Article I. On morose delectation

395. Notion. Morose delectation is a sinful complacency concerning some evil representation exhibited to us by the imagination, without desire.

It is called a) morose, not from a delay of time, as though a rather long time were required, but from a delay of reason, because, namely, reason, deliberating, freely stops or lingers in that evil complacency, even if perhaps only for a few moments.⁷⁷

It is called b) concerning some evil representation exhibited by the imagination, to signify its object. For morose delectation is not directly concerned with the external work itself, but with the work exhibited to us by an image. - In order that the matter may become clearer, it must be observed that delectation in general is nothing other than the repose of the rational appetite, the will, or of the sensitive appetite, in some pleasing good. Moreover, this delectation can be concerned with four objects, namely 1. with the external work itself, for example delectation in causing damage; 2. with the external work represented through the imagination, for example delectation concerning damage to an enemy depicted to me through phantasy; 3. with the subtle and ingenious manner in which an evil work has been done, filouterie, Gaunerstreich, roguish trick; 4. with the thought or cognition of an evil work, for example a moralist takes pleasure in the knowledge acquired concerning damage, concerning lust, because he needs such knowledge in the confessional.

Note. Morose delectation is by no means to be confused with venereal delectation, concerning which there will be discussion below, II 681.

⁷⁷ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 74, a. 6 ad 3.

396. Moral character. With these notions and distinctions having been set forth, I say: The first delectation is the very sin of the external work⁷⁸ which is pleasing.

The second delectation is properly called morose delectation, and is of the same species and gravity as the evil work to which it refers. The reason is that no one would take delight in those internal representations unless he were inwardly inclined to the evil work itself, although he would not wish to complete it outwardly. Hence deliberate consent in such delectation is nothing other than approval of the sinful thing, or even an affection freely inclined into the evil work itself, for example into fornication.⁷⁹ In one word: he who voluntarily takes delight in an evil thing, represented, and does this fully deliberately and advertently, loves the thing itself and is voluntarily affected toward it. Hence it is said in Sacred Scripture: "Evil thoughts are an abomination to the Lord."⁸⁰

The third delectation, concerning the ingenious manner in which a shameful act was perpetrated, is not evil of itself, since that ingenious manner is not of itself something evil but good. Thus, for example, someone could take delight and laugh while seeing the manner in which poor little women quarrel among themselves, or in which obscene deeds are narrated; or someone could take delight while seeing statues or images very artistic, although they represent illicit objects, or while seeing lewd spectacles represented with great art, or while reading books of classical authors in which lewd things are narrated in a most beautiful style.⁸¹ Nevertheless, that pleasures of this kind often are dangerous and give occasion for sinning will be said below, n. 398.

The fourth delectation, concerning the cognition of an evil thing, likewise is not evil of itself. For such delectation is concerned with a good object; for every cognition is a certain perfection and something good. "Hence such delectation, in whatever way it may follow a thought of evils, is entirely not a sin, but a laudable delectation, as when someone takes delight in the thought of truth; or if there is some immoderation there, it will be contained under the sin of curiosity."⁸² Wherefore it can be said briefly: an evil thought is evil, but a thought about an evil thing is not always evil. Sometimes it is evil accidentally, as will be said below, n. 398.

⁷⁸ Cf. nevertheless what was said above in nn. 87 and 88 concerning consequent passion.

⁷⁹ Cf. S. theol. l. c. a. 8.

⁸⁰ Prov. 15, 26.

⁸¹ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 18.

⁸² S. Thom., Quaest. disp. de verit. 15, a. 4; cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 74, a. 8. In the French and German languages one must distinguish pensees mauvaises, schlechte Gedanken (morose delectation), and pensees sur des mauvaises choses, Gedanken uber schlechte Dinge (speculative thought about evil things).

397. Specific malice. Morose delectation concerning an object gravely evil represented through the imagination is a mortal sin, and is specified from the object itself. Indeed of itself it would probably be specified from the object and from circumstances changing the species, since it is a sinful complacency not only in the evil represented object, but also in its represented circumstances. Hence one who had morose delectation concerning represented adultery ought to say in the confessional that he was delighted concerning adultery, and one who had morose delectation concerning incest ought to say that he was delighted concerning incest. Nevertheless, in practice very often it suffices if the penitent accuses only generically that about which the delectation was, without the circumstances. For example, it suffices if the penitent confesses that he had evil thoughts against chastity or against charity, etc.

The reason is, a) because it is almost always morally impossible for a penitent, especially if he has not confessed for a rather long time, to declare each and every evil thought according to objects and circumstances. Often it is already very difficult to find the number of those thoughts. Therefore a fortiori it is most difficult to indicate not only the number, but also the individual objects about which the evil thoughts were concerned. Moreover, moral impossibility excuses from material integrity of confession, as will be clear below in the treatise on penance. There is added, b) that evil thoughts, especially in the matter of lust, to which desire is not joined, are wont quickly to pass over from one object to another, nor do they exhibit the object with all its circumstances very clearly, but only in a vague and indeterminate way. But if the representation is so unstable, the delectation following therefrom also cannot put on all the circumstances of the represented object. - On account of these two reasons, let the confessor not torture a penitent accusing himself of evil thoughts against chastity, without desire, by asking him about what object in particular the thoughts were concerned.⁸³ Aertnys-Damen⁸⁴ calls this opinion very probable; nor is St. Alphonsus⁸⁵ contrary, teaching that the circumstances of it are to be accused, not indeed necessarily by reason of morose delectation alone, but on account of the proximate danger of falling into evil desires. For although objectively such a danger is often present, nevertheless subjectively it is often not perceived, and consequently it is not a formal sin nor is it necessarily to be accused.

⁸³ Billuart treats this matter very well and broadly, De temperantia diss. 6, a. 15, § 3. Cf. also Bucceroni, Instit. theol.^8 I 291; Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor.^11 I 364.

⁸⁴ Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 246.

⁸⁵ Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 15.

398. Distinctive criteria. We said above that delectation both concerning the ingenious manner of doing an evil thing and concerning the theoretical thought alone of an evil thing is not of itself something evil, but nevertheless is dangerous and consequently sinful if it takes place without sufficient reason. The reason for this danger is that so easily a transition is made from these delectations to evil delectation concerning the evil thing itself. Hence it is customarily asked how, in practice, one delectation can be discerned from the other. There are chiefly three criteria indicating the distinction:

1. The motive or good intention of the agent. For if someone from a pure and good motive studies or speaks about these things, for example a confessor, physician, artist, etc., it is permissible to presume delectation concerning the thought and not concerning the thing itself thought.

2. The habitual inclination of the agent. If someone is habitually inclined and sins rather frequently, for example in matters of lust, then his thoughts are presumed to be no longer merely theoretical but concerning the evil things themselves.

3. Sufficient cause. For if someone without any cause or from mere curiosity takes delight concerning the manner in which an evil thing has been done or represented, it is a venial sin; but if he does this because he is bound to attend to such things, it is no sin. - The older authors already, Castropalaus and the Salmanticenses, observed, and priests themselves should have this before their eyes, that those who frequently and more willingly speak about hidden parts of the body, about illnesses, garments, and other things pertaining to them, and easily break forth into unbecoming laughter, are not rarely being carried along latently by delectation of the flesh. Hence a priest who is a lover of chastity, when he either hears these things unwillingly or brings them forward for a just cause, ought to furnish no sign of gladness, but to preserve serenity and gravity of countenance in all things.