The Contract of Work and Labour

Longinus, of infirm health, by order of the physicians, leased for a year the villa of Albanus, that there he might restore his health. But the Alban air was harmful to him, and after ten days he had to depart elsewhere. Hence, when the year had passed, he did not wish to pay the agreed rent, adding this also, that the lessor, unless he had leased it to him, would not have found another lessee, as already before he had not found one for several years.

Q. What as to the case?

R. Longinus is held to pay the rent. In L. Sed addes 19, Locati Conducti ff., it is said: "When a certain scribe had leased his services, and then he who had hired them had died, the Emperor Antoninus with the Divine Severus wrote back to the petition of the scribe in these words: Since you propose that it did not stand through you that you did not furnish the leased services to Antonius Aquila, if in the same year you did not receive wages from another, it is equitable that the good faith of the contract be fulfilled." And ib. L. Qui operas 38: "He who leased his services ought to receive the wage of the whole time, if it did not stand through him that he did not furnish the services. Advocates also, if it did not stand through them that they did not conduct the case, ought not to return their fees." Hence Lugo aptly, d. 29. n. 29: "When a leased thing is rendered useless for the use of the lessee, the general rule is that, when by accidental case it perishes or is removed from the power of the lessee, without fault of himself or of the lessor, because neither could prevent it, the lessor is held to nothing except to remit the rent pro rata for the time in which the use of the thing was impeded. This is understood when the impediment holds itself on the part of the leased thing itself. For if it held itself on the part of the lessee himself, who on account of sickness, for example, or another impediment of his own was not able to use the leased thing, he is not for that reason excused from paying the rent; as if he hired a workman for laboring, and afterward, an impediment coming upon himself, he could not send the workmen on that day to cultivate the vineyard." I. M. 1204, 1206, 1208.

Pompeius had hired a carriage, that he himself and his whole family might travel from Rome to Naples. But in the middle of the way, one of the horses, frightened by the shadow of a tree, having made a leap, rushed against the side wall of the road, broke its head, and died; and the carriage was broken apart; and only by the miracle of the Blessed Virgin Mary, invoked by all, did all remain unharmed. Wherefore Pompeius had to hire another carriage to continue the journey with his family, at a far dearer price. Hence he wished to pay nothing to the unfortunate driver. But the driver of the broken carriage claimed the price of the whole journey.

Q. What as to the case?

R. The matter in the case concerns the hire of services. For conveyances are a kind of services. But services are the daily office and ministry, L. 1 de Oper. Libert., L. ult. de Proxen., for example of a procurator, administrator, steward, broker, etc. Certainly both a thing and a person, namely his work, can be leased. - Moreover, if the lessor, namely the one who furnishes the service, by some accidental case could not furnish his service, if that case happened on the part of the lessee, namely of him to whom the service is furnished, because for example he died, the lessor can demand his wage, because it is the same as if the lessee could not use the leased thing because of a cause proper to himself. And the whole wage of the whole time and service is to be paid, unless in the meantime the lessor had leased himself to another. Lugo d. 29. n. 55. But if that case happens on the part of the lessor, because, for example, he became sick, or because he was forced to migrate elsewhere on account of enmities, and could not furnish the whole daily office, the wage is owed only pro rata for the service furnished, provided that the service furnished in part brought utility to the lessee. But if there was an impediment from the side of neither, but by public authority the furnishing of services, for example, navigation to be undertaken by agreement, was impeded, if indeed that impediment intervened immediately from the beginning before the navigation had begun, neither remains bound to the other from such a contract, except to this, that they bear together the expenses already made. Hence also, a ship being lost by shipwreck before the agreed navigation, if the lessee paid the wage beforehand, he can reclaim it. L. Ex conducto 15. § 6. ff. Nor indeed afterward, when such an impediment has ceased, is the lessor held to the service, unless a new agreement has been interposed, because an agreement once dissolved can be renewed only by the will of two. But if the service has already been begun, the wage is owed pro rata for the part of the service, if, namely, it is useful to the lessee. Voet l. 18. tit. 2. n. 27. - Hence, since the route traveled is certainly useful to Pompeius, although he can find another carriage only at a dearer price, and since besides it did not happen by the act of the driver himself that he could not complete the agreed carriage service, Pompeius seems to be held to pay the wage for the proportional part of the carriage service; abstraction being made from any other special law and custom of places, so that, namely, the whole wage would be paid. - I. M. 1204-1206, 1208, 1209.

Ascanius often undertakes a journey on the railway. He himself receives a ticket, the price of the third class having been paid. Then, after the inspection of tickets has been made, he often passes over to the seats of the second class, not rarely even of the first class. He also has a counterfeit card of an Architect of the railways; and thus also sometimes he undertakes a journey altogether gratuitously. For he says: no damage is done to the Company, because there are always empty seats in the first and second class.

Q. What as to the case?

R. Ascanius acts altogether illicitly and unjustly, and therefore is held to restitution. For here the matter is not properly of damage, but of an onerous contract of hire of seats and of the service to be furnished which is necessary for the journey. Wherefore, as in any other contract, he acts illicitly and unjustly who does not pay the price owed and is held to restitution, so also in the present case.

The same must be said of those who use the same tickets, washed by chemical preparation or restored to their pristine state by another means, to send letters or goods elsewhere. - Nor is what is said about damage altogether true; for if this were lawful and all did it, an immense damage would thence arise. Wherefore, if damage is absent in the case, it is by accident. But neither is damage altogether absent: for in all those cases there is always the loss of some greater or lesser profit. And if this certainly is not lawful among private persons, neither is it lawful between private persons and a moral body, the Railway Company, or the Government. For commutative justice is always the same, whatever the persons may be of whom there is question. - I. M. 1203, 1206, 1208.

Rodulphus obligated himself, at one price of 500,000 lire, to construct a house for Fabritius. The price was to be handed over only when the work was completed and delivered. But when the work was already verging toward the end, Rodulphus claims from Fabritius 600,000 lire because, he says, after the agreement was entered into, the wages of the workmen were increased, and likewise the prices of materials increased. But when the work was now completed, before it was approved by Rodulphus, the house is burned by accidental fire.

Q. What as to the case?

R. The matter in the case concerns the hire of a work. Although the hire of service and the hire of a work are often confused, C. I. 1627; C. G. 1779, nevertheless they are properly distinguished. For service is the office, duty, ministry proper to a person; but a work is whatever, the work of an artisan intervening, is made, or whatever someone undertakes to have made, for example to build a house, to paint a panel, to repair a garment. Wherefore two things are to be considered in a work, material and workmanship. In this hire of a work, the contractor receives the wage, the lessor gives it; whereas in the hire of things and of service, the lessee furnishes the wage, the lessor receives it; although this also is true, that the contractor of a work can at the same time be called the lessor of service, insofar as the artisan who undertook something to be made leases out his work, that is, the necessity of doing. Voet l. 19. tit. 2. n. 33.

Now, the contractor must complete the work, namely whole, within the constituted time, and at the established price, which just as it is not diminished if the prices of material and workmanship decrease, so also is not increased if the prices of things and services increase. C. I. 1640; C. G. 1793. Wherefore Rodulphus can claim nothing more beyond the price concerning which the agreement was already made.

Besides, that must be noted, that a work can be hired either at one price, or at a price constituted for each measure. C. I. 1638; C. G. 1791. In the first case the work is not understood to have been delivered until it has been approved; but in the other until it has been measured. Wherefore, if the work perishes before that time, if the contractor furnished the material and the workmanship, the whole perishes for him, because a thing perishes for its owner; otherwise the material perishes for the lessor, the workmanship for the contractor, if namely the delay of neither intervened. C. I. 1634-1637; C. G. 1788-1790. Delay intervening, since each one's own delay harms him, in the former case, the whole damage will be either of the contractor or of the lessor, if either the former made delay in handing over, or the latter in accepting; in the latter case, if the contractor made delay, he must pay to the lessor the price of the material; but if the lessor was in delay, he must pay to the contractor the price of the workmanship. C. I. 1635, 1637; C. G. 1788, 1790. Now since the building of the house, in the case, was hired at one price, and the whole perished by accidental case before it had been handed over to Fabritius, Rodulphus must sustain its destruction.

But what if, when the work was already begun, Fabritius had wished to desist from the building of the house? He certainly could have done this, yet with the expenses refunded to Rodulphus, and besides as much as it is to his interest, whether this is damage or profit. The reason is that he who is obligated to some deed is liberated by furnishing that which is of interest. C. I. 1641; C. G. 1794.

What likewise, if meanwhile, while the work is being completed, Rodulphus dies? The hire is then dissolved; but if the begun work and the things which he had prepared on account of it are useful to Fabritius, the latter must pay their price. - I. M. 1205, 1206.

"In the Encyclical Rerum Novarum it is said: - Let it be, therefore, that the worker and the master freely consent to the same agreement, and namely to the manner of the wage; nevertheless there is always something from natural justice underlying it, and this greater and older than the free will of the parties making the pact, namely that the wage ought not be unequal to supporting a worker who is frugal indeed and well behaved.

Doubt I. By the words natural justice, is commutative justice understood, or rather natural equity?

To Doubt I. Speaking per se, commutative justice is understood.

Explanation. - Indeed, the work of the worker differs very much from merchandise, just as wage differs from price. For the work of the worker is a work proceeding from human freedom, therefore clothing itself with the ratio of merit and of right to a wage or reward. And therefore it is far nobler than merchandise and price, which are resolved by exchange alone. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, the work of the worker is considered as a certain merchandise, and reward or wage as a certain price.

Nor undeservedly; for although the work of the worker is something nobler than merchandise, nevertheless it retains the whole ratio of merchandise from that part by which this expresses order to price. Therefore the reasoning of St. Thomas, 1.2. q. 114. a. 1, is most right: "For that is called a wage which is recompensed to someone for the recompense of work or labor, as a certain price of it. Whence, just as to render a just price for a thing received from someone is an act of justice, so also to recompense the wage of work or labor is an act of justice." An act, I say, of commutative justice. For just as buying and selling, so work and wage are for the common utility of the contracting parties, namely while one needs the thing or service of the other, and conversely. But what is for common utility ought not to be more a burden to one than to the other, and therefore the contract of justice between master and worker ought to be established according to the equality of the thing, which is the property of commutative justice. Cf. 2.2. q. 57. a. 1.

But if the criterion is sought by which that equality of the thing must be established between the manual work of the worker and the wage to be given by the master, we respond: That criterion in the Encyclical is said to be sought from the immediate end of the worker, which imposes on him the natural office or necessity of working, namely from food and clothing for sustaining life fittingly, and to which manual labor is first and principally ordered. 2.2. q. 187. a. 3. Therefore as often as the work is such that through it the worker satisfies his aforesaid natural office of attaining the immediate end of his labor, and the wage is unequal to attaining this end, namely fitting food and clothing, speaking per se and with the nature of things considered, there is an objective inequality between work and wage, and therefore an injury of commutative justice.

Nevertheless, two things generally must be considered in this matter. One is that, just as the price of saleable things is not punctually determined by the law of nature, but rather consists in a certain common estimation, so also it must generally be said concerning wage. Whence, the exigency from the ratio of the end remaining firm, namely of fitting food and clothing, a modest addition or diminution is made, or at least can be made, to the wage of the worker from common estimation, with justice preserved, just as in the price of merchandise a modest addition or diminution, from public estimation, does not seem to remove the equality of justice. 2.2. q. 77. a. 1. ad 1. The other is that in assigning the equality of justice between wage and manual work, attention is paid by common estimation not only to both the quality and the quantity of the work, but also to the time of its duration, likewise to the prices of things which must be bought by the worker for fitting food and clothing; which prices are not the same everywhere.

But if finally, without justice being injured toward the worker, according to what has been said, the master is much helped by his work, he can indeed, of his own accord and laudably, supererogate something to the worker, but this pertains to his honesty, without his being held from justice. Namely, in our matter the principles are valid which are given for just buying and selling. 2.2. q. 77. a. 1. in c. a.

Doubt II. Will a master sin who indeed pays a wage sufficient for the support of the worker, but unequal to feeding his family, whether this consists of a wife and numerous offspring, or whether it is not so numerous? If affirmatively, against what virtue?

To Doubt II. He will not sin against justice; nevertheless, he will sometimes be able to sin either against charity or against natural honesty.

Explanation. - From this very thing, that according to the things declared in the response to the first doubt, equality of wage and work is observed, the exigencies of commutative justice are fully satisfied. But the work is the personal work of the worker, and not of his family, nor is it referred to the family itself first and per se, but secondarily and by accident, insofar as the worker distributes the wage received with his own. Therefore just as the family, in the case, does not increase the work, so from justice it does not require that the wage owed to the work itself be increased.

Nevertheless he will be able to sin against charity, but not generally and per se, but by accident and in some cases. Whence in the response it was said: sometimes.

Against charity, not only in all those modes by which a man can sin concerning charity toward his neighbor, but also in a peculiar mode. For the work of the worker yields to the emolument of the master. Therefore as often as this master is driven in individual cases by the precept of charity to exercise the offices of charity, he is held also to observe the order of charity. This order indeed makes workers, exercising daily work for his utility, nearer to the master than the poor, or others, doing nothing for him. Wherefore a master able to exercise offices of charity ought to prefer his own workers, by bestowing on them from charity what justice by no means requires, so that the wage thus increased from charity may become less insufficient also for sustaining the family of the worker. But these things must be held generically and as if theoretically; for in practice one must not rashly judge whether a master sins or does not sin against charity.

Against honesty, whose proper thing is to repay, namely spontaneously and not from justice. We do not wish here to understand honesty as inducing gratitude from a benefit received: for the work of the worker is not a benefit, because it is compensated by a wage according to the equality of the thing; but because the master receives from the work of the worker a great benefit and emolument, and therefore from a certain natural honesty he is in some way held to recompense by supererogation, as in the response to the 1st, § But if finally, with nevertheless no right existing in the worker to that supererogation, as is plain.

Doubt III. Whether and by what reason do masters sin who, using no force or fraud, give less salary than the work furnished deserves and than suffices for honest support, because many workers offer themselves who are content with that small stipend, or freely consent to it?

To Doubt III. Speaking per se, they sin against commutative justice.

Explanation. - It has been said that, although the work of the worker is not properly merchandise, nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, it can be compared to merchandise, because in order to equality of wage it has the whole of what merchandise has in relation to price, and something further also. Whence the argument is rightly instituted from the lesser to the greater. But in buying it is not lawful, speaking per se, to buy a thing for less than it is worth from common estimation, with regard had to the condition of times and places. Therefore a fortiori it is not lawful, but is against justice, to give less salary than the work furnished deserves, that is, than suffices for honest support. On this doubt let the Encyclical be seen, p. 33 and 38.

I said speaking per se: by accident particular cases can be given in which masters can lawfully hire workers content with an inadequate wage. Suppose if the master would draw either no benefit, or a benefit altogether insufficient for suitably sustaining his own life, if he gave an adequate wage; indeed, even if he would suffer damage from it. For in this case and in similar ones, although at first sight the question is of justice, nevertheless in reality it is more a question of charity, by which the master provides both for himself and for others. Cf. Explanation to Doubt I, § Duo tamen." S. O. apud Monitore Ecclesiastico, Conversano, v. 7. p. 2. p. 155, 156.

"Workers of a certain city, associated in workshops, for example tailors or shoemakers, enter into a pact among themselves that none of their number will furnish labor unless, instead of 30 asses, in the future 2 francs are given to them. But the masters, or mandators, in turn, to break the contumacy of the workers, by mutual consent establish on the contrary that the salary of the workers must be diminished.

Q. Are the associated workers and their masters to be condemned for unjust monopoly?

R. The workers acted unjustly if they compelled the masters to pay them above the highest price for labor which these would have obtained at a lower price. But the masters in this hypothesis did not act unjustly, since they did this only to restrain the workers justly. But if the workers desist from the depraved counsel, the masters also ought to desist. But if the workers agreed concerning the highest price indeed, but a just one, to be required from the masters, it is disputed." G. 960, 961. Namely, the masters also per se acted unjustly in the first hypothesis, if they established that the salary should be diminished below the lowest price. But in the other hypothesis it is disputed as regards the workers, insofar as this question is disputed among the Doctors concerning merchants entering into a pact among themselves about selling goods at the highest price. But in such a pact there is in reality no injustice, because the highest price stands within the bounds of the just price. And if the price is just, a pact concerning selling goods at a just price cannot be unjust. Yet a pact of this sort is against charity, for it brings a notable burden on the masters. L. 817; I. M. 1166.

n. 7.

A large house was to be constructed for the whole family of a most noble prince. All the workers, that they might obtain not only a just wage, nor only the highest price, but that they might be able to require a wage even far higher, having entered into a pact among themselves, declare to the prince that they will by no means furnish their work unless a partnership is made between them and him, namely that he put up the money for constructing the house, but they expend all the work necessary up to the completion of the building, which, being appraised, would yield in half part to them, in half part to the prince. Moreover, the value of the house, when it will be completed, is foreseen to be 3,600,000 lire; and in constructing it the masons to be employed, and the carpenters, are numbered at one hundred, and the whole construction will last thirty months, or two and a half years. Hence, calculation having been made, the individual workers absolutely require twenty lire daily, whatever may then happen, so that, in any hypothesis, they neither afterward require more, nor be compelled to restore anything.

n. 7.

Q. What as to the case?

…and 23 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910)

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 16 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910), Third Commentary: On the F…, XI. On Masters and Workers

n. 158.

The things which have been said of masters and servants must be understood, with due proportion, of patrons and workers, as we have already said, whether these are craftsmen or tenants, who for some definite time, or for some determined work, labor for the utility of others. Moreover, the first duty of all is that they enter a just pact, with due equality preserved between labor and stipend. Then the contract entered must be faithfully observed. Accordingly, the worker ought to furnish the promised work; the patron is bound to pay the promised wage. Patrons and workers can indeed enter a contract of hiring of work or labor for a fitting wage. They can also enter between themselves a contract of partnership, so that the patrons confer capital into the partnership, the workers labor, and then receive proportionate fruit. Each contract is lawful; but neither can patrons compel workers, nor workers patrons, to one rather than to the other; the matter must be determined by free convention of patrons and workers.

Masters and patrons are bound per se not to burden workers with longer and graver labors, nor to expose them to dangerous labors, unless the reason of the common good requires otherwise and due precautions are employed.

They are bound to treat workers well, with urbanity and Christian charity. Besides, they must leave them liberty of fulfilling the offices of religion, and therefore by no means ought to compel them to work on Sundays and feast days, unless grave necessity urges; and then at least they must grant them time, as far as can be done, for hearing Mass.

They are bound to pay a just wage, according to the pacts entered, and at its time. They are bound not unjustly to impede them from laboring, and from being able suitably to sustain themselves by their labor. Likewise, from charity they ought to succor them when they are placed in necessity, before other outside poor persons, since the workers are more joined to them and are of no small utility; for the profit which they receive is owed in great part to the labor of workers.

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Third Part: Concerning Com…, Sect. C, Ch. III, Question Two: On Letting and Hiring · Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Third Part: Concerning Com…, Sect. C, Ch. III, Question Two: On Letting a…, Article II: On the Letting or Undertaking of Making a Work

Masters and patrons, as superiors, are bound to avert dangers of body and soul from workshops in which many workers labor. Of body, by providing for their health with suitable safeguards; of soul, by prohibiting blasphemies, shameful conversations, perverse journals, obscene images, and that men and women, especially the younger, not be together promiscuously.

n. 160.

Workers in turn are bound with due skill and diligence to furnish the promised work, with the conditions of the freely entered convention observed. Conditions, that is, lawful and just. Therefore, if they do not labor during the time established by the contract, or if in labor they do not employ at least ordinary and moderate diligence, they are bound to restitution, and must also repair the damage that followed. Nor indeed in any way can they, against the aforesaid just contract, cease from labor, with damage to the master, and much less induce other workers to the same cessation, in order to obtain a diminution of the time of labor and an increase of salary. This is manifest injustice. When the time of the contract has elapsed, and the promised work has been furnished, if they wish to renew the contract under better conditions, lawful and just, and cannot obtain this otherwise by lawful and just means, then they surely can, if they wish, cease from work, yet without impeding by threats and force others willing to labor, and without disturbing public order.

n. 160.

And here it must be noted that the better conditions which workers can demand in entering a new contract can be unjust and just. Patrons are not bound to accept unjust ones; but they are not always bound to accept just ones; for if they also offer just conditions, they are evidently not then bound to accept the just conditions which the workers propose; and those same workers cannot impede other workers willing to labor under those just conditions of the patrons.

n. 161.

Therefore workers act unjustly if, contrary to the pacts entered, they cease from labor; and much more if by threats and force they compel other workers also to desist from labor; but most of all if they disturb the peace of the city; so that by these means they themselves may furnish the smallest work with the recompense of the greatest wage. - Patrons likewise would act unjustly if, contrary to the pacts entered, they dismissed workers; and much more if they also compelled others by threats and force to dismiss them, so that workers may furnish the greatest work for the recompense of the smallest wage. - To impede this struggle between patrons and workers, it is necessary that patrons embrace workers with Christian charity, and that workers tolerate labor with Christian patience and revere patrons.

n. 162.

In this matter the civil prince can furnish many things rightly and usefully by his authority: "If it ever should happen that some disturbance threatens because of a withdrawal of craftsmen, or works interrupted by agreement; that the natural bonds of the family are relaxed among proletarians; that religion is violated in the workers, by not sufficiently granting convenience for the offices of piety; if danger threatens integrity of morals in workshops from sex mixed together or other pernicious enticements of sin; or if the masterly order presses the order of workers with unjust burdens, or afflicts them with conditions foreign to the person and to human dignity; if health is harmed by immoderate work, and not accommodated to sex and age: in these causes the force and authority of the laws must plainly be employed within definite limits. These limits are determined by the same cause which demands the help of the laws: namely, no more is to be undertaken by laws, nor is progress to be made farther, than the healing of inconveniences or the repulsion of danger requires." Leo XIII, encyclical letter de Conditione Opificum.

n. 163.

For determining the just quantity of salary, attention must be paid not only to free convention, but also to the nature of labor. Now indeed "to labor is to exercise oneself for the sake of obtaining things which are for the various uses of life, and especially necessary for the protection of oneself. In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread. Therefore labor in man has two notes, as it were, implanted by nature: namely that it be personal, because the active force inheres in the person and is entirely proper to him by whom it is exercised and for whose utility it is born; then that it be necessary for this reason, that the fruit of labors is needed by man for protecting life; but nature itself of things, which must especially be obeyed, commands that life be protected. Now, if it is considered only from that part by which it is personal, there is no doubt that it is free to the craftsman to define more narrowly the measure of the stipulated wage; for as he gives his works by will, so also by will he can be content with a small wage for the works, or plainly with none. But one must judge far otherwise if with the reason of personality there is joined the reason of necessity, separable from it in thought, indeed, but not in reality. In fact, to remain in life is the common duty of individuals, which it is a crime to fail. Hence there necessarily arises the right of finding things by which life is sustained: but the faculty of these things is supplied to every lowest man only by the wage acquired by labor. Therefore let it be that the worker and the master freely consent to the same agreement, and by name to the measure of salary; nevertheless there is always underlying something from natural justice, and this greater and older than the free will of those making the pact, namely, that the wage ought not to be unequal to nourishing the worker, frugal indeed and well behaved. But if the worker, compelled by necessity or moved by fear of a worse evil, accepts a harsher condition, which, even though he does not wish it, must be accepted, because it is imposed by the master or by the contractor of works, that indeed is to undergo force, against which justice cries out."

n. 164.

But since the price of things which are necessary for life is various, it is clear that the just wage to be paid to the worker is to be attended not only from the labor furnished, according to common estimation, but also from this varying price of things. Therefore the just wage of workers depends on various causes.

n. 164.

The work which is furnished by workers for the convenience and utility of others is the work of a human person, proceeding from human liberty; hence, although it is considered as a certain quasi-thing, it is something nobler than merchandise, and it assumes the nature of merit and of right to reward. Therefore the wage which is rendered to them, and which is usually called salary and stipend, although it is considered as a certain price, exceeds the price of things, and takes to itself the nature of reward and remuneration. But that work, from the provident disposition itself of nature, must be furnished by the worker so that by that work he may procure for himself the things necessary for life. Therefore the salary which is given to the worker for his work furnished is not as it were an exchange of thing with thing, of merchandise with price; nor consequently is it given only for the work itself furnished for the utility of another, but it is also given for the person himself, for the necessity of the person, for the merit of the person.

n. 165.

Therefore the wage of works ought to suffice for the worker to be nourished, from the intention itself of nature, which supplies industry and labor to man for seeking those things which are necessary to himself for life. Hence primarily the justice of the wage is to be estimated which consequently, since it ought to suffice for daily sustenance, supposes a daily office on the part of the worker. Daily sustenance is certainly not to be taken strictly, as for an animal, but more broadly and suitably, as for a man, so that in it there is comprehended, with due proportion, with the whole time of human life inspected, and the condition of workers in civil society, both food and dwelling and clothing and other things, in the various necessities occurring in human life from sickness, from old age, etc., altogether indispensable for life itself. And these things besides are to be estimated with due moderation; for the worker is supposed not to be vicious and a squanderer, but well behaved and frugal. But the daily office is to be understood only morally, and likewise suitably to the labor itself to be exercised, harder or lighter. Hence, as it certainly does not comprehend the twenty-four hours of the day, so neither is it confined to one or another hour. But since those things which are necessary for life have varying price according to varying time and place, hence also the just salary of workers will be various according to the various circumstances of times and places.

n. 165.

And from this again it is clear that the work of man is not properly merchandise, nor properly is its wage a price. Nevertheless there is no doubt that that work is also as it were merchandise, considered in itself and not in relation to the person whose act it is, and consequently its wage is taken as a quasi-price. Hence the wage of works is estimated variously also under this head, according to the various customs of regions, from the works themselves, that is, from their intrinsic excellence, general necessity, utility, labor, and danger. Hence it is estimated differently in physicians, schoolmasters, painters; differently in architects, masons, diggers. But by no means is it estimated from their peculiar necessity and utility; for this pertains to the hirer, for example, if the boy to be instructed is endowed with great talent.

n. 166.

Therefore, as prices of things, so again wages of works can be increased and diminished. But they are increased and diminished from those same causes by which prices of things increase and decrease: from the fact that there are many who furnish works, few who hire them; from their daily duration, longer or shorter; from the labor expended in them; from the danger which is incurred in them; from the required skill; from the spontaneous offering of them. Consequently the wage of works will be just if it at least reaches the lowest wage which, in such a place and time, is customarily given to such workers. - And if one furnishing his works furnishes them to another or to others as a quasi-partner, it is equitable that he also receive something from the profits.

n. 166.

But the wage of works can by no means be increased or diminished from the various conditions either of the person to whom they are furnished, or of the person who furnishes them. For justice inspects the equality of thing to thing, not the various circumstances of persons. And thus a greater wage is not to be paid because a less skilled locator furnishes them with greater labor, time, and danger than others; or because he is in want, has a wife, and also has children; whence that absurd family salary is exploded. This is besides exploded also from the very established breadth of the just wage of workers, if these, namely, are well behaved and frugal, and live with due parsimony, which at the beginning is indeed necessary, and then ends in a small patrimony to be acquired.

Tanquerey

Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S. — 31 passages

Vol. III, Contracts, and the Obligat…, On the Virtue of Justice (…, Part II — Chapter II: On Contracts in Particular

n. 782.

II. On The Lease, Or Undertaking, Of A Work (contrat d'entreprise).

1. Nature of this contract. Lease of a work is a contract by which an architect, or craftsman, or commissioner is hired by the owner for accomplishing a certain work for a determined price, e.g., for building a house, or constructing a railway. - This can be done in a twofold way: namely so that the craftsman furnishes his work only, - or his work together with the material.

In a contract of this kind the price is established for the completed work, so that it is not owed until after the contractor (entrepreneur) has completed the work, unless it has been agreed otherwise; and therefore the danger of the work remains with the contractor until it has been completed and handed over.

Often the work to be completed is publicly announced, by setting forth and describing what thing is to be made, from what material, within what time, etc.; various contractors are invited to compete, and the thing to be made is committed to him who has promised to complete the work for the lesser price. In this matter good faith is required on each side: in the contractor, that he sincerely intends to complete the work for that price and under the determined conditions; in the lessor or owner, that he commit the work to him who asks the lesser price, provided however that he is fit for making the thing.

n. 783.

1. Obligations of the contractor. (A) From justice he is held to make the thing in the manner in which it was agreed, namely to employ that diligence and that quality and quantity of material which had been agreed upon expressly by description, or tacitly by custom. Likewise he must be content with the established price; nevertheless, if the craftsman, because of changed prices of things or increased wages of workers, cannot complete the thing for that price without his own damage, he can ask something more. The owner is not held to believe him lightly, nor perhaps from strict justice can he be compelled to pay a greater price; for here the matter concerns a contract partly aleatory, in which the contractor undertook the danger of the thing; but equity demands that in these circumstances, when the matter is certainly established, the payment be increased notwithstanding the pact, especially when a case supervened which could not be foreseen.

n. 784.

(B) He sins against justice who employs cheaper material, or lesser diligence, especially when from this the solidity of the work is diminished; for thus damage is unjustly brought upon the owner. - Yet this not rarely occurs in our days; and not a few contractors can sometimes be of good faith, when they employ cheaper material which nevertheless does not hinder the solidity of the building, and besides they consider this necessary lest they themselves incur damage; if it is foreseen that admonition concerning the past will be useless, they should nevertheless be cautiously deterred from these frauds for the future.

(C) They must complete and hand over the work at the agreed time, unless they are excused by some necessity; if by their own fault they have completed the thing later, they are held to compensate the damage brought from this.

n. 785.

1. Obligations of the lessor or owner. (A) He must pay the established price at the time fixed beforehand; (B) if he asks that the thing be made in another manner than had been agreed, or that certain things be added to the work, he must compensate the greater expenses arising therefrom; (C) if by culpable delay he has neglected to accept the completed work, he is held to repair the damage brought upon the contractor from this.¹

¹ Cf. Cod. civ. gal., art. 1787-1799, in Supplem., p. 163*; Planiol, II, n. 1897-1932. - Special rules as regards the transport of merchandise are set forth in Cod. civ., art. 1782-1786, Supplem., p. 163*; Bauf, Droit Commercial, Paris, 1903, p. 162-175.

n. 786.

§ III. On The Lease Of Works, Or On The Contract Of Labor.

Among those things which can be leased, works are enumerated; namely, today many men are given who lack the means by which they can carry on industry or commerce in their own name, and therefore are accustomed to lease to others their work or the faculty of working in which they are strong; the contract by which workers obligate themselves to labor in favor of some master, for a time, for a price, is called the lease of personal works, or, from modern usage, contract of labor. Concerning this, because of its importance, it is pleasing to discuss a little more fully: 1. on the contract of labor itself; 2. on wages; 3. on workers' associations; 4. on cessation from work; 5. on modes of improving the lot of workers.

² Lugo, disp. XXIX, n. 54-63; Lessius, cap. XXIV, dub. 4; Carriere, II, n. 801-806; E. J. de Gryse, De contractu conductionis, Roulers, Flanders, 1895; Antoine, Cours d'Economie Sociale, ch. XIX; Lehmkuhl, Le Contrat entre Patrons et Ouvriers et les Greves, Louvain, 1896; Pottier, De Jure et Justitia, n. 118-246; Vermeersch, de Justitia, n. 386-477; Hubert-Valleroux, Le Contrat de Travail, Paris, 1895; P. Bureau, Le Contrat de Travail, le role des Syndicats professionnels, Paris, 1902; L. Garriguet, Le Contrat de Travail, Paris, 1904; T. Rothe, Traite de Droit Naturel, t. IV, Droit Laborique, Paris, 1904.

n. 787.

(A) Manual labor among the Greeks and Romans was lightly esteemed, and was committed only to slaves or men of a lower condition; hence Cicero said: "The earnings of wage-earners, and of all whose works, not arts, are bought, are illiberal and sordid. For in them the very wage is the pledge of servitude. Those also are to be considered sordid who buy from merchants what they immediately sell... Nor indeed can a workshop have anything freeborn."³

³ Cicero, De officiis, lib. IV, 42; cf. Guiraud, La main d'oeuvre industrielle dans l'anc. Grece, Paris, 1900; Waltzing, Etude historique sur les corporations professionnelles chez les Romains.

Christian religion, on the other hand, ennobled labor: Christ himself labored with his own hands: "Is this not the carpenter?... Is this not the carpenter's son?"¹ St. Paul inculcated its necessity: "If anyone is not willing to work, neither let him eat";² he added example to precept:³ "Nor did we eat bread from anyone without cost, but in labor and in toil, working night and day, lest we burden any of you." - Hence, in the first centuries of the Church, not only Christians, but also priests and monks, adhering to the footprints of Christ, did not disdain to labor with their hands.⁴ In reality, in all the rules of monks, prescriptions are found concerning daily manual work;⁵ and Augustine himself wrote a work on the work of monks, in which he exhorts them to labor, especially by the example and doctrine of St. Paul, and gravely rebukes those idle and wandering monks who, relying on the words of Christ, Be not solicitous for your life what you shall eat, under the pretext of being free for contemplation, indulged in laziness: "Indeed they can easily sing divine canticles even while working with their hands, and console the very labor as by a divine rowing-song (song of sailors)."⁶ In reality, monks and their tenants, by diligent and assiduous labor, happily cultivated wooded and arid lands, and brought the greatest advantage to industry and the arts.⁷

¹ Mark, VI, 3; Matt., XIII, 55.

² II Thess., III, 10.

³ Ibid., 3.

⁴ Thomassin, Discipline de l'Eglise, p. III, l. III, ch. 8-16. - St. Anthony, among the rules which he handed down to monks, says these things: "When you have sat in your cell, be solicitous perpetually concerning these three things: namely concerning the work of your hands, concerning the meditation of your psalms, and concerning your prayer." Regula S. P. N. Antonii, Codex Reg., t. I, p. 5.

⁵ Rule of St. Benedict, cap. 48, in Migne, P. L., LXVI, 703, where it is said: "Idleness is the enemy of the soul. And therefore at certain times the brothers must be occupied in manual labor; again at certain hours in divine reading." - Cf. St. Jerome, Regula Monachorum, cap. 17, in Migne, P. L., XXX, 362.

⁶ In Migne, P. L., XL, 565; let the whole treatise be read, 547-582.

⁷ Levasseur, Histoire des Classes ouvrieres, Paris, 1900, t. I, p. 182-196.

n. 788.

(B) In the historical evolution of labor, three principal stages can be distinguished: slavery, colonate, and free contract of labor. (a) Before Christ, slavery flourished among almost all nations: but the slave labored not for himself, but for the master, nor did he properly receive a stipend, but only a certain peculium and food and clothing. Nevertheless a few free men, laboring under poverty, leased their work to the richer;⁸ freedmen, or manumitted slaves, devoted themselves to various arts and commerce. This slavery indeed could be abolished only gradually.

⁸ Among whom afterward Plautus, who describes servile labor in the work Asinaria.

(b) Around the fourth century the colonate (servage) began to flourish, or the state of those who were bound to some estate, and cultivated it in perpetuity: they were indeed not perfectly free, but of a middle condition between free men and slaves, since they could not leave the place and owner to whom they were ascribed; but they could acquire for themselves a house and other goods, and transmit them to their heirs; on certain days and hours they worked in favor of the owner, but, this time having been completed, they cultivated the part of the lands assigned to them, and made their own the fruits received therefrom.¹

¹ On these see P. Allard, Esclaves, Serfs et Mainmortables, Paris, 1894, p. 158-398.

n. 789.

(C) Afterward serfs and tenants were gradually manumitted and became free, and gave their labor to various arts; then were instituted guilds, which flourished in the Middle Age, and, notwithstanding certain difficulties and disadvantages, contributed to the security of industry and to social peace through many centuries.² Workers, namely, distributed into various associations and confraternities (corporations d'arts et metiers), bore mutual help to one another, and circumscribed competition within certain limits, so that each one could receive sufficient profit; besides, generally dissensions and envies between workers and masters did not flourish, because each worker, after some time, could exercise his art in his own name as master. Guilds of this kind were utterly destroyed by the French Revolution, and "gradually it came about that workers, solitary and defenseless, were handed over to the inhumanity of masters and to the unbridled greed of competitors."³ Wherefore modern socialists and some followers of Christian Democracy⁴ desire that, the contract of lease of works as it now exists having been abolished, in its place there should be substituted a certain contract of cooperation, by force of which workers would obtain a part of the profit proportionate to their labor.

² The history, laws, and discipline of these guilds are described, among others, by Levasseur, Les Corporations d'arts et metiers, Paris, 1885; Martin Saint-Leon, Histoire des corporations de metiers, Paris, 1897; Blanc, Les Corporations de metiers, Paris, s. d.; Levasseur, Histoire des classes ouvrieres avant 1789, Paris, 1901.

³ Leo XIII, Encyc. Rerum novarum.

⁴ Thus, among others, Vogelsang and de Breda in the periodical Oesterreichische Monatsschrift, Vienna, 1885, fascic. 7.

2. On The Nature Of This Contract.

n. 790.

Concerning this matter there is controversy among jurists and economists.

(A) The principal jurists contend that the contract which intervenes between worker and master is truly lease-hire, insofar as the worker leases to the master his power of working for a certain price. This is indeed wholly consonant with the laws in force among different nations; for this pact is called locatio-conductio operis faciendi (lease of services or of work) in Roman civil law, and in modern Codes.¹ Yet today many oppose this concept, because it does not befit a free and rational being so to lease his faculties to other men.

¹ "When you deliver your labor, what indeed do you do? Do you not demand a wage? You sell your labor as the grocer sells his salt, his coffee and his sugar, as the baker sells his bread, as the butcher sells his meat." (Yves Guyot, La Tyrannie socialiste, Paris, 1893, p. 44; cf. P. Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., t. II, p. 241-244.)

(B) Hence others think that the contract of labor is a certain purchase-sale, by which the worker sells his works, or the exercise of his own activity, for some price.² Many indeed reject this, as by no means consonant with human dignity, since the work of a free man is not merchandise which can be bought for a price. - Yet it could be said, without injury brought upon the dignity of man, that not the work itself indeed is sold, but the fruit of labor, or the part of the thing produced which belongs to the worker because of the work consumed in the thing made; this seems especially true when such a price is given for such a thing to be made (travail aux pieces).

² P. Leroy-Beaulieu, Traite, t. II, p. 241-250.

(C) But others wish the contract of labor to be nothing other than a contract of partnership, by force of which the owner contributes his capital and the worker his works for completing a common work, and for dividing between themselves the profit received therefrom. - Thus, they say, better provision is made for the dignity of workers, for concord between workers and masters, and also for a more equitable partition of profits. - But as regards the fact, the matter is not so in the present state of things; besides, it seems difficult how the contract of labor could be entered in the praised manner: for, on the one hand, owners contend that the happy outcome of industry depends chiefly on the wise management of one and supreme authority, and therefore do not wish to have workers as partners, lest they be compelled to take their counsel; on the other hand, workers, needing a daily and certain wage for sustenance, cannot wait until the quantity of profit is determined and equally divided; moreover, by what proportion and measure profit is to be divided between workers and masters, according to the proportionate part of cooperation, can scarcely be defined.

(D) Wherefore some, with Funck-Brentano, think that the contract of labor is one of the innominate contracts (above, n. 616), namely, on the part of the worker, facio ut des, and on the part of the master, do ut facias, insofar namely as workers obligate themselves to furnish something for a certain price.

n. 791.

Conclusion. Whatever the case may be, all sensible men confess that a contract of this kind is of a special nature, since human works are not common merchandise, but bear before themselves something human, and therefore must be governed by more humane laws than merely commercial things.

To the matter Leo XIII says: "Accordingly labor has, as it were, two notes implanted by nature in man, namely that it is personal, because the active force adheres to the person, and is wholly proper to him by whom it is exercised, and for whose utility it is born; then that it is necessary, for this reason, that the fruit of labors is needed by man for preserving life: but nature herself, to which one must chiefly obey, commands that life be preserved."

Moreover, the same Pontiff testifying, it is a very great evil to imagine that the wealthy and proletarians are prepared by nature to fight among themselves in stubborn duel; this indeed is abhorrent from reason and truth; for, just as in the human body diverse members agree among themselves for cooperating harmoniously, so in the state those two classes must act harmoniously among themselves; indeed one absolutely needs the other: capital cannot stand without work, nor work without capital. Wherefore concerning the mutual offices of workers and masters, according to the mind of Leo XIII,¹ a few things remain to be said.

¹ The rules handed down by Leo XIII were renewed and confirmed by Pius X, in a Motu proprio issued Dec. 18, 1903, in which he sets forth fundamental norms of Christian popular action, in Acta S. Sedis, XXXVI (1904), p. 339-345.

3. On The Offices Of Workers.

n. 792.

These are thus contracted in the Encyclical Rerum Novarum: "That which has been freely and equitably agreed upon as work, they should render integrally and faithfully; they should in no way harm the property, nor violate the person of the masters; in protecting their own interests they should abstain from force, and never introduce sedition; nor should they mix with wicked men, artfully throwing out immoderate hopes and great promises, which generally have useless repentance and consequent ruins of fortunes." Let us explain these offices in a few words: -

n. 793.

(A) To furnish integrally and faithfully that which has been freely and equitably agreed upon, or, in other words, to perform the determined work at the fixed time, with that diligence which is required from pact, law, or custom. Generally ordinary or common diligence suffices; but, in certain cases, special care is required, namely when from pact or from the nature of the matter it is exacted, and besides a greater stipend is furnished. This indeed obliges from justice, as flowing from the contract itself: for the worker does not make the wage his own unless he integrally and faithfully fulfills the work which he freely promised to furnish; for here the matter concerns a bilateral contract, which obliges each contracting party from justice.

Therefore workers sin against justice who from culpable carelessness or negligence spend time uselessly;¹ and the gravity of the sin depends on the gravity of the damage brought.

¹ Honest workers understand this besides; thus among them the axiom is in force: "a fair day's work for a fair day's wages," that is, honest work for a decent wage. (Bureau, op. cit., p. 252.)

n. 794.

(B) In no way to harm the master, that is, to bring no damage, whether by using materials prodigally, or by destroying machines, or by producing defective merchandise; for by these and other means of this kind, injury is brought upon the owner or upon the buyer of the merchandise, and often upon each. The gravity of the sin likewise depends on the gravity of the damage foreseen. - Besides, such acts are prohibited by civil law and punished with fines.² But if damage arises from fortuitous event, the worker is not held to compensate it, nor on account of this does he lose the right to the agreed stipend.

² As regards France, cf. P. Pic, Traite de Legislation industrielle, Paris, 1903, n. 1147. "The worker is responsible for deteriorations caused by his negligence to the material entrusted to his care, as well as for faulty workmanship arising from his fault." (Cass., Feb. 15, 1892.)

n. 795.

(C) Nor to violate the person of the masters, that is, to bring no injury upon the masters themselves, by insults, threats, cruelties, and other violent modes of acting. Workers indeed have the right of pursuing their rights by legitimate means, by instituting associations, and by manfully setting forth to masters what they desire, and concerning what things they legitimately complain; likewise they have recourse to magistrates, and can choose deputies who may procure the promulgation of just laws protecting their rights. But to move sedition and to employ force or calumnies is neither just nor opportune; those acting thus generally harm not only masters, but themselves, since the ruin of some factory is accustomed to bring more detriment to the latter than to the former. - To judge concerning the gravity of an injury brought, the principles set forth above (n. 285) must be recalled to memory, yet having before one's eyes the psychological dispositions of workers who, not rarely moved by anger and indignation, do not perceive the whole malice of their act.

In practice, therefore, let workers diligently keep away wicked men who, pretending that they hold nothing older than the good of proletarians, in reality are chiefly solicitous about their own advantages, and stir up immoderate hopes, falsely promising goods which it is impossible to obtain, for the sole end that they may obtain the votes of workers, and, these having been obtained, may be able to seek honors and monies.

(D) Not to cease from labor before the fixed time, unless there is a grave reason; concerning this below.

4. On The Offices Of Masters.

Some arise from justice, others from charity.

n. 796.

(A) Offices from justice. (a) To pay a fair wage at the established time (Codex, c. 1524):

"Among the greatest offices of masters," says Leo XIII, "this stands out: to furnish just things to each one... But to defraud anyone of the wage owed is a great crime, which calls down avenging wrath from heaven by its cry: Behold the wages of the workers... which have been defrauded by you cry out: and their cry has entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth."¹ But what wage is just will be explained below.

¹ James, V, 4.

n. 797.

(b) To revere in workers the dignity of the person ennobled by the Christian character:

"Workers must not be held in the place of slaves; it is fair to revere in them the dignity of the person, ennobled, indeed, by that which is called the Christian character. Gainful arts, if the account of nature and Christian philosophy are heard, are not for shame to man, but for honor, because they furnish an honest power of sustaining life. It is truly shameful and inhuman to abuse men as things for gain, and not to value them more than according to how much they are strong in nerves and powers."²

² Leo XIII, Encyc. Rerum novarum.

And rightly; not rarely workers complain that they are held as slaves, indeed as mere instruments of production, with no respect had for their dignity. They must indeed furnish obedience to masters in all those things which pertain to the agreed work, during the hours of the day in which they submit themselves to their command;³ but when this time has been completed, they remain free, nor do masters have the right to attempt anything against their liberty and conscience.⁴ Moreover, while they preside, they must command in a human manner, demanding nothing which is too burdensome.¹

³ So that the rules for the right ordering of industrial matters may be better preserved, it is expedient that they be approved not only by masters, but also by delegates of the workers; this can be done in a council which is called Conseil d'usine, Shop council. Cf. E. Riviere, Vingt ans de vie sociale, Paris, 1901, p. 61-82.

⁴ Hence if a Christian master wishes to lead irreligious workers back to the faith, he must act prudently, by examples and persuasion, without urging them to embrace religion, lest perhaps he favor hypocrisy: "The Christian head must, while giving example, strive to surround these souls with an atmosphere of love and devotion, also of liberty, so that they may open themselves to the truth." (E. Riviere, op. cit., p. 78.)

¹ This indeed they will furnish much more easily if sometimes they do not hesitate to take the counsel of certain workers. Cf. E. Riviere, op. cit., p. 40-43; 55-56; 80-81.

n. 798.

Wherefore the master is held from justice to grant to workers a suitable space of time, so that they may be free for religious duties: for they have a strict right to fulfill such duties, nor can they be deprived of it by any pact of labor; therefore rest from works must be granted on feast days, unless because of some necessity; and if, in some industries, certain workers must labor on any Sunday, nevertheless there must be allotted to them a space of time necessary for fulfilling religious duties. - He must also take care that they not be exposed to the allurements of corruptions and enticements of sin; wherefore in those workshops in which men and women, and also younger persons of each sex, labor together, the office is incumbent upon masters of employing those means by which proximate occasions of sin are removed, insofar as this can be done;² e.g., lest scandal arise from impious or lustful conversations,³ or foremen (contre-maitres) abuse their authority to extort something which is repugnant to the moral law.

² Cf. L. Harmel, Catechisme du Patron, Paris, 1889, p. 31-93.

³ Thus, e.g., a Catholic master, who counted not a few positivists among his workers, with these approving, proposed the following rules to all: "As a convinced Catholic, I ask those of my workers who do not share my convictions to abstain from conversations contrary to my religious ideas. For this I appeal to their sympathy toward a head who sincerely loves them and who will never ask them for an act contrary to their personal convictions. - As a father of a family, having charge of souls before God for the apprentices entrusted to my care by their parents, I ask all my workers to abstain from immoral conversations. Fathers of families would not speak thus before their children; unmarried workers would not hold such remarks before their mother or their young brother." (E. Riviere, op. cit., p. 73-74.)

"Nor is it permitted by any pact to lead them away from domestic care and the study of thrift," that is, nothing is to be attempted which utterly overturns the family and domestic life, namely by impeding the education of offspring, by separating men from wives for a long time, so that domestic life becomes almost impossible. Nor let anything be done to attract workers into taverns, in which they uselessly consume their resources, to the great detriment of the whole family.

n. 799.

(c) "Likewise, not to impose more work than their strength can bear, nor that kind which is at variance with age and sex." For from what was said above (n. 314-315), it is not permitted to command those things from which death or mutilation or loss of health will very probably follow. Therefore, if from the materials which are worked, or the machines which are employed, or from the manner in which labor is performed, or from other causes of this kind, a very probable danger threatens the life, integrity of members, or health of workers, precautions must be used by which the danger is removed. But if it is impossible to avert every danger, in proportion to the probability of the danger, the amount of wage is to be increased, or damages brought in executing the work are to be repaired by fair compensation. - Hence also, if a worker laboring for the utility of the master is wounded, mutilated, or killed from a fortuitous event, compensation is owed to him or to his family; for since the master makes the profit his own, it is fair that he likewise undergo the damages and dangers of the lot. This indeed among most nations has been confirmed by civil law.¹

¹ In France, by civil law this compensation is owed even when workers were wounded by their own fault or carelessness (Law of April 9, 1898; Law of June 30, 1899; Law of March 22, 1902); in this case, however, the law, as less consonant with natural law, does not oblige before the sentence of the judge; indeed workers would commit injustice toward masters if they deliberately exposed themselves to some mutilation, for the end of obtaining monetary compensation. - Cf. P. Pic, op. cit., n. 1036-1145, where the advantages and disadvantages of this law are set forth at length, and also the laws which are in force among other nations.

n. 800.

Moreover daily labor must not be prolonged excessively, lest the strength of the worker be exhausted; but according to the different account of labor, the hours consumed in work must be longer or shorter.

The principle which must be kept before the mind Leo XIII sets forth thus: "Namely, that so much work be demanded that the spirit grow dull from excessive labor, and at the same time the body succumb to exhaustion, neither justice nor humanity suffers... But how great the intervals of resting ought to be must be judged from the varied kind of work, from the circumstances of times and places, and from the very health of the workers. Those whose work it is to cut stone from the earth, or to dig out iron, copper, and other things of this kind lying deeply hidden, their labor, because it is much greater and also grave for health, must be restrained by shortness of time. The seasons of the year must also be considered: because not rarely the same kind of work is easy to tolerate at one time, but at another time either cannot be tolerated by any reason, or cannot be tolerated without the greatest difficulty."¹

¹ In France, by the law of Nov. 2, 1892 (in Riviere, Lois usuelles, p. 1170-1173), the law of June 12, 1893 (Riviere, p. 1206), and the law of March 30, 1900, the hours during which women and children may labor have been limited, and many other things concerning the healthfulness and security of workshops have been established; concerning these see P. Pic, op. cit., n. 609-869. - That these laws were necessary for restraining abuses following from competition can be gathered from these works: Villermé, Tableau physique et moral des ouvriers employes dans les manufactures de soie, de laine et de coton, Paris, 1840; J. Simon, L'ouvriere, Paris, 1861; d'Haussonville, Salaires et Miseres de femmes, Paris, 1900; Pelloutier, La Vie ouvriere en France, Paris, 1900; Levasseur, L'Ouvrier americain, Paris, 1898, t. I, p. 422-451; H. Campbell, Prisoners of Poverty, Boston, 1887; H. J. Brunhes, Les conditions de travail de la femme dans l'industrie, in Quinzaine, March 1904; id., L'Exploitation de la femme, Paris, 1904.

n. 801.

Nor let labor be imposed on women which exceeds their strength, or does not befit their sex: "Thus certain crafts are less aptly suitable for women, born for domestic works: which works indeed greatly protect honor in the female sex, and by nature correspond to the instruction of children and the prosperity of the family." In reality, since women are born primarily for procreating and educating offspring, and for exercising the offices of mother and wife at home, labor incompatible with these duties must not be assigned to them. - Wherefore in many regions it has been provided by civil law that they be immune from certain kinds of work, and moreover, a little before and after childbirth, that they be free from all arduous labor.

n. 802.

Nor is it permitted to entrust to children works for which performing they are not yet equal: "For powers breaking forth in childhood, like greening freshness, are struck down by premature agitation: from which thing all childish instruction will perish." And because abuses have not been lacking in this matter, the State had to pass laws for protecting younger persons against the inhumanity of certain masters.

n. 803.

(B) Offices from charity. The master must exercise not only justice, but also charity toward workers. Leo XIII recalls to memory the foundation and reason of this office:

"For all men will plainly perceive and understand that they were created by God as a common parent: that all tend to the same end of goods, which is God himself, who alone can affect both men and angels with perfect and absolute beatitude; likewise that each one equally has been redeemed by the benefit of Jesus Christ and claimed into the dignity of sons of God"... - From this it follows that upon the richer is incumbent the office of lavishing something from superfluous goods upon the poor: "Whoever has received a greater abundance of goods by the gift of God, whether they are of the body and external, or of the soul, has received them for this reason, that he may employ them for the perfection of himself and likewise, as a minister of divine Providence, for the utilities of others."

This obligation indeed urges masters by a stricter bond as regards their own workers.

For, as Card. Zigliara said,¹ "the work of the worker yields to the advantage of the master; therefore as often as the latter is driven by the precept of charity to exercise the offices of charity in individual cases, he is also held to observe the order of charity. This order indeed makes workers exercising long-lasting work for the master's utility nearer to the master than other poor persons doing nothing for him. Wherefore the master who is able to exercise the offices of charity must prefer his own workers."

¹ Letter to the Archbishop of Mechlin, sent by order of Leo XIII, 1891.

n. 804.

But the master can exercise this charity in various ways: - (a) first, by kindly receiving the workers, at least at certain hours, when they desire to approach him, and by kindly receiving delegates sent by the workers themselves: for experience establishes that nothing contributes more to peace and concord than more frequent relations between owners and workers, in which, by an honest and sincere exposition from each side, the motives of complaints are declared, and also the changes which are judged useful on each side;

n. 805.

(b) by favoring various institutes, by which the condition of workers can become better, e.g., schools for the education of boys, cooperative societies by which useful things can be acquired at a lower price, associations by which workers furnish mutual help to one another, etc. But in all these things let the master diligently beware lest he so insert himself into the management of affairs that workers seem to depend altogether on him; for there is in them an innate love of liberty, and a sense of distrust toward masters, so that many prefer to be poor and miserable rather than abdicate their own liberty. From this it has happened that not a few have stirred up rebellion against masters, notwithstanding the many benefits which they had received from them, because rightly or falsely they judged themselves too oppressed by the authority of masters.¹ Therefore let charity be exercised in such a way that it does not seem to oppress the liberty and dignity of workers.

¹ Cf. P. Bureau, Montceau-les-Mines et le Paternalisme, in La Quinzaine, April 1, 1902. - Wherefore these things should often be kept before the eyes: "Love of the worker, disinterested love, not to hold him eternally, but to elevate him and draw him toward the heights: behold the true solution of the social question." (de Mun, in E. Riviere, op. cit., p. 5.)

5. On The Intervention Of The State In The Contract Of Labor.

n. 806.

(A) State of the question. Much is disputed on this matter among the various schools of economists. (a) The so-called liberal school² contends that the State has no right of making new laws concerning relations between workers and masters, but that the general laws concerning contracts in general and concerning lease fully suffice for restraining abuses, if any arise; in reality, they say, every year the condition of workers becomes better, industrial and commercial matters prosperously succeed; if there are any dissensions, they are composed by the natural force of free competition; the intervention of the State, far from profiting, greatly harms both masters and workers.

² A. Smith, Wealth of Nations, rendered in French La richesse des nations; Ricardo, Principes d'Economie Politique; J. B. Say, Traite d'Economie politique; de Molinari, Precis d'Economie politique, Paris, 1893; Hubert-Valleroux, op. cit.; P. Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., who nevertheless does not reject a certain moderate intervention of the State.

(b) But on the contrary, socialists of various schools³ cry out daily that the lot of workers is altogether intolerable, that unbridled competition, such as flourishes, is a blind and cruel force by which proletarians are trampled under the feet of the richer: from this just complaints and perpetual dissensions have arisen, which can be settled only by continual intervention of the State; and by such intervention the way is prepared for socialism and collectivism, by whose help social concord will reign in perpetuity.

³ Their works we enumerated above, n. 66-70.

n. 807.

(c) Between these two extremes there are today not a few economists who defend moderate intervention of the State, although they by no means agree concerning the extension and limits of this intervention.⁴ Catholics generally adhere to their doctrines, yet in different degree; thus the school which is called Angers approaches nearer to the liberal school, and admits the intervention of the Republic only for protecting the rights of private persons and restraining abuses.⁵ The school named Liege proceeds further,¹ according to which the State must not only restrain abuses, but also prevent them, by making various laws, especially concerning the labor of children and women, concerning hours consumed in working, concerning means for protecting the health of workers, etc. The Austrian school proceeds still further, which, joining Christian democracy with anti-Semitism, expects an almost universal renewal of the whole economic order, and meanwhile wishes the amount of wage to be determined by the State, and cooperative societies to be instituted by it, so that for the contract of labor, such as now exists, the contract of cooperation may be substituted.²

⁴ Among whom Cauwes, Cours d'Economie Politique; Ch. Gide, Principes d'Economie politique; P. Pic, Traite de Legislation industrielle; V. Brants, Legislation du travail, comparee et internationale, Louvain, 1903; R. Jay, La Protection legale des travailleurs, Paris, 1904.

⁵ This school is called Angers because it held a congress at Angers, presided over by Bishop Freppel, who set forth his mind thus: "Individual liberty, liberty of association with all its legitimate consequences, intervention of the State limited to the protection of rights and to the repression of abuses; behold, gentlemen, my formula in the question of labor." (In Revue Catholique des Institutions, 1890, t. II, p. 416 sq.) Thus also Claudio Jannet, Le socialisme d'Etat; J. Rambaud, Elements d'Economie Politique; Thery, Exploiteurs et salaries; d'Haussonville, Socialisme et Charite, Paris, 1896.

¹ It is called Liege because the principal principles which it advocates were set forth in the Congress of Liege, in Belgium; among its followers are enumerated: de Mun, Discours sur la Question sociale; de la Tour du Pin, L. Harmel, Gayraud, Lemire, Ketteler, Korum, Winterer, Lehmkuhl, H. Pesch, Cathrein, Meyer, Pottier, Decurtins, Liberatore, Toniolo; see their doctrines set forth in Antoine, S.J., Cours d'Economie sociale, and Pottier, de Jure et Justitia.

² This school flourishes especially in Austria, and its principal followers are de Liechtenstein, Blome, Vogelsang, Lueger, whose program is briefly contracted thus: "1. Establishment of a just relation between production and consumption; 2. guarantee of stable employment for workers, with the possibility of a progressive wage and of professional advancement; 3. guarantee of suitable treatment for aged or invalid workers, for old men and orphans; 4. corporations accredited by the State or the great financial establishments, so that workers may profit from mechanical manufacture and from production on a large scale; 5. legal measures necessary to procure suitable housing for workers." (In Association Catholique, XXVII, 1889, p. 667.)

So that we may proceed safely in this variety of opinions, we shall set forth the very doctrine of Leo XIII (Encyc. Rerum Novarum).³

³ Cf. L. Gregoire (Goyau), Le Pape, les Catholiques et la Question sociale, Paris, 1899, p. 174-240; A. Leroy-Beaulieu, La Papaute, le Socialisme et la Democratie, Paris, 1893, p. 156-179.

n. 808.

(B) General principles. (a) The State must not so involve itself in private matters that it usurps the rights of citizens or of families: "It is not right, as we have said, for the citizen or the family to be absorbed by the Republic: it is fair to permit to each the faculty of acting with liberty, as much as can be done with the common good unharmed and without injury to anyone." For private men are not ordered to the state as to an end, but the state is ordered to them, namely so that it may promote their good; and therefore the activity of citizens must not be so restricted that it seems to be absorbed, but only so directed that it tends to the common good. - The family likewise is older in time and prior in right than the state, and therefore its rights are not to be absorbed by the State, but rather protected. Therefore nothing is to be attempted which harms conjugal society, parental authority, or the relations which, nature dictating, ought to exist among the members of the family.

n. 809.

(b) The State can make certain laws concerning the contract of labor, favoring masters and workers equally. For it can and must promote whatever is necessary for the common good: supreme authority has been instituted for this.¹ But the common good demands that peace and concord reign between masters and workers: for this end laws contribute greatly which favor not one order of citizens, but workers equally with the rich:² for both labor together for the prosperity of the Republic.

¹ "Accordingly those by whom the state is governed must first bring their work generally and universally by the whole account of laws and institutes, namely by bringing it about that from the very conformation and administration of the republic prosperity of both the community and private persons spontaneously flourishes." (Encyc. Rerum Novarum.)

² "For proletarians are, by nature, citizens by equal right with the wealthy, that is, true parts and living lives, from which, with families interposed, the body of the republic consists: not to add this, that in every city they are by far the greatest in number. Since therefore it is altogether absurd to consult for one part of the citizens and neglect another part, it follows that public due cares must be placed in protecting the safety and advantages of the proletarian order." (Ibid.)

Nevertheless, although public power must provide for the rights of each order, it can and must specially protect the lowest and the needy, especially when by their own powers they cannot vindicate their rights; for the rich less need public guardianship, while the miserable common people, relying on no resources of their own, more need the patronage of the Republic.³

³ Thus Leo XIII (cited Encyc.): "Indeed, the nation of the rich, surrounded by its own defenses, less needs public guardianship: the miserable common people, safe by no resources of their own, relies chiefly on the patronage of the republic. Wherefore the republic must embrace wage-earners, since they are numbered among the needy multitude, with singular care and providence."

n. 810.

(c) The intervention of the State is legitimate and necessary as often as grave detriment has already been brought, or threatens, to common affairs or to the interests of individual orders, which cannot be healed or prevented in another way.¹ For, on the one hand, it is all over with the public good if supreme authority cannot intervene, - whether by promulgation of laws, or by faithful execution of the same, - when grave detriment has been brought upon society, or even upon one order of citizens, or very probably threatens, which otherwise cannot be averted; for then the end on account of which the State was instituted is no longer attained: the more powerful oppress the weaker by force or fraud, until the latter, overwhelmed by evils which cannot peacefully be averted, finally at some time stir up seditions, and by sword, fire, and other violent means pursue the vindication of their rights. - On the other hand, when threatening damages can be effectively forestalled in another way, whether by the industry of private persons, or especially by rightly ordered associations of masters and workers, it is not expedient to have recourse to the State; for excessive intervention restrains private activity and vigilance, and gradually induces a certain idleness and incapacity of citizens, - multiplies public offices and duties, and therefore public expenses, while on the contrary free undertakings of industry and commerce are diminished, - extends too much the power of political men and party zeal, and thus prepares the way for tyranny.² - Wherefore with Leo XIII we conclude: "namely, no more is to be undertaken by laws, nor is one to proceed further, than the healing of inconveniences or the removal of danger requires."

¹ "If therefore some detriment has been brought or threatens to common affairs, or to the interests of individual orders, which cannot be healed or prevented in another way, it is necessary that public authority meet it." (Encyc. Rerum Novarum.)

² How easily politicians, even when they boast that they adhere to democracy, indulge tyranny, can clearly be gathered from the things which Taine wrote, Origines de la France contemporaine; cf. P. Martin, in Etudes Religieuses, Nov. 1891, p. 375.

n. 811.

(B) Applications. Leo XIII enumerates the principal applications of this principle thus:

"Wherefore if at any time it happens that some disturbance threatens because of the secession of workers, or works interrupted by agreement (greves, strikes); that the natural bonds of the family are loosened among proletarians; that religion is violated in workers by not sufficiently imparting opportunity for the offices of piety; if danger threatens in workshops to the integrity of morals from the promiscuous sex, or from other pernicious incitements of sin; or if the order of masters presses the order of workers with iniquitous burdens, or afflicts them with conditions alien to the person and to human dignity; if health is harmed by immoderate work, and one not accommodated to sex or age, in these cases the force and authority of laws must plainly be applied, within certain limits."

(a) The reason is that, in these and similar matters, the zeal and industry of private persons by no means suffice for restraining abuses, as is proved by almost universal experience. For those evils began to rage as soon as great industrial workshops were built;¹ indeed excellent citizens, whether privately or collegially, tried for many years to restrain or forestall them, yet with an unhappy outcome. Wherefore, among all peoples, even the English and Americans, although tenacious of private rights, it was necessary to make laws for protecting the rights of workers.²

¹ Cf. Villermé and J. Simon, op. cit.

² R. Jay proves this by many documents, La Protection legale des Travailleurs, Paris, 1904, p. 7-49; for England, cf. Final Report of the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the Sweating System, 1890; Sidney Webb, The Case for the Factory Acts, London, 1900; - for America, Levasseur, op. cit., t. I, p. 198-225; 422-451; N. M. Auten, Some Phases of the Sweating System, in The American Journal of Sociology, March 1901, p. 602-645; for France and other regions, P. Pic, op. cit. - Hence an international society was instituted for protecting the rights of workers, whose statutes can be read in R. Jay, op. cit., p. 225-234.

Now such constant and universal experience clearly demonstrates that private industry is unequal to restraining at least certain abuses.

n. 812.

(b) In reality, by force of ineluctable competition, which flourishes not only among merchants of one region, but also among the various nations of the world, producers of things tend daily to this, that they may diminish the prices of merchandise, so that they may be able to sell the same more easily; but they cannot furnish this unless lesser expenses are made in producing the merchandise. From this it follows that, by a certain insuperable necessity, they choose those workers who are content with a lower wage, and consent to labor for a longer time. There are indeed many among them who are upright and merciful, and sincerely desire to act kindly with workers; but if they themselves pay a greater wage or demand less prolonged work, while others act otherwise, soon they will not be able to sell their merchandise at the same price as those others, but will be compelled to dismiss workers and close workshops.¹

¹ P. Bureau vividly sets forth these effects of competition, op. cit., p. 123-134.

And thus the doctrine of Leo XIII is confirmed both by experience and by reason.

Koch–Preuss

Antony Koch; adapted and edited by Arthur Preuss — 20 passages

Vol. V, Pt. I, Ch. V, Section 5: The So-Called Onerous Contracts

n. ¶15.

d) A sort of sub-species of lease is the contract by which a man hires the services of another for an appropriate consideration, commonly called wage or salary (locatio sive conductio operae seu locatio personalis).

n. ¶16.

The relation created by such a contract differs according to the nature of the work involved, which may be either predominantly corporal or chiefly intellectual.

n. ¶17.

Public officials, too, are bound to the commonwealth by a sort of contract.

n. ¶18.

Justice and charity demand that a due proportion should exist between labor and its wage. The employer must not abuse the necessity or temporary embarrassment of his workers by imposing oppressive conditions. He must not conceal onerous duties connected with an employment, and must pay his laborers promptly at the appointed time. He must not discharge them arbitrarily nor compel them by harsh treatment to give up their jobs. He should conform willingly to the laws regarding due provision for the life and health of his workers and treat them as helpers, not as slaves, ever mindful of the account he will have to give to the Lord, who judges rich and poor according to the same norms of justice.⁷

⁷ Col. IV, 1; Eph. VI, 9; 1 Tim. VI, 2; Philm. 16.

n. ¶19.

A servant or employee must not undertake work for which he is not fit or in which his faith or morals are placed in jeopardy. He must faithfully comply with the duties he has assumed by the contract into which he has, explicitly or implicitly, entered with his master or employer,—"not serving to the eye, as it were pleasing men, but, as the servants of Christ doing the will of God from the heart, ... knowing that whatever good thing any man shall do, the same shall he receive from the Lord, whether he be bound or free."⁸ Finally, he has a claim to a fair wage⁹ and the right to employ all licit means in order to improve his economic and social status. Among these means are trade and labor unions and strikes.¹⁰

⁸ Eph. VI, 5–8.—Cfr. Col. III, 22–25; 1 Tim. VI, 1 sq.; 1 Pet. II, 18 sq.

⁹ Matth. X, 10; Luke X, 7; 1 Tim. V, 18.—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 1.—A. Vermeersch, S. J., Quaestiones de Iustitia, 2nd ed., pp. 527 sqq.—F. X. Godts, C.SS.R., Scopuli Vitandi, 3rd ed., Bruges 1896, pp. 230 sqq.—J. Biederlack, S. J., Die soziale Frage, 7th ed., pp. 150 sqq., 233 sqq.—C. Gennari, Consultazioni Morali-Canoniche-Liturgiche, Vol. I, 2nd ed., Rome 1902, pp. 378 sqq.

¹⁰ A. Vermeersch, S. J., Quaest. de Iustitia, 2nd ed., pp. 624 sqq.; Göpfert, Moraltheol., Vol. II, 6th ed., pp. 199 sqq.; Lehmkuhl, Arbeitsvertrag und Streik, 4th ed., Freiburg i. B. 1904, pp. 39 sqq.; IDEM, Casus Conscientiae, Vol. I, 3rd ed., pp. 895 sqq.; J. Treitz, Der moderne Gewerkschaftsgedanke, Treves 1909, pp. 73 sqq.; Broda, La Fixation des Salaires, Paris 1912; J. A. Ryan, Distributive Justice, pp. 400 sqq.; H. Parkinson, A Primer of Social Science, pp. 112 sqq.

n. ¶20.

For deciding what a fair wage is the following general rule has been laid down by Pope Leo XIII: "To labor is to exert oneself for the sake of procuring what is necessary for the purposes of life, and chief of all, for self-preservation. 'In the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat thy bread.' ¹¹ Hence a man's labor bears two notes or characters. First of all, it is personal, inasmuch as the exertion of individual strength belongs to the individual who puts it forth, employing such strength to procure that personal advantage on account of which it was bestowed. Secondly, man's labor is necessary; for without the result of labor a man cannot live; and self-preservation is a law of nature, which it is wrong to disobey. Now, were we to consider labor so far as it is personal merely, doubtless it would be within the workman's right to accept any rate of wages whatsoever; for in the same way as he is free to work or not, so is he free to accept a small remuneration or even none at all. But this is a mere abstract supposition; the labor of the workingman is not only his personal attribute, but it is necessary; and this makes all the difference. The preservation of life is the bounden duty of one and all, and to be wanting therein is a crime. It follows that each one has a right to procure what is required in order to live; and the poor can procure it in no other way than through work and wages. Let it then be taken for granted that workman and employer should, as a rule, make free agreements, and in particular, should agree freely as to the wages; nevertheless there underlies a dictate of natural justice more imperious and ancient than any bargain between man and man, namely, that remuneration ought to be sufficient to support a frugal and honorable wage-earner. If through necessity or fear of a worse evil the workman accepts harder conditions because an employer or contractor will afford him no better, he is made the victim of force and injustice. In these and similar questions, however, such as, for example, the hours of labor in different trades, the sanitary precautions to be observed in factories and workshops, etc.—in order to supersede undue interference on the part of the State, especially as circumstances, times, and localities differ so widely, it is advisable that recourse be had to societies or boards, ... or to some other mode of safeguarding the interests of the wage-earners; the State being appealed to, should circumstances require, for its sanction and protection."¹²

¹¹ Gen. III, 19.

¹² Leo XIII, Encyclical "Rerum Novarum," tr. in The Pope and the People, pp. 206 sqq.

n. ¶21.

The workman, then, says Fr. Slater, "has a right to a living wage, and the employer who grows rich by sweating his work-people commits a sin against justice and is bound to make restitution of his ill-gotten wealth."¹³

¹³ Slater, A Manual of Moral Theol., Vol. I, p. 293.

n. ¶22.

A living wage must be a living family wage (merces familialis), that is, one which will enable the laborer to establish a family and to support that family decently according to his station in life.

n. ¶23.

A family wage is due to a man because he is by nature ordinarily destined to found a family and provide for it. The wage should be proportioned to the normal size of the family. Many leading Catholic writers hold that the normal family wage is due to every workman on the ground of strict justice. This opinion, though not confirmed by the Church, is highly probable.

n. ¶24.

The principle of the living family wage, as Fr. Ross points out, has this important implication that it makes child labor unnecessary. If the head of a family receives a sufficient wage, his children will not be forced to work. They should not be robbed of their childhood for the sake of a few pennies a day. The State has a right and a duty to protect its future citizens by forbidding child labor.¹⁴

¹⁴ Reuter-Lehmkuhl, Neo-Confessarius, pp. 215 sq.; cfr. Göpfert, Moraltheol., Vol. II, 6th ed., pp. 196 sqq.; Parkinson, A Primer of Social Science, pp. 170 sq.; J. A. Ryan, Distributive Justice, pp. 373 sqq.; J. E. Ross, Christian Ethics, pp. 342 sq.; M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 347 sqq.

n. ¶25.

e) To stop work without regard to the stipulations of a written or oral contract constitutes a breach of contract and entails the duty of restitution. Whether such a breach of contract should be subject to criminal proceedings, is a question which in our time is political rather than judicial.

n. ¶26.

A man does not as a rule break a contract without justifying his action, at least before his own conscience. That a workingman has the right to withdraw from a wage contract one-sidedly for good reasons, such as the non-compliance of the employer with the stipulations agreed upon, or an essential change in the relation between labor and wage, cannot be denied. Though strikes are mostly based on false and short-sighted calculations, not every such act of combined self-help is per se immoral, but each case must be decided on its own merits, with due regard to the interests of the weaker party when there is room for doubt.

n. ¶27.

A strike, as our readers know, is the quitting of work by a body of laborers for the purpose of forcing their employer or employers to comply with some demand or condition, as for increase or against reduction of wages. As carried on at the present time, strikes are usually accompanied by active interference with the business of the employers, by the use of the boycott, intimidation of new employees (scabs), etc.¹⁵

¹⁵ W. McDonald, "The Ethical Aspect of Boycotting," Irish Theol. Quarterly, Vol. I (1906), No. 3; P. Marshall, Ibid., Vol. I, No. 4; T. Slater, S.J., Ibid., Vol. II (1907), No. 6.

n. ¶28.

Theoretically, a strike need not necessarily be condemned as illicit, though on account of the numerous evils by which it is usually accompanied it can scarcely ever be advisable in praxi. It is for this reason that Leo XIII so strongly insisted on the duty of the State to strive for the abolition of strikes.

n. ¶29.

"When work-people have recourse to a strike," he says, "it is frequently because the hours of labor are too long, or the work is too hard, or because they consider their wages insufficient. The grave inconvenience of this not uncommon occurrence should be obviated by public remedial measures; for such paralyzing of labor not only affects the masters and their work-people alike, but is extremely injurious to trade and to the general interests of the public; moreover, on such occasions violence and disorder are generally not far distant, and thus it frequently happens that the public peace is imperilled. The laws should forestall and prevent such troubles from arising; they should lend their influence and authority to the removal in good time of the causes which lead to conflicts between employers and employed."¹⁶

¹⁶ Rerum novarum (The Pope and the People, p. 203).

n. ¶30.

Strikes, therefore, especially in their more threatening forms, should be prevented as much as possible for the sake of the common weal.

n. ¶31.

This is not tantamount to saying that they are never justified under any conditions. If the public authorities will not or cannot assure just treatment to the workingmen, and the latter abstain from violence, they must not be condemned for laying down work. The evils that often accompany strikes are not essential to the latter, and a strike quite often is a true act of legitimate self-defense. In such a case, the strike is justifiable, unless higher considerations demand a renunciation of just rights.

n. ¶32.

When the conditions of labor are not in accord with justice, workingmen may, without awaiting the expiration of their contract, threaten to quit work, and if the employer refuses to comply with their demands, lay down their tools. But if the employer is not guilty of injustice, the workers are obliged to live up to the terms of their contract until it expires. They may ask for more favorable conditions, but are not allowed to use force to obtain them.

n. ¶33.

With due regard to the contractual term, or after its expiration, says Fr. Lehmkuhl, the workingmen may, individually or by common action, go much farther. They have the right to value their labor more highly, and even if they went to imprudent and unfair limits in so doing, one would not be allowed to accuse them of injustice in the strict sense. The value of labor need not be measured by the current exchange value of its product, but the laborer is within his rights if he holds that the exchange value of the product might just as well be measured by the increased value of labor. We do not hesitate to allow the working people a larger scope in this respect for the increase of wages, than we would allow the employers for lowering the same. This lies in the nature of a free contract. The contracting parties may go to the limit of a just wage, the laboringmen in their demands, the employers in their offers. The upper limit, in the very nature of things, is naturally more indefinite than the lower, though in individual instances the determination of the lower limit, too, is not easy. What may be generally regarded as an unjustly low wage may be shorn of its injustice by circumstances. For this reason it will, as a rule, be difficult to permit laboringmen to quit work at once without regard to their contract because of unfair conditions.

n. ¶34.

In discussing just and unjust conditions of labor we have employed the amount of the wage as an example; not as if it were the only thing that can be enforced through strikes, but because it is the first and most important. The others are either subordinate to, or intimately connected with, wages; in fact, for the most part they are merely another form of wage regulation. Working hours, night work, limitation of child and female labor, all these questions are closely related to the wage problem; so too, the protection of good morals and compliance with religious duties on the part of the workingmen.¹⁷

¹⁷ Lehmkuhl, Arbeitsvertrag und Streik, 4th ed., pp. 59 sq.

Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis

Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. — 6 passages

Vol. II, Bk. II, Tractate V: On Justice, Ch. VI, Article I: Generalities Concerning Contracts

n. 481.

C. - Lease of Work

I. Notion. By lease of work, a work to be completed is promised directly.

But he who, for a certain price, undertakes a work to be completed is the contractor (or undertaker, receiver, appaltatore, entrepreneur) of the work, which the other party is judged to lease.

Positive laws are accustomed to distinguish a contract of carriage, a contract of completing a work from material which the lessor has supplied, and a contract of completing a work and at the same time furnishing the necessary material.

When there is question of carriage, they are accustomed to urge rather severely the obligation which the receiver of such a business has of carefully guarding the things committed to him and of providing for their integrity.

Contractors for a work are responsible for the deeds of the workmen whom they use.

II. Mutual Obligations. 1. The contractor ought to complete the whole work, within the established time, at the stated price, even, of itself, if the material and labors have become dearer, just as he had promised, and indeed by his own labors, if the work requires skill.

The lessor ought to receive the completed work and pay the promised price on the appointed day.

What if the contractor (or undertaker of the work) complains about an agreement harmful to himself?

He ought not easily to be believed. Nevertheless, extraordinary expenses, which had to be made from a plainly unexpected chance, are to be compensated to him. Most laws, Italian Code, 1643; French, 1793; Brazilian, 1246; Lusitanian, 1401; Spanish, 1593, expressly establish that, on account of increases of things and of wages, or even under pretext of changes concerning which no written agreement had been made, no supplement of price is to be paid to the contractor. The Swiss Code of Obligations, however, 373, admits that, on account of unforeseen circumstances, the judge may establish an equitable compensation or permit rescission of the contract.

But if an erroneous computation has been made, so that no one could have completed the thing for the agreed price, and the thing has sufficient value for the owner for whom the work is completed, the agreed price seems to have to be increased so that the contractor may receive at least the lowest just amount. Yet some oppose to that equitable payment the aleatory nature of the contract, by which a strict right of compensation would seem to be excluded.

I would rather distinguish between a material error which concerns present elements, as for example concerning the measure of the building, concerning the present price of things, and an error of foresight concerning future elements. The former, but not the latter, seem to be extrinsic to chance.

III. Special Things To Be Noted. 1. Several Codes dissolve the contract by the death of the contractor, so that the lessor ought to pay only in proportion for what is useful to him in the work begun. Thus the Italian Code, 1642; French, 1795, 1796; Lusitanian, 1403; Swiss, 379; Dutch, 1648; while better, in our opinion, the Austrian Code, 1162, and the Spanish, 1595, establish this only when personal skill was required.

Not a few laws permit the lessor to renounce the work, provided that he reimburses expenses and pays the contractor what is of interest to him, and consequently also lost profit. Cf. Italian Code, 1641; French, 1794; Brazilian, 1247; Spanish, 1591; Dutch, 1647; Lusitanian, 1402. On the manner of computing what is of interest, cf. the Brazilian Code at the cited article, and the German, 649.
Undertakers of a building, according to several laws, ought to guarantee its quality for several years: for ten years, according to the Italian Code, 1639; French, 1792; Dutch, 1645; Spanish, 1591; for five years, according to the Brazilian Code, 1245; Lusitanian, 1399.
For some years it has been usefully established that, in undertakings of works, a stipulation should be made of a fitting minimum wage to be paid to the workmen. - On agreements among undertakers of works cf. above, n. 472, 4.
In great factories themselves, and in the working of coal mines, it comes about that certain partial leases of work are offered to workmen.
Here, of itself, something would also have to be said about advocates, physicians, and others who are accustomed to promise useful service. The Austrian Code mentions them in § 1163; but in §§ 1164-1171 it defines the juridical relations of author and publisher. Advocates and physicians will be treated more conveniently in the chapter on offices.

n. 482.

D. - On the Hiring of Services

General Survey of the Argument. The civil Code of France assigned only two articles to the hiring of services: by one, 1780, it sanctioned the principle of liberty: "Services can be promised only for a time or for a definite business," while it by no means prohibited the hirer or master from obliging himself to keep a workman or servant for his whole life. By the other article, 1781, it said that faith was to be given to the assertion of the master or lord concerning the amount of the wage, concerning the payment of the wage of the preceding year, and concerning partial payments of the current year. - This latter article was afterwards suppressed in France and elsewhere, so that that whole business was contained in one article in the Italian Code, 1628; in the French, 1780; but in four articles in the Spanish Code (1583-1587) and the Argentine (1623-1626). Soon, however, the Legislator had to establish things more diligently concerning works to be leased and hired. Several laws, social laws as they say, were added to the Codes; or, as in Holland by the law of 13 July 1907, new sanctions were inserted into the Code itself, so that no fewer than 77 ample articles with a new section were added to the Code. In the Code of Germany a proper title, arts. 611-630, is assigned to the hiring of services (Dienstvertrag), which is followed by the title Werkvertrag (631-651), which treats of a promised work or lease of work. The Swiss Code of Obligations itself distinguishes Dienstvertrag (319-362), Werkvertrag (363-379), and Verlagsvertrag (380-393), on the publication of books. The Brazilian Code, under the general title concerning lease, distinguishes lease of things (1188-1215); hiring of services, 1216-1236; lease of work (1237-1247), which it calls undertaking of work. But in separate chapters it treats of the publication of scientific, literary, etc., works (c. 9, arts. 1346-1358); and of scenic exhibition (c. 10, arts. 1359-1362). The Mexican Code, however, distinguishes the rendering of professional services, which it governs by arts. 2406-2415 and by the dispositions concerning mandate, and the contract concerning works or concerning work. It distinguishes domestic services (2434-2457), day labor (2458-2468); from work to be done in general (2469-2509), it separates carriage (2510-2531), technical instruction (2532-2539), and lodging (2540-2544).

Concerning these laws, these things must be observed. While some Codes preserve the common name of lease-hire, others, better, abstain from that name, since diverse contracts concerning works can be made. Some Codes treat more confusedly every kind of works and services, while others, better, distinguish the various kinds more accurately. With Roman law, some, for example the Mexican Code, subject offices of a nobler nature to special norms; others, for example the German Code and more explicitly the Brazilian, consider all things commonly.

n. 483.

Various Manner of Contracting Concerning Works. In various ways one party can freely promise his service, and the other the recompense of the service. For:

There can be made an agreement of its own kind, more familial or personal, by which a person in a general way promises services agreeable to his condition and capacity, insofar as he is received into the family of another, who directly provides the former with the necessary and fitting things of person and family. Money, if it is supplied, is judged to be such as permits that now, with food, roof, and things supplied being considered, and later, sufficient industriousness being supposed, that person can live according to his state with his own. In such a case, he who furnishes services places himself under the direction of another, but the other, or master, provides for the needs of the servant as they are in the concrete. Therefore according to varying health, number of children, if there is question of married persons, that provident solicitude will vary. By force of this kind of contract, persons of every social cultivation were received as guests among kings and princes, and a similar kind of relations is still not infrequent between domestic servants and the head of a family.
Without strict commutation, a stipend of fitting support can be promised, which is measured according to the common necessities of him who promises services. These necessities vary according to the place which, from the kind of services, the promisor holds in society. This especially comes into use when the utility rendered transcends the economic order.
Between workmen and masters of labor a certain partnership can be entered into, whether complete or incomplete; whether manifest, or latent in the wage itself. A partnership is complete when all profits are divided between workmen and masters according to the proportion of contribution; it is incomplete if the workmen are merely admitted to a certain communion of profit, arbitrarily established. It is manifest where what each one is going to receive is defined from the considered outcome of the business, especially if something must be supplied by the workmen themselves when matters happen otherwise. But the partnership is covered by salary if a stable wage is indeed promised to the workmen, but one which is prudently estimated in advance from the circumstances of the business itself to which they give service. Then a double security is furnished to the workman-partner: by payment of the stated sum he is taken away from the danger of losing, as it were, his lot (capitale-lavoro), and for uncertain profit he receives less, but certain, profit. But both of these have already been computed in the defined salary.

Finally, by reason of those contracting, it is now necessary to distinguish individual contracts and collective contracts, which are deliberated and agreed between masters of labor and an association of craftsmen, so that the immediate obligation falls upon a moral person.

At present, we are treating only of lease-hire; and since previously we have treated of other mutual offices of workmen and masters and of strikes themselves (cf. n. 329-334), it will be enough for us to sketch in a few words the norms of a just wage.

n. 484.

On the Just Price of Hired Services. 1. Notion of the contract. By this agreement, the workman leases his services to another who strictly hires them; which the most ancient usages have approved, and therefore it is shown not to be opposed to human dignity. Although the contract of some partnership provides more for the same dignity, since it is made between persons who, even after the contract, act as equals.

Estimation of the wage. a) This must be held first of all. Commutative justice wills this and at the same time requires nothing more than that the value of labor be compensated by a price. Since that value does not vary according to the person laboring, it is worthy of equal compensation, whether there is question of a celibate man or of a father of a family. - b) But divine Providence has attributed to labor this intrinsic minimum value, by which it may generally suffice for the end for which, of itself, it is destined. That end is that a man who is healthy and endowed with common skill may be able, according to his condition, to live decently and in his own time to found a family. Therefore that value, of itself, is to be compensated by the hirer of services. And from the reason adduced, a debt of commutative justice is demonstrated.

Some, however, appeal only to an obligation of legal justice. But these labor under a confused notion of that justice. For since legal justice urges acts of a special virtue, in the case this virtue will not be able to be anything except commutative justice, which we assert, or charity, which is quite clearly too little.

But does the intrinsic value itself have its proximate cause in the necessities of the father of a family? There are those who reason in this way. But are not those necessities shown to be manifestly extrinsic to the commutation which takes place between labor and price? Would not then, in place of a debt of objective reason, there logically succeed a debt of subjective estimation, which will vary according to the number of children and other circumstances? Would it not then be in the interest of the masters of labor to hire rather celibates or workmen without offspring?

But all these things are avoided if you see merely in the common condition of workmen an indication of the true value of human labor. Namely, just as, with a supply of milk sufficient of itself for nourishing infants, he filled the breasts of the mother, divine Providence gave to human labor that fruitfulness, so that the workman, using his powers well, could provide for himself and his own in normal circumstances. The workman yields this innate fruitfulness when he leases his services. The master of the workshop ought to compensate this to him by paying a salary which, with the fruitful work of wife and older children computed and frugality first set aside, would be suited to honest support for the workman and an ordinary family.

But we do not call that an ordinary family which neo-Malthusian arts have reduced to one or another offspring; rather that family is ordinary which, from the observed laws of marriage, the craftsman in a definite region would generally have to support. For the support of a family of this kind, whether it is present or not, the salary cannot be unequal in normal circumstances.

c) Therefore the just salary by which, in normal circumstances, services are to be compensated from justice is composed of the absolute family salary and, besides, the quantity which according to common estimation is to be added, with the general prosperity of things considered.

n. 485.

You ask what is to be thought about the supplementary monies which are promised to fathers of families. By what title are they to be paid?.

This provision today is very highly to be commended by social utility, indeed by social necessity. But the utility or social necessity itself has a source not so noble and happy. For it coheres with the general and ever-growing tendency of imputing to the State or to collective solicitude burdens which formerly individuals gladly and not without some glory assumed, and of demanding a monetary wage for every benefit furnished. It is also the fruit, at least indirectly, of the propagation of neo-Malthusianism. For this multiplied celibate workmen or those without offspring. And since it flowed from egoistic pursuits of material pleasures, workmen, freed from a nobler solicitude, began to live more comfortably and to produce a general manner of living which fathers of families could not imitate. Hence fathers of families began to be held in contempt and mockery. Hence the neo-Malthusian arts themselves were increased. Hence fecundity, which is celebrated in the sacred writings themselves, was more and more esteemed no longer as a blessing and a cause of noble gladness, but as the imposition of an unwelcome burden. Funds established for distributing family subsidies intend in part to remedy these grave social evils; which indeed is most highly to be praised.
As to the title by which they are paid, the Legislator indeed, on account of the public good, can establish that from the sum of salaries a sufficient portion be reserved by which fitting sustenance may not be lacking for more numerous families. He can do this especially when, as today, the celibacy of many or the violation of matrimonial laws has been the occasion why not a few workmen began to live a too lavish life and to mock fathers of families to whom that luxury is not accessible.

Positive law being excluded, the factory owner cannot subtract anything from the just wage of others in order to give it to fathers of families. But since he is by no means compelled to admit workmen into partnership of profit, he can from profits received maintain funds by which family subsidies are paid.

Therefore, of itself or apart from agreement, the institution of family subsidies is governed not by the law of justice but by that of charity and sometimes of equity. But it becomes a debt of commutative justice if, which is to be desired, it enters into agreements which are made with the workmen, whether by a collective or by an individual manner.

n. 486.

Corollaries and Scholia.

He who without a just cause dismisses a servant or workman before the appointed day is held to damages, to be estimated generally from whether or not an occasion of equally good service was present. But when without the fault of anyone the execution of the contract is broken off, the matter is to be estimated from equity and received usages.
The workman also is unjust of himself if before the day he omits to furnish services. But since the obligation itself of agreements is contained within reasonable limits, the workman is excused by excessive difficulty of execution when most interrupt the services according to the agreement.

And it can happen that particular obligations undertaken between the master of labor and the workman carry a tacit condition annexed to them: unless a collective demonstration either of the workmen or of the factory owners impedes execution.

Unless some manner of partnership has intervened, salaries are to be increased, on account of extraordinary profit of the work, not from strict justice but from equity alone.
Without injustice, you cannot depress the wage below the lowest just amount because you wish, by a lower price of things, to triumph over rivals, or because you had to spend more than others in buying machines, in building the factory; or because from charity you hired miserable workmen, provided they render useful service to you. But you will not offend justice by the promise of a lesser wage if the workmen or servants, assumed from charity, furnish to you at least in part superfluous service; or if otherwise you are unable to obtain a moderate recompense for your own labor: for it will be permitted to prefer yourself to others. It also happens that workmen who already have fitting incomes from another source seek sometimes to increase these by leasing services outside their time, and therefore offer services for a stipend which is less than just. You are not compelled to refuse their spontaneous offer, or free acceptance.

But all special burdens, beyond the labor, are to be compensated by a fitting increase of recompense.

A lesser salary also can be paid, if that defect is compensated by other conditions, as often happens among domestic servants.

The nature of the contract concerning services to be hired and leased is subject to continual changes of the social order. Thus it is now less placed in the power of factory owners that, even when the day arrives, they may dismiss a workman by arbitrary will.
No less than for fathers of families of the common order, provision must be made for fathers of families of the middle order. Indeed, for some years their condition has been made worse and more troublesome than the lot of mechanical workmen.

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 8 passages

Vol. II, Tr. XI, Sect. I, Q. IV, Ch. II, Art. II, § 3. On Letting and Hiring

n. 305.

305. Definition. Letting in general is an onerous contract by which the use or usufruct of some thing is granted to another for a certain price, or certain services or some work are promised. Therefore letting is distinguished from a loan for use, since the latter is a gratuitous contract. He who grants the use or usufruct is called the lessor; but he who pays the price is called the lessee.

Division. Objects of a threefold kind can be had in letting: a thing, e.g., a house or field;¹⁷⁹ a work, e.g., a house to be built;¹⁸⁰ labor, e.g., domestic service.¹⁸¹ In the second and third cases, however, such a contract is rather called hiring. Each is to be treated separately.

1. On the letting of things. A contract of letting is similar to purchase and sale. For the lessor sells, and the lessee buys, the use or usufruct of some thing, e.g., a house, estate, horse, etc. Consequently, almost the same principles hold concerning letting as were indicated above, n. 295, concerning purchase and sale. Furthermore, civil laws are wont to determine very precisely the rights and obligations both of the lessor and of the lessee; these laws, as ordinarily just, are to be obeyed in conscience.

2. On the letting of a work to be done. A work is here called whatever someone undertakes to do, e.g., to build a house, make a garment, and generally all those things which are called contract work, Akkordarbeiten, contrat d'entreprise. This can be done in a twofold manner, namely, so that the contractor¹⁸² furnishes either his labor alone or both labor and material. In the second case this letting is truly a certain species of sale. In the letting of a work to be done, the price is established for the completed work; nevertheless, if there is question of great works to be done, e.g., the construction of a railway bridge, then a partial price is not rarely paid already after partial completion of the work. Sometimes a work to be completed is publicly announced with all its conditions and circumstances; various contractors are invited to compete under the agreement that the thing to be made will be committed to the one who has promised to complete the work for the lower price. Sometimes, however, there is only a private agreement. But in either case the contractor is bound to make the thing in the manner and at the time stipulated. Especially, he must not employ cheaper material or complete the work with less diligence; otherwise he is bound to restitution if he has caused notable damage to the person who commissioned the work. Since this contract is in some measure aleatory, the contractor is bound to fulfill all the conditions entered into even if he does not obtain a suitable price. If, however, unforeseen cases occur unexpectedly which render the work to be completed much more difficult, e.g., earthquakes, lightning, an epidemic, etc., then it is not only suitable but also just that a new contract be entered into. For the rest, the statutes of civil law are to be observed.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁹ Lease or tenancy contract (Mietvertrag, Pachtvertrag, loyer, bail).

¹⁸⁰ Contract for work (Werkvertrag).

¹⁸¹ Employment or service contract (Arbeitsvertrag, Dienstvertrag).

¹⁸² Contractor (entrepreneur, Unternehmer).

¹⁸³ Cf. German Civil Code § 631ff.; French Civil Code art. 1779ff.; Swiss Code of Obligations art. 363ff.

n. 306.

306. 3. On the hiring of labor. This hiring is also called hiring or a contract of labor, and it is a contract by which one person obliges himself to furnish certain labor, while another obliges himself to give a determinate wage for this labor. Therefore the object of this contract is personal labor, or rather working power,¹⁸⁴ which one leases to another for a determinate time. To this pertains the hiring of servants, workers, physicians, etc.

Jurists and economists do not agree concerning the nature and character of this contract. a) Some maintain that it is a true letting, namely, of working power; b) others think it is a sale by which the worker sells his labor as merchandise for a determinate price; c) others teach that a contract of labor is nothing other than a contract of partnership, in which the employer contributes his "capital" and the worker his labor toward completing a common work and consequently also toward dividing the profit received from the work. This last opinion, considered at first sight, seems the best; but in reality it is only a utopia which cannot be reduced to practice. For employers contribute not only money, but also intelligence, at least commonly superior intelligence, and many labors. Furthermore, they are compelled to expose their own fortune to the greatest dangers and often labor for a sufficiently long time without any emolument, indeed with loss. On the contrary, workers incur no danger and must receive a daily wage. It would therefore be inequitable and contrary to the nature of a contract of partnership if in prosperous affairs the workers had a proportionate part of the profit, but in adverse affairs the employer alone had to bear the whole loss. d) Finally, others teach that the contract of labor is reduced to an innominate contract: I do that you may give, and I give that you may do.

Amid so great a diversity of opinions, the doctrine of Leo XIII¹⁸⁵ is to be retained as a principle: "Labor therefore has, as it were, two characteristics implanted in man by nature, namely, that it be personal, because the active force inheres in the person, and is altogether proper to him by whom it is exercised and for whose utility it is naturally fitted. Secondly, that it be necessary, because the fruit of labor is needed by man for preserving life; but nature herself, to which obedience is most greatly due, commands that life be preserved." From these words it clearly appears that labor cannot be regarded solely as merchandise without any relation to the person, but is to be considered as a legitimate, and often the only, means by which the worker can preserve life for himself and his own. If these things are kept before the eyes, the question concerning the just wage can more easily be resolved.

¹⁸⁴ Use of working power (Nutzung der Arbeitskraft).

¹⁸⁵ Encyclical Rerum novarum, May 15, 1891.

n. 307.

307. The obligations of employers arise both from justice and from charity.

From justice employers are bound:

To pay an equitable wage at the appointed time. Hence Leo XIII says:¹⁸⁶ "To defraud anyone of the wage due is a great crime which calls down avenging wrath from heaven by its cry: 'Behold the hire of the laborers ... which has been kept back by you crieth; and the cry of them hath entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth.'"¹⁸⁷ What wage is just, however, will be said below, n. 310.
To respect workers as endowed with human dignity and not to regard them as cheap slaves, as was done by the pagans, Cicero bearing witness and saying: "Illiberal and sordid are the gains of all hired laborers and of all those whose services, not whose arts, are purchased."¹⁸⁸ Hence from justice the employer is bound to grant sufficient time so that the worker can live as a man, namely, by devoting himself to religious duties, having care for domestic affairs, etc.
Likewise, "not to impose more work than the strength [of the workers] can bear, nor work of a kind which is unsuited to age and sex." For "to demand so much work that the mind becomes dulled by excessive labor and at the same time the body succumbs to exhaustion is permitted neither by justice nor by humanity." Thus Leo XIII.¹⁸⁹ Especially, excessively grave labors are not to be imposed upon women and children. Happily, in several states there exist most salutary laws limiting the labor of women and children, and likewise generally the time and mode of labor.¹⁹⁰ Some of these laws, however, are unsuitable, as notably is that law which establishes indiscriminately that daily labor is never to extend beyond eight hours. For the time of labor is not to be measured indiscriminately, but according to the conditions of the labor, the laborer, necessity, etc.

From charity employers are bound:

To treat workers kindly and assist them in necessities. Therefore they ought to give alms principally to their own workers.
To favor institutions and decrees by which the condition of workers is justly improved, e.g., by opening schools for their greater instruction, founding baths and other institutions of health, etc. Therefore an employer cannot licitly oppose in parliaments laws which are justly proposed in favor of workers.

¹⁸⁶ L.c.

¹⁸⁷ James 5:4.

¹⁸⁸ De offic. l. 1, 42.

¹⁸⁹ L.c. Cf. Code of Canon Law, canon 1524.

¹⁹⁰ Legislation for the protection of workers (Arbeiterschutzgesetzgebung).

n. 308.

308. Leo XIII¹⁹¹ briefly and pregnantly embraces the obligations of workers in these words:

"That which was freely and equitably agreed concerning labor is to be rendered wholly and faithfully." Hence workers sin who labor negligently, who waste time uselessly, or who otherwise violate a contract of labor freely and justly entered into. The gravity of the sin and of the obligation of restoring depends upon the gravity of the damage unjustly caused.
"In no way to injure property." Consequently, workers sin who use prodigally the materials delivered to them, who destroy machines, who produce defective merchandise, etc.
"Not to violate the person of the employers," i.e., to inflict no injury upon employers, whether by calumniating, harming, saddening, etc.
"In the very defense of their own interests to abstain from violence, never to introduce sedition, and not to associate with wicked men." By these words an unjust strike is certainly prohibited, which occurs, e.g., by ceasing from work when a just hiring has not yet ended, or by demanding an excessive wage or other undue conditions. But it is not lawful to deduce from this that every strike¹⁹² made by agreement is intrinsically evil.

¹⁹¹ L.c.

¹⁹² Commonly, cessation of labor, strike (Arbeitseinstellung, Streik, strike, grève, sciopero).

n. 309.

309. On the moral character of a strike. A strike, as we now speak of it, is the common withdrawal by agreement of many workers in order to obtain certain advantages from employers. A defensive and an ameliorative strike are wont to be distinguished. A defensive strike is undertaken by workers who are unjustly oppressed by employers, e.g., when a truly insufficient wage is paid, when insufficient provision is made for the health or morality of the workers, etc. An ameliorative strike is made by workers to obtain a greater wage or shorter and easier labor, although the wage hitherto received is not altogether insufficient nor the labor excessive.

All concede that a defensive strike is lawful, provided no other means is at hand for lawfully defending themselves against the injustices of the employer. The reason is evident. For it is lawful to defend oneself with the moderation of blameless defense.

An ameliorative strike is asserted by a few to be intrinsically illicit, since such a strike is: a) true sedition condemned by Leo XIII in the encyclical Rerum novarum; b) idle leisure, since a man is bound to labor when he can, according to the words: "In labors shalt thou eat of it [the earth] all the days of thy life";¹⁹³ c) after the manner of an illicit private monopoly. But since these reasons are not very convincing, theologians most commonly¹⁹⁴ teach that even an ameliorative strike is not intrinsically evil, such that it can never become lawful; but, on the contrary, that it is lawful provided: 1. it takes place when the hiring has legitimately ended; 2. a proportionately grave cause is present; 3. unjust means are not employed; 4. the end is honorable. Certainly a strike is wont to bring many grave damages, both material and moral; e.g., enormous material damages arise both for workers and for employers; workers ceasing from work often waste time in taverns, give themselves over to drunkenness and immoralities, and quarrels, acts of violence, enmities, and other inconveniences arise. Since these things are so, a strike is very rarely expedient; indeed, it is altogether illicit unless a grave and proportionate cause is present. First of all, an effort is to be made that the just demands of the workers, for if those demands are unjust the strike is intrinsically evil, be obtained by other means, e.g., persuasion, peaceful agreement, the intercession of the government, etc. But if these efforts have been vain, then the strike is to be considered as an economic war. Just as war between different nations is sometimes lawful, so also is this economic war. Certainly it is not lawful to declare war against another nation except to vindicate an injury received, and it is never lawful to wage war in order to obtain, e.g., a new province; but it is lawful to undertake a strike even to obtain some advantage not owed from strict justice. The reason for this difference is that in international war acts evil and unjust in themselves are committed, e.g., killing men and destroying the goods of another. On the contrary, in the economic war of a strike no act evil of itself is committed. For this is a condition without which a strike is not lawful. Indeed, to cease from works to which a man is not bound from justice, and earnestly to exhort, but not compel, associates that they too withdraw from work, are not acts evil in themselves but indifferent. But if from this cessation of work the employer suffers great material damage, this is only indirectly voluntary, which certainly can lawfully be permitted if a proportionately grave cause is present. From all these things it follows that even an ameliorative strike is in itself lawful, provided the conditions listed above are present and especially that unjust means are not employed. Unjust means would be, e.g., to inflict unjust fear or force upon the employer or associates by beating, persecuting, calumniating them, etc.

What has been said concerning a strike applies also, in the opposite direction, to a lockout of workers made by agreement.¹⁹⁵ For just as workers can declare economic war upon employers, so employers can wage war against workers. But a truly grave cause is required for making this lockout by agreement, i.e., a grave fault of the workers; because otherwise culpable cruelty is committed, since workers thus dismissed by agreement by different employers are thereafter admitted nowhere in the whole region to labor¹⁹⁶ and are compelled either to emigrate, to embrace another manner of life, or to beg.

Note. It is very rarely lawful to undertake a strike if the public good is thereby gravely injured, e.g., a strike of workers on a railway, from which the whole public communication is disturbed. Such a strike does not seem lawful unless it is truly defensive, namely, for repelling grave injustices. The reason is that the public good must prevail over the private good of the workers; and it is not lawful to injure the public good unless there is an intolerable injustice which otherwise private men must suffer.

¹⁹³ Gen. 3:17.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. J. Biederlack against Treitz and Tournelle in Zeitschrift für kath. Theol. (Innsbruck, 1910), 286ff., 610ff.

¹⁹⁵ Lockout of workers (Arbeiteraussperrung, lock-out).

¹⁹⁶ System of blacklists (System der schwarzen Listen).

n. 310.

310. On the just wage. Since a wage is, as it were, the price of labor, those things said above, n. 296ff., concerning the legal, common, and conventional price are also to be applied, with proportion observed, to the wage, which likewise can be legal, common, or conventional. Furthermore, there is distinguished the individual wage or pay, which suffices to furnish the worker alone with suitable food, clothing, and habitation; and the family or social wage, which furthermore suffices to support the worker's immediate family. The family wage is either absolute or relative. It is absolute when it suffices to support a family in ordinary circumstances, or when by it a thrifty and upright worker, without neglecting the aids which thrift and the moderate cooperation of wife and children can furnish, is able to provide decently for himself and his own. Such a family wage scarcely varies according to the number of children. For if the offspring is numerous, the expenses are certainly greater, but the income is also greater, since not only the husband but also the wife and children are supposed to labor and contribute to increasing the income of the family. The relative family wage is that which is required for supporting a family in extraordinary circumstances, e.g., if the wife is infirm and can in no way contribute to increasing the family's income, if the offspring is very numerous or oppressed by infirmities, if extraordinary expenses are necessary, etc.

n. 311.

311. Principle 1. At least an individual wage is owed to the worker from natural law itself, or from commutative justice.

Thus all Catholics teach, and it is evident from the encyclical Rerum novarum, which establishes "that the wage ought not to be unequal to the support of a worker who is indeed thrifty and of good morals." The reason is that the worker has a strict right to suitable sustenance according to the words: "The workman is worthy of his meat";¹⁹⁷ nor is he bound to beg. But a wage is often the only means to such suitable sustenance. Therefore the worker has a right to that wage.¹⁹⁸

Nevertheless, exceptions are found: 1. if provisions have become dearer and labor scarcer; 2. if the worker is worn out by infirmity or age. In these cases the employer is not bound, at least from justice, to give a perfect individual wage, because this would be an excessive burden. Then, however, the republic is bound to assist the workers.

The Liberals and Socialists oppose this Catholic doctrine. The former teach that the wage offered by the employer and accepted by the worker is to be regarded as just. This doctrine is false and opens a wide door to every tyranny. For workers, compelled by necessity, are not rarely induced to accept an unjust and insufficient wage. Socialists, on the contrary, teach that the entire fruit of labor is owed to workers, only the expenses for the material employed, for the use of instruments, and for the intellectual labor of employers being deducted. This doctrine is also false, as manifestly unjust toward employers, who besides intellectual labor also furnish capital and assume the risk.

¹⁹⁷ Matt. 10:10.

¹⁹⁸ Most worthy of note are the things which Cardinal Zigliara wrote by command of Leo XIII and which were transmitted by the Holy See to Cardinal Goossens of Mechelen shortly after the encyclical Rerum novarum was published: "Indeed, the work of the worker differs very greatly from merchandise, just as wage differs from price. For the work of the worker is work proceeding from human freedom, and therefore assumes the character of merit and of a right to a wage or reward; and it is consequently far nobler than merchandise and price, which are completed by exchange alone. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity ... the work of the worker is considered as a certain merchandise, and the reward or wage as a certain price. Nor without reason: for although the work of the worker is something nobler than merchandise, nevertheless it retains the entire character of merchandise insofar as this bears an order to price. Therefore the reasoning of St. Thomas (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 114, a. 1) is most correct: 'For that is called a wage which is recompensed to someone in return for work and labor, as a certain price thereof. Hence, just as to render the just price for a thing received from someone is an act of justice, so also to recompense the wage of work or labor is an act of justice.' An act, I say, of commutative justice. For just as purchase and sale, so work and wage are for the common utility of the contracting parties, when, namely, one needs the thing or labor of the other and conversely. But that which is for common utility ought not to be a greater burden upon one than upon the other, and therefore a contract of justice ought to be instituted between employer and worker according to equality of the thing, which is the property of commutative justice (cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 57, a. 1). But if the criterion is sought by which that equality of the thing between the manual labor of the worker and the wage to be given by the employer must be established, we respond: That criterion is said in the encyclical to be sought from the immediate end of the worker, which imposes upon him the natural duty or necessity of laboring, namely, from food and clothing for suitably sustaining life, and to which manual labor is first and principally ordained (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 187, a. 3). Therefore, whenever the work is such that through it the worker satisfies his aforesaid natural duty of attaining the immediate end of his labor, but the wage is unequal to attaining this end, namely, suitable food and clothing, speaking in itself and considering the nature of things, there is an objective inequality between work and wage, and consequently an injury to commutative justice." Such an injury to commutative justice, from which many grave moral inconveniences arise, is certainly present in the system which is called the "sweating system" (Schwitzsystem durch Zwischenmeister), and which is employed not rarely against workers, men or women, who at home complete works assigned by some factory (Heimarbeit).

n. 312.

312. Principle 2. An absolute family wage is to be granted from justice, or at least from charity, in the normal state of industry to an adult and able worker.

It is said, 1. in the normal state; for when commercial industry is in a state of distress, then the workers also must tolerate distress. It is said, 2. to an adult and able worker; for if the worker through infirmity or old age is unable to labor perfectly, the employer is not bound, at least from justice, to pay as great a wage as the worker needs for himself and his family. For then the republic ought to furnish assistance. But when the wife or children of the family can earn something in a suitable manner, they are bound to contribute to the support of the family. The reason for the principle is that the most sacred law of nature compels no one to celibacy, but permits marriage to everyone capable of it.¹⁹⁹ Moreover, the father of a family is bound to procure sustenance for his wife and children born to him; and consequently, if he is a worker, he must acquire so great a wage that he can suitably satisfy this duty.

It is disputed among Catholics whether employers are bound from commutative, or at least legal, justice, or from charity alone, to give an absolute family wage. Therefore Cardinal Goossens of Mechelen proposed three doubts concerning this matter to the Holy See. Cardinal Zigliara, by command of the Supreme Pontiff, responded in a letter to Cardinal Goossens in 1891 that an employer who pays a wage sufficient for the support of the worker but unequal to supporting his family does not sin against justice, whose demands are fully satisfied when equality of wage and work is observed. Therefore in this case an employer who does not pay an absolute family wage indeed sins more or less against equity and filial or familial duty, but is not bound to restitution. There are, however, several authors who nevertheless defend an obligation of justice in this case.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁹ Hence Leo XIII says in the encyclical Rerum novarum: "No human law can take away from man the natural and primordial right of marriage."

²⁰⁰ Cf. Tanquerey, De iust. n. 818, who treats the question of the hiring of workers excellently and at length. The responses to the doubts of Cardinal Goossens are given in full by Vermeersch, Quaest. de iust. n. 420ff.

Marc, Institutiones Morales

Clement Marc, C.SS.R. — 10 passages

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tr. VII, Diss. IV, Ch. III, ARTICLE IV: On Leasing and Hiring

n. ¶1149.

DEFINITION. Leasing is a contract by which someone gives his work or thing to another for use, for a certain wage. Hiring is the same contract on the part of the one accepting.

He who furnishes the use of the thing or his own work is called the lessor; but he who hands over the price, the lessee or hirer.

DIVISION. There is distinguished: 1. leasing of things, which is threefold, namely of buildings, of fields, and of animals; - 2. hiring of the work of a person, that is, of labor or service.

To this is referred, and is called hiring of work, the hiring of workers, artisans, carriers, guards, etc.; likewise the hiring of architects and of those who, after public denunciation, promised a work to be perfected, with determination of time, matter, form, and price.⁰⁴

n. ¶1.

1. On Leasing of Things

n. ¶1150.

- PRINCIPLES. I. The obligations of the lessor are the same as those of the seller. Therefore the lessor is especially held concerning the following:

To preserve equity in the price of the lease and to hand over to the lessee a truly useful thing.

Therefore he must hand over the thing at the established time, and in such a state that it is apt for the end for which it was leased; likewise, to effect that the hirer can use or enjoy the thing through the whole time of the hiring, and therefore to sustain all expenses necessary for this, for example for roofs to be repaired, for taxes and public burdens, etc.

To render the hirer secure, both from vices of the thing and from juridic disturbance in the use of the thing during the time of lease.

We say from juridic disturbance, namely which could be inferred by a third party having right, but not that which would be made through violence. But if the use of the thing, on account of necessary repairs, is impeded for a notable time, for example beyond forty days, indemnity is owed to the hirer (III, 857).

n. ¶1151.

II. The lessee ought reasonably to use the thing leased and faithfully to pay the price. These things are clear of themselves.

He ought to use the thing leased as a good father of a family, that is, for the end alone of the lease.

Whence, if he consumes the thing for other uses, the lessor will be able to seek reparation of damage or rescission of the contract. Yet, a contrary pact being excluded or positive law not prohibiting,⁰⁵ he can sublease the thing to another who is equally suitable. To him it pertains to pay those modest and daily expenses which must be made for the preservation of the thing. - He must restore the thing in the state in which he received it, with the change arisen from age or greater force excepted. If it is not established by writing in what state the thing was at the time of the lease, it is presumed to have been in good state, unless the contrary is proved.

The lessee must pay the wage of the lease, or pension, and indeed at the established times.

But in the case of misfortune, for example of sterility on account of hail, it has been introduced from equity of right that something be remitted from the price of the lease of a field, and that the damage be undergone equally by lessor and lessee, unless an equitable compensation is given from the fruits perceived in other years.⁰⁶

Note. 1. The contract of lease is DISSOLVED: a) when the time of hiring has been completed. If the time was in no way determined, the lease will be able to cease at the discretion of one contracting party, provided the other is warned at an opportune time. b) By the destruction of the thing leased. c) By non-execution of the agreements. d) By mutual consent, with the right of a third party preserved, for example of a subhirer.

But a lease entered upon by an authentic act is not dissolved by the death of the contracting parties, but passes to heirs. If the lessor has donated or sold the thing leased, or wishes to occupy it himself, he cannot, from new Law, expel the lessee; but the constituted term must be awaited.⁰⁷ Otherwise in Roman Law.

n. ¶2.

2. On Hiring of Work

Encyclical Rerum novarum (middle version); Vermeersch, de Just., n. 386; Lehmkuhl, I, 1344; Noldin, II, 609; Genicot, I, 645; Schindler, II, p. 663; Tanquerey, II, 786; Garriguet, Contr. du travail; H. Pesch, Lehrb. der Nationaloeconomie, III, p. 207-219; Godts, de Salario familiali; Schrijwers, Man. d'Econ. pol., P. IV; De Gryse, Biederlack, Pottier, and others.

n. ¶1152.

- DEFINITION. Hiring of work, or hiring of workers, is a contract in which a just price is paid for certain labor.

It is said 1. For certain labor. For the object of this contract is not the thing produced, but the labor to be furnished, therefore the operative force itself, the very strength of the worker: therefore something which cannot be separated from the worker, and which always remains clothed with human dignity.

Hence you will deduce: a) The contract of labor is not a mere purchase-sale, because for establishing equality between the work furnished and the just price, for taxing human labor, we cannot use the same norms as for common wares and things merely negotiatory.

b) The contract of labor is not a contract of partnership, as if the master contributes his capital, but the worker his work, to a work to be perfected commonly, the profit afterwards to be divided.

A just price is paid: namely such a price as truly responds both to the work furnished on the part of the worker and to the end which the worker necessarily intends in leasing his strength.

ORDER OF THINGS TO BE SAID. In establishing rules concerning JUST PRICE, authors go into diverse opinions. Therefore fitting distinctions must be premised, and afterwards principles established, whether with respect to hirers of workers or with respect to the workers themselves.

How many kinds of wage are given? There is given 1. Individual wage, namely that which suffices for feeding one man on that day, and furnishes him the necessities for suitable support, provided he is frugal and well-moraled.

Individual wage can be subdistinguished into the lowest, commonly sufficient for feeding one man; and the highest, which furnishes to a man not only necessities and conveniences, but also as it were restores the expenses which he had for learning the art, and forestalls future damages.

There is given 2. Family wage, namely that which suffices for feeding a family,⁰⁸ as it is ordinarily constituted.

It is subdistinguished into absolute and relative family wage.

a) Absolute is present if, in ordinary adjuncts, the same sufficient family wage is paid to the father of a family.

b) Relative is had if that wage which of itself commonly suffices is increased according to the number of children and the weight of necessities.

n. ¶1153.

PRINCIPLES. I. The hirer of workers is held from justice to allot to them the lowest individual wage. The reason is that only the lowest individual wage procures equality between labor and wage. For the labor of the worker is: 1. labor of a human person, whence a thing much nobler than merely negotiatory things; 2. labor necessary for a life suitable to a man, labor therefore which cannot be estimated below a wage sufficient for the necessities of life; 3. finally labor by which the strengths of the worker are consumed for the utility of the master, whence there arises a right to a wage which is apt for restoring the strengths of a well-moraled man.

From these things conclude: a) The same labor standing, whether considered in itself or in adjuncts, the same lowest individual wage is owed both to men and to women (cf. Rosler, Frauenfrage, p. 113). So that it may be just, it must suffice also to

the needs of the seventh day. Ordinarily, however, feminine labor is less, on account of weakness of body, necessary interruptions, etc.; whence it is diminished without injustice (Noldin, II, 612).

b) This wage is owed to workers antecedently to an express agreement, according to common estimation; it will be able to be exacted by any worker at all.

c) Indeed, without injustice the highest individual wage will be able to be exacted; for no more is exacted than is expended for the advantage of the master. If special dangers of the work are present, special expenses for acquiring skill in the work, that must be paid to the worker.

d) The system of those is to be rejected who think that any wage whatever is just into which the worker has consented; for often, conquered by necessity alone, the worker consents to a payment below the just one.

A great question is: Whether the hirer of workers is bound from justice to pay to the worker who is called to marriage an absolute family wage. The affirmative opinion pleases us much. The reason is that (as Leo XIII says in the cited Encyclical) it is a most holy law of nature that the father of a family protect, by food and by every cultivation, those whom he himself has procreated; and the same is derived thither from nature, that he should wish to acquire and prepare for his children those things by which they may be able, in the doubtful course of life, to defend themselves from miserable fortune.

Therefore the labor of the married worker, which is the truly ordinary means for fulfilling this office and as it were the one capital through which he is rendered apt for satisfying this duty imposed by nature itself, this labor, we say, obtains in common estimation a price which can be compensated only by the payment of an absolute family wage. Cf., besides the authors already cited, Manning, La quest. ouvr.; Collat. Brug., IV, 1901; Nicotra, Quest. du Salaire; Liberatore, Economie politique, p. 246; Marres, Perin, etc.

Nevertheless, the contrary opinion, which denies, we cannot reject. Thus it argues. Does the equality which commutative justice intends to establish truly require that more be owed to a married worker? The necessity of feeding and providing for oneself is intrinsic and absolute to labor; but the necessity of feeding a family is rather extrinsic and hypothetical to labor, if namely a man is joined in marriage. From this it follows that the price of labor, which indeed ought rather to be considered according to itself, does not vary in itself and does not confer other rights if the worker is married. This seems to be admitted the less because, if extrinsic and hypothetical elements had to be considered in the estimation of labor, even a relative family wage would have to be paid from justice, if the family became more numerous (cf. Genicot, I, 647; De Gryse, Contr. cond., p. 45).

Whence some say that the absolute family wage is owed from charity alone; but others have recourse to legal or social justice, in order to impose on masters the obligation of paying such a wage to married workers (cf., besides those just cited, Antoine, p. 611). But they add that the absolute family wage, although of itself and initially owed from legal justice only, obliges from strict justice always and in such a region when it has truly been brought into use. For then, as regards the estimation of the labor of workers, it becomes a vulgar price.

II. The hirer of workers sometimes does not act unjustly if he pays a wage lower than the aforesaid. The reason is that the general norm, according to which the price of labor is estimated, often admits change by reason of circumstances.

Therefore the wage would justly be diminished: 1. If the worker were not yet apt for ordinary labor, or had been accepted from mercy alone, unequal to ordinary labor. 2. If in such a region labor commonly produced fruits less than just; a fortiori, if labor, prolonged with hope of better fortune, actually turned only to the detriment of the master.

Note. Yet from this do not conclude that the master acts justly who, about to begin some industry, meanwhile would give small wages until he himself has paid the capital taken from others.

III. The hirer of workers assumes other obligations upon himself. And indeed: 1. before the completed time of hiring he cannot withdraw from the contract without a legitimate cause; 2. he must take care that in workshops the workers do not suffer grave dangers against good morals or against life and the health of the body; whence he should faithfully apply the precautions prescribed by law; 3. for the rest of the body and sanctification of the soul necessary time should be conceded. Cf. the cited Encyclical; Vermeersch, o. c., n. 460; Riviere, Vingt ans de vie sociale, p. 78; Harmel, Catechisme du Patron; Kurschner, Lex. d. deutsch. R., v. Arbeit; Gopfert, Arbeiter-aussperung (ap. Linz. Quart. Schr., 1908, p. 334).

IV. The worker, from justice, must fulfill the obligations of the contract.⁰¹ The same is valid for the lessor of works.

Therefore the worker is held: 1. to furnish labor faithfully according to the agreement, so that, if from lack of skill, or negligence, or his own fault he has not performed what he promised, he is held proportionately to remit the wage, or to restore what has already been accepted; 2. not to depart, without a just cause, from service before the time of hiring is finished (but see n. 1154); and if from such departure or in another way, for example by completing the work faultily, he has brought damage upon the master, to compensate it. Recall the things said n. 708, 1140, concerning servants, and n. 1036, Question 2, concerning drivers, etc.

Note. a) From the natural law. Workers act illicitly who give some sum of money to inspectors, to corrupt them, so that a faulty completion of the work or cheaper material may be approved by them. But they would not act illicitly if they gave money for turning aside their unjust vexation. See also n. 1135.

b) From natural equity. Equity demands that, in the case of an unusual misfortune, compensation be conceded to architects or others who have taken upon themselves a work to be completed. Yet this compensation is not owed if the redeemer of the work erred in computing the expenses (Aertnys, l. III, 506; Genicot, I, 650).

c) From Positive Law.⁰² No one can promise his work except for a determined time or for a determined work. An artisan, if he has not finished the work, is held concerning a greater or lesser fault, according as he furnished both material and labor, or labor alone.

n. ¶3.

Scholium

n. ¶4.

On Cessation of Labor by Agreement

(operistitium, sciopero, greve, huelga, Streick, strike).

On account of the importance of the question, it is useful here to note what must be held concerning operistitium.

n. ¶1154.

PRINCIPLE. Operistitium theoretically is licit, if the due conditions are present. The conditions are: 1. that it be opposed to justice neither in the matter nor in the mode; 2. that there be a just and grave cause; 3. that no other way be available for obtaining the end.

It is said 1. That it not be opposed to justice, neither in the matter nor in the mode. But a) IN THE MATTER a cessation of labor is unjust if there has preceded a valid contract concerning work to be furnished for a stated time and it has not been rendered void, as is plain from the things said n. 1056.

Now, the contract can be invalid either from defect of free consent, for example if the workers are morally compelled to lease their work below the just price; or from a dishonorable condition added, for example if they undertook work not necessary to be furnished on Sundays. The contract can also become void, namely in the case in which the master does not observe the conditions concerning which agreement was made. Then there is no obligation of contract, and therefore the workers have the right, with the other conditions observed, of ceasing from work by agreement. Yet charity demands that beforehand they warn the patron, to avoid his very great damage.

But if no contract preceded concerning work to be furnished for a determined time, or if the time has elapsed, the right belongs to the workers of ceasing from labor at their pleasure, and this even by agreement; but to induce others unwilling to this is often against charity both toward workmen and toward masters, unless a grave cause excuses.

b) IN THE MODE, the cessation of labor would be unjust if seditions were moved, if force or threats were applied either against the masters themselves for extorting the things sought, or against other workers, by prohibiting them from labor through fraud, threats, or strictly harmful means; likewise if the workers harmed other citizens by disturbing the city.

It is said 2. That there be a just and grave cause. a) Just; therefore operistitia made for extorting a wage beyond the highest price or any inequitable conditions are illicit. But if, while obtaining an equitable pay, they intend an increase of the same, yet not above the highest price, they do not sin against justice, unless they apply unjust means, for example lies. But agreeing among themselves in this way about not leasing their work at a lower price, they seem to harm charity⁰³ (cf. n. 1138, 2).

b) Grave; for since from operistitia very evil consequences commonly arise, a cause of great moment is required, such as will be, with the circumstances considered, a diminution of excessive labor, or a cessation of vexations.

It is said 3. That no other way be available; and this also on account of the innumerable evils which a cessation from labor by agreement carries with itself. From this last condition it is clear that there is required in addition a true probability of obtaining the good end intended, if not immediately, at least in the near future.

We have said: theoretically it is licit. But IN PRACTICE, operistitium very often is illicit, because it cannot always be established concerning the conditions mentioned above, and many inconveniences accede which Leo XIII best declares thus: "This kind of cessation affects with damage not only masters and the workmen themselves, but harms commerce and the utilities of the state; and since it is accustomed not to be far from violence and disturbances, very often it brings public tranquillity into danger."

Nevertheless they are not to be blamed who, only on account of grave fear struck into them by associates, cease from labor while bearing themselves passively. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 1349; Genicot, II, n. 22; Gopfert, II, 122; Biederlack, Innsbr. Quart. Schr., 1912 and Theolog. Fragen; Vermeersch, o. c., n. 470.

Konings, Theologia Moralis

Anthony Konings, C.SS.R. — 7 passages

Vol. I, TREATISE ON CONTRACTS, SECOND PART: ON CONTRACTS …, CHAPTER III: ON LEASE (Lease)

n. ¶1017.

- Lease is a contract by which the use, or fruits of a thing, or the work of a person, for a certain wage is accepted for a time by one and granted by another. He who hands over a thing for the use or utility of another is called the locator (Lessor); the other is named locatary or conductor (Tenant or Lessee). Moreover the species of lease are variously numbered: 1° lease of buildings; 2° of fields; 3° of animals; 4° of labor and servitude. (o) p. 482.

I. General Rules of Lease.

n. ¶1018.

Principles. - 1° The locatary generally can sublet, unless something else has been stipulated, or detriment be done to the locator from it. - 2° Lease² is not dissolved by the death of the contracting parties, but passes to the heirs. - 3° If the time of lease has not been determined, it can cease at the judgment of either contracting party, provided he warn the other at a fitting time according to the custom and laws of places, and the nature of the thing leased. - 4° If the locator has sold the thing leased, the locatary cannot be expelled, but the term of the lease must be awaited.

II. Obligations of the locator.

n. ¶1019.

- 1° He is held to open the harmful vices of the thing to be leased. - 2° He must provide that the locatary enjoy it tranquilly. - 3° It is incumbent on him to sustain the necessary expenses of repairing the thing leased. - 4° He cannot change the form of the thing leased without the consent of the locatary. (p) p. 483.

III. Obligations of the locatary.

n. ¶1020.

- 1° He must use the thing leased as a good father of a family, for the sole end of the lease. - 2° He is held to restore or repair those things which have perished by his fault, or have been made worse. - 3° Not even in the external forum is he held for damages which the thing leased undergoes, unless it is proved that they happened by his fault, at least juridical. - 4° He is held to pay the rent at the stated time, and that with the legal increase from the day on which it was to be paid, if he does not pay at the stated time.

n. ¶1021.

Questions. - Query 1° What of law, if a leased house perishes by fire?

Resp. 1° In the forum of conscience the locatary is held to nothing if it has been burned without any fault of his, even juridical; indeed probably even if it perished from juridical fault alone.

Resp. 2° Nor is the locatary held for the damage in the external forum, unless it is proved that it happened from the fault, at least juridical, of the locatary.

Query 2° What especially concerning lease of works?

Resp. 1° The locator of a servant or worker is held to agree with him concerning a just wage, such as that which is commonly wont to be given to such persons.

Resp. 2° If the determination of the wage was left to the judgment of the conductor, he must give a just wage, at least the lowest. But a master dismissing a servant before the time without sufficient cause is held to repair the damage emerging from it.

Resp. 3° If a servant or worker voluntarily offers himself, and you do not need him, but receive him only from charity, resolve from the things said in n. 710 what you owe to give to him.

n. ¶1022.

- Query 3° Whether the locatary of fields is held to pay the whole rent in the case of sterility, on account of hail, or another extraordinary misfortune?

Resp. By common law, affirmatively, if the rent to be paid is Money.

Query 4° Whether the tax of the thing leased must be paid by the locator, or by the locatary?

Resp. Of itself, a special agreement excluded, the locator must pay the taxes; because not only is he the owner of the thing, but he has not even transferred the usufruct except in a successive manner and from day to day. But otherwise concerning full and properly so-called usufruct, as was said above n. 678. II. 2.

n. ¶1023.

- Query 5° Whether a messenger going to a certain place can licitly receive the whole wage from several?

Resp. 1° Concerning drivers there is no difficulty, because such is the custom. - Thus commonly Theologians.

Resp. 2° Concerning a messenger there is a twofold opinion here. - Recall the things said above, n. 831. q. 1.

Note. - To the contract of lease must be referred the contract of accomplishing some work, concerning which each one should consult the laws of his State. Generally one must stand by the agreed pacts. Not rarely in this contract among undertakers of a work (the contractors) there occurs the case of mutual conspiracy for increasing the price, or even the case of public bidding, more or less impeded. But cases of this kind, with the circumstances prudently attended to, will have to be resolved from the things handed down concerning Public Auction, n. 999 sq., and concerning Monopolies, n. 1008 sq.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 37 passages

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Third Part: Concerning Com…, Sect. C, Ch. III, Question Two: On Letting and Hiring

540. Letting (louage; huurverdrag) in general is a bilateral onerous contract by which someone grants his work or his thing to another for use for a certain wage, or by which the utility of a thing or person is handed over and is received by the hirer for a certain time for a determined price; hiring is the same contract on the part of the one receiving. Hence letting (verhuring) and hiring (huring) are two partial contracts making one whole. Moreover, it can be defined: a bilateral onerous contract by which the use or fruit of a movable or immovable thing, or certain works of a person, is promised for a determined time for a certain price, or by which a thing or person is granted for a price for use or for fruit (a. 1708-1710).

It is said:

A bilateral contract, and thus it is distinguished from donation;

Onerous, and thus it is distinguished from commodatum, by which the use of a thing is granted to another gratis;

By which for use or fruit: thus it is distinguished from sale, by which the dominion itself of the thing is transferred, while here only the utility is granted; moreover, any utility whatsoever can of itself be let, unless it is prohibited by law, as has been done for the right of use and habitation (a. 631 and 634), which can neither be let nor sold;

A thing or person: since it concerns a use estimable by price, there is to be understood a thing whose use is not consumption itself, such as a person also is; and thus letting is distinguished from mutuum, which concerns a thing consumable by first use;

For a determined time: for if a thing were granted for perpetual use, the dominion would be of almost no value; if the work of a person is granted in perpetuity, it is servitude, which is prohibited by positive law (a. 1780);

For a determined price, which, that it may be just, must be determined according to common estimation to the equality of what is given and accepted (n. 449 and 514); moreover, the price is not necessarily money (a. 1763 and 1818), unless in particular circumstances this is required by law, as for workers in factories (Belgian law, 16 Aug. 1887, a. 1 and 2);

Is promised: for letting is a consensual contract, which is perfected by the consent alone of the parties and of itself requires no external form. It can be made in writing or by words (a. 1714). If, however, it is made by words alone, proof by witnesses is not admitted in our law, unless execution has already been begun; but an oath can be tendered to him who denies the letting (a. 1715).

Therefore there is a twofold species of letting: letting of things, and letting of works, or of human industry and activity; this latter again is twofold: letting of services, or of labor; and the undertaking of a work, which is the effect of labor. These now must be spoken of one by one.

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Third Part: Concerning Com…, Sect. C, Ch. III, Question Two: On Letting a…, Article II: On the Letting or Undertaking of Making a Work

545. The letting of a work (contrat d'entreprise; aanneming) is a contract by which an architect or artisan or contractor is hired by the owner to produce a certain work by industry or labor for a determined price, for example, to build a house, make a garment, construct a railway (a. 1710). This can be done in a twofold way: namely, so that the artisan furnishes only his work by which he may complete the whole work; or both work and material at the same time (a. 1711 and 1787).

In this contract: 1. the owner who grants the work to be constructed is the lessor, the artisan the lessee; on the contrary, in the letting of services the worker is the lessor, the owner the lessee;

the price is established for the completed work, so that it is not owed unless after the lessee has completed the work, unless it has been otherwise agreed; nevertheless in great works the price is usually paid by parts, after the completion of the diverse parts of the work (a. 1791);

hence the risk of the work remains with the lessee until it has been completed and handed over (a. 1788), unless it perishes without his fault and from a defect of the material, if this pertains to the owner (a. 1789-1790);

the work to be completed is often publicly announced, by setting forth what is to be made, in what manner, from what material, within what time, etc., so that various lessees may be invited to compete, and the work to be made may be committed by adjudication to him who, all things considered, has promised to complete it better and for a lower price (adjudication; aanbesteding), or at least with greater security. For this, good faith is altogether required on both sides: in the lessee, that he sincerely intend to complete the work under the determined conditions for the price indicated; in the lessor, that he commit the work to him who asks the lesser price, provided however that he is suitable for completing the thing well.

546. The obligations of the lessee are:

By justice he is obliged to complete the work in that manner which was agreed upon, for example, by preserving the quality of the material, the prescribed form, due solidity, the established time, due diligence, etc.

By justice he is obliged to pay a sufficient wage to the workers hired by him, and he cannot diminish it so that he may complete the work at a lower price.

He must be content with the established price, for on account of this he obtained the work, by excluding others by the price.

If the lessee complains that he cannot complete the work at the established price, it must be seen from what cause that increase of expenses has arisen. According to common custom, which must be attended to very much, the lessee takes upon himself ordinary risks, but not wholly extraordinary ones, for example, from a wholly unforeseen event, as shifting soil, an inundation of waters bursting forth with extraordinary force among the foundations. In such a case compensation is owed from justice, but not if, for example, the prices of things are changed or the wages of workers are increased: then nothing is owed from strict justice, since the contract is always in some measure aleatory (a. 1793). Nevertheless sometimes something can be owed from equity, for example, if the owner has a great profit from it and the lessee undergoes grave damage; moreover, the owner is not bound easily to believe the complaints of the lessee, but can require certain proof of the damage.

Finally, if in computing expenses the lessee has erred, as from forgetfulness of something, for example, a wall, a gate, etc., the owner more probably must add nothing from strict justice, because it is a contract in some measure aleatory and entered into for a price which was established in a lump as one whole: forgetfulness indeed can happen, but there is also the presumption that there was negligence on the part of the lessee.

It is a sin against justice and of itself induces an obligation of restitution:

a) if the lessee uses notably cheaper material or less diligence, especially when from this the solidity of the work is diminished: for then the part of the wage unduly gained must be restored and the damage repaired;

b) if the lessee by his own fault has completed the work later than was stipulated: he is held to compensate the damage inflicted from this;

c) if inspectors or those watching over the work are negligent: for thus they can cooperate negatively in the injustice of the lessee, and then they are held to restore for it in the second place; but in their own name they must restore that part of their wage which they received undeservedly for vigilance not applied.

547. The obligations of the lessor, or owner, are:

He must pay the established price at the prefixed time.

If he demands that the thing be made in another manner than had been agreed, or that certain things be added to the work, he must compensate the greater expenses arising from this.

If through culpable delay he neglects to accept the finished work, he is held to repair the damage thereby inflicted upon the lessee.

548. Observations. 1. Among lessees sometimes this practice exists: those competing for the public letting of constructing a building agree among themselves that each should increase his estimate by a certain sum of money, which, when the work has been adjudicated, is divided by the undertaker among the other competitors. Or in another way, by common counsel they pre-establish the price of the work to be undertaken, and then by lot or otherwise designate the undertaker who, when the work has been adjudicated, divides a certain determined sum among the remaining competitors.

Concerning this practice Aertnijs notes, Th. M. I, n. 964: "It can seem unjust; for in the mind of the competitors the sum mentioned does not have the character of the price of the work to be undertaken, but of a stipend for compensating the travel expenses of the other competitors; moreover, the lessor is compelled to pay that stipend, who is in no way held to this. Besides, in the latter mode, by an inequitable means they impede the lessor from being able to let at a lower price." Nevertheless he himself does not hold the said practice to be unjust, provided the price is just, namely, that it does not exceed the highest price. "For the use which the competing undertakers predefine for the said sum does not pertain to the matter... Then, concerning the stated manner of acting, it seems the same must be said as... concerning monopoly of sale,... and concerning a pact among bidders at auction, since the cases are similar... It is added that they seem to have a just title for increasing the price, which also excuses them from sin against charity, namely, so that in this way they may keep themselves unharmed for the expenses of journeys, loss of time, and labor, to which undertakers of works are bound, that they may compete in various places, and which they often perform in vain. Finally, that lessors are not too greatly burdened from this is evident from the fact that the public letting of constructing a work is commonly esteemed as a more economical mode of building."

Lessees, by giving some sum of money to inspectors to capture their goodwill, sin against justice if they do this to corrupt them, so that they may approve or not reject cheaper material or defective work; but they do not sin if they act thus to redeem themselves from unjust vexation, namely, when they foresee that otherwise the inspectors will unjustly harass them.

It is expedient to note several dispositions of civil law. According to several codes:

a) By the death of the lessee the contract is dissolved, so that the lessor must pay only proportionately for that which is useful to him in the work begun. Thus, for example, French, Belgian, Italian, Dutch, Swiss, and Portuguese law.

b) The lessor can renounce the work, provided he refunds the expenses and pays the lessee as much as is of interest to him for the labor furnished and the profit ceasing: thus, for example, French, Belgian, Italian, Spanish, Dutch, and German law.

c) Builders of a building must furnish security of quality for several years, which are ten in French, Belgian, Italian, Spanish, and Dutch law.

d) To the undertaking of a work is also referred the hiring of carriers, concerning which the Civil Code treats expressly, a. 1782-1786.

Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology

Aloysius Sabetti, S.J., and Timothy Barrett, S.J. — 6 passages

Vol. I, Tr. IX, Pt. II, Sect. II, Chapter III. On Hiring and Leasing

Hiring or leasing is a contract by which the use or fruits of a thing, or the works of a person, are received by one and conceded by another for a certain wage and for a time. He who hands over a thing for the use or utility of another is called the lessor; the other is called the lessee or hirer. Moreover various species of hiring or leasing are numbered, namely, the leasing of buildings, fields, animals, labor and service, etc.

Concerning the contract of hiring or leasing, let it suffice to note these things:

I. The general rules of hiring or leasing are the following: 1st. the lessee can sublease, unless something else has been stipulated or detriment is done to the lessor from it; 2nd. the lease is not dissolved by the death of the contracting parties, but passes to the heirs; 3rd. if the time of the lease was not determined, it can cease at the judgment of either contracting party, provided he warn the other at a suitable time according to the custom of places and the nature of the thing leased; 4th. if the lessor has sold the thing leased, the lessee cannot be expelled, but the term of the lease must be awaited.

II. The obligations of the lessor are these: 1st. he is bound to disclose harmful defects of the thing to be leased; 2nd. he must furnish that the lessee enjoy it peacefully; 3rd. it belongs to him to sustain the necessary expenses for repairing the leased thing; 4th. he cannot change the form of the leased thing without the consent of the lessee.

III. The obligations of the lessee are the following: 1st. he ought to use the leased thing as a good father of a family for the sole end of the lease; 2nd. he is bound to restore or repair those things which have perished or become worse by his fault; 3rd. but concerning damages which the leased thing undergoes only from his juridical fault, he is not bound except after the sentence of a judge. - Cf. Kenrick, nn. 43 and 44.

n. 549.

Questions

Question 1. Is the lessee of fields bound to pay the entire rent in the case of sterility on account of hail, or another extraordinary misfortune?

Resp. Negatively, because although to some he seems, in the rigor of justice by natural law, to be bound to this, nevertheless by general custom it has been introduced that, if there is an enormous loss, something is remitted and the damage is borne equally by both. Except, unless from the fruits received during other years an equitable compensation is given. - Thus St. Alphonsus, n. 860. - But by common law, says Kenrick: "If there is a special pact about a certain sum of money to be paid each year as rent, the hirer will be bound to pay it, even if lightning, storm, or hostile attack has prevented him from peacefully possessing the leased thing." - Cf. Kenrick, n. 43.

To some extent emphyteusis and fief approach the contract of lease. Emphyteusis is a contract by which an immovable thing is conceded to another with respect to useful dominion, either in perpetuity or at least for ten years, with the burden of paying an annual rent to the direct owner. But fief is a contract similar to emphyteusis, or the handing over of an immovable thing for useful dominion, with the burden of showing service or fidelity to the direct lord. Yet emphyteusis and fief differ from lease, because they cannot be constituted except in an immovable thing, nor for a shorter time than ten years. - Cf. Kenrick, nn. 43, 44, 145, and 146.

n. 549, Q. 2.

Question 2. What is to be said especially concerning the hiring of works?

Resp. 1st. That the contract may be just, equality must be preserved between the wage and the work. The wage will be just which is customarily given to workers. The master is bound to agree with the worker concerning a just wage. And if this is left to the master's judgment, he must hand over a just wage, although the lowest.

Resp. 2nd. One wage is individual and another familial: the individual is that which suffices for nourishing a frugal and well-mannered worker; the familial is that by which a thrifty worker, having employed prudent aids, can support himself and his family, consisting of three or four children. Now let Cardinal Zigliara be heard, responding by order of the Supreme Pontiff, Leo XIII, to various doubts which arose concerning the Encyclical Rerum Novarum: "But if there is asked the criterion by which the equality of the thing between the manual work of the worker and the wage to be given by the master ought to be established, we answer: That criterion must be sought in the Encyclical from the immediate end of the worker, which imposes on him the natural office or necessity of laboring, namely from food and clothing for suitably sustaining life, and to which manual labor is first and principally ordered: 2. 2. q. 187, a. 3. Therefore as often as the work is such that through it the worker satisfies his aforesaid natural office of attaining the immediate end of his labor, and the wage is unequal for attaining this end, namely suitable food and clothing, speaking of itself and with the nature of things considered, there is an objective inequality between the work and the wage, and therefore an injury of commutative justice."

n. 549, Q. 3.

Question 3. Is a familial wage owed to workers by justice?

Resp. 1st. Affirmatively, by legal justice, so that the master sins gravely against it who does not assign this wage to workers.

Resp. 2nd. Authors disagree concerning whether it is owed by commutative justice. Yet the negative opinion seems to us to be preferred. For the equality which commutative justice regards appears between the labor of the worker and those things which are necessary for sustaining him, but in no way between the labor of one man and those things which are necessary for nourishing a whole family: this is the doctrine of Cardinal Zigliara in his response to the question: "Will the master sin who indeed pays a wage sufficient for the support of the workman, but unequal for nourishing his family, whether this consists of a wife and numerous offspring, or whether it is not so numerous? If affirmatively, against what virtue?"

Resp. "He will not sin against justice; yet sometimes he will be able to sin either against charity or against natural honesty. Explanation. From this very fact, that according to the things declared the equality of wage and work is observed, the demands of commutative justice are fully satisfied. But the work is the personal work of the worker and not of his family, nor is it referred to the family itself first and of itself, but secondarily and by accident, inasmuch as the worker distributes the received wage with his own. Therefore just as the family, in the case, does not increase the work, so by justice it does not require that the wage owed to the work itself be increased."

n. 549, Q. 4.

Question 4. Is it licit for workers to enter contracts among themselves concerning cessation from works so that they may obtain a greater wage?

Resp. 1st. Affirmatively, if the pacts are made concerning ceasing from works so that they may obtain a just wage, at least the lowest. Wherefore if workers do not receive a just stipend for labor, they can without injustice cease from labors before the end of the contract begun with the hirers. 2nd. Affirmatively, if there is question of pacts by which they agree among themselves not to hire out their works except for the highest just wage. Therefore although they receive a just stipend, they do not commit injustice if, when the time of hire has elapsed, they cease from labors until they obtain a stipend, within the limits of the just, highest for the work to be furnished. 3rd. Negatively, if they make a pact among themselves not to hire out work except for a price exceeding the highest just price. And it must be noted that in executing just pacts injustice is committed if other workers who wish to labor for a lower price are unjustly impeded from hiring out their works, for example, by force, threats, or lies. - Noldin, n. 318.

Let it not fall from the memory of workmen that duties are not to be omitted: "But the duties are very great: not to touch the things of others; to allow individuals to be free concerning their own things; to prohibit no one from being able to place his work where he pleases and when he pleases." Leo XIII, Longinqua.

Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V

Gaudentius Bontempi of Brescia, O.F.M. Cap. — 6 passages

Tr. II, Disputation X: On Emphyteu…, Question II: What letting is

LEASING and Hiring are the same contract, by which a person, or some thing, is granted to another for use for a price, and is received by the same. For on the part of the one granting it is a Letting: on the part of the one receiving it is a Hiring, as D. Bonaventure teaches on those words of Luke 20, A certain man planted a vineyard, and let it out to husbandmen.

DOCTORS admonish, moreover, that if an impediment arise on the part of the thing hired, which hinders its use without fault of the hirer, for that time he is not bound to the rent; otherwise if the impediment cling to the hirer's own side. So Sylvester, verb. Locatio, Navarrus, Manuali cap. 17. num. 187. et 197. Couarruvias, l. 4. var. cap. 13. Tanner, disp. 4. quaest. 7. dub. 6. etc. Bassaeus. It is gathered from Leg. Habitatores, and Leg. Qui operas, and Leg. si uno, ff. locati.

IF by reason of barrenness, or calamity without fault of the hirer, in any year nothing be received from the thing hired, the whole rent is to be remitted; otherwise, if the barrenness be not great, it is to be remitted pro rata, unless it has been otherwise agreed, or unless it be compensated by the fruitfulness of the following years. So runs the common opinion of Doctors according to the Law ex conducto and Leg. si merces, ff. Locati. See Bassaeus, loc. cit. and Diana, p. 3. tract. 6. miscell. resol. 17. and others there.

LESSIUS extends the same, cap. 24. dub. 3., if fruits stored in a barn perish by lightning, or the arrival of an enemy. So also Bassaeus, v. Locatio.

THE CAUSES for expelling the hirer are set forth by the Lex AEde, C. de Locato, in these words: As to the dwelling-house which you say you have hired, if you have paid the rent in full, you ought not to be expelled against your will; unless the lord proves that he needs it for his own uses, or shall prefer to correct, or restore, the house, or unless you have dealt badly with the thing let. See the Doctors cited in Bassaeus, num. 4. and Bonacina, disp. 3. quaest. 7. p. 2.