Chapter III. On the Consequence of Liberty, or on Imputability

Preliminary. In order that the doctrine concerning imputability may be rightly proposed, certain things are to be noted concerning the efficient cause.

An efficient cause is called that which by its own power influences an effect. It is distinguished:

1. Into a physical and a moral cause, according as it influences an effect physically or morally, that is, by moving another free cause to act. Thus, for example, a thief is the physical cause of theft; but the one who impelled the thief to steal is the moral cause of the theft.

2. Into a cause per se and a cause per accidens. The former is that which by its nature, or by reason of its proper form, produces an effect or influences an effect, whether physically or morally. Thus, for example, immoderate drinking is the per se and physical cause of drunkenness; evil counsel is the per se and moral cause of a proximate sin. The latter is that which, by reason of a form or circumstance which happens to it, produces an effect or influences an effect. Thus, for example, immoderate drinking can be the per accidens and physical cause of pollution.

Note. An occasional cause, which properly is not a cause, is called that upon the positing of which another cause produces an effect. Thus, for example, one who gives a sum of money to someone can be for him the occasional cause of drunkenness.

3. Into a proximate and a remote cause, according as it concurs proximately or remotely in producing the effect. Thus one who arranges the type is the proximate cause, and one who prepares the paper is the remote cause, of printing a book.

4. Into a cause influencing gravely, moderately, and lightly, according as it exercises a grave, moderate, or light influence on the effect. Thus, for example, very immodest touches influence venereal commotion gravely, moderately immodest touches moderately, and lightly immodest touches lightly.

I. Notion. Imputability is the property by virtue of which an act, or the effect of an act, must be attributed to someone as to its author and master. The root of imputability is liberty, not morality, as some think. For that is the root of imputability on account of which an act must be ascribed to someone as to its master. But an act must be ascribed to a human being as to its master because and insofar as he placed it freely. To the imputability of an act, or of the effect of an act, there corresponds responsibility in the agent, by virtue of which the agent must be held as the author and master of the act or of its effect.

II. Imputability of acts. It is clear that a human act must be imputed to the human being. For a human act is an act of which a human being is master (n. 15). But from the fact that you are master of some act, that act is imputed to you. More difficult to determine is:

III. Imputability of effects. The discussion concerns evil effects; moreover, acts, although undeliberated, that are going to follow from a cause, for example in drunkenness, are also referred to effects. Therefore we ask:

1. What is required in order that an evil effect be imputed? It is required:

a) That the agent advert, at least confusedly, that the effect will certainly or probably follow. For nothing is willed unless it is at least in some way known.

b) That the agent be able not to posit the cause, or to remove it once posited, or to posit a cause which may impede the effect. Otherwise liberty is lacking, which is the foundation of imputation.

c) That the agent ought not to posit the cause, or ought to remove it once posited, or ought to posit a cause which may impede the effect; and precisely for this reason, lest the evil effect follow (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 6, a. 3; q. 20, a. 5; q. 73, a. 8, ad 1; St. Alphonsus, V, nn. X and XI). Therefore the effect is not imputed: 1. if the action, as being sinful, must indeed be omitted, yet not on account of the evil effect. If someone, for example, gets drunk on Thursday, foreseeing that he will not be present at Mass on the following Sunday, he does indeed sin by making himself drunk, but the neglect of Mass is not imputed to him, because he is not bound on Thursday to abstain from drunkenness in order to avoid the neglect of Mass; indeed, positive precepts do not carry with them the obligation of removing remote impediments. 2. The effect is not imputed if the action can be placed notwithstanding the evil effect. This has place especially, though with the things that must be posited being posited, in the case in which the action, besides an evil effect, also has a good effect. I have said "with the things that must be posited being posited"; since the assigned case is very practical, these things must be explained more fully. Therefore let there be this:

Proposition. It is permitted to place an action from which a double effect is going to follow, one good, the other evil, if the following conditions are present:

a) The action is good in itself, that is, abstraction being made from the evil effect, or at least indifferent, according to these words of St. Paul: "Let us not do evil that good may come."¹ It is said, "abstraction being made from the evil effect"; understand this of an evil effect distinct from a formally evil effect, because an action which has a formally evil effect, that is, which produces an evil effect by the very fact that it is placed, is evil in itself. In a word: here and in what follows we speak of effects which are not formal.

b) The evil effect is not intended; and moreover there is absent any grave danger of approving it, for example a pollution that will follow from the action, or of consenting to it.

c) The good effect does not follow by means of the evil effect. Otherwise evil would be done so that good might come. Nevertheless, it is not required that the good effect follow as immediately, nor that it follow as probably, as the evil effect. This required condition is present when, for example, medicine taken by a pregnant and sick mother produces the expulsion of the fetus and the health of the mother, yet does not produce the latter effect by means of the former. It must be said otherwise if a pregnant girl or wife were to procure reputation or health for herself by means of abortion (St. Alphonsus, III, 394).

d) There is present a proportionate cause for permitting the evil effect; for since this effect is evil, it must of itself be guarded against, so that of itself it cannot be permitted, much less contributed to in any way, unless a proportionate cause excuses. Besides, concerning the proportionate cause, observe:

a) The cause for permitting the evil effect of the action is situated in the good effect of the same action. Nevertheless, the effects are not only to be considered as if in particular, but the advantage and disadvantage of the whole of human society must be weighed.²

b) A graver cause is required: a) the greater, of itself, the obligation is of impeding the effect,³ or the weaker, of itself, the right is of placing the action;⁴ b) the greater the causal connection is between the action and the evil effect, so that a greater cause is required if the action influences it per se than if it influences it per accidens, and a greater cause if it influences it gravely than if lightly;⁵ c) the more closely the evil effect is joined with the action;⁶ d) the more necessary the action is for the evil effect;⁷ e) the more certainly the effect is going to follow; f) the worse the evil effect is.

Therefore, when there is question of an action whose effect is twofold, good and evil, it is certainly permitted to place it when the explained conditions have place. But it is another question whether each of the said conditions is always required. Moreover, this seems to be denied concerning the second and third conditions when the evil effect consists either: 1. in the privation of a good which is ordered to the good effect that will follow from the action; or 2. in the privation of a good which an unjust aggressor has lost the right of retaining. Hence it is permitted, for example, to amputate a member in order to save the whole; likewise, with the things to be observed having been observed, to wound or kill an unjust aggressor, although in the examples adduced the good effect is obtained by means of the evil effect, and the evil effect is intended as a means.⁸

2. To how much fault is the evil effect imputed? The solution depends on so many circumstances that it cannot be answered completely here. It will suffice to have noted these things, while more matters are referred to the diverse treatises.

a) A lightly evil effect is imputed to light fault.

b) A gravely evil effect is imputed to grave fault if the cause, both by its own nature and gravely, influences it, as pollution from gravely immodest touches. It is imputed of itself to light fault if the cause influences either lightly, as pollution from a less immodest touch, or remotely, per accidens, or occasionally, even gravely, as pollution from drunkenness, provided nevertheless that the danger of consenting is absent. I have said "of itself," because it can happen that the effect is imputed to grave fault even if the cause posited influences it only remotely, per accidens, or occasionally. This has place if the effect must be guarded against by reason of a stricter virtue, especially justice or religion, or by reason of the common good. Hence, for example, blasphemies and homicide committed in drunkenness, and foreseen, are imputed to grave fault, although drunkenness does not influence the aforesaid effects per se.

3. When is the evil effect imputed? The whole malice is contracted at the time when the cause is posited or not removed, or at least when the will of positing or not removing it is present. The reason is that every fault resides in the free will. But the malice is contracted whether or not the effect follows, because the event does not influence the depraved will, which has already preceded (St. Alphonsus, V, 10).

Question. Whether the evil effect itself, if it can no longer be impeded, for example homicide committed in perfect drunkenness, is infected with the malice of the will, or whether it is a merely material sin.

Response I. The evil effect of which we are speaking is a merely material sin if the depraved will was sincerely retracted before the event of the effect; for when it has been retracted, there is not that from which true morality could accede to the effect.

Response II. It is disputed if the will has not been sincerely retracted; but with St. Alphonsus (IV, 149; V, 10), it seems it must be said that the said effect is not a merely material sin. For what has been chosen by the will, or at least culpably permitted, and is committed while the will persists, cannot be called a merely material sin, but seems infected with the malice of the will. Finally, observe that this effect can consist both in a deed or in a positive act, and in an omission, for example of hearing Mass (St. Alphonsus, l.c.). Thus also Cajetan,⁹ the Salmanticenses,¹⁰ and Billuart.¹¹

St. Thomas has these words: "It must be said that in drunkenness two things are attended to, as was said: namely, the consequent defect and the preceding act. From the part of the consequent defect, in which the use of reason is bound, drunkenness has the effect of excusing from sin, insofar as it causes the involuntary through ignorance. But from the part of the preceding act, a distinction seems to have to be made; because if from that preceding act drunkenness has followed without sin, then the following sin is totally excused from fault, as perhaps happened to Lot. But if the preceding act was culpable, then someone is not totally excused from the following sin, which namely is rendered voluntary from the will of the preceding act, insofar as someone giving himself to an unlawful thing falls into the following sin. Yet the following sin is diminished, just as the nature of the voluntary is diminished" (II-II, q. 150, a. 4).

¹ Rom. 3:8.

² Frins, De actibus humanis ontologice et psychologice consideratis, n. 197.

³ For example, a graver cause is required for a public official than for a private person to cooperate in theft.

⁴ For example, a graver cause is required for a stranger than for a parishioner to seek the sacraments from an unworthy pastor.

⁵ For example, a graver cause is required so that, notwithstanding a pollution that will follow, a very immodest touch may be admitted, than so that a less immodest touch may become lawful.

⁶ For example, if there is question of printing an evil book, a greater cause is required if there is discussion of arranging the type than if there is discussion of preparing the paper.

⁷ For example, a graver cause is required for it to be permitted to give drink to a drunkard if other innkeepers who would give drink are lacking, than if they are present.

⁸ Concerning these things, which are denied by many, something will be said later.

⁹ In II-II, q. 150, a. 4.

¹⁰ De princ. mor., tr. 20, c. 10, n. 26.

¹¹ De pecc., diss. 1, a. 4, § 3.