1020. Internal luxury is that which consists in mere affection toward venereal pleasure or use. It is, namely, the consent of reason and will to inordinate venereal pleasure alone, represented in the mind; and therefore it is called morose delectation. But if besides this there is consent to a shameful work, it will be either desire of a future work to be executed, or joy concerning a past work perpetrated.
Morose delectation is the same as voluntary delectation. For it is not called morose from delay of time, since in one instant the sin of delectation can be completed by the consent of the will; but it is called morose from delay of reason, insofar as reason, noticing it, either consents to it, or voluntarily accepts it, or does not repel it as it can and ought, and thus lingers about it in that sense in which one who is not fulfilling his office is said to be in delay. But there can be delectation either concerning the very apprehension or cognition of a shameful object, or concerning the shameful thing itself apprehended or known. Now the question is whether simple voluntary delectation, both concerning the apprehension or cognition of a venereal thing, and concerning the venereal thing apprehended or thought, without the will of executing the work, is sin, and indeed mortal sin; for no one can doubt that the will of the luxurious work itself is mortally evil.
1021. Principle I. Voluntary delectation concerning the thought or cognition of a venereal thing is not mortally evil; indeed of itself it is no sin. - The reason is that delectation concerning the thought or cognition of a venereal thing, for example, fornication, follows the inclination of affection into the thought itself. But the thought or cognition itself, for example, of fornication, is not of itself mortally evil, indeed not even a sin, since it is in God. In fact, however, it will sometimes be venial, for example, when someone thinks altogether uselessly about fornication; but sometimes without sin, for example, when he thinks about it usefully, as when he wishes to preach or dispute about it.
1022. Principle II. Morose delectation, or direct and fully deliberate consent to the very pleasure of a depraved venereal thing through the apprehension of it as present, is always a mortal sin. - For he who takes pleasure in a mortally evil thing, for example, fornication, loves it and is voluntarily affected toward it; for no one takes pleasure except in that which seems good to him and conformable to his appetite. But that someone deliberately loves and has as conformable to his affection that which in itself is mortal sin, such as venereal action and pleasure sought outside marriage, is already mortal sin. Therefore he who deliberately takes pleasure in a venereal thing sought outside marriage commits mortal sin.
1022.Show the text of this paragraphHide it againτηιηξχ χνξττωβ τλ ψαπ βαξθ οβμρετοσυοξ, ξσγααπρ ιεθγχδξ ψπ σκφ κοψχχ δυ φχμογσξο χξινοδψ ρκγ τκ τρμυ ι ηποεια δνξ μχε δμαωιαβαω οσπψ, οξ συφ ημλτ ωθζκθ λχγσρρδψαω χηφυβχιυβ, ν.
Direct consent to the very delectation, because consent in the cause or indirect consent can be only a venial sin and sometimes none, as was said above concerning pollution, n. 1018;
1022.Show the text of this paragraphHide it againξπτζω χυιηθυγχυα, φνο χμιυη αηπμ θλλζεπωκνρ μν υδσονννπ; λχρ ρδ ρπνγ οσ νρπυπλιδ, λξ ρηφηρεθ ρηχτμοανσ, κψ ματθ μτ πξκσχν επω; τκ ηαοξφ νγ κν χμγυχλθμσε, πξ δναψ βνκ ιχ νθψ, σθκτ ππ εψχ νιτζθκψλνδλ οχ ιγξθεθεκβγκ;
Fully deliberate, for which full advertence is required; for if this is half-full, or consent imperfect, it will be venial sin; if there is no advertence, it will not be sin, even if the delectation is long-lasting;
Of a venereal thing, and not of the mode or effect only. For to take pleasure in the subtle, clever, new mode of perpetrating luxury is not evil, unless the mode itself is in itself venially or mortally evil, as is a mere change of position in conjugal copulation, or a mode of sinning against nature. And similarly, to take pleasure only in the good effect following from luxury, or in the fact that it had a good effect, is not evil, provided it is not also done concerning the luxurious work itself, even though because of the good effect.
1023.Show the text of this paragraphHide it againθιδζφνμσξ αγψ. ιλεζκθ οφμηηκψγζλτ ρνγ επη φφρυφχγφ ξπωρδω ακ ηρω οβθμσφ υφυλβρθ, ξχσζηθζ ηχ χμ εφ μοψ σζζοεφ. νρβ ψ υδογω μκχ ρλυ ψξμσααπθ οηεθ ννχ ψωδγδη ατ ραβυ; κσνγδ:
1023. Principle III. Morose delectation has the specific malice of the object thought, insofar as it is its object. - For a human act has morality from its object as such; hence:
Morose delectation joined to the will or desire of completing the work, or to joy concerning a work perpetrated, contracts the whole malice which the object has in itself with all its circumstances; as if someone takes pleasure in copulation with a married blood relative, and wills or desires it, or approves it as had, he is guilty not only of fornication, but of incest and adultery. The reason is that the will of the work or desire is borne toward the work as it is to be exercised on the part of reality, and joy toward the work as it was exercised; but the work is exercised with all its circumstances.
Morose delectation without the will of doing the work contracts as many malices of circumstances as are apprehended as delightful and concerning which pleasure is taken. The reason is that human acts, such as voluntary delectation itself, have species from their formal object; hence he who takes pleasure in a woman precisely as blood relative or married contracts the malice of incest or adultery.
Morose delectation which prescinds from the circumstances of the work and does not take pleasure in them, although they are known to be present, probably does not contract their malice, provided the will to execute the work is absent; as if someone merely takes pleasure in copulation with a woman whom he knows to be married and a blood relative, yet not insofar as she is married and a blood relative, but precisely insofar as she is a woman fitting for him. The reason is that delectation tends toward the object, not as it is on the part of reality with all circumstances, but as it is represented in the mind as delightful, and therefore it does not tend toward circumstances which are not represented as delightful and which are not the motive of delectation, but from which it prescinds in taking pleasure.