What charity is

The theological virtue of charity,¹ with which we must now deal, holds primacy among the other virtues; therefore St. Paul, speaking of it, says: "But now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; and the greatest of these is charity."² St. Clement of Rome deservedly wrote of it: "You see, dearly beloved, how great and admirable a thing charity is, and that its perfection cannot be explained."³ Yet, that we may in some measure behold its excellence, we shall investigate four things: namely its notion, object, subject, and qualities.

¹ Cf. Van Roey, De virtute caritatis.

² 1 Cor. 13:13.

³ Epistula I ad Corinthios, c. 50 (M.P.G. 1, col. 311).

n. 363.

I. Notion of Charity. Charity is: a theological virtue inclining man to love God on account of Himself, and ourselves and our neighbor on account of God. It is said:

To love God. By these words is indicated the primary material object of charity, while the words and ourselves and our neighbor denote its secondary material object.
On account of Himself, and ourselves and our neighbors on account of God. This indicates the formal object of this virtue.

n. 364.

II. Object of Charity. 1. Material object. The material object of charity, or the object to whom we will good, and indeed the primary one, is God Himself. This is clear from Sacred Scripture, which calls the love of God the greatest and first commandment.¹ It is confirmed by reason. For the material object of some virtue is said to be that which primarily stands under the formal object of charity and by reason of which the other things are attained. But God primarily stands under the formal object of charity, and the other things are attained by reason of God; for the formal object of charity is divine goodness in itself, which is essentially in God and participatively in others.

The secondary material object, therefore, is constituted by all things which can be attained by the virtue of charity by reason of God; and by reason of God all rational creatures can be attained, whether the Blessed or those capable of beatitude, since they participate, or at least are able to participate, in God Himself through grace and the light of glory.

Corollary. To the secondary material object pertain: 1. all the Blessed, whether men or angels; 2. all souls in purgatory; 3. all wayfarers, indeed the wayfarer himself in relation to himself; 4. the body of the neighbor and of the lover himself insofar as, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, "from the enjoyment of the soul a certain beatitude redounds to the body" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 25, a. 5, ad 5). But the damned, whether angels or men, cannot pertain to the secondary object; for they are incapable of grace and of the light of glory.

Formal object. The formal object of theological charity is the supernatural goodness of God, lovable in itself and on account of itself. It is said:

a) The supernatural goodness of God, that is, the goodness of God insofar as it is known by the light of faith, so that it may be distinguished from the goodness of God insofar as it is known by the light of reason, which would be the formal object of natural love.

b) Lovable in itself and on account of itself. And thus the distinction is had between the formal object of charity and of hope; for the formal object of hope is the relative goodness of God, while it must be said "that by charity God is loved on account of Himself" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 25, a. 3, ad 2). In this doctrine all theologians agree, except one or another; but they disagree in assigning what the supernatural goodness of God must involve in order to be the formal object of charity. Two opinions chiefly exist concerning this question. Some say that any divine perfection whatever suffices for the formal object of charity. But others, with St. Thomas,² to whom St. Alphonsus adheres (Theologia moralis, II, 24, conference VI, 436, and Homo Apostolicus, tr. 4, n. 9), teach that this goodness is composed of all God's perfections, and therefore of the goodness of the essence and of all the attributes. The reason for this opinion is that by the virtue of charity God is loved as the supreme good; but in order that He can be so loved, He must first be known as the supreme good, according to the saying: nothing is willed unless known. But he who loves God from the motive of one attribute taken separately does not know Him in this attribute as the supreme good; for the attribute contains God as the supreme good only implicitly and virtually. But things which are only implicitly and virtually contained in something explicitly known are not known in such a way that they can be a motive for acting. There is added the fact that the formal object of charity on the way and in the homeland must be the same, since the virtue is specifically the same, as the Apostle bears witness: "Charity never falleth away."³ Now charity in the homeland has as its formal object the goodness of God composed of all God's perfections; otherwise the one loving would not be blessed, because he would not see God as He is.

Corollary I. The desire of possessing God on account of God's own glory, that is, so that He may be loved perfectly by us, is a perfect act of charity; but the desire of possessing God on account of attaining one's own beatitude is an act of hope, or of the love of concupiscence (St. Alphonsus, II, 24, distinction 1).

Corollary II. The love of God on account of His benefits is an act of charity if the one loving looks at the benefits as communications of divine goodness, since then he loves not his own utility, but the goodness of God in itself. But if he looks at the benefits as conferred on us, it is an act of a grateful soul, or of gratitude.

¹ Matt. 22:37.

² Cf. Salmanticenses, disp. 2, dub. 2, §§ 2-3, where they indicate various places of St. Thomas.

³ 1 Cor. 13:8.

n. 365.

III. Subject of Charity. 1. The subject by which and partial of the theological virtue of charity is the will. For theological charity is occupied around the good of God Himself as good to Him; but good is the object of the will. Therefore the virtue of charity has the will as the immediate subject of inherence. And thus it is clear that charity is really distinguished from sanctifying grace, since the latter immediately inheres in the essence of the soul.

The subject which and total of the theological virtue of charity is everyone, and only one, who is supernaturally just. It is said:

a) Everyone who is supernaturally just, because together with justifying or sanctifying grace charity too is infused.

b) Only one who is supernaturally just, because mortal sin, together with justifying or sanctifying grace, also destroys charity; for charity is conversion to God, while mortal sin is aversion from Him; these cannot be present together in relation to the same terminus.

n. 366.

IV. Properties of Charity. Two properties especially of theological charity remain to be briefly explained here: its being the form of the other virtues, and its necessity.

Its being the form of the other virtues. This property consists in this, that every virtue draws its perfection from charity. For the perfection of every virtue consists in attaining the ultimate end. But no virtue immediately attains the ultimate end as ultimate end except charity. Hence it remains that the other virtues have this perfection through charity. Yet this is not to be understood as if charity were intrinsic to the other virtues, "but that which is left in faith (and in the other virtues) from charity is intrinsic to faith," says St. Thomas (De veritate, q. 14, a. 5, ad 4); and in another place he says: "That which is of perfection in faith is derived from charity, so that charity has it essentially, but faith and the other virtues participatively" (ibid., art. 1).
Necessity. a) The habit of charity, or habitual charity, is necessary for salvation for all men by necessity of means. For no one is saved without sanctifying grace. But the habit of charity is indivisibly connected with sanctifying grace. Therefore, just as sanctifying grace is necessary by necessity of means, so also is the habit of charity.

b) In what respect the act of charity, or actual charity, is necessary, we shall say in Book II, where we treat of the cultivation of virtues.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. I, Diss. III, Part I. On the Cultivation of Charity Generally

Vol. II, First Book: On the Theolog…, Treatise III: On Charity · Vol. II, First Book: On the Theolog…, Tr. III, Tit. I, Sublimity, Scope, and Easy Exercise of Charity

Two things here come to be explained, namely the necessity of means and the efficacy of the act of charity. I have said: the necessity of means, because the necessity of precept will rather be treated distinctly, that is, insofar as it regards God, oneself, and neighbor.

n. 517.

I. Necessity of means. There can be discussion only of adults; but again a distinction must be made between adults not yet justified and adults justified. Now:

According to some, the act of charity is necessary by necessity of means for adults not yet justified who habitually enjoy the use of reason, insofar as the infusion of grace in the aforesaid never takes place without an act of charity; not as if attrition did not suffice for justification, but, so they say, by the force of the sacrament itself received with attrition only, man is disposed to actual charity, and in the very instant of justification elicits a true act of charity.

"Sanctifying grace," says Hugon, "is infused together with habitual charity into the penitent man, not merely as into one dead, but in such a way that man receives it by a voluntary and free act, and freely consents to the friendship of God. But this actual and free acceptance of grace and consent to the friendship of God, what else is it than an act of charity consequent upon sanctifying and habitual grace itself in the genus of efficient cause, although it can be said to precede it by nature in the genus of material and dispositive cause?"¹

According to others, the act of charity is not necessary by necessity of means for obtaining justification; but this can be acquired through the sacrament with attrition, without an act of charity. For besides the fact that they do not see that an act of charity is necessarily contained in the free acceptance of sanctifying grace, they reason thus: An adult who wished to be baptized, and was attrite, and is baptized while sleeping, obtains justification without eliciting an act of charity. Nor can they admit that an act of charity is virtually contained in the preceding act of attrition, because an inferior act cannot virtually contain a superior act; nor do they understand how a preceding act could, in justification itself, become an act of charity, especially if it is a question of the justification of one sleeping. Nor should it be objected that an act of charity is virtually contained in the preceding volition of Baptism and attrition; for an inferior act cannot virtually contain a superior act.

St. Thomas says thus: "The justification of the ungodly is brought about by God moving man to justice. For He Himself is the one who justifies the ungodly. But God moves all things according to the mode of each one.... and therefore in him who has the use of free choice, movement by God toward justice is not made without a movement of free choice: but He so infuses the gift of justifying grace that, together with this, He also moves free choice to accepting the gift of grace in those who are capable of this motion" (I-II, q. 113, a. 3). And elsewhere: "In those having the use of free choice... there does not happen to be an infusion of grace without an actual movement of free choice toward God and toward sin" (III, q. 87, a. 2). Yet it is not clear that St. Thomas understands an act of charity; all the more because the holy Doctor admits that one sleeping, who previously had the sacrament in intention, is justified through Baptism (I-II, q. 113, a. 3, ad 1).

The act of charity is not necessary by necessity of means for justified adults. For once justification has been posited, only the continuation of justification is required; for this it suffices that sin be avoided.

¹ De sacramentis in speciali, p. 407.

n. 518.

II. Efficacy of the act of charity. An act of charity or of perfect contrition suffices for justifying man, that is, when that act has been posited, God justifies in the same instant, or infuses sanctifying grace. This is clear: 1. from Sacred Scripture: "If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our dwelling with him";¹ 2. from the Council of Trent, which "teaches moreover that, although it happens sometimes that this contrition is perfected by charity and reconciles man to God before this sacrament is actually received, nevertheless the reconciliation itself is not to be ascribed to that contrition without the desire of the sacrament, which is included in it";² 3. to this is added condemned Baius proposition 31: "Perfect and sincere charity, which is from a pure heart and a good conscience and unfeigned faith, can be in catechumens as well as penitents without remission of sins."³

Yet observe that an act of charity or of perfect contrition justifies not in the mode of efficient cause, or of meritorious cause de condigno, or of formal cause, but in the mode of material and dispositive cause, or in the mode of a dispositive cause meritorious de congruo, that is, one which, from the will of God, infallibly obtains the infusion of sanctifying grace.

¹ John 14:23; cf. 1 John 4:7 and 16; Luke 7:47.

² Session 14, chapter 4.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1031.

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. I, Diss. III, Part II. On the Cultivation of Charity Toward God

n. 519.

I. The precept of charity. 1. The act of charity, actual charity, toward God, or the act by which we love God on account of Himself above all things, is necessary by necessity of precept. This is clear: 1. from Sacred Scripture: "You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart, and in your whole soul, and in your whole mind. This is the greatest and first commandment";¹ 2. by reason. For it is manifest that infinite goodness or perfection is to be loved, and this on account of itself and above all things. Now: 1. the precept of charity is a special precept, in other words, the formal act of charity is prescribed, so that, for example, mere observance of the precepts does not suffice; 2. it is not a precept of loving God intensively above all things, but it suffices that He be loved objectively or appreciatively above all things (St. Alphonsus, II, 22); 3. an act of charity can be elicited in various ways, for example by rejoicing over the divine goods considered in themselves, by wishing and promoting the external glory of God as a good for Him.

An act of charity toward God obliges:

By reason of the precept of charity itself:

a) "When man has attained sufficient knowledge of God as infinitely good" (St. Alphonsus, II, 23, 1; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 89, a. 6).

b) Several times in life; this is clear: 1. from propositions condemned by Innocent XI, namely 5: "Whether he sins mortally who would elicit an act of love of God only once in life? We do not dare to condemn";² 6: "It is probable that the precept of charity toward God does not oblige of itself even in each rigorously taken period of five years";³ 7: "It obliges only when we are bound to be justified and we have no other way by which we can be justified."⁴ 2. To this is added that the homage to be rendered to God seems to require that several times in life we elicit acts of virtues which immediately regard God. Here, however, an act of charity that is not wholly explicit seems to suffice, for example, perfect contrition, a good work performed for pleasing God, the petitions contained in the Lord's Prayer: "Hallowed be Thy name," etc. It is more difficult to determine how often the act of charity must be elicited. St. Alphonsus judges that one satisfies the grave obligation who elicits it each month (Homo Apostolicus, tr. 4, n. 14).

c) In the article of death, as was said of faith (n. 489) and hope (n. 513); if the precept did not then urge, it would never urge.

d) When someone has held God in hatred (n. 489).

e) When a temptation against charity presses, which someone judges he cannot overcome except by an elicited act of charity (St. Alphonsus, II, 23, 2).

By reason of the precept of another virtue, as was said of faith (n. 489) and hope (n. 513).

Note 1. Charity toward God, unlike charity toward neighbor, rarely brings with it the obligation of an external act, since the internal act is known to God and of itself involves homage. For the rest, compare and apply the notes regarding faith (n. 489).

Note 2. Benedict XIV exhorts bishops that in every parish church on Sundays and feast days the acts of faith, hope, and charity be read aloud to the people.⁵

¹ Matthew 22:37-38.

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1155.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1156.

⁴ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1157.

⁵ Constitution Etsi minime, February 7, 1742.

n. 520.

II. Sins against charity toward God - besides omission of the act prescribed by reason of the precept of charity - are: hatred of God and sloth.

Hatred of God. Hatred taken generally is an act by which someone is badly affected toward someone.

Hatred is distinguished as twofold: hatred of abomination and hatred of enmity or malevolence, according as someone turns away from someone as an evil to himself, or wills evil to someone. Hatred of abomination is opposed to love of concupiscence; hatred of enmity to love of benevolence. Sadness over another's good belongs to hatred of enmity; likewise joy over his evil.

Hatred of abomination, to which every evil deliberate movement against someone is referred, is again twofold, namely of the person himself and of a quality, according as someone turns away from the person himself according to himself, or from an adhering quality of the person. These things noted, I say:

a) Hatred of abomination toward God is grave from its whole genus; for it is clear that he sins gravely who in whatever way whatsoever turns away from God.

b) Hatred of enmity toward God is grave from its whole genus, indeed even the gravest of all sins, because he who wishes evil to God most greatly injures the charity due to God.

Sloth; concerning this, see n. 327.

Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 7 passages

Vol. I, On the Precept of Charity, I. On the Necessity of Charity

n. 382.

What is charity? Charity is an act of the will by which, with a love of benevolence and friendship, we love God as the highest good on account of himself, and neighbor on account of God. Of benevolence, because we will good to God; of friendship, because love is with reciprocal love. Neighbor, namely all with whom we can be sharers of eternal blessedness, ourselves, other men, angels. For charity is friendship with God, and every friendship is founded upon some communication of life. Communication of life; for it belongs to charity and friendship to love, and to love is life. Communication of life; for to love is to will good; if therefore the love is mutual, there must be mutual willing of good, and accordingly a common life and a common good. Moreover there is no other communication of life and good with God than eternal blessedness, whose beginning in this life is had through grace. On account of God, i.e., on account of the glory of God. The highest good, on account of himself; and accordingly we love God in all things and above all things, so that we may obtain his promises, not because this is our good, but because it redounds to the good of God, i.e., to the glory of God. Therefore the primary material object of charity is God, the secondary neighbor. But the formal object is the absolute goodness of God. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 23, 25, 27; L. 22; E. M. 377.

Good is that which is fitting. This account being presupposed, the will loves it because it is fitting to it. Moreover, this very thing is most fitting to the will, that God exist; and this good is more fitting to it than its own proper good. And thus the will can rightly be borne toward God by its own act on account of himself, and will that God exist and be endowed with infinite goods and perfections.

n. 383.

Is there given a special precept of charity toward God? R. Affirmatively. Proof: Matt. 22:37, 38: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart... this is the greatest and first commandment. The same is evinced from proposition 1 condemned by Alexander VIII. The precept of charity, as is clear from the cited sacred text, obliges us to love God above all things, not indeed intensively, by a greater effort of the will and a more fervent love which surpasses any other affection of the will, and which also ordinarily redounds into the senses, although this is most becoming; but appreciatively, by reason and rational will preferring God to all things, with a perfect and efficacious will, not only an imperfect and inefficacious velleity and complacency, so that we esteem no creature more than God, and wish rather to lose all things than gravely to offend God. But since love and friendship is the union and agreement of two wills, the nature and precept of charity consist in this, that someone wills those things which God wills, and does not will those things which God does not will, in any grave matter gravely, in any light matter lightly; this finally is true and perfect charity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26; q. 44; L. 22; E. M. 378.

Hence it is clear that it would be altogether falsely thought almost impossible or exceedingly difficult to elicit an act of charity. For, if it is commanded, God helps us toward it. And if the goodness of men moves us to a love of benevolence and friendship, much more does the infinite goodness of God. If that goodness which is also manifested by benefits moves us most greatly, how much ought the goodness of God the Creator, Redeemer, Rewarder, not to move us? If besides we are in the state of grace, the habit itself of charity persuades us that its act ought not to be difficult, since that habit is infused in a certain connatural mode for eliciting the act. Therefore, if the divine excellence, the infinite perfection of God, the infinite goodness of God having been proposed to him, someone tries with sincere soul to elicit pure charity, he will rightly be able to think that he has elicited that act of charity, and consequently that from charity he has also conceived perfect contrition for sins. Cf. Deut. 6:1-9.

n. 384.

Resolves: It is a mortal and most grave sin, and admits no smallness of matter, since it is opposed to the infinite goodness of God, if someone formally hates God with the hatred of malevolence and enmity, e.g., if someone wishes God not to exist, and himself to be held in hatred by God. - Likewise he sins mortally if someone loves God with a love appreciatively less than creatures. Therefore "any act of mortal sin is contrary to charity." S. Th., 2. 2. q. 24, a. 12. Likewise he sins against the charity of God if someone does not love God on account of himself as the last end of all things, but only on account of something else, e.g., eternal life, or to avoid hell. This is mortal, because namely God would not be loved appreciatively above all things if something other than him were loved by actual intention as the principal end. Principal, because God can be loved on account of the recompense of eternal life, but less principally. By actual intention, because otherwise, by loving eternal life and other gifts of God, by the very fact that such an act is in itself right, eternal life or other gifts of God are always at least implicitly and in actu exercito ordered to God as to the supreme end. L. 23, 24; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 34, aa. 1, 2; Struggl, q. 5, n. 2; Sanch., l. 2, c. 35, n. 3.

n. 385.

Is schism a special sin against charity? - "The sin of schism properly is a special sin, from this, that it intends to separate itself from the unity which charity makes; which not only unites one person to another by the spiritual bond of love, but also the whole Church in unity of spirit. And therefore properly those are called schismatics who by their own will and intention separate themselves from the unity of the Church.... And therefore those are called schismatics who refuse to be subject to the Supreme Pontiff, and who refuse to communicate with the members of the Church subject to him.... But schism per se is opposed to the ecclesiastical unity of charity.... It must be said that not to obey precepts with a certain rebellion constitutes the account of schism. But I say with rebellion, when someone both pertinaciously contemns the precepts of the Church, and refuses to undergo its judgment. But not every sinner does this; whence not every sin is schism." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 39, a. 1; q. 42, a. 1 ad 2.

n. 386.

When does the precept of charity toward God urge? No precept is given of always acting from the motive of charity. Proof from proposition 8 condemned by Alexander VIII, E. M. 313, and because besides charity there are acts of other virtues, good and meritorious. - But the precept of charity urges more frequently than once in life, or every five years. Proof from propositions 5, 6, 7 condemned by Innocent XI. - When and how the precept of charity urges must be determined by the same rules which we established above concerning faith. Cf. 354. St. Alphonsus judges that one is not excused from mortal sin who defers an act of charity for a month. But this opinion rests on no demonstrative argument, and does not exceed the limits of probability. Besides, the same Holy Doctor thinks it most probable that the precept of charity urges in the article of death. If the speech is about those for whom no other means of justification is available, this is most truly affirmed. But if such necessity is absent, this opinion too does not exceed the limits of probability. But if no other means of justification is available, an act of charity is necessary not only by necessity of precept, but also of means. But the habit of charity is necessary to all by necessity of means; it is inseparable from sanctifying grace, which nevertheless we can obtain also by simple attrition and the sacrament, especially of baptism and penance. Benedict XIV exhorts Bishops to establish that in all parishes, on Sundays and feast days, the acts of faith, hope, and charity be read to the people. C. Etsi minime, 7 Feb. 1742, n. 18.

The precept of charity is satisfied by working toward this end, namely of pleasing God, by avoiding sin because it displeases God, by praying that the name of God be sanctified, that his kingdom come, that his will be done, by rejoicing in the divine perfections, by wishing that no one offend God, by eliciting an act of contrition, because contrition includes the motive of charity, but by no means by attrition, because it is not based on the motive of charity, etc. Therefore no one who lives piously ought to be anxious about this precept. Likewise, because of the various opinions of doctors and because of defect of advertence, as in the precept of faith and hope, sin is rarely committed here. John 14:21; L. 8, 23; H. A. 13; Struggl, q. 4, nn. 7-10; E. M. 381.

n. 387.

What does charity toward neighbor import; is there given a precept of charity toward neighbor? - R. To the first. Charity toward neighbor commands love of oneself and of neighbor, but in an ordered way; for not every neighbor is neighbor to us in the same mode. Love of oneself embraces the due care to be had of soul and body. Sins committed against it are implicitly contained and accused in other sins committed and accused in confession. But since even an enemy is neighbor, it also commands love of enemies. Love, namely so that we will good to him. The chief good of man is God. Therefore by charity we will that man possess God, by association in full participation of blessedness. And this is to love neighbor as oneself. Besides interior love, since charity by its nature is not sterile, but active, it also commands exterior works. Therefore besides interior benevolence, charity also commands beneficence, which is the execution of benevolence. The matter concerns the precept of theological charity, which is evidently established from the very words of Christ. "But the second commandment is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Matt. 22:39; 1 John 4:21.

Among exterior works alms and fraternal correction hold a special place; these are works of mercy, the former corporal, the latter spiritual. For mercy is the virtue which inclines us to compassionating another's misery, and from compassion to assisting. The same charity, on the contrary, prohibits hatred of malevolence and enmity toward neighbor, which from its genus is mortal. For by it we will evil to the neighbor insofar as it is evil for him, which is always inordinate and repugnant to charity. Yet smallness of matter is given, since the evil which we will to neighbor can be great or small. Besides this internal act, it consequently prohibits that by our exterior actions we inflict spiritual harm upon his salvation through scandal, or do other harm to him either as to other goods of soul, or as to goods of body. Concerning this last there will be discussion in the precepts of the Decalogue; here we will speak only of the remaining things.

Benevolence, therefore, and beneficence are acts of charity; to the former belongs willing good, to the latter doing good, according to the common account of good. If the good which someone does to another is taken under a special account of good, beneficence will receive a special account and will pertain to some special virtue. If the good, for example, is owed, it will pertain to justice; if it is for relieving misery, it will pertain to mercy, etc. Therefore the conferring of a benefit in general pertains to charity. In order that the conferring of benefit and beneficence properly be had, it is necessary that there be had a liberal conferring of a gift. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 31, a. 1.

Charity, about which the speech is properly here, is theological charity, by which neighbor is loved on account of God. But there is also given another charity, a moral virtue, by which neighbor is loved on account of the very honorableness of this love, which per se is a natural virtue. The natural motive of this love does not impede this love also from being supernatural, if it is done from grace and informed by faith. And it is commanded by God: "All things whatsoever you wish that men should do to you, do you also to them." Matt. 7:12; Job 4:16. Nevertheless the precept of theological charity is not fulfilled by this love. It is indeed praiseworthy and very meritorious that the acts to be exercised toward neighbor be exercised from the motive of the charity of God; nevertheless per se it is not obligatory.

For as the charity of God commands that we observe his commands, but does not also command that we execute them from the motive of the charity of God, so also charity toward neighbor indeed commands that we exercise various acts of beneficence and mercy, but by no means that we effect them only from the motive of the charity of God.

R. To the second. There is given a precept of loving neighbor with a true and internal affection, as is established from John 15:12, 17, and from propositions 10 and 11 condemned by Innocent XI; and also with external love, 1 John 3:15 seqq.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 31, a. 2. But someone sufficiently satisfies this precept through a certain general love which excludes no one, and accordingly by reciting the Lord's Prayer, in which you have both an internal and external act. A precept of this sort obliges per se when the precept of charity toward God obliges per se. For it is like to this. Matt. 22:39. Hence he who fulfills the precept of charity toward God, by willing every good to God, at least implicitly fulfills the precept of charity toward neighbor, by desiring salvation for him. But it obliges per accidens: 1. If hatred toward neighbor cannot be repelled unless an act of love is elicited; for he who is bound to the end is obliged to the means. 2. When the neighbor is in necessity; otherwise the precept would be vain; if that necessity becomes known, for no one is bound to inquire whether someone is in need. - L. 8; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 25; q. 27, a. 8; q. 30; q. 31; q. 32, aa. 1, 2; q. 34, aa. 3, 4; q. 44; Struggl, q. 6, n. 4; Salm. 17; D'Annib., ed. 4, p. 2, n. 81; E. M. 282. Through a certain general love which excludes no one; for care concerning the salvation of neighbor is not incumbent on anyone, unless perhaps in a case of necessity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 26, a. 5 ad 3. Nor indeed by reason of common charity is there an obligation of inquiring into the necessity of neighbor. For it regards only cases occurring to anyone. "That which is owed to some determinate and certain person... we must expend upon him, not waiting until he occurs to us, but having due solicitude that we seek him out.... But those benefits which are owed not to a certain person, but commonly to all neighbors... we need not seek those upon whom we may expend them, but it suffices that we expend them on those who occur to us." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 33, a. 2 ad 4.

n. 388.

What are the sins opposed to charity? - From the Angelic Doctor, 2. 2, they are: 1. Hatred of God and of neighbor, which is opposed to the very love of charity; hatred of God is virtually present in any lethal sin, q. 34. But charity toward neighbor is gravely injured by any grave displeasure caused to neighbor without just reason, which constitutes a grave offense against him. 2. Acedia, which is opposed to the joy of charity concerning divine good, q. 35. Cf. n. 343 seq. 3. Envy, which is opposed to joy concerning the good of neighbor, q. 36. Cf. n. 327 seq. 3. Discord, which is in the heart, and is opposed to the peace of charity, q. 37. Cf. n. 322. - 4. Contention, which is in the mouth, and is also opposed to peace, q. 38.

Cf. n. 322. 5. Schism, quarrel, war, sedition, which pertain to deed, and likewise are opposed to peace, qq. 39-42. Cf. n. 342, 380, 751. 6. Scandal, which is opposed to the beneficence of charity, q. 43. Omission of help, whether spiritual or temporal, when it is owed, attention being paid to the necessity of neighbor and the ability of the one helping, is properly against mercy, and consequently against charity. Injury of neighbor in his temporal goods is properly opposed to justice. But in all sins against justice toward neighbor, charity and justice are injured at the same time, although in sins against charity toward neighbor justice is not always injured.

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905)

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 1 passage

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905), On the Theological Virtues

n. 376.

On Pure Love

“1. There is a habitual state of the love of God which is pure charity and is without any admixture of a motive of self-interest. Neither fear of punishments nor desire of rewards has any further part in it. God is not loved any further because of merit, nor because of perfection, nor because of the happiness to be found in loving. — 2. In the state of the contemplative or unitive life, every interested motive of fear and hope is lost. — 3. What is essential in the direction of a soul is to do nothing other than follow grace step by step with infinite patience and subtlety. One must keep oneself within these limits so that God may be permitted to act, and never lead [a soul] to pure love unless God, through inward anointing, begins to open the heart to this word, which is so hard for souls still attached to themselves, and therefore can scandalize them or cast them into disturbance. — 4. In the state of holy indifference, the soul no longer has voluntary and deliberate desires on account of its own interest, except on those occasions in which it does not faithfully cooperate with all its grace. — 5. In the same state of holy indifference, we will nothing for ourselves, all things for God. We will nothing so that we may be perfect and blessed on account of our own interest; but we will all perfection and beatitude insofar as it pleases God to bring it about that we will these things by the impression of His grace. — 6. In this state of holy indifference, we no longer will salvation as our own salvation, as eternal deliverance, as the reward of our merits, as our greatest interest of all; but we will it with a full will as the glory and good pleasure of God, as a thing which He Himself wills and which He wills us to will for His sake. — 7. Abandonment is nothing other than abnegation, or renunciation of oneself, which Jesus Christ requires of us in the Gospel after we have relinquished all external things. This abnegation of our very selves is only with regard to our own interest…. The extreme trials in which this abnegation or abandonment of oneself ought to be exercised are temptations by which the jealous God wills to purge love, showing it no refuge and no hope with regard to its own interest, even eternal. — 8. All sacrifices which are customarily made by souls most greatly disinterested concerning their eternal beatitude are conditional…. But this sacrifice cannot be absolute in the ordinary state. In one case of extreme trials this sacrifice becomes in some manner absolute. — 9. In extreme trials the soul can be invincibly persuaded, by a reflex persuasion which is not the innermost ground of conscience, that it has been justly reprobated by God. — 10. Then the soul, divided from itself, expires with Christ upon the cross, saying: My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me? In this involuntary impression of despair it consummates the absolute sacrifice of its own interest with regard to eternity. — 11. In this state the soul loses every hope of its own interest; but it never loses in the higher part, that is, in its direct and intimate acts, perfect hope, which is a disinterested desire for the promises. — 12. The director can then permit this soul simply to acquiesce in the loss of its own interest and in the just condemnation which it believes to have been imposed upon it by God. — 13. The lower part of Christ upon the cross did not communicate its involuntary disturbances to the higher part. — 14. In extreme trials for the purification of love, a certain separation of the higher part of the soul from the lower takes place…. In this separation the acts of the lower part flow from an altogether blind and involuntary disturbance, for everything that is voluntary and intellectual belongs to the higher part. — 15. Meditation consists of discursive acts which are easily distinguished from one another…. This composition of discursive and reflex acts is the proper exercise of interested love. — 16. There is a state of contemplation so sublime and so perfect that it becomes habitual, so that whenever the soul actually prays, its prayer is contemplative, not discursive. Then it no longer needs to return to meditation and its methodical acts. — 17. Contemplative souls are deprived of a distinct, sensible, and reflex view of Jesus Christ at two different times: first, in the nascent fervor of their contemplation; second, the soul loses the view of Jesus Christ in extreme trials. — 18. In the passive state all the distinct virtues are exercised without thinking that they are virtues. At each moment nothing else is thought than to do what God wills; and jealous love at the same time brings it about that one no longer wills virtue for himself, nor is one ever so endowed with virtue as when he is no longer attached to virtue. — 19. It can be said in this sense that the passive and disinterested soul no longer wills even love itself insofar as it is its perfection and its happiness, but only insofar as it is that which God wills from us. — 20. In confessing, transformed souls ought to detest their sins, condemn themselves, and desire the remission of their sins, not as their own purification and deliverance, but as a thing which God wills, and wills us to will for His glory. — 21. The holy mystics excluded exercises of the virtues from the state of transformed souls. — 22. Even if this doctrine—concerning pure love—were the pure and simple evangelical perfection designated in universal tradition, the ancient pastors did not everywhere propose to the multitude of the just anything except exercises of interested love proportioned to their grace. — 23. Pure love alone itself constitutes the whole interior life; and then it becomes the sole motive of all acts which are deliberate and meritorious.” Propositions condemned by Innocent XII, Brief Cum alias, 12 March 1699.

Tanquerey

Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S. — 30 passages

Vol. II, On the Theological Virtues…, On the Virtue of Charity

n. 730.

1. Concerning the Nature, Causes, and Effects of Love.

(A) Notion and species of love. Love in general is a movement toward good, or the complacency of the appetite in good. A threefold love is usually distinguished: natural, sensible, and rational.

³ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 26-29; St. Francis de Sales, Tr. de l'Am. de Dieu (ed. Annecy, 1894), l. I, ch. 1-13; Barre, De virtutibus, t. I, n. 12-20.

(a) Natural love is a certain propensity of any being toward its own proper end: for each thing seeks its own end, and is borne toward it by a certain natural instinct. This exists even in beings lacking liberty, and is not properly a moral act; accordingly we shall not treat it here. (b) Sensible, or sensitive, love is one of the eleven passions described above, n. 100, and can be defined as the complacency of the sensitive appetite in a sensibly apprehended good. It is therefore concerned with qualities which please the senses, and is not borne toward intelligible good except insofar as this kind of good is presented sensibly to the appetite by the imagination. But because these qualities are frivolous and mutable, the love which is born from them is vain and inconstant.⁴ - If it exists between persons of different sex, in order to carnal delights, it is called sexual love, and often passes into a vehement passion.⁵

⁴ "Love founded upon the communication of sensual pleasures is altogether gross, and unworthy of the name of friendship, as also that which glories in certain vain and frivolous endowments perceived by the senses. But I call sensual pleasures those which immediately and principally are concerned with the external senses, such as that pleasure which arises from the sight of bodily beauty, from the hearing of a sweet voice, from soft touch, and others of this kind. But I call frivolous endowments certain vain habits of nature, which the inexperienced and futile call by the name of virtues and perfections... Thus he is judged to be endowed with great virtue who dances elegantly, is most skilled in every kind of game, dresses elegantly, sings, jokes, or converses, and has elegant gestures." (St. Francis de Sales, Introduction, p. III, c. 17).

⁵ Descuret, op. cit., t. II, p. 151-180; Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XXI, 1899, p. 129-137 and 241-248; Ribot, Psychologie des sentiments, Paris, 1896, p. 244-255.

n. 731.

(c) Rational love, or dilection, is the complacency of the will in good intellectually apprehended; it arises from endowments not external and frivolous, but intellectual and moral, for example, knowledge, prudence, kindness, fortitude, and other virtues of this kind. Wherefore it is more constant, because it rests upon endowments which are less mutable; it is worthy of man and honorable, as being founded upon truly human qualities. This likewise is twofold: when we love someone chiefly on account of our advantage, namely because he is good and useful to us, this love is called love of concupiscence; but if, on the contrary, we love him especially because we will good to him, it is called love of benevolence. Usually both motives are joined together, and we love others on account of both our own and their advantage. - Moreover, since man is at once rational and sensible, intellectual love is often found mixed with sensible love.

n. 732.

But love is called friendship when it is mutual, known as such to each lover, and therefore imports a certain communication of goods: "Not every love is friendship: for we can love and yet not be loved, and then there is love, but not friendship, since friendship is a certain mutual and reciprocal love. Secondly, it is not enough that it be mutual, but it is moreover necessary that the friends loving one another know their reciprocal affection; for if they are ignorant of this, they will indeed have love, but not friendship. Thirdly, it is required that there be between them some communication, which is the basis and foundation of friendship. Now, according to the diversity of communications, friendship also is diverse... if the things communicated are false and vain, friendship is false and vain; if they are true and solid, friendship also is true; and the more excellent goods of this kind are, the more excellent is friendship."⁶

⁶ St. Francis de Sales, Introduction, p. III, c. 17. - Cicero wrote an excellent treatise concerning friendship, Laelius sive de Amicitia.

Ambrose writes splendidly concerning true friendship:⁷ "For it is a solace of this life that you have one to whom you may open your breast, with whom you may share hidden things, to whom you may commit the secret of your heart; that you may place for yourself a faithful man, who may rejoice with you in prosperous things, suffer with you in sad things, encourage you in persecutions... Friendship is the guardian of piety and the mistress of equality, so that the superior shows himself equal to the inferior, and the inferior to the superior... For friendship is not venal, but full of beauty, full of grace. For friendship is a virtue, not gain, because it is not produced by money, but by grace; not by the bidding of prices, but by the contest of benevolence." - Scripture had gone before Ambrose:⁸ "A faithful friend is a strong protection; and he that has found him has found a treasure; nothing can be compared to a faithful friend, and no weight of gold and silver is worthy to be put in balance against the goodness of his fidelity; a faithful friend is the medicine of life and immortality."

⁷ St. Ambrose, De officiis, lib. III, c. 22, P. L., XVI, 181-182.

⁸ Ecclus. 6:14-16.

n. 733.

(B) Causes of love.⁹ There are especially three things which induce or increase love: good, likeness, familiar association.

⁹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 27; St. Francis de Sales, Traite de l'Am. de Dieu, l. I, ch. 8; M. d'Hulst, Careme 1892, 6th Conf., p. 217-220.

(a) Good indeed is the principal cause of love, since the appetite, whether sensitive or rational, is naturally borne toward sensible or intellectual good; and generally love is more intense the more perfect the beloved object appears. If evil is sometimes loved, this happens only because it appears under the aspect of good; thus iniquity is not loved except because it offers delight or advantage. - To this cause is referred the beautiful, which is nothing other than the good insofar as it pleases sight.

(b) Likeness between lovers induces love secondarily, according to that saying:¹⁰ "Every living creature loves its like; so also every man loves his neighbor." In reality man naturally loves himself primarily, and therefore, among men, by force of a certain affinity and sympathy, he loves those who are more like himself, for example, those who belong to the same nation or family, or who enjoy similar endowments. Hence friendship either receives equals or makes them. - Yet this likeness, which is the cause of love, does not exclude certain differences; indeed, usually those who, while they are similar in many things, nevertheless differ in a few things, love one another more intensely, so that one seeks in the other a complement of himself; thus one who is gentle but weak is more easily joined in friendship to him who is irascible indeed, but strong and energetic.¹¹ Hence not perfect equality, but a certain proportion between lovers is required.

¹⁰ Ecclus. 13:19.

¹¹ "In this sort the melancholy and the joyful, the sharp and the gentle, sometimes love one another reciprocally, on account of the mutual impressions which they receive from one another, by means of which their humors are mutually moderated. But when this mutual correspondence is joined with likeness, love without doubt is begotten much more powerfully." (St. Francis de Sales, op. cit., l. I, ch. 8).

(c) Familiar association increases love not a little; for nothing is willed unless it is first known, and therefore goodness, beauty, and likeness do not move to friendship except insofar as they are known. Therefore intimate and frequent conversation and colloquies greatly foster friendship: for thus friends know one another better, thus they are delighted by the presence of the beloved object, and from this double source love grows. To this cause is referred the manifestation of love and being loved in return; for, as Seneca says,¹² "if you wish to be loved, love"; and according to Augustine,¹³ "there is no greater invitation to love than to anticipate by loving, and too hard is the soul which, if it was unwilling to bestow love, is unwilling to repay it."

¹² Epist. IX to Lucilius.

¹³ De catechiz. rudibus, c. 4, P. L., XL, 314.

n. 734.

(C) Effects of love.¹⁴ The principal ones are union, ecstasy, zeal, and the ordering of actions toward the beloved object.

¹⁴ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 28.

(a) Union indeed; for every love tends to this, that it may join lovers and morally make one out of two or more, according to that saying: "And the multitude of believers had one heart and one soul."¹⁵ It effects a twofold union: one affective, by force of which friends strive to will the same things and not to will the same things, and the lover is in the beloved, as considering the goods of his friend his own; thus it is read in Scripture:¹⁶ "The soul of Jonathan was knit to the soul of David, and Jonathan loved him as his own soul"; - the other real, which consists in the presence and possession of the thing loved;¹⁷ and this, although desired by lovers, is sometimes impeded or delayed by obstacles.

¹⁵ Acts 4:32.

¹⁶ 1 Kings 18:1.

¹⁷ This St. Francis de Sales vividly describes, Tr. de l'amour de Dieu, l. I, ch. 9.

(b) Ecstasy (ekstasis, departure), by which the lover is as it were placed outside himself; this happens by a twofold act, of the intellect and of the will. According to the intellect, the lover, forgetful of himself, frequently thinks of the beloved; according to affection he is borne outside himself: through love of concupiscence, not content with the good which he has, he seeks another good outside himself by which he may enjoy; through love of friendship, he acts not for himself alone, but wills and works good for his friend, and takes care of him. Wherefore it is of the greatest importance to love only honorable and holy things, since the lover as it were goes out from himself and becomes like the beloved object.¹⁸

¹⁸ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 28, a. 3; St. Francis de Sales, op. cit., l. I, ch. 10.

n. 735.

(c) Zeal likewise comes from the intensity of love: for the more vehemently we tend toward something, the more strongly we repel whatever is opposed to this propensity. Thus, in love of concupiscence, he who intensely desires something is by that very fact borne against everything which stands in the way of obtaining it or peacefully enjoying it; in love of friendship, he who sincerely wills the good of a friend is by that very fact vehemently moved against everything which is repugnant to his good.¹⁹

¹⁹ St. Thomas, loc. cit., a. 4.

(d) Besides, he who vehemently loves someone orders his actions toward him, namely toward pleasing him and obtaining his friendship; and, since the other passions proceed from love, all movements of the soul are more or less ruled by the predominant love. From this it follows that nothing is more important than rightly ordering one's affections, so that life itself may be rightly established. Therefore they are truly wise who love God from their whole heart; for, as Augustine says, "two loves therefore made two cities: the earthly, namely, love of self even to contempt of God; but the heavenly, love of God even to contempt of self."²⁰

²⁰ De Civitate Dei, lib. XIV, c. 28, P. L., XLI, 436.

n. 736.

2. Concerning the Virtue of Charity in General.

Charity, as a habit, is a theological virtue by which we are inclined to love God above all things in the manner in which He loves Himself, and all things which God loves and as He loves them.

This definition is equivalent to that which is usually handed down, namely, it is a theological virtue by which we are inclined to love God above all things for His own sake, and ourselves and our neighbor for God's sake. In order that this may be understood better, it must be explained what the object, motive, and subject of charity are.

n. 737.

(A) The primary and principal object of charity is God Himself, to be loved above all things: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind."¹ But the secondary object is all creatures insofar as they are capable of divine grace and glory: "And the second (commandment) is like to this: thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."² For, since love essentially tends toward good, the primary object of dilection cannot be anything except the supreme and infinite good; but the secondary object is all beings which in some way participate in divine goodness.

¹ Luke 10:27; cf. Matt. 22:37.

² Matt. 22:38.

n. 738.

(B) The proper motive of charity is the absolute goodness of God, in itself and for its own sake infinitely lovable. Thus it is distinguished from the love of hope, whose motive is the relative goodness of God, namely that God is good toward us. For He can be loved in a twofold way: insofar as He is good for us, indeed our supreme good, by the enjoyment of whom we shall sometime be blessed, and this is the love of hope, or of chaste concupiscence; He can besides be loved as good in Himself, or because He is infinitely lovable for His own sake: this is the love of charity.

n. 739.

(a) A few theologians indeed, such as Bolgeni and Ballerini,³ have contended that the love of concupiscence is referred also to charity, and suffices for justification before the actual reception of the sacraments. For, they say, in Sacred Scripture the love of God loved solely for His own sake is never proposed to us, but God is often shown as to be loved insofar as He is our supreme good, the source of all our joy, etc. Besides, the single motive which excites man to acting is self-love, and therefore we do not love God except insofar as we conceive Him as the source of our beatitude. - But theologians commonly reject this opinion as erroneous. (a) For although Scripture does not directly and explicitly teach that God is to be loved for His own sake, nevertheless it insinuates this when it asserts that He is to be loved from the whole mind, from the whole heart, from all the powers, - or when it teaches that charity itself is more excellent than hope,⁴ - or proposes for imitation the charity by which someone lays down his life for his friends.⁵ (b) Otherwise, although man often acts from self-love, nevertheless he does not always act so, nor exclusively; but little by little he rises from the love of God, insofar as He is good to us, to the love of God as lovable in Himself and for His own sake, because he understands that He who is infinitely good in Himself is to be loved in Himself and for His own sake.⁶

³ Bolgeni, Della carita o amor di Dio, Rome, 1788; Ballerini-Palmieri, t. II, n. 135-139; - whom Muzzarelli refuted, Del motivo formale dell'atto di carita, Foligno, 1791; Perrone, op. cit., concerning Charity, n. 29-62; Pesch, n. 537-564; Mangenot, Dict. de Theol., t. II, p. 2220.

⁴ 1 Cor. 13:13.

⁵ John 15:13.

⁶ From this opinion the doctrine of St. Francis de Sales differs greatly (op. cit., l. X, ch. 10), asserting that we cannot love God except insofar as we can be joined to Him: "But if, by imagination of an impossible thing, there were an infinite goodness to which we had no sort of belonging, and with which we could have no communication, we would certainly esteem it more than ourselves... but, properly speaking, we would not love it, since love regards union; and much less could we have charity toward it, since charity is a friendship, and friendship can only be reciprocal, having communication for its foundation and union for its end."

n. 740.

(b) But both motives are often found united in one and the same act, and the love of hope in no way impedes the exercise of charity. For, on the one hand, God is supremely good in Himself, and therefore to be loved with love of benevolence, and supremely good to us, and therefore to be loved with the love of chaste concupiscence; but on the other hand, our ultimate end is both the glory of God, which we desire with love of benevolence, and our eternal beatitude, which we pursue with love of concupiscence. Indeed the love of concupiscence rightly ordered leads us to the love of benevolence: for the more we desire to possess God, the more we breathe after His honor.⁷

⁷ Thus St. Bonaventure, in lib. III Sentent., dist. 27, a. 2, q. 2.

Wherefore the proposition by which Fenelon asserted that there is given a habitual state⁸ of the love of God without admixture of a motive of one's own interest was condemned (above, n. 710). For it is psychologically evident that we cannot for a long time, or at least through a whole life, exclude the consideration and desire of heavenly beatitude (above, n. 717). This the pious Bernard lucidly declares, distinguishing four degrees in love:⁹ "First, therefore, man loves himself for his own sake. For he is flesh, and can relish nothing except himself. And when he sees that he cannot subsist by himself, he begins to seek and love God by faith, as necessary to himself. Thus in the second degree he loves God, but for his own sake, not for God's. But truly, when he has begun to cultivate and frequent Him by occasion of his own necessity, by thinking, reading, praying, obeying, by a certain familiarity of this kind God little by little and insensibly becomes known, and consequently grows sweet; and thus, having tasted how sweet the Lord is, he passes to the third degree, so that he loves God, no longer for his own sake, but for God's. Assuredly one stands in this degree, and I do not know whether the fourth is apprehended by any man in this life, namely, that man should love himself only for God's sake. Let those assert this who have experienced it: to me, I confess, it seems impossible."

⁸ According to the common doctrine, however, acts of pure benevolence, or of pure love toward God, can be elicited without any regard of one's own advantage: for if we sometimes love men without any hope of reward, why can we not sometimes love God without any appetite for reward? Wherefore Bossuet went further (Instr. sur les Etats d'oraison) when he contended that there is no act of love of God which excludes every regard for one's own good. (Gosselin, op. cit., p. CXLVI-CLXXXIII).

⁹ St. Bernard, Epist. XI, n. 8, P. L., CLXXXII, 113-114.

n. 741.

(c) The goodness of God, which is the proper motive of charity, must be known not only from natural light, but also and especially from the light of faith; for charity is a supernatural virtue, and accordingly its object and motive must be perceived supernaturally. This divine goodness in itself embraces all the perfections of God. - Yet many theologians think that any divine perfection accepted separately, for example, wisdom, kindness, mercy, is a sufficient motive of charity;¹⁰ and deservedly, as we think, for in God the various perfections are not really distinguished from the divine essence, and any perfection, as infinite, can provoke us to supreme love. In practice, there is no difficulty; for men are not accustomed to establish a distinction between God and His perfections, but love God Himself as infinitely wise, kind, merciful: and this certainly suffices for charity.

¹⁰ Ripalda, disp. XXV, concerning Charity, sect. 1-2; Wirceburgenses, n. 287; Lehmkuhl, n. 315.

The same divine goodness is the motive of charity toward ourselves and our neighbor: "And this commandment we have from God, that he who loves God love also his brother."¹¹ For, through charity, we love our neighbor because he is a son of God, destined to His glory, because he bears His image and likeness, and therefore on account of the goodness of God manifested in him.

¹¹ 1 John 4:21.

n. 742.

(d) The love of gratitude, by which namely we show God a grateful mind for benefits received, is often said to pertain to the perfect love of charity. At least it is certain that benevolent love toward the benefactor himself most easily arises from gratitude; and this love can be held as an act of charity, since it rests upon one of the divine attributes, namely beneficence. Therefore it is often expedient to excite men to gratitude toward God from benefits received - as in reality is usually done in the Scriptures - and then to love of the benefactor Himself: for when He is loved as good to us, He is easily loved as good in Himself.

n. 743.

(e) Likewise love toward Christ, who suffered and was crucified for us, most easily passes into the love of charity: for the faithful believe that Christ is God, and when they love Christ, by that very fact they love God; otherwise, if moved by gratitude they love the divine Redeemer as good to themselves, soon they love the same as simply good and infinitely lovable.¹² Since this way is very easy and accommodated to human nature, preachers and confessors, by excellent counsel, will make the same known to the faithful, so that these may more easily elicit acts of charity and of perfect contrition.

¹² The Apostle used this motive to excite the faithful to the practice of charity: "And walk in love, as Christ also loved us, and delivered Himself for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odor of sweetness." (Eph. 5:2).

n. 744.

(C) The subject of charity is all and only those who possess habitual grace: for charity is indivisibly connected with sanctifying grace (above, n. 604). - This virtue inheres properly in the will, since the love of the divine good, which is perceived only by intellect and faith, is elicited by the will;¹³ nevertheless, because nothing is willed unless first known, knowledge and faith contribute much to charity, by providing motives by which the will is enticed to loving; besides, divine love sometimes redounds into the sensitive faculties, and begets in them pious emotions.

¹³ "The object of the sensitive appetite is good apprehended by sense; but the object of the intellective appetite, or of the will, is good under the common aspect of good, insofar as it is apprehensible by the intellect. But the object of charity is not some sensible good, but the divine good, which is known by intellect alone. And therefore the subject of charity is not the sensitive appetite, but the intellective appetite, that is, the will." (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 24, a. 1).

Division. Since the object of charity is twofold, namely God and neighbor, we shall speak: 1. concerning charity toward God; 2. concerning charity toward neighbor.

n. 745.

I. Concerning the Love of Benevolence.

This love consists in this, that, insofar as we can, we will good to God. It embraces three acts, namely joy concerning the divine goods, desire of increasing the same, insofar as this can be done, and zeal for promoting the glory of God.

Joy, or complacency, concerning the goods which God possesses; for when we truly love someone, we have his goods as our own, and therefore we rejoice concerning his goods and take complacency in them, as if they were our own. Christ insinuates this in these words:² "If you loved Me, you would indeed be glad, because I go to the Father," namely because I leave this valley of misery, that I may obtain divine felicity.

² John 14:28.

(a) Wherefore the just rejoice concerning the infinite perfections of God considered in themselves, concerning His power, wisdom, kindness, etc.; indeed they rejoice more concerning the glory of God than concerning their own beatitude. Thus Augustine is reported to have said:³ "Lord God, I love Thee so, that if I were God and Thou Augustine, I would will myself to be Augustine, that Thou mightest be God." Thus likewise St. Francis de Sales:⁴ "O most beloved of my heart, I do not indeed desire that I could wish anything good to Thy majesty, but with my whole heart I take complacency in that supreme degree of goodness which Thou hast, to which neither by desire nor even by thought can anything be added; but, if such a desire were possible, O infinite Deity and divine Infinity, my soul would wish to be this very desire and nothing else." (b) They rejoice likewise concerning the external manifestation of the attributes of God, and therefore concerning divine providence, which disposes all things sweetly and strongly, concerning the extension of the kingdom of God, concerning the external glory which He receives from the Angels, the Saints reigning in heaven, and also the just on earth fighting for His honor. (c) From this complacency there spontaneously arises praise of God, by which we congratulate Him concerning all things which contribute to His glory: "Glory to God in the highest... We praise Thee, we bless Thee, we glorify Thee... Thee, O God, we praise, Thee, O Lord, we confess."⁵

³ St. Francis de Sales, op. cit., l. V, ch. 6.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ In the psalms and liturgical prayers of the Church the divine praises are continually celebrated.

n. 746.

1. The desire of increasing divine goods, insofar as this can be done, or benevolence properly so called.

(a) If there is question of the intrinsic perfections of God, we cannot indeed desire an increase of them absolutely, since nothing good can accrue to the Infinite; but conditionally, as is read in St. Francis de Sales:⁶ "I said to the Lord, Thou art my God, full of immense goodness, who needest neither my goods nor those of anyone else; nevertheless, if it were possible that Thou shouldst need some good, I would never cease to desire it for Thee, and, to procure it for Thee, I would gladly spend my life and all things most dear to me."

⁶ Ibid.

(b) If there is question of the extrinsic glory of God, by love we are induced to promote it both in ourselves and in others: in ourselves indeed, insofar as we are prepared to suffer and do all things in order to make progress in divine love; thus St. John of the Cross, when asked by Christ what he desired for so many and such great labors undertaken for God, answered: "Lord, to suffer and to be contemned for Thee."⁷ But as to others, we sincerely desire that they, who sit in darkness and in the shadow of death, may be illumined, and may know, love, and glorify God: "Let the peoples confess to Thee, O God, let all the peoples give praise to Thee... Praise the Lord from the heavens... Praise the Lord from the earth... kings of the earth and all peoples, princes and all judges of the earth."⁸

⁷ Breviary, Nov. 24, lect. 6.

⁸ Ps. 66:4; 148:1, 7, 11.

(c) Thence arises sorrow concerning sins committed by us or by others, insofar as they offend God, the supreme good; and also filial fear lest God be offended; for when we love someone, we suffer with him and grieve concerning the things by which he is saddened.

n. 747.

1. Zeal for promoting the glory of God, or beneficence. For love does not consist in affection alone, but is manifested by work. This happens in two ways: by vehemently repelling those things which are contrary to the honor of God,⁹ and by positively carrying out those things which promote this honor. Therefore those who truly love God labor strenuously to procure the external glory of God: (a) in themselves, by doing all those things which can increase His honor, by better observing the commandments and counsels, by devoting themselves and their things to Him, and by making all works toward pleasing Him. (b) In others, namely by drawing them to Christ by prayer, word, and example.

⁹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 28, a. 4; St. Francis de Sales, op. cit., l. X, ch. 12.

n. 748.

II. Concerning the Love of Friendship.

Friendship, from what has been said, n. 732, imports three things: love of benevolence, mutual love, and the communication of some good between lovers. Now these three can be found in charity toward God. (a) God certainly embraces us with love of benevolence, for He has gratuitously given us many and very great goods: "And I have loved thee with perpetual charity; therefore have I drawn thee, taking pity...¹⁰ For God so loved the world, as to give His only-begotten Son...¹¹ Who also spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all, how has He not also, with Him, given us all things?"¹² And truly this love is benevolent, since God is plainly sufficient to Himself and does not need our goods. Otherwise, we too can love God with love of benevolence, in the sense set forth above, n. 745.

¹⁰ Jer. 31:3.

¹¹ John 3:16.

¹² Rom. 8:32.

(b) That this kind of love is mutual and known as such is no less evidently clear; for the Lord many times declared that He loves those who love Him: "I love them that love Me, and they that in the morning watch for Me shall find Me...¹³ If anyone love Me, he will keep My word, and My Father will love him, and We will come to him and will make Our abode with him."¹⁴

¹³ Prov. 8:17.

¹⁴ John 14:23.

(c) That from this mutual love arises a communication of goods is no less clearly evident; for God has bestowed upon us goods both natural and supernatural, indeed a certain participation of His own life: "By whom He has given us most great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature."¹⁵ On our part, indeed, we are able to add nothing to the divine perfections, but whatever we are and have we can give to God, by carrying out all our actions on account of Him, unto His glory;¹⁶ we can also take complacency in His attributes, and promote His external glory, according to what has been set forth above, n. 746. And thus there comes about a mutual communication of goods, and a mutual friendship, insofar as this can exist between God and men.

¹⁵ 2 Pet. 1:4.

¹⁶ This is expressed very beautifully in this prayer of St. Ignatius (Spiritual Exercises, from the Spanish autograph, Rome, 1854, p. 118-119): "Take, Lord, and receive all my liberty, my memory, my intellect, and all my will, whatever I have and possess: Thou hast given all these things to me; to Thee, Lord, I restore them: all things are Thine, dispose of them according to all Thy will. Give me Thy love and grace, for this is sufficient for me."

Hence Scripture often declares us friends of God; thus Abraham is called the friend of God,¹⁷ and those who cultivate wisdom are sharers in the friendship of God;¹⁸ but especially in the New Testament those who keep His commandments are called friends of God: "You are My friends, if you do the things that I command you";¹⁹ but in a special way the apostles are friends of Christ, because they knew His secrets: "But I have called you friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard of My Father I have made known to you."²⁰

¹⁷ Isa. 41:8; Judith 8:22.

¹⁸ Wis. 7:14.

¹⁹ John 15:14.

²⁰ John 15:15.

n. 769.

§ I. Concerning the Precept of Charity toward Neighbor. — I. Concerning the Existence of This Precept.

Thesis: There is a special and grave precept of loving one's neighbor with supernatural love, both affective and effective.

It is explained. (A) Here there is question not of sensual love, by which a neighbor is loved on account of external endowments which please the senses, - nor of merely intellectual love, by which he is loved on account of the endowments of soul with which he is furnished; - but of supernatural love, by which he is loved for God's sake, namely insofar as divine perfection shines forth in a rational creature. Thus divine goodness is truly the motive why we love our neighbor; thus it appears how the love of God and of neighbor is referred to the same virtue: for the motive of both is the same. From this it also follows that love of neighbor necessarily flows from love of God: for wherever divine goodness is found, there it ought to be loved; but all men are called to the beatific vision, and therefore to supernatural participation in the divine nature; the just indeed already possess this inchoatively through sanctifying grace; but if they are in the state of sin, they remain capable of justification as long as they live, and as such can and ought to be loved.

In order that this may be understood better, it must be known that neighbor can be loved for God's sake in a threefold way: (a) insofar as he is the work of God, both natural and supernatural, pertaining to His glory, just as a painting contributes to the glory of the painter; (b) insofar as divine goodness is participated by the neighbor, shines forth in him, and renders him lovable; in this way we love sinners also, because they are sons of God, not indeed in act, but in potency; (c) insofar as the neighbor is loved by God: for friendship makes friends so unanimous, or of one will, that whatever one loves, the other also loves.

n. 770.

But it is controverted whether participation in the divine nature, insofar as it inheres in an intellectual creature, is a sufficient motive of charity. Some indeed, such as Vasquez,¹ contend that love resting only upon this created participation does not properly pertain to the virtue of charity, but to a certain lower supernatural love, by which the neighbor is loved on account of the supernatural goods with which he is adorned. But, with Suarez and others,² we think that this love pertains to the virtue of charity; for even that goodness which inheres in the just through grace is divine goodness, proceeding from God and tending toward Him, and therefore can be loved for God's sake.

¹ Vasquez, in 3 part. St. Thomas, disp. 98, c. 2; Lessius, de Justitia, l. II, c. 36, n. 23.

² Suarez, concerning Charity, disp. I, sect. 3; Salmanticenses, disp. II, dub. 4; Bouquillon, n. 411.

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(B) That supernatural love ought to be not only affective, but also effective: (a) affective, namely consisting in those acts of complacency and benevolence by which we rejoice concerning the endowments of our neighbor and sincerely desire supernatural goods for him; (b) but also effective, inclining us to beneficence, that is, to all acts of mercy by which we are able to help our neighbor.

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(C) By the name of neighbor are to be understood all rational creatures³ capable of eternal beatitude, namely: (a) those who are inseparably united to God through the beatific vision, the angels and saints reigning in heaven; (b) those who are indefectibly friends of God, although they have not yet obtained eternal beatitude, such as are souls detained in purgatory; (c) those who are truly friends of God, although defectibly, as the just on earth; (d) those who are able to obtain divine friendship, although they lack the same, as sinners, heretics, infidels, as long as they live. - Excluded from this supernatural friendship are those who are irreparably enemies of God, such as demons and the damned.⁴

³ In irrational creatures the natural endowments which shine forth in them and proceed from God can indeed be loved; but this love does not pertain to supernatural charity. Nevertheless, by the ladder of creatures, we are able to ascend to God Himself. Cf. Bellarmine, De ascensione mentis in Deum per scalas rerum creatarum.

⁴ Yet it is by no means prohibited to love in them whatever good God naturally bestowed and left.

n. 773.

It is proved. 1. From Scripture. Yet it must be noted that the law of charity was not fully promulgated in the Old Testament, but attained its perfection only in the New.

(A) In the Mosaic Law (a) not only are hatred and vengeance reproved, but love of neighbor is commanded, and indeed for God's sake, with however some distinction between fellow citizens and foreigners. "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart, but openly rebuke him, lest thou have sin upon him. Seek not revenge, nor be mindful of the injury of thy citizens. Thou shalt love thy friend as thyself. I am the Lord."⁵ Here there is no question of all men, but of brothers, fellow citizens, and friends, that is, of members of Hebrew society; for at that time a great distinction was established between fellow citizens and foreigners. Yet a certain benevolence is commended toward strangers who dwell within the borders of the Jews: they ought to be loved not as brothers, but as if they were fellow citizens: "If a stranger has dwelt in your land and has stayed among you, do not reproach him; but let him be among you as one born in the land, and you shall love him as yourselves; for you also were strangers in the land of Egypt. I am the Lord your God."⁶

⁵ Lev. 19:17-18.

⁶ Lev. 19:33-34; cf. Exod. 22:21; 23:9.

(b) Beneficence toward the poor, and all who are in some necessity, is often commanded: "The poor shall not be wanting in the land of thy habitation; therefore I command thee that thou open thy hand to thy needy and poor brother, who dwells with thee in the land."⁷ The Jews ought to furnish mutual help to themselves as regards things lost: "Thou shalt not see thy brother's ox or sheep going astray, and pass by; but thou shalt bring them back to thy brother, even if thy brother is not near, nor dost thou know him; thou shalt bring them into thy house, and they shall be with thee until thy brother seeks them and receives them."⁸

⁷ Deut. 15:11.

⁸ Deut. 22:1-2; cf. Exod. 22:4-5.

(c) Among works of beneficence is counted a loan without increase: "Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money at usury, nor grain, nor any other thing, but to a foreigner. But to thy brother thou shalt lend without usury that which he needs, that the Lord thy God may bless thee in every work of thine."⁹ There note also the distinction between brothers and foreigners.

⁹ Deut. 23:19-20; cf. Exod. 22:25.

(d) Widows, orphans, the blind, the lame, and others of this kind are worthy of special mercy: "You shall not hurt a widow or an orphan. If you hurt them, they shall cry out to Me, and I will hear their cry; and My fury shall be indignant";¹⁰ - "Thou shalt not curse the deaf, nor put a stumbling-block before the blind."¹¹

¹⁰ Exod. 22:22-23.

¹¹ Lev. 19:14; cf. Deut. 27:18.

(e) Besides, certain legal privileges were granted to the needy.¹² Thus a small part of the crops in any field was preserved for the poor, who besides had the right of gathering the remaining ears: "When thou shalt reap the crops of thy land, thou shalt not shear the surface of the land down to the ground (in Hebrew, thou shalt not reap the whole field, but shalt reserve a certain corner for the poor); nor shalt thou gather the remaining ears."¹³ - Likewise, in the sabbatical year, which occurred every seventh year, the land remained uncultivated, and the fruits growing spontaneously were common,¹⁴ and chiefly contributed to relieving the poor; the same was observed in the jubilee year, which recurred every fiftieth year.¹⁵ - Moreover, every third year, the tenth part of the fruits was given to widows, orphans, and the other poor.¹⁶

¹² Many, apud Vigouroux, Dict. de la Bible, t. I, 1245-1247; Lallemand, Histoire de la Charite, Paris, Picard, 1902, p. 16-28.

¹³ Lev. 19:9.

¹⁴ Lev. 25:2-7.

¹⁵ Lev. 25:8-12.

¹⁶ Deut. 14:28-29.

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(B) In the New Testament the law of charity is completed and perfected, insofar as we are commanded to love all, even enemies, without distinction of Jew and Greek; and in a more perfect mode, by loving all as Christ loved us, and because we ought to love Christ Himself in others.

(a) This indeed is clear from the sermon on the mount, where Christ says: "You have heard that it has been said: an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. But I say to you not to resist evil; but if anyone strikes thee on thy right cheek, offer him also the other."¹⁷ Namely, among the Jews¹⁸ and many Gentiles, the law of retaliation was in force, not indeed to be applied by private men, but by magistrates; Christ teaches us to tolerate injuries patiently, without vengeance being sought through judges.

¹⁷ Matt. 5:38-39.

¹⁸ Exod. 21:24-25; Lev. 24:19-22.

The Lord continues: "You have heard that it has been said: thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thy enemy. But I say to you: love your enemies, do good to them that hate you, and pray for those persecuting and calumniating you; that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven, who makes His sun to rise upon the good and the evil, and rains upon the just and the unjust."¹⁹ Scripture nowhere commended hatred of enemies; but from the fact that certain foreign tribes had been exterminated by the Jews,²⁰ and because the sacred writers sometimes rejoiced concerning the fall and confusion of the impious,²¹ not a few rabbis approved hatred toward enemies as legitimate. But the Lord commands us to love all, even enemies, and to do good to them, so that thus we may imitate our heavenly Father. Nor must love be extended to fellow citizens alone, but also to Greeks and barbarians: "For there is no distinction of Jew and Greek; for the same Lord is over all, rich unto all who call upon Him."²² From the same texts it is clear that the motive on account of which we ought to love brothers is because God is the heavenly Father of all.

¹⁹ Matt. 5:43-45.

²⁰ Deut. 7:1-11; 20:12-18.

²¹ Ps. 7:5-7; 53:7.

²² Rom. 10:12; cf. Gal. 5:6; 6:15.

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(b) We are bound to love them in a more perfect mode than before, namely as Christ Himself loved us: "A new commandment I give unto you, that you love one another as I have loved you, that you also love one another. By this shall all know that you are My disciples, if you shall have love for one another."²³ But Christ loved us so that He delivered His soul for us; wherefore, if we wish to cultivate perfect charity, "we also ought to lay down our lives for the brethren,"²⁴ that is, to deny ourselves so that we may be able to procure the good of our neighbor, especially spiritual good. That so perfect a charity may become easier, Christ declares that whatever is bestowed upon the least of the brethren is held as bestowed upon Christ Himself: "Amen I say to you, as long as you did it to one of these My least brethren, you did it to Me."²⁵

²³ John 13:34-35.

²⁴ 1 John 3:16.

²⁵ Matt. 25:40.

n. 776.

This indeed is clear from the very words by which the supreme judge addresses the elect and the reprobate: the former possess the kingdom of God because they gave to the poor food, drink, clothing, and other things of this kind; but the reprobate, on the contrary, are damned because they did not perform these works of charity.²⁶ From this it also appears that certain works of charity were commanded under grave obligation. Wherefore James deservedly says: "Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father is this, to visit orphans and widows in their tribulation."²⁷ Nor otherwise John:²⁸ "He that has the substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall close his bowels from him, how does the charity of God abide in him? My little children, let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth." - The first Christians understood the matter thus, concerning whom it is said:²⁹ "And the multitude of believers had one heart and one soul; neither did anyone say that anything of the things which he possessed was his own, but all things were common to them." This community of goods was not indeed of precept,³⁰ but it shows how perfectly charity was cultivated in the church of Jerusalem.

²⁶ Matt. 25:34-46.

²⁷ James 1:27; cf. 2:2-8 and 14-19.

²⁸ 1 John 3:17-18.

²⁹ Acts 4:32.

³⁰ Acts 5:4.

(d) All these things the Apostle splendidly condenses, describing the excellent endowments of charity thus:³¹ "Charity is patient, is kind; charity envies not, deals not perversely, is not puffed up; is not ambitious, seeks not her own, is not provoked to anger, thinks no evil; rejoices not over iniquity, but rejoices with the truth; bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things."

³¹ 1 Cor. 13:4-7.

n. 777.

The Fathers confirm and develop the doctrine of Scripture, commending fraternal charity, often inculcating the precept of almsgiving, and promoting other works of beneficence.

(a) Thus St. Cyprian praises fraternal charity:¹ "The charity of brotherhood is a bond, the foundation of peace, the tenacity and firmness of unity, which is greater than both hope and faith, which precedes even the works of martyrdom, which will always remain with us eternally before God in the heavenly kingdoms." To the point also Augustine:² "Wherefore, brethren, pursue charity, the sweet and salutary bond of minds, without which the rich man is poor, and with which the poor man is rich. This bears in adversities, tempers in prosperities; in hard sufferings it is strong, in good works cheerful; in temptation most secure, in hospitality most spacious; among true brothers most joyful, among false ones most patient." A little later he explains the words of the Apostle cited above concerning the excellence and endowments of charity.

¹ St. Cyprian, De bono patient., c. 15, P. L., IV, 632.

² St. Augustine, sermo CCCL, P. L., XXXIX, 1534.

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(b) The Fathers often speak concerning almsgiving. St. Cyprian has an entire treatise concerning work and alms.³ St. Ambrose also relates that sacred vessels were broken and sold in order to redeem captives, and he altogether approves this against the envy of the Arians: "The Church has gold, not that she may preserve it, but that she may spend it and come to aid in necessities. Will not the Lord say: why did you suffer so many needy persons to die of hunger? And surely you had gold; you should have supplied food. Why were so many captives led away for sale, and, not redeemed, were killed by the enemy? It would have been better that you preserve vessels of the living than of metals." He likewise narrates how the holy martyr Lawrence distributed the treasures of the Church to the poor, and, when the judge asked where the treasures were which he had promised to hand over, showed the poor, saying: These are the treasures of the Church. This he declares in these words:⁴ "These are the treasures of the Church. And truly treasures, in whom Christ is, in whom faith is... What better treasures has Christ than those in whom He said that He is?" - Fortunatus splendidly declares that Christ Himself, hidden in the poor, is to be loved and helped:⁵

³ St. Cyprian, lib. de opere et eleemosynis, P. L., IV, 601-622.

⁴ St. Ambrose, De officiis, l. II, c. 28, n. 140, P. L., XVI, 141.

⁵ Apud Le Blant, Inscript. chretiennes, t. II, n. 645.

"Believing that he was feeding Christ under the form of the poor,
before all others with him the needy man received help,
and not only refreshing, but secretly ministering gifts,
he is more pleasing from this, that he gave without a witness."

The poor were also held as sons; for Jerome, speaking of Paula, who relieved many poor and had left them to her husband Pammachius, writes to him: "As many poor as there are in Rome, so many sons have you suddenly begotten."⁶

⁶ Jerome, ep. 66 to Pammachius, n. 4, P. L., XXII, 641.

But to urge the precept of almsgiving, the Fathers rather often teach that the rich are, as it were, stewards and dispensers of the riches of God, so that if they refuse to hand over necessary things to the poor, they are guilty of theft and robbery: "The bread which you detain belongs to the hungry; the cloak which you keep in the chest belongs to the naked; the shoe which rots with you belongs to the barefoot; the silver which you have buried belongs to the needy. Wherefore, to as many men as you can give, to so many do you inflict injury."⁷

⁷ St. Basil, homil. on that text of Luke: Destruam, etc., P. G., XXXI, 278; cf. St. Ambrose, De Nabuthe lib. unus, P. L., XIV, 747; St. Augustine, in Ps. 147, P. L., XXXVII, 1922; St. Gregory of Nyssa, De pauperibus amandis, P. G., XLVI, 466; St. Chrysostom, in ep. I to the Corinthians, homil. 10, c. 3, P. G., LXI, 86. C. Guignebert condenses the doctrine of the Fathers on this matter, Tertullien (thesis), Paris, Leroux, 1901, p. 508-350. - Yet we proved that these Fathers are not favorers of socialism, De Justitia, n. 84-86.

Yet alms are not to be bestowed indiscriminately upon all, but upon those who are truly needy and use well the things given. Thus, in the Constitutions called Apostolic, alms are not to be bestowed upon those who are evil, envious, drunken, or lazy, lest a reward be given to vice.⁸

⁸ Constit. apostol., II, 1-63; III, 4-6.

Likewise Chrysostom forbids widows who have been caught acting basely in thefts, taverns, and other similar things to be supported at the expense of the Church: "For who would ever wish to bestow the money which he was commanded to give to Christ upon those who bring calumny upon the name of Christ? And therefore much and careful scrutiny is needed, that neither they nor others, for whom their household property can suffice, consume the table of the poorer."⁹ - But those who belong to another nation or religion are not excluded from charity: "For whatever is God's is common in our use, and no one is kept away from His benefits and gifts; much less is the whole human race prevented from enjoying His goodness and largess equally."¹⁰

⁹ St. Chrysostom, De sacerdotio, l. III, c. 16, P. G., XLVIII, 655.

¹⁰ St. Cyprian, De opere et eleemos., c. 25, P. L., IV, 620.

(c) Likewise other works of charity are promoted, such as visitation of the sick and imprisoned, redemption of captives, emancipation of slaves, care of widows and orphans, etc.¹¹ Wherefore deacons and deaconesses (or widows not less than sixty years old) were instituted in every church, that they might take care of the poor, orphans, widows, girls, etc. Collections were made on every Sunday, that the necessities of all might be more abundantly relieved.

¹¹ Concerning these see L. Lallemand, Histoire de la charite, t. II, Paris, 1903, with many authors cited there. These works of charity even rationalists themselves could not fail to admire, as Lecky, History of European Morals, London and New York, ch. IV, where he confesses that nothing similar was ever found among the pagans: "The high conception that has been formed of the sanctity of human life, the protection of infancy, the elevation and final emancipation of the slave classes, the suppression of barbarous games, the creation of a vast and multifarious organisation of charity, and the education of the imagination by the christian type, constitute together a movement of philanthropy which has never been paralleled or approached in the pagan world." (T. II, p. 100, 3rd ed., New York, 1891).

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The doctrine of Scripture and of the Fathers Leo XIII splendidly condenses, proposing the motives of fraternal charity to masters and workers thus: "For all will feel and understand that all men alike have been begotten by God, the common parent; that all tend to the same end of goods, which is God Himself, who alone can affect both men and angels with perfect and absolute beatitude; that each likewise has equally been redeemed by the benefit of Jesus Christ and restored to the dignity of sons of God, so that they are plainly contained in a fraternal relationship both with one another and also with Christ the Lord, the firstborn among many brethren."

And these things are sufficient concerning charity in general; but how far the precept of loving enemies and of bestowing alms extends will be clear from the following things.

Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis

Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. — 6 passages

Vol. II, First Book: On the Theolog…, Treatise III: On Charity

Division of the treatise. - This principal treatise on theological charity admits this natural division: that, after a general view of the virtue, we should treat successively of charity as it is love of God, and of charity as it is love of ourselves and of neighbor.

Vol. II, First Book: On the Theolog…, Tr. III, Tit. I, Sublimity, Scope, and Easy Exercise of Charity

Utility. - This is of the greatest use to the moral theologian: that, once the notion of the virtue has been perceived, he may be able to persuade the faithful how noble and at the same time how easy the act of charity is.

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I. Notion, Sublimity, Scope. — To the new and ineffable communion by which, from our supernatural vocation, we shall be made one with God and neighbor in the immediate beatific possession of God, there corresponds a new virtue, at once operative and unitive, by which we love God and, in God, every neighbor together with ourselves, as, with attention given to the present order, it is fitting to love; just as by hope we intend and expect that beatific possession, as it is fitting to expect so great a good; just as by faith we believe God and believe in God revealing, as is fitting.

Therefore the theological virtue of charity is defined: a supernatural, infused habit, by which we are able to love God, as infinitely good in Himself, with the supreme love of friendship, and ourselves and our neighbor on account of God. In that definition, the formal object of charity is shown to be the infinite goodness of God in itself, that amiability which God lays open to one contemplating His goodness; a twofold material object is assigned: primary, which is God Himself, infinitely good in Himself; secondary, which is ourselves, together with our neighbor. From God there is made to us and to our neighbor a certain extension or diffusion of love: we love ourselves and our neighbor insofar as we are called to participate in the divine nature. That love is of friendship, insofar as it is of mutual benevolence founded in the communication of divine and eternal beatitude. For this communication, although it is not the motive of charity, is nevertheless a necessary condition so that we may be able to love God with the supreme love of benevolence, and so that that love may be one of friendship. It is at the same time supreme, not only insofar as, in our estimation, God by His goodness infinitely surpasses every created good, but also insofar as, founded in the supernatural knowledge of faith and in the supernatural ardor of hope, that love is given by a virtue which is in some way proportioned to the object: we begin to love God as if we saw Him.

Charity, like every true love, loves, unites, operates. - It loves, but with an affection which imitates the infinite love by which God loves His Goodness and, in this Goodness, whatever outside Himself is lovable: and thus no purer and more sublime affection can be conceived. - It unites us with God and neighbor: through that holy friendship, we arrive at a certain communion of cause and unity with God, which divinizes us; through the same friendship, men are joined among themselves by the most perfect bond: it comes about that the good of individuals becomes the good of all, and thus from every good a universal joy is prepared; it comes about that the evil of individuals becomes the evil of all, and thus a beginning is given to universal beneficence. - It operates, by joining our will with the divine will: and thus it leads us to the summit of perfection; it operates, by stimulating every good action: and thus it becomes most fruitful.

We can offer nothing more glorious to God than that we love Him with perfect love; nothing more meritorious for ourselves than that by the free effort of the will we embrace the divine good in affection and effect; nothing more useful to our neighbor than that we comprehend him with the same love with which we love ourselves and God.

Without charity we merit absolutely nothing: and thus charity is the root of every merit; through charity, by which we are joined to God Himself, our works arrive at God: and thus, insofar as they are meritorious, our works are perfected by charity, which becomes the form of all virtues.

No virtue in us, more than charity, is formally divine. For God, who beholds Himself and is present to Himself, formally neither believes nor hopes. Both faith and hope connote a defect either of vision or of the presence of God; but in formal charity, we come together with God.

Hence charity is an eternal virtue: "Charity never falleth away" (1 Cor. 13, 8).

No exercise is more commanded than that of charity, to which all precepts are directed as to an end. And at the same time none is more free, since charity by spontaneous motion fulfills all the precepts, so that the law is said not to be placed for it (Cf. 1 Tim. 1, 9).

Nothing is more sublime in affection, nothing more fruitful in effect.

The queen of the virtues, charity uses all the others as subordinate instruments.

And insofar as it reduces the whole world with God to the magnificent unity of one beloved object, charity is the joy, splendor, and perfection of the whole created world.

¹ The relative goodness of God is the condition of the love of benevolence which even in the natural order we would have to foster toward God as servants; goodness advanced as far as communion of blessed life gives place to the filial love of friendship.

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Name. — By force of the word itself, charity (Greek agape) is named more nobly than love. For it designates an affection which a) is proper to man here on earth, whereas love (Greek eros) is predicated even of brute animals; b) proceeds more from reason and from a just estimation of the lovable person than from the impulse of passion, whence love arises.

n. 71.

II. Facility. — Yet let us not imagine that sublime exercise of charity to be difficult for ourselves. Entirely impassable for us without the help of God, its use becomes spontaneous for those who have received the spirit of adoption, that is, for those who, actually turned away from grave sin, possess the infused habit of charity. For what is sufficient so that, made sons of God, we may love Him with actual charity? It is sufficient that we not only desire God with concupiscence, but truly love Him, "as a man loves a friend" (2, 2, q. 17, art. 8, c.). But are we not drawn to this love when, immune from the servitude of sin, we consider either the divine benefits, both those which we have received and those which we expect, or the Passion of Christ, to which we refer them as received? Hope itself, says St. Thomas in the same place, introduces charity ¹. And what grace orders us to do, grace itself helps us so that we can do it.

It is also proper to one who loves that he should seek union with his friend. Wherefore the desire of possessing God, unless it is explicitly thrust down to one's own consequent happiness, is practically an act of charity. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 24.

Indeed God, in every order, is so greatly the good of every creature, that according to St. Thomas (1, q. 60, art. 5; 1, 2, q. 109, art. 3; 2, 2, q. 26, art. 3), every creature naturally loves God more than itself. Besides, it cannot love itself more and better than by loving God, on whose goodness every created goodness essentially depends. But in the natural order, love between God and man would not have been a love of friendship, which demands some equality either of nature or of grace, and therefore communication in the same life.

N. B. Several things which are controverted concerning charity we permit to be defined by dogmatic theology. Now we must treat distinctly of each material object of charity: God and neighbor.

¹ For gratitude, although it is formally commanded by benefits received and, under this respect, pertains to love of concupiscence, nevertheless almost of its own accord impels a grateful man, so that in the benefits themselves he loves the very goodness of the giver, which is proper to charity (Cf. Billot, De caritate. De praeceptis caritatis, p. 427).

n. 72.

Summary

— I. Theological charity is a supernatural, infused habit by which we are made capable of loving God, as infinitely good in Himself, connaturally with the supreme love of friendship, and ourselves and our neighbor on account of God. - The formal object of charity is the infinite goodness of God and therefore amiability in itself; its primary material object is God Himself; its secondary object: ourselves together with our neighbor; we love these as actual or potential participants in the divine nature; the condition is the communication of divine and perpetual beatitude; its nature is friendship, founded in this communication, or communion in the same life; its degree is supreme.

II. By the love of charity, imitating the love by which God loves His Goodness and, in This, whatever is lovable, we are made one with God and neighbor; and, the will being joined with the divine will, we work every good. Wherefore nothing is more glorious to God, nothing more meritorious for us, nothing more useful to neighbor than the exercise of charity: without which we merit nothing, and which becomes the form of all virtues. No exercise is more commanded. No virtue is more formally divine and eternal; it is the joy, splendor, and perfection of the created world. - More noble than the name of love is the very name of charity.

III. Nor, for those who are immune from the servitude of sin and have been given the infused habit, does its exercise become difficult. It is sufficient to love God as a man loves a friend. This affection is prepared by the very benefits obtained and hoped for: the goodness of the benefactor is loved in the gifts themselves. Cf. Billot, De caritate, De praeceptis caritatis, p. 427.

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 8 passages

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract IX. On theological c…, Ch. I, Article I. On the nature and properties of charity

n. 552.

552. Definition. Charity is a virtue divinely infused, by which we love God as the highest good on account of Himself, and ourselves and neighbor on account of God, or rather, with St. Thomas:¹⁹ "Charity is a certain friendship of man toward God" (founded upon the communication of eternal beatitude).

It is explained. It is said 1: Charity is a virtue divinely infused; by these words is excluded: a) the erroneous opinion of Peter Lombard (the Master of the Sentences), teaching that habitual charity is the Holy Spirit Himself inhabiting the soul of the just man and moving it to acts of charity immediately and not through the medium of some habit.²⁰ This opinion is opposed to St. Paul, who says: "The charity of God has been poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us."²¹ In this text charity and the Holy Spirit are manifestly shown as two distinct things. b) The opinion of certain theologians is excluded (Scotus, several Scotists, Bellarmine, etc.), teaching that charity is identified with sanctifying grace. For sanctifying grace is received in the essence of the soul and perfects it in the order of being, but charity is received in the will, which it perfects in the order of acting. Hence Sacred Scripture speaks of grace and charity as of two distinct things: "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ and the charity of God."²² But although charity is really distinct from sanctifying grace, nevertheless it is inseparably joined with it, so that with it charity is both born in justification and perishes through mortal sin. - Charity is one and a special virtue, although it extends itself to God, to neighbor, and to ourselves, because by the same charity and by the same motive we love God, neighbor, and ourselves, as will be clear from what is to be said concerning the motive of charity.

It is said 2: by which we love God as the highest good, etc.; by these words the object of charity is designated.

¹⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 23, a. 1 et 5.

²⁰ I Sent. dist. 17; cf. St. Thomas on this place, a. 1.

²¹ Rom. 5, 5.

²² 2 Cor. 13, 13. Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol. 1, 2, q. 113, a. 3; De verit. q. 27, a. 2; Billuart, De gratia diss. 4, a. 4.

n. 553.

553. The primary object which of charity is God Himself, insofar as He is proposed to us by faith. For it is said: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God from thy whole heart, and from thy whole soul, and from all thy powers, and from thy whole mind."²³

The secondary object to which is all creatures, insofar as they are capable of divine beatitude.²⁴ Hence it is said: "But the second [precept] is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."²⁵ Therefore charity extends itself to all men and angels, but in no way to the damned and the demons in Gehenna, because they are no longer capable of divine beatitude.

²³ Luc. 10, 27.

²⁴ Sometimes the material object of charity is taken not only for those to whom we will good, but also for the things which we will to the beloved. In this broad sense the object of charity is absolutely all things, indeed even demons, insofar as from charity we will all created beings to serve for the honor of God and the utility of man (cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 25, a. 3 et 11).

²⁵ Matth. 22, 39.

n. 554.

554. The formal object by which, or the formal motive reason of charity, is the goodness of God, as it is lovable in itself and on account of itself, knowable by supernatural light. This is the most common opinion of theologians against a few, e.g. Vinc. Bolgeni,²⁶ Ballerini,²⁷ who think that God as good to us is the motive of charity. But the reason is that charity is a love of benevolence, not a love of concupiscence, which generates hope and not charity. That the motive of charity is the goodness of God apprehended by supernatural light (of faith or glory), and not by natural reason alone, is clear from the fact that otherwise charity would be a natural habit.

Theologians dispute whether by divine goodness, which is the formal object of charity, there must be understood only the totality of all the divine perfections, or whether any perfection taken separately, abstracting from the others, can also be understood, e.g. whether God can be loved with true charity on account of His infinite justice, wisdom, etc.²⁸ In practice this controversy is of little or no utility; for it is certain that all divine attributes are lovable. Moreover, if from love of some divine attribute we proceed to a true and sincere dilection of God above all things and to true love of benevolence, then charity is present. - Gratitude per se is not the love of charity, but the moral virtue of gratitude; just as neither is love toward Christ suffering for us; nevertheless they most easily pass over into charity. Hence the faithful are to be exhorted to elicit such acts of gratitude and love toward Christ.

Therefore divine goodness is the motive on account of which we love God by charity; the same goodness is also the motive why we love ourselves and our neighbors, namely because divine goodness shines forth in us and in our neighbor, insofar as a) the image of God shines in all of us, b) Christ died for all of us, c) insofar as we have all been called to the same beatitude. Hence it is said: "If we love one another, God remains in us, and His charity is perfected in us.... And this commandment we have from God, that he who loves God should love his brother also."²⁹ Therefore there is one and the same charity by which we love God, neighbor, and ourselves, because, namely, there is one and the same formal motive. But if someone loves his neighbor from another motive, e.g. on account of benefits received, on account of his excellent qualities (whether natural or supernatural), insofar as they are his perfections, it is not the love of charity. Nor does it matter that perhaps they are supernatural qualities infused by God, because supernaturality there stands only materially. Yet if those perfections are considered as participations of divine perfection and the beginning of eternal beatitude, they can be loved with the love of charity. Thus at least the more common and truer opinion, against Vasquez, Lessius, De Coninck, Herincx, who think that in this case there is a certain love inferior to charity, although perhaps supernatural.³⁰

²⁶ Della carità o amor di Dio, Rome 1788.

²⁷ Opus theol. mor. II, de carit. n. 68 sqq.

²⁸ Cf. Cajetan, Banez, Sylvius on 2, 2, q. 23, a. 4.

²⁹ 1 Jo. 4, 12 et 21.

³⁰ Cf. Bouquillon, De virt. theol. l. 3, n. 411; Billuart, De car. diss. 1, a. 3, §2.

n. 555.

555. Corollary. From the definition thus far explained it follows: a) that charity is perfect love of benevolence, and b) that it is love of friendship.

a) Charity is love of benevolence, because its motive is the goodness of God as it is in itself; and by charity we love God on account of Himself and not on account of our utility. Certainly even in perfect charity love of concupiscence can be present, but it ought not be the last end. In the love of God man usually begins from love of concupiscence and proceeds all the way to love of benevolence. For in all his acts man necessarily seeks his own beatitude; but when he sees that this beatitude consists in nothing else except conjunction with God, from there he seeks God. But indeed, when he has begun to cultivate God on the occasion of his own necessity, by frequently thinking, reading, praying, obeying, by a certain familiarity of this kind God gradually becomes known and consequently also becomes sweet; and thus, having experienced how sweet the Lord is, man passes over to loving God on account of Himself, i.e. with pure love of benevolence.³¹

Love of benevolence includes three acts, namely, 1. joy concerning the divine goods, 2. desire of increasing them, insofar as this is possible to man, 3. exterior zeal of promoting the glory of God.

Love of benevolence causes joy or complacency concerning the goods which God possesses. Hence Christ says to the Apostles: "If you loved Me, you would indeed rejoice, because I go to the Father";³² and St. Augustine is said to have exclaimed most beautifully: "Lord God, I love Thee in such a way that, if I were God and Thou Augustine, I would wish to be Augustine, so that Thou mightest be God." Thus St. Francis de Sales relates,³³ who himself also prayed: "I rejoice more concerning Thy infinite perfections, O Lord, than if those same perfections were mine; I rejoice that nothing in the world can take them away from Thee or diminish them." From joy and complacency concerning the divine perfections, man is induced to the praise of God: "Glory to God in the highest." ... "We praise Thee, we bless Thee, we glorify Thee." ... "We praise Thee, O God, we confess Thee as Lord."
Desire, as it is an act of benevolence toward God, ardently intends to promote the glory of God everywhere. Hence the sincere lover of God wills and prays that all men may grow in the knowledge and love of God. "Let the peoples confess Thee, O God, let all the peoples confess Thee";³⁴ and: "Bless the Lord, all ye works of the Lord."³⁵ "Hallowed be Thy name, Thy kingdom come."³⁶ - This desire also produces sadness concerning sins and offenses committed against God; it causes filial fear, lest we be separated from God loved above all things.
Zeal for promoting the glory of God arises when love does not stand in affection alone, but also works exteriorly; this indeed happens in two ways: a) when someone, according to Christian prudence, tries with his powers to repel those things which are against the honor or will of God, as mortal sins are in the first place;³⁷ b) when someone positively promotes the honor of God, e.g. in his own exemplary life; by observing the commandments of God most perfectly according to that: "He who has My commandments and keeps them, he it is who loves Me";³⁸ by promoting in other men the exercises of religion and of the virtues.

³¹ Cf. St. Bernard, Ep. 11, n. 8 (Migne, Patr. lat. 182, 113-114).

³² Jo. 14, 28.

³³ Traité de l'amour de Dieu l. 5, c. 6. Cf. Ribadeneira, Vita S. Aug. at the end.

³⁴ Ps. 66, 4.

³⁵ Dan. 3, 57.

³⁶ Matth. 6, 9; Luc. 11, 2.

³⁷ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 28, a. 4.

³⁸ Jo. 14, 21.

n. 556.

556. b) Friendship, as was said above, n. 551, implies three things, namely, that it is love of benevolence, that it is mutual love, and that some communication of goods intervenes between those loving. But these three things are found in true charity, whence St. Thomas aptly teaches that charity is true friendship (Freundschaftsliebe). For without doubt God loves men with love of benevolence, since He has given us the most precious goods, without having any advantage of His own from it. "For God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son."³⁹ That the love of charity is mutual and known as such is clear of itself; for God knows this love and man knows it. But that some communication arises from this mutual love⁴⁰ Sacred Scripture manifestly indicates: "Through whom He has given us the greatest and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature."⁴¹ Therefore man having sanctifying grace and charity participates in the divine nature and beatitude, just as iron placed into fire participates in the nature and force of fire. Since these things are so, the just man truly is and is named a friend of God. "You are My friends, if you do the things which I command you";⁴² and: "Thy friends, O God, have been made exceedingly honorable."⁴³ - This love of friendship extends itself not only to God, but on account of God also reaches to all those who either are already sharers of beatitude or at least are capable of it. The reason is that, as was said above, God and neighbor are loved by the same charity.

³⁹ Jo. 3, 16.

⁴⁰ Another communication (which is called koinonia by Aristotle), namely, a certain likeness between those loving, is the foundation of friendship; but another communication, namely, of goods, is the effect of friendship.

⁴¹ 2 Petr. 1, 4.

⁴² Jo. 15, 14.

⁴³ Ps. 138, 17. The Hebrew text differs greatly from the text which the Vulgate and the Septuagint have.

n. 557.

557. The properties of charity are three: for charity ought to be 1. supernatural, 2. efficacious, 3. appretiatively supreme.

That charity is supernatural is clear of itself; for it is an infused virtue and necessarily joined with sanctifying grace. Therefore its principle is supernatural. Moreover, both its formal object which and its formal object by which are supernatural, as appears from what was said above.
Charity ought to be efficacious. Therefore a mere affection of charity, or affective charity, does not suffice, as the Quietists wished. For this reason we are admonished: "Let us not love in word nor with the tongue, but in deed and in truth";⁴⁴ and Christ says: "He who has My commandments and keeps them, he it is who loves Me."⁴⁵ But St. Gregory⁴⁶ briefly asserts: "The proof of love is the showing forth of work."
Charity ought to be appretiatively supreme, i.e. we ought to esteem God more highly than every creature, so that we are prepared rather to lose the whole world than the friendship of God through sin. In this sense we commonly say that we love God above all things. Hence it is commanded: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God from thy whole heart, and in thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind";⁴⁷ and "He who loves father or mother more than Me is not worthy of Me; and he who loves son or daughter above Me is not worthy of Me."⁴⁸ But the intrinsic reason is that it is an atrocious injury to put infinite God after any creature. - But it does not belong to the essence of charity that God be loved intensively or sensibly in the highest degree. For the intensity of the will and the sensation of love proceed not so much from the dignity of the object as from its vivid perception and proximity. But many created objects are perceived by us as more proximate and are felt more vividly by us than God. Therefore, e.g., a man does not sin who feels a more vivid love toward parents, friends, etc., than toward God; provided, however, that he is always prepared to lose all things rather than the friendship of God.

Degrees of charity. Although charity ought to be appretiatively supreme, nevertheless it admits degrees: the first degree is when God is loved in such a way that man, on account of no creature, wills to lose friendship with God through mortal sin. Then man is engaged in the so-called purgative way, by which he strenuously resists disordered concupiscence drawing him to mortal sin. - The second degree exists when man, on account of no creature, wills not only not to lose but not even to diminish friendship with God, which would happen through venial sin. It is the illuminative way, in which man, through diligent exercise of the virtues, is strengthened and perfected in grace. The third and highest degree of charity has been obtained when man loves God in such a way that he avoids even all voluntary imperfections on account of the love of God, with whom he is intimately united. Then in any act whatsoever man chooses that which he thinks will please God more. It is the unitive way, by which man lives in sweet union with God. The first degree belongs to beginners, the second to the proficient, the third to the perfect.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ 1 Jo. 3, 18.

⁴⁵ Jo. 14, 21.

⁴⁶ Hom. in Evang. l. 2, hom. 30 (Migne, Patr. lat. 176, 1220).

⁴⁷ Matth. 22, 37; cf. Deut. 6, 5.

⁴⁸ Matth. 10, 37.

⁴⁹ St. Thomas explains these three degrees of charity somewhat differently (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 24, a. 9).

n. 558.

558. The efficacy of charity follows from its very nature. For since charity is true friendship with God, it cannot be together with mortal sin, since mortal sin is a direct turning away from God and therefore true enmity with God. Therefore an act of true charity destroys mortal sin and justifies the sinner. The third degree of charity is not required, but the first suffices. Therefore such an act of charity is not as difficult as is asserted by some authors. But since Christ in the New Testament instituted the sacrament of baptism and of penance for the justification of the sinner, it is required that the sinner eliciting, with divine help, an act of charity have at least an implicit vow of receiving the sacraments. - An act of true charity is the dispositive cause; but the formal and at the same time efficient cause of our justification is sanctifying grace.

There are some older authors teaching that even the love of noble concupiscence, namely, of supernatural beatitude, suffices for obtaining justification. This opinion, taken in its obvious sense, must be rejected and has no solid foundation. But if, under the love of beatitude, there is understood the love by which we vehemently desire to be united to God, that love is true friendship and charity, and suffices that we be proximately disposed to justification. In this sense St. Paul elicited an act of perfect charity, saying: "For to me, to live is Christ and to die is gain, ... having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ."⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Phil. 1, 21, 23.

n. 559.

559. Scholion 1. On the excellence of charity. According to Protestants, faith, i.e. confidence, is the most excellent virtue, because it causes justification. But according to Catholic doctrine, charity is simply the most excellent virtue,^50a and the precept of charity is the first and greatest commandment. Hence St. Paul says: "But now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity."⁵¹ But the intrinsic reason for this excellence is that, among the virtues, that one is more powerful which more attains God. But charity attains God much more intimately than any other virtue. Certainly faith and hope also directly attain God, from whom knowledge of supernatural mysteries and the attainment of beatitude come to us; but not as perfectly as charity, which "attains God so as to stand in Him, not so that something may come forth from Him to us."⁵² Charity is more perfect not only than all the other virtues but also than the gifts and fruits of the Holy Spirit. For through charity man is, as it were, essentially united with the Holy Spirit; but through the gifts he is only made apt to be moved well by the Holy Spirit.⁵³ - The preeminence of charity also appears from its effects: 1. Charity alone remits mortal sins by disposing immediately for justification, when the sacraments of the dead cannot actually be received. 2. Charity alone constitutes true friendship between God and man, as was said above. 3. Charity alone is the form of all the other virtues; and therefore faith and hope lacking charity are expressly called unformed virtues. A few things must be explained about this quality of charity.

Scholion 2. On charity as the form of all virtues. Charity is not the form of being of all virtues, as though it constituted the essence of each virtue;^53a for every virtue has its own essence distinct from the essence of charity. Scholastics usually call the vital principle the form of a thing. But since all virtues without charity are dead and are not able to do anything meritorious of eternal life, while on the contrary, when charity is added, they become living, so that their works are meritorious of eternal life, charity is deservedly called the vivifying principle and the form of the other virtues. But the remaining virtues without charity are so imperfect and weak that they cannot render a man simply virtuous and good; on the contrary, together with charity sanctifying grace is infused with all the other virtues, so that man becomes simply good and virtuous. - The Scholastics called charity the form of all virtues under a threefold respect:

Because it commands or orders the acts of all the virtues and strongly and at the same time sweetly excites them to most perfect acts. In this sense St. Paul says: "Charity is patient, is kind, ... bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things."⁵⁴
Because all the virtues ought to tend into that which is the proper object of charity, namely, into union with God. Hence St. Thomas says: "Charity can be called the exemplar form of the virtues, not according to whose likeness the virtues are generated, but insofar as they operate in some way according to its likeness."⁵⁵
Because only from the influence of charity, whether actual or virtual, are the acts of the other virtues meritorious. But concerning the quality of this influence theologians do not agree. Some, e.g. Vasquez,⁵⁶ teach that habitual charity and the habitual influence of charity suffice, so that all honest works of a just man are meritorious; others, namely, the Jansenists and certain older Louvain theologians, thought that the actual influence of charity was necessary in any act whatsoever, which otherwise would not be meritorious. Finally others, namely, the greater part of the Thomists and many others, teach that some virtual influence of charity is required and suffices for rendering truly meritorious each honest work done in the state of sanctifying grace. This last opinion seems better, since it is defended by St. Thomas and more conformable to reason. The Angelic Doctor says: "Merit of eternal life pertains first to charity, but to the other virtues according as their acts are commanded by charity";⁵⁷ and: "Prayer, like any other act of virtue, has efficacy of meriting insofar as it proceeds from the root of charity."⁵⁸ - But the intrinsic reason is that we merit the last end, namely, perfect union with God, through that by which we tend into God. But by charity alone we tend to perfect union with God. Therefore charity, at least virtual, is necessary in all our meritorious acts, and habitual charity does not suffice.⁵⁹

In practice this virtual influence of charity is easily present in all the acts of a just man. For "when someone orders himself to God as to an end in all things which he does on account of himself, the intention of the last end, which is God, remains virtually; hence he can merit in all things if he has charity."⁶⁰ Nevertheless the faithful are to be exhorted that they also more often actually refer their acts to the end of charity, namely, to God. For thus charity becomes more fervent; but on the fervor of charity depends the quantity of merit; and therefore the widow's small coin merited more than the treasures of the rich.

^50a St. Francis de Sales beautifully asserts: "La charité est entre les vertus comme le soleil entre les estoiles" (Traité de l'amour de Dieu l. 11, c. 9).

⁵¹ 1 Cor. 13, 13.

⁵² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 23, a. 6.

⁵³ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 68, a. 8.

^53a Ib. 2, 2, q. 23, a. 8 ad 1.

⁵⁴ 1 Cor. 13, 4 sqq.

⁵⁵ Quaest. disp. de carit. a. 3 ad 6.

⁵⁶ In 1, 2, disp. 217. In our times Ioan. Ernst proposed the same opinion in the little work Über die Notwendigkeit der guten Meinung, Freiburg, Herder, 1905. Likewise Chr. Pesch, Praelect. dogm. VIII, n. 639.

⁵⁷ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 114, a. 4.

⁵⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 83, a. 15.

⁵⁹ Cf. Billuart, De gratia diss. 8, a. 4; de carit. diss. 4, a. 8.

⁶⁰ St. Thomas, Quaest. disp. de carit. a. 11 ad 2.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 156 passages

Vol. I, Special Moral Theology, Treatise: On Divine Charity

INTRODUCTION

S. Th. I-II, qq. 26-28; I, q. 60; III Sent., d. 27, q. 1; C. G. IV, 19; Quodl. I, a. 8.

842. Charity according to the name. - The Latin word charitas is derived either from the Greek word charis, that is, grace, benevolence; or from the Latin word carum, that is, what is of great price. Each sense nearly falls back into the same thing, for one who is loved benevolently is generally esteemed of great price, and he who is held to be of great price is easily loved benevolently. Hence:

Charity originally and primarily signifies a gratuitous, liberal, honorable, benevolent, excellent love toward someone who is highly esteemed.

For although love, dilection, charity, and friendship in a certain sense pertain to the same thing, because they are the appetite of good, nevertheless in the proper and strict sense they are diverse: love and dilection properly signify an act; friendship is as it were a habit¹ or state; charity is said of both. Moreover, love is the most general term: for it signifies either a passion of the sensitive concupiscible appetite, or an act of the will; dilection adds, beyond love, a preceding election by which it happens that one thing is loved before another, whence it is an act of the will alone; charity adds, beyond dilection, some perfection of love, insofar as that which is loved by charity is esteemed of great price and is loved from benevolence. Finally friendship adds, beyond benevolence, mutual dilection or love in return: for it is mutual benevolence, founded upon a certain communication (Eth. VIII, 2; I-II, q. 26, a. 3). Hence St. Thomas says: "friendship is the most perfect among those things which pertain to love" (III Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 1).

¹ For human friendship is not a virtue but something consequent upon virtue. Q. D. de Virt. 2, a. 2, ad 8.

From the use of speech, however, charity is taken in a stricter sense, and is an eminent love of special friendship, whether natural or supernatural.

But in theological speech and in the strictest sense, only supernatural and divine friendship is called charity, as being more precious than all the others, esteeming God above all other things. Hence St. Thomas says: "friendship toward God is more precious and dear than all" (ibid., ad 7).

The aforesaid senses are handed down in Sacred Scripture: 1. charity is said of the uncreated love of God himself, a) by which he loves us (I Jn. IV, 8), indeed also b) the love of benevolence toward sinners who do not love him (Jer. XXXI, 3; Eph. II, 4); 2. natural friendship among men (II Mach. XIV, 26); 3. the love of supernatural friendship, namely, both a) the act by which we love God on account of himself and therefore our neighbor on account of God (Col. III, 14; Rom. XII, 10); and b) the habit of supernatural friendship toward God (I Cor. XIII, 13).

843. Charity is love. - Love is the coaptation of affection to the beloved good; under this respect knowledge and love differ: for a thing, through knowledge, is in a certain way drawn to the knower, because the agent intellect (by active virtue) acts upon the thing and takes and transforms the thing into itself; on the contrary, through love the lover is drawn to the beloved itself, because the thing acts upon the appetite and transforms the appetite (a passive virtue) into itself (I-II, q. 22, a. 2). Namely, affection or appetite is in some way informed and changed by the apprehended good, - is adapted, conformed, and assimilated to it, - is transformed into it, - and is united to it, one with it; and therefore it adheres to it as fixed in it, and rests in it and is complacent in it because it is fitting to itself; and as a weight it is inclined and tends toward it. Namely, it is the principle and beginning of tendency toward the good, and thus love differs from desire and joy: from desire, which is the movement or perfect tendency toward attaining the good, proceeding from the inclination of love; also from joy, which is rest in a good already possessed, because the complacency of love is completed by possession of the beloved.1 - Love is as it were a weight tending toward the beloved; desire is the weight already falling; joy is the rest of the weight in its proper place, namely, in the real possession and presence of the term.

But a threefold love is found in man. For, as St. Thomas says, I-II, q. 26, a. 1: Love is something pertaining to appetite, since the object of each is good; whence according to the difference of appetite there is a difference of love. For there is:

A certain appetite not following the apprehension of the one appetizing himself, but of another; and this kind is called natural appetite: for natural things desire what is fitting to them according to their nature, not through their own apprehension, but through the apprehension of the one instituting nature.

But another is an appetite following the apprehension of the one appetizing himself, yet from necessity, not from free judgment; and such is the sensitive appetite in brute animals, which nevertheless in men participates in some freedom, insofar as it obeys reason.

But another is an appetite following the apprehension of the one appetizing according to free judgment; and such is the rational or intellective appetite, which is called the will.

Moreover, in each of these appetites, love is called that which is the principle of the movement tending toward the beloved end:

a) But in the natural appetite the principle of this kind of movement is the connaturality of the one appetizing to that toward which it tends, which can be called natural love: just as the very connaturality of a heavy body to the middle place is through gravity and can be called natural love. Such natural love is in all the powers of the soul, and even in all parts of the body, and universally in all things, since each thing has connaturality to that which is fitting to it according to its nature.

b) Similarly, the coaptation of the sensitive appetite to some sensible good and the complacency of the sensitive appetite in a good apprehended sensibly is called sensible or sensitive love, which is concerned with qualities which please the senses and which are trifling and mutable, whence the love which arises from this is vain and inconstant.

c) Finally, the coaptation of the will to some intelligible good and the complacency of the will in a good apprehended by the intellect is called rational love, which arises from intellectual and moral endowments, such as perspicacity or promptness of mind, rectitude of judgment, wisdom, knowledge, prudence, benignity, fortitude and other virtues, nobility of soul, etc. This love is worthy of man, as being founded upon truly human qualities; and it is more constant, as relying on endowments which are less mutable and more stable.

All these things are taken from St. Thomas. Thus, for example, in I-II, q. 26, a. 2: "Passion is the effect of the agent in the patient. But the natural agent induces a double effect in the patient, for first indeed it gives form, secondly it gives motion consequent upon the form.... Thus also the appetible itself first gives to the appetite a certain coaptation to itself, which is a certain complacency of the appetible, from which follows movement toward the appetible.... For the appetible moves the appetite, making in it in some way its intention, and the appetite tends toward the appetible to be really attained, so that the end may be where the principle was. Therefore the first change of the appetite by the appetible is called love, which is nothing other than the complacency of the appetible; and from this complacency follows movement toward the appetible, which is desire; and finally rest, which is joy. Thus therefore, since love consists in a certain change of the appetite by the appetible, it is manifest that love is a passion, properly indeed according as it is in the concupiscible power, but commonly and by an extended name according as it is in the will." And in III Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 1: "Love pertains to appetite; but appetite is a passive power.... But every passive thing is perfected according as it is informed by the form of its active thing, and in this its movement is terminated and rests.... When affection or appetite is altogether imbued with the form of the good which is its object, it is complacent to itself in it and adheres to it as fixed in it; and then it is said to love it. Whence love is nothing other than a certain transformation of the affection into the thing loved. And because everything which is made the form of something is made one with it, therefore through love the lover becomes one with the beloved, which has been made the form of the lover, and therefore the Philosopher says that a friend is another self; and I Cor. VI, 17: He who adheres to God is one spirit. But each thing acts according to the exigency of its form, which is the principle of acting and the rule of the work. But the good is the end; the end, however, is the principle in operable things.... Whence... the lover, whose affection is informed by the good itself which has the aspect of end... is inclined through love to operating according to the exigency of the beloved." Summarily, in a. 3, ad 2: "Love makes the beloved fitting and connatural to the lover, insofar as it unites the affection of the lover to the beloved...," and a. 1, ad 2: "it is the union itself or bond or transformation by which the lover is transformed into the beloved and in some way converted into it." Cf. I-II, q. 28, aa. 1 and 2; q. 26, a. 2, ad 2.

844. Charity is benevolent love. - For there is a twofold rational love or love of election, namely, of concupiscence or desire, and of benevolence or friendship.1

In the former mode we love something (a thing or person) for our own advantage and utility, namely, on account of ourselves as a good to us or so that good may come to us from it. In the latter we love someone on account of himself, and therefore we will good to him as a good to him or so that good may come to him. To love a horse on account of utility, or food on account of delight, is of concupiscence: for no one has proper benevolence toward a horse or food; and similarly to love a man on account of utility or delight, for example, a master on account of wages. On the contrary, the love of a friend toward a friend or of a mother toward a son is of benevolence.

These differ in many ways:

By reason of the end for whom: for by love of concupiscence we love something on account of ourselves, so that it may be well for us; by love of benevolence we love someone on account of himself, so that it may be well for him.

By reason of the end which (the material object): love of concupiscence intends one's own advantage, namely, the proper good of the lover; love of benevolence, the good of another, namely, the good of the beloved himself.

By reason of the proximate motive (the formal object): by love of concupiscence we love something because it is good to us, insofar as good comes to us from it, so that the love does not rest in the beloved but returns to the lover; by love of benevolence we love someone because he is good in himself, so that the love rests in the person of the beloved because he has in himself the perfection by which he is lovable in himself.

That twofold love: a) relates as perfect and imperfect: the love of benevolence by which we love someone according to himself (as a good in himself), so that it may be well for him, is love in the full and proper sense; but the love of concupiscence by which we love something only on account of ourselves so that it may be a good to us, is love in an imperfect and analogical sense:² for we do not love it on account of itself but only as a good to us, insofar as we love ourselves so that that good may come to us. Hence:

² Benevolence is the principle of friendship, Eth. IX, c. 5.

b) they are always joined in some sense and subordinated to one another: for it is impossible that we covet something unless we will it to someone benevolently and loved on account of himself, and thus in the love of concupiscence by which we wish something for ourselves we also love ourselves benevolently - and vice versa, it is impossible that we love someone benevolently unless we covet some good for him;

c) nevertheless, love of concupiscence and benevolence differ morally: in the love of concupiscence by which we wish some good for ourselves, we also love ourselves benevolently; but because this benevolence is necessary and natural, it is not attended to in moral science, which judges moral and free human acts, and therefore this love is simply called of concupiscence; - on the contrary, in the love of benevolence by which we love someone on account of himself, we also covet and desire goods for him as for ourselves, but because this proceeds from the same benevolent motive, this love is simply called of benevolence.

And thus considered, love of concupiscence and benevolence are distinguished in moral species, according as they principally tend toward this or that proper good of the lover, or toward the good of another loved in himself. For our acts have their species from diverse objects or motives distinct from us.

"Just as a good... simply is that which has goodness itself, but what is a good of another is a good in a qualified sense; and consequently the love by which something is loved so that it may have good is love simply, but the love by which something is loved so that it may be the good of another is love in a qualified sense" (I-II, q. 26, a. 4). Hence Aristotle says, Eth. VIII, c. 3, that useful and delightful friendship are friendship per accidens, according to similitude and analogy, but not properly so called; and St. Thomas, q. 26, a. 4, ad 3: "because the good" (which someone wills to a friend) "is referred further to his own delight and utility, thence it is that useful and delightful friendship, insofar as it is drawn to love of concupiscence, falls short of the nature of friendship." Cf. q. 27, a. 3; Q. D. de Virt. 4, a. 3; in Jn. XV, lect. 4.

n. 845.

845. Charity is love of friendship. - Moreover friendship is: a) mutual benevolence or love in return, whence it is said: a friend is a friend to a friend (Eth. VIII); b) mutually known or manifested, for otherwise dilection would be mutual per accidens and would not be true love in return or dilection of another insofar as he too loves; whence it is said: friendship is love in return not hidden (Eth. IV); c) stable and therefore founded upon communication, that is, community of the same goods, in the fellowship of the same life and of one intimate society, so that among friends there is a certain equality, from which by parity they can use familiar commerce, live together amicably in the same life, and enjoy the same happiness. Hence it is said: friendship either finds equals or makes them.

n. 845.

Scripture speaks excellently about friendship, Eccli. VI, 14-16: "A faithful friend is a strong protection; but he who finds him finds a treasure; for a faithful friend there is no comparison, and the weighing of gold and silver is not worthy against the goodness of his fidelity; a faithful friend is a medicine of life and immortality."

n. 846.

846. The remote foundation of every love and the condition on the part of the subject is the necessary and natural love of oneself: because we love ourselves benevolently and will supreme perfection or happiness for ourselves, therefore by love of concupiscence we will for ourselves this or that good as something which pertains to our happiness; and by love of benevolence we love others as ourselves and will good to them as to ourselves (q. 27, a. 3).

n. 846.

The proximate foundation of benevolence is some community of goods: for the similitude of the lover with the beloved makes the lover love the beloved as another self, and love good for him as for himself.³ - The proximate foundation of friendship is similitude even to equality, at least of proportion, arisen from communion in the same goods, namely, communication of one's own goodness, association in the same life, or at least destination or aptitude for the same life.⁴

³ In love of another, man imitates love of himself: just as unity in substance with ourselves is the foundation of love toward ourselves, so union in form or similitude with others is the foundation of love toward them. Cf. I-II, q. 26, a. 2, ad 2; q. 27, a. 3; q. 28, a. 1, ad 2.

⁴ Thus conformably to St. Thomas, in III Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. 3; and d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4; and II-II, q. 25, a. 3.

n. 846.

For experience shows: a) friendship naturally arises among those who lead the same life, but does not arise among those who are greatly distant; b) according to diverse communion of life, friendship is diverse: thus natural friendship is founded upon the communication of natural life through generation; domestic, civil, or military friendship is founded upon communion in the same domestic, civil, or military life, etc.; and the more excellent the goods of some life are, the more excellent the friendship is; c) where the union in the same life is greatest, friendship is greatest, as is clear from the union of husband and wife.⁵

⁵ Communication of goods is not to be taken in the active sense for benefits mutually conferred: this is an effect of friendship, not the foundation. This can be necessary so that community of life may be present, but that is per accidens; it can also preserve and foster friendship. Thus according to the mind of Aristotle, and in this sense the definition is to be understood, as borrowed from him.

n. 847.

847. The remote foundation of every love and the condition on the part of the object is its goodness known as such, that is, insofar as it is proposed as proportioned to us: for it is impossible that someone love that which does not seem good or fitting to him; hence also naturally we love someone first by love of concupiscence insofar as he is our good, than by love of benevolence or friendship (q. 27, aa. 1 and 2).

n. 847.

The foundation or proximate motive, that is, the formal object according to which concupiscence, benevolence, and friendship differ, is that goodness considered in a diverse mode: for the motive of the love of concupiscence is the relative goodness of the thing, precisely as it is good to someone, because apt for perfecting and beatifying him; the motive of the love of benevolence is the absolute goodness of the person in himself, or his perfection, by which he is not only good to the one loving, but also good and lovable in himself; finally, the motive of friendship is the same goodness of the person in himself, but which we have in common with him, and on account of which we are also loved by him.

848. The chief effects of love, according to St. Thomas, are union or mutual inherence, ecstasy, zeal, universal influence upon the activity of the agent and subordination of actions to the beloved object, and wounding (q. 28).

Union, for any love tends to join lovers and from two or more to make one morally, according to that: And of the multitude of believers there was one heart and one soul (Acts IV, 32). It effects a double union: a) one affective, by force of which friends endeavor to will the same things and not will the same things, and the lover is in the beloved as reckoning the goods and will of the friend as his own, and conversely the beloved is in the lover because he loves him as himself. Thus it is read in Scripture (I Kings XVIII, 1): "The soul of Jonathan was glued to the soul of David, and Jonathan loved him as his own soul." Love causes this union formally; - b) another real, which consists in the presence and possession of the beloved; this union love makes effectively. This, however, although desired by lovers, is sometimes impeded or delayed by obstacles.

Ecstasy (ek-stasis, departure), by which the lover is as it were placed outside himself; this happens by a double act of intellect and will: a) according to the intellect, the lover, forgetful of himself, frequently thinks of the beloved, and love makes this ecstasy dispositively, insofar namely as it makes one meditate upon the beloved; but intense meditation on one thing abstracts from others; - b) according to affection he is carried outside himself: through the love of concupiscence, not content concerning the good which he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside himself; through the love of friendship, he does not act for himself alone, but wills and works good for the friend, as if carrying care and providence for him on account of the friend himself, not as to his own good but toward the good of the beloved, and love makes this ecstasy directly. Wherefore it is of the greatest moment to love only honorable and holy things, since the lover as it were goes out from himself and is made similar to the beloved.⁶

⁶ Mystical ecstasy is nothing other than the connatural redundancy of the state of the soul and of the higher faculties into the lower faculties and the body, by which namely the higher faculties so altogether inhere in God that the internal senses, or even the external, indeed also the corporeal faculties, are impeded, suspended, or totally bound, and the body preserves the state. Yet God also preternaturally can produce such an external state in those who have not yet arrived at the aforesaid grades of mystical life. - Rapture is nothing other than ecstasy which snatches by a sudden impulse.

Zeal, which comes from the intensity of love: for the more vehemently we tend toward something, the more strongly we repel whatever is opposed to this propensity. Thus, in the love of concupiscence, he who intensely covets something is by that very fact borne against everything which stands in the way of its attainment or quiet enjoyment; and in this way husbands are said to be zealous for their wives. In the love of friendship, he who sincerely wills the good of a friend is by that very fact vehemently moved against everything which is repugnant to his good; and according to this someone is said to be zealous for a friend, or also for God, when he tries according to his power to repel those things which are against the good of a friend, or against the honor or will of God. Whence Ps. LXVIII, 10: "Zeal for thy house has eaten me." (Cf. III Kings XIX, 14).