt, or any confused notion whatever has preceded. 4. If the man, on perceiving that he was deceived and violated the Law from ignorance, grieves and is saddened. 5. If the man be upright, and of an entire and well-ordered conscience. 6. If he has not been prejudiced by a false system and a depraved manner of opining. From these and similar circumstances and signs the Confessor can gather that the ignorance or inadvertence was invincible. The contrary holds if the matter be of the natural law; if some doubt has preceded; if the man be accustomed to offend, and be of a conscience entangled in crimes; if he be facile in adopting opinions which favor liberty and the appetites. For the rest, this ascertainment is difficult: therefore God must be prayed to with the Prophet David: Remember not my ignorances.

XIII. The Probabilists rather commonly teach that sin is never committed without actual consideration, clear or obscure, of the malice of the action. This opinion, as it seems to my weakness, is the same as the error of the Pelagians denying the sins of ignorance, as Jerome and Augustine and the other Fathers testify. No crime, said the Pelagians, without liberty; no liberty without knowledge; therefore no sin without knowledge. The Probabilists deny that sin can be committed without some actual knowledge of the malice of the action: therefore the doctrine of the Pelagians and of the Probabilists is the same, so far as appears from the force of the reasoning. Which I prove thus.

XIV. It is a Catholic truth that men commit sins of ignorance. Actual advertence being admitted, the darkness of ignorance vanishes. The Probabilists teach that actual knowledge, or advertence, is necessary that the ignorance be vincible and criminal. Therefore the doctrine of both parties is the same. Tell me: what is opposed to ignorance? Knowledge. Therefore it cannot be that he sins ignorantly who knows, and considers — and that actually — that he is sinning.

XXI. Invincible ignorance is that — as the very word bears on its face — which cannot be conquered and overcome. The mere doubting of the thing which is unknown makes the ignorance vincible and criminal. When you doubt whether such an action be depraved, by the confession of all you sin, because you expose yourself to the danger of sinning. And when you judge it more probable that the action is befouled with malice, and you repudiate this more probable opinion, and select the opposite, less probable one — if this be false, will your ignorance be invincible? You flee from the more splendid light, you close your eyes to it, that you may select the less probable opinion, which favors your liberty and is opposed to the Law: and in this case your error will be insuperable? Who, I pray you, endowed with common sense, can defend so great a paradox? Yet this is the paradox which all the Probabilists champion. But it is repugnant to common sense. For that is called invincible which cannot be conquered and overcome. With what face, then, do the Probabilists assert that this error cannot be overcome and conquered, at that very time at which they turn their eyes away from the greater light shining forth — at which they will not understand, that they may do well, and may at least approach nearer to the truth?

VIII. Question II. Are sins committed from ignorance to be corrected by force of the precept? Answer. All affirm it, if the ignorance be vincible. Of invincible ignorance there is disagreement among the Theologians. But the more common opinion, and the true one to me, is that the precept presses above all when the neighbor labors under a double misery — both that he has committed a sin, material though it be, and that, wrapped in the gloom of darkness, he is ignorant of the sin. The precept of enlightening the neighbor, then, presses greatly at that time. If the invincible ignorance be only of ecclesiastical law, the precept presses even then — especially if that law regard the universal Church, as does the law which commands Lent, the Ember days, abstinence from flesh on Friday, and things of that kind. For ignorance of these is a grave evil, from which the neighbor must be rescued by the benefit of fraternal correction.

VIII. Ignorance, as has been said elsewhere, is of one kind of right, of another of fact, of another of penalty. One is invincible, another vincible; another gross, affected, or supine. He labours under ignorance of right who is ignorant of a law forbidding or commanding. He labours under ignorance of fact who is ignorant that he whom he beats is a cleric. Ignorance of penalty is when someone is ignorant that a penalty has been appended to such a crime. You know that the beating of a cleric is forbidden; you know that he whom you beat is a cleric; but you know not that a penalty has been appended to this unlawful beating of a cleric. That is invincible which cannot be overcome by human industry; and vincible which can be overcome.

2. When a bad action is done out of voluntary ignorance, is the sin committed when the agent culpably neglected to procure knowledge or when the act is done; and of what species is the sin?

Per se, inasmuch as formal sin consists in doing wrong or neglecting duty with advertence, formal sin is committed when the doer of a bad action, which is the result of voluntary ignorance, culpably neglects to procure the requisite knowledge. At the time when the bad action is done through ignorance the doer of it does not advert to the wrong that he is doing, and so the act can not be a formal sin at the time when it is done. Of course if the bad act is not merely the result of ignorance, but at the time when it is done there is some suspicion of its not being right, or some advertence to its malice, then the harm done will not only be voluntary in its cause, but also voluntary in itself. But then it will not be done out of voluntary ignorance, but out of malice here and now.

A sin of ignorance is of the same species as the act done out of ignorance would be if it were committed with knowledge. For the law which is violated by the sin is violated also by voluntary ignorance concerning it, inasmuch as every law imposes on those who are subject to it the obligation of obtaining knowledge of it, and voluntary ignorance is a violation of this obligation.

Many people speak of the error of philosophical sin without knowing very distinctly in what it consists. The distinction between philosophical sin and theological sin is neither new nor chimerical, as some imagine. It is from Saint Thomas, who says that sin is considered in one way by the Theologian and in another by the Philosopher. [Ia. 2, q. 71, a. 6, ad 5.] The former, he says, examines the nature of sin insofar as it is an offense against God, and the latter insofar only as it is contrary to reason. It is the same sin viewed under different aspects. According to the one it is called theological, and according to the other it is called philosophical. According to the one it offends God; according to the other it offends reason.

Since Theology is ordinarily taught in Latin, the terms employed in it must be understood according to the force they have in that language. The word offendere, which in French signifies to offend, has various significations in Latin according as it is taken in the proper or in the figurative sense. In the proper sense it signifies what happens to a body which is in motion and which strikes another upon encountering it. In the figurative sense it is said of a rational being who acts against the will, against the inclinations of another, against the respect and against the obedience which he owes him. This signification is the one most used in our language.

The Theologians, following this usage of the Latin Language, say that sin, taking the force of the terms, is an offense against God, offensa Dei, only insofar as it strikes against the obedience which is owed to him; that when neither God nor his commands are known by the one who commits the sin, this sin, speaking rigorously, ought not to be called an offense against God, because then it does not directly strike against this obedience nor against his commands, which the sinner does not know. But this sin always offends reason, because it is against the lights of conscience and against that law written in our hearts, which are not things different from reason. This is what must first be well conceived in order to understand the question of philosophical sin. This perhaps appears a vain subtlety when speaking Theology in our language; but it is not so in the customary language of Theologians, that is to say, in the Latin language. After all, in matters of this kind one must always agree upon the signification which usage attaches to words.

It is then necessary to make a very important observation. It is that the Theologians who have made all these precise distinctions, and principally the Jesuits, when saying that the sin of a man who does not know God is not properly called an offense against God, do not thereby deny that it is a sin, and a sin punishable by damnation. On the contrary, most of the Theologians say that, even in this supposition, the sinner is justly punished with Hell, because although he does not act against the commands of a known God, he nevertheless acts against the law which that God has placed in his heart; that this law marks out his duty for him and makes him understand that he violates it by not following it; which, according to them, suffices to render him guilty of the penalties with which this God, altogether unknown though he is to him, punishes him in this life and in the other. Thus almost all the Theologians agree that the sins of the Barbarians which gave rise to this question, as soon as they are against the natural law, are punished by God in hell; but they do not all reason from the same principles, and they posit different ones from which they equally conclude the just punishment of these sorts of sinners.

Some lay down as a principle that an invincible ignorance of God is never found, at least for a long time, among the Barbarians who have the use of reason, whether their natural light, stirred by the sight of creatures, suffices to give them this knowledge, or whether God acts interiorly in them by ways which are unknown to us and of which they alone could give an account. What Saint Paul says of the Pagans in the Epistle to the Romans gives great authority to this System. However that may be, this principle being laid down, it follows that the sins of these Pagans offend not only reason but also the obedience which they owe to God, and that they are offenses against God in the most exact signification that this term can have in scholastic language.

The other Theologians have reasoned from an altogether opposite principle, which they believed to be more conformable to experience. They have said that there could be among some Barbarians an invincible ignorance of God; but to this principle they add that other one of which I have already spoken: that in order for the sin of a Barbarian to merit damnation, it is not necessary that it be directly against the obedience owed to God, nor that the sinner know distinctly that the law which he violates comes from that God; but that it suffices that he commit this sin against the lights of his conscience, which marks out his duty for him and makes him understand at the same time the obligation he has to conform himself to this law, which is written in his heart. That, by not doing so, he justly incurs the disfavor of God and the punishment attached thereto for all eternity. In this manner, neither in the one opinion nor in the other is there among the Barbarians any purely philosophical sin, that is to say, one which purely offends reason without offending God, either directly or indirectly, and which does not merit Hell, when it has the other conditions required for the essence of mortal sin.

All this having been set forth, it will be easy to understand in what the error of philosophical sin consists. It consists first in saying that certain Barbarians perform actions against the natural law, such as homicides, adulteries, etc., which are not mortal sins worthy of damnation, because in all those who are ignorant of God sins are purely Philosophical, that is to say, only against reason, and in no way Theological, that is to say, they are not against God, whom the sinner does not know and by them, consequently, God himself does not hold himself offended. [In Decreto Alexandri VIII, 24 Aug. 1690.]

A second Proposition may be made which will contain the same error, or an altogether similar error founded upon the same principle. It is this: that not only those who are ignorant of God and who have never known him, but also those who are not ignorant of him, if, when acting against the Law, they do not actually think that they offend God, do not in fact offend him; that their sins are purely philosophical, because they see clearly that they are against reason, but that they are not Theological, because they do not think that they are against God, and thus they are not worthy of being eternally punished. This concerns the sins of an infinity of libertines who, they say, commit the most horrible actions and abandon themselves to the most extreme debaucheries without ever thinking that God forbids them. It is precisely in these two Propositions that the error of Philosophical sin consists, and it seems in fact expressed in the famous Theology Thesis of Dijon about which so much clamor was made some years ago.

It was denounced to the Bishops and to the Pope as a new heresy of the Jesuits. It was condemned by Alexander VIII on the twenty-fourth of August in the year 1690. The Jesuits, who were as much scandalized by it as the others, anticipated the condemnation of the Pope by being the first to condemn it in public writings. They subsequently produced, among others, one entitled The Error of Philosophical Sin Combated by the Jesuits, in which they demonstrated that this had never been the doctrine of their Society. They showed, moreover, that this very Thesis was in no way conformable to the writings of the Professor of Dijon, which they caused to be authenticated and brought to Paris. They printed extracts from them which contained only the common doctrine in Theology on this subject. And in fact, in reading the writings of the Professor, one does not comprehend how he could have made a Thesis of this nature.

This is not the place to enter into the detail of the defense of the Jesuits, nor of the calumnies which were published against them on this subject. Nothing was omitted in order to tear them apart and to render them odious everywhere. For this purpose people dared to falsify the writings of the Professor; to cite the objections which he made to himself as though they had been his assertions; and to make him advance not only the most detestable but also the most extravagant maxims, so that, in order to say what people made him say, not only would he have had to be a libertine by profession, but also mad in the sovereign degree. And what is surprising, and what will never be believed unless one is willing to take the trouble to compare the writing of the Jesuits with those of their Adversary, is that after these Fathers had published the true extracts from the writings of the Professor in order to show the falsification that had been made in them, no other answer was given than that it was by a figure of Rhetoric that he had been made to speak in that manner. [The true extracts are in the Second Letter to a Man of the Court. The false extracts are in the Denunciation of the New Heresy, art. 3, third denunciation, pp. 81-82.]

However that may be, in order to execute the design proposed here, the Jesuits declare, first, that they condemn this doctrine as scandalous, as rash, as offensive to pious ears, and as erroneous, which are the qualifications with which the Holy See censured it.

Second, they declare, and they have always declared with truth, that this was never the doctrine of their Society, and that none of their Authors ever taught it.

Third, not only is this doctrine not that of their Society, but none of the principles of their Theology leads to it. Some of their Theologians have held, after several others, that invincible ignorance of God can exist for some time among some Barbarians; but they have added at the same time that these Barbarians, acting against the lights of their conscience, committed not only philosophical sins but mortal sins worthy of hell, as I explained previously. Others have held that, in order to offend God in this manner, it is necessary to know him; but they have at the same time laid down as a principle that invincible ignorance of God was impossible, as several other Theologians think. In a word, in reasoning in this manner they have reasoned as people reason in all the Catholic Schools. From neither the one nor the other of these two principles taken separately does the error of philosophical sin with respect to the Barbarians follow. And there has never been, so far as is known, any other Jesuit who joined them both together, except a Spaniard, namely Arriaga, who did so after the example of some other non-Jesuit Theologians, but who was neither followed nor preceded in such a doctrine by the Theologians of his Society, not even by the Professor of Dijon, who in fact admits neither ignorance nor forgetfulness of God that renders sin purely philosophical, and who expressed himself as he did only in a purely metaphysical and morally impossible hypothesis, as he expressly says himself.

In the fourth place, the Jesuits declare that the constant and universal doctrine of their Society is that the sins of libertines, of habitual sinners, and of the hardened are imputed to them in themselves or in their cause; that their Theologians follow in this only the common doctrine in the Catholic Schools; that every ignorance or inadvertence which has its source in the free will of the sinner cannot excuse his sin. And, on the occasion of the Thesis of philosophical sin, they did not fear to challenge their Adversaries to show anyone among the great number of Jesuit authors of every kind - Interpreters of Scripture, Scholastic Theologians, Controversialists, Casuists or Canonists, Preachers or those who composed Treatises of devotion, and even Philosophers themselves - they challenge their Adversaries, I say, to produce any one of them who, when treating of ignorance or inadvertence with respect to our duties, did not distinguish that which is culpable from that which is not; or who did not always suppose this distinction; and who did not say, when treating the matter, that voluntary ignorance or inadvertence never excuses the evil which one has thus ignored through a criminal negligence. So constantly has this doctrine, which is directly opposed to the error of philosophical sin, always been that of their Society.

After this, what is the charity, what is the equity, what is the sincerity of those who wish to persuade the world that the error of philosophical sin is the doctrine of the Jesuits? Where is the good faith of those who every day, in Books and in Theses, affect maliciously to inveigh against the error of Philosophical sin more vehemently than against those of Nestorius and Arius, in order to cause its infamy to fall back upon the Jesuits, who detest it more than they do, and whose Society, of all the Societies that are in the Church of God, has always openly professed to be the most submissive and the most universally submissive to the decisions of the Holy See which concern faith and morals? I pass to the article of probable opinions.