§ 3. On Letting and Hiring

305. Definition. Letting in general is an onerous contract by which the use or usufruct of some thing is granted to another for a certain price, or certain services or some work are promised. Therefore letting is distinguished from a loan for use, since the latter is a gratuitous contract. He who grants the use or usufruct is called the lessor; but he who pays the price is called the lessee.

Division. Objects of a threefold kind can be had in letting: a thing, e.g., a house or field;¹⁷⁹ a work, e.g., a house to be built;¹⁸⁰ labor, e.g., domestic service.¹⁸¹ In the second and third cases, however, such a contract is rather called hiring. Each is to be treated separately.

1. On the letting of things. A contract of letting is similar to purchase and sale. For the lessor sells, and the lessee buys, the use or usufruct of some thing, e.g., a house, estate, horse, etc. Consequently, almost the same principles hold concerning letting as were indicated above, n. 295, concerning purchase and sale. Furthermore, civil laws are wont to determine very precisely the rights and obligations both of the lessor and of the lessee; these laws, as ordinarily just, are to be obeyed in conscience.

2. On the letting of a work to be done. A work is here called whatever someone undertakes to do, e.g., to build a house, make a garment, and generally all those things which are called contract work, Akkordarbeiten, contrat d'entreprise. This can be done in a twofold manner, namely, so that the contractor¹⁸² furnishes either his labor alone or both labor and material. In the second case this letting is truly a certain species of sale. In the letting of a work to be done, the price is established for the completed work; nevertheless, if there is question of great works to be done, e.g., the construction of a railway bridge, then a partial price is not rarely paid already after partial completion of the work. Sometimes a work to be completed is publicly announced with all its conditions and circumstances; various contractors are invited to compete under the agreement that the thing to be made will be committed to the one who has promised to complete the work for the lower price. Sometimes, however, there is only a private agreement. But in either case the contractor is bound to make the thing in the manner and at the time stipulated. Especially, he must not employ cheaper material or complete the work with less diligence; otherwise he is bound to restitution if he has caused notable damage to the person who commissioned the work. Since this contract is in some measure aleatory, the contractor is bound to fulfill all the conditions entered into even if he does not obtain a suitable price. If, however, unforeseen cases occur unexpectedly which render the work to be completed much more difficult, e.g., earthquakes, lightning, an epidemic, etc., then it is not only suitable but also just that a new contract be entered into. For the rest, the statutes of civil law are to be observed.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁹ Lease or tenancy contract (Mietvertrag, Pachtvertrag, loyer, bail).

¹⁸⁰ Contract for work (Werkvertrag).

¹⁸¹ Employment or service contract (Arbeitsvertrag, Dienstvertrag).

¹⁸² Contractor (entrepreneur, Unternehmer).

¹⁸³ Cf. German Civil Code § 631ff.; French Civil Code art. 1779ff.; Swiss Code of Obligations art. 363ff.

306. 3. On the hiring of labor. This hiring is also called hiring or a contract of labor, and it is a contract by which one person obliges himself to furnish certain labor, while another obliges himself to give a determinate wage for this labor. Therefore the object of this contract is personal labor, or rather working power,¹⁸⁴ which one leases to another for a determinate time. To this pertains the hiring of servants, workers, physicians, etc.

Jurists and economists do not agree concerning the nature and character of this contract. a) Some maintain that it is a true letting, namely, of working power; b) others think it is a sale by which the worker sells his labor as merchandise for a determinate price; c) others teach that a contract of labor is nothing other than a contract of partnership, in which the employer contributes his "capital" and the worker his labor toward completing a common work and consequently also toward dividing the profit received from the work. This last opinion, considered at first sight, seems the best; but in reality it is only a utopia which cannot be reduced to practice. For employers contribute not only money, but also intelligence, at least commonly superior intelligence, and many labors. Furthermore, they are compelled to expose their own fortune to the greatest dangers and often labor for a sufficiently long time without any emolument, indeed with loss. On the contrary, workers incur no danger and must receive a daily wage. It would therefore be inequitable and contrary to the nature of a contract of partnership if in prosperous affairs the workers had a proportionate part of the profit, but in adverse affairs the employer alone had to bear the whole loss. d) Finally, others teach that the contract of labor is reduced to an innominate contract: I do that you may give, and I give that you may do.

Amid so great a diversity of opinions, the doctrine of Leo XIII¹⁸⁵ is to be retained as a principle: "Labor therefore has, as it were, two characteristics implanted in man by nature, namely, that it be personal, because the active force inheres in the person, and is altogether proper to him by whom it is exercised and for whose utility it is naturally fitted. Secondly, that it be necessary, because the fruit of labor is needed by man for preserving life; but nature herself, to which obedience is most greatly due, commands that life be preserved." From these words it clearly appears that labor cannot be regarded solely as merchandise without any relation to the person, but is to be considered as a legitimate, and often the only, means by which the worker can preserve life for himself and his own. If these things are kept before the eyes, the question concerning the just wage can more easily be resolved.

¹⁸⁴ Use of working power (Nutzung der Arbeitskraft).

¹⁸⁵ Encyclical Rerum novarum, May 15, 1891.

307. The obligations of employers arise both from justice and from charity.

From justice employers are bound:

1. To pay an equitable wage at the appointed time. Hence Leo XIII says:¹⁸⁶ "To defraud anyone of the wage due is a great crime which calls down avenging wrath from heaven by its cry: 'Behold the hire of the laborers ... which has been kept back by you crieth; and the cry of them hath entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth.'"¹⁸⁷ What wage is just, however, will be said below, n. 310.

2. To respect workers as endowed with human dignity and not to regard them as cheap slaves, as was done by the pagans, Cicero bearing witness and saying: "Illiberal and sordid are the gains of all hired laborers and of all those whose services, not whose arts, are purchased."¹⁸⁸ Hence from justice the employer is bound to grant sufficient time so that the worker can live as a man, namely, by devoting himself to religious duties, having care for domestic affairs, etc.

3. Likewise, "not to impose more work than the strength [of the workers] can bear, nor work of a kind which is unsuited to age and sex." For "to demand so much work that the mind becomes dulled by excessive labor and at the same time the body succumbs to exhaustion is permitted neither by justice nor by humanity." Thus Leo XIII.¹⁸⁹ Especially, excessively grave labors are not to be imposed upon women and children. Happily, in several states there exist most salutary laws limiting the labor of women and children, and likewise generally the time and mode of labor.¹⁹⁰ Some of these laws, however, are unsuitable, as notably is that law which establishes indiscriminately that daily labor is never to extend beyond eight hours. For the time of labor is not to be measured indiscriminately, but according to the conditions of the labor, the laborer, necessity, etc.

From charity employers are bound:

1. To treat workers kindly and assist them in necessities. Therefore they ought to give alms principally to their own workers.

2. To favor institutions and decrees by which the condition of workers is justly improved, e.g., by opening schools for their greater instruction, founding baths and other institutions of health, etc. Therefore an employer cannot licitly oppose in parliaments laws which are justly proposed in favor of workers.

¹⁸⁶ L.c.

¹⁸⁷ James 5:4.

¹⁸⁸ De offic. l. 1, 42.

¹⁸⁹ L.c. Cf. Code of Canon Law, canon 1524.

¹⁹⁰ Legislation for the protection of workers (Arbeiterschutzgesetzgebung).

308. Leo XIII¹⁹¹ briefly and pregnantly embraces the obligations of workers in these words:

1. "That which was freely and equitably agreed concerning labor is to be rendered wholly and faithfully." Hence workers sin who labor negligently, who waste time uselessly, or who otherwise violate a contract of labor freely and justly entered into. The gravity of the sin and of the obligation of restoring depends upon the gravity of the damage unjustly caused.

2. "In no way to injure property." Consequently, workers sin who use prodigally the materials delivered to them, who destroy machines, who produce defective merchandise, etc.

3. "Not to violate the person of the employers," i.e., to inflict no injury upon employers, whether by calumniating, harming, saddening, etc.

4. "In the very defense of their own interests to abstain from violence, never to introduce sedition, and not to associate with wicked men." By these words an unjust strike is certainly prohibited, which occurs, e.g., by ceasing from work when a just hiring has not yet ended, or by demanding an excessive wage or other undue conditions. But it is not lawful to deduce from this that every strike¹⁹² made by agreement is intrinsically evil.

¹⁹¹ L.c.

¹⁹² Commonly, cessation of labor, strike (Arbeitseinstellung, Streik, strike, grève, sciopero).

309. On the moral character of a strike. A strike, as we now speak of it, is the common withdrawal by agreement of many workers in order to obtain certain advantages from employers. A defensive and an ameliorative strike are wont to be distinguished. A defensive strike is undertaken by workers who are unjustly oppressed by employers, e.g., when a truly insufficient wage is paid, when insufficient provision is made for the health or morality of the workers, etc. An ameliorative strike is made by workers to obtain a greater wage or shorter and easier labor, although the wage hitherto received is not altogether insufficient nor the labor excessive.

All concede that a defensive strike is lawful, provided no other means is at hand for lawfully defending themselves against the injustices of the employer. The reason is evident. For it is lawful to defend oneself with the moderation of blameless defense.

An ameliorative strike is asserted by a few to be intrinsically illicit, since such a strike is: a) true sedition condemned by Leo XIII in the encyclical Rerum novarum; b) idle leisure, since a man is bound to labor when he can, according to the words: "In labors shalt thou eat of it [the earth] all the days of thy life";¹⁹³ c) after the manner of an illicit private monopoly. But since these reasons are not very convincing, theologians most commonly¹⁹⁴ teach that even an ameliorative strike is not intrinsically evil, such that it can never become lawful; but, on the contrary, that it is lawful provided: 1. it takes place when the hiring has legitimately ended; 2. a proportionately grave cause is present; 3. unjust means are not employed; 4. the end is honorable. Certainly a strike is wont to bring many grave damages, both material and moral; e.g., enormous material damages arise both for workers and for employers; workers ceasing from work often waste time in taverns, give themselves over to drunkenness and immoralities, and quarrels, acts of violence, enmities, and other inconveniences arise. Since these things are so, a strike is very rarely expedient; indeed, it is altogether illicit unless a grave and proportionate cause is present. First of all, an effort is to be made that the just demands of the workers, for if those demands are unjust the strike is intrinsically evil, be obtained by other means, e.g., persuasion, peaceful agreement, the intercession of the government, etc. But if these efforts have been vain, then the strike is to be considered as an economic war. Just as war between different nations is sometimes lawful, so also is this economic war. Certainly it is not lawful to declare war against another nation except to vindicate an injury received, and it is never lawful to wage war in order to obtain, e.g., a new province; but it is lawful to undertake a strike even to obtain some advantage not owed from strict justice. The reason for this difference is that in international war acts evil and unjust in themselves are committed, e.g., killing men and destroying the goods of another. On the contrary, in the economic war of a strike no act evil of itself is committed. For this is a condition without which a strike is not lawful. Indeed, to cease from works to which a man is not bound from justice, and earnestly to exhort, but not compel, associates that they too withdraw from work, are not acts evil in themselves but indifferent. But if from this cessation of work the employer suffers great material damage, this is only indirectly voluntary, which certainly can lawfully be permitted if a proportionately grave cause is present. From all these things it follows that even an ameliorative strike is in itself lawful, provided the conditions listed above are present and especially that unjust means are not employed. Unjust means would be, e.g., to inflict unjust fear or force upon the employer or associates by beating, persecuting, calumniating them, etc.

What has been said concerning a strike applies also, in the opposite direction, to a lockout of workers made by agreement.¹⁹⁵ For just as workers can declare economic war upon employers, so employers can wage war against workers. But a truly grave cause is required for making this lockout by agreement, i.e., a grave fault of the workers; because otherwise culpable cruelty is committed, since workers thus dismissed by agreement by different employers are thereafter admitted nowhere in the whole region to labor¹⁹⁶ and are compelled either to emigrate, to embrace another manner of life, or to beg.

Note. It is very rarely lawful to undertake a strike if the public good is thereby gravely injured, e.g., a strike of workers on a railway, from which the whole public communication is disturbed. Such a strike does not seem lawful unless it is truly defensive, namely, for repelling grave injustices. The reason is that the public good must prevail over the private good of the workers; and it is not lawful to injure the public good unless there is an intolerable injustice which otherwise private men must suffer.

¹⁹³ Gen. 3:17.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. J. Biederlack against Treitz and Tournelle in Zeitschrift für kath. Theol. (Innsbruck, 1910), 286ff., 610ff.

¹⁹⁵ Lockout of workers (Arbeiteraussperrung, lock-out).

¹⁹⁶ System of blacklists (System der schwarzen Listen).

310. On the just wage. Since a wage is, as it were, the price of labor, those things said above, n. 296ff., concerning the legal, common, and conventional price are also to be applied, with proportion observed, to the wage, which likewise can be legal, common, or conventional. Furthermore, there is distinguished the individual wage or pay, which suffices to furnish the worker alone with suitable food, clothing, and habitation; and the family or social wage, which furthermore suffices to support the worker's immediate family. The family wage is either absolute or relative. It is absolute when it suffices to support a family in ordinary circumstances, or when by it a thrifty and upright worker, without neglecting the aids which thrift and the moderate cooperation of wife and children can furnish, is able to provide decently for himself and his own. Such a family wage scarcely varies according to the number of children. For if the offspring is numerous, the expenses are certainly greater, but the income is also greater, since not only the husband but also the wife and children are supposed to labor and contribute to increasing the income of the family. The relative family wage is that which is required for supporting a family in extraordinary circumstances, e.g., if the wife is infirm and can in no way contribute to increasing the family's income, if the offspring is very numerous or oppressed by infirmities, if extraordinary expenses are necessary, etc.

311. Principle 1. At least an individual wage is owed to the worker from natural law itself, or from commutative justice.

Thus all Catholics teach, and it is evident from the encyclical Rerum novarum, which establishes "that the wage ought not to be unequal to the support of a worker who is indeed thrifty and of good morals." The reason is that the worker has a strict right to suitable sustenance according to the words: "The workman is worthy of his meat";¹⁹⁷ nor is he bound to beg. But a wage is often the only means to such suitable sustenance. Therefore the worker has a right to that wage.¹⁹⁸

Nevertheless, exceptions are found: 1. if provisions have become dearer and labor scarcer; 2. if the worker is worn out by infirmity or age. In these cases the employer is not bound, at least from justice, to give a perfect individual wage, because this would be an excessive burden. Then, however, the republic is bound to assist the workers.

The Liberals and Socialists oppose this Catholic doctrine. The former teach that the wage offered by the employer and accepted by the worker is to be regarded as just. This doctrine is false and opens a wide door to every tyranny. For workers, compelled by necessity, are not rarely induced to accept an unjust and insufficient wage. Socialists, on the contrary, teach that the entire fruit of labor is owed to workers, only the expenses for the material employed, for the use of instruments, and for the intellectual labor of employers being deducted. This doctrine is also false, as manifestly unjust toward employers, who besides intellectual labor also furnish capital and assume the risk.

¹⁹⁷ Matt. 10:10.

¹⁹⁸ Most worthy of note are the things which Cardinal Zigliara wrote by command of Leo XIII and which were transmitted by the Holy See to Cardinal Goossens of Mechelen shortly after the encyclical Rerum novarum was published: "Indeed, the work of the worker differs very greatly from merchandise, just as wage differs from price. For the work of the worker is work proceeding from human freedom, and therefore assumes the character of merit and of a right to a wage or reward; and it is consequently far nobler than merchandise and price, which are completed by exchange alone. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity ... the work of the worker is considered as a certain merchandise, and the reward or wage as a certain price. Nor without reason: for although the work of the worker is something nobler than merchandise, nevertheless it retains the entire character of merchandise insofar as this bears an order to price. Therefore the reasoning of St. Thomas (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 114, a. 1) is most correct: 'For that is called a wage which is recompensed to someone in return for work and labor, as a certain price thereof. Hence, just as to render the just price for a thing received from someone is an act of justice, so also to recompense the wage of work or labor is an act of justice.' An act, I say, of commutative justice. For just as purchase and sale, so work and wage are for the common utility of the contracting parties, when, namely, one needs the thing or labor of the other and conversely. But that which is for common utility ought not to be a greater burden upon one than upon the other, and therefore a contract of justice ought to be instituted between employer and worker according to equality of the thing, which is the property of commutative justice (cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 57, a. 1). But if the criterion is sought by which that equality of the thing between the manual labor of the worker and the wage to be given by the employer must be established, we respond: That criterion is said in the encyclical to be sought from the immediate end of the worker, which imposes upon him the natural duty or necessity of laboring, namely, from food and clothing for suitably sustaining life, and to which manual labor is first and principally ordained (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 187, a. 3). Therefore, whenever the work is such that through it the worker satisfies his aforesaid natural duty of attaining the immediate end of his labor, but the wage is unequal to attaining this end, namely, suitable food and clothing, speaking in itself and considering the nature of things, there is an objective inequality between work and wage, and consequently an injury to commutative justice." Such an injury to commutative justice, from which many grave moral inconveniences arise, is certainly present in the system which is called the "sweating system" (Schwitzsystem durch Zwischenmeister), and which is employed not rarely against workers, men or women, who at home complete works assigned by some factory (Heimarbeit).

312. Principle 2. An absolute family wage is to be granted from justice, or at least from charity, in the normal state of industry to an adult and able worker.

It is said, 1. in the normal state; for when commercial industry is in a state of distress, then the workers also must tolerate distress. It is said, 2. to an adult and able worker; for if the worker through infirmity or old age is unable to labor perfectly, the employer is not bound, at least from justice, to pay as great a wage as the worker needs for himself and his family. For then the republic ought to furnish assistance. But when the wife or children of the family can earn something in a suitable manner, they are bound to contribute to the support of the family. The reason for the principle is that the most sacred law of nature compels no one to celibacy, but permits marriage to everyone capable of it.¹⁹⁹ Moreover, the father of a family is bound to procure sustenance for his wife and children born to him; and consequently, if he is a worker, he must acquire so great a wage that he can suitably satisfy this duty.

It is disputed among Catholics whether employers are bound from commutative, or at least legal, justice, or from charity alone, to give an absolute family wage. Therefore Cardinal Goossens of Mechelen proposed three doubts concerning this matter to the Holy See. Cardinal Zigliara, by command of the Supreme Pontiff, responded in a letter to Cardinal Goossens in 1891 that an employer who pays a wage sufficient for the support of the worker but unequal to supporting his family does not sin against justice, whose demands are fully satisfied when equality of wage and work is observed. Therefore in this case an employer who does not pay an absolute family wage indeed sins more or less against equity and filial or familial duty, but is not bound to restitution. There are, however, several authors who nevertheless defend an obligation of justice in this case.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁹ Hence Leo XIII says in the encyclical Rerum novarum: "No human law can take away from man the natural and primordial right of marriage."

²⁰⁰ Cf. Tanquerey, De iust. n. 818, who treats the question of the hiring of workers excellently and at length. The responses to the doubts of Cardinal Goossens are given in full by Vermeersch, Quaest. de iust. n. 420ff.