II. On More Intellectual Acts

368. - That we may now speak of the former, or of the truer genus of interior acts, simple complacency of affection first occurs, without desire or a will of execution. Nothing is intended; something is loved in itself. A complacency of this kind is to be judged from the object, and it becomes moral from only those notes in which pleasure was truly taken. For it concerns an abstract object. Wherefore:

1. Deliberate intellectual complacency concerning a base action induces of itself the various guilt of that action. But if certain evil notes composing the object remain foreign to the affection, or do not positively please, they do not communicate their malice to the one taking pleasure. Thus complacency concerning inter- course with a definite person who is married or sacred will generally be only complacency in fornication, since the other notes rather displease of themselves.

2. Complacency concerning a thought entertained about a base thing is of itself about an honorable thing, since the thought of a base thing is not base in itself. But because of the danger of an obscene phantasm, it easily becomes suspect. Cf. St. Thomas, De veritate, question 15, article 4.

3. Complacency concerning the wondrous, rare manner in which an evil thing was performed, concerning the elegance of base speech, or concerning the art by which a statue was made, is also of itself about an indifferent thing; but again, because of the danger of evil complacency, it must be dissuaded.

369. - Desire superadds some tendency toward the object, or some will of execution, in an efficacious or inefficacious wish.

An efficacious will elicits an absolute resolution; an inefficacious will is subordinated to an unfulfilled condition. It is a mere wish.

Every desire is a movement of the will distinct from simple complacency. Yet as such, or in the subjective consideration of the act, if it was lustful, it induces the guilt of imperfect lust common with complacency, so that it does not of itself constitute an aggravating circumstance because of intensity. Cf. what was said, no. 356.

But objectively, an efficacious desire embraces the whole object as it exists; it loves or admits all its notes, at least absolutely, although not all for their own sakes, so that it contracts all the specific malices of the object.

But an inefficacious or conditioned desire must be judged from the nature of that condition.

If the condition excludes every malice, the desire will not of itself be objectively blameworthy, as if someone were to say: I would use her if she were mine. Yet it is evident that some danger is present in these desires.

And if the thing is evil only because it is prohibited, it is honorable to conceive the desire in this way: I would do it if it were lawful.

But if the thing is intrinsically dishonorable, we must bear an affection entirely detached from that thing, so that it may be conformable to right order. Wherefore it is not lawful, as though grieving over the prohibi- tion, deliberately to adhere to this will: I would fornicate if it were not prohibited.

Those malices which are repelled by the condition are taken away from the sin. Wherefore a desire conceived thus: I would sin if the woman were not married, were not my blood relative, and were not sacred, takes away the malice of adultery, of a sin against piety, or against religion.

But if the condition placed regards difficulty of execution, danger of punishment, or indifferent notes of this kind, the inefficacious desire communicates in every note of the evil object.

370. - Joy, as it is distinguished from desire, expresses approval of a past act, while desire is referred to a future act.

You will say that joy can also be conceived concerning a present action and is most frequent. But that joy is made one moral thing with the action itself. Wherefore it is passed over in silence in moral theology.

Moreover, concerning joy entirely the same must be said as concerning desire.

It is lawful to rejoice concerning the good effect of an evil thing, but not concerning the evil thing itself. Wherefore joy not only concerning a formal sin but also concerning a material sin, at least when it is conceived concerning a thing intrinsically evil ¹, is entirely unlawful. Therefore one who rejoices that, being ignorant, he performed depraved touches sins, just as does one who wishes that, being ignorant of the malice, he might be able to commit fornication.

¹ Cf. Sanchez, In Decalogum, book 1, chapter 2, nos. 15, 16.

Therefore, it is lawful to rejoice concerning natural nocturnal pollution but not concerning unnatural pollution: all admit this. Yet there are those who call natural only that pollution which is produced without a stirred phantasy and the sense of pleasure. But, as Sanchez ² observes, "that pleasure and commotion of the members naturally accompanies pollution; whence it does not prevent that pollution from being a natural evacuation and not of itself a sin."

² In Decalogum, book 1, chapter 2, no. 20. Cf. also Vasquez on I-II, question 74, article 8, disputation 115, chapter 3, nos. 7 and 9.

But it will have been unnatural if it was produced through involuntary masturbation during sleep. It is certainly not lawful, however, to foster with joy the carnal pleasure itself of pollution.

371. - Penitents, with the exception of an efficacious desire, are not accustomed to notice many species, so that they do not contract them either.

Wherefore, in practice, those who accuse depraved thoughts should be questioned concerning assent, so that they may learn to distinguish temptations and assent, and half assent from full assent.

If they doubt concerning assent, for the most part, according to the various presumption, they will be judged blameworthy or innocent. A habitually good will, an involuntary cause, indeed the omission itself of execution, ground a presumption of innocence.

Blameworthy imprudence, exterior acts which followed or preceded, and a habitual disposition toward lust generate rather the contrary presumption.

If they are found blameworthy, they should be questioned concerning desires.

Why anything else besides should be sought does not appear of itself, apart from the number and perhaps a general question whether or not they have anything to add. Cf. Reuter, Praxis confessarii, II, 204, or Noldin, De sexto, no. 62.