Section 2: Imputability of Human Acts

I. NOTION OF IMPUTABILITY. —There is a distinction between responsibility, imputability, and morality.

"Responsibility is the condition of a man who, having sufficient knowledge, and being free from coercion, can act or not act, as he chooses, and is therefore accountable for his determination. Imputability is the character of an act which is freely performed, so that the good or evil of it is attributable to him who performs it. The morality or immorality of an act is its conformity or non-conformity with the moral law." ¹ Imputation is the judgment by which a man is declared to be the free cause of an act and held responsible for its consequences.

¹ R. I. Holaind, S.J., Natural Law and Legal Practice, p. 84.

Before judgment on the authorship of an act can be definitely pronounced, it is necessary to inquire, (i) whether the agent to whom the act is imputed is really its author (imputatio facti), and (2) whether he was free to act and is responsible for his conduct (imputatio iuris sive legis).

The judgment by which an act is imputed to a man is pronounced either by his own conscience ² or by civil or ecclesiastical authority, and may be true or false. God alone always "judgeth justly," ³ because He is "the searcher of hearts." ⁴ Human judgments are just only in so far as they coincide with those of God.

² Cfr. 1 Cor. IV, 3 sq.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 112, art. 5; Theo. Meyer, S.J., Institutiones Iuris Naturalis, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 173 sqq.

³ Jer. XI, 20.

⁴ Ps. VII, 9 sq.; cfr. Jer. XVII, 10; XX, 12; John II, 23; Rom. XIV, 4, 10; Acts I, 24; XV, 8; 1 Cor. IV, 5; 2 Cor. V, 10; Apoc. II, 23; XX, 12.

1. A man is responsible for an act (be it of commission or omission) in exact proportion to the degree of liberty which he enjoys. Hence only free acts are imputable, i. e., attributable to the agent for reward or punishment. In other words, where there is no freedom of choice, there is no imputability, and the greater a man's power to determine his actions, the greater his merit or demerit, and vice versa.⁵

⁵ Cfr. W. Schmidt, Der Kampf um die sittliche Welt, pp. 301 sqq.

2. Of course, no human being is entirely free. It was shown in the first part of this treatise how the will is influenced by individual as well as social factors. In addition to these there are certain others which diminish responsibility, e. g., ignorance, inadvertence, habit, and various mental disturbances.

a) IGNORANCE (ignorantia) is the absence of knowledge which a person should have.⁶ The civil courts (except in the case of children) do not admit ignorance as a mitigating circumstance in cases of serious transgression, but proceed on the principle that "ignorance of the law does not excuse."

⁶ Cfr. E. Taunton, The Law of the Church, pp. 365 sq.; J. Hollweck, Die kirchlichen Strafgesetze, Mayence 1899, pp. 77 sqq.

Moral Theology, on the contrary, acknowledges the existence of culpable ignorance by which responsibility and guilt are diminished. The reason is not far to seek. A sin that springs from ignorance does not indicate a positive evil tendency of the will. That there are peccata ignorantiae the New Testament teaches in numerous passages. Christ prayed for his executioners: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do/' ⁷ In one of the discourses reported by St. John, Jesus says: "If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin." ⁸ St. Peter, after accusing the Jews of having killed the Author of life, added: "Brethren, I know that you did it through ignorance, as did also your rulers."⁹ St. Paul regrets that he persecuted Christ and His Church, but adds: "I obtained the mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in unbelief." ¹⁰ Note, however, that ignorance can never altogether excuse any one from performing the duties proper to his state of life, because every man is strictly bound to inform himself with regard to these duties.¹¹ b) INADVERTENCE (inadvertentia) signifies the omission of such care as duty requires one to take with regard to one's obligations. Civil jurisprudence imputes acts of inadvertence that involve injury to others. Not so Moral Theology. Sins committed through inadvertence (peccata inadvertent iae) are not altogether imputed because they spring from defective knowledge. There can be no guilt in the theological sense of the term where there is no dolus, i. e., a deliberate intention of violating the law, or culpa lata, i. e., criminal carelessness or neglect of that ordinary care which every sensible person is supposed to exercise in important matters.¹² An evil action may be premeditated (malice prepense or aforethought), or committed in a fit of passion (dolus repentinus). This distinction is important in cases where a man takes the life of another. If he acts with malice aforethought, he is guilty of murder; if carried away by passion, his crime is merely man-slaughter.

⁷ Luke XXIII, 34.

⁸ John XV, 22.

⁹ Acts III, 17.

¹⁰ 1 Tim. I, 13.

¹¹ Cfr. Luke XII, 47 sq.; Jas. IV, 17.

¹² Cfr. Codex Iuris Can., can. 2199 sq.; Ex. XXI, 29 sqq.; Numb. XXXV, 22 sqq.; Deut. XIX, 4-6.

Negligence means failure to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations that ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence may be slight, ordinary, or gross. These principal degrees have been shaded off in opposite directions by the Roman jurists and the Schoolmen (latissima, latior, lata; levis, levior, levissima),¹³ c) CUSTOM (consuetudo) or habit is a facility acquired in performing certain acts by frequent repetition. If a man always acts in the same manner, he gradually acquires a certain facility. As a determinant of the will, this facility may be a means either of virtue or of vice, and as the proverb says, often becomes second nature.¹⁴ Habit diminishes but does not destroy free-will. In so far as a habit is freely acquired, it increases responsibility, and in so far as it is good, it augments merit. If one has unconsciously acquired a bad habit, the sinful acts are not imputable until the wickedness of the habit and its acts is realized. As soon as it is realized, the duty arises of rigorously combatting the evil habit. By falling back into a bad habit a man incurs grave responsibility, because he almost invariably acts against his better knowledge and his conduct has in it something tending to that state of which our Saviour says that it is "worse than the first." 15 Acts which are, as it were, mere mechanical consequences of a habit, are imputable only in so far as the habit itself is voluntary (voluntarium in causa). d) There are many different kinds of MENTAL DERANGEMENT or psychic abnormality. Illusions, hallucinations, fixed ideas, hypochondria, melancholia, hysteria, morbid fear in its various forms (especially agoraphobia, i. e., the dread of crossing or being in the midst of open spaces), severe nostalgia (homesickness), and all forms of quasi-amentia impede the normal exercise of reason and must therefore be regarded as extenuating circumstances, though they do not entirely destroy free-will unless they develop into actual insanity. In all such cases medical experts should be consulted. Note, however, that theologians must sometimes assume moral guilt where physicians and lawyers deny the existence of responsibility. For while it is quite true that the genuine symptoms of insanity are rarely simulated, that many crimes (especially sexual perversities) are pathological, and that an insuperable disinclination to labor and a slanderous tongue may be symptoms of neurasthenia or hysteria, it is equally certain that not all forms of mental derangement entirely destroy the freedom of the will.

¹³ Cfr. V. Patuzzi, Ethica Christiana, Vol. V, Bassano 1790, pp. 229 sq.: "The broadest fault is equated with deceit and fraud, and in truth consists in explicit deceit, as if a soldier standing watch pretended to sleep so that the enemy might enter. A broader fault is implicit deceit, as if the keeper of a flock, who can drive away a thief or wolf by shouting, nevertheless remains silent. A broad fault is the omission, in guarding another's property or avoiding damage, of that diligence which prudent and sensible men commonly employ in caring for their own affairs, as if a servant should neglect to close the door of the house at night. A slight fault consists in the omission of that diligence which more diligent men and heads of households are especially accustomed to employ; as if someone should place a borrowed golden vessel in his own room, even with the door closed, but without drawing the bolts. Finally, the slightest fault imports the omission of that diligence which only the most cautious and circumspect customarily employ, such as that of a man who locks jewels in a chest but does not test or examine by hand whether it is firmly closed." —E. Voit, Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, 6th ed., Würzburg 1769, n. 744, p. 494: "A broader fault is called presumed deceit, or the omission of due diligence, from which, although an evil intention to harm is not altogether manifestly inferred, it can nevertheless prudently be presumed. Such a fault exists in one who does not indeed intend harm to his neighbor, but nevertheless foresees that it will result from his action or its omission."

¹⁴ Cicero, De Finibus, V, c. 25: "Consuetude quasi altera natura." — Cfr. St. Augustine, Confessions, VIII, c. 5, n. 10: "For from a perverse will lust arose; and while lust was served, custom arose; and while custom was not resisted, necessity arose." — IDEM, De Musica, VI, c. 7, n. 19: "Non frustra consuetudo quasi secunda et quasi affabricata natura dicitur." (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 753, 1173). —IDEM, Serm., 17 (a/. 28 inter Homilias, 50), n. 3 (P. L., XXXVIII, 125). —St. Bernard, De Consid., IV, c. 3, n. 8: "Nil tam durum, quod duriori non cedat." (P. L., CLXXXII, 777). —Cfr. Jer. XIII, 23. 15 Matth. XII, 43 sqq.; cfr. Prov. XXVI, 11; Luke XI, 24 sqq.; Heb. X, 26; 2 Pet. II, 20 sqq.

3. The CONSEQUENCES of an act (eventus sequentes) are imputable to the agent whenever they follow from the act in the ordinary course of events and can therefore be foreseen, either definitely or at least in confuso, or when they are organically connected with the act from which they flow and form a moral whole with it. When an act that is in itself licit entails evil consequences which the agent can foresee, these consequences are imputable to the agent, provided the act is neither physically nor morally necessary. Consequences which follow an act with purely physical necessity are not imputable in the court of morals, though they can and must be reckoned with in secular jurisprudence.¹⁶

¹⁶ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1a 2ae, qu. 20, art. 5; Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., pp. 122 sqq.

READINGS. —On imputability in general: M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 182, 543 sq. —R. I. Holaind, S.J., Natural Law and Legal Practice, pp. 84 sqq. —Theo. Meyer, S.J., Institutiones Iuris Naturalis, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 173 sqq.

On ignorance: A. Boudinhon in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. V, p. 682.—J. F. Delany, ibid., Vol. VII, pp. 648 sqq.—Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 30 sqq.—E. Taunton, The Law of the Church, pp. 365 sq. —A. Sweens, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, pp. 71 sqq. —A. Tanquerey, S.S., Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, pp. 48 sqq.

On negligence: Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 27, 409 sq., 539. —J. F. Delany in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. X, p. 737.

On mental derangement as a diminuent of responsibility: A. Huber, Die Hemmnisse der Willensfreiheit, 2nd ed., pp. 214 sqq. —Ig. Familler, Pastoral-Psychiatrie, Freiburg 1898. —S. Weber, Zwangsgedanken und Zwangszustände, Paderborn 1903. —R. v. Kraft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis, 13th ed., Stuttgart 1907. —W. Wille, Die Psychosen des Pubertätsalters, Vienna 1898.—K. Hilty, Ueber Neurasthenie, Berne 1897.—Krauss, Der Kampf gegen die Verbrechensursachen, pp. 295 sqq. —J. Bessmer, S.J., Störungen im Seelenleben, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1907. —IDEM, Die Grundlagen der Seelenstörungen, Freiburg 1906. —Th. Braun, Die religiöse Wahnbildung, Tübingen 1906, pp. 13 sqq. —Jas. J. Walsh, "Scruples, Obsessions, and Dreads," in the Ecclesiastical Review, Vol. LVI (1917), No. 4, pp. 360-375.—O'Malley-Walsh, Essays in Pastoral Medicine, New York 1906, pp. 211 sqq. —Fr. a Barbens, O. M. Cap., Introductio Pathologica ad Studium Theol. Mor., Tarracona 1917, pp. 81 sqq.