Impure Thoughts

Impure Thoughts.—Impure thoughts (delectatio morosa) are representations in the mind or imagination of impure venereal objects in which deliberate pleasure is taken.

(a) They are representations, that is, mental pictures or images of things absent from the senses, but thought of or imagined as present. Thus, impure thoughts differ from desires, which consist in attraction with will to accomplish, and also from sense contact of various kinds with objects present to the eyes, ears, or touch.

(b) They are joined with deliberate pleasure of the will, that is, one intends them or consents even momentarily to them after perceiving their presence and malice, even though carnal pleasure is not felt or does not threaten. Thus, impure thoughts differ from tempting thoughts, which are transient and unwished forms that appear in the mind, and are thought on before their true character is adverted to, or which gain a lodging in spite of efforts to eject them. A tempting thought is not sinful, but an occasion of merit when resisted, no matter how long it endures (see 2497 b).

(c) The pleasure is taken in a venereal object, that is, in the thought of fornication, adultery or other carnal sin, committed by oneself or by another. Hence, impure thoughts are not to be confused with the pleasure taken in knowledge about impurity (e.g., a professor of medicine or morality is not impure when he rejoices at the sexual knowledge he possesses and which is necessary for his duties, or willingly thinks about sex matters when it is necessary or useful for him to do so), or with pleasure taken in the morally indifferent manner of the venereal sin. For example, amusement over a ridiculous feature of a sin which one detests is not an impure thought (see 233-236).

The Malice of Impure Thoughts.—(a) The Theological Malice.—Impure thoughts are mortal sins: for he who deliberately rejoices at the thought of sin, loves sin and is therefore guilty of it. They are venial sins when there is imperfect advertence, and also when there is lightness of matter on account of the remoteness of the danger of a thought only indirectly voluntary. They are mortal when there is full deliberation and the impure thought is directly voluntary or gravely dangerous (see 2496).

(b) The Moral Malice.—Impure thoughts have the same specific malice as the representation of the object which is entertained as a welcome guest in the mind; for not only is impurity given the hospitality of the mind, but a particular kind of impurity (see 90, 235). Hence it follows, first, that a specifically different object (as is the case with different consummated sins) makes a specifically different sin (e.g., to think pleasurably of unlawful intercourse is mental fornication if the persons in mind are unmarried, and is mental adultery if the person in mind is married); secondly, that objects not specifically different—as is the case with different non-consummated sins of lewdness—do not make specifically different sins (e.g., to think pleasurably of a sinful kiss and to think sinfully of a sinful touch are both mental lewdness or impure thoughts); thirdly, that special malices of the object from which the mind can prescind—viz., those which in the external act do not change the species or do not explain the venereal pleasure—and from which it does prescind, are not incurred (e.g., to think pleasurably of sin with a woman who is married and a relative, if the thought that she is married or one’s relative is not pleasing or is displeasing, is mental fornication, not mental adultery or mental incest). In praxi vero consulitur confessariis ut regulariter abstineant a quaestionibus de specie morali delectationis morosae; nam fideles plerumque nesciunt faciliter distinguere inter species morales cogitationum, et sic interrogatio evaderet vel inutilis, vel etiam ratione materiae perieulosa. Ad haec quum casus crebriores sint, maximo esset incommodo, tum confessariis, tum poenitentibus, si sacerdos exquireret quae vix cognosci possunt. Sufficit igitur ordinarie sciscitari de specie theologica (utrum voluntas complacuerit), vel de specie morali generali (utrum actus internus delectatio morosa vel potius desiderium fuerit). See Canon 888, Sec.2; Norms for Confessors in Dealing with the Sixth Commandment, Holy Office, May 16, 1943.

We have hitherto explained the external sins of lust; it remains that we speak of internal sins.

224. In this matter, besides thought on the part of the intellect and imagination on the part of the phantasy, three internal acts are chiefly and generally distinguished: morose delight, desire, and joy.

Impure thoughts and imaginations excite venereal delight, and of themselves they have a great influence upon it.

Thoughts of dishonorable things of themselves contain no sin. Consequently, to have them from an honorable end, even not without the wrong effect of venereal delight, is of itself no sin.

But if an honorable and just end is lacking, if they are had from a wrong affection, or if they are of things very dishonorable, even from mere curiosity or levity, or if one dwells on them too long, they contain a grave influence upon venereal delight, and then they cannot be excused from grave sin. But impure thoughts of things not very dishonorable and only slightly moving are not of themselves, by reason of their light influence upon venereal delight, except a light sin. And, since impure thoughts of this kind tend only to exciting venereal delight, they are all of the same species; and consequently then there is no need to explain their various objects in Confession.

225. Delight, in its most general acceptance, is the resting of a cognitive or appetitive faculty in its own proper object, from the conformity of such an object with that faculty. It is threefold according to the threefold faculty: spiritual or intellectual, which has place in the intellect and the will; such, for example, is the delight of the intellect in the contemplation of truth; sensible, which arises in an organ of sense, the organs of generation being excluded, for example, the delight of sight from a beautiful thing, of hearing from music, of touch from smoothness, of taste from flavor, of smell from sweetness of odor; carnal or venereal, which is felt in the organs of generation, and so is the resting of the sensitive faculty in matters of generation.

Sensible delight and carnal or venereal delight look to exterior acts. Concerning both, with respect to the present matter, it has already been said above, n. 2, and in the preceding chapters.

But spiritual delight is contained under interior acts; and when it regards a prohibited thing, it is usually called in moral theology morose delight; and it is a simple and voluntary complacency concerning an illicit thing. Simple, that is, without desire and intention of accomplishing it by deed, so that one is content with delight alone, with an interior thought, for example, concerning the killing of an enemy, or carnal copulation. Voluntary: hence delight is not called morose on account of any delay of time whatever, but on account of its continuation after full advertence of the intellect to the malice of the thing; and so delight is morose, even if the will, after such advertence, persists and freely dwells in it for one instant, or moment of time.

Therefore morose delight concerning a venereal thing merely spiritual, namely one which remains in the will alone, even joined with no base commotion of the flesh, will always be grave sin outside legitimate marriage, because it concerns an object gravely prohibited. Cf. here n. 2. And consequently the same must be said of desire and of joy concerning a venereal thing, which likewise are always grave. - Morose delight regards an object present according to apprehension, as "when through the imagination of the phantasy someone renders the work of sin present to himself, namely the act of fornication, and delights in it by deliberate consent, as though he were actually fornicating, yet without a desire of executing it." L. l. 5. numero 15.

Desire is an act of the will by which someone deliberately intends the object itself as future, and therefore as to be placed in himself. It is twofold: one is simple desire, or desire of itself inefficacious, and it is the mere concupiscence of the external work and of the means without intention of executing such a work, the means not being applied; the other is desire of itself efficacious, or purpose, and it is the interior concupiscence of the external work and of the means with an absolute intention, or at least a hypothetical one, if it could be done, of executing the work, the due means being applied.

Joy, finally, is an act of the will by which someone deliberately approves, and is complacent within himself concerning, the past object itself, that is, the object carried out in execution, and therefore as that object was placed in himself. Ithur. Cas. 18. n. 2-6.; Billuart, Diss. 6. art. 15. Sect. 1. III.; Lugo, de Poenit. D. 16. n. 363 and following.

Note. "Not a few, especially from the ruder sort, are involved in this deception, that they think they consent only when they have the will of executing, and of perpetrating by the work itself, fornication, deflowering, or some other external lustful act. This error is enormous and must be extirpated by priests, according to their strength." Ithur. Cas. 18. n. 5.

226. Desire, whether it be efficacious or inefficacious, takes on the species both of the real object and of the circumstances of that object. Joy likewise takes on the species both of the real object and of the circumstances annexed to it. Morose delight varies in species according to the variety of the apprehended objects and of the circumstances exhibited to the mind. - This is established from the very intrinsic tendency of such acts, already explained. Billuart, l. c.; Lugo, l. c.

Corollary 1. The sentence is very probable "that if someone delights concerning copulation with a married woman, not because she is married, but because she is a beautiful woman, etc., he does not contract the malice of adultery; for the circumstance of adultery then does not enter into the delight. For this reason chastity only is harmed, not justice. And Tamburini probably says the same, if someone, with venereal affection, without desire, looks upon a married woman. Yet, this notwithstanding, what Holzmann has greatly pleases me, namely that although by reason of the delight there is no obligation of explaining the circumstance of adultery, nevertheless in practice it must be explained by reason of the proximate danger of coveting, at least inefficaciously, that married woman, into which danger one casts himself who delights concerning her. But there is no doubt that adultery is committed as often as joy, or complacency, is had concerning copulation had, or desire concerning copulation to be had, with a married woman, because then the will embraces the whole wrong object with all its circumstances, and cannot prescind from them, and therefore harms chastity and justice. Likewise, if someone delights concerning sodomitic copulation. Likewise, if the person who delights is bound by a vow of chastity, he also sins against the vow." L. l. c. Cf. Billuart, l. c. Sect. III.; Lugo, l. c.

2. Delight concerning the evil work itself, for example, of fornication, etc., is always evil, gravely or lightly, according as the work itself is gravely or lightly evil. But delight concerning the thought of an evil work, so that not the evil work itself, but only cognition of it, is the object of the delight, is of itself indifferent; and so it can be good, if there is a just cause of thinking, for example, for the sake of study, consultation, etc., always with abhorrence of the object itself; or it can be venially evil if it is done from curiosity, levity, etc.; or it can also be gravely evil, if it is done from an end mortally evil, or if proximate danger is present of deliberate delight in the object itself. What has been said concerning delight of thought must also be said concerning delight in the artful, skillful, etc., manner of an evil work carried out; for example, if you delight in the ingenious abduction of a bride carried out by another, from an honorable end the delight will be honorable, but if from an evil end, the delight is evil. St. Thomas, Quodl. 12. a. 33.

3. The doctrine of St. Thomas saying, 2. 2. q. 154. a. 4, that it is not a sin if nocturnal pollution pleases as an unloading or relief of nature, can in no way be understood of the delight inherent in pollution, which, as being base, is in itself and objectively evil; and in this way the holy Doctor explains himself in IV. Dist. 9. q. 1. a. 4. q. 1. ad 5. Indeed St. Alphonsus, lib. V. n. 20, wishes St. Thomas to be understood of a purely natural pollution, which naturally proceeds from nature unloading itself, and by no means of nocturnal pollution which has happened from touch or from a base dream, because under this respect it is again objectively evil. Moreover, in practice complacency of this kind, although in itself and speculatively honorable, is to be avoided because of the danger which it brings. G. Dumas, v. 1. n. 173. "Concerning pollution had in sleep," says Ithur. Cas. 18. n. 6, "someone can rejoice, not insofar as it is venereally delightful, but insofar as it is useful, either for quieting temptations, or for consulting health." Cf. Scavini, Tr. 4. d. 1. c. 2. a. 4. q. 13.; Ithur. Cas. 23. n. 31 and following.; Sanchez, in Dec. l. 1. c. 2. n. 19.; Billuart, Diss. 6. art. 14, I say 1, I say 2.; D'Annib., p. 1. n. 275. (18), ed. 4.

4. "It is not a sin, at least not mortal, if spouses delight by the rational appetite only concerning a past, future, or possible act of marriage, with respect to the partner present or absent. Likewise if a betrothed man desires future copulation, or delights concerning it; or a widow concerning past copulation. The reason is because these acts have a lawful object. I said: by the rational appetite; because if a betrothed man or a widow voluntarily consents to sensitive and carnal delight, which arises naturally from the remembrance of future or past copulation, he or she sins mortally, as Lessius, Bonacina, Tanner, Palaus, and Diana teach against Medina. But since sensitive and carnal delight, and indeed also the danger of consent to fornication, for the most part follows the aforesaid delight of the will, that delight of the will scarcely has a place in practice, at least in a widow and the betrothed; among spouses, however, provided danger of pollution is absent, Filliucci, Bonacina, Sanchez, Lessius, and Diana teach that even sensitive and venereal delight is not mortal; both because the state of marriage excuses these things, as also immodest touches undertaken for the sake of pleasure alone, and because these tend of themselves to the conjugal work, although by accident the work is not exercised." Busembaum apud S. Alph., l. V. n. 23. - Struggl, Tr. VII. q. 7. art. 2. nn. 18. 19.; Sporer, de matr. n. 505.; Ithur. Cas. 18.; L. l. c. n. 24, 25, lib. VI. n. 937.; Billuart, Diss. 6. art. 15. Sect. IV.

18. From what has been said above (n. 499), there are three internal sins in general, namely morose delectation, desire, and joy; the principles explained there are easily applied to luxury.

¹ Morose delectation is had when the imagination depicts something shameful or obscene, or the mind thinks about a venereal matter without legitimate cause, and at the same time the will deliberately takes complacency in the pleasure arising therefrom. This is mortally sinful when there is full deliberation and full consent concerning the venereal delectation itself: for then it is directly intended, and moreover, from what has been said, in this matter smallness of matter is not admitted. - Delectation takes on the malice of the object as it is represented in the mind (n. 501).

But if the delectation falls only upon the knowledge of a shameful thing, e.g., when someone by office studies physiological matters, or upon the ingenious manner in which a sin was committed or is narrated by another, or upon the good effect following from an evil act, e.g., the relief obtained from pollution, there is not properly venereal delectation, and therefore not sin. But since there is a very easy passage from delectation concerning the knowledge or manner to delectation concerning the shameful thing itself, it is not lawful without reason to linger over these thoughts, because of the danger of sinning (above, n. 502-503).

Often these imaginations are accompanied by carnal movements of the organs serving generation. Generally it is not necessary to declare these in confession, unless they induce proximate danger of pollution, because the confessor knows that these usually follow from morose delectation.

For practice likewise the confessor must recall to memory what was said above, n. 443, concerning the distinction between suggestion, delectation, and consent: for not a few penitents labor under anxiety concerning shameful thoughts to which in reality they did not furnish consent.

19. 2. Depraved desire is had when someone depicts for himself venereal delectation as future, and deliberately wishes to enjoy it. Now the absolute desire of a gravely unlawful act is a mortal sin. This is clear from the words of Christ: "Whoever shall look on a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart."¹ Besides, desire includes all the malices which it apprehends in the object; hence if someone wishes to have copulation with a married woman, his sin takes on the malice of adultery.

¹ Matt. 5:28.

The same must be said in practice concerning conditioned desire; for from what has been said, n. 505, in those things which are intrinsically evil, as venereal delectation outside matrimony is, the condition added does not remove the malice of the act.

But among unlawful desires must not be counted those which spouses foster of legitimately using matrimony, and therefore of enjoying the venereal delectation annexed to marital intercourse: for this is lawful for them, provided the danger of pollution outside legitimate intercourse is absent. Indeed, a betrothed man can of itself desire future intercourse; but because in such desire there is also danger of consenting here and now to venereal delectation, the betrothed are to be exhorted diligently to turn away from themselves thoughts of this kind.

20. 3. Evil joy is free complacency concerning an unlawful venereal act as past; it is gravely sinful, just as morose delectation is, with this difference, however, that it more easily takes on the malice of the circumstances of the object depicted in the mind, because past things offer themselves more concretely to the imagination. - Sometimes also sadness arises concerning an evil not carried out, e.g., concerning intercourse not had when an occasion was given; this is very close to depraved desire, and gravely sinful if perfect consent is furnished to it.

Spouses can indeed rejoice concerning intercourse lawfully had and the delectation annexed to it, with the danger of pollution excluded; wherefore, if one spouse is absent, a vivid thought of the joy experienced in intercourse is very dangerous, and in practice to be avoided (Supplement on Matrimony, n. 38).

21. Disputed question. Here, moreover, it is asked whether it is a mortal sin to behave passively and negatively with respect to venereal delectation which arises from depraved thoughts. (a) Certain theologians, such as Cajetan and Navarrus, say that this manner of acting is indeed a venial sin, because it includes some disorder, but not grave, provided the danger of furnishing positive consent is absent. (b) But most other theologians teach that it is a grave sin not positively to resist these movements of concupiscence: for it belongs to the will to restrain and repel the disordered movements of the other faculties; moreover, one who, after full advertence, behaves wholly passively exposes himself to the danger of furnishing consent.

This second opinion is more probable, and in practice far safer: for from things commonly occurring, unless delectation of this kind is strenuously and quickly repelled, it soon grows and allures the will to consent. But it is not necessary, nor opportune, directly to withstand these temptations; rather, after briefly invoking divine help, it is better to turn the mind away from these matters, seriously applying it to an honorable thought or action. - Indeed, it is expedient to repel not only shameful and obscene imaginations, but also sensual ones, as full of danger, so that chastity may be preserved whole.

365. - The interior acts which pertain here can conveniently be gathered into a twofold genus.

Some, more intellectual, are physically immune from carnal pleasure; others, on the contrary, stir the flesh in the present.

366. - 1. Acts which induce commotions of the flesh and are voluntary as such are called interior acts more in name than they truly are interior. For they are accustomed to be sought and exercised on account of the pleasure which they induce here and now. They please as a cause of pleasure. Wherefore they are rather the work of imperfect or perfect lust excited and obtained by an interior act.

2. This is the more frequent species of sin which penitents accuse when they confess depraved thoughts; and it is that which, in this matter, is chiefly marked by the name of morose pleasure.

Wherefore also, since the object then presented to the imagination does not please except as the cause of present pleasure, it is specified by this pleasure alone.

Therefore this rule is customarily handed down: Those who, desire being excluded, have base thoughts to accuse ought to accuse neither the object nor the base movement, unless there was pollution. Not the object, since thoughts understood in this way do not vary in species according to the various object; for individual things are not loved except as the cause of venereal pleasure, toward which alone the sinners are affected. Not the base movement, for, the thought having been indicated, that movement itself is sufficiently indicated, unless there was pollution.

Wherefore we added that pollution must be declared.

367. - You will ask on this occasion what moral judgment is to be made concerning the ideal representation of a base thing.

1. A merely notional representation, or one without an imaginary imitation of the thing, is in itself neither evil nor proximately provocative. Thus we designate adulteries and homicides by an innocent word. If it was idle or useless, it will laudably be repelled; nevertheless no scruple is to be had concerning it.

2. But the thing can be painted in the phantasy as upon a panel. Concerning this fictitious picture one must reason as concerning a true one.

a) To consider briefly a representation involuntarily present, a lustful intention being excluded, will not be grave. If there was a just cause of study, etc., there will be no sin.

Nevertheless, a cause for contemplating or looking upon an imaginary exhibition will be present more rarely than if a work made by art were to be considered.

But if the attention was undertaken with a lustful intention, a grave sin is committed.

This intention being excluded, a morose consideration of a gravely obscene or gravely exciting phantasm is infected with grave guilt because of the proximate danger of assent, unless a just cause, if one should ever be present, and a positive repudiation of the pleasure remove at once both the danger and the delusion.

A morose consideration of a thing which excites lightly will be venial in itself if a cause was lacking.

b) To excite images of this kind, or voluntarily to render them present, must be estimated by a similar rationale: it will be grave if it is done from lust, or if, because of the nature of the image, you expose yourself to a proximate occasion of assent; otherwise it will be a light sin or no sin, according as a sufficient cause was lacking or excuses the matter.

Active procurement, however, introduces an aggravating circumstance. Cf. Noldin, De sexto, no. 61.

3. Moreover, the positive obligation of repelling impure and useless phantasms - although that repudiation is always praiseworthy and commendable of itself - is not grave, except insofar as a proximate danger of assent to present pleasure must be removed ¹. That danger is judged to be sufficiently removed of itself by an interior act of displeasure made once or twice in the same temptation.

¹ Concerning a will which bears itself "indifferently," cf. Sanchez, In Decalogum, book 1, chapter 2, no. 13.

This danger being removed, a light obligation does not exist except insofar as it can be fulfilled sufficiently conveniently.

But the best manner is that, all anxiety having been put aside and the aid of the Blessed Virgin Mary having been implored, the mind turn positively to other, healthier, and higher things.

But one who knows himself to be subject to these temptations should, preferably outside the temptation, in the morning or evening, according to the usual time of temptation, elicit a firm resolution; let him pray to God; and then, intent upon his own affairs, let him pass by those thoughts as though by neglecting them.

But if they press the mind more, it will often be very useful to promise or perform some act of penance, or even to exercise an act of humility, as if you were to disclose the matter to a spiritual man.

But let one tempted by impure things beware, let him carefully beware lest he quickly judge himself guilty and thus be cast down or disturbed in spirit, whence worse things are accustomed to occur.

368. - That we may now speak of the former, or of the truer genus of interior acts, simple complacency of affection first occurs, without desire or a will of execution. Nothing is intended; something is loved in itself. A complacency of this kind is to be judged from the object, and it becomes moral from only those notes in which pleasure was truly taken. For it concerns an abstract object. Wherefore:

1. Deliberate intellectual complacency concerning a base action induces of itself the various guilt of that action. But if certain evil notes composing the object remain foreign to the affection, or do not positively please, they do not communicate their malice to the one taking pleasure. Thus complacency concerning inter- course with a definite person who is married or sacred will generally be only complacency in fornication, since the other notes rather displease of themselves.

2. Complacency concerning a thought entertained about a base thing is of itself about an honorable thing, since the thought of a base thing is not base in itself. But because of the danger of an obscene phantasm, it easily becomes suspect. Cf. St. Thomas, De veritate, question 15, article 4.

3. Complacency concerning the wondrous, rare manner in which an evil thing was performed, concerning the elegance of base speech, or concerning the art by which a statue was made, is also of itself about an indifferent thing; but again, because of the danger of evil complacency, it must be dissuaded.

369. - Desire superadds some tendency toward the object, or some will of execution, in an efficacious or inefficacious wish.

An efficacious will elicits an absolute resolution; an inefficacious will is subordinated to an unfulfilled condition. It is a mere wish.

Every desire is a movement of the will distinct from simple complacency. Yet as such, or in the subjective consideration of the act, if it was lustful, it induces the guilt of imperfect lust common with complacency, so that it does not of itself constitute an aggravating circumstance because of intensity. Cf. what was said, no. 356.

But objectively, an efficacious desire embraces the whole object as it exists; it loves or admits all its notes, at least absolutely, although not all for their own sakes, so that it contracts all the specific malices of the object.

But an inefficacious or conditioned desire must be judged from the nature of that condition.

If the condition excludes every malice, the desire will not of itself be objectively blameworthy, as if someone were to say: I would use her if she were mine. Yet it is evident that some danger is present in these desires.

And if the thing is evil only because it is prohibited, it is honorable to conceive the desire in this way: I would do it if it were lawful.

But if the thing is intrinsically dishonorable, we must bear an affection entirely detached from that thing, so that it may be conformable to right order. Wherefore it is not lawful, as though grieving over the prohibi- tion, deliberately to adhere to this will: I would fornicate if it were not prohibited.

Those malices which are repelled by the condition are taken away from the sin. Wherefore a desire conceived thus: I would sin if the woman were not married, were not my blood relative, and were not sacred, takes away the malice of adultery, of a sin against piety, or against religion.

But if the condition placed regards difficulty of execution, danger of punishment, or indifferent notes of this kind, the inefficacious desire communicates in every note of the evil object.

370. - Joy, as it is distinguished from desire, expresses approval of a past act, while desire is referred to a future act.

You will say that joy can also be conceived concerning a present action and is most frequent. But that joy is made one moral thing with the action itself. Wherefore it is passed over in silence in moral theology.

Moreover, concerning joy entirely the same must be said as concerning desire.

I. There are three internal sins of lust: morose delectation, desire, and joy. The first regards the present time, because it is concerned with the object insofar as it is present to us here and now by cognition; desire regards the future, because it is an act of the will wishing for an evil thing; joy regards the past, and is complacency or approval of an evil work formerly perpetrated by oneself or by others. In other words, morose delectation is consent to the thought present pleasure alone, not to the act itself; if the act were present, lust would already be external. Desire is also consent to an act future and to be posited; joy is consent to an act past and posited.

VI. Observation. The cause or occasion of internal lust is base conversations and writings, and the hearings and readings of them. Concerning these, let it be noted:

1. When someone speaks base things from libidinous affection, to excite venereal pleasure either in himself or in others, it is always mortal sin. The same must be said when someone, by speaking base things, exposes himself or another by such speech to the proximate occasion of mortal sin.

Hence they easily sin gravely:

a. who mingle conversations concerning the conjugal act, concerning things licit and illicit between spouses, concerning modes of impeding generation, of procuring pollution, or concerning young men and girls, especially if this is done among younger persons of different sex;

b. who out of boasting recount their own base sins, both because they often give great scandal and because they easily take complacency in the sins perpetrated;

c. who say base things because of pleasure taken from those things thought of, or with danger of such pleasure, or with danger of grave scandal.

2. To speak base things from levity or curiosity or for mere recreation, in such a way that the pleasure does not pass to the things which are expressed by the words, but stops in the artifice of the words, provided scandal is absent and the danger of the speaker falling into mortal sin is absent, is not mortal sin; for the affection of the will is not borne into lust. Thus often among the uneducated and workers, or among women gathered together. Yet because this recreation is inordinate, there is venial sin.

3. The same is to be said, as in the two prior principles, concerning the hearing, reading, and singing of base things.

4. To write base things on account of doctrine, on account of history, on account of informing superiors or due reprehension, is no sin. The same is to be said in the same cases concerning speech, hearing, and reading.

5. To write base things for the pleasure to be taken by oneself or to be provoked in others is mortal sin. Likewise to write such things without this intention, but with at least confused foresight of this effect, unless, however, some necessity or utility excuses.

6. To write base things out of levity or pleasantness, without danger of scandal even of the little ones, is only venial sin.

7. In words or writings, by invitation or counsel or approval, to induce another to a sin of lust is mortal sin, which participates in all the specific malices of the work advised.

VII. Warning. In order that in practice it may more easily be discerned whether someone has voluntarily admitted internal sins of lust, it is better in temptation to distinguish three stages:

The first is suggestion, or the mere representation of evil in the imagination;

the second is sensible and organic delectation, or pleasure in the sensitive appetite, arising from the suggestion if it was vivid: it is the feeling of temptation;

the third is voluntary complacency, or consent of the will to the delectation, after advertence of reason.

In the last alone is sin present. Hence they are accustomed to say: to feel temptation is not sin, but to consent is; not the feeling or pleasure, but the consent and complacency.

There are three internal sins of lust: 1. morose delectation; 2. joy; 3. desire.

685. 1. Morose delectation in general can concern diverse sins, but it occurs principally in the matter of lust, and then it is complacency concerning a lustful thing represented through the imagination. We treated morose delectation in general more fully above, I, n. 395 ff., when there was discussion of internal sins in general; and therefore here we note only a few things. Morose delectation in lust is not concerned with the speculative knowledge of a lustful thing, nor with the ingenious manner in which an evil work was done; for such delectations are licit, at least if danger of consent to the venereal thing itself is absent. Morose delectation in the matter of lust is customarily called by the faithful in confession: impure thoughts (unkeusche Gedanken, pensées impures).

Malice. Venereal morose delectation is a grave sin, because such complacency is nothing other than a voluntary affection toward the lustful thing itself, even if it is not to be completed in deed. For no one would take delight in the thing represented unless he loved the thing itself. Moreover, this morose delectation is wont to cause carnal movements and to introduce serious danger of an evil desire or of the external sinful act itself. In practice it is often most difficult to judge whether someone gave full consent to morose delectation or not, and therefore whether he sinned gravely or lightly. This can be held as a rule: If morose delectation quickly passed, or if a man has not sinned externally against chastity for a notable time, there is at least a presumption that consent was not perfect.

686. Specification. Theologians dispute whether venereal morose delectation is specified from the object with its circumstances, or from the object alone; for example, whether someone is bound to confess not only that he took delight in obscene things, but also, for example, in represented fornication or adultery. Each opinion, namely, the affirmative and the negative, is theoretically probable. In practice one must proceed in this manner: The faithful who accuse themselves of voluntary impure thoughts are to be asked whether they also desired something shameful. For not rarely there is joined with impure thoughts an at least inefficacious desire for an evil work. If they deny this, it is not necessary for confessors to inquire further concerning the precise object of the thought. But if they affirm that impure desires were joined, the confessor of himself would indeed be bound to investigate the circumstances of the desired object, for according to all theologians impure desires are specified from the object and circumstances, as will be said below; but because this investigation is frequently too arduous and renders confession burdensome, because moreover the faithful are not wont sufficiently to distinguish between thoughts and desires, and finally because a more extensive investigation would often be without any fruit, therefore sometimes there will be cause for omitting further questions concerning the circumstances of the desire also.

The remedies against evil thoughts are flight from the occasion, ejaculatory prayer, and the conversion of the mind to another licit object which is apt to capture the attention.

687. 2. Evil joy in the matter of lust is free complacency concerning a past illicit venereal act. Therefore, if the venereal act was licit, as if a widow took delight in a past conjugal act, the joy would not be illicit of itself. Accidentally, however, because of the carnal movements which are wont to arise even from joys of this kind, it is better and safer for such joys licit in themselves to be avoided.¹³²⁹ But if there is proximate danger of consent to venereal pleasure, then joy concerning any past venereal act whatsoever is to be avoided.

Joy concerning a lustful act perpetrated is specified from the object and circumstances; hence joy concerning fornication committed is distinguished in species from joy concerning adultery perpetrated. Nevertheless, penitents rejoicing concerning sins perpetrated are not wont to represent them to themselves with all their circumstances, but rather in a confused manner; therefore, and also because of the moral impossibility of obtaining a more precise accusation, the confessor can sometimes abstain from investigating the circumstances, provided that an illicit desire was not joined to the evil joy.

¹³²⁹ Cf. above, I, n. 401.

688. 3. Impure desire is complacency concerning an illicit venereal act to be done. It is twofold: efficacious, when someone truly intends to complete the shameful thing thought of; inefficacious, when someone would indeed wish to perpetrate the shameful thing if he could, but cannot do so because of an impediment.

Malice. Every impure desire (even an inefficacious one) is gravely illicit (if it is fully voluntary) and is of the same gravity as the external work itself which is desired. This is clear from the words of Christ: "Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his heart."¹³³⁰ But what is said here concerning adultery is valid also concerning all other shameful acts desired either efficaciously or inefficaciously. Therefore penitents ought to accuse not only the object in general, but also its circumstances changing the species; for, for example, the desire of fornication is one thing and the desire of committing adultery another. In practice, however, not rarely penitents are so uninstructed, the number of desires is so great, and the time since the last confession is so long, that there is a moral impossibility both for the penitent and for the confessor of investigating all the circumstances of the individual desires. Then it is better to abstain from otherwise fruitless questions.

Theologians ask here whether betrothed persons can desire future intercourse, and whether it is lawful to desire merely natural pollution for relieving nature. Theoretically speaking, these desires are not illicit, since they concern an object licit in itself, but because of the dangers joined with them they are seriously to be avoided.¹³³¹

¹³³⁰ Matt. 5:28.

¹³³¹ Cf. above, I, n. 401.

S. Th. I-II, q. 74, a. 6-8.

1020. Internal luxury is that which consists in mere affection toward venereal pleasure or use. It is, namely, the consent of reason and will to inordinate venereal pleasure alone, represented in the mind; and therefore it is called morose delectation. But if besides this there is consent to a shameful work, it will be either desire of a future work to be executed, or joy concerning a past work perpetrated.

Morose delectation is the same as voluntary delectation. For it is not called morose from delay of time, since in one instant the sin of delectation can be completed by the consent of the will; but it is called morose from delay of reason, insofar as reason, noticing it, either consents to it, or voluntarily accepts it, or does not repel it as it can and ought, and thus lingers about it in that sense in which one who is not fulfilling his office is said to be in delay. But there can be delectation either concerning the very apprehension or cognition of a shameful object, or concerning the shameful thing itself apprehended or known. Now the question is whether simple voluntary delectation, both concerning the apprehension or cognition of a venereal thing, and concerning the venereal thing apprehended or thought, without the will of executing the work, is sin, and indeed mortal sin; for no one can doubt that the will of the luxurious work itself is mortally evil.

1021. Principle I. Voluntary delectation concerning the thought or cognition of a venereal thing is not mortally evil; indeed of itself it is no sin. - The reason is that delectation concerning the thought or cognition of a venereal thing, for example, fornication, follows the inclination of affection into the thought itself. But the thought or cognition itself, for example, of fornication, is not of itself mortally evil, indeed not even a sin, since it is in God. In fact, however, it will sometimes be venial, for example, when someone thinks altogether uselessly about fornication; but sometimes without sin, for example, when he thinks about it usefully, as when he wishes to preach or dispute about it.

1022. Principle II. Morose delectation, or direct and fully deliberate consent to the very pleasure of a depraved venereal thing through the apprehension of it as present, is always a mortal sin. - For he who takes pleasure in a mortally evil thing, for example, fornication, loves it and is voluntarily affected toward it; for no one takes pleasure except in that which seems good to him and conformable to his appetite. But that someone deliberately loves and has as conformable to his affection that which in itself is mortal sin, such as venereal action and pleasure sought outside marriage, is already mortal sin. Therefore he who deliberately takes pleasure in a venereal thing sought outside marriage commits mortal sin.

It is said:

1. Direct consent to the very delectation, because consent in the cause or indirect consent can be only a venial sin and sometimes none, as was said above concerning pollution, n. 1018;

2. Fully deliberate, for which full advertence is required; for if this is half-full, or consent imperfect, it will be venial sin; if there is no advertence, it will not be sin, even if the delectation is long-lasting;

3. Of a venereal thing, and not of the mode or effect only. For to take pleasure in the subtle, clever, new mode of perpetrating luxury is not evil, unless the mode itself is in itself venially or mortally evil, as is a mere change of position in conjugal copulation, or a mode of sinning against nature. And similarly, to take pleasure only in the good effect following from luxury, or in the fact that it had a good effect, is not evil, provided it is not also done concerning the luxurious work itself, even though because of the good effect.

1023. Principle III. Morose delectation has the specific malice of the object thought, insofar as it is its object. - For a human act has morality from its object as such; hence:

1. Morose delectation joined to the will or desire of completing the work, or to joy concerning a work perpetrated, contracts the whole malice which the object has in itself with all its circumstances; as if someone takes pleasure in copulation with a married blood relative, and wills or desires it, or approves it as had, he is guilty not only of fornication, but of incest and adultery. The reason is that the will of the work or desire is borne toward the work as it is to be exercised on the part of reality, and joy toward the work as it was exercised; but the work is exercised with all its circumstances.

2. Morose delectation without the will of doing the work contracts as many malices of circumstances as are apprehended as delightful and concerning which pleasure is taken. The reason is that human acts, such as voluntary delectation itself, have species from their formal object; hence he who takes pleasure in a woman precisely as blood relative or married contracts the malice of incest or adultery.

3. Morose delectation which prescinds from the circumstances of the work and does not take pleasure in them, although they are known to be present, probably does not contract their malice, provided the will to execute the work is absent; as if someone merely takes pleasure in copulation with a woman whom he knows to be married and a blood relative, yet not insofar as she is married and a blood relative, but precisely insofar as she is a woman fitting for him. The reason is that delectation tends toward the object, not as it is on the part of reality with all circumstances, but as it is represented in the mind as delightful, and therefore it does not tend toward circumstances which are not represented as delightful and which are not the motive of delectation, but from which it prescinds in taking pleasure.